

Formation of an Interstate System in East Asia

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SUMMARY

This paper aims to account for the formation of an interstate system in East Asia in the 1990s. International trading system in one form or another has continued to exist in the area since the medieval and especially modern eras. In contrast, we have had no autonomous interstate system until very recently. Before the Second World War, most of the Asian nations were Western or Japanese colonies, and thus they did not have even a fragment of their own international political system. But now all the nations in Asia are independent, and in addition, they have established their own way of political interactions among themselves. In this paper the author gathers data on changes in the diplomatic relationships among countries in the area after the end of the Second World War to probe into the systemic formation. His findings are that an autonomous interstate system has been at work in East Asia since the 1990s. Southeast Asian countries have played a leading part in forming it since the mid-1970s. Although China during the Great Cultural Revolution, and Vietnam after unification were once revolutionary, hence major turbulent actors, now both have become normal states in diplomatic terms. The end of the Cold-War in the early 1990s brought about the global milieu favorable to the

formation of the interstate system in East Asia. Besides, North Korea does not look to be so turbulent as generally said, as it seems to be seeking more favorable international settings. Finally, Japanese specialists on Asia regard an Asian region as containing local international or world systems, each of which, in their views, possesses an integrity but whose function is flexible, multiple and/or overlapping. In this regard, the interstate system in East Asia is judged to be a case, although its functions are formal, basic and fixed within its range.

1. Introduction

This paper investigates the diplomatic relationships among East Asian countries after the end of the Second World War up to the present, probing into their systemic transformation. During the period under discussion, there have been great domestic and international changes in Asian politics. Some of them have delayed, and the others have promoted the emergence of the interstate system in the area.

Firstly, Japan and Thailand were only two countries in Asia that were independent in the pre-War time. However, soon after the War, other Asian nations regained independence: the Philippines in 1946, India in 1947, Burma and the two Koreas (the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) in 1948, China (the founding of the People's Democratic Republic of China as a complete sovereign state ending its former status of a semi-colony) and Indonesia in 1949, Laos and Cambodia in 1953, and Malaya in 1957 (later Malaysia in 1963), and Singapore in 1965 (formerly a part of Malaysia). In Indochina, Vietnamese struggles for independence led to the first Indo-Chinese War in November 1946, and the Geneva Agreement on its conclusion in July 1954 brought about two Vietnamese states (the Vietnamese Democratic Republic in the North and the State of Vietnam/the Vietnamese Republic in the South). Independence of those countries was an essential prerequisite for the formation of an Asian interstate system.

Secondly, the founding of the three socialist countries - North Korea, China and North Vietnam (the unified Vietnam since 1976) - has greatly affected international politics in East Asia. In the Korean Peninsula the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950 when North Korean armies invaded South Korea, crossing their border. This domestic war became internecine and international, as the United States and later China (the Chinese People's Voluntary Forces) took part in it. The Armistice Agreement was concluded in July 1953. Meanwhile, in Indochina, the national liberation war entered the second stage in 1960. It intensified in 1962 when the United States started to engage in it on a large scale, supporting the South Vietnamese Government and its forces. The second Indo-Chinese (Vietnamese) war was fought between South Vietnam and the United States on the one hand, and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front and North Vietnam on the other. It ended in the victory of the latter when the United States

forces retreated in March 1973 and the Government in Saigon collapsed in April 1975. In China, the United States dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Straits of Taiwan in support of the Nationalist Government in Taipei soon after the outbreak of the Korean War. Thus, in contrast to the cold war in Europe, war in Asia became 'hot,' and thus the founding of an independent Asian interstate system was considerably delayed.

Thirdly, the international milieu surrounding Asia has radically changed since the early 1990s. Needless to say, the ending of the Cold War in the early 1990s brought about a completely new set of rules to this area as well. For example, although the Soviet Union, adopting the Cold War strategy, had been a major actor in Asian politics up to the late 1980s, now Russia cannot afford to intervene in it. Besides, global and regional organizations centering around the United Nations have gained momentum in the post Cold War international arena. Moreover, in the economic sphere, the Asian region has increasingly become a new center in accordance with its remarkable economic growth, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), founded in 1989, is a prominent example of economic cooperation schemes in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, in this connection, 'Asia-Pacific' has come to be accepted as a geo-economic concept. Thus, by the 1990s, the international milieu had been firmly set up for promoting an interstate system in Asia.

Fourthly, Asian politics has become bipolar or tri-polar since the 1970s. The new pole is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was founded in 1967 by its original member countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines) and joined by Brunei in 1984. Having started as an organ against the Socialist Vietnam, ASEAN has expanded to accept Vietnam as its member in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. The original members of ASEAN also promoted the founding of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, which works as a consultative body based on the principle of equality among the major countries in Asia and Europe. ASEM exemplifies the rise of Asian countries as important players in world politics today, which is quite a contrast to the past. Then the West played as colonial powers, whereas most Asian nations were subjected to them as the colonized. The traditional pole(s) in Asian politics lies in East Asia, which can be divided into China on the one hand, and Korea and Japan on the other. In other words, East Asia in a narrow sense is considered to have either one or two poles. Accordingly, East Asia in a

wide sense can be either bipolar or tri-polar. Either way, we can now recognize the strong political voices of the member countries of ASEAN, something which were totally unthinkable fifty years ago. Their initiatives have been a major factor of the formation of an interstate system in Asia.

Finally, in the political sphere, after independence most of the countries in Asia sooner or later have come to govern by an authoritarian regime. In the economic sphere, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have succeeded in export-oriented industrialization and been the economic powers since the late 1970s. Their strategy was based on a combination of development politics or dictatorship and rapid economic growth. In the 1990s, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia followed suit, and so did the Communist China, which began to adopt the Reform and Open Policy' in the late 1970s. In politics, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand moved to democracy in the late 1980s – the early 1990s, and Indonesia in the late 1990s, but authoritarian regimes still exist in North Korea, China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Singapore. Dynamism for economic growth and democracy has become increasingly stronger in domestic politics in most of the Asian countries in these years. In particular, economic developmentalism has become a common cultural norm supporting an interstate system in Asia.

In the next section, the author shall gather factual data on bilateral diplomatic relationships among East Asian countries, and in the third section, show the genesis of an interstate system in the region in the 1990s. We shall then juxtapose our findings in the context of Japanese discourses on Asian systems. Finally, we shall explore their implications for rectifying our image of Asia.

2. Formation of Bilateral Diplomatic Relationships in East Asia

The term 'Asia' in this paper refers to East Asia, from which South Asia and the Pacific region are excluded. 'East Asia' has a single meaning in Japanese usage, which refers to Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia. Although Siberia can be included in the region in geographical and economic terms, it is usually excluded from it in cultural and political terms, as is done here. In contrast, 'East Asia' has two meanings in the English usage. One is a narrow concept identical with the Japanese

usage, and the other, a broad concept in which the Southeast Asian countries (the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei) are also included. Here the author defines Asia to mean East Asia in the broad sense above. This selection has two reasons. One is grounded on a view in the economic history that stresses the former prosperity of the region as a set of trading zones among Chinese tributary and other Southeast Asian maritime trade systems. The second reason derives from the latest facts that East Asian (in the narrow sense) and Southeast Asian countries have formed a firm regional integrity in the economic sense, and that they strive for some regional cooperation in the political sense too.

The author tried to collect all data on matrices of bilateral formal relationships among those Asian countries. Although we still miss some data, especially concerning Mongol and Laos, we have those data that are available for observing important systemic changes in the interstate relationship. Table 1 shows Japan's relationship with Asian countries in the latter half of the twentieth century. Japan has formal relationship with all of those countries except North Korea. It maintains informal but substantial relationship with Taiwan. In the 1940s-1960s, it approved none of Communist governments in North Korea, Mongol, China and North Vietnam. Its implication is that Japanese diplomatic lines were completely divided along the East-West confrontation, and Japan set itself on the side of the West under the strong US influences. For instance, during the Vietnam War, it supported American military operations by providing the US with the military bases in Okinawa and other benefits. But already in the early 1970s before the end of the war, it established diplomatic relationship with such Communist countries as China and Mongol in 1972, and North Vietnam in 1973. This was in part an act of escape from the Cold War framework between the East and the West.

However, in the 1980s, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, Japan ruptured the formal relationship with Cambodia (Heng Samrin and Hun Sen governments) under Vietnamese influences, and also chose to freeze the formal relationship with Vietnam. Meanwhile, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Japan tried to restore order in Cambodia with China's consent, working together with ASEAN countries, especially with Thailand. (Ikeda 1996) One of the two major aims was to prevent Vietnam from becoming a local great power on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and

the other, to restore order in Cambodia by depriving Pol Pot and his faction of military and political power. Eventually Japan established the formal relationship again with Vietnam in 1991 and Cambodia in 1992. Furthermore, as widely known, Japan is the only country in Asia that was admitted as a full member state into the Western State System before the Second World War. Now, all of the Asian states are entitled to the membership of the global interstate system, sharing the equal partnership. This is totally different from that in the pre-War period when Asian nations were subjugated as Western or Japanese (semi-)colonies. Now Japan has squarely to face it.

South Korea was under much stronger influences of the Cold War than Japan. In 1950 South Korea was involved in the Korean War that was initiated by North Korea for the purpose of 'liberation' of South Korea. Thereafter, South Korea has faced the military threat from the North without interruption. Its formal relationship with (former) Communist countries came to be established only during the 1990s: with the Soviet Union in 1990, Mongol in 1990, China and Vietnam in 1992, Laos in 1995, and Cambodia in 1997. Referring back to the 1970s, it had no formal relationship with Indonesia until 1973, and Myanmar and Singapore until 1975. We may be able to say that Korean economic miracle, achieved in the 1970s-80s, was also a political miracle under the most unfavorable international conditions. Its establishment of diplomatic relationship with China is also to be noted, since it was a big surprise, given the old Chinese World Order.

In Asia there used to be the Chinese World Order. It was Sino-centric, and also based on the assumptions that Chinese culture is superior to every other culture in the world, and that the ethical norms of Confucianism constitute 'civilization.' These notions of superior culture and ethics were embodied in the Chinese State and personified by the Chinese Emperor, the Son of the Heaven. The order was based on a dichotomy of the civilized China (the Center of the World) and the uncivilized Barbarians (the peoples surrounding the Center: Korean, Japanese, Mongolian, Vietnamese, Tibetan, and others ; in which Europeans were also included theoretically). The relationship between the Center and the surrounding countries crystallized into a t'se-feng relationship where the Emperor was to 'invest'(feng) a number of 'vassals'(fan) who in turn paid 'tribute' to him. While a 'tribute' and the feeling of gratitude were due to come from the bottom upward, the legitimacy of each kingdom,

its military protection (in case of being invaded by others), higher culture, and trade benefits were due to flow from the top downward. (Fairbank 1968) The construct of the Order was hierarchical, in contrast with that of the Western State System among the inner member states on the basis of equality principle. China and Korea have never established equal partnership till 1992. This establishment of modern diplomatic relationship between the two was thus a great event, historically unprecedented in the region. Both countries are now equals for the first time throughout history. This is a starting point for the Western type of modern diplomacy between China and Korea.

Table 3 discloses North Korea's formal relationship with Asian countries and two outside major powers. North Korea's case is noteworthy in two senses: dissimilarity and similarity with South Korea. In principle, its relationship with Communist and former Communist countries (Mongol, China, North Vietnam, the united Vietnam, and the Soviet Union) has been in order, and it has kept good relationship with Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia as well. This is quite a contrast to South Korean policy that had no formal relationship with those countries until the 1990s. But similarity was found when North Korea established diplomatic relationship with Southeast Asian countries in the mid-1970s - Malaysia in 1973, Laos in 1974, and Thailand, Myanmar (to be ruptured due to the bombing operation by their operators in 1983) and Singapore in 1975. The mid-1970s was the time when Asian countries, liberal and Communist, did their best to establish an interstate system within this region. It should have been the first turning point in the Asian international system in history.

Now North Korea has diplomatic relationship with most of the Asian countries (Brunei in 1999 and the Philippines in 2000). Still its relationship with Japan, South Korea and the US is informal. Viewed in this way, North Korea has been striving to extend diplomatic networks further. It is the US and Japan that have tried to contain the country. It does not seem that North Korea is containing itself within a narrow circle. That country is not so much isolated from the outside world as is generally imagined. For instance, at the end of 1990, while South Korea had diplomatic relationship with 145 countries, North Korea had with 105 countries. Then eighty-nine countries held diplomatic ties with both of them. Among the Asia-Pacific countries, twenty-eight countries had diplomatic relationship with South Korea, while nineteen countries did with North Korea, and fifteen countries with both of them. (Kankoku Kita-chôsen Sôran

1993: 311-2)

As shown in Table 4, China is now fully accepted into the Asian interstate system. In the late-1980s and early-1990s, it established diplomatic relationship with Singapore in 1990, Brunei in 1991, and South Korea in 1992 (mentioned above). It reestablished the relationship with Indonesia in 1990, and with Vietnam in 1991. Since the establishment of the Communist Government in Beijing in 1949, its diplomacy has been very dynamic throughout the last fifty years, with the ebb and flow of diplomatic tides. In the 1950s, China, together with India, Indonesia and Burma, formed the leading bloc at the top of the newly independent states or those nations striving for independence in Asia and Africa. But in the late-1960s, the Cultural Revolution made China break off relations with even Communist or friendly countries. In the 1970s, however, China took over the diplomatic relations with the US from Taiwan, whereas in the 1970s-1980s it ruptured ties with the Soviet Union that was its former revolutionary ally. In addition, in the late February through the early March of 1979 China waged 'punitive' war against Vietnam, who had invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978 under the pretext of assisting Heng Samrin government from Pol Pot forces. The Chinese operation in Vietnam did not prove so successful, whereas in Cambodia China continued to help Pol Pot and Sihanouk factions throughout the 1980s, militarily or politically. Eventually in the 1990s it abandoned its support for Pol Pot faction, whereas it maintained good relationship with Sihanouk in Cambodian politics. Finally we should also note that Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines established diplomatic relationship with China in the mid-1970s. As mentioned above, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Singapore improved the relationship with North Korea respectively in the mid-1970s, while Myanmar, Singapore, and Indonesia did so with South Korea in the same period. Hence the mid-1970s almost became a turning point in the history of Asian international relations, which was later overturned by an aggressive Vietnam.

China took part in the Korean War, and supported North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. These two wars (Korea and Vietnam) are generally considered to typify the military confrontation between the East and the West in the Cold-War context. Although the Korean War encompassed direct warfare between China and the US, the relationships among US, China and the Soviet were more complicated in the context of the Vietnam War. The US took part in warfare on the

side of South Vietnamese Government. But neither the Soviet Union nor China joined warfare on the national liberation side of Vietnam in a directly military way, although China and the Soviet Union claimed to fully support the Vietnamese people's struggles for liberation. Actually the conflicts between China and the Soviet Union were accelerating at a fast pace, whereas the former foes, the US and China, were searching for a form of united front against the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. These situations are better explained by the framework of power politics or the balance of power than that of fixed confrontation between the member states of the two opposing blocs. In this limited sense, it could be said that the Cold War was over in Asia more than ten years earlier before the official end of the Cold War (1989). Nevertheless, the image of the Cold War lingered on in the region still in the 1980s and even in the 1990s, maintained mainly by the US and Japan. South Korea might have been more concerned with the confrontation with North than the Cold War at large.

Table 5 shows the case of Vietnamese diplomacy. Vietnam was divided into North Communist and South 'Liberal' Governments until the unification under North Vietnam in 1976. Accordingly international supporters were also divided into two camps of the North and the South. A case was the Vietnam War. After unification, Vietnam kept its national integrity up to the present. Asian countries recognized the legitimacy of North Vietnam even before unification, or that of the unified Vietnam immediately after it (Japan and Singapore in 1973, Malaysia in 1975, and Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in 1976). Here too, the mid-1970s appeared to be a turning point in Asian international history. But, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 to provide Heng Samrin and his faction with military support, Vietnam's foreign relations came to be divided into two groups again. This time, one was a group formed by the Soviet Union and its allies (Mongol) supportive of Heng Samrin's and Hun Sen's faction, and the other was a group mainly consisting of Japan, China, and ASEAN member states that supported Pol Pot's and/or Sihanouk's factions in a military and/or political way. At that time Vietnam itself was a great destabilizer in the embryonic interstate system in the region. It was only after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989 that Vietnam could formally recover friendly relations with Asian countries (Japan, China, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines). In addition, it established diplomatic relationship with

South Korea and Brunei in 1992, and the US in 1995. Today Vietnam, pursuing the 'Doi Moi' policy, is no longer a revolutionary (f)actor in international politics in East Asia.

Table 6 shows Malaysia's diplomatic relationship since its independence in 1963. Malaysia's independence from Britain brought about territorial or legitimacy issues with the two neighboring countries (the Philippines and Indonesia), and the severance of diplomatic relationship with them, once or twice within the following few years. At least in the early-1960s, it was not the Vietnam War but those conflicts, ensuing from Malaysia's independence, that created the image of a turbulent Southeast Asia. (Yamakage 2000: 135) However, Malaysia, together with the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, soon formed the ASEAN in 1967 so as to contain the Communist forces within Indo-Chinese Peninsula. Moreover, it displayed a unique way of diplomacy, coping with Communist forces within as well as without. It did not recognize either of the two Chinese Governments (Beijing and Taipei) until it finally recognized the Beijing Government in 1974. It established diplomatic relationship with Mongol in 1971 and North Korea in 1973. Malaysian diplomacy is typical in the ASEAN countries. Thus the member countries acted similarly when they established diplomatic relationship with Communist countries in Asia in the mid-1970s, and more or less similarly when they put great pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia and persuaded Sihanouk faction, and possibly Pol Pot faction, to create order from within.

3. Formation of an Asian Interstate System

We can obtain matrices of interstate relationship in Asia by accumulating all of the bilateral diplomatic relationship, six cases of which were observed in the above. The matrices render us some findings on the formation and deformation of an interstate system in East Asia. In the mid-1960s the framework of the Cold War was dominant in the region, where the Communist and the 'Liberal' blocs were clearly demarcated (see Table 7). In the mid-1970s, especially after the unification of Vietnam (1976), some kind of an interstate system should have been formed on the initiative of ASEAN member states (see Table 8). However, it was the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam (at the end of 1978) that destroyed the new dynamism. As a result, in the 1980s, Vietnam

and Cambodia under Hen Samrin's and Hun Sen's premierships respectively came to be isolated from the rest of the Asian countries. The emergent system in Asia became chaotic (see Table 9). However, since the end of the 1980s, Japan, China, Thailand and other ASEAN members practiced a kind of concerted diplomacy, persuading that Vietnam should withdraw its military forces from Cambodia and political factions in Cambodia should cooperate with each other to restore order in an appropriate way. Eventually, the Vietnamese forces withdrew back home in September 1989, and in Cambodia the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was set up in March 1992 as an intermediary for the nation rebuilding. In September 1993 Kingdom of Cambodia started anew.

In the 1990s, locally the *détente* in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and globally the end of the Cold War and the domestic as well as international collapse of the former Soviet bloc brought about the conditions that enabled East Asia to construct an interstate system based on equality. In the late-1990 the system appeared on the surface, provided that Taiwan enjoyed not formal (political) but informal (economic and cultural) relations with all nations in the region and that North Korea had diplomatic relations with Asian nations except South Korea, Japan and Myanmar (see Table 10). Thus in principle a network of diplomatic relations is well established, connecting almost all nations in East Asia. We can define it as an international *system* due to the following reasons.

As to the concept of system, we like to refer to the definition in *The Oxford English Dictionary*. It defines 'system' to be (1) a set or assemblage of things connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity, or (2) a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan. In studies of international politics, the conception of 'system' has been used mainly in two ways: international system, and world system(s). The term 'international system' is a concept for analysis or description of international politics. Used as an analytical term, it is predicated upon a definite notion of system. But it is not necessarily so when it is used to describe situations of international relations at a given time. The term 'international system' came to be accepted as an academic term in the late 1950s, soon becoming fashionable, but more or less obsolete in the late 1990s.

While the first part of OED definition is more extensive in usage, the second is

limited to such cases as those related to a preconceived scheme or plan. When we extrapolate this contrast to international relations, we come across the argument developed by H.Bull in elaborating on the distinction between international system and society. As to the former, he defines: A *system of states* (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole (Bull 1977: 9-10). This corresponds very well to the first definition of system noted above. Turning to international society, he defines: A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull 1977: 13). If we borrow Bull's concepts, international relations have been rapidly changing from international system to international society in the post-Cold War era. In the Asian context, an autonomous system of states was formed in the 1990s for the first time in history, and it has already acquired some elements of international society.

The basis of the Asian system is a modified version of the Western State System, deprived of the function of Western dominance. The Western State System was quintessentially Western-centric, where legitimate actors were limited to the sovereign states in the West. While it brought development, wealth, and state-building to Western nations, it destroyed non-Western nations in terms of politics, economics, society, and culture. The system embraced a practical code of inter-state behavior, comprising a double standard of behavioral code, one applied to Western nations, and the other to non-Western nations. While Western nations acted as equals to each other in principle, they treated polities outside the West in such discriminatory ways as they considered appropriate. The core of the inward code was threefold: national sovereignty, the balance of power, and international law. The ideal type of states was nation-states. Dependent on the outward code, the Westerner would never easily admit that the non-Western nations also have sovereignty. The West regarded non-Western nations as a target of Western mercantilism, colonialism, and imperialism. Moreover, they tried to destroy any indigenous industrialization in the rest of the world, particularly that in Asia which had been far more ahead of the West in this respect until the mid-eighteenth

century. Globally speaking, the 1960s was epoch-making in the international system, as was expressed in such significant incidents as the emergence of 'African years,' the finding of 'the North-South problem,' the impasse of 'the nuclear stalemate,' or the assertion of 'international interdependence.' In the current international system, the outward code in the Western State System has ceased to function, and the equality principle applies to all the states. (Hatsuse 1993: 279-288)

A network of interstate relations in Asia must encompass those principles or rules that prescribe actions or behavior of all the elements (i.e. states) comprising the network, if it is defined to be a *system*. In the Western State System, there were the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty, international law, and the balance-of-power. In the emergent Asian interstate system, the first two principles among three - sovereignty and international law - are in principle observed, but there is no balance-of-power system in a military sense. To take account of the 'balance of power', we can borrow an idea from M. Kaplan's analytic model of international systems. In his definition, he elucidates six rules of 'balance-of-power' system, one of which refers to a principle of coalition formation. This rule posits that actors act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance over the rest of the system. (Kaplan 1957: 22-23). This fits very well with the situation surrounding Vietnam in the 1980s in a political, though not military, sense. Referring to the Cambodian peace process, T. Shiraishi, who specializes in Southeast Asian politics, observes, 'Its real target was not Cambodia, but Vietnam, that is, to "solve" the Cambodian question, stop bleeding Vietnam, promote economic cooperation with it, and make it part of ASEAN-led Southeast Asia.' (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1979: 1889) As Yamakage, being an ASEAN specialist, notes, ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are nothing but loose military constructs that rely only on confidence building measures (CBM). ASEAN has actually promoted CBM in a substantial sense by trial and error, but without adopting it as the official policy term. (Yamakage 2000) The ASEAN member states, China, and Japan displayed a sort of concerted containment policy against Vietnam in the late 1980s – the early 1990s, which can be taken as an extension of CBM idea pursued by the ASEAN member states. This can be also considered as a sort of the balance-of-power policy, though in the non-military sense, achieved by all the concerned states.

This system has had two turbulent factors: revolutionary states and the US hegemony. As for the former, China during the Great Cultural Revolution and Vietnam after unification were two outstanding cases. In the 1960s-70s, China in the Great Cultural Revolution chose the policy of isolation by breaking down most of its pre-existing foreign relations. In the 1970s-80s, Vietnam played the role of a destabilizer in the region by invading Cambodia. Not until the beginning of the 1990s when both the Cold War and the Second Vietnam had come to the end, we had no viable interstate system working in Asia. Today, in contrast, both China and Vietnam have already gone normal. Neither does North Korea look to be so turbulent as generally said, as it seems to be seeking more favorable international settings. Despite the containment policy of the US and Japan, North Korea's foreign policy seems to be more open than generally considered. The confrontation between North and South Korea is considered to be more domestic or national than foreign or international. As for the second turbulent factor, the US has had both stabilizing and destabilizing roles. It acted as a stabilizer in the Korean War and an initiator and destabilizer in Vietnam. We can be neither too optimistic nor pessimistic about its future functions.

Analytically, the Asian international system is a subsystem of the global international system, which is often system-dominant. (Kaplan 1957) If we take the Asian system as an independent system, we must deal with the global system as an environmental factor. As is often the case, the Cold War system dominated the Asian international politics until the 1980. But even in the 1970s-80s, the latter was not a pawn of the former but an independent player on its own. When we see East Asia as an international system, we must define the US, the former Soviet Union (or Russia), the EU, and others as environmental factors. Needless to say, the US and the Soviet Union were two major actors in Asian political issues, as were apparent in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In this context they were not outside but inside the area. Here, however, we would like to shed light on the internal relationship among the Asian nations, setting aside those big Powers as external factors in the environment, for we can see a lot of regional initiatives in the interrelationship of those Asian countries.

Asian nations could not afford to enjoy the so-called 'long peace' during the Cold War period. As A. Tanaka notes, in the post-War period (up to the 1980s), ninety-three wars occurred in the world, with almost twelve million war dead. Although

only a third of the wars occurred in Asia (down to Pakistan in the West), the death toll reached half of those who died in the wars. It is evident that war in Asia was more ferocious than in other areas. There were three areas of war: Northeast Asia involving China as a major actor, Indochina centering on Vietnam, and Southeast Asian insular area revolving around Indonesia. While the first two were connected through Chinese and/or American involvement, the third was more endogenous than exogenous. The first two groups of war were fought on a larger scale, reinforced by the logic and strategy of the Cold War. To enumerate the number of war dead in these two war groups, we have 1,000,000 (the Civil War in China, 1946-50), 2,000,000 (the Korean War, 1950-53) and 21,000 (the China-Vietnam War, 1979) in the first group. And in the second group war dead counted 95,000 (the Indo-Chinese War, 1945-54), 302,000 (the Civil War in South Vietnam, 1960-65), 24,000 (the Civil War in Laos, 1960-62 and 1963-73), 1,216,000 (the Vietnam War, 1965-75), 156,000 (the Civil War in Cambodia, 1970-75), 50,000 (the Vietnam-Cambodia War, 1975-91), and 21,000 (the China-Vietnam War, 1979). Since the 1980s, however, almost no serious war happened in the region. In Tanaka's view, in the 1940s-50s, the causes of almost all wars were related to popular struggles for national liberation from the colonial status under Western dominance, and to attempts at building a new nation in each territory. But since such causes of war no longer existed, this type of war came to the end in the 1960s, the last of which was the Vietnam War. He sees a bright future for Asian international relations that is based on liberalism, underpinned by dynamic economies. Thus his observation also gives us a rationale for the emergent interstate system in East Asia. (Tanaka 1994) Assuredly, the Cold War became 'hot' in East Asia, overshadowing the struggles for national liberation there, when the global system was dominant over Asian regional systems. Even then, as shown in the above section, the dominant system could not nip all the regional initiatives by subsystems in the bud.

Summing up the above discussions, independence of all Asian nations was the first prerequisite for the formation of an interstate system in East Asia. However, as long as the logic of the Cold War persisted, an autonomous interstate system in East Asia could not easily come out. Nevertheless, the demise of the Cold War system in the early 1990s brought about an important factor in the environment surrounding the Asian system, which would work positively toward its birth. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian

countries, Japan and China displayed a concerted diplomacy toward peace in Indochina in the late 1980s – the early 1990s. In retrospect, Southeast Asian countries had already promoted a kind of system building in East Asia by officially recognizing each other and other East Asian countries in the mid-1970s. In the background is the culture of developmentalism or the belief in economic growth that is shared by all those nations.

4. Discourses on Asian Systems

Here we shall juxtapose the interstate system in Asia in discourses on Asian systems, of which overlap, multiplicity, variety and flexibility are characteristics. For instance, Table 11 gives us a picture of ‘Multinational framework in Asia,’ in which the year of participation of each member country in ASEAN, ASEAN + 3, ARF, APEC, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and ASEM is shown. This table has three sets of information. The first is to confirm the expansion process of each regime, informal or formal. What matters here is not what countries constitute these organizations, but the date when each member state took part in them. ASEAN started with the original five member states, including Brunei in 1984, three Indo-Chinese states and Myanmar in the late 1990s. This enlarged version of ASEAN came to encompass three major powers in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea, and China) within the framework of ‘ASEAN plus three’ in the late-1990s. ARF is a consultative body whose major objective is to create confidence-building measures. The original member states are most of ‘ASEAN plus three’, the US, Russia and others, whereas one of the new member states is North Korea (2000). It is obvious that those regimes started on the initiative of ASEAN, and expanded to include other nations, the original ASEAN members being the center. Thus the wind has begun to blow from the South in East Asia.

Secondly, as shown in the table, the two economic regimes (APEC and ADB) have accepted Taiwan and Hong Kong as a full member. This is quite a contrast to the two political or military regimes (ASEAN+3, and ARF) that do not give them membership. We have two layered systems of politics and economics in this region. In other words, Asian systems are likely to be flexible, and so are their operators. The last message, drawn from the table, is that East Asia as a whole has become equal to the West in international politics and economics. In the economic sphere, APEC represents

the equal partnership between East Asia and the Americas. In the political sphere, ASEM typifies consultation on equality between East Asia and Europe. These two are unprecedented events in the modern history of Asia.

Thus variety, multiplicity, and overlap are major features of Asian regional systems or regimes, and so is flexibility in their operation. In this connection, K. Hirano, who specializes in international relations in East Asia, remarks, 'We need to take a view that treats not only traditional actors (a state or nation) but also "regional systems" (a new concept) as agents who make up international relations. Needless to say, the character of Asian international system changed radically in the modern era, but...it has in essence maintained its nature of "multiplicity" throughout the modern and contemporary history. Characteristically, it is regional systems in Asia that have generated the multiplicity of the international relations.' (Hirano 1994: 3) He stresses the importance of multiplicity or historicity in Asian regional systems, contrasting it with the simplicity of the Western State System that regards only a territorial state or nation state as the single legitimate actor in the system, casting away the multiplicity. Moreover, he emphasizes the fact that there used to be spatial, temporal, historical and territorial multiplicity, and above all multi-centrality in Asia, as was observed in the 'Center-Periphery' structure observed in the former Chinese World Order. These features can be a basis for setting up flexible and dynamic systems in the contemporary context. Specifically he notes the overlaps of contemporary systems at global, Asian (total), regional (East, Southeast, South and Islamic), sub-regional, national, sub-national, or individual levels (For example, overseas Chinese utilizing those overlapping systems in East Asia). S. Yamakage also emphasizes such a multiplicity of measures as APEC adopts for the purpose of regional cooperation. They are oriented toward cross-ideological (hence crossing social structures), cross-developmental (hence crossing the South/North line), multifarious and pragmatic (hence among various agents), and cross-cultural cooperation. In his view, multiplicity, variety and flexibility are considered as characteristics of Asian systems. (Yamakage 2000: 146-147)

T. Shiraishi points out the socio-economic foundation of a regional interstate system in Asia. He regards Asia as being a regional system that generates, develops, ripens and destroys itself in history. He is interested in the historical formation of Asia as a region, and concerned with Japan's position in it. (Shiraishi 2000: i) His historical

perspective has three layers: secular (five hundred years), long (one hundred fifty to two hundred years), and short (fifty years) trends. The secular trend refers to the traditional East Asia, which was sustained by the Chinese World Order and its tributary trading zones. Western entrepreneurial people were encroaching on it since the sixteenth century. From the perspective of two hundreds years or less, the area was characterized firstly by the gradual demise of the former order and trade system, and secondly the penetration of the Britain's informal empire. That empire covered the maritime Asia, which stretched from Penang and Singapore, to Hong Kong, Amoy, and Shanghai, as commercially and militarily strategic ports, and formed a network connecting these ports. Lastly, for fifty years after the War, the maritime East Asia has been dominated by an American informal empire (or Free Asia). In the politico-economic structure, the US has exerted the hegemony so as to contain Mainland China and restore Japanese economy. Its major tool is the security system comprising the US working as a hub, and Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and the former South Vietnam playing as the role of spokes. The US is the center of the triangular trade system consisting of the US itself, Japan and other East Asian countries. In that system, the function of Japan is to accept the status of half a sovereignty, to act as a workshop of Asia, and to play the role of a junior partner to the US. Economically, Japan has led the region, flying at the front of those flying geese of East Asian countries. 'The great success in economic development induced East Asian countries to promote regionalizaion, so that "East Asia" became *one region*. The engine was not regionalism such as APEC or ASEAN, but the economic development in this region.' (Shiraishi 2000: 178 Emphasis added)

Y. Hara develops an argument, which is in a sense similar to those of Hirano, Yamakage and Shiraishi. He is an economist who has studied the development of East Asian, especially Southeast Asian economies from the standpoint distinct from the neo-classical development economics. In his view, Japanese discourses on the Japan-Asian relationship have centered around two axes of civilization and development, both of which are now out of use. The point at issue is not the confrontation between the Western and the Asian civilizations, but between the dominance of global, especially financial capitalism on the one hand, and the reaction of culture of each region to it on the other. According to Hara, furthermore, it is time that

we should also abandon the idea of ‘stages of development,’ because such a framework as the conflict between an advanced Japan and a developing Asia has lost relevancy. The story of ‘flying geese’ has already ended. Hara continues that we should search after common elements among us so as to create the paradigm on a regional order in East Asia. This is not only distinct from an imperialistic or Asianistic approach but also an easy belief in the omnipotence of market economy. One alternative way he recommends is to re-appraise the utility of human networks of Asian economies in production, trade and financing. (Hara 2000: v-vi, 125; Hara 2001: 7-8, 21) Thus he stresses the systemic nature of Asian economies. Summing up the discussions in this section, the author argues that an interstate system in Asia is a part of multifarious overlapping regional systems.

5. Concluding Remarks

An interstate system has been emerging in East Asia since the early 1990s. In this system all nations are now equals. Among the member states, the economic stratification is collapsing rapidly. Accordingly, the central role of Japan in the region is decreasing. Now our problem is not how to build a bridge between Japan as a leader and other Asian countries as counterparts, but how to create networks placing Japan as one of many equals in the region. Next, we would raise a question of how Japanese people have reacted to such a change in the surrounding environment.

Japan was the only Power in the pre-War Asia. As a result, this old image lingers on even in contemporary discourses on the Japan’s relations with other Asian nations. One example is those arguments that evaluate positively the history of Japan’s relations with the rest of Asia as that of the ‘liberation’ of Asian peoples from Western dominance. Y. Wakamiya, a journalist from *Asahi Shimbun* (newspaper), examines in his book the views about Asia taken by Japanese prime ministers (conservative) in the post-War period, and summarizes them as follows.

In Japanese views on Asia, while the traditional idea of ‘Leave Asia and join the West’ proposed by Y. Fukuzawa in 1884 still stubbornly persists, the visions of the ‘Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ or the aspiration after a ‘Greater Asia’ has not yet passed away. Post-War Japanese politics looks away from the scars on Asian peoples left by pre-War Japan. Is it indebted to them for its own misdeeds? Or is it seeking to hear their Romantic

voices? Essentially, while being predicated on historical continuity, these views have come to be conditioned to a great extent by the Cold-War structure in the post-War era. Has Japanese politics faced Asia, setting the 'settlement of its colonial rule and aggression' as a vertical axis and 'the East-West confrontation' as a horizontal one? Thus, in tandem with the collapse of the horizontal axis, the voice for the 'Age of Asia' has become much stronger. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, Japanese views on Asia seem to be stuck in a state of confusion and embarrassment, being unaware of the time and necessity for their great transformation. (Wakamiya 1995: 4)

As Wakamiya notes in the above, Japanese discourses on its relations with the rest of Asia are predicated upon a mixture of true and illusionary images of Asia. In this regard, Hara observes, 'When the economic crisis struck East Asia toward the end of the twentieth century,...the global market raised its voices in chorus for modifying the crony type of Asian economic system from the foundations. This is the reappearance of the worn-out idea that we should now leave Asia and join the West....There were other loud voices as well. They shouted that we should now unite ourselves as Asian people, against the global project for American finance capitalism pursued by a complex of Wall Street and the Treasury. This is nothing but the reappearance of Pan-Asianism. Both 'Leave Asia and join the West' and Pan-Asianism were intellectual products that could not be supported by academic findings in "area studies." It is absolutely necessary that we should recognize the contemporary intellectual situations surrounding these two kinds of worn-out arguments for and against Asian solidarity.' (Hara 2001: 228) Besides, T. Aoki, specializing in cultural anthropology of Asian societies, remarks, 'Pan-Asianists are those exponents of Asia who have very flat images of Asia. Protagonists for the "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" have had very thin interest in and perceptions of Asian societies and cultures.' (Aoki 1999: 37). Professors Yamakage, Shiraishi, Hara and Aoki are all specialists on Southeast Asian affairs, who stress the importance of 'area studies' as intellectual bulwarks against the chauvinistic Pan-Asianism in Japan.

However, even when we used to argue for a prosperous Asia in the future, our illusions about Asia went far ahead of its reality. In retrospect, in the 1950s the strong voices for solidarity among Asian and African nations were heard and they sounded very nice at that time. But in accordance with the formation of Asian systems, Asia and Africa seem to have lost most of their emotional ties. (Kajihara 1999) This is a side effect of the formation of an Asian interstate system. The old optimism resulted from a lack of information on Asian societies, cultures or people, Chinese studies being the

sole exception. For example, we paid little attention to ethnic problems inherent in Asian countries in the 1950s. In the 1960s, area studies on Southeast Asia started to fill in academic blanks in Japan. Still our intellectual blanks remain to be filled on a real Asia.

The author has tried to verify the formation of an interstate system in East Asia. Although this work is not so well founded as those of area studies, hopefully it has filled at least one missing point in arguments about international system in Asia. As mentioned above, Professors Yamakage, Shiraishi, and Hara, along with Professor Hirano, all regard an Asian region as containing local international or world systems. In their views, each of them possesses an integrity but their functions are flexible, multiple or overlapping. Although the current Asian interstate system is uni-dimensional, short of flexibility, it is thought to constitute a very important basis of other Asian regional systems.

Finally Kim Bong-jin, a Korean specialist in Asian international relations, raises three points of reference to look at Asia from the eyes of Asian people. The first is to take more multinational than national viewpoints. Secondly, he recommends that we think in a comparative and comprehensive way so that we can see both the positive and negative aspects of the pre-modern (traditional) and modern eras. Lastly he emphasizes the necessity of finding out a way to de-construct the West-centered modernism or Orientalism in international politics, international relations and other social science fields. (Kim 2000: 127-128) One answer to the problems raised by him would be the discovery of the emergent interstate system in the region that this paper addresses.

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Table 1: Japan's foreign relationship

	1940s-1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s-	
S. Korea	65*****				
N. Korea	////////////////////////////////////					
Mongol	////////////////////////////////////		72*****			
China	////////////////////////////////////		72*****			
Taiwan	52*****		72.....			
N/Vietnam	////////////////////////////////////		73*****	78(*****)	91*****	
S. Vietnam	53*****		76			
		neutral	Lon Nol	Pol Pot	Under Vietnam	UNTAC/after
Cambodia	53*****		70**	75**	79////////////////////////////////////	92*****
Laos	(51)...53*****					
Thailand	52*****					
Myanmar	52*****					
Malaysia	57*****					
Singapore		65*****				
Indonesia	(51)... 58*****					
Brunei					84*****	
Philippines	(51)... 56*****					
USA	45...51*****					
SU/Russia		56*****				

source: Kindai Nihon Sougou Nenpyo (2nd ed.)

note: *****(formal relationship),(informal relationship), //////////////////////////////////(no relationship)
 (*****)(frozen relationship)

Table 2: S. Korea's foreign relationship

	1940s-1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s-
Japan	65*	*****	*****	*****
N. Korea	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////
Mongol	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	90*****
China	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	92*****
Taiwan	*****	*****	*****	*****	92.....
N/Vietnam	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	92*****
S. Vietnam	*****	*****	76		
Cambodia	neutral	Lon Nol	Pol Pot	Under Vietnam	UNTAC/after
	//////////	70***	75***	79//////////	97***
Laos	*****	*****	75//////////	//////////	95*****
Thailand	//////	58*****	*****	*****	*****
Myanmar	//////////	//////////	75*****	*****	*****
Malaysia	//////////	60*****	*****	*****	*****
Singapore		65//////////	75*****	*****	*****
Indonesia	//////////	//////////	73*****	*****	*****
Brunei				84*****	*****
Philippines	49*****	*****	*****	*****	*****
USA	...48*****	*****	*****	*****	*****
SU/Russia	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	90*****

source: Sekai Nenkan
Kankoku Kitachosen Soran (1993)

note: *****(formal relationship),(informal relationship), //////////////(no relationship)

Table 3: N. Korea's foreign relationship

	1940s-1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s-
Japan	////	////	////	////	////
S. Korea	////	////	////	////	////
Mongol	48*	****	****	****	****
China	49*	****	****	****	****
Taiwan	////	////	////	////	91.....
N./Vietnam	50*	****	****	****	****
S. Vietnam	////	////	76		
Cambodia	neutral		Lon Nol	Pol Pot	Under Vietnam
	////	64****	70//	74****	79//
					91****
Laos	////	63//	////	74****	****
Thailand	////	////	////	75****	****
Myanmar	////	////	////	75****	83//
Malaysia	////	////	////	73****	****
Singapore		65//	////	75****	****
Indonesia	////	64****	****	****	****
Brunei					84//
Philippines	////	////	////	////	99**
USA	////	////	////	////	////
SU/Russia	48*	****	****	****	****

source: Sekai Nenkan
 Tonan-ajia Yoran
 Kankoku Kitachosen Soran (1993)

note: *****(formal relationship),(informal relationship), ////(no relationship)

Table 4: China's foreign relationship

	1940s-1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s-
Japan	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	72*****	*****	*****
S. Korea	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	92*****
N. Korea	49*****	*****	*****	*****	*****
Mongol	49*****	//////	71*****	*****	90*****
Taiwan	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	91.....
N/Vietnam	50*****	*****	79	////////////////////////////////////	91*****
S. Vietnam	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	76	netural	Lon Nol Pol Pot Under Vietnam UNTAC/after
Cambodia	53////58*****	*****	70////75*****	79	////////////////////////////////////90*****
Laos	54////61**	64	////////////////////////////////////75*****	80	////////////////////////////////////88*****
Thailand	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	75*****	*****	*****
Myanmar	50*****	//////	*****	*****	*****
Malaysia	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	74*****	*****	*****
Singapore	65	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	90*****
Indonesia	50*****	67	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	90*****
Brunei	84	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	91*****
Philippines	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	75*****	*****	*****
USA	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	72.....	79	*****
SU/Russia	49*****	*****	69	////////////////////////////////////	89*****

source: Sekai Nenkan

note: *****(formal relationship),(informal relationship), /////(no relationship)

Table 5: North Vietnam's and Vietnam's foreign (since 1976) relationship

	1940s-1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s-
Japan	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	73*****78(*****)	91*****	*****
S. Korea	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	92*****
N. Korea	50*****	*****	*****	*****	*****
Mongol	*****	*****	*****	*****	*****
China	50*****	*****	79////////////////////////////////////	91*****	*****
Taiwan	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	91.....
	neutral	Lon Nol	Pol Pot	Under Vietnam	UNTAC/after
Cambodia	*****	70//75*****77//79*****	91*****	*****	*****
Laos	???	57//62////////////////////////////////////	75*****	*****	*****
Thailand	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	76***79(*****)	87*****	*****
Myanmar	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	75*****	*****	*****
Malaysia	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	75*****79(*****)	88*****	*****
Singapore	65////////////////////////////////////	73*****79(*****)	91*****	*****	*****
Indonesia	////////////////////////////////////	64*65////////////////////////////////////	76***79(*****)	87*****	*****
Brunei	84/////////92*****	*****	*****	*****	*****
Philippines	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	76***79(*****)	92*****	*****
USA	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	////////////////////////////////////	95*****
SU/Russia	50*****	*****	*****	*****	*****

source: Sekai Nenkan
Tonan-ajia Yoran

note: *****(formal relationship),(informal relationship), //////(no relationship)
(*****)(frozen relationship)

Table 6: Malaysia's foreign relationship

	1940s-1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s-
Japan	57	*****			
S. Korea	60	*****			
N. Korea	63	//////////73	*****		
Mongol	63	//////////71	*****		
China	63	//////////74	*****		
Taiwan	63	//////////74		
N/Vietnam	63	//////////75	****79	(*****)	91*****
S. Vietnam	63	*****76			
Cambodia	neutral	Lon Nol	Pol Pot	Under Vietnam	UNTAC/after
		//////////70	***75/76	**79	//////////91*****
Laos	/66	*****			
Thailand	63	*****			
Myanmar	63	*****			
Singapore	65	*****			
Indonesia	63*64//66	*****			
Brunei				84	*****
Phillipines	63//66	***68/69	*****		
USA	63	*****			
SU/Russia	63///67	*****			

source: Sekai Nenkan
Tonan-ajia Soran

note: *****(formal relationship),(informal relationship), //////(no relationship)
(*****)(frozen relationship)

Table 7: Matrix (1965)

	SU	NV	NK	CH	CB	BM	IN	TW	SK	ML	SG	PH	TH	JP	US
Soviet Union		*	*	*	/	*	*	/	/	/	/	/	*	*	*
N.Vietnam	*		*	*	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
N. Korea	*	*		*	*	/	*	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
China	*	*	*		*	*	*	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Cambodia	/	/	*	*		*	*	/	/	/	/	*	/	*	/
Burma	*	/	/	*	*		*	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*
Indonesia	*	/	*	*	*	*		/	/	/	/	*	*	*	*
Taiwan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/		*	/	/	/	/	*	*
S. Korea	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	*		*	/	*	*	*	*
Malaysia	/	/	/	/	/	*	/	/	*		*	/	*	*	*
Singapore	/	/	/	/	/	*	/	/	/	*		*	/	*	*
Philippines	/	/	/	/	*	*	*	/	*	/	*		*	*	*
Thailand	*	/	/	/	/	*	*	/	*	*	/	*		*	*
Japan	*	/	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*
USA	*	/	/	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	

note: *(formal relationship), /(no formal relationship)

Table 8: Matrix (1976)

	SU	CH	NK	VT	CB	BM	ML	TH	SG	IN	PH	JP	SK	TW	US
Soviet Union	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	/	/	*
China	/		*	*	*	*	*	*	/	/	*	*	/	/	/
N. Korea	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	/	/	/	/	/
Vietnam	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	/	/	/
Cambodia	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	/	*	*	*	/	*
Burma	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	/	*
Malaysia	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	/	*
Thailand	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	/	*
Singapore	*	/	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	/	*
Indonesia	*	/	*	*	/	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	/	*
Philippines	*	*	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	/	*
Japan	*	*	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	/	*
S. Korea	/	/	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*
Taiwan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	*		*
USA	*	/	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	

note: *(formal relationship), /(no formal relationship)

Table 9: Matrix (1985)

	TW	CB	VT	NK	CH	SK	SG	IN	JP	TH	ML	PH	BM	US	SU
Taiwan	/	/	/	/	/	*	*	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Cambodia	/		*	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	*	/	*
Vietnam	/	*		*	/	/	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	*	/	*
N. Korea	/	/	*		*	/	*	*	/	*	*	/	/	/	*
China	/	/	/	*		/	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	/
S. Korea	*	/	/	/	/		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	/
Singapore	*	/	(*)	*	/	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Indonesia	/	/	(*)	*	/	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Japan	/	/	(*)	/	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*
Thailand	/	/	(*)	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*
Malaysia	/	/	(*)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*
Philippines	/	/	(*)	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*
Burma	/	*	*	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*
USA	/	/	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*
Soviet Union	/	*	*	*	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	

note: *(formal relationship), /(no formal relationship), (*) (frozen relationship)

Table 10: Matrix (2000)

	TW	NK	JP	SK	CH	VT	CB	TH	MM	ML	SG	IN	PH	US	RS
Taiwan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
N. Korea	/		/	/	*	*	*	*	/	*	*	*	*	/	*
Japan	/	/		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
S. Korea	/	/	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
China	/	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Vietnam	/	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Cambodia	/	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Thailand	/	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Myanmar	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*
Malaysia	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*
Singapore	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*
Indonesia	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*
Philippines	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*
USA	/	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*
Russia	/	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	

note: *(formal relationship), /(no formal relationship)

Table 11: Multinational frameworks in Asia (the first year of each membership)							
	ASEAN	ASEAN+3	ARF	AFTA	APEC	ADB	ASEM
Japan		97	94		89	66	96
S. Korea		97	94		89	66	96
N. Korea			2000				
Mongol			1998			1991	
China		97	94		1991	1986	96
Taiwan					1991	66	
Hong Kong					1991	1969	
Vietnam	1995	97	94	1995	1998	66	96
Cambodia	1999	97	1995	1995		66	
Laos	1997	97	94	1997		66	
Thailand	67	97	94	92	89	66	96
Myanmar	1997	97	1996	1997		1973	
Malaysia	67	97	94	92	89	66	96
Singapore	67	97	94	92	89	66	96
Indonesia	67	97	94	92	89	66	96
Brunei	1984	97	94		89		96
Philippines	67	97	94	92	89	66	96
USA			94		89	66	
SU/Russia			94		1998		
Canada			94		89	66	
Australia			94		89	66	
New Zealand			94		89	66	
EU			94				96
India			1996			66	
PNG			94		1993	1971	
Bangladesh						1973	
Sri Lanka						66	
other American countries (3)					1993 - 98		
other Asia-Pacific countries (23)						66 - 1999	
European countries (14)						66 - 1991	
EU member countries (15)							96
note: a founding member (1900 omitted); a newly joining member (1900 added)							