

# Toward the Evolutionary Theory of the State

Yoshifumi Ueda\*

## Abstract

As a result of adaption to the First Bronze Revolution, early states emerged from the preceding kin-based communities through the intermediate stage of chiefdom. Increase in net-benefits gained by the adaption motivated chieftains to change the chiefdom system into an early state. Since, however, the early state is also one form of the society, in order to claim the legitimacy of the power it had to actualize the ultimate purposes of the society — the survival of its members. It is shown that the main synthetic propositions derived from the early state are also applicable to other forms of the states.

*Key Words:* State, Technological Revolution, Adaption, Kantian Categories

*JEL Codes:* D74, C72

## 1. Introduction

As a result of adaption to the First Bronze Revolution,<sup>1</sup> an early state<sup>2</sup> emerged from the preceding kin-based communities networked widely by external trades in the last stage of the Neolithic Age, through an intermediate stage named the chiefdom.<sup>3</sup> The bronze innovations in both military and economic technology motivated a military-entrepreneur type of war leaders to finance the cost of not only armed force but also governance at their own expense. Such a process of an early-state building can be consistently explicated under the Kantian causality-relation category. On the other hand, the traditional theories of the state failed to present consistent synthetic propositions explaining “why and how the state came into being”<sup>4</sup> (hereafter, the causality of the

state). It is not only because they did not take important archaeological and anthropological facts into due consideration, but also because they did not explicitly subsume their logic under the Kantian causality-relation category.<sup>5</sup>

“What the state is” (henceforth, the concept of the state, for short) has been also one of the unsolved theoretical problems with the theory of the state. If, however, synthetic propositions on the concept of the state are explicated under the Kantian category of the “substance and accident” relation, the state can be recognized as one accidental form of the society. It is why the exercise of the state's power has been *de facto* legitimized by fulfilling the ultimate purposes of the society. However, the traditional theories did not subsume the concept of the state consistently in the above Kantian categorical framework. They could not

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\* Correspond to: Yoshifumi Ueda.

Affiliation: The Graduate School of Social Sciences and Department of Economics at Hiroshima University.

Address: 1-2-1, Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima City, Japan (zip: 739-8525).

Tel.: (082)-424-7273, Fax.: (082)-424-7271.

E-mail: yosifm@hiroshima-u.ac.jp.

<sup>1</sup> According to the archaeological study of Muhly (1995), the bronze — strictly speaking, an alloy comprised of ninety percent of copper and ten percent of tin — were used in the Mesopotamia area in the last half of the BC 3000s for the first time in human history, though the place where it was developed in the first is not specified yet.

<sup>2</sup> As to the theoretical and empirical study on the early state, see Claessen and Stalik (1978; 1981), though their concept of the early state is different from the one of this paper.

<sup>3</sup> See Service (1971), as to the concept of the chiefdom.

distinguish the state from other societal forms<sup>6</sup> as well as they could not discern various forms of the states. It is because their concepts were not subsumed under the Kantian “substance and accident” category, let alone their disregard for the relevant archaeological and anthropological facts.

Furthermore, the synthetic propositions explicating what factors determine the territory size of a state or why various forms of the society coexist in the same period (hereafter, the “interrelationship of the state”) cannot not be derived without subsuming those propositions under the Kantian interrelation category. It is why, though the “benefit and cost” approach<sup>7</sup> is useful for the determination of a territory size, it could not explain why various forms of the society co-exist in the same period.

Therefore, not only the causality of the state but also the concept and interrelationship of the state must be begun with answering the following question: what the ultimate purposes of the society are or why the society exists.

In this paper, by taking the relevant archaeological and anthropological facts into consideration and by subsuming those synthetic propositions on the state under the Kantian categorical frameworks,<sup>8</sup> the following two unresolved theoretical problems with the state are solved: The first problem is on the concept, causality and interrelationship of the early state.<sup>9</sup> The second one is on how to discern various forms of the state appearing on the historical stages. This latter problem is solved by showing that the main propositions on the early state are applicable to those

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<sup>4</sup> The causality hypotheses on the state presented by the traditional theories can be classified into the two major groups, called the contract theory and the predatory theory. The modern version of the former is now represented by Rawls (1971, 2001), Nozick (1974) and Buchanan (1975) based on the individualistic approach of Hobbes (1651), Spinoza (1677) and Locke (1690) by way of Rousseau (1762). They are in common based on the state of nature of an ahistorical individualistic type. Hardin(1995) belongs to the contract theory but distinguished from others by his emphasizing the plus-sum cooperative benefits obtainable from any contract. On the other hand, the latter — predatory theory — is represented by the Marxian exploit theory (Engels, 1878; 1884) based on the empirical work of Morgan (1877), the conquest theory of Oppenheimer (1926), the “rational bandits” theory of Olson(1993; 2000), McGire and Olson 1996)), and Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003), the predecessor of all of whom is the “pirate model” of St. Augustus (Augustine, 1967). Furthermore, the North's transaction-cost approach (1981), the conflict models of Skaperdas (1992) and Hirshleifer (2001), and Moselle and Polak (2001) also may belong to the contract theory. The circumstance hypothesis of the Caneiro (1970) should be also subsumed in the second group. However, whilst the contract theory is *de facto* the logic to justify the legitimacy of the state's power, the predatory theory focuses on one process of the whole processes of state-building, that is, on the topic of whether it was begun with conquest war or not. Furthermore, it is involved in the motives for the “power to enforce”, and focuses on the selfish motives of the power-seeking subjects. Therefore, though the arguments between both sides may seem antagonistic, they are in fact at cross-purposes. Plato (1941), Aristotle (1946, 1975) and Hegel (1824/25, 1807)) are some exceptions in the sense that they regard the state as a social entity locating on the top stage of the historical development of communities, though they could not derive the causality relations on the origins of the state. Hume (1752) and Ortega (1921; 1930) are unique in separating how state-building was begun from how the state should be ruled.

<sup>5</sup> As to the cognitive philosophy of Kant, see Kant (1787; 1800; 1912).

<sup>6</sup> For example, the traditional definitions of the state in common include explicitly or implicitly the conceptual proposition that the state is a social organization with an effective monopoly in the legitimated or justified violent power, according to the conceptualization of Weber (1911). However, the violence or armed force as the last resort to the “legitimated power to enforce” was more or less provided also by kin-based communities, even by primitive communities, as well as the chieftdom. As to the empirical study of the wars among the kin-based communities, see Chagnon (1974), Knauf (1991), Boehm (1993) and Gat (2008). The “continuity principle” of Lowie (1962) is also based on the same failure in distinguishing the form of the society with the society itself. On the other hand, Fukuyama (2011) misleads us into recognizing the state as the centralized political system of an empire-state type.

<sup>7</sup> See Alesina and Spolaore (2005), and Riker (1962; 1964)

<sup>8</sup> As to the reevaluation of the Kantian categorical frameworks by the modern neuroscience, see Pinker (1997, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> In order to apply to the birthplace of an early state, Ueda (2009; 2011) formulated the process of an early-state building in irrigation communities under the analytical framework of the “link and network” game (Slikker and Nouweland, 2001) and the hierarchical cooperation game (Demange, 2004). The irrigation model of Witfogel (1957) was subsumed under those frameworks.

other forms of the states, *mutatis mutandis*.

In what follows, this paper is organized as follows: In the second section the concept of the “society as the substance” is explicated on the basis of biology and neuroscience.<sup>10</sup> In the third section, the empirical backgrounds — the relevant archaeological, anthropological and historical facts — on which the basic assumptions of this paper are based are summarized. In the fourth section the synthetic propositions on the concept of the early state are derived. In the fifth section, the synthetic propositions on the causality and interrelationship of the state are derived. In the sixth, those propositions are corroborated by reference to their archaeological and historical correspondents. In the seventh section, those main propositions are applied to other forms of the states coming on the later historical stages. The last section concludes this paper with a brief summary, policy implications and some notes on terminology.

## 2. The Society

Homo sapiens have organized themselves into various cooperative organizations for the sake of overcoming the common problems with which it is hard to tackle only by one individual organ. Those problems are concerned with how innately-programmed behaviors booted up by the genes mechanism, but made aware of by the cerebrum cognition, should be controlled or reconciled so as to adapt to external conditions different from the environments to which the genes had developed to adapt. They are classified into the “emotional affects” and the “instinctive appetites (drives).” Though the former is self-recognized as feelings and the latter as

desires (motives), both are the innate programs functioning so as to keep up the homeostasis. They are interrelated in a hierarchical way where the former is in a higher order. Furthermore, each of them is interrelated, in a telescopic way with hierarchies, with sub-conscious mechanisms comprised of metabolism, innate reflection, endocrine, pleasure-displeasure mechanism in the order of the evolutionary development of organic life. Whilst the emotional programs evolutionally developed to enhance survivability by better coping with external relations with other living-lives, the instinctive programs to better manage to provide an organic life with necessities indispensable for self-preservation and proliferation.<sup>11</sup> Since those genes' programs were evolutionarily developed in the ages of the savanna life, they have not yet developed so as to be able to adapt to new environments surrounding the later life of Homo sapiens.<sup>12</sup> Homo sapiens have been endeavoring to overcome this gap by the cognitive work of the cerebrum and the will power under apperception.

Straight goal-catching behaviors booted up by those two programs can be consciously controlled, within a range subjected to the sub-systems' constraints, so as to be reconciled with the external conditions such as social circumstances and/or natural environments to which the cognitive work of the cerebrum induces an individual organ to adapt. Furthermore, the will power under apperception leads him to stick to behaviors induced by the cognitive work, until desired results are brought about.<sup>13</sup> The survival of an individual organ and its offspring depends firstly on how much they are protected from external threats and secondly on how satisfactorily they are provided with necessary goods for survival. However, it is hard for only one

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<sup>10</sup> The terminology of “evolution” is based on the epigenetic theory. Its application to the state shares some common spirits with Rubin (2002) titled “Darwinian Politics,” though the accidental characteristics of the Darwinian evolution theory are not necessarily adopted in this paper. If the society is conceptualized on the basis of the empirical facts of biological and neuroscience study as well as of anthropological and archaeological study, the concept of the evolution based on the epigenetic theory is considered to be more realistic.

<sup>11</sup> See Damasio (2003). As to the pioneering empirical work on the functions of emotions, see Frank (1988), Le Doux (1996) and Damasio (1993; 1999).

<sup>12</sup> This proposition is quoted from Ridley (1997), but I am not sure who derived it in the first.

<sup>13</sup> Libet (1985) presented the empirical evidence to show that behaviors going against the will can be stopped before 200 ~ 300 milliseconds.

individual organ to achieve those goals, even if the emotional mechanisms and the instinct ones drive each individual organ to pursue the goals. The society was formed in order to overcome shortcomings inevitable for an individual behavior.

Therefore, the ultimate purposes of the society are to achieve the targeted goals of those behaviors booted up by the homeostatic functions with some room for conscious discretion. The first ultimate purpose is to achieve the goal of the “behaviors affected by the emotional programs,” which contribute to the purpose of the physical protection of an individual organ and its offspring from external threats. The second is to achieve the goal of the “behaviors driven by the instinctive programs,” which are contributive to the purpose of keeping-up the inner subsystems of an individual organ and its offspring. Both purposes are fulfilled by coordinating those individuals into a cooperatively-working organization so as to raise the achieved level of the targeted goals of the individual behaviors at least to the survivability level.

Finally but not the least, the third ultimate purpose of the society is derived from the above two. It is to maintain the social systems under which those cooperative organizations are maintained and the cooperative behaviors are more promoted. This third is required because those cooperative behaviors are often in contradiction with innate behaviors driven by the sub-conscious mechanism of “pleasure and displeasure” booted-up by those cooperative behaviors. The latter behaviors may contradict with the selfish goal of the genes pursuing their long-run survival. Since an organic individual is an “agent” who is self-conscious of his own emotional affections and instinctive appetites, and has some discretion to

behave freely from the selfish goal of the “genes as a principal,” the agent can and is willing to allow his egoism to take precedence over the selfishness of the genes, whenever the “egoism of an organic individual” often contradicts with the “selfishness of the genes.”<sup>14</sup> This contradiction must be overcome somehow. It can be done by maintaining those social systems. Such systems are comprised of formal rules, customs and the ethical codes to which the secondary emotional mechanisms affect each individual to adhere.<sup>15</sup>

Here, two notes are in order. The first one is that all forms of the society have more or less the “enforcing power” which works to maintain social systems as well as to protect the members from any violent threat. The enforcing power functions as the last resort or *ultra ratio*. The second is that Homo sapiens have four kinds of the means to acquire necessities indispensable for achieving, in particular, the second goal: the first means is to acquire them by their own production work, the second by trades, the third by plunder and the fourth is by “rule” under which tributes or taxes are regularly paid by the ruled people in return for protection from capricious plunder and violent threats from inside and outside. Which one is chosen depends on which of the above four means brings about the largest net-benefits. Therefore, the image of the “states of nature”<sup>16</sup> should not be fixed, though the modern political theories of international relations tend to stick to the three fixed images as follows: the “realist” based in the Hobbesian tradition,<sup>17</sup> the “idealist” in the Enlightenment or liberalist tradition<sup>18</sup> and the “international anarchist” based on the Grotius internationalism.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> See Maki (2008).

<sup>15</sup> See Turner (2000), Thagard (2010) and Batson (2011).

<sup>16</sup> In spite of no explicit specification, the justification by the natural laws does not contradict with the justification by the ultimate purposes of the society. The former may be considered to be subsumed under the latter. Such an implicit relation between them is also observed in the justification by Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel (1824/25).

<sup>17</sup> It is represented by Morgenthau (1978) and Waltz (1979, 2001).

<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, the liberalist images are ramified into the international interventionists such as Kant, Cobden and Bright and the international interventionists represented by Woodrow Wilson. As to this classification of the liberalist images, see Waltz (2001).

<sup>19</sup> The notion of the anarchic international society is represented by Bull (1995). The last two notions are considered as a ramification of the Enlightenment originating in the efficient image of economic activities.

### 3. Empirical Bases

There are three empirical facts which should be borne in mind for explicating the concept and causality of the state: The first fact is that war is a general phenomenon in human history. The second is that wide-spread external trades among kin-based communities preceding the chiefdom had been prevailing prior to the process of early- state building. The third is that the time period in which early states emerged temporally overlaps the time period in which the First Bronze Revolution arose. The first fact contradicts with the basic assumption of the traditional theories of the state, since they recognize the essence of the state as a “social organization with a relative monopoly in the legitimate violent power”<sup>20</sup> and the armed force for war was “legitimately” – based on agreements – organized even by many primitive communities. The second fact contradicts with the assumption of both the predatory theory and the contract theory, as long as both assume that a conquest war breaks out among autarkic groups or individuals without a network of the division of work, more concretely speaking that those traditional theories did not take into due consideration that prior to engaging in warfare, the winner side and the loser one had been usually networked through external trades. The third has been neglected by the traditional theories.<sup>21</sup> Due to this negligence, they could not explain why the state did not emerge in the stone-ages but came into being in the first stage of the Bronze Revolution for the first time in human history. This section focuses on the relevance of those empirical facts to the evolution approach to the states' theory.

#### The Generality of War and Enforcing Power in Human History

As to the concept of the state, the traditional

theories of the state in common consider the state as a social organization with the “power to enforce” generated by an effective monopoly in the legitimated violence. The use of the state's power, if conceded by the ruled members, has been called the legitimate power in the jargon of political philosophy.

The above proposition on the concept of the state is based on the hypothesis that only the state has the legitimate armed force. However, the empirical study of evolution anthropology pioneered by Chagnon (1974) revealed that even primitive band-communities regularly mobilized their adult male members into an armed force not only with the aim of acquiring their necessities such as a means of livelihood and female partners but also with the aim of defending against external threats. Furthermore, it is well known that many of the traditional tribe-communities mobilized a group of qualified male members into an armed force for the purpose of aggression as well as defense.<sup>22</sup> Those facts contradict the above assumption of the traditional theories – the proposition that a relative monopoly in the legitimate violence is an essential factor to distinguish the state from other societal forms. It is because a relative monopoly in the violence works as the last resort to the “power to enforce.” In other words, the former gives physical guarantee to the latter. This contradiction convinces us that it is necessary to take other factors into allowance in order to explicate the state on an empirical basis.

#### The External Trades among Kin-based Communities

It is well known that many kin-based communities including even primitive ones such as Aborigines in the Paleolithic ages were engaged in inter-community trades.<sup>23</sup> In particular, the tribe-communities just prior to the historical process of building an early state in Mesopotamia had been networked by way of external

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<sup>20</sup> This conceptualization is popular, since Weber (1911) defined the state in accordance with it.

<sup>21</sup> Some exceptions are Plato who recognizes the state (polis) as a political organization to deal with extended economic division of work, Hegel who builds the state on the basis of the civil communities and Ortega who recognizes the process of building a state as adaption to historically new circumstances..

<sup>22</sup> See Gat (2008) and Wade (2006). As to the empirical study, see Knauf (1991), Boehm (1999) and Carneiro (2000).

<sup>23</sup> See Ridley (1997, 2010). Furthermore, on how inter-community trades in the stone ages were carried out, see Polanyi (1963; 1977), Sahlins (1972) and Nadel (1999).

trades widely spreading among the Afghan, Indus, Red Sea, Anatolia, and Black Sea region.<sup>24</sup> The fortified cities were the commercial-activities center as well as protected residence of those tribe-communities. As some tribe-members who accumulated private wealth through a success in those external trades rose up as “person in economic power,” the traditional kin-based communities gradually transformed themselves into a hierarchical community differentiated by wealth ownership. Because external trades in those days were still under anarchy, they were usually accompanied with armed guardians, and actually commercial activities engaged in such an external trade were combined with, and not distinguished from, looting activities. Peaceful transactions in the external trade were guaranteed by an open reveal of guardians' weapons, and the bargaining power — the terms of trade in economics terms — was influenced by the relative power-balance between traders.<sup>25</sup> Since, however, any party engaged in the external trade was not freed from a stone-weapon system, the power balance was maintained and therefore, the means of acquisition by peaceful trade<sup>26</sup> was preferred to that by plunder. If, however, a new condition emerges so that the more powerful the armed forth are, the more wealth they could accumulate privately and thus the more payable to take on the cost of the armed force, then those stakeholders in the external trade were motivated to strengthen their armed force at their cost.

As the bronze innovation was introduced, a new process of destroying the balance of power began in the last stage of the traditional tribe-communities and it opened a way to the chiefdom. However, the chiefdom is not yet a state. In order to motivate chieftains to transform the chiefdom form of the society into an early state, net-benefits gained by plunder had to be exceeded by net-benefits acquired

by rule.

### The Impacts of the First Bronze Revolution

How to acquire the necessities and means to satisfy drives or appetites booted up by the instinct programs were divided into the four kinds of means as mentioned in the second section. The period when the fourth means of acquisition — the acquisition by rule — appeared for the first time in human history is around the same period as, or overlaps with, the period in which the First Bronze Revolution arose. Such a correspondence is typically observed in the Sumerian society in the last stage of the BC 3000s.<sup>27</sup> The Bronze Revolution brought about innovations in both weapon system and production tools. Those innovations are considered to have changed the balance of military power among the kin-based communities equipped with conventional stone weapons to such a level that the acquisition by plunder is preferred to that by trade. Furthermore, if applied to the production processes of a conquered territory, those innovations could enhance economic productivities to such a level that net-benefits gained by rule surpass those gained by looting.

Though the acquisition by regular rule should be distinguished from the one by plunder in spite of similar appearance, the traditional theories of the state including the modern anthropology failed in distinguishing those two types of acquisition in a consistent way. For example, though the “rational bandits” theory contributed to refining the theory of the state by founding it on the selfish motives of looters, they could neither distinguish the acquisition by plunder from the one by peaceful trade. It is because they did not take those innovations in both weapon system and productive processes brought about by the Bronze Revolution into due consideration, as well as they did not take those wide-

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<sup>24</sup> As to the anthropological evidences, see Klenge (1983), Jarrige et al. (1995), Possen (2007) and Law (2011). I found out that Fukuyama (2011) and Ridley (2010) criticized the ahistoric individualistic assumption made by the traditional theories of the state and that they emphasize trading networks preceded the process of forming any society.

<sup>25</sup> See Polanyi (1963; 1977) and Sahlins (1972).

<sup>26</sup> Needless to say, a surprise raid, if possible, was always an option. See Gat (2008).

<sup>27</sup> See Muhly (1995) as to the archaeological evidence.

spread external trades as the existing condition just prior to an early-state building.

As long as all warring parties were equipped with stone-made weapons and thus the military technologies were in the same level, the attacking side, if an open attack, also had to suffer from the heavy cost and high risk. This is why wars before the First Bronze Revolution took on the characteristics of a surprise raid and at the same time why the acquisition by trade was preferred to the one by plunder, subjected to the condition that the transaction was accompanied with guardians' weapons. When, however, some of the opponent parties could introduce innovative weapons with higher lethality earlier or more efficiently than others, the expected net-benefit of a war increased so much that the war for plunder aimed at war booties became a regular military-enterprise but not a surprise raid. It is the First Bronze Revolution that brought about such a change in the aim of war. The bronze revolution gave a crucial impact on the traditional tribe-communities, so crucial that the first runners of them transformed themselves into new societal form called chiefdom — the historical stage intermediating between the kin-based community and the early state.

However, war in the chiefdom era still took on the characteristics of looting activities. That is, the purpose of the war was still the acquisition by plunder but not yet the one by regular rule.<sup>28</sup> In order for the purpose of war to change into the acquisition by regular rule, the winner side had to be motivated to apply also the bronze innovation to production processes in defeated territory. In order to be so-motivated, it was necessary for the economic productivity to increase to such a high level that the revenues obtainable from a tribute system are bigger than the cost to rule or govern the defeated side and as a result, net-benefits gained by rule grow bigger than those by plunder at least in a long run perspective. When this necessary condition was met, the chiefdom

was transformed into a new societal form called “early state” on a rational basis. Looting activities are replaced with the legitimate exploiting activities by rule. It is these impacts of the First Bronze Revolution that all of the traditional theories of the state failed in taking into consideration. This is why they could not distinguish the state from other forms of the society preceding to the early state, and why, as shown in the seventh section, they could not distinguish one form of the state from other forms in a consistent way.

#### 4. The Concept of the Early State

In what follows, all forms of the society preceding the chiefdom are subsumed under the kin-based community. The chiefdom which emerged from a kin-based community such as tribes is the intermediate stage between the early state and the kin-based community.<sup>29</sup> In order to conceptualize the early state in the Kantian categorical framework, firstly it has to be distinguished from the kin-based community, secondly it is distinguished from the chiefdom and thirdly it has to be proved that the early state actualizes the final purposes of the society. This proof is required because the former is one form of the latter. In the following paragraphs those three conditions required for conceptualizing the early state are detailed, in turn.

*Firstly*, the chiefdom is distinguished from the kin-based community by the change of warrior-mobilizing system from volunteer warriors to hired standing corps. Whilst in the former the “enforcing power” with an armed force as the last resort is generated by, or originates in, a military team organized on an egalitarian principle, in the latter it is by a military-entrepreneur type of war leaders who take on the cost of the armed force at their own expense. Such a change in the military system was brought about by an increase in the net-benefits obtainable from a war

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<sup>28</sup> Wars in the chiefdom are not documented yet, and therefore have to be inferred from other resources such as archaeological study and Homer's works though its military technology reflects the second bronze revolution. As an example of such an inference, see Finley (1978). Furthermore, according to Gat (2008), the origin of the ancient Greek king called “basileus” is traced back to a military-entrepreneur type of war leaders in the last stage of the tribe-community age.

<sup>29</sup> The concept of the chiefdom is not mere conceptual medium. As to the anthropological study, see Service (1973).

enterprise to such a level that the war leaders of a military-entrepreneur type are motivated to maintain the armed force at their own expense. The profitability of a war enterprise was improved by applying the bronze revolution to military system. Then, the armed force with a bronze-weapon system could defeat the conventional armed force equipped with stone-made weapons at much lower cost than when the former was equipped with the conventional stone weapons. Therefore, it could pay those war leaders of a military entrepreneur type to adopt the bronze-weapon system at their own expense. On the other hand, in the kin-based community, war booties had to be distributed on an egalitarian basis among volunteer-warriors joining in war enterprise. It is because as long as the probability of the stone-made armed force being winning is no high enough, it is not payable to maintain hired warriors equipped with the stone-made weapon system at their expense, and therefore because each participant in war enterprise has to equip himself with stone weapons at his own cost. As a result, there was little room for accumulating private wealth to such an influential level as to have an overwhelming economic power which leads to a relative monopoly in the enforcing power. The bronze revolution put the traditional volunteer-warriors system into an end, and opened a way to the privately-hired standing corps, i.e., the mercenary warriors hired by a military entrepreneur called “chieftain.”

*Secondly*, the state is distinguished from the chieftain by a difference in the purpose for using the armed force or the power to enforce. Whilst in the chieftain it is used for the sake of acquiring war booties by plunder, the state exercises it to rule defeated people after it was used for conquest war. If the net-benefits obtainable from regular rule or governance — tributes or taxes less governance cost — become larger than the net-benefits obtainable from a war enterprise — war booties less war cost —,

the chieftains are induced to transform the existing chieftain system into a new form, later called “early state.” In order for this rational condition to be satisfied, however, the economic productivity of conquered territory had to increase to such a high level as to satisfy the above benefit-cost condition by applying the bronze revolution to the production processes of the conquered territory.

If the above rationality condition is applied to the determination of the territory size, an analytical proposition is derived as follows: the territory size of an early state is limited to the border where the additional tributes or taxes obtainable from ruling a territory are balanced with the additional cost to rule it. This is the way how external relations are determined and this is why various forms of the society co-exist at the same time in human history. Such an interrelationship is subsumed under the Kantian interrelation category.<sup>30</sup>

*Thirdly*, since the early state is an accidental form of the society, it is also required to fulfill the ultimate purposes of the society in order for “person in power” to be able to claim the legitimacy to exercise the state’s power. The criteria for judging the legitimacy are not consciously recognized as definite one. However, if any of those final purposes is not actualized to a satisfactory level and never tends to show any sign of recovery, the various signs of resistance demonstrated by the ruled side tends to show some resistance prove that a person in power — an early king — is losing the legitimacy of the power.<sup>31</sup> How the ultimate purposes are actualized under the rule of an early king is shown below.

The first ultimate purpose is actualized by maintaining a military system comprised of not only armed force but also fortified residential place.<sup>32</sup> Although it was maintained for the sake of the early king’s self-interests, it functioned for defending the territory from external threats and for protecting the

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<sup>30</sup> This means that the interrelation category is not independent from the substance category in contradiction with the independent classification by Kant.

<sup>31</sup> The tyranny is a political system whose rulers lost the legitimacy of the power exercise and therefore, cannot rule by the consents of the members of a state, ending with subjugating those members by violence.

<sup>32</sup> See Weber (1924) as to the classical work insisting the fortified residence is the origin of a polis type of the state



members of the early state from internal threats. The second purpose is achieved by providing both infrastructures and means of production. It contributes to increasing the productivity of the ruled people engaged in production and trade and to satisfying the instinctive desires in the end. The third is attained by establishing the religious system which sublimes various norms, codes and customs into an authorized belief and by defying, or making a myth of, the kingship of a person in power. If, in return for paying tributes or taxes, those purposes were actualized to a satisfactory level whose minimum is the participants' constraints, then the use of the state's power could be *de facto* legitimized and the *de facto* legitimization can be corroborated by continuance of a political stability.

## 5. The Causality of the Early State

The synthetic proposition explicating why and how the early state came into being — the causality of the state — should be subsumed under the Kantian causality category. In order to apply the logic of the causality category, that synthetic proposition should be divided into the following five distinguishable factors: existing conditions, external shock-factors, main subjects, motives and results.<sup>33</sup> Since the existing conditions of the early state are the chiefdom, as a preliminary to explicating the causality of the early state we begin from summarizing the causality of the chiefdom.

### 5.1 Preliminary: A Summary of the Causality of the Chiefdom

The existing conditions from which the chiefdom emerged are the kin-based tribe- communities in the last stage of the Neolithic era, in which they had been already engaging in wide-spreading external trades. When those tribes transacted with trading counterparts, both sides were usually accompanied with their own guardians with stone-made weapons.

However, since their weapons were stone-made, the military power was balanced and therefore they chose peaceful trades on a rational basis. This is the military background against the peaceful images of the external trades among the kin-based communities in the stone ages. However, if the chance is open, they often took a surprise-raid option with the aim to gain war booties.<sup>34</sup>

The external shock-factors are the First Bronze Revolution and its applicability to both weapon system and production process. In the last stage of the BC 3000s it occurred and brought about a drastic innovation in weapon system and production tools such as cutting tools. The revolution was introduced to the Mesopotamia area and led it to building the urban organizations which function as the political, commercial and residential center of the chiefdom and of the early state of a polis type later. The bronze revolution destroyed the military power balance among the kin-based communities. If some of them could apply the bronze revolution to their weapon system, they could have much more favorable positions in the bargaining in the transaction of the external trade backed up by guardians with the conventional stone weapons. The most favorable position could be achieved, if net-benefits gained by plunder are larger than those obtained by trade, and actually the bronze revolution promoted the net-benefits by plunder to grow larger than those by trade.

The motives for applying the bronze revolution to both weapon system and production process were those of the tribe chiefs who had been in a position to negotiate with trading counterparts or those of the military entrepreneurs many of whom had been a military officer appointed by the tribe chiefs. The drastic increase in the net-benefits of a war enterprise works as the incentives to boot up their motives or drives. The First Bronze Revolution made it possible that even if the cost to maintain the bronze-weapon system was financed at their own expense, it could pay them to bear the cost and risk.

The chiefdom emerged from a kin-based tribe

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<sup>33</sup> Such classification of the factors of causality originates in Aristotle's metaphysics. See Aristotle (1924).

<sup>34</sup> See Gat (2008).

community as a result of the net-benefits gained by plunder growing bigger than those by trade. Such a turnaround of the net-benefits was brought about by applying the First Bronze Revolution to military system and production process.

## 5.2 The Causality of the Early State

The existing conditions of the early state are the chieftdom. The main concern of a chieftain is the military enterprise the aim of which is to gain war booties by plunder. If his military power was balanced with the opponent counterparts equipped with a bronze-weapons system, or if it cannot pay him to appeal to the armed force because the trading counterparts are located far away, they take the option of peaceful trade. However, under the relative-power condition that the military-power balance tilts to some chieftain's side, he chooses to appeal to the armed force and to acquire war booties by plunder. Those chieftains engage in plunder but are not induced to choose the acquisition by rule.

The external shock-factors are the technological possibility that the applicability of the bronze innovation to production process as well as to military system raises the productivity of conquered territory. It is costly to apply the bronze revolution to an innovation in the production process of a conquered territory, because it is required to provide new economic infrastructures and to have dispatch governing officers. However, if the net-revenues gained by governing a new territory exceed those gained by plunder, the chieftains are induced to change the means of acquisition from the one by plunder into the one by the rule under which the ruled people are burdened with tribute payment and labor service at regular periods in return for protection from capricious plunder and from both external and internal threat.

The ruling subjects of the early state are the ex-chieftains and the motives or drives of those subjects for the power to enforce are bootied up by the

“increase in the net-benefits” made possible by the change of the means of acquisition from the one by plunder into the one by rule.<sup>35</sup> The warriors and governing officers hired by an early king belong to the junior ruling class and a part of public revenues are allocated to them as the salary which must exceed the once allocated war booty in order to satisfy the participants' constraints. The people engaged in production and trade belongs to the main ruled class. In order for them to concede the power used by the early king, the burden of tribute payment and labor service must be surpassed by the benefits of public services. That is, in order to meet the constraint that the ruled side concedes to bear the burden, the residual share of the ruled side in the net-benefits brought about by ruling the conquered territory is required to grow bigger than their opportunity cost which can be approximated by their ex-standard of living. This constraint condition is a necessary condition for the new “person-in-power” called the early king to claim the legitimacy of his exercising the state's power. In order to satisfy not only the selfish motives of the chieftain but also the above legitimacy conditions, the “whole pie” to be shared among all members of an early state must be able to increase enough. It made possible by the application of the bronze revolution to an innovation in the production processes of the conquered territories as well as to the application to weapon system.

As a result of the causal relations comprised of above five factors, an early state came into being and the once-capricious plunderer changed into a regularly-exploiting early-king conceded by the conquered people. The Sumer states were built through such spontaneous processes in the Tigris and Euphrates area and are recognized as the “original early state” in the sense that such a societal form emerged for the first time in human history in terms of the absolute ages. The historical process is summarized below.

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<sup>35</sup> Weber (1924) considered that an early king emerged from a charisma type of military officer. However, the image of the early king seems to be that of a chieftain and furthermore he did not explain the motives of the king for the power of a state.

## 6. Historical Correspondents

### 6.1 The Original Early State in terms of the Absolute Ages and the Relative Ages

The divisions of labor and external trades among the kin-based communities from the Neolithic ages onward were begun with those between agricultural tribes — more strictly speaking, irrigation agricultural tribes — and pasturage ones. Even though the former were more cost-efficient in transportation and hit-and-run attacks due to their higher mobility, it was rational to maintain a peaceful way of transactions due to the high cost of looting activity under the military-power condition that both types of the tribes had to engage in the inter-tribe trades guarded by stone-made weapons in the Neolithic stone ages. Those trade-networks had been already spreading so widely as to connect the Indus, Afghan, Black Sea, Red Sea, Anatolia region. In the last stage of the Neolithic ages, the bronze — strictly speaking, an alloy made from the mix of copper with 90 per cents and tin with 10 per cents — was developed somewhere in those regions. Since the mines of both minerals have not been discovered in the agricultural regions in the river sides of the Mesopotamia area and furthermore the modern archaeological study shows that both were imported by way of other regions such as Yemen and Oman region (later, via Anatolia), the pasturage tribes having an advantage in transportation could learn this technological innovation, or put it to practical use, earlier or more efficiently than the agricultural tribes. It can be inferred that the military-power balance tilted to the pasturage tribes and they had an advantage over the agricultural tribes in bargaining in the transactions of the inter-tribe trades. They gradually transformed the traditional kin-based community into the more hierarchical form of the society called the “chieftain” where the ex-elected war officers or tribe chiefs changed in essential quality into a military entrepreneur type of war leaders called the “chieftain,” and they organized the armed force at their expense with the aim of looting war booties. The enforcing power originated in this armed force the cost of which was financed by the chieftains for the sake of their

private-interests, and the armed force worked as the last resort to the power to enforce.

However, the chieftains were not yet called a “king.” This is because they did not yet ruled the conquered side. To be a king, it required the establishment of a tribute system which assures that the defeated side concedes to pay the spoils of a war from a part of their products at regular periods in return for ensuring not only protection from both plunder and any threat but also a share of their products satisfying the opportunity-cost condition. Under such a tribute system the once-capricious plunderer changed the chieftain society into a regular exploiting societal form with a contractual basis. The Sumer states were built through such spontaneous processes but not through the passive effects of outsiders' influences in the Tigris and Euphrates area. In this sense, the Sumer states are the original early state in terms of the absolute ages.

Likewise, the processes of building early states on the Pacific side of the South America are considered to have begun independently from the influence of any early-state building in other regions. By the familiar archaeological study of the Moche civilization which are estimated to have begun developing around the turning point of the Christian era, the contemporary relation between the metal innovation and the early-state building are corroborated. Though the metal was not necessarily the bronze but hardened copper, it was used as weapons even in the last age of the Inca Empire (the 16th century). On the other hand, the Tiwanaku civilization developed in Bolivia region around the same age developed a bronze alloy. Those traditional communities had been engaged in pasturage, agriculture, and fishing. In particular, the irrigation agriculture had been widely developed in the valley area and those communities had been networked by inter-tribe trades. Furthermore, many archaeological data show that the political unity was formed through the process of conquest wars. Therefore, even though the processes of building the early states in those areas began much later than the Sumer ones in the absolute-age's term, the early states in those South-American regions can be subsumed

under the original early-state in terms of the relative ages.

## 6.2 The Peripheral Early State

Many political organizations in the riversides of the Nile around the BC 3000 have been considered as an original early state in terms of the absolute age, because it is a common sense to consider it to have been built around BC3000 independently from the effects of the Sumerian early-states. The Nile riversides in those days also experienced the process that pasturage tribes had moved to the Nile riversides prior to the process of early states' building, and that external-trade networks had been spreading by making use of river-water transportation as well as of inland transportations connecting with both the Red sea region and inlands. However, empirical evidences corroborating the contemporary relation between the bronze revolution and the early states' building in the Nile region are not yet found, even though the import of cooper via the Sinai Peninsula is corroborated and bronze tools were used for digging pyramid-stones in later historical stages. If the early states in the Nile's riversides were built as a result of adapting to the external impacts of the Sumer early states, they should be called a peripheral early state.

Based on the same logic, the Indus Civilization, though wide-spread inter-community trades are corroborated by Law (2011), might be subsumed under the peripheral early state, as long as the state-building in those areas are recognized as a result of adaption to the external impacts of the external trade with the Sumer states. The early states in the Yellow riversides may well be also recognized as a peripheral early state, as long as it is plausible that the bronze impacts which may belong to the second stage of the bronze revolution reached there in later historical stages around the first half of BC 1000s after overcoming a long distance-gap. The political system of a peripheral state is determined by the combination of the type of its existing societal form with the type of the state playing the role of external shock-factor.

On the contrary, the period in which the “Mayan

early states” arose has no empirical evidence to corroborate the bronze innovation or other metal substitutes for it, though wide-spreading inter-tribe trades were corroborated by many archaeological works. The Maya has been called the “civilization of the stone-age.” However, as long as those Mayan societies remained in the Neolithic age, the conventional view that the “Mayan civilization was at the stage of an state” is in contradiction with the concept of the early state. Even if the Mayan communities were networked by inter-tribe trades and were ubiquitously engaged in wars, such external relations are observed in many kin-based communities preceding the early state, as Gat (2008) emphasized.

## 6.3 Application to Territory Size, Federalism and Tyranny

The processes of building an early state were usually accompanied with a series of conquest wars. However, the territories were confined to a finite size. It is because the chieftains were the rational decision-maker whose criteria for deciding on a war are the “benefit and cost” principle. If the cost to conquer a territory including the cost of governance amounts to the benefit obtainable from it, it is rational to stop extending the territory size. As the targets of conquest are located further away, the cost of conquest tends to increase. Due to such an increase in the cost of conquest, other communities and other states could co-exist independently from, and maintain trade-relations with, some hegemonic states.

On the other hand, the process of forming a federal state shows that all processes of federal-state building were not necessarily associated with conquest war. This is because federal states belong to the peripheral state. That is, in order to protect its political units from some hegemonic states' threats common to them, they had to generate the sovereign power in haste and it was too risky to wait until the victor of the inner wars builds a new state.

In addition to the relative nature of the sovereign power against outsiders, the “power to enforce inside members” was also relative in the sense that its actual

level depends on how much sufficiently the conditions of legitimacy are satisfied. An unbearable burden is imposed due to an increase in the cost of not only maintaining main economic infrastructure but also mobilizing qualified members into a war. Then, the state's power becomes less tolerable to both inner resistance and outside threats. As the consents of the ruled people tend to be lost, the person in power is destined to appeal to a straight violence in order to keep political system under his rule. The tyranny is a political system in the last stage of such a political process through which the once-legitimate state declines to a ruin.

## 7. The General Propositions: toward the Evolutionary Theory of the State

The synthetic propositions on the early state derived in the fifth section can be generalized to the evolutionary theory of the state by deriving the essential factors from those propositions. The evolutionary theory of the state subsumes other forms of the state appearing on the later historical stages. The generalized propositions are classified into the concept part and the causality one. In this section, they are explained in turn.

### 7.1 Generalization to the Concept of the State

Two general propositions on the evolutionary concept of the state are derived from the synthetic propositions on the concept of the early state.

*Firstly*, any historical form of the state appearing after the early state has to be distinguished not only from the preceding state's form but also from the succeeding one. The distinction is made by a difference in the origin of the power. More strictly speaking, a state's form is determined by how the state's power is generated. In general, the power of a state is generated, if some political-military entrepreneur can organize both human resources and economic ones into an armed force as the last resort to

the “enforcing power.” Whilst those human resources must be qualified for operating the state-of-the-art military technology and for managing bureaucratic organizations, the economic resources have to be able to finance at least the cost of both the armed force and the governing organizations. The “military power” is relatively determined by how the political-military entrepreneur can effectively combine those human and economic resources into the “sovereign power to enforce” both for defense against external threats and for protection from illegal violence.

In order for some economic classes to bear the burden of the economic cost of generating the power, it has to pay them to take on the cost burden. It is made possible, only if economic policies carried out by the government under the state contribute to increasing the net-benefits of those economic classes. More strictly speaking, in order for those economic classes to be the main provider of the public fund to financially support the state's power in sufficiently long periods, their business has to represent the main leading sectors of the historical stage in the sense that the more contributive to their business the economic policies are, the more tax revenues the government can gain by way of an increase in the export, investment and economic growth. That is, the type of those economic classes represents the innovative technologies of the age.

On the other hand, the political-military entrepreneur has to be able to mobilize military staffs qualified for the operation of the military technology and bureaucrats qualified for the management of the government into the state's power by using the fund which is provided by those economic classes in return for the economic policies pro their business. Since the military technology is influenced by those technologies innovated in the economic sector, the military technology is also represented by the innovative technologies of the age. However, the qualified political-military entrepreneur above mentioned is of a hero type and therefore, all societies are not necessarily provided with such a political-military entrepreneur in spite of the popular saying — “The age brings about the hero.” Those main factors

are summarized by the first general proposition below.

*The First Proposition of the Evolutionary Theory of the State: The Form*

*The form of a state is determined by whom and by what mechanism the core or avant-garde social organ functioning as the “armed force” in anarchy — the last resort to the enforcing power — is generated. Innovative technologies, economic classes with the capability of financing the cost of the armed force, military technology and a type of political-military entrepreneur are main factors to distinguish the form of a state from the preceding and succeeding form of the state.*

*The ruling classes of a state are comprised not only the principal members who can generate the enforcing power but also of the agent members entrusted to use the power by the principal. The enforcing power generated by the ruling classes allows them to pursue the maximization of their self-interests, subjected to the survival conditions of other members. On the other hand, the ruled classes are those members who, though excluded from the use of the enforcing power, can determine whether they should concede the state's power exercised by the ruling classes, i.e., whether the state's power is legitimate or not.*

Secondly, as long as any form of the state is also one form of the state, it has to fulfill the final purposes of the society itself by exercising the enforcing power generated through the mechanism summarized in the first proposition. The political system under a form of the state is distinguished by how the use of the state's power actualizes those purposes: how the power to enforce is used for defense against external threats and for protection from illegal violence, how the satisfaction of the instinctive desires are assured under the state, and what kinds of social system are effective

for maintaining the political system under the state's form. The power of the state has been *de facto* legitimated, if it can actualizes those purposes on a satisfactory level.

The first purpose is actualized by the use of the power to enforce — concretely speaking, by an appeal to the military power which is generated by combining a political-military entrepreneurship with an economic power financing the cost of a military system with the state-of-the-art technology of the age, subject to the participants' constraint of the ruled people servicing as a military soldier. Though the armed force is maintained by the self-interested motives of the political-military entrepreneur to monopolize tributes or taxes gained by ruling the territory, both the defense against external threats and the protection from internal illegality are provided for the members of the state, as a result.

The second purpose is actualized by pursuing such an economic policy as to promote the main economic sectors to grow — more concretely speaking, by carrying out such an economic policy to increase the net-profits of the economic classes bearing the cost of a military system under the condition that the participants' constraints of the ruled people are met. The political-military entrepreneur is motivated to promote those policies by an increase in the tributes or taxes collected from those growing economic sectors. The economic classes engaged in those sectors and the main ruled people could concede that as long as their instinctive desires are satisfied by those economic policies, the political-military entrepreneur who became a person in power exercises the state's power.<sup>36</sup>

The third purpose is fulfilled, in general, by establishing an imaginary community<sup>37</sup> which is formed by uniformalizing various cultural factors such as religions, languages, histories, myths, norms, customs, ethical codes, legal systems and ethnical

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<sup>36</sup> When the economy stagnates by discordance among economic policies, it becomes hard to reconcile the goals of the ruling economic classes with those of the ruled people, as observed in the external trade policy of ancient Athens, which pursued the export of processed agricultural products such as wine and olive oil in return for the import of cones. Whilst the former are the main products of the aristocrats who served as the warrior of cavalry, the latter are those of the independent farmers who played the core role of the iron-armed heavy infantry system. An economic downfall of the independent farmers led to the ancient republic system of Athens and Roma.

<sup>37</sup> See Anderson (1983) as to the concept of the imagined community.

grouping into a set of cultural packages.

The political system of a state is determined a result of reconciling the actualization of the ultimate purposes on a satisfactory level with coordinating the members of the state to participate in cooperative actions to fulfill those ultimate goals under the historical conditions for a form of the state to emerge.

The above propositions are summed up as the Second Proposition on the evolutionary concept of the state, below.

#### *The Second Proposition of the Evolutionary Theory of the State: The Political System*

*The political system of a state is determined by how the ultimate purposes of the society itself are actualized by the use of the state's power, subjected to the constraint that the state's members are assured of their survival conditions under the state. If the self-interest seeking use of the state's power can be reconciled with actualizing the ultimate purposes on such a satisfactory level as to meet the survival conditions of the ruled members, the political-military entrepreneur who became a person in power is de facto conceded the legitimacy of the state's power by the members of the state. Then, the power of the state is called legitimate in the jargon of political philosophy.*

### 7.2 Generalization to the Causality of the State

The logic to explain how and why an early state came into being — the causality of the early state — was composed of the following five factors: the first one is the existing conditions — the chiefdom society —, the second is the external shock-factors — the First Bronze Revolution —, the third is the main subjects — the chieftain-turned early king, hired warriors, bureaucrats and working classes engaged in the main economic sectors —, the fourth is their motives — the self-interested motives —, and the fifth is the final result — the emergence of an early state. These five factors are generalized in a straight way to the causal relations of the evolutionary theory of the

state. They are summed up as the third general proposition, below.

#### *The Third Proposition of the Evolutionary Theory of the State: The Causality*

*A new form of the state emerges from the preceding form, which plays the role of the existing conditions of the new state, as a result of adaption to such external shock-factors as to motivate a political-military entrepreneur type of the members to take advantage of the external shock-factors and/or its secondary effects for their self-interests. The main subjects are a political-military entrepreneur, the economic classes who can finance the cost of generating the armed force by engaging in the leading economic sectors representing the state-of-art innovative technologies, the junior ruling members who are entrusted to use the state's power and usually engaged in military service and governance, and the ruled people engaging in the process of direct production and trade. The motives of those subjects for participating in the state building are the self-interested one. The result is the new form of the state.*

## 8. Applicability to Other Forms of the State

In this section, it is shown that other forms of the state appearing on the historical stages later than the early state are categorized in accordance with the above three general propositions derived from the synthetic propositions of the early state.

### 8.1 The Ancient Aristocracy in the Second Stage of the Bronze Revolution

The existing condition of the ancient aristocracy is an early state. The external shock-factor of the ancient aristocracy is the Bronze Revolution in the Second Stage which brought about an innovation in both military system and economic system. The military system is characterized with a horse-pulling war coach driven by an armored warrior and driving valets. On the other hand, the economic system is characterized

with the autarkic economy the ownership of which belongs to an aristocrat-warrior. He manages it to maintain the military system at his cost.

The economic background of this system is that ancient kingship under the early state could not finance all of the cost to maintain the new military system due to the heavy cost. Those horse-pulling war coaches had wheels cum-spokes. They were introduced to the Near East region around BC 1800 by the Hittites, after the more primitive coaches with spokes pulled by small-scaled Equidae named “onager” were developed around BC 3000 in Mesopotamia and the horse-pulling coaches with wheels cum-spokes were developed in the Step area of Euroasia around BC 2000. Then, they were spread to other regions such as Egypt by the Hyksos, India by the Aryan, and Greek by the Mycenaean. In the end, around BC 1200 it was introduced to the northwestern part of China by the ancestors of Zhou dynasty. The new weapon system in the second stage of the bronze revolution was a distinguishable change from a club weapon with bronze head characterizing the first stage of the Bronze Revolution, in the sense that the new weapon system overwhelmed the old one in battles between the aristocrats' corps and the traditional foot soldiers with those conventional weapons. One unit of corps is composed of one warrior dressed in bronze-made armor and some attending valets taking on the role of a coach driver and assistant. Those bronze-armored warriors are called the “ancient aristocrat.” They took on the cost to finance such a new weapon system at their expenses, because it could pay him to take on the cost on a rational basis. That is, since the benefits of joining in a war enterprise exceeded the cost to provide for the armed force, those aristocrat warriors were motivated to bear the cost of the armed force on their own. As a result, the power to enforce originated mainly in the armed force of the aristocrat

warriors. They ruled their own economic bases called the *oikos* or *oikoi* in the ancient Greek. The war leader of a military entrepreneur type organizing those aristocrats into a military system is considered to be *primus inter pares* — the chief among the equals — though he has been often called a “king.”<sup>38</sup>

Since the power of the state is generated by the armed force which is shared by those aristocrats, they share the power of the state in proportion to the armed force they can provide for the state.

Finally, in order to fulfill the ultimate purposes of the society, the aristocratic rulers also had to meet the participants' conditions of the ruled members — the members of their *oikos*. The exercise of the enforcing power could be conceded by the ruled side, only if those conditions were met. The more powerful the armed force is, the more affluent the *oikos* economic basis is, and vice versa. Such an ascending spiral is a phenomenon characterizing the developing process of the ancient aristocracy.

## 8.2 Timocracy and Ancient Empire in the First Stage of the Iron Ages

Around BC 1200, the aristocratic states in the second stage of the bronze ages, such as the Hittites and the Mycenaean, were ruined all together as a result of the invasion by the so-called “sea tribes” equipped with iron weapons. Their native lands are considered as Anatolia and the Aegean Sea. The basic corps of its military system was comprised of horse-riding warriors and heavy infantry but the main armed force in battles was the heavy infantry.<sup>39</sup> For example, in the last stage of the dark ages in the ancient Greek, that is, around BC 900 to BC 800 in which the aristocratic states had been destroyed by the iron-armed tribes, the traditional rulers of the Greek were still the bronze-armed aristocrats with their own *oikos*. Though they

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<sup>38</sup> Documented data to robust have not been found except for archaeological evidences. Popular scenes described by Homer may be considered to represent the aristocracy state but actually they correspond to the chiefdom, though the weapon system represents the second stage of the bronze revolution. This discordance is due to the peripheral nature of the Mycenaean states, in the sense that a societal form in the chiefdom age had to adapt to the impacts of the societal form in the age of the second bronze revolution. By contrast, the images of the Chou dynasty are more robustly confirmed by historical documents.

<sup>39</sup> It is inferred from the relief describing wars in the ancient Egypt. See Gat (2008), chap.11.



were a horse-riding warrior armed with the bronze weapons, they had not yet organized their corps into a team comprised of a mix of horse-riding warrior and infantry equipped with iron weapons. The iron revolution in the first stage brought about such an innovation in military system, which is characterized with a team of horse-riding warriors and infantry. Furthermore, it also brought about a technological innovation in farming tools, and then, the iron revolution became the external impact-factors of the timocracy usually called the “ancient republic.”

Prior to the spreading of iron-made tools around BC 1000 which were made possible by a cut in the production cost, the horse-riding technology began developing since BC 2000 near the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, and was developed, in particular, in the Karasuk age (BC 1500 to 800) which was still in the second stage of the Bronze Revolution.<sup>40</sup> It became possible by breeding a large-scaled type of horses with the withers height of 140 to 150 cm. Pasturage tribes adopting the horse-riding innovation could move their economic base to the wider steppes far away from agricultural areas and developed themselves to the so-called “horse-riding nomads” and began invading agricultural societies. The Scythians and Kimmerians are an example for those horse-riding nomads.

On the other hand, the introduction of iron tools to farming work and the self-arming of self-employed farmers were spread after it became possible to cut the cost of iron-made tools around BC 1000. It is around BC 900 that Assyrians — *the first state of an empire type based on the lands* — adopted both the horse-riding innovation and the iron innovation together. A little later, the Achaemenian Persians could introduce both of those innovations, too. In Greek around BC 700, iron-made tools were considered to have been already spread to the self-employed farmers, according to the work of Hesiod. The self-employed farmers could provide themselves with iron-made weapons for infantry service at their own expenses. They grew to one of the main economic groups in which the power to enforce originate. In the end, they gained the rights to participate in political decision-

making, subject to the constraint firstly that the rights are proportional to the property they hold and therefore to the burden of military cost, and secondly that commanders in chief and administrative officers are elected from the horse-riding aristocratic class. This form of the state is called the “timocracy” in the ancient Greek, which Aristotle admired as an ideal political system. Those innovations in the horse-riding and the iron-made tools were the external impact-factors of the timocracy and the ancient empire appearing later, in the sense that the “power to enforce” in both types of the ancient states originated in the military system comprised of a set of horse-riding warriors and iron-armed infantry, though the armed force of the ancient Athens empire was further strengthened by the navy corps whose main members are mobilized from the demos serving as a hired sailor.

No-property classes such as the people engaged in commerce, handicraft and ruined independent-farmers were freed from the obligation to maintain the armed force on their own. They have only the obligation to join in a war declared by the name of a polis. In return for that obligation, they have the proportional political rights to give sanction to the election of the consul recommended by the senate and the rights to be freed from direct taxes. Those no-property classes consist of the ruled people of the timocracy. The legitimacy condition is satisfied, if the net-benefits of the ruling classes are maximized subjected to the constraint that it meets the participants' conditions of those people. The “bread and circus” policy worked as one of the means to satisfy those conditions.

Here, it seems worth paying attention to why the first stage of the iron revolution brought about two distinguishable forms of the ancient states — the timocratic type and the centralized empire type. The reason lies in a difference in the main battlefield where they had to fight with the main enemies. The main battle fields of Assyrians were wide plain areas where the movability of horse-riding warriors could play a more crucial role in winning than if the battlefield is in narrow areas. On the other hand, the main battlefield of Greek is surrounded by mountains

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<sup>40</sup> See Hayashi (2009).

and swamps. Thus, the iron-armed infantry of the Assyrian army could not play the main role but played an assistant role in the battle in those plains — such as a role to guard other warriors taking on the attack by a bow and arrow. By contrast, in ㄉㄨ narrow battlefields in Greek, the horse-riding corps could not make available of their high movability. In the crucial stage of many battles, they had to get off from a horse for fighting together with the infantry armed with iron-made weapons. On the other hand, these infantry corps played a crucial role. This means that the Greek self-employed farmers consisting of the infantry corps contributed to strengthening the armed enforce more and therefore the state's power than those of the Assyrian army. It is because this difference in the contribution to the power origins was crucial why the first stage of the iron revolution brought about those two different types of the state. In this respect, the Achaemenian Persia also shared the same characteristics with the Assyrians.<sup>41</sup>

As well known, however, the ancient Athens also changed into an empire-state in the end. This is because the economic base of the self-employed farmers had been ruined under the Athenian rule under which the external trade policy promoted not only the export of the processed and finished goods such as wine and olive oil but also the import of the lower-priced wheat from the Black Sea regions. However, the wheat is not only one of the necessary goods desired by the Greek consumers but the main product of the self-employed farmers on the Greek side. The wheat production in Greek was costlier because the croplands are in narrow areas surrounded by mountains. In the end, the self-employed farmers lost their economic base to maintain the infantry system with the iron arms, whilst both the aristocrats who engaged in the production of wine and olive and the marine traders who took on risky marine business could accumulate their private wealth. In order to maintain the traditional trade-policy, the navy corps had to replace the infantry in the end. The seamen played an important role in the navy and were

mobilized from craftsmen and other non-property classes. However, they could not provide themselves with armaments on their own and therefore had to be employed as the public official, whose salary was financed with the war booties and tributes from the allied subordinate polis. In this process, the necessary goods desired by Athens continued to increase not only in kind but in volume, because the materials and natural resources necessary to strengthen the navy power, such as timber and iron, added to those conventional ones represented with wheat. This pressed the Athens to enlarge and maintain supply-roots for those goods in a stable condition and therefore motivated them to pursue a monopolistic bargaining-status in the transaction of foreign trades. In the end, Pericles ushered those ancient mass-democrats into the *de facto* ancient empire-state. Such a historical process is observable also in the process of building the ancient Roman-empire, if the navy is replaced with mercenary soldiers employed by candidates for the emperor.

As well known, it is by Alexander the Great (BC356-323) that the ancient empire state was consummated in the Hellenes world. He is the military-entrepreneur who could put into practical use all military innovations in the ancient age-heavy infantry, horse-riding warrior and sieging operation system, all developed by his father.

### 8.3 The Medieval Feudal State in the Second Stage of the Iron Ages

The existing condition of the medieval feudal state is the last stage of the ancient empire-state's age. The ancient empire-states in the golden days had peaceful external-trading networks with neighboring pasturage tribes — for example, the ancient Roman vs the Germanic tribes, and Han dynasty vs the pasturage tribes in the west-north regions, though at the beginning days the Han dynasty was subordinated to the more military-powerful horse-riding nomads called the Xiongnu. Those pasturage tribes gradually

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<sup>41</sup> The first empire type in China — the Qin and Han — was also faced with plain battlefields. This is why those dynasties are of a centralized nature.

made inroads into the anarchic regions where the military balance was tilted toward the pasturage side. They occupied the ruling position, ruined and took over the empire in the end. In the process of building an ancient empire-state, it required such a cultural system as to promote the members of an empire-state to feel a sense of unity and to have common criteria for communication. This is because not only the conqueror members but conquered members, both of whom were incorporated into an enlarged political unit, had been once in various traditional cultures. Universal religious systems played the role of consolidating those multiple cultural factors and replaced the traditional animism and ancestor worship distinguishing one member society from others. Under such existing conditions with a common cultural system, the second stage of the iron revolution arose in the following regions: the northwestern part of Europe, the territory of the Byzantine Empire, the Egypt under the Mamelukes and Japan.

The iron age at second stage is the external shock-factor and it brought about new technological innovations in agriculture — to take an example from the northwest of Europe, the deep plowing by horse-pulling and the three-field system.<sup>42</sup> Those innovations made it possible to extend arable land to the once-barren areas filled with forest, solid soil and marshy land. Farmers could engage in farming in those areas, if they were organized into one production unit which required the above-mentioned innovative tools and domestic animals under a new production system embodying those technological and organizational innovations. Since the cost to put those innovations to practice was too heavy for a few farmers to bear on their own, new societal form of a cooperative agricultural community type had to be organized into the basic unit of agricultural venture. Those circumstances *en masse* were the external impact-factor of the feudal state in the second stage of the iron revolution.

The main subjects are, at first, local bosses, monks, and aristocrats' descents under the ancient political system and they took entrepreneurial leadership for new agricultural ventures mentioned above, and after Karl Martel introduced the “comes” system in the 8<sup>th</sup> century, a new type of entrepreneurs called “comes” were dispatched to the confiscated Catholic monastery lands as the warlord ruler. Those agricultural entrepreneurs had to maintain the economic base to finance not only the investment in agricultural ventures but also the cost of a horse-riding warrior system clad in heavy armor with a bow and arrow at first and with iron spears accompanied with stirrups later. (In the case of Frank, stirrups prevailed after the 8<sup>th</sup> century and saddles and spears after the 12<sup>th</sup> century). The horse-riding warrior system was superior to the conventional ones in a power to strike by taking advantage of saddles, horse's hoof, and stirrups. Since the political authority under the ancient empire system could not maintain the economic base to finance the cost of the new military system to rule effectively over those new cultivated lands, it was inevitable for those lands to become a private estate called the “manor.” The manor system was promoted and established by the mutual contracts between the manor warrior lords and the one with hegemonic power among them called the “regional king.” According to those mutual contracts, the former are assured of the rights to their manors in return for financing the cost to maintain heavy-armored horse-riding warrior corps at their own expenses and to join in wars led by the regional king. Based on such contract, the manor warrior lords gained the status of a feudal aristocrat.

The manor was managed as autarkic an economic community as possible where the farming workers called “tenant” paid tributes and corvee of a various type in return for the benefits of infrastructures for agricultural production and consumption. (The corvee was replaced with a fixed amount or a fixed rate of

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<sup>42</sup> Strictly speaking, these images of farming community are a typical one in the final stage of the medieval feudal period after the later stage of the Carolingian dynasty. Until the later stage of that dynasty, it is not corroborated that those iron plows were used in that territory. Archaeological study shows only that in the homeland regions the three-field system and the so-called “classic manor system” were prevailing. See Horikoshi (2010).

tribute, later). Furthermore, the manor lords provided peddling salesmen and craftsmen with market places in the territory and gained revenues from taxes on them. On the other hand, at first the effectiveness of the property right to those lands was not secure, as long as it had to be assured by the manor lords' own military force. They enhanced the effectiveness of the ownership right by making a contract with a more powerful lord or the traditional authorities including religious ones. As said above, the ownership of a warrior lord was guaranteed by mutual contracts with the more powerful agents such as the regional king or the traditional religious authorities gaining a pseudo-form of donated lands. Here, the regional kings had been hostile to the traditional authorities for clash of interest, until the former overwhelmed the latter in the military power and established the absolute monarchy in the end.

To sum up, therefore, the main ruling subjects of the mediaeval feudal state<sup>43</sup> are the manor lords and the chief among them, and the power to enforce originates in the military force provided by their alliance or mutual contracts. The net-benefits gained by managing and protecting the manor motivated those subjects to finance the cost of the military force with an innovative military technology. They may be called a “regional state,”<sup>44</sup> since the territory of one regional state was located inside the much wider area of the ex-ancient empire state and continued to fight with each other to enlarge their territories and trade networks. However, the power to enforce is relative but should not be considered as the fixed one represented by the term the “sovereign” or “absolute” power. The state's power of the regional state is

relative to the state's power of the absolute monarchy. On the other hand, the main ruled people of the feudal state are farming workers, merchants, and handicraftsmen. The rulers had to meet the participants' constraints of those ruled people as the necessary condition to claim the legitimacy of using the enforcing power. The necessary condition required that that the burden of tax and corvée had to be surpassed by or at least was equal to the benefits obtainable from the economic infrastructures and protection from any violent threat which are provided by the feudal rulers.

#### 8.4 The State of the Horse-riding Nomad, Sea Nomad and Camel-riding Nomad: The Outside World of the Medieval Feudal States

The horse-riding nomads in the steppe areas, the sea-river traders with an armed transportation system in the northeast Europe, and the desert merchants with an armed caravan system were one of the outside social conditions with which the medieval feudal world was faced. Though those outside groups had been trading with the medieval world, their military predominance continued to be a serious threat to the medieval feudal world. The military power of those outside trader-groups was generated by combining their superior transportation system, economic wealth and an iron-armed soldier system. It is after Carl Martel adopted the horse-riding warrior system of al-'Abbasiya dynasty that the Caroling could occupy a dominant position in the Frank world.

*The Horse-Riding Nomadic States: The horse-riding*

<sup>43</sup> Bull (1995) denies, based on the relativity of the sovereign power, that the medieval regional power is a state. He denies it, because neither the regional kings nor the warlords had the absolute power over their territories and the independence power against the Pontiff and the Holy Roman Emperor. His denial is based on the fixed image of the state's power, according to which the power must be absolute in the sense that violence is monopolized inside the territory and that it is strong enough as to protect the state's members and territory from any external threat.

<sup>44</sup> The Byzantine Empire was actually a regional kingship adopting the mediaeval feudal hierarchical relations based on mutual contracts on how to finance the armed force comprised of horse-riding warriors, infantry and navy soldiers. The difference from the feudal state of the west Europe lies in that the Byzantine emperor had his own armed force overwhelming local warrior lords under the military system called “Themata” and that the armed force under the direct control of the emperor was financed with an entire-territory scaled taxation system comprised of taxes on independent farmers and commerce. Thanks to such adaptation to the feudal military system, the Byzantine could maintain life against military threats from the neighbor nomadic states much longer than the West Roman empire. The Tang dynasty in China also share the similar characteristics with the Byzantine Empire.

was developed in the Eurasian step area around the 1300BC of the Karasuk culture age which was still in the second stage of the Bronze Revolution. As a preliminary, it required for an innovation in the breeding of large-sized horse, which is considered arose around the late 2000BC near the Caspian Sea and the Lake Aral. Kimmerian and Scythian are the first to emerge as the horse-riding nomadic state in the history. They could stand at advantage over agricultural societies by their military power. It was made possible not only by their superiority in the movability but also in the flexibility of war tactics such as the less costly “hit and run” tactics made possible by the movability of their economic base — pasturage.

The nomadic pasturage also requires for both agricultural products and metal products to maintain their economic life. As long as their military power cannot surpass that of other societies which produce those necessary goods, the nomads go along with a peaceful trade with those supplier-sides. When the balance of the military power changed in a way favorable to the nomads, they changed the peaceful means of acquisition to the one by plunder. The Turk, the Xiongnu, and then the Hun established the “rule and ruled” relation with subjugated agricultural states under which the ruled side concede to pay various tributes to the ruling side at regular periods in return for the assurance of stopping violent plunder.

However, as long as the economic base of those horse-riding nomadic states continued to be the nomadic pasturage, they could not govern the subjugated states in such a direct way as to move their economic base to the subjugated territories. The Hungary step was so long the western border where they can station.<sup>45</sup> This is why those early horse-riding nomads had to be satisfied only with extorting the subjugated side to pay tributes from outside. After it became less risky to move from the nomadic home lands to the capital locating in the subjugated agricultural areas and sufficiently large wealth gained by taxing on commerce added to the nomadic pasturage, Mongolians and Turks built their capital in

the agricultural center.

*The Muslim Arab State:* The Muslim Arab state is distinguished from the above horse-riding nomadic states by three characteristics. The first one is that the economic base of the Muslim Arab is the “commercial business equipped with an armed force” which networked scattered communities in the desert areas, and the second is that they formed, in a dominant position, an alliance with the Bedouin camel-riding nomads with the aim of making up for the transportation capacity and supplementing the military power. The third is that the power to enforce originated in the military power generated by military entrepreneurs with talents for organizing cooperative followers into one commerce-alliance whose solidarity was further strengthened by religious appeal as well as by economic incentives. In the year 622 Muhammad organized the religious community called “umma islamiya” into a societal form of a chiefdom type in Medina, and then he started engaging in a “commerce cum plunder” venture after such a communal organization was arranged. He became a king around the year 628 when the armed force of the umma community conquered an oasis city in the northern neighbor and introduced a tribute-paying system replacing the traditional plunder.

*The Sea Nomad:* Some parts of the sea nomads moved into the mediaeval world and occupied dominant positions. Other parts settled in their home land areas and built a new type of the state called the Viking state which financed the cost to maintain the armed force by tariffing the marine business passing its territory.

In the end, those land nomad-states were taken over and consolidated by the Mongol Empire which could take advantage of both nomadic movability and gunpowder to innovate military system. The cost of the military system was financed by taxing on commerce sector and agricultural one. Though the process of their conquering war stopped at Hungary plane as other nomadic conqueror, the gunpowder and primitive firearms which the Mongol Empire brought to Europe changed the military balance among the

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<sup>45</sup> See Gat (2008).

mediaeval feudal states and played the role of an external shock-factor to the next historical age — the absolute monarchy.

### 8.5 The Absolute Monarchy in the Discovery Age with the Firearm Revolution

In the last stage of the mediaeval feudal ages, in particular, after the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the traditional manor system was taken over by a market-oriented agricultural system under which the former feudal tenants grew to a self-dependent farmer or a large-scaled agricultural entrepreneur tenanting the former landowners' lands. The market system extended nationwide and the worldwide oversea-business was just around the corner. The inner wars among the regional kings and/or the warlords continued with the aim of monopolizing levies on those newly-arising market businesses. Under such existing conditions, the firearm revolution became an external shock-factor and changed the balance of the military power among the regional kings. A series of inner wars among those regional kings in the last stage of the middle ages ushered in the age of the absolute monarchy.

The victor of the inner wars was such a regional king as to be able to take the lead in adopting a new military system equipped with firearms. In addition to the lethal superiority of the firearms, the new military system could maintain the full-time standing army which can join in a war in any time under the direct conduct of the regional king. In order to take the lead, however, a new source of funds to finance the cost of the new military system had to be found out, since the feudal military system was maintained under the feudal tributes system. The new source was found out in new economic power generated by then-arising new economic classes engaged in oversea business, domestic commerce, market-oriented handicraftsmen and market-oriented farmers.<sup>46</sup> The regional king

equipped with the new military system could overwhelm his rivals both by the military power and by the economic power. It is obvious, because his rivals remained dependent on the feudal military corps which is comprised of semi-independent feudal war lords.<sup>47</sup> A drastic increase in the net-benefits gained by war enterprise — war to extend territory — motivated the regional kings to introduce the new military system at their own cost, which was financed by the tax-revenues paid by those economic new classes. The final victor of the territory wars among the regional kings became the absolute monarch and the ex-regional kings and feudal war-lords consist of the ruling group. The power of the state originated in the combination of a political-military entrepreneurship of the absolute monarch with the economic power of those new economic classes. As long as the benefits obtainable from the provision of economic infrastructures and the protection of life and property are larger than the cost to bear the burden of taxes, they could concede the state's power used by the absolute monarch and the power became *de facto* legitimate.<sup>48</sup>

Under the absolute monarchy, the once semi-independent warrior lords and the ex-regional kings who could survive the inner wars became aristocrats and served as bureaucrat for the absolute monarch. The oversea traders who were militarily backed up by those absolute monarchs launched onto worldwide competition among them. The once-infantry soldiers in lower hierarchies, freed from military service, were specialized in the farming and new manufacturing business. A part of them, in particular, the land-property owners took on local governorship acting as the public official of an absolute monarch. Later, capitalist manufacturers and traders come out from them as well as commerce business in cities.

Owing to the development of market economy and the general use of mercenary system before the

<sup>46</sup> Those economic classes supporting financially the new armed force system are not only engaged in market-oriented businesses but also city residents. In this sense, the absolute monarchy is combined with commercial towns from the beginning.

<sup>47</sup> The firearm military system was systematically used for the first time in history, when Charles VIII invaded into Italy in 1494. It is the victory of the Swedish King, Gustav II Adolf, in the battle of Breitenfeld against the Habsburg in 1631 that the modern firearm military system brought the final end to the traditional feudal military system. See Howard (2009).

<sup>48</sup> As to the legitimacy of the sovereign power of the absolute monarch, see Lutz (2006) and Bodin (1576).

establishment of the absolute monarchy, the cost to finance the new military system could be paid by precious metals represented by gold and silver. This is why the government of the absolute monarchy pursued the mercantilist policy. The state's power of the absolute monarchy originates in the armed force which is comprised of the professional standing army with the firearm military system and was financially supported by the economic power generated by the oversea and nationwide trading business. It was, furthermore, strengthened by the mercantilism policy which was pursued under a fiscal system managed by the new aristocratic bureaucrats.<sup>49</sup>

### 8.6 The Nation State under Bourgeois Democracy: The First-Stage Nation State

The existing conditions of the “nation state with the political system of bourgeois democracy” (for short, the first stage-nation state) are the emergence of new industrial sectors which in the last stage of the absolute monarchy were begun with manufactures with natural power and soon later developed by steam power. Though new economic classes in manufacturing business had been developing a capitalistic employment system, they could not have such an overwhelming economic power as to play as the leading political role in the absolute monarchy. This is because the production system of those manufacturing businesses is based on natural energies and lacked of something more powerful.<sup>50</sup> It is steam

power.

The external shock-factor of the first-stage nation state is the capitalistic production system with large scaled manufactures moved under the steam power. As an ideological reflection of such technological and economic innovations, the Enlightenment spread. From the view points of the newly-arising economic classes called “the bourgeois” *en masse*, the wealth could be much more increased by promoting the division of labor and free trades, that is, by peaceful economic means but not by appeal to the armed force. They believed that since the people can be connected in a spontaneous way through peaceful economic activities based on division of work, the war is not the inevitable destiny and rather a result of irrational behaviors based on false notions. The British free traders and the French physiocrats advocated such an idea on the basis of economic analyses.<sup>51</sup> The Enlightenment served as an ideological factor which promoted the development of capitalism.

The bourgeoisie believed that the state's power originating in the professional standing army under the absolute monarchy had lost legitimacy, and that a new state should take over the state of the monarch, on the basis of a new criterion to justify the legitimacy of the new state's power. This new form of the state is the nation state and the legitimacy of the new state's power is justified by the agreements of the main members of a nation. Those agreements are symbolized with ideological notions such as the liberalism and egalitarianism.

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<sup>49</sup> The Ottoman Turk empire which was established by the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 is also subsumed in the absolute monarchy, because it satisfies the essential conditions of the absolute monarchy. Two other Islam empires — the Mughal empire which started in 1524, and the Safavid dynasty in Iran which started in 1587 under the rule of the Shah Abbas I the Great — were also subsumed under the absolute monarchy. Both imitated the process of introducing the firearm system which had been adopted by the Ottoman Turks one century before. Japan established the absolute monarchy in the late 16th century after introducing the firearm system consisting of the matchlock handgun and artillery from Portugal in 1543. See McNeill (1999) as to the relation between firearms and the monarchy.

<sup>50</sup> The series of political events in Britain, which was begun from the Puritan Revolution and ended with the Glorious Revolution, is a “revolution” in the sense that the property of the monarch was taken away by violence as the French Revolution. Though, however, the ancestors of the later industrial capitalists, comprised of the gentlemen in low hierarchies, yeomen and city merchants, acted as the main engine of inner wars, they had to make a compromise with other classes with the more influential economic power. This is why those political events cannot yet be called the bourgeois revolution.

<sup>51</sup> These ideas based on the economic principle are later reflected in the notions of international relations which are ramified to the Woodrow Wilson's “idealist” view based on the Kantian universalism and the Bull's “international anarchist” view based on the Grotius internationalism.

The opening stage of the first-stage nation state in Britain emerged in the processes of the Chartist Movement, in France after the so-called Revolution and in the U.S after the Independence War. Since employed workers and lower income classes were not reliable for bearing the cost to maintain the first-stage nation state, the bourgeoisie had to bear a higher share in the cost to maintain the new state. This is way the franchise was given to the bourgeoisie who could pay the taxes as the qualified condition, but not to those other working classes. The bourgeoisie were motivated to share the tax burden in return for the rights to participate in social decision-making and to protect their life, property and economic freedom. The British bourgeoisie could not abolish the absolute monarchy by violence, because their economic power could not overwhelmed the traditional classes. Therefore, they had to be satisfied with the acquisition of the franchise which could contribute to protecting the above-mentioned rights. This is why the first-stage nation state in Britain is under the “constitutional monarchy” but not under a republic system like the US and France.<sup>52</sup>

The traditional land owners including the royal family, bureaucrats serving as a public official and the capitalists consist of the ruling group, whilst the ruled people of the first-stage nation state are the lower economic classes who are excluded from the franchise in return for an exemption from income taxes. As long as the unemployment and/or subsistent wages were inevitable results of capitalism, they were the most serious threat to the legitimacy of the nation state under the bourgeois democracy.

### 8.7 The Nation State under the Mass-Democracy with Full Manhood Suffrage: The Second-Stage Nation State

The nation state under the mass democracy with full manhood suffrage is called the “second-stage nation

state,” for short. The existing conditions of this nation state are the first-stage nation state in the process of the second industrial revolution which begun in the late 19th century.

The external shock-factor is the full opening of the second industrial revolution. The main industrial arenas where the technological innovations had been arising shifted to the heavy, chemical and machine industry from the traditional light industries represented by textile industry. The main energies shifted to electric power and oil from steam power and coal. Those new leading industries were so large-scaled that the joint-stock corporation with limited liability is required to finance the cost of investment in those industries. The management system of such a joint-stock corporation changed from the capitalist-managing system in the age of the first industrial revolution into a new system called the “separation of ownership and management”

At the same time, a drastic technological innovation arose also in the military system, in particular, in warship and land transportation. The warship was made from iron, equipped with big canons and moved under steam-engine power. The land transportation by railway moving under a steam-power could network their territories nationwide. Such innovations in the warship and railway system changed the balance of power among the front-running nation states in the era of the second industrial revolution, their rivals and their trade-counterparts in a subordinate position. Under such new circumstances, the Enlightenment was taken over by a new militarism — the imperialism — leading to the colonial war and to the establishment of the hegemony.<sup>53</sup> This militarism is the second imperialism under the mass democracy since the Athens or Roman imperialism waged conquest wars aimed at establishing the hegemony over subjugate allied polis and colonized the conquered regions under the political system with the demos ‘s right to sharing in the use of the state's power. The

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<sup>52</sup> The nation states which were established in Japan and Germany in the latter half of the 1800s also belong to the constitutional monarchy, though their parliaments were less powerful in electing the cabinet members and in fiscal decision. Such a weaker political power of the bourgeois in the governmental decision-making reflected the underdevelopment of capitalistic sectors in those countries.



second imperialist war under the mass democracy, however, required a national-scaled mobilization not only in personnel but in logistics, owing to the heavy cost and the large-scaled tendency of a war. Therefore, the second imperialism war required the participation of manufacturing workers in military services, as well as the farming workers. Actually, their technical skills and work disciplines trained in the work places of large-scaled corporations were necessary for, and conducive to, the operation of the new weapons. In order for them to concede the obligation of the military services, however, they had to be given sufficient incentives in return. The general male franchise was one of the incentives in addition to welfare services. In such a process the second-stage nation state began coming into being.

New economic power was generated by the new economic classes who are stockholders, managers and workers in those large-scaled joint-stock corporations. The “power to enforce” originated in the armed force the cost of which was financed by those new economic classes, the traditional middle classes and landowners. Political parties were organized through the process of representing the interests of those classes. The state's power was exercised by those political parties which could succeed in organizing their supporters into a political majority.

Under this new political system, whilst stockholders and top-managers joined in a coalition with the traditional asset owners and self-independent classes, the workers were organized into a nation-wide labor union and became the main pressure group of left-wing political parties. In spite of such a political polarization, many managing workers in the lower hierarchies of the management system came into being and they remain un-organized group so long that they are the main pool of the so-called floating voters. As long as the ruling parties are representing the interests of the ruling economic classes, those managing workers and the unionized laborers are the main ruled

people of the second-stage nation state. Since the capitalist system became more unstable in maintaining employment, the legitimacy of the state' power is more volatile to the criticism of the capitalism.

After military technologies entered into the more advanced stage characterized with combat aircraft, aircraft carrier, submarine, tank, and atomic bomb in the end, the second-stage nation state and the imperial war ended with the victory of the anti-Axis powers which overwhelmed the Axis power by both the economic power and the military power.

#### 8.8 The Nation State under the Mass Democracy with the General Suffrage: The Third-Stage Nation State

After the Second World War, the general suffrage spread out to the nation states under the mass-democracy with the full manhood suffrage. This new type of the nation state is called the third-stage nation state, for short. The existing conditions of this new form of the state are the nationwide mobilization including women for the Second World War and the welfare programs provided for workers which were designed so as to contribute to promoting the mobilization under the pressure of communism. Those existing conditions are based on the not-so-different level of economic development from the one of the second-stage nation state. The external impact-factors of the third-stage nation state are an increase in the opportunity for women to participation in work place under the political pressure of communism. The participation of women in the capitalistic work places could increase the capability of women workers to pay taxes.

This third-stage nation state was more or less accompanied with the fiscal system of progressive taxations and welfare expenditures — called the welfare policy *en masse* — and has been called the “welfare state.” However, the terminology of the welfare state obscures the essential nature of the third-

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<sup>53</sup> The concept of the imperialism in this paper means the international strategies aiming to expand territories by conquer or by the suzerain-vassals relation and at least to establish hegemony over other countries. This terminology is different from the one defined by Morgenthau (1978) who defines it as a state's international tactics aimed at changing the existing balance of the power in a way more favorable to it.

stage nation state with respect to the concept of the state, since the problem of how the enforcing power is generated or that of what the origins of the power are is obscured by that terminology. Bearing in mind that the military power balance after the second world war lost the necessity of the nation-wide mobilization into a war due to high military technology and its mutual destructiveness, and that the origins of the state's power have not changed so much as to require a change in the share of the rights to political decision-making, the third-stage nation state tilted the balance between political rights and obligations in a way more favorable to the lower income-earners than the people in the higher status of income hierarchies. That balance is tilted more in that way, when the former are exempted from military service or some substitutable public service. This criterion for the imbalance is, of course, based on the economic principle that the income distributions determined by free-market's operation are subjected to the natural law. Such an imbalance was made possible by exercising the political pressure which is brought about only by the number size of low-income earners. In this sense, the third-stage nation states share the same characteristics as the late Roman Empire where the citizens were exempted from military service as well as income tax but could be provided with both foodstuff for staple diet and entertainments free of charge. This means that some other economic classes feel over-burdened. Therefore, it is inevitable that they tend to recognize the power of the third-stage nation state to be less-legitimate. The more the population share of these over-burdened classes is, and the more contributive they are to an increase in the economic power of the nation, then the more unstable the political system is.

A new type of the welfare state called the “third approach” is under way in some northern European countries such as Britain and Dutch since the 1980s. Under this political system, welfare services are not supplied free of charge — for example, the beneficiaries of unemployment insurance services are obliged to be trained for taking jobs later. That is, the

beneficiaries of the traditional distribution policies are more disciplined to refrain from enjoying subsidized benefits. In this sense, the traditional mass-democratic system of a “continental type of welfare-state”<sup>54</sup> may be in the process of reformation.

## 8.9 The Autocratic State: Ahistorical State 1

The autocratic state should be conceptualized on the basis of what are the origins of the power to enforce, but not based on a difference in the historical stage or a difference from democracy,<sup>55</sup> because it can emerge in various historical stages. It should be kept in mind that the enforcing power of the autocratic state is also generated by the political-military entrepreneur who can combine armed force, governance and economic power into the power of the state. The cost to finance the activities of the political-military entrepreneur is financed by some economic class who can gain so sufficient benefits as to be able to bear the cost burden. However, the autocratic state is distinguished from other forms of the state by a difference in the way to generate the state's power. The autocratic state is defined as one type of the state in which the exerciser of the state's power — person in power — has also the economic power to financially support the cost of the armed force and governance. Many of the modern autocratic states in common, for example, have a monopoly in basic industries such as energies and infrastructure sector. Such a monopolistic position in those necessary goods gives the person in power not only the economic power but also the capability to influence the economic conditions of the ruled people.

The autocratic state can be classified into two types as follows: The first one is those mineral-rich countries where the monopolized industries owned by a person in power have international competitiveness. If those monopolized industries are competitive in international markets — for example, fossil mineral resources of Muslim countries — and therefore, sufficiently large net-revenues are obtained by the owner of those resources so sufficiently as to provide

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<sup>54</sup> See Esping-Andersen (1990) as to the modern welfare state and its classification.

<sup>55</sup> In this respect, the concept defined by Tullock (1987) is misleading.

the ruled people with a means of livelihood and welfare services almost free of charge, the autocratic state of this type, though it may sound somewhat contradictory, can be benevolent to the ruled people, as exemplified by the Persian Arab Gulf states and Brunei.

The second one is, by contrast, those countries where the monopolized industrial sectors are not competitive in international markets and therefore are required to be protected. The autocratic state of this type must be economically based on those non-exportable “government-owned enterprises,” which should be called “the ruling party-owned enterprises. As well as owned by the ruling group of the autocratic state, in order to self-finance the cost to generate the power, they must be managed by the bureaucrats who are not only a government official but also one of the ruling group or one of “persons in power.” Whilst laborers and lower managing-workers employed by those party-owned enterprises are the ruled people, they concede, and lend tacit support to, the exercise of the autocratic state's power under the condition that they are assured of the participants' conditions as the minimum necessary condition of the legitimacy. However, since the whole pie to be shared is within a smaller limit in this second type of the autocratic state than in the first type of the autocracy, the political system of the second type more often tends to fall into tyrannical one, as exemplified by the self-proclaimed communist states. It should be noted that these autocratic states of the second type never grow to one of the modern democratic countries, as long as the origins of those states' power are not changed and furthermore, that any trade-relation between the private company of a democratic country and the ruling party-owned enterprise is never freed from the influence of the diplomatic and military strategies pursued by the autocratic rulers. Though second type of the autocrat state tends to end with a tyranny, the former is not the same as the latter in spite of both being non-democratic.

## 8.10 The Modern Empire-State: Ahistorical State 2

The empire state is those states which have incentives to conquer other states and/or to establish the hegemonic status beyond its original territory by an appeal to the armed force and pursue military and diplomatic strategies aimed at such an imperialist goal. This form of the state cannot either be classified definitely in terms of the historic ages, because whenever the conditions are met, it can appear over a various range of time and space. That is, if the power balance is tilted in a way favorable to a hegemony-pursuing country or a suzerain-inclined one so enough as to motivate itself to prefer the acquisition by plunder to the one by trade, it is inevitable for such a country to pursue the imperialism policy. After the Second World War, it became much costly to carry out the conquest war which is the precondition of the acquisition by rule, because due to the irrecoverable destructive power of atomic bomb, an appeal to war as the means to begin the processes of governing a conquered territory has lost rationality. However, if conventional weapons can be advanced in so an effective way as to induce the hegemonic country to appeal to the armed force, an empire state can emerge even at the present time. Even if the present countries are more widely and rigidly bound in the process of economic globalization and therefore the net-benefits obtainable from peaceful economic activities can grow larger than an appeal to the armed force, it should be noted that those developments are assured by the power balance whose preconditions are not a fixed factor.<sup>56</sup>

## 8. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I reconstruct the theory of the state by taking into consideration recent historical, archaeological and biological study indispensable for understanding the essence of the state in the Kantian categorical frameworks. The main propositions were

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<sup>56</sup> Findley (1996) presented the first analytical framework to determine the territory size of the state of an empire type. However, since he neglected the acquisition by peaceful trade, the comparison between two means of acquisition was not made.

derived from generalizing the synthetic propositions of the early state and are composed of the three synthetic propositions. I called those propositions on the state *en masse* the “evolutionary theory” in the epigenetic sense. Furthermore, I showed that the evolutionary theory is applicable to various types of the state appearing in human history later than the early state. It is needless to say that it remains to corroborate the evolutionary theory by supplementing relevant historical details.

Taking up some problems for immediate solution, it is an urgent work to apply the main synthetic propositions to the problem of state-building in conflict-torn countries and to the present international relations, *mutatis mutandis*. The state is not a fixed precondition for economic or political analysis. If the political system of a state cannot reconcile the selfish motives for the state's power with the achievement of the ultimate purposes of the society, in other word, if it cannot satisfy the legitimacy conditions, the capability of the state to achieve the final purposes of the society declines. It is because the economic power which financially supports the origins of the power is weakened by sticking to contradictory or irrational policies. Then, the actual level of the state's power also declines, leading to a decline in the economic status, the diplomatic influence and the military power. In such processes the state is more exposed to threats both from outside and from inside. Many of the once-thriving states ruined in such a process in the end.

At this final stage, it may be in order to mention on the “evolutionary” approach to which the text of this paper has not explicitly referred, though it is not required to have the thorough knowledge of its details as the preliminary condition for readers to follow the logic of this paper.

Firstly, the evolutionary approach is the view point derived from the modern biology and neuroscience, according to which human behaviors are put in the perspective of the genes mechanisms. The traditional approach of both economics and political science, based on the individualism, is inclined to focus only on the human behaviors driven by the instinct programs but controlled by the cognitive functions of

the cerebrum, implicitly subject to the homeostatic limits. On the other hand, other types of human behaviors beyond the framework of that traditional approach had to be explained in terms of artificial concepts such as the social capital and the behaviorism until now. Such a disorder in the traditional approaches originates firstly in neglecting the other programs of the selfish genes, in particular, the emotional programs, and secondly in confusing the egoism of an “organic individual as the agent” with the selfishness of the “genes as the principal.” Human behaviors in both economic and political arenas are required to be put in the perspective of the whole programs of the genes and to be reexamined from those points of view.

Secondly, the “evolutionary theory” is based on the “epigenetic hypotheses” of the genes mechanisms, and the “emergence concepts” rather than the Darwinian ones. It is because the former seems more plausible in emphasizing the fundamental fact that when faced with new circumstances, Homo sapiens have been trying many innovative enterprises to adapt to them regardless of evolving to mutant genes or not, whilst the Darwinian approach recognizes any mutant as an accidental change.

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