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JAPAN IN THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

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CHAPTER 1

MILITARIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Militarization – a crucial element in the global problematique

Ever since the Club of Rome published its highly pessimistic *The Limits to Growth*,¹⁾ the concept of the global problematique has slowly become accepted by a considerable number of attentive scholars interested in this type of clinical diagnosis of the future world. However, the global problematique has mainly been categorized as a long-term issue of human survival in terms of population, food, energy, resources and environment. Other micro-human problems related to this long-term perspective were also included, of course, and the problem of war and conflict figured amongst these. Nevertheless, war and conflict were considered not so much a problem of immediate urgency but rather as one problem amongst many and a subject for systematic classification. The efforts of the Goals, Processes, and Indicators of Development Programme (GPID) may well have been typical of such classificatory efforts. The collapse of detente, accelerated by the mutually worst-case learning of the, ironically cooperative, leaderships of Reagan and Brezhnev in pursuing a further nuclear build-up, have now made this conventional way of classifying the global problematique obsolete: the process of global militarization, centred on the nuclear arms race between the superpowers, and disseminated via arms transfers from the First and Second to the Third World, is now *the* most urgent and imminent issue for survival.

Since military strategists in the United States are already predicting attaining the capability for winning a limited nuclear war, and a group of strategists including Defence Secretary Weinberger have informally referred to the possibility of fighting a protracted nuclear war, the avoidance of such disasters urgently demands a thorough analysis of these eventualities, and of the various predictions of nuclear catastrophe. Such an analysis is the real prerequisite for avoiding nuclear war, and considered formally is also certainly one intellectual prerequisite for opening the way to remedying the global problematique. In this sense the global problematique is not simply a global set of disturbing situations, but also represents the lack of a deep understanding of the imminent crisis – a crisis which will not be resolved without the creative and fresh institutionalization of an alternative information order counterposed to the present power-structure, in which the nation-state system occupies one of the core parts of the set of relations in the process of global transformation.

The first prediction of nuclear catastrophe is based on a very simple diagram of the statistical distribution of the relationship between frequencies of different scales of wars measured against time.²⁾ According to this diagram a limited nuclear war appears inevitable within this century, and in the first part of the next century; not only is it inevitable that two instances of war on this limited scale will occur, but a total nuclear war, killing 3.6 billion people, is also inevitable. This type of analysis is also validated by the waiting-hour type of approach, derived from the original statistical distribution.³⁾ In this diagram, as well as in the original, the most significant issue is whether the parameter value for predicting the future trend should be extrapolated continuously (in a linear or non-linear form) or not. However, it is evident that without a sudden creative change taking place in the global situation the parameter values seems to be constant in both linear and non-linear extrapolations.

The second prediction of nuclear catastrophe is based on a more detailed analysis of statistical correlations between the same categories of wars, and the probability that war of the same category will be repeated in the future. According to David Singer's work, the probability of war between the US and USSR is nearly 60–70% based on an extrapolation of historical data of wars between great powers,⁴⁾ and nearly 90% if present US–USSR relations are categorized as the superpower relation which should be extrapolated further within this model to reflect the change-of-scale-effect occasioned by the size of these great powers vis-a-vis former great powers.⁵⁾

The third prediction is based on the more substantial development of strategic interaction and a deep analysis of its effects. This type of prediction is formulated on the basis of the increasing accuracy of missiles, and the chances of success of a pre-emptive counterforce strategy. Because of this possibility, and the mutual fear that the opposition will seek to implement it, the nuclear arms race has accelerated through the increased militarization of science and technology, and resulted in the vicious circle illustrated in the collapse of detente.⁶⁾

The fourth prediction is based on the various phenomenological data directly or indirectly related to the social process itself. This is a more ambiguous, and in a certain sense, intuitive area, akin to a fortune teller's prophecy. However, such an approach could possibly be transformed into the formulation of alternative indicators offering the detection of early warning symptoms. *Kenzaburo Oe*, a well-known Japanese literary critic, has offered the suggestion that a literary individual might function as a kind of human canary, sensitized to the signs of impending disaster. This idea is not based merely on the personal experience

of an individual critic, but on empirical evidence of the past keen sense of the canary.⁷⁾ Thus, a set of empirical facts about past wars would, if collected, provide good early warning indicators for the prediction of future wars. It might also be possible to develop a theory of early warning indicators based on more substantive alternative international conflict theory.

The fifth prediction is based on a more fundamental mathematical theory, an approach which does not necessarily require any empirical facts at all. Mathematical game theory tells us of the existence of plural discontinuous solutions for a multi-person game.⁸⁾ Within this framework, it is possible to predict the inherent instability of multi-person games, and develop a deep understanding of the causes of the collapse of detente. Such a method is particularly necessary in the social sciences, since it could open up an alternative creativity through an understanding of the reality which might culminate in nuclear catastrophe.

Above and beyond these five predictions, militarization has generated grave problems within the overall process of global transformation, initially illustrated in the development of competitive industrial nation-states. This pattern of competition has passed through a number of profound changes. Increasing military expenditure has now not only followed the generalized depression of the world economy, intensifying bankruptcy and unemployment, but at the beginning of the 1980s has also been a specific product of the economic crisis in the Third World in particular, where numerous regimes are becoming increasingly militarized via the transfer of arms from the USA, USSR, France and others. Some of these weapons are intended for the suppression of political opposition, and some for the pursuit of armed struggle.

That type of militarization symbolized in the nuclear arms race at the top level of the current global structure, and that type symbolized in arms transfers to the Third World to the Third World, at the resultant intensification of oppression at the lowest level, are not independent and isolated phenomena. Each is closely interwoven with the other through the initiatives of top-level rivalry. The militarization of the contemporary world is therefore the most serious global problematique for human survival, in both the long and short-terms. The global problematique is a global political-military crisis exposed to the hazard of acceleration by the world economic crisis: it should also be defined as a total political, military, economic, and social crisis in the global transformation process of the present interdependent world.

The task of developing a system of early warning indicators for predicting catastrophe

is a very arduous one. More intuitive indicators for warning symptoms might be developed, in addition to the five types of prediction noted above, even though such an approach remains, as yet, not fully adequately theorized. Such indicators offering alternatives to those generated by nation-centred statistics might include: the acceleration of world military expenditure relative to public spending on education and health, the diversion of resources for military purposes compared with the number of adults who cannot read and write, the number of people who have no job or are less than fully employed, the number of children who cannot attend even a primary school, the number of people suffering from hunger or malnutrition, the number of babies who die every year before their first birthday, the number of people who do not have safe water to drink, and the number of people who live in urban slums or shantytowns. Although tentative, such indicators can form the basis for symbolic comparisons: for example, the lack of \$100 for each of the poorest young children and mothers meant that 17 million children lost their lives in 1981 alone. The sum of \$1.7 billion needed to combat this emergency is what the world spends in only one day on military arms. The cost of eradicating malaria – the most serious disease in the tropical Third World – is put at \$450 million, less than half what the world spends each day for military purposes. Three out of five people in the developing countries do not have easy access to safe drinking water, and three out of four have no kind of sanitary facilities. The \$60 billion required annually for a ten-year plan to provide such facilities is what the world spends in forty-three days on arms. To reduce the absolute number of undernourished people in the world from 420 million to 230 million by the year 2000 is estimated by the FAO to require a total investment of \$21.9 billion, equivalent to 16 days spending on arms. Finally, an aggregate total of the contributions needed to rescue all the world's refugees in 1980 is equivalent to 8 hours' military spending. What do such comparative figures mean? As far as conventional theories of international relations are concerned, they possess no serious meaning. However, once we recognize the necessity for developing an alternative theory of global militarization, and its remedy, such figures would be important in developing an alternative system of indicators. The problem here is concerned with whether militarization is recognized as one of the most imminent and significant elements in the global *problematique*.⁹⁾

Alternatively, one can consider this question in terms of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons: the combined explosive power of the, at the least, 40,000–50,000 nuclear weapons currently in existence is estimated at more than one million Hiroshima bombs; or

some 13 billion tons of TNT – more than 3 tones for every man, woman, and child on earth. The situation appears more serious, and more obvious, if we reflect on the fact that more than one million Hiroshima bombs could kill 200 billion people, or about 50 times the total world population of 4.2 billion. Even if those equivalent calculations are based on simple assumptions, it should be emphasized over and over again that the total explosive power of the current stock of nuclear weapons is estimated at 20,000 megatons, and that strategic interaction between the two superpowers is expected to become increasingly unstable through the accelerated militarization of science and technology.

2. Causes of the arms race and global militarization

As we have already explained in the preceding section, the process of global militarization has now become the most imminent issue for survival. And since this process centres around the nuclear arms race, the first step towards achieving any remedy must involve an exploration of the causes of the nuclear arms race. These, of course, constitute a specific subset of the more general causes of the arms race. However, since such complex processes often preclude a separate analysis of causes, we treat both sets here as being interrelated.

Firstly, the nuclear arms race is the product of the increasing international tension between rival nation-states in the current nuclear setting of the global transformation process. Of course, international tension is externally oriented, at least at the outset. But because of the feedback processes set in train via the responses of rival states, this tension easily becomes transformed into a *combination* of the products of both external and internal stimuli. This positive feedback mechanism means that the external stimuli always produce internal stimuli in the opponent, and via the feedback loop in turn accelerate external and internal stimuli.

Secondly, the nuclear arms race is a product of the increase in international conflicts which develop relatively independently of each individual nation-state, particularly in the age of a multi-polarized, diversified world. In the peripheral area of world politics, moreover, so-called structural violence has emerged as a new source of conflicts, characteristic of a different, incongruent phase of the cultural matrix in the given political, military, economic, and social structures and illustrated in such instances as Indochina, Iran, Afghanistan and El Salvador. The see-saw of severe conflicts in the contemporary international environment demands a tough security policy on the part of each nation-state, even though any individual state may not have a direct relationship to the various causes of conflicts. In this

sense, international conflicts in the environment of any given state have become external elements in the arms build-up of all states. Depending on the overall structures of the configurations of power, such stimuli can easily increase international tensions. In the case of the nuclear arms race, conflicts in the international environment are unlikely to be independent of the two nuclear superpowers, inasmuch as these have exercised a profound influence over the operation of the international system in which new conflicts are constantly generated, and old conflicts exacerbated. If we include such kinds of international conflicts, the increasing number of international conflicts will act as a cause of the arms race, as a consequence of the 'rational' national security policies governed by traditional means-ends rationality.

Thirdly, once a process of military build-up is semi-permanently internalized within a given nation-state, the internal demands of the arms race automatically increase, independently of the external stimuli. Because of this internalization, the internal motivations specific to organizational dynamics – such as those of the military-industrial-bureaucratic-academic-labour complex within certain industrialized nation-states may sometimes, intentionally or otherwise, manipulate these external stimuli. Where this happens, the internal stimuli themselves are a major cause of the arms race.

However, the development of an international network between sovereign states creates a new political situation in which the above clarification is not so manifest nor so easily applicable. Given this quite recent development in the transnational political situation, internal stimuli themselves take on international characteristics, in the sense that the armers in one country have close contact with the armers in others. These phenomena themselves constitute the *fourth* cause of the general arms race, in which the *nuclear* component cannot be neglected since it occupied the uppermost stratum within the arms race's hierarchical structure. This was well illustrated in the formation of the alliance between NATO, and the Japan-US security pact – that is the adoption of a tough strategic posture, especially in the late 1970s – in which a global linkage of hawks in the different blocs played an initiating role. The causes of the arms race are structural in such a context, in the sense that they can no longer be explained through a so-called billiard ball type of model of national interaction; the real causes of the nuclear arms race have to be sought using global functional theory.

The structural causes of the arms race may be classified into two main categories: marginal causes and internally structured causes. As we have already explained, the latter

are undeniably growing in importance with the diminishing validity of the billiard approach. Although such a model might still retain some limited validity in explaining the reopening of the Cold War, internally structured causes are now more significant: marginal causes could only subsume internal causes in the classical theory of international politics, in which states encounter each other horizontally, so to speak. Vertical causes, acting throughout the social structure are more appropriate when we turn to the phenomenon of *global militarization*, rather than the arms race *per se*. This does not mean that we should abandon any explanation based on balance of power theory, but rather reflects the fact that the internal-external dichotomy of international relations has now become extremely sterile, and that a new type of mixed vertical and horizontal explanation is needed given that the current international system is participating in the global transformation process.

The concept of the *process of global militarization* has therefore emerged at the forefront of our analysis. In one sense, global militarization can be termed a pathological process, one which has brought humanity to an acute crisis of survival through the nuclear arms race and its accompanying global oppression. The process is symbolized by the militarization of science and technology, which is illustrated in the scale of nuclear weapons – the accumulation of the equivalent of one million Hiroshima sized bombs – and the increasing accuracy of long and medium range missiles. It is also symbolized by the pathological evolution of rational military strategy – from MAD to NUTS – around which serious disputes have developed in the US and Europe, which is faced directly with the deployment of theatre nuclear forces (so-called TNF problems).

The theory of global militarization focuses on an aspect of the international power structure in which superpower rivalry still prevails as a form of horizontal and vertical struggle among states, and spreads to the intermediate as well as to the peripheral part of the world. The process of militarization thus develops at the level of the superpowers, the level of intermediate areas, and the level of dependent areas. The entanglement of the three levels produces ${}_3C_2$ plus ${}_3C_3$ relationships in addition to ${}_3C_1$ interrelations between each level.¹⁰⁾

Moreover, the theory of global militarization focuses on various aspects of the functional transnational order of the global structure, not only re-examining the political, military, and economic orders, but also the cultural, informational, scientific, technological, and educational orders in terms of their contribution to stimulating militarization in the global transformation process. Within this framework of analysis, it becomes relatively easy to dis-

tinguish between the marginal causes of global militarization and its internally structured causes, even when applied to the explanation of militarization based on the central dynamics of power relations between nation-states. The marginal causes of global militarization are well illustrated in the contemporary militarization of science and technology, in the sense that this is the most significant factor in the present nuclear arms race, and an indispensable element in the collapse of detente. This does not mean that there were no internally structured causes already present which have not contributed to the current acceleration of the nuclear arms race: such causes have not ceased to be of explanatory relevance. However, the current prevalence of the militarization of science and technology has pushed such causes into the background, and whether such internally structured causes might become marginal once again remains an open question.

In my paper 'Global Militarization and Its Remedy'¹¹⁾ I offered a design for creating overall peace under six categories: the reduction of international tension, the demilitarization of science and technology policy, active participation (of science and technology) in peace-building via university reform, creation of new integrated disciplines through re-examining goals of development, re-evaluation of various institutions as actors in global politics, and the formation of alternative networks to create a new learning process. Each of these categories can be seen to correspond to the causes of militarization. Hence, the more diverse these causes, the greater the need for diversity in the strategy for peace.

This section has highlighted increasing international tension, an increase in internal conflicts, and internal motivation rooted in organizational dynamics as the causes of global militarization. It should be pointed out here that the second cause was added to my original six categories, and that the third category could be broken down into many sub-categories, as illustrated in my previous paper.¹²⁾ New additions could be made to those sub-categories, such as the financial weakness of institutions such as the United Nations University, and related institutions, the lack of autonomy or weakness of provincial and local government in supporting peace-building institutions (and the fact of the qualitative underdevelopment of such governments *per se*).

3. Disarmament theory and global strategy for demilitarization

The causes of global militarization are more structural than the causes of the arms race inasmuch as global militarization constitutes a total societal phenomenon, and is a product of the global transformation process. The neglect of disarmament by decision-makers in

the superpowers is deeply rooted in the ideological framework in which balance-of-power politics and principles and sovereignty structurally dominate the present international setting. Sheer neglect of disarmament is not, however, the whole story. An intensive disarmament effort was made by a *minority* of decision-makers. But these efforts were not successful, despite the fact that predictions of a coming nuclear showdown promoted arms control negotiations between the superpowers (the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and SALT) which resulted in detente, at least during the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, the combined effects of breakthroughs in military technology, illustrated by the marked improvements in missile accuracy, and sudden unstable political changes in pivotal areas inside the existing balance-of-power system inflicted serious damage on detente and resulted in the opening of the second Cold War in the late 1970s. What has to be emphasized here is that the failure of disarmament is not only the result of the collapse of detente, but also one of the most significant causes of the collapse of detente.¹³⁾

Previous theories of disarmament, if any, were deficient in their failure to establish a correspondence between the causes of the arms race and their proposed path towards disarmament. Of course, given the complex nature of the causes of the arms race, interrelations between different causes are often very significant, and it is consequently virtually impossible to remove any individual causes without influencing other causes. One strong argument for the pursuit of more indirect methods of removing the causes of the arms race would be establishing that such methods would encounter relatively meagre structural resistance from the power-establishment. This approach necessitates the formation of alternative networks in close proximity to power relations. Within this framework, the causes of global militarization which are located in the global setting, such as the reinforcement of worst-case learning, might be surmountable at a higher level within the hierarchy of an alternative network formation and/or in terms of future perspectives for an alternative institutionalization to control the global transformation process.

However, before taking up such an integrated strategy for disarmament and demilitarization, we consider the more substantial correspondence of causes of the arms race and opportunities for disarmament. We first have to consider the causes of the increasing international tension within the framework of the collapse of detente. This requires a phenomenological analysis of why Kissinger's attempt to form 3 or 2.5 poles between the US, USSR and China – 'a floating peace structure' – failed. According to the position which sees the current development as a revival of the Cold War – although some disagreements

as to the definition of the Cold War remain – the collapse of detente was produced by the balance of power type of global rivalry: if this was indeed so, N-persons games theory could easily predict the instability of alliance patterns by using the Pareto-optimum cores. Anatol Rapoport's 'N-persons game theory' is a good illustration of a successful application of this approach for predicting stable or unstable balance-of-power relations between the US, USSR, and China. Rapoport severely criticized the use of N-persons games theory for strategic purposes since military strategists apply it to achieve their narrow, national interest rather than, as intended, as a means for mutual peaceful accommodation by arriving at a deeper understanding of the fundamental characteristics of the structure of the game.¹⁴⁾ The grey area in the SALT negotiations suddenly enlarged after the concept of parity moved from US–USSR relations to US + China + USSR triangular relations. NATO's theatre strategy also faces increasing uncertainty regarding the concept of parity in the same 3-person game theory logic. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the above explanation for the revival of the Cold War considers only one of several causes. However, in our view it was the most significant marginal cause of the revival of the Cold War in the sense that it operated as a *necessary* condition: naturally, once internalized into the present international structure, it ceases to be a marginal cause.

Different marginal causes would appear successively as the situation deteriorated further. Within this framework of analysis, indirect remedies will probably be the most effective means of weakening or eliminating identifiable causes, once the various successive structures of linkage between the causes in the revival of the Cold War are identified. Indirect methods often do not attract strong reactionary responses from the hawkish group.

Actual decision-makers did not listen to the advice of scientific peace research when N-persons games theory successfully predicted the unstable outcome of Kissinger's tri-polar structure: they will also probably ignore its advice in the future too. Nevertheless, such applications of peace research do make a positive contribution to raising the level of consciousness within the general population. At some point, this higher consciousness within the population at large will have an impact on the inner circle of decision-makers. This would therefore appear to be an effective indirect strategy for remedying a number of current global maladies.

Secondly, when looking at the role of increasing international conflicts in causing the arms race and militarization, it is also necessary to make a distinction between short and long-term remedies. These correspond to the marginal causes of the arms race, in the first

instance, and the internally structured causes of the arms race and militarization in the second. Great power intervention in regional conflicts via arms transfers also inevitably aggravates these conflicts, and therefore acts as the most salient marginal cause of the intensification of such conflicts.

Tetra-structural relations between the US–USSR–Afghanistan–Iran could offer the most demonstrative proof of this: it is easy to see how the policies of the superpowers represent the marginal cause of the intensification of international conflict, despite the prevalent, stereotypical view that conflicts in the Third World are increasingly independently of the industrialized world. Within the framework of conflict formation in the global transformation process, each superpower tends to compete with its opponent in further aggravating the situation simply by shifting the responsibility onto the opponent. There are, of course, other types of marginal cause behind the increase in conflicts: for example, the overlapping effect of economic, religious, educational, linguistic, and ethnic discrimination in the peripheral region (sometimes as a significant marginal cause). However, in general, these causes are internally structured and mostly static within the context of a given conflict. It should also be recognized that identifying the salient marginal cause of the increase in conflict is more amenable to phenomenological judgement than computerized calculation. Once the salient marginal cause of a given conflict is established, the strategy for resolving the conflict becomes apparent. If the conflict is relatively isolated, intervention by neutral forces might be possible, such as the activities of the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Cyprus, or by a number of neutral countries, as in the Middle East. However, if the conflict in question is not isolated from the actors who wish to intervene in it – that is, if the actor is a partner in the process of conflict formation – any intervention by such an actor would naturally aggravate the situation. In such an instance, indirect methods would be required. First and foremost, phenomenological identification of the given conflict is always the prerequisite for diagnosis, prognosis, and so-called clinical treatment of the conflict. It should be noted that the superpowers are not in general free from the process of the formation of conflicts. This has also been identified historically and phenomenologically.

Thirdly, as far as the militarization of science and technology as a cause of the arms build-up and militarization are concerned, the *differences* in the phase reached by the development of science and technology between countries have become the immediate marginal cause – although the overall phase attained constitutes a salient marginal cause of global militarization. This situation throw the concept of nation-centred science and technology

into question. Of course, in the formulation of alternatives for any stage of science and technology, it is necessary to consider the steps in sequence. However, the total structural reform of science and technology policy based on alternative human values would clearly be more important as a long-term indirect method of achieving demilitarization and disarmament.

Forthly, the role played by inactive or militarized universities in global militarization raises not only the specific issue of the militarization of universities, but additionally the general issue of these institutions' conservative character. Addressing the latter involves discussion of how to set about removing the internalized structural causes of global militarization. University reform is therefore closely linked to the total structural reform of science and technology policy, since both are interrelated in the process by which scientists and engineers are reproduced. The establishment of the UNU, related peace research organizations, related academic societies, including the International Peace Research Association, are extremely significant in this context, since the development of such an alternative academic network holds out the hope of university reform. This possibility also rests on the indirect strategy for global demilitarization.

Fifthly, as far as over-specialization in disciplines, and their associated loss of any integrative perspective for analyzing the real world as an implicit cause of global militarization is concerned, the required remedy not only involves innovation in each specialized discipline, oriented towards solving the global problematique, but also the urgent creation of more integrative alternative theories for peace-building. The research activities of the GPID project were the first effort to create such a theory amongst UNU research projects. However, this project faced tremendous difficulties in conducting analytical research in a coordinated effort at global network formation involving, originally, twenty six units. The UNU is proposing to begin a new project on peace and conflict-resolution, and alternative security as one of five medium-term research subjects. The GPID will therefore become the strong base for the further development of alternative integrative global theory, provided that the GPID's original scheme of alternative categorization can be revived in the field of attempts to develop theories of global demilitarization.

Sixthly, as far as the characteristics of actors who never contribute to peace-building are concerned, it is virtually impossible to overcome the negative inertia of such organizations under normal circumstances in contemporary society. However, it is possible initially to develop instead an indirect alternative network which can interpenetrate into conven-

tional power relations. Such a strategy is also based on identifying each salient and marginal organization, together with the more internalized and structured pattern of organization. An assessment of various actors in terms of their peace-building capacity is an urgent task for a creative global intellectual strategy.

Seventhly, as far as the strengthened feedback mechanism of the worst-case learning network is concerned, the direct formation of alternative networks for generating best-case learning will inevitably appear to be a frontal assault on older, established networks. However, here too the indirect method of alternative network formation seems to be more effective because the contemporary social structure exhibits a continuous gradation between the worst-case and the best-case. An assessment of the various characteristics of different actors could easily be applied to this purpose. One factor of importance is the interrelatedness and mutual reinforcement of the various causes of global militarization; as a result, global demilitarization strategies should also be interrelated and mutually supportive, depending on the complicated relationship between the various causes of militarization.

Eighthly, as far as the financial weakness of the UNU and related institutions is concerned, the fundamental question is simply how to bolster the financial basis of such bodies. The UNU's 1982 budget amounted to US \$17.5 million; in contrast the annual budget of the University of Tokyo totals US \$360 million – more than twenty times more. Of course, the University of Tokyo is not a militarized university, having removed the suffix 'Imperial' and adapted its development to that of the economic and political climate of post-war Japan under the Japanese 'Peace Constitution.' However, it did not develop any active institutionalization for the study of peace-building. The University's various new institutions were developed exclusively within the framework of the exigencies of Japan's industrial advancement – in fact, with somewhat of a lag compared with the country's business class. This was not a mistake for the Japan of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. However, the Japan of the 1980s has reached the stage at which the advancement of high technology has to be combined and integrated with active peace-building. The University of Tokyo does not possess the capacity to inaugurate such a new era since it could not generate the appropriate spirit within the university community, and is still very conservative on issues such as university reform. In contrast, in its short seven-year history – compared with the University of Tokyo's hundred – the UNU has been able to inspire such a spirit. Many universities in other countries are in an even worse position than the University of Tokyo inasmuch as they have direct involvements in military research via funds provided by mili-

tary agencies. The UNU's alternative network is, in this sense, very creative from the perspective of establishing a New International Information Order.

Ninthly, as far as the weakness of autonomous provincial governments is concerned, two aspects stand out: i) the budgetary powers of provincial and local government vis-a-vis central government, ii) the increasing significance of the *quality* of provincial budget allocations. In Japan, examples of local government activities can be seen in the progressive role played by the Kanagawa prefecture in organizing international peace-oriented conferences in Yokohama, with the close cooperation of the City of Yokohama, the UNU, and several peace research societies. The City of Hiroshima is also expanding the scope of its activities beyond its own, inwardly oriented, deep experience of being an atomic-bomb victim.

Tenthly, as far as the qualitative underdevelopment of autonomous provincial units is concerned, several stages of strengthening autonomy can be considered as steps towards accelerating the process of global transformation through the formation of alternative networks. The first stage would appear to be the formation of a network of sister-cities across national boundaries. The second stage is the promotion of transnational exchange between these cities. During this stage, the qualitative improvement of exchange and the further development of the network are always a significant factor in catalyzing the peace-building process. In the third stage, some of the provincial units would declare themselves as units in the world federation network. Creative intellectual exchange could continue to improve the contribution of this network. In the fourth stage, some of the provincial units would declare themselves as nuclear-free zones, or demilitarized zones: such a development is already occurring even before this stage. If those tendencies were to be reinforced still further, some provincial units could enter the new era in which they would want to declare themselves independent of their mother-country. The European Community developed via the integration of many different nation-states in Western Europe. The alternative movement for peace-building could follow a different path: if, within some large nation-states, an alternative community at the stage of overall development but emerging from opposite forces and aspirations to present nation-states could be created by the independence of provincial units from the mother-country/centralized state, the character of the international system would be further transformed into a peaceful one.

4. Development and demilitarization

Disarmament theory was explained above in terms of a close relationship with the

theory of the causes of global militarization and the arms race. In general, the order of presentation was successively from marginal causes to internally structured causes – although some exceptions may have crept in unintentionally. The significance of internally structured causes makes it increasingly evident that the theory of global disarmament and demilitarization is in fact equivalent to an alternative theory of development. Any development theory which accelerates militarization must therefore represent a *pseudo*-theory of development.

In his famous 1968 Montreal speech, Robert A. McNamara stressed the importance of development over military security, emphasizing that security *is* development, and that without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shed its human nature. If security implies anything, it implies a minimum measure of order and stability. Without internal development of at least a minimal degree, order and stability are impossible.

McNamara continued,

As development progresses, security progresses and when people of a nation have organized their own human and natural resources to provide themselves with what they need and expect out of life, and have learned to compromise peacefully among competing demands in the larger national interest, then their resistance to disorder and violence will enormously increase. Conversely, the tragic need of desperate men to resort to force to achieve the inner imperatives of human decency will diminish.

Although located in the framework of conventional development thinking, McNamara's speech was attempting to highlight the importance of development over military security. He subsequently departed from Johnson's Vietnam strategy and became the President of the World Bank. The GPID programme's research perspectives identified conventional development – centred on the nation-state – as a cause of current global militarization. The programme therefore began working with an alternative conception of development from the outset. This was later developed a step further into the concept of transformational capability for solving the global problematique. The development of a higher level of hierarchical control should promote an alternative path of development via demilitarization. The deeper content of this claim is that if alternative development and demilitarization were to form a cyclical feedback loop, capable of promoting demilitarization and alternative

development through the transformation capabilities of new networks and the fresh potentialities of newly created peace-oriented institutions, this would indeed represent the successful attainment of the transformation of transformational responsibility.

The concept of development is now, therefore, the most significant issue in the framework of disarmament and global demilitarization. Even the conventional concept of economic development now has to confront the question of whether disarmament and demilitarization are possible solely via the conventional strategy of the nation-state. The most vivid example of a response to this question is Japan's choice of whether to assume more military responsibility from the United States or not. Japan's choice also involves choices as to its contribution to alternative peace-building objectives, totally different from those of military security. At present the Japanese government is pursuing a double-track strategy, in the sense that although strong pressure from the Reagan administration has forced it to increase its military budget, it is nonetheless developing alternative institutions, such as UNU and its related organizations, by providing some financial support. With the globalization of the Japanese economy and Japanese technology, Japan as a nation-state is now faced with a serious dilemma. Historically, any nation-state which has become a big economic power has had a natural tendency to become a big military power too. There have, of course, been various variations in individual instances. Some nation-states hurried to become big military powers, without a commensurate economic basis. The best example of this was the pre-war development of Japan. Some nation-states have been hesitant to become military powers, even after becoming giants economically – as in the case of post-war Japan. And some nations which could not become giants economically because of geographical and other factors – such as Sweden – decided very early on in their history not to become big military powers. We cannot neglect the existence of many such peaceful neutral countries, which have an entirely different diplomatic logic from that of the big powers.

However, the intrinsic logic of central power dynamics in the Westphalian international system still operates in the global transformation process. It is here that the conventional development of the nation-state would be open to question on the issue of whether it is able to overcome the restrictions imposed on the ability to remain a disarmed nation-state, once having become an economic giant. According to Takashi Inoguchi's classification scheme of security policies, the policies of nation-states can be tabulated along three dimensions: the focus of attention, level of activity, and level of strength. The following map

Level of Strength	Level of Activity	Outward Looking	Inward Looking
Strong	Active	Conquest	Revolution
Weak	Active	Hegemony	Finland Model
Strong	Passive	Manipulation	Seclusion
Weak	Passive	Manoeuvring	Submission
Focus of attention			

shows his classification on the eight categories of security policy.¹⁵⁾

The historical dynamics of Japan's security policy can be seen to be accommodable within this framework. The development of modern Japan started from seclusion in the Tokugawa era, and developed to conquest during the period of the Pacific War via manoeuvring, manipulation and hegemony, in step-by-step correspondence with Japan's international development as a nation-state (in the conventional sense of development). By contrast, post-Second World War Japan began from submission to the US Occupation Forces and developed to economic hegemony, mainly through manoeuvring. It must be emphasized here that Japan's Peace Constitution has the potentiality to transform Japan into a Finland Model. However, this process was not realized, and the interpretation of the Japanese constitution remains a major issue. It should be noted here that the Finland Model was originally termed Finlandization, intended in a pejorative sense, by some hawkish strategists. However, nation-states such as Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden, are more or less oriented to the Finland Model of national security. In this sense, the Finland Model should be re-examined in the light of alternative theories of international security policies. In the global transformation process, the capability of the nation-state system *per se* is radically diminishing in relation to the mounting pressure of the global problematique. The nuclear arms race and global militarization are amongst the most significant elements of the global problematique, inasmuch as they involve the survival of both small states as well as the big powers. If we look at other categories of security policy, the Finland model is the only possible alternative for a nation-state to survive in the age of global conflict formation between the two superpowers. It might be true that military strategists in the superpowers still believe in their capacity to win a nuclear showdown. However, this is surely no

longer true for the peoples of other countries. The Finland Model is therefore the only alternative for other nation-states to survive. But the basic concept goes even further. It offers the only way out of the intrinsic properties of the Westphalian international system, in which the central dynamics of power relations tend to determine the whole process of the transformation of the system. It should, however, be re-emphasized, that the Westphalian system itself is also currently involved in the global transformation process – not in the sense of the successive rising and falling of empires, but through the gradual dissolution of the system based on billiard-ball type of nation-state relations. The process is not symmetrical through time, since the rise and fall of empires cannot be repeated in the global transformation process. A symbolic proof of this would be Japan's refraining from becoming a big military power despite becoming the number one economic power, and skillfully transforming its economic capacities for the creative purpose of peace-building. The crucial question here is how to put Japan's economic capability at the disposal of the common intellectual effort of the global academic community. The concept of alternative development is crystallized in this creative process of intellectual institutionalization.

The strong relationship between development and demilitarization – development first, demilitarization second – would be well illustrated in the case of Japan were it to successfully resist the Pentagon's pressure to increase its military budget. In the previous economic development of Japan, Japanese economists in the main subscribed to a conventional understanding of development. Political and military problems were outside the scope of their consideration. However, it is undeniable that post-war Japan's concentration on economic development involved a transformation of the pre-war military spirit to a commercial merchant spirit. The difference in the international environment was clearly crucial in post-war Japan being able to develop so fast through a concentration solely on economic development. However, the conventional concept of development of a nation-state even in the field of economic growth is faced with a serious dilemma within the conventional framework of the theory of international politics, since this theory demands that a big economic power take on a commensurate financial burden towards its own security. This demand is based on empirical, historical reality. But it is a very superficial argument. An alternative normative argument can be developed through the application of an alternative theory of the global transformation process to the analysis of the process of the development of the nation-state.

In the process of Japan's development, the marginal factor in development varied

depending on the stage of development reached. Educational variables were very significant in the sense that they operated over a considerably longer period of time than other variables, such as transportation, communication, or production.

As space precludes a detailed empirical study here I propose to summarize the study undertaken by Johan Galtung and myself in another context. In the early period of Meiji Japan, between 1875–1895, the increase in the number of primary school students and teachers was the most significant factor in subsequent economic growth, with a lag of five years. Between 1895 and 1915, the increase in the number of students in vocational middle school was the most significant marginal factor for later economic growth, with a 10-year time lag. Between 1915 and 1932, the most significant marginal factor for time-lagged economic growth shifted from vocational middle school to vocational college (producing a very elegant shift in the map of the computer output based on time-series time-lag correlation analysis). The shift in the marginal factor from the pre-war period to the post-war period is more significant in the sense that the number of university graduates has become the most salient factor in time-lagged economic growth. The lag is seven years for graduating undergraduates, and five years for graduating graduates (taking higher degrees). These correlations were calculated up until the mid-1960s. In the 1970s such a strong and salient correlation disappears as far as university students as a whole are concerned. There might be another shift of marginal effect from universities to think tanks. Or a specific university specialism might exercise a salient effect on the growth of the economy. No economist is currently undertaking empirical research of this type in Japan. However, the pioneer diagnosis of the present-day Japanese economy is moving towards emphasizing the importance of high technology and the internationalization of the Japanese economy. An intuitive diagnosis of the contemporary world would suggest that the globalization of the Japanese economy should be developed further, in the sense that Japan's high technology should contribute to the demilitarization of the world and facilitate further development. It should be noted here that the present issue for Japanese technology centres around the Pentagon's demand for Japan to contribute to the development of US military technology. In the context of the development of this issue between the US and Japan, scientists and engineers who work in the field of high technology should be mobilized for an alternative dialogue and multi-sided discussion in which they could play a creative role in peace-building. The demilitarization of high technology is the most significant marginal factor for the further development of the global community, as well as for Japan itself.

Alternative political science in alliance with peace research could follow the example of Professor Glenn Paige, who is attempting to systematize non-violent political science. According to Professor Paige, the social role of political science will shift from the relatively passive, peripheral role of a 'pro-violent service station' to the more active role of a central institution for the creation and application of non-violent political knowledge. It will seek to change the environment, rather than 'trouble shoot' its defects.¹⁶⁾

This might be the same task required of scientists and engineers who wish to develop high technology. The difference between them is that the latter have tended to conceive their task within the narrow context of conventional national security, whilst the former tries to conceive its task for human survival in the global transformation process. However, the accomplishment of this shift in social role is a very difficult task, even for political science. Professor Paige himself emphasizes that to accomplish such a shift, political science will have to detach itself from its present dependent relationship towards institutions which accept violence, and create non-violent institutions which it can wholeheartedly support. This task would be more difficult in the case of scientists and engineers because of big science and technology, which tends to rely on the traditional nation-state for its financial support.

What is the salient marginal factor for the next phase of development? This question should be posed in a creative way. Development and demilitarization cannot be dissociated, since development *means* alternative global development.


Notes to Chapter 1

- 1) Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*, Universe Books, New York 1972.
- 2) Ivan A. Getting, 'Halting the Inflationary Spiral of Death' in *Air Force / Space Digest*, April 1963, cited by Robin Clarke, *The Science of War and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, 1972, p. 4.

<i>Casualties per war</i>	<i>1820-1859</i>	<i>1860-1899</i>	<i>1900-1949</i>	<i>1950-1999</i>	<i>2000-2050</i>
500-5,000	100,000 killed in 63 wars	100,000 killed in 75 wars	100,000 killed in 71 wars	100,000 killed in 64 wars	100,000 killed in 57 wars
5,000-50,000	300,000 killed in 25 wars	200,000 killed in 21 wars	300,000 killed in 25 wars	300,000 killed in 25 wars	300,000 killed in 25 wars
50,000-1 million	400,000 killed in 4 wars	700,000 killed in 7 wars	1.5 million killed in 15 wars	2.2 million killed in 22 wars	2.5 million killed in 25 wars
1 million- 5 million	—	3.6 million killed in 3 wars	4.6 million killed in 4 wars	5 million killed in 5 wars	2.5 million killed in 6 wars
5 million - 50 million	—	—	36 million killed in 2 wars	38 million killed in 3 wars	40 million killed in 4 wars
50 million - 500 million	—	—	—	360 million killed in 1 war	400 million killed in 2 wars
500 million - 5,000 million	—	—	—	—	3,600 million killed in 1 war
<i>TOTAL</i>	800,000 killed in 92 wars	4.6 million killed in 106 wars	42 million killed in 117 wars	406 million killed in 120 wars	4,050 million killed in 120 wars
<i>World Population</i>	1,000 million	1,300 million	2,000 million	4,000 million	10,000 million
<i>Per Cent Population Killed in War</i>	0.1	0.4	2.1	10.1	40.5

After Ivan A. Getting, "Halting the Inflationary Spiral of Death," in *Air Force / Space Digest* (April 1963).

- 3) Carl Sagan, *Cosmos*, Random House, 1980, p. 327.



The Richardson diagram. The horizontal axis shows the magnitude of a war ($M=5$ means 10^5 people killed; $M=10$ means 10^{10} , i.e., every human on the planet). The vertical axis shows the time to wait until a war of magnitude M erupts. The curve is based on Richardson's data for wars between 1820 and 1945. Simple extrapolation suggests that $M=10$ will not be reached for about a thousand years ($1820+1,000=2820$). But the proliferation of nuclear weapons has probably moved the curve into the shaded area, and the waiting time to Doomsday may be ominously short. The shape of the Richardson curve is within our control, but only if humans are willing to embrace nuclear disarmament and restructure dramatically the planetary community.

- 4) David Singer (ed.), *The Correlates of War: II Testing Some Realpolitik Models*, The Free Press, 1980, pp. 68–82; David Singer and Associates, *Explaining War, Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project*, Sage, 1979, pp. 240–252.
- 5) Cf. Singer, *Explaining War*, pp. 199–229.
- 6) Robert Sheer, *With Enough Shovels*, Random House, 1982, pp. 4–5.
- 7) Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), *Boryoku to Heiwa* (Violence and Peace), Asahi Newspaper Co., 1982, pp. 214–36.
- 8) Anatol Rapoport, *N-Persons Game Theory*, pp. 183–5, 309–10.
- 9) The Dept. of Public Information, the United Nations, *The Nuclear Threat to Our World: An Exhibition*, pp. 90–105.
- 10) Hiroharu Seki, 'From a Theory of Disarmament to a Theory of Demilitarization,' mimeo, presented at Yokohama Asian Peace Research Association Meeting, December 1980.
- 11) Hiroharu Seki, 'Global Militarization and Its Remedy,' IPSHU Research Report Series No. 3, August 1979.
- 12) *Ibid.*
- 13) Hiroharu Seki, 'Re-opening of the Cold War and the Crisis of the World Order,' in Hans-Henrik Holm and Eric Rudeng (eds.), *Festschrift for Johan Galtung*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1980, pp. 122–138.
- 14) Rapoport, *op. cit.*
- 15) Takashi Inoguchi, 'Political Security: Towards Its Broad Conceptualization,' mimeo, 1978.
- 16) Glenn Paige, 'On the Possibility of Nonviolent Political Science,' IPSHU Research Report No. 4, 1980.

CHAPTER 2

EVALUATION OF GPID CAPABILITIES TO SOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMATIQUE

1. Crisis of Capability of the Nation-State System

Nation-states have gradually developed various forms of institutions to perform their obligations to solve a broad spectrum of problems for their national organizations as well as for their people. In spite of such obligations imposed upon nation-states after many years of industrialization, few nation-states have developed enough capabilities to perform such obligations. So-called welfare states are still extremely few, despite the tremendous increase in the number of nation-states since the Second World War. Moreover, capabilities of nation-states have been mostly limited to the domestic areas although interdependent cooperation among nation-states has developed so much particularly for the past 39 years of the post-World War II period. The reason lies with the fundamental characteristics of the international system in which external relations of each nation-state cannot be decided, nor solved by unilateral decisions by each nation-state. As a result, conflict and collaboration among nation-states have produced a very unstable situation. In the present international system, in general, for which no possibility of unified decision-making is well institutionalized despite the creation of the United Nations system which has functioned within a very limited sphere of the present international system. Particularly, in the conflict resolution of the globalized world, even the superpowers are each other one of the partners of the global conflict formation process, and, as a result, a superpower cannot manage conflict at least without minimum cooperation of the opponent. This is the fundamental axiom intrinsic of the international system which is theoretically explicated rather than historically and empirically demonstrated. The contemporary symbolic expression of this negative development is manifestly illustrated in the formidable but easily predictable fact that the superpowers are also suffering from an unmanageable nuclear arms race and are being threatened by a possible crisis of nuclear annihilation.

Moreover, other types of problems such as population, food, energy, resource and environment have been step by step globalized, ironically because of successful scientific and technological revolutions developed by industrialized nation-states. Therefore the world finally reached a new stage where serious problems thus produced face the deteriorat-

ing capability of the nation-state system for solving them. The tempo of deterioration of such capabilities are so manifest compared with the increasing multiplication of problems that if ratio of capability to problem drop further, the future perspective seems to be very gloomy.¹⁾ Moreover, if the ratio drops with accelerated speed, as the first report by the Club of Rome predicted, a gloomy world will inevitably appear at the end of this century. Moreover, the Club of Rome, in the later stage of "Report," recognized the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe as a more serious prediction than those of population, food, resource and pollution. Current policy science which has been mostly developed in the highly industrialized countries particularly in the United States, is not capable of dealing with these problems, and thus the development of a new global policy science has become necessary. The GPID (Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development) research project was thus organized by the UNU in 1977 as one of the HSD (Human and Social Development) research projects in the first term plan of the UNU which was established in Tokyo in 1975. The purpose of the GPID has been to overcome the strong limitations imposed on the information order by the traditional nation-state system and to open a new era for creating a fresh academic information order in which transnational justice would be firmly categorized. Since its inception the emphasis of the GPID has changed considerably because of difficulties in the methodologies involved and limitations of integrative effort from the analytical work of specification. One of the most manifest change of emphasis was that from the analytical universal terms of categorization of alternative developmental scheme to the more phenomenological classification of global problems in the integrative effort. The global problematique was thus successively defined²⁾ instead of the more universalized terms of categorization of the original GPID research. To successfully overcome the crisis of capability of the present nation-state system is such a difficult and complicated task, because of the firmly established nation-state centered academic information order. In one sense, crisis-consciousness is still very weak, and the necessity to overcome limitations of the nation-state system is not ripe as far as the intellectual, short-term policy elites are concerned.³⁾ This is a real crisis of the capability of the nation-state system.

The international crisis in this sense, has been well illustrated not only in the process but also in the structure of the present international system. The detente which was partly established in the middle of the 70's nearly collapsed after the inauguration of the Reagan Administration. The collapse of detente was intrinsic in the process of detente formation through which the so-called emerging peace structure designed by the Kissinger diplomacy

only produced a very unstable tripartite relations among the US, USSR and China. The mathematical three persons game situation is always unstable if any partner of the game wishes to utilize this instability for her calculated benefits. The so-called China card, Russian card or American card are sometimes utilized by respective partners explicitly or implicitly in this triangular international relations. Moreover, the process which developed in the superpower relations was further complicated by the vertical political dynamics intrinsic in the present international structure in which other types of unstable international triangular or quadratic relations as illustrated in the US, USSR, Iran, Afghanistan relations or the US, China, Vietnam, Cambodia relations, are interconnected and interrelated with each other vertically and horizontally, and accelerated the collapse of detente. It is not deniable that in the large formation and collapse of detente, the US took a great role and responsibility with her global national strategy and foreign policy since the US is still the number one superpower, even with her relative weight considerably decreased and her relative position markedly declined. The Allies such as Japan and the NATO countries also could not escape from the joint responsibilities with the US, because their predicting capabilities were extremely biased to intrinsically inaccurate forecasting of the formation and collapse of detente in their efforts to cooperate with the US global policy. It means that inter-government relations among Western Allies and the information order established among them have produced such biased prediction which intentionally or unintentionally resulted in the collapse of detente by which future perspective for human survival seems to be unquestionably sceptical. In the sense that this gloomy perspective was the necessary result of the crisis of the present international system in which the nation-state system occupies the core part of the structure and the process, it might be argued that the responsibilities of the Western Allies should be criticized more than the other partners of the international politics. However, the most relevant and significant issue here is how to overcome the intrinsically deteriorating capabilities of the nation-states and in what ways to surpass the present global crisis and impasse, which might result in a nuclear disaster, by a creative, alternative global policy formation. The new task is the creation of a new international information order because the previous nation-state centered information order has tended to produce very biased prediction and forecasting, detrimental to human survival such as illustrated in the collapse of detente and intensified nuclear arms race accompanying further global militarization and distorted development of the world economy for which misuse of science and technology is also responsible in the sense of huge scale application of them in

the global international setting. The present international order in which science and technology have been developed and applied mostly by the highly industrialized countries to their national scale of preference produced the present crisis of capability of the nation-state system. It is not deniable that creating new alternative global science and technology policy is one of the most imminent and significant priority to overcome and surpass such a crisis.⁴⁾

2. Creative character of the GPID

The GPID's creative capability is illustrated in the following five points.⁵⁾ Firstly, the key concept of development is defined not as a nation-state centered development but as a human development. As a result, the key concept of such development is quite different from the conventional concept of development which focuses mainly on the production of goods and services, and on their necessary corollaries such as the allocation of goods and services, institutionalization, structural change, cultural development or ecological technology. Basic human needs and their development are highly evaluated in the GPID project. Security, welfare, identity and freedom are the core targets in that framework within which basic human needs and their development are measured.

Secondly, it was strongly emphasized that, in the contemporary global development process, there are no developed countries in the sense that no country, whether developed or underdeveloped in conventional terms, has reached a level to satisfy even minimum standard of security, welfare, identity and freedom of the people. Within the framework of the GPID, it has been emphasized that the existence of underdeveloped and overdeveloped countries and their relations are strong obstacles to further development in the global transformation process.

Thirdly, in order to understand the deep character of the contemporary concept of development, necessity of dialogue or multilogue process among different cultures, among researchers and citizens, among researchers and decision makers or planners, and among citizens and decision makers or planners, etc. have been advocated. Thus, the framework of human-centered development continuously asks researchers on development to re-evaluate their research design even by the methodological device of their dialogue with themselves. This is so because the goals and process of development require feedback to consider what true human need is.

Fourthly, the GPID has pointed out that the separation of theory of overdevelopment

from the theory of underdevelopment tended to result in the neglect of interdependent relations between overdevelopment and underdevelopment, although in reality the two are causally interrelated. Previously, researchers in the First World have focused on the total world including the Second World and the Third World, but researchers in the Third World have tended to focus only upon themselves. Unless the Third World picks up the total world and does intensive research on the First and the Second Worlds as well as the Third World, a common theory of development would not be created in this global intellectual world. And the global transformation process could not be completed.

Fifthly, the GPID has emphasized the importance of integrative research in the present world of extreme specialization. Previously, idealistic academic researchers concentrated their research only on goals but not on processes. Researchers of bureaucratic think-tanks tended to research only the process and not the goal. Goals were always forgotten by them except the implicitly predetermined ones. In the case of most statistical researchers, they concentrated their research on various indicators and completely neglected goals and processes. They also tended to pick up measurable indicators which were already processed or prepared to be easily processed. Moreover, processing of data and indicators were mostly monopolized by the nation-state, particularly by the highly industrialized states. Surely, these produced seriously biased empirical research. Integrative research should overcome this type of unintentionally oriented bias.

Along the line of development of the above five key concepts of the GPID, sub-categories of the GPID evolved and were developed into the independent but interdependent sub-projects at the Dubrovnik Workshop in 1977. Sub-categories such as concepts of development, needs, rights, alternative ways of life, visions of desirable societies, visions of desirable worlds and theories of development were set up within the framework of goals. Sub-categories such as expansion and exploitation processes, liberation and autonomy processes, militarization, processes of the U. N. system, alternative strategies and scenarios were set up within the framework of processes. Sub-categories such as goals indicators, territorial system indicators, non-territorial system indicators, ecological balance indicators, and politics of indicators were set up within the framework of indicators.

And finally, within the framework of tools as methodologies, sub-categories such as dialogues, networks, semiotics, mathematics, forms of presentation, methods of analysis and inter-regional studies were set up. In addition to the above sub-categories, energy sub-project and world economy sub-categories have also been active during the latter part of the

evolution of the GPID.

In the total process of the GPID research, new network formation has been the most effective tool for research development in the sense that not only has the GPID research been the products of new network formation pioneered by the newly established UNU in 1975, but also the new methodology of network has been emphasized practically as well as theoretically by the GPID itself. The original network has consisted of 26 research units all over the world including the First, the Second and the Third worlds. The map of the network is shown in the footnote diagram.⁶⁾

3. Strength and weakness of the GPID in the integration phase

The GPID started at the Dubrovnik meeting in 1977 when detente was still viable. It started by setting entirely new analytical categories as starting points of their joint research, in which specialization in only some of those analytical sub-categories was recommended as shown in the previous diagram, and great expectation for synthesis and integration of those sub-categorical research at a later stage was anticipated and manifestly expressed. Such a beginning of the GPID project has meant a very natural development of critical research of the old established disciplines. The GPID was revolutionary in terms of the Western tradition of social sciences. However, it has come to recognize step by step that integrative work is extremely difficult and even sterile in a practical sense much like the efforts of computer specialists who wish to build theory only by synthesizing a broad range of data. In the GPID also, the original idea of sub-categorization by our pre-theoretical consideration lost most value in the later stage of our integrative work. It is undeniable that a strong concern with theory is increasingly necessary in the later stage of the GPID research, but, it is also undeniable that the later stage of the GPID research will become more and more differentiated, specialized⁷⁾ and as a result, inevitably lose at least the explicit integrative concern by each subcategorized research unit. Once the world of research is divided into sets of independent sub-categories, the results are surely dilemma and contradiction in the sense that more specialization is always inimical to integration.

It is very ironical that although the GPID was created for critical research of the analytical tradition of Western social science, the weakness of the Western tradition of social science was illuminated in the process of evolution of the GPID research itself. The Western tradition of social science tends to emphasize the importance of systems analysis and systems thinking. It also emphasizes methodology based on model-data interaction. However,

even if empirical research based on systems thinking might have great value as social science research, the approach to understanding of complicated realities from fictitious elements of each system has serious limitations in the sense that individuality for each unit is always neglected and systems thinking itself is also fictitious in the framework of individual understanding of the aggregate.

So-called billiard type theory of international politics was also developed in the Western tradition of the discipline of politics. This is a strong bias of Western cosmology. In contrast to Western cosmology, Eastern cosmology has an orientation which tends to think in terms of totality from the beginning. Thus the Eastern tradition of understanding as totality has developed an intellectual attitude which starts from thinking about collective entity even in the case of social science research. Of course, each research method has strengths and weaknesses whose nature is the reverse of those of the other. Thus, Western cosmology sometimes conscious of her weakness tends to orient to the Eastern way of thinking and successfully developed analytically oriented dialectical methods which were at first illustrated in Hegelian philosophy and in the next stage Marxist dialectical materialism. In this sense, dialectical philosophy which developed in Western cosmology was without question not only the effort of Western cosmology to overcome its intrinsic weakness, but also its effort to add something to Eastern cosmology which tends to an ambiguous understanding of totality.

However, because of the intrinsic difficulties of the dialectical method applied to the Western tradition of empirical science, much misunderstanding of dialectical methods has become step by step prevalent among ideologically oriented so-called objective scientific communities. The ideological character of each nation-state as well as the ideological character of each social class were so strong that not only was a deep analysis of the present global crisis trends implicitly or explicitly lacking but also the formation of a new international information order was suppressed. Thus normative approach as well as realist approach have fallen into pitfalls in the way of understanding of our future. Of course, human capability is far from the omnipotence of god, and the human intellectual capability has intrinsic limitations.

Depending only on the dialectical method is unquestionably dangerous. But depending on empirical approach also has intrinsic weakness. As intellectual human occupations, it is natural that both of them have intrinsic weaknesses and limitations. Marxist theory was surely successful in reversing Hegelian philosophy not only in terms of epistemology but

also in terms of social theory. It shifted the core of Hegelian dialectics from the self-introspection of the spiritual process to the analysis of the real historical economic process. This has been done by reversing the original Hegelian standpoint. In the limited sphere, it was so successful in explaining the historical development of class society that Marxist theory could achieve the popular reputation in the political movement to eradicate class society. However, the development of Marxist theory mostly stopped there except for a few cases like the global capital accumulation theory developed by our favorite colleague, Samir Amin, because the nation-state system which is the core element of contemporary international society is beyond the analytical power of Marxist class theory. A symbolic example of the failure of Marxist analysis is found in the theory of state and revolution in which the gradual death of the state after socialist revolution is clearly manifested. In reality, the opposite tendency from the theoretical prediction has developed. The ironical tendency to strengthen state apparatus of every socialist country resulted in new conflict formation among socialist powers as well as traditional conflicts between capitalist countries and socialist countries; this should be symbolically illustrated for explicating the point. Of course there is still a strong argument that the state will die once the capitalist system dies in all part of the world. However, there is no new definite prospective that the state will die in the predictable future as far as the historical development of state in capitalist as well as socialist societies are empirically observed.⁸⁾

The Marxist theory could never provide the explanation and prediction of the future in its own terms as far as the death of the state is concerned. On the other hand, development of multinational enterprises and their impact on the world political economy is unquestionably increasing. It is a steady tendency that the development of multinational enterprises deeply influences interdependence and interpenetration among nation-states. The traditional billiard-type model of international politics is expected to become obsolete very rapidly even if decision makers of various nation-states wish to stick firmly and tenaciously to that theory.⁹⁾ It is still not deniable that the Marxist-type of analysis of history and the realist type of international relations analysis have some range of validity within their extremely limited respective spheres as far as the explanatory power of analysis of the global transformation process is concerned. In this framework of the historical achievement of intellectual history, strengths and weaknesses of the GPID should be also reconsidered and re-evaluated.

4. The GPID and contemporary social theories

Hegelian philosophy was not successful in analyzing central dynamics of the nation-state. It emphasized the divine character of the state as the last complete form of dialectic of spirit. Marxist philosophy was not successful in analyzing spiritual and cultural characters of the state. It emphasized the contradiction between the force of production and the relationship of production as the materialist process of historical development. In the framework of the strength and weakness of the respective philosophies, it is very difficult for either to be accepted as a whole for the real academic analysis of future information order of the global society. In this context, the contemporary social theories have had strong obligations to overcome such limitations of social philosophies illustrated in the Hegelian and Marxist traditions. These philosophies manifestly neglected the existence of nation-states competing with each other. It is in this context also that present social theories should be re-examined and reconstructed. We must also recognize that the present social theories are well classified on the dimension of collectivist and individualistic orientations as well as on the dimensions of spiritual and materialistic orientations. Individualistic theories of society developed as a set of theories of representative government in the domestic arena and billiard type model of international relations in the external arena, but they carry severe limitations within such sets in the sense that each theory operates in an entirely different arena and has an entirely different logic of social dynamics. Also two theories have difficulties in the synthesis of aggregating individual analysis of units and face insurmountable intrinsic theoretical dilemmas in their analysis of total aggregate systemic behavior. Probably this limitation is not so serious pragmatically in the case of the theory of representative government compared with the theory of the billiard type of international relations because internal problems within each nation-state are easier to solve, since the nation-state is already considerably developed, than the external problems of each nation-state. It should be recognized that internal problems of the industrialized countries have reached the stage in which they are solved practically by developed institutionalizations, compared with the poorly developed ones for the international arena.

Collectively oriented theories evolved not only along the line of right-wing state theory but also along the line of left-wing Marxist Leninist type of theory of state and revolution. The former has emphasized the divine character of the nation-state, and the latter has emphasized the reality of the class state in which exploitation of the oppressed class tends to be strengthened by the state-apparatus, and the necessity of eradicating the state-appara-

tus in capitalist countries as far as it means symbolically to be the force-mechanism of police or military. However, such a tendency rather strengthened force-mechanism of the nation-state not only in socialist countries but also in capitalist countries. Thus, socialist revolutions resulted in developing stronger mechanism of state apparatus in opposing capitalist countries as well as socialist countries. The former cases are illustrated particularly in the peripheral nation-states which face political instability by socialist oriented revolutionaries. And the latter cases are illustrated in most of the communist countries in the sense that they fear military intervention by the capitalist countries. The pan-nationalist and pan-religious movements are, in one sense, degenerate corollaries of right wing state theory. However these movements emphasize paternalistic brotherhood across national boundaries against oppression by great powers even if these movements themselves tend to become imperialistic or sub-imperialistic. It is not deniable that such tendencies are the indispensable products of the present international structure in which the hierarchical structure of nation-states and the hierarchical structure of class society intermingle and are intrinsically internalized. In this framework of international structure, it is natural that the most simplistic answer for revolutionaries is the idea of the world revolution as illustrated in the Trotskyist type of theory or in some of the radical new left theories. Here, internal and external dichotomy of collectivist orientation is enlarged to the global scale even in the expected normative form in the support of friends or in the fight against the enemy. This dichotomy ignores state boundary in one sense. However, it tends to frequently utilized state force-mechanism in the expansionist way. Thus, the present global structure in which nation-states occupy the core part of the system and perform the central dynamics of the power game, imposes severe restrictions on any type of political movement, national or international. On the other hand, any social theory is a social product. In this sense, the position and phase of theorists are very significant. Not only the identification to a class or nation-state but also the degree of commitment to them and the phenomenological phase of class or nation-state evolution are decisive factors of the phase and pattern of any theory. Moreover, the present global structure has strengthened the inter-government network in intellectual and cultural communication. Such a network undeniably supports the present international information order, which is a strong ideological basis of the present world order, and strengthens the present way of development as well as the present strategic thinking of the defense community.

The GPID project started in the present international structure although in 1977

detente was still viable. It is undeniable that without the UNU no such creative and radical intellectual experiment would have been possible in the global alternative network formation quite different from the previously established network rooted in the present world power structure. It was natural that the GPID has emphasized the special importance of networks as tools. However, once network formed, they did not develop further. Moreover, with meager understanding of the phase of the GPID in the UNU, rash criticism of the UNU policy developed, and the continuation of the original idea was in some aspects disturbed. The GPID, the HSD (Human and Social Development Project) and the UNU are all creative intellectual products in the contemporary international structure, and all of them have intrinsic limitations even if they are revolutionary in their relations to the previous social theories and realities. Therefore, it is necessary that the GPID be re-evaluated in contrast to various modern social theories particularly in international context.

As the conventional theory of international politics has been separated from political science which, in general, deals with domestic politics only, even modern systems theory of international politics tends to be deeply involved in Machiavelian and Hobbesian tradition of social theory and is still quite unable to escape from being drawn into the theoretical strategic quagmire of the zero-sum game. Thus the revised theory of international politics is naturally oriented towards escaping this quagmire and so the concept of interdependence and interpenetration are easily accepted without regard to the central political dynamics of power relations among nation-states. Thus the collapse of systems theory based on the billiard type model of international relations produced the transnational theory in the horizontal arena and dependency theory in the vertical arena in extremely simplistic ways.¹⁰⁾ With more sophistication, center-periphery theory of social dynamics took the place of the transnational theory as well as that of dependency. It might be possible to see this incomplete evolutionary process of the theory of international politics from the entirely different direction of differentiation of structural theory from the simplest type of systems theory to more sophisticated analysis of international phenomena.¹¹⁾ Although it might be partially true, the evolution of theory is not complete. In this framework of the incomplete evolution process, there appeared an adaptation of Marxist theory as illustrated in the global capital accumulation theory developed by Samir Amin, one of our favourite colleagues of the GPID. Also conventional historical theory has been adapted as in Imanuel Wallerstein's theory of historical development. Thus, the GPID researchers should be more attentive to these academic trends. However, the GPID, had tended to concentrate on the differentiated

analytical sub-categories, although in a later stage, it has shifted its focus to the global problematique.¹²⁾ In spite of the successful shift in focus, the GPID has lost theoretical interest in the initial stage of planning to set various alternative sub-categories particularly in the field of the central dynamics of international politics.

5. Transformational capability of the GPID

The core characteristics of the GPID have been rooted in the individualistic and analytic tradition of Western cosmology. Compared with this analytic flavor, the contrasting methods of the SCA (Socio-Cultural Development Alternative in the Changing World) has been very illuminating in the sense that the SCA focuses on the analysis of totality by the use of in-depth case studies through which integrative focus is given in the total process of specific research. The method contrasts with that of the Western cosmology oriented GPID, which has resulted in difficulties of integrating the various analytical concepts. However, difficulties in project integration necessarily demanded the transformation of the GPID from mediocre and average attitudes to the various analytical categories, or from the voluntary emphasis on some analytical categories to the fresh emphasis on approach of problem-solving. The concept of the global problematique which thus became the fundamental concept of the GPID provided a similar approach to that of the Club of Rome which has been successful. Thus the transformational capability of the GPID has gradually improved, not only in its capability to reorganize conventional disciplines, but also in its capability to solve serious problems for human development and survival in the global context.

The GPID tries to reorganize conventional nation-state centered policy science, which is directed mainly to solve domestic problems, to a global policy science which involves the development of new transnational actors to solve the global problematique. Such an effort to reorganize various conventional disciplines along the new dimension of human development is expected to be integrated into the intellectual and academic criticism of the traditional state-centered policy science. In this critical process the purely theoretical foundation of systems theory is also questioned, since it presupposes the existence of fictitious units and systems as analyzable entities and is poor in the phenomenological understanding of reality. The particularly imminent danger of a nuclear strategic interaction between the superpowers with its probable catastrophic outcome is one of the most serious global problematique to be solved at present. Given that the traditional nation-state system has no such capability, a new network formation and its institutionalization are the imminent tasks

of the GPID although it is still in the form of an indirect intellectual effort of network formation and has no political capability to transform the present world order.

In order to strengthen such a transformational capability, deep understanding of the deteriorating capability of the nation-state might be the prerequisite. If we look at the history of the rise and fall of nation-states such as the British Empire, the United States and possibly the Soviet Union, it is easily conceivable that the capability of each nation-state goes through a historical cycle. Imperialist and sub-imperialist powers have shown cyclical patterns in nation-state capability. After 1970, the relative position of the US has dropped very significantly. The GNP of the US accounted for one quarter of the world GNP in 1975 compared with one half in 1950. The US is no longer secure from a possible nuclear attack by the USSR, while it did enjoy security in the beginning of the 1950's. This radical drop in the capability of the United States has been an inevitable result of the contemporary world transformation process. It could not be explained simply by the cyclical historical change of powers as principal actors or game players. The development of science and technology and their impact upon the global social structure is the primary factor of this phenomenological change. Thus the structured and internalized network of the development of science and technology in the global setting is one of the most imminent global problematique. It is a very dynamic force in the making of the international order. The present information order in the world has also been formed by the dynamic force of the development of science and technology. Is it possible to control this process of the international order by alternative network formation? This is the question which must be raised in searching for an alternative capability of the GPID. And this is the question to be raised in asking whether the GPID is prepared to develop such intellectual capability. How to develop such capability should be re-examined in an entirely fresh and creative manner. For this purpose, it is better to re-examine the GPID in the context of the development of other projects within the UNU and to formulate a broader network around the UNU. Without such effort to clarify the total map of new network formation, fresh meaning of transformational capability of intellectual network formation could not be measured and evaluated.

A historical development beyond the Westphalian system cannot be successful without such network formation. We must recognize that the expansion and deepening of the spectrum of fresh non-governmental actors is the first possible reservoir for a new network formation. However, that is not adequate, for the worst case study network is already too strongly established among powers as illustrated in the nuclear arms race. Instead of the

worst case learning network,¹³⁾ the best case learning network should be found or created in the global transformation process. The development of the UNU offers a significant alternative because the UNU was born in the present international structure and could not easily overcome present impasse of the structural limitations, particularly in the field of national security.

The reality of such limitations was well expressed in the UNU's first research planning term which consisted of three core subjects: World Hunger Project, Resource Utilization and Control Project, and Human and Social Development Project. Peace research was not included. In this sense, the GPID was much expected to take a role of peace research *per se*. It included an important sub-category of militarization as pathological maldevelopment. However, the study of the nuclear arms race and arms transfer were not the main focus. Moreover, the GPID was very weak in setting a normative perspective for a historical transformation of the Westphalian international system. When the main focus moved from the analytical subcategories to the global problematique approach, the studies of conflict resolution and demilitarization were not included as the core of the global problematique. In this sense, the weakness of the study of militarization is not so different from the Club of Rome reports although the latter improved at a later phase. The GPID picked up the study of militarization at the Oslo meeting in 1981. It was called the "Conference on Militarization, Development and Alternative Strategy of Security" and it included several important researches on militarization. However, those researches were not well integrated in the main research activity. Thus, although various criticisms of the conventional discipline were raised, there was only weak criticism of the missing link in human security study in terms of creating alternative security and development, that is, security by demilitarization.

The question as to why the UNU was established and how the UNU has operated should be explained to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the GPID in the political context in which the UNU is located. As far as the origin of the UNU is concerned, it was a product of the university crisis in the end of the 1960's. Although the late Secretary General U Thant originally proposed the establishment of the UNU as a truly global peace university, his idea had not realized until university unrest had raised the necessity of developing an alternative global university. In 1972 and 1973, the U. N. passed a resolution to establish the UNU headquarters in Tokyo as well as to demand various governments to promote peace research. The combined effects of the university crisis and the U. N. resolution opened a fresh and creative era for academic reorganization in Japan. In 1973, the

Peace Studies Association of Japan was established and the Japan Academic Council was activated to promote peace research in Japan. And, in 1975, the Institute for Peace Science was established in Hiroshima as the first peace research institute affiliated with a national university in Japan although the Ministry of Education is still hesitant to recognize it on a judicial basis. It was the same year that the UNU was inaugurated by the formal recognition of the government. It should be noticed here that the Japanese Government had supported the U. N. resolutions in 1972 and 1973 previously mentioned.¹⁴⁾ The processes of development of peace research and the UNU shows how difficult new network formation is given the present global structure of the nation-state system. In this difficult framework of the development of the UNU research projects, a complicated strategy for further development of research projects has been indispensable, although criticism of the UNU bureaucracy frequently expressed in the GPID represented by the former coordinator Johan Galtung, had some basis. It was tragic that Johan's position has become very difficult in Japan because of his continuous criticisms of the UNU headquarters. The true tragedy for him is that his methodology which is strongly oriented towards Western cosmology, could never understand the position of the UNU in the present political context of Japan. However, a breakthrough for peace research has been made by the UNU. The following chronology will illuminate a pattern of development for the foreseeable future of peace research projects despite Johan's criticisms of the UNU.

6. Future prospect of the UNU beyond the capability of the GPID

Faced with the weakness of the study of militarization by the GPID as illustrated in the small number of workshops on militarization, the Institute for Peace Science at Hiroshima University has tried to hold militarization research workshops in Japan.¹⁵⁾ This effort finally succeeded when the Roman Catholic Pope visited Hiroshima in 1981. The main cause of difficulty for the UNU to take up peace research as one of its core research projects was gradually removed by the joint efforts of the UNU, City of Hiroshima and the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University. The Hiroshima Commission for Promoting International Peace (Chairman, Dr. Michio Nagai) was successfully formed through intimate cooperation among these three organizations. This Commission decided to invite the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI), the Palme Commission, to hold two workshop sessions in Tokyo and Hiroshima for deep study on disarmament proposal to the Second U. N. Special Session on Disarmament. The preparation and


execution of the whole plan were co-ordinated by Dr. Michio Nagai who played a key role in the establishment of the Institute for Peace Science at Hiroshima University while he was the Minister of Education in 1975.¹⁶⁾ The Workshop on Disarmament and International Security Tokyo Session, and the Workshop's Hiroshima Session were made successful also by the impact of the intellectual activities of the Palme Commission. The political atmosphere in Japan gradually changed towards favoring disarmament as illustrated in the formation of the Dietmen's Union for Disarmament (*Gunshuku-Giin-Renmei*). In 1982, the UNU could hold two significant meetings: Task Force Meeting on Peace and Global Transformation (24–26 March) and Asian Regional Perspective Task Force Meeting on Perspective for Peace and Transformation in Asia (4–6 April).¹⁷⁾ The activities of the GPID and SCA gradually created an atmosphere favorable for alternative security and development research. Furthermore, the Japan Political Science Association held the first round table of the IPSA in Japan on the subject of Political Development and New International Economic Order in Asia and Pacific. Partly competing and cooperating with the Japan Political Science Association, the Asian Peace Research Association which was formed at the Asian Peace Research meeting at Yokohama at the end of 1980 organized by IPRA (International Peace Research Association – Secretary General, Prof. Yoshikazu Sakamoto), also held the APRA workshop on Militarization and Alternative Development in Tokyo. The two workshops cooperated with the UNU. Particularly, the latter partly joined in the Task Force Meeting on Perspective for Peace and Transformation in Asia. These cooperations are being cultivated by the alternative intellectual peace research networks independent of the government-government networks which are deeply rooted in the present international power structure. The fifth international seminar, the Making of the New International Order by the SCA project which was held in Yokohama (29 November – 3 December, 1982), was the highlight of the first term of the UNU research project because this fifth transworld seminar is expected to develop into transworld subprojects of the UNU which is moving to the second stage of its activities starting on January 1, 1983.

In this framework of the emergence of peace and alternative development research networks which have been strongly supported by the UNU, the role of the GPID should be re-evaluated as one of the most important attempts to move the academic world from the conventional approach to innovative multilogues for alternative security and alternative development. Along the original dimension of the analytical sub-categories of the GPID, it could not develop a more integrative theory of the global transformation process and could

not develop a new framework of alternative global policy science in the last stage of the GPID. However, the GPID has gradually shifted its main focus to the direction of epistemology of the global problematique. And although the GPID has not developed fully along this dimension the systematic theory of global alternative policy science, it is not deniable that the GPID has provided fresh and creative inspiration for the further advancement of peace research and alternative development research in the respective research organizations of the world including the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University as well as the other research projects of the UNU. The original analytical sub-categories set by the GPID might have another opportunity to be revived in future UNU research projects if the necessity to develop integrative theory would become realized again in some stage of global transformation process of the present world in which the UNU should have a more active role.

Notes to Chapter 2

- 1) The ratio of capability to problem is shown in the following diagram.



- 2) Paris Arnopoulos, *The Global Problematique* (System & Method for Problem Analysis) Gamma-Concordia, Montreal, June 1981. Paris defines a problem as a disturbing situation (*op. cit.*, p. 4). However, in the framework of concept shown in the diagram of 1, more dynamic global definition might be necessary as far as the GPID is concerned with global problematique deeply rooted in the global crisis situation of the contemporary world.
- 3) Particularly, security intellectuals mostly represented by military strategists are victims of nation-state system. Their concerns could not overcome limitations of nation-state system thinking. This is clearly symbolized in the unprecedented nuclear build-up of the Reagan Administration and its resultant crisis in the American-European relations as well as American-Soviet relations as was explained in the next part of this chapter.
- 4) The UNU set "Science and Technology and Their Social and Ethical Implication" as one of five "Priority concerns and Problem Areas for 1982–1987" in the medium term perspective of the UNU research.
- 5) Johan Galtung, 'Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development, A Project Description', HSDPD-9/UNUP-11, pp. 1–4.
- 6) For readers' convenience, the diagram is shown as a reproduction of original edition in 1977 (*op. cit.*, pp. 28–29). So, later revision of this diagram is not included here.

global transformation process should be picked up in the politics of this planet earth. However, it seems to me that even the UNU might have extreme difficulty in picking up theory of state in this global transformation period, because even the UNU itself was born in the strong limitation of the present power structure of nation-state system.

- 9) Compared with theory of state in the global transformation process, study of theory of MNC might be easier even if some strong limitations also exist. In reality, there have been many publications on MNC for the past ten years. However, in this field, integrative theory building for state and MNC in the global transformation process is still outside of those publications. The GPID also could not do such type of research. This is surely the study in the field of global political economy in the normative as well as empirical framework deeply rooted in the global historical transformation process.
- 10) In one sense, billiard type of international theory is more systematic rather than revised international theory such as transnational theory or dependency theory. In this framework, linkage theory also lacks systematic foundation of theory building as far as it does not mention its relationship with systems theory on the abstract level and as far as it does not evaluate theory of state on the concrete level.
- 11) In this framework of theory development, it should be mentioned here that Talcott Parson's theory has never developed to the direction of explication of global society in which transformation process of nation-state system is going on. Exceptional effort was done by my book published in Japanese. See *Idea of Global Politics (Chikyu Seijigaku no Koso)* Nihon Keizai Shinbun Co., 1977.
- 12) Johan Galtung's works on studies of international social structure were very illuminating in his effort of developing structural theory of center-periphery dynamics in the global society. However, historical evolution process was a missing link of his theory. And he himself rushed to cosmological explanation of the contemporary world without regards to the development of theory of global transformation process.
- 13) See my work, "Global Militarization and Its Remedy" (IPSHU Research Report Series, No. 3), August, 1979. This is an enlarged edition of original report of the same name published by the UNU.
- 14) See my paper "The Concept of Peace Research in Japan and Its Political Context" (IPSHU Research Report, No. 6).
- 15) For one of the efforts, see "A Joint Study Meeting of the United Nations University (UNU) and the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University (IPSHU) on Peace and Development – Modernization and Militarization; A Summary of Reports and Discussion; As Starting Materials for Future Plans (Discussion Proposal, 1980) in *Hiroshima Peace Science*, No. 4, pp. 51–83.
- 16) UNU Report "Activities in Japan of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security

Issues, Tokyo and Hiroshima Sessions, 3–9 December 1981.”

- 17) The UNU “UNU Sub-Program on Peace and Global Transformation” Documents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

CHAPTER 3
JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE DEMILITARIZATION
OF NORTHEAST ASIA

1. The Korean problem in the global transformation process

The global transformation process which began at the end of the Second World War is well exemplified in the situation of Korea. In 1945 Korea found itself with the USSR occupying the north and US troops in the southern half of the country. This partitioning of Korea was viewed as a temporary measure, but almost four decades later the separation of North and South remains an international problem that has persistently eluded any solution.

In 1977, when it appeared that the Carter Administration might be looking for a solution to the Korean problem, I made a new proposal in my paper presented to the US–Japan Conference in Washington, D. C., to solve the Korean problem in terms of the Finlandization of North Korea and the converse-Finlandization of South Korea. However, towards the end of the 1970's, Finlandization became a highly charged ideological term which some influential hawkish strategists frequently used in attacking dovish intellectuals in the West as if they were caught in a Soviet trap.

After the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Cold War was again revived and when the Reagan Administration started a big military build-up detente collapsed completely. In such an international atmosphere the solution of the Korean problem seemed to become even more difficult than during the original Cold War period.

However, in spite of the global conflict formation process symbolized by the intensifying nuclear arms race, Reagan's reopening of the Cold War is creating serious repercussions from every part of the world within the past two years. Domestic support for Mr. Reagan is also being withdrawn as is well illustrated in the major defeat of the GOP in the 1982 mid-term elections, with the passage of nuclear freeze proposals in nine states, and the strong anti-nuclear declaration by Catholic bishops calling for national moral standards related to human survival. It means that the Westphalian international system *per se* is being questioned in terms of its inability to provide real security for the people of this planet Earth.

Conflict on the Korean Peninsula was one aspect of the global conflict formation process. And, in the sense that conflict in the Korean Peninsula could not be solved even in the period of detente in the middle of the 1970's, the difficulty of solving it is intimately

related to the intrinsic characteristics of the Westphalian system. This system is now accelerating global militarization as I analyzed in the first chapter.¹⁾ There, I asked what is the marginal salient factor for the next development, and concluded that development and demilitarization could not be dissociated so far as development means global alternative development.

In this chapter I wish to argue, first, that the solution of the Korean conflict is one of the most salient marginal factors for the next development in the theoretical framework of the global transformation process. First, it must be pointed out that the Korean War became the symbolic turning point of the opening of the original Cold War, and that Cold War is being revived without solving the Korean conflict. In this symbolic sense this is the most serious conflict in the current global conflict formation process.

Secondly, though the US resolved the so-called China problem during the Nixon-Kissinger era, this reduction in tension in East Asia did not extend to the Korean Peninsula because of the weakness of Kissinger's approach. In the context of Kissinger's tripartite power diplomacy the Korean conflict was seen as a peripheral conflict. And the dynamics of power politics tended to worsen any peripheral conflict if that conflict was still unresolved.

Third, the Korean Peninsula was one of the symbolic victims of the intrinsic characteristics of power politics not only in the origin of the Korean War, but also in the case of Kissinger diplomacy. Furthermore, the Korean conflict continues to be the marginal salient cause of the regional arms race which, in turn, tends to accelerate the global conflict formation process. It was surely one of the causes of the reopening of the Cold War in East Asia. In this sense, the solution of the Korean conflict is the prime requisite for global demilitarization. Without a settlement of the Korean conflict the next stage of true global development cannot be initiated nor can a new international order be realized.

Fourth, the Korean conflict was, from the beginning, a North-South conflict, different from the East-West German conflict even though both seemed to have the same characteristics.²⁾ The elements of the North-South conflict in Korea were not examined during the Cold War period. It was after the middle of the 1970's that both North Korea and South Korea expressed their strong desire to become formal members of the non-aligned nations. North Korea was accepted because foreign troops were not stationed there; but South Korea was not accepted because US troops were still stationed there.

Thus, in the global transformation process of the Korean conflict, the character of the

North-South problem is becoming more and more important. It is very ironic that the elements of the Korean conflict have become salient only after both North and South Korea have successfully achieved a high level of economic development and have become an alternative model for Third World countries.

Fifth, in spite of the successful development of their economies, militarization of Northeast Asia is being developed in the specific pattern of time-lag relation among the US–Japan–South Korean military establishments. This transnational militarization process is well illustrated in the progression of, first, US–Korean military cooperation, then US–Japan military cooperation, and, finally, Japan–Korean military cooperation as shown in my previous paper, “The Development of the Military Structure among Japan, the US, and Korea.”³⁾ In this situation, without a solution to the Korean conflict, Japan, contrary to its policy under the “Peace Constitution,” is being forced to remilitarize and any Japanese effort toward a new international order is likely to be deferred.

Sixth, the Korean conflict embodies many of the intrinsic characteristics of the peripheral as well as the central dynamics of the Westphalian international system in the sense that structural aspects of the vertical center-periphery relationship were combined with horizontal power relations of the billiard type of international relations. Removing the source of the conflict in the case of Korea could become the best model for conflict resolution in the global transformation process because such causes of conflict are prevalent in the peripheral areas of the world. In the structural sense, removing the sources of conflict is not an easy task especially in cases of protracted conflict.

Seventh, Japan was the most significant source of conflict in Korea in her occupation during the period between 1910 and 1945 and continued to be a source of conflict, particularly after 1965. During that period Japan’s economy and technology advanced tremendously.

No one could deny that Japan has reached the stage where a more active political role in the global transformation process is appropriate. However, because of the US pressure on Japan to take on a greater share of the military burden, the meaning of political burden seems to be still ambiguous in terms of the theory of international politics. As a result, Japanese policy operates on a double track, that is, on one track an increase in the military budget which results in deteriorating international relations in Northeast Asia, and on the second track an increase economic cooperation with the developing countries in the Third World which should result in decreased tension. It should be noted here that even the

latter track tends to force Japan to support strategic pivotal areas to strengthen their military capability, thus resulting in an accelerated arms race in that region.

In the global transformation process this might be the most serious challenge to Japan: to create an alternative peace policy. But in order to do this Japan cannot walk on the double track. Japan should develop a global policy independent of the Pentagon-influenced US foreign policy.

2. Evaluating Japan's capability for the making of a new international order

The globalization of Japanese economy and technology has produced a new international situation in which the grammar for decision-making behavior based on the classical Westphalian international system is out of date, at least from a long-term perspective. If we look at the history of the rise and fall of such nation-states as Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, the US, and possibly the USSR, the capability of each nation-state as a whole showed an up-and-down historical cycle. Not only imperialist powers but also sub-imperialist powers showed some cyclical up-and-down symptoms in their nation-state capabilities. After 1970, the relative position of the US and her weight dropped significantly: the relative weight of the GNP of the US to the world total had become one-fourth in 1975 compared with one-half in 1950 and one-third in 1970. The US is no longer a sanctuary for a possible nuclear exchange between the superpowers, even though the US was still a sanctuary in the early 1950's. This radical drop in US capability came, inevitably, as a result of the global transformation process. It could not be explained and understood only by cyclical up-and-down patterns of the historical change of powers of the principal actors or game players of the world. The development of science and technology and their impact on global social structure, in which Japan has taken leadership by her rapid advancement of economic structure, has become the salient marginal factor of such phenomenological change in international politics *per se*. In the contemporary setting of international politics, high science and high technology is becoming the most dynamic and revolutionary force in the making of a new international order. The present information order of the world has been also formed by the dynamic forces of the historical development of science and technology. The issue we are most concerned with is whether high science and technology can create a new international order in which the arms race and global militarization process can be successively curbed or reversed. And the corollary issue is how such an alternative process would be created and who would become the leading actors and in what ways.

Japan as a nation-state in the conventional and traditional sense would become again the big military power as she has become the economic giant who is developing high science and technology and competing successfully with the US in these fields. Moreover, the Pentagon is putting strong pressure on Japan to contribute her science and technology for the cooperative development of US and Japanese military technology. This pressure is creating one of the two tracks already mentioned above. However, Japan is also developing an alternative global network as evidenced in the alternative activities of the UNU and related institutions and academic societies. Since UNU was established in Tokyo the alternative network formation of global academic institutions and critical intellectuals has developed considerably; nothing comparable to this has ever occurred previously in the intellectual history of Japan. The role of such alternative network formation will be described in the future history of the UNU and related organizations, governmental and non-governmental, as most significant in the process of the making of a new international order.

In the recent history of Japan, step-by-step development of education from primary to higher through vocational and technical college played a big role in the rapid growth of the Japanese economy. This was proved by time series time-lag correlation method for analyzing long-term change of educational variables throughout the pre-and post-war periods since the Meiji Restoration in Japan. It was shown as a very elegant analysis of auto-correlation. We could easily extrapolate this empirical result to the future of the global transformation process in the sense that high science and technology and then the internationalization of the Japanese intellectual world would become the most salient marginal factor for alternative development of the present international order. Considering the global militarization process of the contemporary world, globalization of Japanese economy and technology would become the biggest issue: whether Japan could contribute to the demilitarization of the world where the making of a new international order could be expected to develop more easily than in the present heavily militarized world.

Looking at the international environment of Japan, the most difficult obstacle for Japan to overcome is the temptation to militarization which exists in various forms on both the international scene as well as on the domestic scene. One of these obstacles is surely the conflicts in the divided nation of Korea. Once Japan could become a giant economic and technological power and developed a huge capability for the making of an international order, such capability should not be used for worsening international tension in Northeast Asia or for accelerating an arms build-up. Global demilitarization strategy by the use of

Japanese potential capability for a globalized economy and globalized science and technology should be delicately and creatively devised by the global intellectual community now being formed through the alternative network developed by the UNU and its related organizations.

A few years ago Professor Glenn Paige pointed out in the Institute for Peace Science that the social role of political science will shift from the relatively passive peripheral role of a "pro-violent service station" to the more active role of a central institution for the creation and application of nonviolent political knowledge.⁴⁾ It will seek to change its environment rather than to "trouble shoot" around its defects. He emphasizes also that to accomplish this shift in its social role, political science will have to detach itself from its present dependent relation to violence-accepting institutions and to create new nonviolent institutions to which its academic support can be wholeheartedly given. This shift of social role should be the same for scientists and engineers who wish to develop high science and technology. However, in the case of scientists and engineers, such a task seems to be more difficult because these professions tend to rely on traditional nation-state, and especially their military organizations for their funding. The potential capability of the UNU to transform academic community from traditional compartmentalization into different disciplines and into different cultures, into integrative dialogue and multilogue process is also expected to develop.

So far as the dialogue and multilogue among different cultures are concerned, the SCA and GPID have already contributed substantially through their unique methodology for mobilizing global intellectual resources.⁵⁾ However, solutions for peripheral conflicts and the demilitarization of science and technology have not yet been developed. Particularly in the case of the Korean conflict, the UNU has not been successful in mobilizing the global academic community into active participation for conflict resolution. In order to evaluate Japan's capability for the making of a new international order, the UNU's effort to make a significant breakthrough in the solution of the Korean conflict might be the most important measure of Japan's capability for the making of a new international order. With its high science and technology, strong peace research, and intellectual internationalization through the UNU network, a creative approach to the Korean conflict could be a significant test of Japan's future capability for the making of a new international order. It should be noted here that without such a test of capability, Japan cannot resist the pressure from the transnational defense community to increase her military budget and, again, may be forced to be-

come a big military power with a deteriorating capability to solve the global problematique.

3. The Korean problem as an issue in the making of a new international order

The dismemberment of the Cold War structure is undeniably the prerequisite for the making of a new international order. It means that without solutions to the serious conflicts in the peripheral regions of the world, the making of a new international order would be seriously delayed because the existence of such conflicts *per se* is a symbolic expression of the failure to make a new international order.

The Korean problem can be analyzed in this framework of the making of a new international order. It was surely the product of the Cold War in the global transformation process. As far as it was so, it was expected to be solved in the formation of a detente policy in the middle of the 1970's. But even though the China problem was solved in the detente formation process, the Korean problem could not be solved, and the reopening of the Cold War made the solution of the Korean conflict more difficult than it would have been during the period of the original Cold War. In this sense the Korean problem is also the product of the intrinsic characteristics of the power dynamics in the Westphalian international system. Furthermore, the Korean situation embodies the problems of center-periphery dynamics in the global transformation process. Because of this composite character of the Korean conflict, the remedy for the conflict would have to be composite, depending on respective conflict formation process.

For the intrinsic characteristics of the Westphalian international system, comparison of the situation between Europe and Asia would illuminate the difference of detente formation process between both in the middle of the 70's and the difference of the strength of resistance capability of both against the collapse of detente and the revival of the Cold War. In the case of Europe, there are the established neutral Scandinavian countries of Northern Europe, namely, the pro-Western countries of Norway and Denmark, and pro-Eastern Finland. Already, in the 50's they constituted an informal co-existence area which relieved the tension between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.⁶⁾

The science, technology and culture agreement made between Finland and the countries of Eastern Europe in the late 1960's has become the model for the countries of Western Europe. Not only the countries of Northern Europe but also the countries of Western Europe, one after another, finally imitated the example of Finland and she became a pioneer of peaceful coexistence. It was not by accident that the headquarters of the Interna-

tional Peace Research Association moved to Tampere in Finland during the latter part of the 1970's.

But in Asia no single country could perform the role of the Nordic countries in Europe, and Japan could not do so as a government. But Japanese political parties like JSP and some non-governmental organizations partly played a role similar to Finland's in Europe. It was only after the fourth Middle Eastern War that Japan's foreign policy could strengthen individuality even if it was nothing more than a passive flexible response to the changing international structure from Cold War to detente and from big power primacy to the increased strength of the Third World countries.

When the security policies of nation-states are tabulated on three variables such as focus of attention, level of activity and level of strength, conquest, hegemony, manipulation, maneuvering, revolution, the Finland model (including converse Finland model), seclusion and submission could emerge step-by-step in each cell of eight categorization.⁷⁾ Examining the other seven categories of security policy, I had already reached the conclusion that the Finland model is only one possible alternative for nation-states to survive, provided that the capability of the Westphalian international system is radically diminished in an age of nuclear competition between the two superpowers.⁸⁾ It must be emphasized here that Japan's constitution has the potential to transform Japan's security policy to something akin to the Finland model. Even if this change in policy is not realized, it still remains the central political issue of the true meaning of the Japanese constitution. The establishment of the UNU and its network is expected to open a new era for the realization of such an alternative security policy of Japan by using this approach to the Korean conflict within the framework of alternative development policy.

Considering the history of unification attempts of both Koreas, the recent situation is quite an improvement over the previous decades of the 1950's, 60's and 70's. Though North Korea proposed a very rigid plan for a confederation system after the fall of the Syngman Rhee regime in 1960, in the 22 years since then both South and North have proposed more flexible formulas for unification that would keep intact their respective political systems. The proposal for a confederation system, refined by Kim Il Sung at the sixth Labour Party General Assembly in 1980, proposed that a formula that would establish a semi-permanent co-existence of the present social/political structures in both South and North. This formula also calls for joint military headquarters and some form of top-level political unification. Although South Korea still continues to reject any kind of federation

formula, the difference between the South and the North for their unification formulas has diminished very much.

If the idea of world federation could be realized by increasing multi-relation coexistence among present nation-states, this soft type of confederation is a necessary precondition for the making of a new international order. This is surely the logical development beyond the Westphalian system, and could be credited as the most significant achievement of the world federation movement. If a federation movement can be advanced in both parts of Korea, is it not possible for coexistence and interdependence among different nations to progress accordingly in the global transformation process? We should ask such kinds of questions.

Given the center-periphery dynamics of the Korean conflict in the global transformation process, the best course for both Koreas would be dissociation from big power relations. Although this appears to be the opposite direction to a movement for world federation, it would, in fact, constitute a significant move toward establishing a world federation. Since both Koreas applied to become formal members of the original 77 members of the non-alignment movement the Korean problem was transformed on a formal level also into a North-South confrontation from the original Cold War-induced East-West conflict. It is very ironic that Reagan's global policy has tried to reverse this historical trend. If the North hopes for self-reliant development as a non-aligned nation, and the South still sticks to the development model of subordination to the US or Japan, the South's position would be less advantageous than the North's position. The problem here is that the South Korean Chun Doo Hwan regime insists on supporting the Reagan policy of reviving the Cold War by focusing on the threat of the North and of Soviet communism. This is indeed putting an end to peaceful coexistence between the South and the North. No matter how loud Chun Doo Hwan claimed a desire for dialogue with the North, he was, in fact, opposing the North when he installed operational nuclear weapons in the South. In this atmosphere, the creation of new possibilities for peaceful unification such as a soft-type confederation has become impossible. Though it is clear that the South should put forth a counter-proposal for an alternative confederation plan based on peaceful coexistence of the North and South, it has not yet done so.

So far as economic development of both Koreas is concerned, the average living standards seem to be not so different between the North and the South, although the North shows more harmonious development based on an autonomous development of education

through "Chu Che" ideology. Such a formula for economic development seems to be the most condensed and purest application of Japan's development since the Meiji Restoration. So far as the pattern of leadership of Kim Il Sung is concerned, symbolic expression of its characteristics would be charismatic combination of Emperor Jimmu, Emperor Meiji and post-war Daisaku Ikeda. In this sense, political leadership in the South could not compete with the North. However, the North's strength in patterns of leadership has a counterpart weakness in the development of intellectual freedom, particularly in the field of the social sciences and humanities. Thus, if intellectual capability of the South could be transformed into disarmament and global demilitarization capability for the making of a new international order, an equal dialogue between South and North could undeniably be developed. In the framework of alternative science and technology also, a North-South dialogue would be extremely fruitful for creating an alternative development formula in the South. In the case of the North, a dialogue with creative intellectuals in the South would surely promote a better idea of non-alignment and neutrality as well as intellectual freedom ironically obstructed by a "creative Chu Che ideology." Above all, stereotyped thinking in both Koreas would be diminished by such dialogue and an alternative non-alignment movement with such ideas as Finlandization of the North and converse Finlandization of the South would be created in Northeast Asia.

When the Korean problem is analyzed in the framework of the Cold War structure, it is clear that dismemberment of the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia is the prerequisite for the solution of the Korean problem. It is very important that North Korea has consistently demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops and foreign military bases in Korea. North Korea's independent and autonomous position on this issue is well proved by her successful achievement of withdrawal of Soviet and Chinese troops and the removal of their military bases. Moreover, North Korea expressed a common wish to make all of Korea a nuclear armament free zone in agreement with the Japanese Socialist Party. It is surely a more advanced position than the line North Korea has taken when it announced the confederation system, i.e., proposing to reduce 100,000 armed services personnel each from the South and the North. Even if the Chun Doo Hwan regime has been deaf to these propositions, it is undeniable that the Pentagon always refers to the balance and the compromise of military strength between the North and the South. The main problem here is that the Pentagon does not take into account the presence of the US Army and nuclear weapons in South Korea.

The Cold War structure in Northeast Asia is such that tripartite militarization process by Japan, the US and Korea which will directly confront the North Korean non-alignment approach that seeks the reduction of armament in the Korean peninsula, is still developing without seriously considering the creation of a situation favorable to the reduction of armaments in the Korean peninsula. The way to demilitarization, rather than to further militarization of the Korean peninsula, is to eliminate the danger of limited nuclear war as well as conventional war in the area to assure contributions toward the peaceful unification of the South and the North based on a soft type of federation formula. This would surely create an alternative development process within the Pan-Japan Sea area as a necessary adjunct to a similar process in the Pan-Pacific Basin. Japan's economic strength calls for urgent action on her part because global policy of the Reagan Administration is expected to respond to the increasing demands of awakening people who are increasingly concerned with eliminating the danger of nuclear war and with the making of a new international order. No policy of the Reagan Administration concerning Asia could succeed without Japan's close cooperation. The crucial issue for Japan is the question of how to use Japan's economic power.

4. Japan's possible alternative strategy for the solution of the Korean problem

In the pre-World War II period, the whole Korean peninsula was colonized under Japanese militarism. In the post-World War II period Japan hesitantly followed the US Cold War policy, but in the middle 60's Japan's view of Korea as a frontier of Japan's defense perimeter was revived in the framework of geopolitical strategic thinking. Korea constituted a life line for Japan in the pre-war thinking of the independent Japanese military. However, in the post-war period, Korea constitutes a frontier for the Pentagon's global strategy of defense perimeter. It should be noted that in the global transformation process, this type of strategic thinking and policy is becoming more and more dangerous because it not only perpetuates the Korean conflict, but also aggravates regional military build-ups resulting in accelerating global militarization on the regional level. Northeast Asia was a victim of such geopolitical strategic thinking and policy. Government level policy-making could not easily overcome such traps of thinking and policy, because the intrinsic characteristics of the Westphalian political dynamics disrupts alternative creative thinking and policy.

In this framework of analysis, the establishment of the UNU in Japan had great meaning for Japanese global policy. Alternative intellectual network formation by the UNU and

its related institutions and societies, including Kanagawa prefecture and the city of Yokohama, is creating an important prerequisite for the making of a new international order. This is surely one step to solve global problematique in the global transformation process of the present world structure. Quite recently, one American expert on Japan has made a proposal to Japan through the newspaper, Asahi, that Japan should contribute 20 billion US dollars per annum in cooperation with the anachronistic policy of accelerating global militarization and increasing tension, particularly in Northeast Asia, or for the detente and reduction of armament in this region by her effort to accomplish the peaceful unification of Korea. This is the very important choice Japan is facing today. In this framework of analysis, the UNU's effort to create a fresh intellectual atmosphere for the making of a new international order should shift more and more to the solution of the Korean problem as a high politics issue in the global intellectual community.

Once the importance of the Korean problem would be recognized various indirect strategies for demilitarization of Northeast Asia would come to the fore, because the intrinsic characteristics of the sovereign state are deeply rooted in the Westphalian international system which tends to disrupt direct strategy more than indirect strategy. This distinction between indirect strategy and direct strategy is based on the theoretical and empirical analysis of salient marginal causes of militarization and internalized structured causes of militarization.⁹⁾ To remove the former would be called a direct strategy, and to remove the latter would be called an indirect strategy. The probable correspondence between two sets of variables becomes ambiguous because designation of the distinction is not so easy in the rapid change of the global transformation process. However, it is surely the way to more effective alternative development theory and demilitarization theory that the basis of distinction of both sets of variables could be recognized and understood.

In the internalized and structured aspects of the militarization process within the sovereign state the weakness of autonomous provincial units is a big problem for the making of a new international order. Sister city or sister prefecture agreements which accelerate the exchange of creative ideas would be the starting point for further advancing the present structure of the global society. If the city of Yokohama would develop sister city relationships with the Korean cities of Namp'o in the North and Inchon in the South, it would promote fresh alternative thinking to solve the Korean problem. Remember Yokohama has been the sister city of San Diego in California in the State for the past twenty years. Kanagawa prefecture has recently established sister prefecture (state) agreements with Mary-

land in the United States where Johns Hopkins University and the University of Maryland are located. It should be pointed out here that one city in Maryland recently declared itself as a nuclear free city and that also recently, the 28th North American convention of Peace Science Society International was held at the University of Maryland. These connections, if well integrated in the theory of linkage politics, could provide a future perspective for the making of a new international order and the Korean problem would become easier to solve. If the UNU has enough capability to enlarge its network institutions for solving the Korean problem it might be expected to establish a series of workshops at different stages of the resolution process for dialogue or multilogue among related actors in a conflict situation. One such example might be three stages of symposia for the solution of the Korean problem in which the first one would be participation by North Koreans and global intellectuals in the West, the second one would be participation by South Koreans and global intellectuals in the West, and the third one would be attended by participants from both Koreas and global intellectuals. Joint workshops might be possible only after several separate meetings and on the condition that they would be held in neutral countries.

Workshop scenarios for the content and agendas would be difficult to set up in a way that both Koreas could accept common rule of dialogue or multilogue. Specific designs for gaming type of simulation which deals with alternative choices for the Korean future might be very helpful if such simulation could be successfully developed based on previous achievement of global simulation models or on the basis of creative new ideas. Transnational alternative network formation of universities and think tanks would become the center of intellectual creativity under the leadership of the UNU. Cities and prefectures could become the catalyzer for alternative network formation if the financial capability of those provincial units could mobilize money for such purposes. This might be a more difficult task for these actors rather than to declare themselves as world federation actors or to enlarge sister city or sister prefecture (state) agreements. The concern here is for the quality of global development activities rather than the quantity of activity. Japan's role in the demilitarization of Northeast Asia should be placed in the broad spectrum of activities of the Japanese people. It should be performed not only by the Japanese intellectual community but also by the global intellectual community being formed by the global leadership of the UNU.

Notes to Chapter 3

- 1) Forthcoming also as one of the chapters of *Development as Social Transformation*, Final work of the GPID.
- 2) Bruce Cummings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Princeton University Press, 1981.
- 3) Hiroharu Seki, "Development in the Military Structure Among Japan, the US and Korea" *Korea Scope*, Vol. III, No. 5, June 1982.
- 4) Glenn D. Paige, "On the Possibility of Nonviolent Political Science," IPSHU Research Report No. 4, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University, 1979.
- 5) See chapter 2, forthcoming as a chapter in *Alternative Development Readings – Beyond Methodological Imperialism, Part II – Diversities in Perspective*. Final work of the GPID.
- 6) Hiroharu Seki, "Toward a Peaceful Solution of the Conflict of Divided Korea in the Global Context – Role of Japan and Its Policy Implications" submitted to US–Japan Conference on the Korean Problem, June 3–5, 1977.
- 7) See pp. 16–17 above.
- 8) See chapter 2.
- 9) See chapter 1.

