

The Use of the Particle *eva* in the Aṣṭādhyāyī

Hideyo Ogawa

Pāṇini's use of the particle *eva* may be classified into six types.

A. P8. 1. 62 *cāhalope evety avadhāraṇam*. Note the phrase *evety avadhāraṇam*. The particle *iti* following the word *eva* indicates that *eva* is here used meta-linguistically to refer to the word-form (*śabdavarūpa*) "*eva*," while the word AV(*adhāraṇa*) assigns the meaning "restriction" to the form. In this rule Pāṇini intends to specify the meaning of *eva* for a particular operation, thus implying that *eva* can bear meanings other than AV. Cf. Vārttika 3 ad P6. 1. 94: *eve cāniyoge*. Kaiyaṭa, commenting on this, explains that *eva* can convey *anavakṛpti* (impossibility), a meaning the particle has when used adversatively, in addition to *niyoga* which is synonymous with AV.

The central meaning of *eva* is AV. Let us consider briefly what the Pāṇiniyas mean by this term. For Kātyāyana and Patañjali, "AV" and "N(*iyama*)" are equivalent in meaning and the synonymy of these terms is demonstrated in the argument on *pratyayāvadhāraṇa* and elsewhere. In the Mahābhāṣya two forms of N-formulation are found. For example, with reference to P2. 3. 50, Patañjali states: a) *śeṣa eva śaṣṭhi bhavati nānyatra* [*arthaniyama*] or *śeṣa śaṣṭhi eva bhavati nānyā* [*pratyayaniyama*] b) *yatra śaṣṭhi cānyā ca prāpnoti śaṣṭhi eva tatra bhavati*. According to Nāgeśa, the N formulated in the first form, a), is an exact equivalent of *parisaṅkhyā*, while the N of the second form, b), is equivalent to the term as used in the Mimāṃsā system. Nāgeśa observes in Mimāṃsā terminology *parisaṅkhyā* and N do not differ in essence, since the function of excluding others (*anyanivṛtti*) is inherent in both. He interprets *eva* in such N-formulation as standing for *anyayogavyavaccheda* (exclusion of relatedness to other things).

B. P1. 4. 8, 2. 20, 5. 3. 58, 6. 1. 80, 6. 2. 80, 6. 2. 148, 8. 3. 61, 6. 4. 145. Normally, the AV or N-function, namely, restriction, is served by *eva*. But in some

(13) The Use of the Particle *eva* in the Aṣṭādhyāyī (H. Ogawa)

cases this function is fulfilled without it: in certain contexts where rule Y stands as a re-statement (*anuvāda*) of another rule X, rule Y is itself considered to constitute N. Patañjali states: *evakāraḥ kimarthaḥ. naitad asti prayojanam. siddhe vidhir ārabhyamāṇo 'ntareṇaivakāraṁ niyamārtho bhaviṣyati*. This amounts to saying that when a *vidheya* (what is to be stated for the first time, viz., the new content) of rule Y can be seen as having already been established by rule X, then, rule Y becomes redundant in that it has the same *vidheya* as rule X; and so, in order to dispose of this charge of "redundancy," we must assume some purpose for rule Y which renders it meaningful. Consider P8. 3. 16. This rule enjoins that *rU* is replaced by *visarjantya* before the locative plural ending *suP*. But this operation is obtained from P8. 3. 15 which enjoins that *r* is replaced by *visarjantya* before *kharādi* (an item beginning with *khaR*), because *rU* (*udit-repha*) and *suP* are included in *r* in general and in *kharādi* respectively. For this reason, P8. 3. 16 cannot be taken as having the purpose of enjoining a *visarjantya*-substitution for *rU*. Accordingly, this rule only becomes meaningful when regarded as restrictive in purpose. We may assume two forms of N-formulation for this rule: {*ror eva supī nānyasya supī*} and {*roh supy eva nānyatra*}, since by P8. 3. 15 alone *visarjantya*-substitution for any *r* will take place before any *kharādi*. The question then naturally arises, what is the ground for judging which form of N is suitable? The answer is that P1. 1. 70 containing the sequence of *h* and *s* of *saṁyoga* shows that the first form of N is not acceptable.

Since any rule as such can be regarded as implying a N-function even without the occurrence of *eva*, the rules in this group are complicated by the fact that each of them makes use of the particle. Thus, we have to assume some function for *eva* distinct from that of N: otherwise, *eva* would become superfluous because its function, N, is already implicit in the nature of rule-making. To obviate this superfluosity, the Pāṇinīyas posit a special function for *eva*, viz. *iṣṭato 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ* (the function of gaining an AV in the desired way), or, to put it another way, *viparītanīyamanirāsārthaḥ* (the function of setting aside an inverted N). P1. 4. 8 is a case similar to P8. 3. 16, discussed above. Taking P1. 4. 7 into consideration, we have the following N-formulation concerning rephrased P1. 4. 8 *patih samāse*: {*patir eva samāse*} or {*patih samāsa eva*}. Here we are not

given any explicit authority like P1. 1. 70 on which to decide between these two N's. So the Pāṇinīyas are of the opinion that a desirable N is indicated by the presence of *eva*; in other words, this *eva* implies that the N of the latter form {*patiḥ samāsa eva*} is preferable.

P6. 4. 145 is an exceptional rule in this group, according to the Kāśikā. Although this rule seems to be of the same type as P1. 4. 8, yet the purpose of *eva* here cannot be taken as *iṣṭato 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ*, because the so-called *vipartitanīyama* is cancelled on the authority of P6. 4. 169. Therefore, the Kāśikā maintains *eva* is used here for the sake of clarity (*viśpaṣṭārthaḥ*), that is to say, with a view to making clear a N expressed by the rule in question.

C. P3. 4. 70. This rule relates by means of *utsarga-apavāda* to P3. 4. 67. The *uddēśyas* of these rules show the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* relation, while their *vidheyas*, on the other hand, exhibit mutual exclusion (*bādhyabādhakabhāva*). *Takrakaunḍīnyanyāya* applies here, so the exclusion of *karṭṛ* by *bhāva* and *karman* is self-evident. The Pāṇinīyas differ among themselves in their justifications for this use of *eva*. In the Kāśikā, it is explained as *kartur apakarṣaṇārthaḥ* (having the purpose of rejecting *karṭṛ*), which is glossed in the Padamañjarī as *spāṣṭapratīpatyārthaḥ* (having the purpose of clearly understanding the rejection), the net effect of which seems to be that *eva* is used to confirm the *nyāya* at hand. Patañjali, on the other hand, proposes *samāveśārthaḥ* (the purpose of co-applying the rules) which is taken up by Nilakaṇṭhadikṣita who expounds *eva* here as *takrakaunḍīnyanyāyānityatvajñāpanārthaḥ* (having the purpose of indicating that the *nyāya* is not universally valid). Interestingly enough, in justifying this same *eva*, the author of the Kāśikā and Patañjali evaluate the above-mentioned *nyāya* in opposing ways.

D. P3. 4. 111. Here *eva* is described as *uttarārthaḥ* (serving a purpose in subsequent rules). This interpretation proceeds from the following two considerations: 1) since rule P3. 4. 110 can be taken as stating N in relation to P3. 4. 109 and consequently the rule in question must count as an *apūrvavidhi*, *eva* thus becomes totally meaningless as far as this rule is concerned, and 2) the subsequent rules such as P3. 4. 115-116, however, require this *eva* to exclude an item which would otherwise occur. In this case, *eva* is able to retain its N-function by find-

ing its scope in other relevant rules.

E. P4. 3. 69. This rule is an *apūrvavidhi* like P3. 4. 111. Another way of interpreting *eva* in an *apūrvavidhi* is proposed for this occurrence of the particle. In the Padamañjari, this *eva* is characterized as *sarvavākyaṅāṅṅ sāvadhāraṇat-vajñāpanārthaḥ* (serving the purpose of indicating that any sentence has an AV for its meaning). When a rule with *eva* is regarded as an *apūrvavidhi*, there is definitely no possibility of **N** induced from the context functioning in the domain of the rule's application. And unlike the case of P3. 4. 111, the necessity of *eva* is not recognized in other rules. Granting that there is something to be excluded by P4. 3. 69, the exclusion is a matter of cognition of the sentence-meaning (*vākyaṛtha*), not of grammatical operation by the rule. In this case, no other rules pertain to exclusion or that which is excluded in the rule at issue. According to the Nyāsa, the same thing is true of *eva* in P3. 1. 88 *tapas tapaḥkarmakasyaiva*. This occurrence of *eva* is explained as *vispaṣṭārthaḥ* (serving the purpose of making an AV clear) on the grounds that no sentence fails to convey an AV irrespective of the presence of *eva*.

F. P1. 2. 65, P2. 4. 62. These rules are *apūrvavidhis*, but here the proper function of *eva*, viz., **N**, is recognized, although this *niyama* is not context-made in the sense that it is not induced from the context as in the case of P8. 3. 16. We can point to another *viśeṣa* in P1. 2. 65 and *bahutva* conditioned by an item different from that which is referred to by *tat* in P2. 4. 62. According to the Maḥābhāṣya, P3. 1. 88 in the **E** group also might be included in this group in that *eva* there can be described as *niyamārthaḥ* (serving the purpose of restricting). Resorting to the method of *yogavibhāga* (splitting of a rule), Patañjali divides this rule into two: 1) *tapaḥ sakarmakasya* and 2) *tasya tapaḥkarmakasyaiva*. In association with P3. 1. 87, 1) is hereby taken as stating **N** in the form {*tapa eva sakarmakasya*} which is then interpreted as signifying that the verbal root \sqrt{tap} , whatever it may mean, can constitute a *karmakarṭṛ*-construction, so long as it is transitive (*sakarmaka*). Under these circumstances, rule 2) is now required to provide a particular object (*karman*) for \sqrt{tap} and to exclude others so that \sqrt{tap} can constitute the construction, *only* when its object is *tapas*. This is how *eva* in 2) is held to perform the **N**-function. (Assistant, Hiroshima University)