

Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, and Akalaṅka

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0. The two main branches of Jainism, the Digambaras and Śvetambaras of Jainism, are generally believed to have no discrepancies in the philosophical issues. In fact, they have only slightly changed their doctrine in their long history of more than 2500 years. Both schools, for example, have the highly developed karma theories which are not essentially different from each other. Their philosophical views seem to have remained monolithic through the ages. This observation is also true when we study the Jaina ideas of logic and epistemology as a whole. The Śvetambaras as well as the Digambaras classify *pramāṇas* into two sub-divisions: *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.

But when it comes to the details, we come across different views between the two branches. The Śvetambaras admit the authority of the canons written in *Ardhamāgadhī*, while the Digambaras deny it, saying that the old canons vanished in ancient times. Moreover, the latter does not admit that women can attain the final liberation, while the former proclaims that even a woman can annihilate karmas completely to liberate herself. Thus, there is a female tīrthaṅkara or savior in the Śvetambara tradition. According to the Digambaras, however, all the tīrthaṅkaras are male. In addition, the two branches have a difference of opinion as to whether or not a kevalin, or omniscient person, feels hungry. These discrepancies noted by many scholars are well-accepted. About epistemological differences, we have so far very little information. In this paper some examples of such differences in Jaina *Nyāya* will be shown.

1. Akalaṅka, Digambara philosopher in the eighth century, has written many independent philosophical works such as *Siddhiviniścaya* and *Nyāyaviniścaya*. Among them, *Pramāṇa-saṃgraha* with *Vṛtti*¹ is regarded as his last and most mature work of his career. As the title suggests, it is a compendium of *pramāṇas* containing about ninety verses in nine chapters. In the sixth chapter which discusses the way of debate (*vāda*), Akalaṅka refers to three kinds of *hetvābhāsas* mentioning three Jaina philosophers by name. It reads:

*asiddha[h] siddhasenasya viruddho devanandī-
naḥ / dvedhā samantabhadrasya sattvādir
acalātmani // v. 56 //*²

When we try to establish the reality of *ātman* (which does not change at all) by means of a *hetu*, such as *sattva* or existence, that *hetu* is regarded as *asiddha* by Siddhasena and *viruddha* by Devanandin while Samantabhadra regards it as both.

This verse and Akalaṅka's own commenary are difficult to fully understand.³ Fortunately Akalaṅka writes a similar verse in the sixth chapter of *Siddhiviniścaya* which deals with the characters of correct *hetus*. The verse reads as follows:

¹ Published as a part of *Akalaṅka Granthatrāya*, ed. by M. K. Jain as *Siṃghī Jaina Granthamālā*, no.12. Ahmedabad-Calcutta 1939.

² The letter enclosed in brackets is added by the editor.

³ According to the editor of *Siddhiviniścaya*, Anantavīrya is said to have written a sub-commentary on Akalaṅka's auto-commentary, which is not available to us. For details, see *Siddhiviniścaya* vol. 1 (Kāśī 1959), Hindī introduction, p. 60.

asiddhaḥ siddhasenasya viruddho devanandinah / dvedhā samantabhadrasya hetur ekāntasādhane // v. 21 //

Akalaṅka explains this verse in his own commentary as follows:

If we try to establish the reality of a thing which is regarded as having absolute nature, attributes of a real thing, such as existence (*sattva*), when used as *hetu*, are *asiddha* because absolutism of momentariness as well as permanence can never be established. Alternatively the attributes must be *viruddha* because they establish that otherwise-not-understandableness (*anyathānupapatti*) proves non-absoluteness of a thing. Moreover if those who have not ascertained the meaning of the truth try to prove the momentariness etc. by means of a *hetu*, such as existence, then that *hetu* would be *anaikāntika* because it exists in both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. (*sattvāder vastudharmasya asiddhatvaṃ sākalyena kṣaṇiketa-raikāntayor asiddheḥ / anyathānupapatter anekāntasāadhanād viruddhatvaṃ / anaikāntikatvaṃ punaḥ sattvādeḥ kṣaṇakṣayādisādhane asamikṣitatattvārthaiḥ lokapratītiṃ pramāṇam āsṛitya tathā hetur ubhayatra vartate svapakṣavipakṣayoḥ, . . .*)⁴

Here Akalaṅka criticizes the ontology of other schools, such as momentariness or eternalism, and refers to three kinds of *hetvābhāsas*. The relationship, however, among the three Jaina philosophers and the *hetvābhāsas* remains unexplained. What we can infer from Akalaṅka's statement is that Siddhasena, Devanandin, and Samantabhadra seem to have different opinions on *hetu* and *hetvābhāsa*.

⁴ *Siddhiviniścaya* vol. 2 (Kāsi 1959), p. 404. To understand the auto-commentary clearly, we have to consult Anantavīrya's commentary in *Siddhiviniścaya* vol. 2, p. 404.

2. As far as we know, the verse is quoted, with some modifications, by three Jaina philosophers: Vādirāja in his *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa*,⁵ Vādidevasūri in his *Syādvāratnākara*,⁶ and Śāntisūri in his *Nyāyāvatāravārtika-vṛtti*.⁷ And the last two explain its meaning in some length, so does Anantavīrya in his *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* when he comments upon Akalaṅka's verse quoted above. Hereafter, with the help of these three commentaries, we shall attempt to find out the differences in the opinions among Samantabhadra and the others.

2.1. In order to explain the meaning of the verse, Anantavīrya quotes a verse from Siddhasena's *Sammati-tarka / -suttaṃ / -prakaraṇa*.

*je samtavāyadose sakkolūyā bhaṇaṃti samkhāṇaṃ / samkhā ya asavvāe tesim savve vi te saccā // III-50 //*⁸

The Buddhists as well as the Vaiśeṣikas point out the fault in the theory of evolution (*samtavāya*, Skt. *sadvāda*) of the Sāṃkhya. In turn the Sāṃkhya also do that to their theory of creation (*asavvāa*, Skt. *asadvāda*). All of them remain true.⁹

Only with the help of this verse we cannot understand why the *hetu* is regarded as *asiddha* in Siddhasena's opinion. In this connection we shall consider the statements of a Digambara philosopher Māṇikyanandin. To illustrate the *sandigdhasiddha hetvābhāsa*, Māṇikyanandin declares, in his work called *Parīkṣamukha*, as follows:

⁵ *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* vol. 2 (Kāsi 1954), p. 181.

⁶ *Syādvādaratnākara* vol. 2 (Delhi 1988), p. 1032.

⁷ *Nyāyāvatāravārtika-vṛtti* (Bombay 1949), p. 107.

⁸ *Sammati-tarka* (Ahmedabad 1939; reprint, 2000), p. 124.

⁹ See *Sammati-tarka*, op.cit.

sāṃkhyam prati pariṇāmī śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt
//VI-27 // *tenājñātatvāt* // VI-28 // ¹⁰

If someone argues with the followers of the Sāṃkhya school and states that sound is perishable because it is caused, then that *hetu* is *asiddha* since the Sāṃkhya school does not accept it.

Thus it is understood that, in the Jaina tradition, any attribute used in reasoning is *asiddha* when the opponent does not admit its reality. So Akalaṅka's intention in the pāda '*asiddho siddhasenasya*' seems to be as follows:

According to Siddhasena, *sattva* etc. in the proof of the reality of a thing is *hetvābhāsa* because of the absolutism (*ekāntavāda*) of other schools. In absolutism an attribute of a thing, *kṛtakatva* or the attribute of being something that has been created, for example, admitted by the one school, say Buddhists, is not recognized by the other, i.e., the Sāṃkhyas.

Siddhasena is the first Jaina philosopher that indicated such tendencies of absolutism in other schools.¹¹ That is why Akalaṅka refers to him in connection with *asiddha*.

Here a question arises: why Anantavīrya does not refer to or quote from the *Nyāyāvatāra* which is generally regarded as a work of Siddhasena? In the *Nyāyāvatāra asiddha*, along with *viruddha* and *anaikāntika*, is clearly defined.¹² Śāntisūri, in his commentary on the *Nyāyāvatāra*, says that the Siddhasena referred to by Akalaṅka is the author of *Nyāyāvatāra*.¹³ But he does not give any reason.¹⁴ One possible answer for the ques-

¹⁰ *Parīkṣamukha* (Lucknow 1940), p. 169.

¹¹ Kundakunda also refers to the Sāṃkhya school in his *Samayasāra*, verse 366ab. He, however, does not refute the absolutism in the school.

¹² *Nyāyāvatāra* 23: *asiddhas tv apratīto yo yo 'nyathāvopapadyate / viruddho yo 'nyathāpy atra yuto 'naikāntikah* //

¹³ *Nyāyāvatāravārtika-vṛtti*, p. 107: *siddhasenasya sūtrakartuḥ sākalyenāsiddhatvāt sakala eva hetuḥ asiddhaḥ iti*.

tion may be that the Siddhasena mentioned by Akalaṅka is not the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* but that of *Sammatitarka*.¹⁵

2.2. The next philosopher to be considered is Samantabhadra. Akalaṅka says that, according to Samantabhadra, *sattva* etc. are *anaikāntika hetus* which exist both in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. To explain such an opinion, Anantavīrya quotes a verse from Samantabhadra's *Svayambhūstotra* and paraphrases it:

ye paraskhalitonnidrāḥ svadoṣe 'bhinimilinaḥ / tapasvinaḥ te kiṃ kuryur apātraṃ tvanmataśriyaḥ // ¹⁶

Those pitiable persons who are not receptacles of the glory of your doctrine cannot do anything because they shut their eyes to their own fault while they are very careful about the defects of their enemy.

'The glory of your doctrine' (*tvanmataśrī*) here means, as Anantavīrya says, the *anekāntavāda* or non-absolutism of Jaina which pervades all things.¹⁷ Samantabhadra is the first Jaina philosopher that has clearly shown the theory of *anekāntavāda* in his *Āptamīmāṃsā*. With that theory the Jainas maintain that an attribute of a thing exists as its own nature, and does not exist as the nature of another. In other words, an attribute of X exists in X as X's nature and that of Y in Y as Y's nature. Thus a *hetu* like *sattva* exists in a thing which is regarded as momentary and as well as that which is regarded as eternal. Such a *hetu* should be called *anaikāntika hetvābhāsa*.

¹⁴ In order to explain the original verse of Akalaṅka, Vālidevasūri quotes the sentence beginning with '*sarvam evaikāntavādinā*' (*Syādvādaratnākara*, op.cit.), whose source is unknown.

¹⁵ On the necessity to suppose the two different Siddhasenas, see my paper "Distinguishing two Siddhasenas" in *Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies)* 48, no. 2, 1999.

¹⁶ *Svayambhūstotra* 99. This verse is quoted in *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*, p. 406.

¹⁷ *Siddhiviniścaya*, op.cit.: *śrīḥ sarvapadārtha-*

Samantabhadra does not explicitly refer to *anaikāntika* as a *hetvābhāsa*. The following verse, however, shows that he has a good knowledge of *hetvābhāsa*.

*anarthikā sādhanasādhyadhīś ced vijñānamātrasya na hetusiddhiḥ / athārthavattvaṃ vyabhicāradoṣo na yogigamyam paravādisiddham // 18 //*¹⁸

If knowledge of probans and probandum (=inference) has no real object, then the *vijñāptimātra* could not be established by means of *hetu*. But if it had any object, then it would commit the fault of *vyabhicāra* . . .

2.3. The relationship between Devanandin and *viruddha* remains unclear. In his explanation Anantavīrya quotes a phrase from *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa: siddhir anekāntāt*.¹⁹ But he does not go into detail. If Akalaṅka refers to, with the name Devanandin, the Jaina philosopher called Pūjyapāda, then we must trace his epistemological thoughts in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*, a commentary on *Tattvārtha Sūtra* of Umāsvāti. But Pūjyapāda has no epistemological discussions in that treatise, thus naturally there is no mention of *hetvābhāsa*.

Moreover, Vālidevasūri as well as Śāntisūri reads Mallavādin instead of Devanandin.²⁰ This Mallavādin must be the author of *Nayacakra* as Śāntisūri points out.²¹ Even then the reason why he assumes that the *hetu* is *viruddha* remains unknown. Though we already have the well-edited text of *Nayacakra*,²² most of all the contents of this famous book has yet to be touched by modern scholars.

vyāpyanekāntābhidheyam.

¹⁸ *Yuktyanusāsana* (Bombay 1920), p. 45.

¹⁹ *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa* (Kāsī 1956), p. 1.

²⁰ *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 1032; *Nyāyāvatāravārtika-vṛtti*, p. 107: *asiddhaḥ siddhasenasya viruddho mallavādinah.*

²¹ *Nyāyāvatāravārtika-vṛtti*, p. 108: *mallavādinah nayacakravādhātur . . .*

²² *Nayacakra* of Mallavādin, ed. by Jambūvijaya

3. With these discussions it can be safely concluded that on the *hetvābhāsa* Samantabhadra and Siddhasena have different opinions. From a historical point of view this may show the development of the idea on the *hetvābhāsa* in Jainism: at an earlier stage Siddhasena, probably the author of *Sammati-tarka*, recognized only one type of *hetvābhāsa*, i.e., *asiddha*. Later, Samantabhadra added another kind to it, i.e., *anaikāntika*.

in three volumes. Bhavnagar 1966-1988.