

A Revision of the Theory of Democratic Peace

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1 Introduction

Democratic peace is a classic argument proposed by the liberal research tradition of international relations. Therefore, some suppositions which are characteristic elements of this tradition are found at the base of this theory. In particular, we can clearly identify two fundamental pre-suppositions.

In the first place, the theory of democratic peace is based on the idea that it is possible to limit some negative aspects of the situation of anarchy in the international system. Among these aspects, war is undoubtedly the most important. This is based on the supposition that relations among states in the international system do not react necessarily to a zero sum game in which the benefits of one state coincide with the costs of the other, but that these relations can be characterized by the establishment of forms of cooperation and mutual benefit. In the second place, this theory loses its meaning if it is not recognized that states behave differently in the international system, and that the existing internal political regime influences in a substantial manner such behavior, even disregarding the position of a state in the structure of the international system. These theories, which are defined as reductionist, tend to explain the behavior of a state beginning with internal factors. As stated by Waltz (1979:66) “The essential element of the reductionist, therefore, is that the total is known by studying its parts.”

In particular, this theory ascertains that in foreign policy, democracies tend to behave in such way, that they attain conditions of crisis resolution among states without the use of force. This disposition could be caused by some factors closely linked to the democratic political regime. Once these matters are fixed, we should ask ourselves about the meaning of the term democratic peace. At least two different ways to consider the phenomenon of democratic peace can be present. A first point of view, described as “dyadic” (Doyle, 1983:205-235,323-353), presents two basic suppositions. In the first place, this version maintains that states with a democratic regime tend to adopt pacific conduct in relations with those countries with the same type of regime. In the second

place, states with a democratic political system exercise aggressive behavior against states which do not have a democratic political regime.

This hypothesis, known also as “separate peace” (Panebianco, 1997: 94-114), refers to the “community of security” identified by Deutsch (1957) at NATO, which encompasses western European countries and North America (USA and Canada) in a common military defense agreement. In fact, the element which unites these countries is that all are liberal democracies.

A second point of view is described as “monadic” (Rummel, 1983: 27-71) and maintains a hypothesis according to which democracies are peaceful in regards to foreign policy, independently of whether other regimes are or not of democratic character. The hypothesis is that democracies are peaceful and, as such, enter into war against authoritarian regimes only in situations of attack or threat by these. In the following paragraphs two different points of view will be presented regarding the phenomena of democratic peace, which attempt to understand which of the two versions is empirically sustainable, based on statistical data on the participation of democracies in war.

2 Two Versions of Democratic Peace

2.1 Monadic Version

The “monadic” hypothesis of democratic peace has received attention since the publication of an article by Rummel in 1983 (Rummel, 1981: 27-71), which summarizes an impressive work in five volumes published between 1976 and 1981 comprising *Understanding Conflict and War*. In this article a definition of democratic peace is found which has stirred up strong controversy within the tradition of liberal research.

Rummel maintains two basic suppositions which constitute the fundament of the monadic version. The first hypothesis assures that states with a “libertarian” political regime, such as that defined by Rummel, tend to not use violence in relations among themselves. The second hypothesis, more controversial and criticized, maintains that the larger the grade of “libertarianism” in a political regime, the lesser the level of expressed violence by this regime, both internally and in its relations with other states,

independent of the type of regime which characterizes the states with which it enters in contact.

Substantially, Rummel maintains a totally pacific version of liberal democracies, inclined to non-violence in their relations, not only among themselves but also with states characterized by different political regimes. The explanations facilitated by Rummel are found in the two models of interpretation which we will present in the last paragraph. In fact, we can identify the elements, both of the institutional and structural model, as well as the cultural/regulatory model.

In particular, the explanation emphasizes the importance of the economic structure of a political regime. For a “libertarian”, public opinion and interest groups exercise strong resistance to the possibility of going to war and, in this manner, avoid the costs implied in terms of increasing fiscal pressure and recruitment for military service. Democratic leaders, who should take under serious consideration the opinions of the electorate, tend to adopt peaceful solutions to avoid the escalation of violence which leads to war. On the contrary, in an authoritarian or totalitarian government, power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of persons, or in a sole leader who, by controlling all coercive resources and the media, manipulates public opinion and submits interest groups. It is, thus, that liberal democracies are dragged into war against non democratic regimes as the result of aggression by these.

What interests us is to emphasize that the explanations given present a mix of different and diverging typologies. The period taken into consideration by Rummel extends from 1976 to 1980. The unit of measure known as “dyad-years” is the number of conflicts for a pair of countries by the number of years which the conflict lasts. In total Rummel has theorized 62,040 “dyad-years”. This test has shown that a high level of “libertarianism” is negatively co-related with the degree of violence expressed in relations between two states. This research note, which merited great debate in the concept of democratic peace, has received much criticism. The first is related to the effectiveness of proof presented by Rummel. In the first place, the period is much too short. In fact, the years from 1976 to 1980 are only five, and some factors linked to particular historic situations can influence the result of the analysis. For this reason, Weede (1992: 649-664) has increased the period of analysis to twenty years, from 1960 to 1980. This research has shown a significant difference between the participation of

democracies and non-democracies in war. In addition, this research has shown the absence of a significant difference between the involvements in war by monarchies in relation to non-democracies.

In accordance to the research projects done by Chan (1984: 617-648), who studied the relationship between internal political systems and their participation in war, empirical evidence falls in the opposite direction from Rummel's thesis. In fact, the presence of a "libertarian" political regime seems to be associated with a greater number of wars. The theory that democracies are involved in wars in less measure than other political regimes has been rejected by a series of continued research following Weede and Chan.

Inclusively, Levy (1988: 653:677), who had already considered as empirical law of international relations the hypothesis that democracies did not carry out wars against each other, admitted that these have participated in war as much as non-democratic regimes. It is the same conclusion arrived at by a series of later investigations which arrived at a unanimous consensus, with the exception of Rummel, in respect to such an affirmation (Gleditsch, 1992: 369-376, Starr, 1992: 41-59).

Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that Rummel's research concentrated on the relationship between "libertarianism" and violence expressed by the state, and not on the link between "libertarianism" and the frequency of their participation in wars. In effect, as pointed out by Ray (1995), Rummel himself, in the fifth volume of *Understanding Conflict and War*, recognizes that a correlation between "libertarian" regimes, and the frequency with which countries which are characterized by this regime result implicated in wars was not verified.

Rummel's idea is that "libertarian" regimes result in less violent in conducting war and are not more peaceful as such. Later research criticized both hypotheses, arguing that democracies are less inclined to violence and the participation in wars than non-democracies, but not in their interrelations; and not necessarily in the wars in which they become involved. As a matter of fact, according to Geller (1985), the frequency with which a state becomes involved in war depends on the internal structural limitations which characterize the political regime. The effectiveness of such limits is related to the internal stability of the regime. In the presence of an unstable political system, even if it is democratic, the limits are incapable of carrying out their function.

This explains why democracies become less involved in wars than other regimes but, not for this sole reason, should they be at peace among themselves.

Some investigations have demonstrated that unstable democracies have a higher tendency level to conflict than non-democracies. Processes of democratization determine an increase in the levels of conflict in the state in which they develop (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002: 297-338). According to research by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), a democracy, for reasons related to the internal structure of the political system, tends to promote diplomatic solutions through negotiation rather than the use of force. This implies that the tendency toward diplomatic negotiations of democracies in a conflict with another state is independent of whether these states are deemed democracies or not.

In fact, according to research by Bremer (1992: 309-341), the presence of a democracy in a crisis with another state reduces the probability of war. On the other hand, the idea that democracies become involved in war against non-democratic regimes in answer to an aggression from these, has raised many doubts. There are cases in which it seems difficult to establish precisely which state is the true aggressor and which is the victim of an attack. This might be because, in some cases, the escalation process which leads to military conflict is slow and implies a series of small confrontations which degenerate into war; or in other cases, because the state can make some use of a preventive war (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997: 283-310). In either case, Rummel's hypothesis about the non-violent nature of democracies seems very questionable, for its simplicity and determinism to describe a complex phenomenon, such as the conduct of a state's foreign policy (MacMillan, 2003: 233-243).

Research carried out during the 1990s has increasingly associated the monadic version to a structural/institutional interpretation of democratic peace. This is because by examining only those elements of internal functioning of liberal democracies, the theory of democratic peace is simplified. Nevertheless, this simplification has come to exclude or trivialize the external elements which influence the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy. For these reasons, the monadic version, which had the honor of emphasizing the functioning of some internal mechanism for democracies, does not appear to verify itself empirically. In contrast, the dyadic version which has held the

interpretation of democratic peace as a separate one seems more useful to supply an interpretation of foreign policy behavior than a liberal democracy.

2.2 Dyadic Version

The dyadic version of democratic peace has found support in Doyle's research. In particular, two recognized articles also published in 1983 (Doyle, 1983: 205-235, 323-353) by Doyle, have supported the hypothesis that liberal states are not pacific, as such, they are so only among themselves, but are aggressive against non-liberal states. The author inspired his analysis in the Kantian theory of perpetual peace. In fact, the idea that "republics" progressively establish peaceful relations among themselves (to the point of uniting through a *foedus pacificum* in a federation of republics, and that they maintain a state of war with states which do not take part in this federation) is, without a doubt, the nucleus of the dyadic version of democratic peace. Even if the explanation given by Kant to this phenomenon is contradictory, if public opinion rejects war to avoid suffering the ensuing costs (the Kantian effect), this rejection would include war against non-democracies. Hence, this evolution would displace Kant toward a monadic version.

In whatever case, even if the origin of Kant's thought of the dyadic version is doubtful, Doyle's thesis found a strong consensus in academia, which has formed a new research trend within the tradition of liberal research defined as "neo-Kantian" (Panebianco, 1997). In particular, Doyle maintains the hypothesis which have constituted the center of neo-Kantian thought, as well as the dyadic version of democratic peace. The first hypothesis maintains that liberal democracies tend to ally among themselves. The last maintains that liberal democracies are aggressive against non-democracies. Even in this case, the explanations given by Doyle mix elements of the structural/institutional model with the normative/cultural model. Nevertheless, this last model places much attention on the role performed by liberalism as a cultural element, in conditions which establish the effect of the absence of war among liberal democracies.

A series of empirical investigations have attempted to verify the dyadic version of democratic peace. In particular, research by Maoz and Abdolali (1989: 3-35) has examined the impact of war among all the possible couples of states between 1816 and

1976. Three hundred and thirty two couples of states involved in wars among themselves during this period were detected. In 20% of these cases, a democracy is the aggressor and in 23% a democracy is attacked. Theoretically, only fifteen wars would have developed among two democracies; therefore, in proportion, about 5% of the conflicts between two states would have been composed of two democracies. Nevertheless, the empirical research of Maoz and Abdolali has found that 0% of wars occurred between democracies. This difference is significant and would demonstrate the effect of democratic peace.

However, it must be taken into account that the number of democracies during the period encompassing 1816 to 1976 has varied in a significant manner. There were few existing democracies during the nineteenth century and, this, according to many critics, could explain the data obtained for this research. For this reason, Maoz and Abdolali have decided to adopt a measure which would take into account this factor, calculating the number of wars between couples of states by years (Dyad years) observed from 1816 to 1976, for a total of 271,904 Dyad years. Of these, only 24,489, that is 9%, involved the participation of democracies.

A series of criticisms have put in doubt this data. In particular, it is necessary to take into account that the number of wars among 332 couples of states includes the observation of multilateral wars as separate wars. The observations made between one state against all others cannot be considered as independent themselves. How can relations solely between two states not be considered independent during the last number of years? This has caused an unusually high number of observations, alternating in this way the effect of the research (Ray, 1995).

For this reason, it was necessary to review this data to try to correct research errors. Maoz and Russett (1983) have developed a research method which supplies more certain data for the empirical evidence of democratic peace. This has restricted the period considered in the analysis of Post-WWII, more precisely between 1946 and 1986. Three reasons exist for taking into account this period to verify empirically the absence of conflicts among democracies.

In the first place, after the war, the number of democracies has increased considerably, tripling the number of couples of democratic states in comparison with the previous period. In the second place, the post-war period was characterized by a series

of new factors, such as economic development and systems of formation of defensive alliances against the threat of the Soviet Union. These elements can be taken into account, faced with the evaluation of competitive hypotheses which attempt to explain the phenomenon of democratic peace. Lastly, democracies have demonstrated more stability and durability during this period. This implies that democracies are perceived as stable regimes which foment reciprocal confidence.

The unit of measure continues to be a number of **couples** of states per year (Dyad-years). During the noted period, this number has increased from 50 to 160, widening the number of adopted cases to 265,000. Nevertheless, the majority of these pairs are only theoretical, taking into account the fact that, for many of these, it is not plausible to state that military or diplomatic disputes have ever existed. To clarify the research, it is necessary to limit the analysis through the introduction of two factors.

The first is “contiguity”, that is, the geographic proximity between two states. It could be expected that distance reduces the possibility of conflict between two states, and, thus, controversies between themselves should be eliminated from the calculation. However, it is necessary to examine separately the conflict between major powers, even if they are not geographically close to each other, given that, possessing a role at the international scale, they have a real opportunity to enter into conflict with other countries, even if they are distant. The second factor which limits the scope of the research is the fact that one of the two parts is a major power. It is useful to consider conflicts between major powers and small states and their colonies unfeasible.

These limits restrict the analysis of 36,162 dyad years, with approximately 714 disputes among themselves. From these controversies, fifteen involve democracies and only one of these conflicts was produced among democracies. This investigation has manifested the empirical evidence of the phenomenon of democratic peace, such as it has been interpreted by the dyadic theory.

A series of ambiguous cases continue occurring, in which it is not easy to define with precision the type of political regime which characterizes one or another of the two states¹⁾. Once the empirical evidence of this phenomenon is defined, it is necessary to take into consideration possible explanations.

3. Models of Interpretation

Based on studies by Russett and Maoz (1993: 624-638), the investigation of possible causes for democratic peace has been characterized by interpretative models provided by these researchers. Obviously, this distinction between explanations “structural/institutional” and “cultural/normative” are not exempt from criticism. It is not always possible to easily distinguish structural and cultural elements, and this creates super-positions between the two assumptions, which causes the interpretation of the phenomenon to be more confusing. Nevertheless, this distinction continues to be the most used by scholars, mainly for the achievement of feeding a fruitful debate among researchers about the relationship between peace and democracy, and peace and liberalism.

The capacity for prediction of these explanations about peace or war does not present critical cases, as it tends to predict the same result, and in critical cases, the prediction is mixed. A proof of the merits of an interpretation must necessarily take into account the cases in which the empirical prediction of the two models is contrasting. This serves to point out which of the two models currently presents the largest capacity to interpret the phenomenon of democratic peace.

In the following paragraphs, the hypotheses formulated for the institutional/structural and normative/cultural models will be presented, as they were listed by Russett (1993). These will be analyzed in light of the different versions of democratic peace, using most recent research of this matter.

3.1 Institutional/Structural Model

Explanations named “institutional” or “structural” are characterized by attention to internal factors of a political democratic regime. In particular, these explanations concentrate on the effects which, institutions in a democracy, influence the behavior of foreign policy of a state. The main thesis is that violent conflicts among democracies are rare. This is demonstrated by a series of hypotheses.

1) “In an economy of checks and balances, the division of power and the presence of public debate in the formulation of public policies, implies that the decision to enter into large scale conflict is an extremely difficult one.” (Russett,1993:40).

This first hypothesis is the foundation of structural conception. The basic idea is that the presence of a series of institutional limitations makes the decision by government leaders to go to war “difficult”. But, what is understood by “difficult”? The difficulty of a political decision can be seen in two interrelated manners. In the first place, a political decision can be considered difficult if it involves complex negotiation between the actors in a political system. In the second place, the difficulty of a decision can be expressed in terms of the time needed for its effective application. There are mainly three structural limits which make the decision for war in democratic regimes difficult.

a) The first element which makes the decision for war or peace difficult is the balance of power. In a political system characterized by the presence of a series of checks and balances, which leads to a condition whereby no single power of the State is capable of completely dominating the other, a decision as important and risky as war cannot be taken, disregarding the consensus of the other powers. Certainly, the principle of a balance of power is diffused in a structural institution. In particular, it becomes concrete in the presence of an institution which plays the role of balancer²⁾. Nevertheless, the presence of this institution is not, by itself, sufficient to guarantee balance between powers. In fact, in order for the balancer to exercise its role, it is necessary that the principle of a balance of powers be considered a value by all parties involved in the system. This means that this element must be more linked to a normative/cultural explanation than a structural/institutional one. In fact, the concept of balance of powers does not belong to democratic tradition but to liberal thought.

b) The second element is closely connected to the first. In effect, the principle of separation of powers is simply a juridical codification of the principle of balance. Regardless, these two elements should not be considered synonymous. While a balance of powers appears as a cultural factor, the division of powers is, without a doubt, a structural factor in a political regime. The obstacle for the decision of war is represented by the presence of veto players (Tsebelis, 2002), institutional if it is a political regime, capable of blocking a government decision. The fact that the powers of a state are separate among themselves does not signify that they are necessarily in balance. These

powers, even separately, can converge among themselves giving way to a corporative system.

According to this point of view, it is sufficient that the powers of the state be lawfully separated to determine a level of complexity which prevents a decision of war. We must keep in mind the fact that the decision to go to war is taken by a government which seeks legitimacy in a vote by parliament. Normally, parliaments do not deny approval to governments and limit themselves to ratifying a declaration of war. However, the process of decision making must take into account the type of institutional relationship between the government and the parliament. In a presidential form of government, in which Congress maintains strong autonomy in respect to the President, especially in a divided government situation³⁾, it can be expected that a decision as important as war be more complex and requires more time to take. In parliamentary forms of government, negotiation takes place within the executive power, and the parliament more frequently ratifies without major problems. In fact, in federal states, due to the representation of local interests in central institutions, the government must seek approval of each of the units which make up the federation, and this makes decision processes more complex (Silverstone, 2005:1-55). In any case, the difficulty is presented only during the time needed to apply the decision. Therefore, it can be stated that democracies require more time for a decision to go to war.

c) The third element is public debate, or the capacity of public opinion to put pressure on the government of a political regime. As we have seen, this hypothesis has been formulated by Kant in “The Eternal Peace”. At this point, it is necessary to study this hypothesis in depth to attempt understanding whether it is true the public is capable of influencing foreign policy in a state, and if it is true that this pressure always tends to choose peaceful conduct. In regards to the first point, it must be said that this pressure can exist only in a democratic context. As Kant intuited, only a in political regime in which popular consensus is needed by the government in order to win elections and remain in power, are political leaders sensitive to the demands of public opinion. If a democratic leader decided to go to war in opposition to the desires of the public, audience costs should be taken into account.

In fact, as demonstrated by Gaubatz's research, democracies tend to not go to war at times close to electoral cycles to avoid suffering a loss of consensus and risking electoral failure (Gaubatz, 1999). This idea was in conflict with a series of studies on the behavior of USA presidents in terms of foreign policy during elections (Russett, 1990). The decision to use force can generate, in some contexts, an increase in consensus of public opinion. This effect, known as "rally round the flag" (Lee, 1977: 252-256), allowed presidents, during uncertain electoral conditions, to achieve an increase of 2 to 3 percentage points in popularity (Lian and O'Neal, 1993: 277-300).

The theory of deviation, or distraction, already suggested by Machiavelli and Bodin, presents a series of conditions which limit the field of action. A government decision to use force during an electoral period is always risky and, unless a series of necessary conditions is present, the deviation strategy is not applicable. In the first place, there must be certainty of victory with few deaths and, to continue, there must exist a high differential of strength against the opponent. In any case, the effect on electoral consensus for a military victory is doubtful, as demonstrated by the cases of Winston Churchill and George H. Bush (Andreatta, 2005: 213-233). On the other hand, the enemy should be credible; otherwise, on the contrary, the public and media will not support the use of force (Lian and O'Neal, 1993: 277-300). In particular, research by Geva and Mintz (1993: 484-503) has manifested that democracies tend to not use the theory of deviation against other democracies. In the second place, the "rally round the flag" effect only functions if the country has strong internal cohesion. In fact, if there are strong internal divisions caused by contrasts of ethnic and religious minorities, the decision of conflict could be perturbing and undermine internal order. For these reasons, the theory of deviation is not conditioned to refute Gaubatz's thesis. At the most, this represents a rare exception to the theory of electoral cycles.

The consensus of public opinion in the decision for war is essential for a democracy. The definition of national interest becomes a central factor in obtaining public consensus (Reiter and Stam, 2002). Furthermore, not all democracies are equal. The pressure of public opinion can have different effects depending on the type of institutional structure present in a state. It is possible that some democracies are more open to the influence of public opinion in matters of foreign policy than others. This depends upon the level of concentration of power that an institutional system presents.

In particular, the pressure of public opinion seems more effective in democracies in which power is fragmented and decentralized, with weak institutions and strong organized social groups. It must be said that this pressure has less power in a political system which works in inverse form.

There are democracies which offer a mix between two extremes, where the pressure of public opinion is filtered by political parties (Risse-Kappen, 1983: 479-512). In respect to the second point, it must be asked why public opinion should be pacific. Two types of explanations can be identified. The first maintains that the public is always opposed to war because it does not want to suffer its costs, both in terms of economy and casualties. As for economic costs, it supports the hypothesis that military intervention determines the need for greater fiscal pressure and that this would produce opposition. Nevertheless, it is not sure that the economic costs of war are high. For example, in the case of an asymmetrical conflict, between a great power and a small state, the economic costs of war would be limited, and public opinion could support the decision of war, expecting larger benefits than costs (Schweller, 1992: 240-242). This signifies that the calculation of economic costs is not always an element to dissuade conflicts: in fact, in some cases it could even encourage them. This point of view assumes that the public is a rational actor capable of evaluating the economic cost of a conflict with precision.

Research on the role of public opinion has shown that foreign policy preferences are organized in a series of cognitive schemes on the basis of a structure of values, more than on economic calculations (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987, 1099-1120). On the contrary, the cost in terms of human lives is always the element which most affects the sensitivity of public opinion. However, it can be pointed out that new wars are carried out mainly by professional armies and not by citizens obligated to military service (Kaldor, 1999). On the other hand, military technology continues to reduce the need for a large number of persons in war, diminishing the risk and number of losses of human lives. This implies that even this type of cost, in part, has lost its capacity to mobilize public opposition to the war. A second hypothesis maintains that public opinion in a democracy is pacific, for motives related to cultural values, which characterize this political regime. This second hypothesis makes clear reference to a normative/cultural

model and, therefore, will be discussed in the next paragraph. What interests us in this part is refuting the idea that public opinions are necessarily pacific.

2) “Leaders of other democratic countries know the difficulties and limitations imposed on democracies in the decision to go to war” (Russett, 1993: 40).

As we have seen, difficulties imposed upon democracies from the structural point of view produce a greater slowness of these in the decision for war. The second option presented by this model sustains that other states, characterized by a democratic political regime, are conscientious of these difficulties. The idea is that democracies are transparent political systems, in which the decision making process, due to the presence of political opposition and free media, is totally visible from the outside.

This condition of reciprocity of transparency is capable of creating a climate of trust between democracies and resolving the dilemma of security (Doyle, 1986: 1151-1169). The mutual recognition of peaceful intentions is an essential element for creating this climate of trust among states and results useful for the pacific solution of crises. Transparency reduces the effects of problems of communication and coordination between democratic states (Fearon, 1994: 577-592). In fact, in a dispute between states, the lack of precise information leads to diplomatic negotiation on the basis of reciprocal bluffs about the intention to use force. This coercive diplomacy increases the risk of a military escalate of the crisis. Nevertheless, in democracies, the presence of internal political opposition, favors the transparency of objectives and ways to resolve international crises by the government. This would explain the reason why democracies would be capable, among themselves, to avoid international crises which affect them and can degenerate to the point of reaching violent conflict (Schultz, 2001).

Furthermore, the lack of diplomatic agreements determines an internal and external cost which democratic leaders should take into account. In particular, the violation of agreements produces damage in terms of reputation and credibility of the conduct of a state in questions of foreign policy. These costs determine an incentive for cooperation among democracies (Crawford, 1994: 345-386). In accordance with the theories of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), democratic peace can be explained by reference to the type of “image” that states provide to others in the international system. If the leaders of one country are not obliged by internal political factors to

provide a pacific solution, then they have an aggressive image (hawk States) which feeds the dilemma of security. On the contrary, leaders of a state strongly limited by interior political opposition, tend to present peaceful solutions (dove States). This makes it less probable that the crises among democracies give way to violent conflicts.

Nonetheless, not all studies agree on the transparent nature of conduct of foreign policy in democracies. Some research has shown how, in many areas especially related to military security, inclusive, democracies tend to maintain the greatest possible reserve (Rosato, 2003: 585-602, Finel and Lord, 1999: 325-339). Regardless, in a crisis among democracies, this lack of mutual information does not seem to represent a problem such as to place in danger diplomatic negotiation. This is due to the presence of organizations which carry out a managerial function in relations among democratic states (Dembinski, 2004: 545-565). These organizations carry out two important functions. In the first place, they reduce the rivalry for power among states which form part of these. This is demonstrated by the fact that alliances among democracies are more stable and lasting with alliances in the international system (Gaubatz, 1996: 109-140). In the second place, these democratic organizations are capable of stabilizing cooperation among democracies, carrying out control of fulfillment of agreements, and as an independent source of information for the resolution of crises (Keohane, 1989).

Therefore, the transparency of democracies is, without a doubt, an important factor to explain the phenomenon of democratic peace. Nevertheless, the explanation based on the transparency of information emphasizes only one aspect of this link of trust among democracies. In addition, as we have seen, information transparency among democracies can be explained by the role of inter-democratic institutions more than by the effect of national institutional factors endemic to each state. Therefore, we have to understand which factors lead each state to join these institutions.

3) “Democratic leaders are conscientious that other democracies require time to decide, and that they cannot surprise attack” (Russett, 1993: 40).

This hypothesis is based on the idea that democracies, which require time to decide, are not in conditions to organize surprise attacks against their adversaries. This implies that in a crisis between two democracies, both will know that diplomatic negotiations will be given the needed time to be completed, without the risk of being

interrupted by a surprise attack. This phenomenon has been analyzed by the Schweller's research regarding theories of the evolution of Gilpin's international system. According to Gilpin (1981), the balance of the international system can change as a result of the differential growth of power among the states which compose these. This situation represents a contrast between the hegemonic power in decline and a growing power of defiance. The hegemonic power can decide to eliminate an opponent with a surprise attack, foreseeing a probable war of hegemony. The use of preventive war is inscribed in Gilpin's theory as a tool used by hegemonic power to maintain status quo. Nonetheless, Gilpin himself underlines the fact that not all changes in the international system have been characterized by preventive wars and hegemonic wars. The possibility of a peaceful change of the international system exists. The most evident example is the passage of the role of hegemonic power of Great Britain and the USA during the 20th century. This passage was carried out without these two countries entering into war with each other, and this is due to the fact that both countries share a series of common values. The fact of sharing common values is a needed condition to have a peaceful change in the international system.

Departing from these theories, Schweller (1992: 240-242) was able to formulate a hypothesis about the behavior of democracies in relation to the decision regarding preventive wars. According to his research, when a transition of power involves a democracy in a stage of decadence, under no circumstances, will there be preventive wars. If the defying power were a democracy, a compromise would be reached. On the contrary, if the defying power were not democratic, the hegemonic democratic power will tend to create defensive alliances to protect itself against it. Regardless, the explanations supporting this theory are not linked to the slowness in decision making of democracies, but to elements, as we shall see, which are considered part of the cultural/normative model.

For this reason, a direct link does not seem to exist between the slowness in decision making and the absence of preventive wars. In effect, a democracy can also use the time of diplomatic negotiations to prepare for a surprise attack against the enemy. Therefore, it is not in this phenomenon that an explanation for the absence of preventive wars among democracies can be identified. The second thesis reaffirms that violent

conflicts among democracies and non democracies and among non democracies are frequent due to:

1) “Leaders of non democracies are not restricted by limits in decision making and, therefore, can decide easily, with speed and in secret, the start of a war of aggression” (Russett, 1993: 40).

Authoritarian regimes do not present internal factors we have identified in democracies. In fact, in these, a legal separation of powers or efficient functioning of the principal of balance of powers, does not exist, and the pressure of public opinion may not have any effect on the foreign policy options of the government. However, it is useful to introduce a distinction among non democratic regimes. Authoritarian regimes can be divided in three different types. In the first place, there are military authoritarian regimes in which the armed forces have been converted to be the dominant group in society and exercise a form of control or efficient direction of the civil government (Pasquino, 2000). In the second place, there are personal authoritarian regimes, also known as personal dictatorships, in which only one person is placed at the top of the most important institutions of the regime.

Lastly, there are authoritarian regimes based on the control by a sole party. These authoritarian regimes, even without the limits of democracies, do not present the same propensity for war. In particular, research done by Pency and Butler (2004:565-581), showed that authoritarian personal regimes are characterized by a greater propensity for conflict compared to authoritarian sole party regimes. The demonstration of this hypothesis is referred to as selective theory by Bueno de Mesquita. On the other hand, not all scholars agree on the link between peace and democracy. In accordance to the theories of Cohen (1994: 207-223), forms of separate peace can exist inclusive in the absence of democracy. In particular, Kacowicz (1995: 265-276) identifies eight areas of peace from 1815 to date, only one of which is characterized for having democratic institutions. Nevertheless, he himself notes that the peace zone which is characterized by democratic institutions presents peculiar characteristics.

In this way, if it is true that authoritarian regimes do not possess the internal limits of democracies, it is also true that not all authoritarian regimes have the same propensity for conflicts. In any case, authoritarian regimes of whatever type do not

present any form of transparency on the intentions for conduct of foreign policy, and much less in the control of arms. In fact, they often do not accept the control of a supra-national organization or limit the efficiency of their research. In an authoritarian regime, institutions are considered as instruments of internal coercion and, frequently, participate in violence through an apparatus of well structured security and, in general, conducted by the military. In addition, they are capable of extracting and rapidly mobilizing their internal resources to military zones without facing opposition (Lake, 1992: 24-37). This leads to a climate of mutual mistrust which feeds, undoubtedly, a climate of insecurity.

Nevertheless, the process for internal government decision-making will not be the same between the various authoritarian regimes taken into consideration. The authoritarian military and personal regimes have less need for internal negotiation in the decision for war in comparison with one party regimes. This is due to the fact that one party regimes still have a type of internal division among diverse currents with various leaderships which clash among themselves.

2) “The leaders of a State, be they democratic or non democratic, in confrontation with a non democracy, will begin a preventive attack to evade a surprise attack”. (Russett, 1993: 40).

This theory appears to be both partially confirmed and partially refuted by Schweller’s thesis. In fact, as we have seen, Schweller (1992: 240-242) maintains that democracies never carry out preventive wars, even when they are in conflict with a non democracy. Democracies tend, in this case, to create defensive alliances among themselves to discourage preventive attacks by a mishap of an emerging non democracy. If the hegemonic democracy attempted to balance the power of an adversary through a preventive war, it could result in failure. This is due to a series of factors that a hegemonic power should consider. In the first place, the best democratic allies of a hegemonic power will be other democracies which, in times of peace, do not have a large army at their disposition for attack to protect the prestige of its ally. These democracies prefer to discharge the costs of maintaining status quo in the hegemonic power. If the governing democracy decides on a surprise attack, it could lose the support of its allies. In the second place, it is difficult to find a democracy which is not favorable

to the status quo. On the contrary, it is more probable that democracies seek to support the revision of the international system through a policy of bandwagoning⁴⁾ with the defiant non democratic power. For these reasons, the hegemonic democracy tends to create common defense structures which can act as dissuaders against a preventive attack of the emerging power. We have seen that alliances among democracies proved to be among the most stable between possible alliances within the international system. This implies that, if the hegemonic power is a democracy, it tends to create structures of common defense with other democracies. Therefore, democracies tend not to carry out preventive attacks against non democracies.

In conclusion, the structural/institutional model has many limitations in its explanation of democratic peace. In the first place, the balance of powers cannot be considered an institutional factor and, therefore, cannot form part of that model. In addition, the division of powers can decelerate the time for political decision, but not block it. This implies that the absence of preventive wars in democracies is not linked to slowness of decision making. In respect to public opinion, democratic leaders do not worry about audience costs. If there is a similar situation, the effect of reducing wars made by democracies during times close to elections is also reduced. The only structural effect can be identified in the major or minor efficacy of the pressure of public opinion on government decisions in foreign policy. This pressure changes considerably depending on the country's form of government. For this, we must ask ourselves why and in what contexts does public opinion manifest itself against war.

The argument that opposition to war is linked to economic and casualty costs does not seem verifiable in all cases. For example, the judgment of public opinion and the pressure on government against these two wars, is not the same. The problem of costs cannot be exposed in absolute terms but should be considered in terms relative to the objective which the conflict proposes to reach. The increase in costs of WWII was considered by Americans to be just, because it was used for an end that was considered just. Therefore, the attention of the analysis should move toward factors which characterize a country's culture. In the second place, we have seen how democracies are not transparent regimes as such, but can resolve the problem of lack of mutual reciprocal information recurring to inter-democratic organizations.

3.2 Cultural/Normative Model

The hypothesis named as “cultural” or “normative” attempts to explain the phenomenon of democratic peace from factors attributed to cultural phenomena. This model is based on two fundamental assumptions:

- 1) “In relation to other States, leaders tend to follow the same rules for the resolution of conflicts which characterize the internal political process.”
- 2) “These expect leaders of other states to follow the rules which characterize their internal political process in the resolution of conflicts” (Russett, 1993:35).

In accordance with these commitments, states are influenced by the internal political regime in their conduct of foreign policy: not as much by the internal functioning of institutional structures, as by the norms which characterize the modality of resolution of internal political controversies. These norms, applied to foreign policy, are conducive to the tendency of democracies to pacific solution of crises with other states. This can provide an explanation for the phenomenon of peace among democracies. This hypothesis, formulated by Kant, maintains that the entire peace project perpetuated among states is only possible if norms are produced which regulate the internal political process of democracy in the international system. The functioning of these norms is capable of reducing the harmful effects of the situation of anarchy in the international system.

The constructivist tradition of research has attempted to develop a theory which could explain the birth and evolution of the norms of a political system within the international system. Research by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 887-917) has identified three phases of the vital cycle of norms. The first phase is characterized by the emergence of norms. In this stage, it is important to examine the role played by those individuals or social groups who promote the affirmation of a particular norm, whose function is conditioned by the interpretation and point of view of those who have favored its inception. In this stage, organizations which are created to promote the apparition of the norm play a decisive role. Organizations which favor the emergence of norms which regulate the functioning of the international system continue to be the

states. The first attempts to resolve the crisis through mediation can be traced clearly among many democratic states, in particular between Great Britain and the USA. This demonstrates that the internal functioning of these organizations determines the effect on the phenomenon of emergence of the norms in the international system.

The second phase is characterized by the acceptance of norms. For a new norm to enter into practice in foreign policy, it is necessary that organizations which comprise the international system be institutionalized. The effect of the acceptance of the state is influenced, not only by the number of states which decide to apply the norm, as it is in function of which states adopt this norm. It is evident that, the decision to contract a certain norm for conduct of foreign policy on the part of a hegemonic power, is capable of influencing the entire international system in the extension of its power.

The third phase is characterized by the internationalization of the rule. The process of “socialization” is the fundamental mechanism which explains the phenomenon of propagation in a “cascade” of norms. In accordance with this theory, the acceptance of a norm by a group of states is conducive to a tendency on the part of other states in the international system to recognize and practice this norm. In fact, diplomatic practices, both bilateral and multilateral, spread by the group of states which have accepted this rule, are reinforced by a series of incentives and material sanctions.

The cultural/normative model maintains that violent conflict among democracies is rare because:

3) “In a democracy, rulers tend to resolve political differences with compromise and non-violence, respecting the right to opposition” (Russett, 1993: 35).

This case points out the behavior of democracies in the solution of internal conflicts. The idea is that democracy is a political system in which violent conduct by the state is submitted to a series of very strong restrictions. All participants in the political process of a democracy can expect that the norms which regulate the democratic political system be respected by everyone.

At this point, we should ask ourselves which are the norms that democracies have put in place to resolve internal conflicts. Some fundamental values of the democratic system can be identified. Democracy is a competitive system, regulated and

non-violent for the solution of conflicts among institutions of the State, in which decisions are made by the principle of majority. This principle prescribes a series of behaviors related to the functioning of the democratic political system, but does not prescribe any explicit limit to public policies that such a system can deploy. In this way, we can identify two regulatory elements common to all democracies. In the first place, a democracy is always characterized by the presence of a bounded and non-violent (Russett, 1993) competition (Dixon, 1994: 14-32), in which material interests and political values enter into conflict with the purpose of determining public policy. This competition is expressed by the mechanism of elections. Nevertheless, democracy cannot be identified simply as a system of intermittent elections (Schmitter, 1991: 75-88). Competition in the political system implies various actors, from the political elite to social groups which are organized around specific interests, and are carried out in diverse forms in which elections are only one of the modalities.

It can be stated that democracies vary among themselves in accordance with the type of norms which govern internal competition. In the second place, the decisions of democratic institutions are made by the criteria of the majority. These principles, the foundation of a democratic model, are often associated with values which refer to the tradition of liberal thought. The link between liberalism and democracy is, without a doubt, very close. This makes it difficult to establish a frontier between the normative values of one or the other. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take into account this distinction with the goal to deepen the analysis of the link between democracy and peace. In fact, many scholars tend to identify, in the values of liberalism and not in the values of democracy, the explanation of the phenomenon of peace among liberal democracies.

The central nucleus of liberalism identifies itself with the attempt to restrain political power. Therefore, the values of liberalism are not limited to guaranteeing that the political competition among actors in the system be regulated and result in non-violence, such as is established in a democracy, but also that public policies implemented by the government be limited in respect to individual rights. It can be affirmed that the practice of non-violence in a liberal democracy is limited to groups which comprise the corporative system which characterizes it. Yet, in a liberal democracy, the use of violence against people is also considered illegitimate. From the

conceptual point of view, the principle of non-violence in a liberal democracy is partial because the use of force is limited by the rights of social groups co-aligned amongst them. But, in a liberal democracy, the respect for individual rights determines a much wider non-violent principle and is not half-completed by belonging to a social group.

4) “Democracies follow the same rules for pacific resolution of conflicts faced by other democracies and expect others to do the same” (Russett, 1993: 35).

At this point, it is necessary to understand if it is the values of a democratic system or the values of liberalism which determine internal and external incentives of democratic peace. In respect to pacific incentives internal to democracies, we can refer to what we said about the role of public opinion and the effect of the system of elections on the conduct of foreign policy of a state. The strongest internal incentive against the decision of war for a government is the public opinion’s opposition. We have seen that the reasons for such opposition cannot be identified exclusively in the economic evaluation or the human cost of war. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the cultural reasons which characterize public opinion of a country, to be able to understand who and when it expresses itself against war.

Some research has demonstrated that the public relates to international policy by “cognitive schemes”, in which a series of values placed in hierarchy are present (Conover and Feldman, 1984: 92-126). Through these core values, public opinion interprets the international system condition (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1099-1120). It is necessary to understand which these fundamental values are. The reasons, for which public opinion can manifest itself against a war, can be united in two types. In the first place, the public can express its opposition to a war if it considers that national interests are violated. In the second place, the use of violence can be perceived as “legitimate” on the part of the public. If it were not this way, strong opposition would be present.

In respect to the first point, what is understood as national interest must be taken into account. A first type of definition affirms that national interest can be considered “as the requirement for self security of each state in a condition of anarchy of international relations...” (Pistone, 2004). According to this definition, the concept of national interest is linked to the concept of national security so strongly as to be considered synonymous. This interpretation was considered unsatisfactory and partial

according to the point of view of George and Keohane (1980), who have tried to redefine the contents of this concept, proposing a different concept of security and the introduction of additional elements. In particular, these authors have proposed replacing the concept of national security for the concept of physical survival of its citizens, an objective to be reached inclusively at the expense of territorial integrity. They have also proposed that the problem of economic subsistence of citizens and the integrity of the institutions of the state be included as national interest. This last point shows how it is not possible to define with precision the concept of national interest, disregarding the constitutional context of a state (Von Vorys, 1990). “The national interest, adequately conceived, cannot be in conflict ...with the principles which give information to the political community.” (Parsi, 1998:206).

The constitutional context in which the interests of social groups can express themselves and compete among each other to define national interest, is that which is democratic. For this, the protection and liberty of democratic institutions must be recognized as a constitutive element of the concept of national interest. Therefore, public opinion will oppose or support a war based on the perception of threat to the constitutive values of the community.

In the case of a liberal democracy, public opinion will attempt to maintain a balance of the political system which, as we have seen, is the only true limit to the power of the state. War is the greatest threat to the balance of powers because, in states of exception, power tends to concentrate itself in the hands of the government (Panebianco, 2004: 287). It is for this reason that public opinion in liberal democracies is inclined to oppose war unless it not be considered necessary and legitimate (MacMillan, 2004: 179-200).

The principle of legitimate use of force is the second factor which can determine support or opposition of public opinion. In accordance to MacMillan, liberals support or reject war based on the perception of legitimacy of this choice. Legitimacy is determined on the basis of respect for the norms of conduct derived from the principles and values of liberal tradition (MacMillan, 2004: 179-200). This does not mean that liberal democracies never go to war, but, as happens with its internal policy, they tend to regulate the use of force to fulfill a set of values and principles which refer to liberal tradition. Nevertheless, it is always possible that in the government of a liberal

democracy there exist a non-liberal leadership; the costs in terms of electoral consensus would have to be taken into account.

In accordance with Owen's theory (1994: 87-125), liberal ideology can be considered a cause for democratic peace, where democratic institutions are the medium. The presence of these two elements can explain democratic peace. Owens maintains that liberal leaders tend to give confidence to states considered liberal democracies. In this sense, separate peace among liberal democracies cannot be considered a general law, because this effect is produced only if a liberal democracy is perceived by the rest as such. This moves all attention on the role carried out by the "perception" of liberal leaders, in particular, of public opinion.

This theory helps resolve the problem of some doubtful cases in which two liberal democracies have entered into war between themselves. The presence of a democratic regime and of liberalism in a controversy between two states is not, in itself, a sufficient condition not to produce war between them. The perception of both parts is crucial. It is not always true that liberal democracies recognize each other as such, and if this not be the case, it is probable that public opinion will not consider the use of force illegal. It is for this reason that we should keep in mind the theories regarding processes of mutual recognition among liberal democracies.

A process of mutual recognition implies the definition of "them" and "us" as an entity with different characteristics. The crucial matter is to understand what is defined as "us" among liberal democracies. As we have said, for Owen "us" is defined in terms of liberal values. For Risse-Kappen (1995: 491-517), the definition of identity should take into account many factors, among the most important of which are the institutional structure of the state, the vision of economic policy and the cultural values of a country. The process of recognition and externalization of norms is based on a series of mechanisms of communication of pacific intent related to these factors. For Weart (1998) the process of recognition depends on two factors which operate in oligarchy and democratic republics: the first factor is given by the presence of such political culture; the second, by the presence of a republican political culture identified on the principle of non-violent commitment.

These suppositions have been the object of criticism by Oren (1995: 147-184) since the concepts of democracy and liberal thought are both unstable in time. In fact,

these will depend upon the internal and international context in which a state is found. The process of recognition cannot but take into account the relations of power between states in the international system and this qualifies it as a political process. This theory has, as a supposition, that democratic peace is equivalent to the concept of hegemonic peace. Therefore, democratic peace would be a result of the hegemonic role of the USA in the international system.

Nevertheless, this hypothesis, widely shared by realists, does not explain why this theory is widely spread outside the USA. In an attempt to show the dynamics of power behind the theory of democratic peace, Oren has ignored the relational element of the process of recognition. In accordance with Williams (2001: 525-553), the process of recognition is based on a process of construction of identity, both at the individual, as well as, the social level. The theory of democratic peace is founded on a process of construction of identity which consists of three phases. The first phase is characterized by the recognition of subjects as individuals with rights and interests. In the second phase, the actors acknowledge similarities and establish a form of government which reflects these values (liberal democracy). In the third phase, a process of mutual recognition between governments is established based on an attitude of respect understood as a self-limitation of interests and actions.

This principle of tolerance is characteristic of liberal democracies which reinforce their common liberal identity, opposed to what is considered “outside” the liberal community. Therefore, the process of formation of “us” and “them” is strongly characterized by the reference to cultural and normative values. This process of identification involves public opinion of liberal democracies which tends to consider the war against another liberal democracy as a diplomatic failure of its leaders. It is for this reason that, in a liberal democracy, leaders should take into account the audience costs related to the decision to go to war against another liberal democracy.

1) “The higher the stability of a democratic regime, the higher the influence which norms for pacific resolution of conflicts will exercise on the behavior of foreign policy”.

2) “To establish a conflict between democracies, it is necessary that at least one of them be from an unstable political regime”. (Russett, 1993: 35).

This hypothesis emphasizes the importance of stability in liberal democracies in the phenomenon of externalization of norms. We already have examined the concept of stability as a fundamental element in a democracy. The definition of stability which we have presented defines a democratic regime as stable as the first alternative in the government. This conception provides a useful tool to evaluate the stability of a democratic regime.

Democracies have demonstrated greater stability than other forms of political regimes (Gurr, 1974: 1484.1504). Nevertheless, liberal democracies are characterized by the presence of values belonging to liberal tradition spread and rooted in the culture of a country. To evaluate with objective criteria the roots of normative and cultural values is not a simple task. It can be supposed that a political system, characterized by certain values, tends to encourage dissemination, because it forms the basis of legitimacy of that political regime. The greater the dissemination of liberal values, the greater will be the effect produced in the political system of a state.

Much empirical research has demonstrated diverse efficacy during times different from the phenomenon of democratic peace (Gowa, 1999). For this reason, some scholars have proposed a dynamic interpretation of the phenomenon of democratic peace. As we have seen, the Kantian idea of perpetual peace is presented as a regulatory ideal toward which to tend. This signifies that the elements of this project can also be identified as regulatory principles. The phenomenon of dissemination of civil liberties, which constitutes a fundamental element for the creation of “republics”, is seen as a gradual process of consolidation of democratic norms; in the first place, in public opinion and, from there, to leaders. In this sense, the well democratic functioning of peace should be read as a dynamic evolutionary process (Cederman, 2001: 15-35). Kant’s thought has anticipated the principles of the modern theory of Darwin’s evolution (Modelski, 1990- 1-24). In accordance to this idea, organizations evolved as individuals through a series of changes to their structures. Liberal democracies are capable of promoting and changing the development of internal structures and its foreign relations. According to Cederman, the effects of liberal democracies are mainly two. First, this evolutionary process produced a change in the behavior of foreign policy.

Second, on a long range basis, an all time larger difference between inter-democratic relations and other types of relations between states has been revealed.

The statistical research done by Cederman on the probability of controversy regarding dyad-years shows, with some temporary exceptions, a continual decline in controversies among democracies. Some theorists have proposed interpreting the phenomenon of democratic peace as a product of intrasystem cohesion of blocks due to bipolar tension produced by the Cold War and the presence of nuclear arms (Mearsheimer, 1990: 5-56, Gowa, 1999). Nevertheless, empirical research shows how the effect of democratic peace has been in action since the end of WW I and, therefore, a long time before the effects that the Cold War could have influenced on the evaluation of the phenomenon.

Therefore, democratic peace is a historic and dynamic process, not static as many realism theorists maintain. The element which makes this phenomenon dynamic is linked to the evolutionary characteristic of liberal thought (MacMillan, 1998). Liberals consider international relations as a gradual and irregular evolution toward liberty and peace (Zacher and Matthew, 1995). It is possible, thus, to join the relevance of the focus of the phenomenon of democratic peace to those processes of dissemination and mutation of liberal thought.

With WW I, the tradition of liberal research has given way to a revision of the “innocent” theories which have supported the “great illusion” of peace through commerce. Wilsonism held a reforming role in liberal research by signaling to scholars a series of questions, among them that of democratic peace (Mandelbaum, 2002). The attempt to attain a new order in the international system, inspired by liberal principles, failed in Europe because of the 1929 crisis and due to the dissemination of Nazi-Fascist ideologies. Nevertheless, in the USA, Wilsonism has had an unforgettable legacy in the conduct of foreign policy.

According to the normative-cultural model, war among democratic and non-democratic regimes happens often because:

- 1) “The leaders of an autocratic regime use violence against their opponents as a method for resolving controversies in the internal political process”.

2) “Autocratic regimes use violence, or threaten its use, in its conflicts with other states, and these anticipate such behavior”.

3) “The norms for resolution of conflict among democracies do not have efficacy in the relations with non-democracies, and this obliges democracies to adopt aggressive behavior against non-democracies” (Russett, 1993: 35).

These three hypotheses are related with those discussed previously. In respect to the first two, we have seen how non-violence is a distinct trait of functioning in democratic regimes. This implies that all non-democracies are characterized inherently by a high level of internal violence. The use of violence is considered an integral part of the functioning of the state in authoritarian regimes, be they military, personal or one party. It is demonstrated by the fact that, in these non-democratic regimes, the apparatus of internal security and the military apparatus are of especial importance in the structure of the state. The functioning of these devices is vital for the authoritarian regime, without which it would be incapable of resisting the pressure of internal opposition and public opinion.

Authoritarian regimes base their legitimacy and their role on the use of force against “enemies”, both at an internal and external level. In essence, authoritarian regimes prefer to “cut heads rather than count them”. Authoritarian regimes, independent of their particular form, have common characteristics. In the first place, they consider institutions as a means of internal coercion for the mobilization and extraction of resources for the goal of strengthening the power of the state. In the second place, to reinforce their internal legitimacy, authoritarian regimes often encourage a strong sense of nationalism to create ideological conformity with the regime and the diffusion of a mentality of personal sacrifice to attain the objectives of the state. In the third place, authoritarian states tend, not only to reinforce structures of internal and military security, but also to militarize society with the objective of propagation of a mentality of hierarchy and respect for authority, useful for controlling society (Schweller, 1992: 240-242).

According to Moore (1958), authoritarian regimes are characterized by a mentality of a powerful and centralized state conditioned to control and resist pressures

of social groups. This mentality is accompanied by a technical and amoral conception of politics which considers the power of the state as a good in itself. This attitude is transferred also to conduct of foreign policy. This is the reason why non democracies tend to threaten preventive attacks against other states.

In addition, as we have seen, the theory of distraction is applied to democracies, presenting a series of needed conditions, without which it would be counterproductive for national consensus. Nevertheless, not all of these conditions can be valid for a non-democratic regime. In fact, the creation of an external enemy can be coherent and distract the attention of a society in situations of internal crisis. In a democracy, the media and public opinion carry out a form of control over the “credibility” of the government using force against another state, while in an authoritarian regime, the media is totally under control of the regime.

As for the third option, as we have demonstrated, the capacity of democracies to resolve their conflicts depends on the liberal contents of their conduct of foreign policy. This implies that norms of conduct have an effect only between two liberal democracies. Nevertheless, according to research by Muller (2004: 494-529), not all liberal democracies have the same propensity for war against liberal regimes.

Two types of liberal democracies can be singled out. The first type is defined as “militant”, including in this term all those democracies which consider antagonistic relations with liberal regimes. These are characterized by larger investment in arms and a greater propensity for military intervention against liberal regimes. The second type includes liberal “pacifist” democracies, characterized by a tendency to diplomatic negotiations with liberal regimes. This distinction is closely linked to an internal contradiction in liberal thought. Even Doyle (1997: 251-258) observed that liberal democracies fluctuate between “imprudent vehemence” and a “submissive attitude” in the conduct of foreign policy. This tendency can be understood if the elements which characterized liberal thought are taken into account. In fact, the *universalist and equalitarian* elements of liberalism should lead a liberal democracy to the mission of propagating liberalism in the world against non-liberal regimes. This interventionist policy would increase the possibilities of conflict. While the tolerant element of liberal thought would lead a liberal democracy to make the decision of non intervention.

The cultural/normative model presents a series of strengths which have made it the most convincing interpretation. In the first place, this model is capable of offering an explanation for how norms of conduct of foreign policy of states can be compared with internal norms for the solution of conflicts. In the second place, the model is able to present a theory about the formation of a concept of national interest, keeping in mind the political values of public opinion which is, in diverse ways among democracies, capable of exercising pressure on the government. In addition, this model can offer, through carrying out an analysis of the perception and recognition among liberal democracies, useful explanations for the resolution of doubtful cases, when conflicts have occurred among liberal democracies.

These advantages have stimulated research regarding cultural and normative factors in the conduct of foreign policy in a state. It seems convincing to identify in liberalism the cultural element which has most influence on the functioning of institutional mechanisms which the structural model identifies as the cause for democratic peace. Therefore, it would seem more useful to consider these structures as the means by which the pacific tendency of liberalism, in relation to other liberal democracies, is expressed.

Notes

- 1 Doubtful cases in which the theory of democratic peace have been refuted are: 1812 Great Britain-USA; 1849 Republic of Rumania-France; 1861 American Civil War; 1863 Ecuador-Colombia; 1870 Francia-Prussia; 1899 Boer War; 1898 Spain-USA; II War Phillipines; I World War, Germany against Western Democracies; II World War, Finland against the Allied Democracies; 1948 Lebanon-Israel; 1948 India-Pakistan; 1967 Lebanon-Israel; 1974 Turkey-Cyprus.
- 2 Balancer in a political system is a power which has the role of maintaining the system's balance displacing its political weight
- 3 By "divided government" it is understood that one of the two chambers, or both, represent a majority of a political party different from that of the president.
- 4 Bandwagoning is understood as the decision to support the power which is assumed to be expanding to favor change in the international system
- 5 For Weart, oligarchy republics are distinguished based on the modality of the relationship with internal enemy groups by the elite in power

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