Peace Building: Operational Imperatives and Organizational Co-ordination

Ho-Won JEONG

Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, USA

SUMMARY

This paper examines how various components of peace building programmes in different sectors can be co-ordinated. It starts with the examination of the practice by various co-ordinating mechanisms applied to post-conflict peace building operations. By using the example of Bosnia, the paper examines various features of vertical and lateral co-ordination and discusses how NGO operations can support major international agencies in converting their strategic level decisions into field operations.

I. Introduction

In order to be effective, the work of various organizations has to be embedded in the overall peace building plan. Improved planning and effective organizational co-ordination are crucial for successful peace operation. Given the limited commitment and resources from various external organizations, a successful mission benefits from operational effectiveness. Co-ordination and teamwork are essential for maximisation of the effects of each component's operation.

Multi-component peace building programs require both vertical and horizontal co-ordination among a large number of organizations, which have diverse responsibilities. In a multi-functional mission, with geographical dispersion, there is always a danger of miscommunication if each component reports only to its central headquarters without lateral contact at every level. Since various components of peace building missions often work in the same theatre of operation in isolation and against each other, horizontal co-ordination is critical for promoting the collaboration of actions among organizations.

At the same time, vertical co-ordination is also necessary for policy implementation across levels. 'The co-ordination of activities within a mission presupposes a certain unity of command to ensure that a coherent strategy is consistently carried out' (Mockaitis, 1999, p. 135). Through vertical communication, the local wealth of knowledge (which is necessary for strategic decision making) is passed up to higher level agencies. Operation through vertical co-ordination is made through communication lines among various types of agencies at international, regional and local offices. Due to the limitations of major international organizations to reach local communities, NGOs fill in the gaps between decision-making agencies at the centre and local communities.

This paper examines how various components of peace building programs in different sectors can be co-ordinated. It starts with the examination of the practice by various co-ordinating mechanisms applied to post-conflict peace building operations. By using the example of Bosnia, the paper examines various features of vertical and lateral co-ordination and discusses how NGO operations can support major international agencies in converting their strategic level decisions into field operations.

II. Operational Structures

In response to the demand for more leadership of the international community, the post of a Special Representative designated by the Secretary General (SRSG) was newly created with the authority for the overall co-ordination of UN peace building missions. Prior to the 1989 Namibia mission, the commanders of peacekeeping forces operating under the UN mandates de facto acted as heads of the missions, and carried out negotiations with the assistance of their political advisors (Williams, 1998). However, in the last decade, it has become a norm for the civilian component to be responsible for the integral nature of UN operations. In most operations (e.g., Namibia and Cambodia), SRSG was authorized to serve as overall co-ordinator of a peace building process over both civilian and military subordinates.

In complex operations, SRSG especially plays a critical role in providing great political directions in the field. The Special Representative can have 'full responsibility for negotiating and implementing the peace process, managing the input of the UN Secretariat, mobilizing the support of the operational funds and programs for humanitarian and development activities and leading the team of autonomous specialized agencies' (Wholly, 1997, p. 116). Therefore, the SRSG should have skills to effectively manage complex organizations and mobilize resources and public support as well as possessing negotiation and political skills.

Martti Ahtisaari, the SRSG for the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) was overseeing the mission's planning and subsequent implementation. While his main task was to be in charge of three thousand and five hundred civilians, of which close to half were hired for the civilian police force, he also helped set up the establishment of a joint working group on political problems. In the work of monitoring and preventing violence, the network of district officers reported the SRSG about political development. By informing local people as to the nature of the UN Namibia mandate, he was able to obtain support of the local population for the legitimacy of UNTAG.

While the Namibia mission is considered one of the most successful post-conflict peace building operations, the SRSG has not always been able to draw political, civil and military elements together into a common approach. In practice, the

role and power of the Special Representative are affected by external support and the leadership quality. The SRSG in the UN mission to Mozambique (1992-1994), Aldo Ajello enjoyed more authority over the control of local situations through chairing supervisory and monitoring commissions than the Special Representative in Angola Margaret Anstee. Despite a great need for more international intervention, the Second UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) (1991-1995) was not able to go beyond observing and verifying the national elections with a limited number of personnel and resources, in part, related to devotion of international attention to other parallel operations.

Successful co-operation also requires the proper allocation of resources, which are commensurate to the complexity of the tasks. Compared with the Namibia mission, the UN civil administration in Cambodia established in February 1992 had more difficult challenges with its expansion to a comprehensive settlement, including civil and electoral administration, repatriation, rehabilitation and protection of human rights. All these tasks had to be accomplished by only less than 200 inexperienced staff recruited to cover civil administration activities for both central and regional offices. While the UN eventually accomplished a full responsibility for the conduct of the poll (Findlay, 1995), UNTAC was not able to come up with more concerted efforts to resolve post-election political disputes.

When the local administration is in disarray (Somalia, for example), an operation may be authorized by an international mandate to exercise more direct control. In that capacity, UN observers might set up and monitor local authority. The international mission can have an overriding authority to re-direct local policy decisions and even dismiss personnel. On the other hand, not every mission is required to have a direct control over local situations and some missions are more oriented toward assistance (El Salvador, for example). International operations can also adopt a partnership arrangement in establishing an international standard for the development of government structures.

Many missions have divisions on elections, human rights, humanitarian relief and development as well as the military and police. Resident co-ordinator drawn from a wide range of UN bodies helps to organize more coherent UN activities in development areas at a country level. Given their expertise in development planning, the Resident

Representatives of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are particularly in a position to fulfill the role for ensuring the focus of the country work in Rwanda, Haiti and other countries, which need development assistance. In recognition of its traditional work to protect responsibilities for refugees, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has been designated as a lead agency for assistance to war victims. The resident co-ordinator can serve as Deputy to the SRSG for humanitarian and development activities (Whaley, 1997). The resident co-ordinator system is a useful mechanism to counter the pressures for fragmentation.

Co-ordination issues become complicated, since many organizations tend to go beyond competence in particular areas of expertise with the development of dual mandates in other areas. For instance, UNDP and UNICEF have long-term social and economic development goals, but they have recently been involved in relief work, too, which addresses short-term humanitarian emergencies. At the same time, development agencies begin to pay more attention to fostering human rights with a focus on long-term social needs.

The maximization of efforts fails because many organizations take simultaneous actions to achieve opposing goals (Whitman and Bartholomew, 1994). Incompatibilities between activities derive from different organizational goals, values and cultures. Funds to cover large expenses for reconstruction, land transfer, demobilization, judicial, military and police reform need to be mobilized by international financial institutions through donor meetings. At the same time, fiscal constraints often imposed by IMF austerity programs put pressure on the local population while being oriented toward tackling monetary and budgetary issues. A program on macro-economic stability needs to be counterbalanced with projects, which focus on micro level initiatives.

Economic and social reconstruction cannot be co-ordinated through a clear chain of command, which is common in war zones. Centralization will not happen since various international agencies and NGOs want to keep autonomy and resist any attempts to impose external authority over them (Weiss, 1999). Since co-ordination has to be based on consensus, leadership lies in the capacity to orchestrate a coherent response and mobilize the key actors around common objectives and set up priorities.

In the absence of an effective co-ordinating entity, the rudimentary exchange of

information can be achieved through regular briefing sessions. The compatibility of field activities can be promoted by the negotiation of inter-agency frameworks for action with the establishment of task teams on specific issues. Clear structures for co-ordination among key agencies emerge from the division of labor among actors. Overall, the degree of engaging actors in co-ordination differs according to domains and levels.

III. Organizational Links and Levels of Operation: Bosnia

Bosnia is particularly rich in the number and variety of programs designed for post-conflict reconstruction. In that sense, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a laboratory for applying new understandings of peace building to overcoming local challenges (Bosco, 1998). Co-ordination in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is very complex due to heavy presence of international organizations with different mandates. With the establishment of a dual co-ordinating structure by Western allies and the UN, there exist multiple layers of authorities and responsibilities divided among different agencies. The High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement is in charge of overall co-ordination and monitoring of civilian aspects of the operation. Contrary to other missions, the authority of SRSG is limited to the supervision of several UN functions in human rights, demining and policing. Various activities in the military security arenas have been co-ordinated by NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR), while development issues have become a main focus of UNDP, UNICEF and other UN Specialized Agencies.

(1) Co-ordinating Authorities

The High Representative (HR) has the final authority regarding interpretation of the peace agreement on civilian implementation, such as the return of displaced persons and refugees, humanitarian assistance and the election process. The office is also involved in the co-ordination of economic reconstruction, social rehabilitation, political and legal affairs and the promotion of human rights.

In the event of non-compliance of public officials with the Dayton Peace

Agreement, the office is given authority to dismiss them or impose decisions. The Office of High Representative (OHR) dismissed several federation government agency officials and issued decisions amending federation laws on fund management and employment. However, their authority has been challenged by an undemocratic nationalist elite whose power depends on the resistance to any change in the gains they obtained during wartime. In particular, dealing with the military and political organizations in the Croatian part of Bosnia proved to be a critical test. They exercise direct control over the local communities through taxation and confiscation of production facilities. The European Union Administration's attempt to reorganize administrative district in Mostar was met by resistance from Croats. The control of extreme elements (which challenge the decisions of the High Representative) has been a formidable task, and so far the situation has been managed by avoiding violent confrontation with the local thugs. As recently as spring 2001, a nationalist Croat group used rioters to block the investigation of the banks controlled by a Croatian nationalist party (Washington Post, April 6). A lack of effective political pressure on the Croatian government (which can influence the local groups) by Western governments weakened the positions of the HR.

The SRSG, as head of the United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, exercises authority over the three major components of United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), including the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF), Civil Affairs and the Mine Action Center. The Special Representative also co-ordinates other UN activities in the areas of humanitarian relief and refugees, demining, human rights, elections and rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction. In addition, the office organizes inter-agency meetings on a monthly basis to exchange information and coordinate overall UN activities with those of other international actors, especially OHR.

In many ways, Bosnia can be compared with Cambodia where the UN was a single authority to supervise war termination. In Cambodia, institutional and structural simplicity of the mission was provided by the fact that the SRSG in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, was able to instruct and guide the overall peace process. In Bosnia, as major responsibilities to rebuild society belong to Western allies, OHR (which is responsible for the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council based in London) replaced SRSG for the

co-ordination function. However, the office lacked sufficient authority since it was not endowed with a proper leadership function, and UN agencies and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have autonomy of their own operations.

Another major difference was that civilian and military operations were married under the UNTAC umbrella, but the two components were not integrated in Bosnia. In Cambodia, joint military-civil co-ordinating groups were established to successfully meet with the challenges of maintaining security and holding the elections despite the threats from Khmer Rouge. UNTAC's military unit was assigned to high and medium risk areas to support electoral preparations. In the areas of lower risk, civilians were protected by unarmed civilian police and UN military observer. The major weakness in the Bosnian operation is the separation of NATO (which contributed the majority of forces to peacekeeping) from the civilian administrative function (Williams, 1999).

(2) Democracy and Governance

The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) contributes to the establishment of the rule of law through a variety of programs on reform and monitoring of the police and the judicial system. Police monitoring, training and assistance have been provided by IPTF. The international police force was created to help the parties in BiH to carry out their low enforcement responsibilities as set forth by the Peace Agreement. The institutions need to be restructured in order to get a democratic, professional and multi-ethnic police force. The international police mission has been making progress in establishing truly multi-ethnic police force. IPTF advised local police on providing security for returning refugees and its training units addressed key public security issues such as organized crime, drugs and corruption as well as refugee returns. Its executive power was extended to investigate allegations of human rights violations by police officers.

The Civil Affairs Officers, deployed with their civilian police colleagues, monitor human rights, political and socio-economic situations. By providing information and analysis, they support the activities of IPTF, SRSG and the High Representative. Alleged human rights violations are also investigated by officials at a

human rights division of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. They frequently meet with judges, prosecutors and lawyers. Their ultimate goal is to support the creation of an independent judiciary.

Along with bilateral projects like those of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, the democratization branch of the OSCE has been interested in the development of civil society. Programs on local NGO development and formation of political parties have often been implemented by the National Democratic Institute and other Western based NGOs. These programs focus on promoting participatory government and an increased presence of women in the political arena as well as an emphasis on behavioral change with transmission of knowledge, skills and attitudes.

Tension can arise between human rights and democracy programs due to their different skill sets and approaches. Whereas the democratization branch of OSCE wants to develop a working relationship with local authorities, the human rights branch has to respond to complaints against local officials through its advocacy role.

Elections are the purview of the elections division of the OSCE, but collaborative efforts involve IPTF, UNHCR and SFOR in registration and protection of voters. The elections without the return of refugees do not reflect the pre-war population distribution and institutionalise ethnic power imbalance. Minority returns are thus linked to municipal and local government elections, since the elections conducted without the safe return of refugees can legitimise the outcome of ethnic cleansing.

(3) Security and Military Functions

The SFOR campaign has been endowed with the mandate of maintaining order by the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). SFOR deters a resumption of hostilities; provides selective support for civilian organizations; oversees de-militarization and also pursues war criminals warranted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Through a close liaison, SFOR provides enforcement of certain IPTF directives since IPTF's function is limited to monitoring, mentoring and assisting the local police with policing skills rather than actively getting involved in managing community violence.

In response to concerns regarding a lack of effective communication between

civilian administrators and military commanders, the personnel with backgrounds of law enforcement, public health, communications, education and transportation have been deployed along with the troops to improve cooperative relations with OHR, OSCE and UNHCR (Williams, 1998). SFOR (and its predecessor NATO International Enforcement Force, known as IFOR) gave tactical support for OSCE in the logistical aspects of the operation such as transporting ballot boxes to polling stations.

On the other hand, there has been some reluctance of the military to actively support human rights and other agencies engaged in law enforcement functions (Cousens, 2001). The War Crimes Tribunal (whose operation largely depends on assistance of enforcement forces) expressed frustration about a lack of more effective action by SFOR to arrest persons indicted for war crimes. Some national units of SFOR did not actively prevent local parties from interfering with freedom of movement supported by UNHCR. For instance, Italian contingents did not take any serious action when Serbs threw rocks on the buses, which were carrying Muslims visiting the graves of their relatives. Especially in Bosnia (where security issues are a major concern), the success of the civilian aspects of peace building relies on military support.

In the absence of control over both civil and military offices by one person, Civil-Military Cooperation Centers can fulfill co-ordination functions with local and international civilian personnel. Although unified command is difficult to achieve in practice, an effective system of military and civil cooperation at all levels from strategic to tactical is essential for successful operation. Since UNHCR requires more support of the military components than other civilian agencies, a contact relationship between UNHCR and SFOR has been established not only at a headquarter level through the Combined Joint Civil Military Task Force but also at branch and field office levels.

(4) Relief and Reconstruction

The civilian peace building elements, in particular relief and development, are managed by UNHCR and UNDP. The Dayton Peace Accord assigned the UNHCR to coordinate humanitarian assistance and take the lead role for dealing with issues relating to refugees and displaced persons. UNHCR provides humanitarian assistance through special assistance programs such as home care and psycho-social support for the general

population, particularly the elderly, the handicapped, severely traumatized individuals and households with no income.

In recognition that a lack of income is a major barrier to refugee resettlement, UNDP has a comprehensive approach to reconstruction/rehabilitation. It combines activities for rehabilitating shelter and social infrastructure with community development efforts to promote social cohesion in the smooth integration of refugees and displaced people. This approach is aimed at complementing the objectives of UNHCR in the areas of community development and promotion of reconciliation. At the same time, a large emphasis is placed on capacity building for strengthening a social safety net and supporting increased responsibilities of local authorities for social services. In order to help the return and peaceful integration of Croat and Serb refugees and displaced persons in Western Slovenia, UNDP and UNHCR collaborated on a rehabilitation and reconstruction project with distribution of basic agricultural equipment and reconstruction of schools and roads.

UNHCR protection and field branch officers lack resources to deal with a large number of interpersonal and inter-communal problems. An effective response to these matters is beyond the capability and mandate of a single organization. On the matters of refugee abuses, the UNHCR gets reports from the Human Rights Branch of the OSCE mission. Housing projects for returnees are supported by the UNDP. UNHCR has to depend on IPTF and SFOR for the safety of returning refugees (Whitman, 1999, p. 128). The UNHCR also relies on other agencies to identify new returnees when it has low presence in local areas. Their programs are implemented at a community level through contracts with NGOs.

(5) Economic Recovery

Responsibility for economic recovery is split between international financial institutions and UN agencies. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are responsible for aid coordination and have played a key role in financing Bosnia's reconstruction debt, in collaboration with bilateral and private donors (Vayrynen, 1997). UNDP has paid a greater attention to income generating activities through emergency employment and the establishment of micro-enterprises, while private sector donors are more interested

in industrial and commercial development.

Through reconstruction programs, UNDP supports reorganization of essential municipal and social services and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure such as local roads, education, health, power and water supplies. UNDP is also engaged in clearing the mined agricultural areas for farmers to cultivate. Recently the Resident Coordinator has taken an initiative of coordinating the preparation of a Common Country Study on development challenges in BiH aimed at fostering a common understanding among the agencies.

IV. Operational and Tactical Level Implementation

Main activities in consultation among local co-ordinators of international organizations include sharing information and exchanging different views. For example, in Banja Luka where regional headquarters are located, the liaison offices of the SFOR headquarters, IPTF and UNHCR are assigned to each other, holding regular meetings and co-ordinating policies. Here, staff can generally reconcile differences in the information that field offices present to them.

At the operational level, the accomplishment of one agency's goal depends on the support of others and often requires their involvement in common tasks. Planning of security for returnees demands a field level consultation between IPTF, the local police, SFOR and UNHCR. A high level of collaboration of these agencies has proven critical to successful refuge returns. In Drvar, a town in Northwest Bosnia, the local UNHCR and OSCE officers co-ordinated their weekly activities with IPTF and SFOR in order to handle an acute problem with Croat resistance to returns of Serb refugees. For local elections in the municipal area of Drvar, all the key international agencies are drawn together in meetings of the Election Results Implementation Committee.

Operational agreements at a branch level can be undermined by the inability of the higher headquarters of their respective organizations to determine a common policy. Headquarters focus on strategic decisions that are more complex than lower level tactical operations. Exploring an effective means of maximising efforts at the tactical level is made difficult by a friction generated by higher headquarters of many organizations. In general, despite regular meetings organised by OHR, OSCE, SFOR

and the World Bank, horizontal co-ordination in Sarajevo seems to be less effective than at a lower level where their regional offices are located.

The ability of international intervention to control local situations is affected by the degrees of each organization's presence in the field. The requirements for having a capacity to gather information first-hand or to affect events directly depend on the nature of operations. Since the Office of the High Representative is only concerned about management and information rather than action on individual issues, their administrative structure does not reach beyond three regional offices in Banja Luka, Mostar and Brcko. Given their tasks, which demand daily operations at a community level, SFOR and IPTF maintain a strong presence in many local towns and villages. SFOR keeps large areas under close observation through regular patrols. IPTF has stations dispersed to the lowest level and accompanies local police on patrol.

Organizations, which do not have a more elaborate vertical command structure, are less pervasive at an operational and tactical level. Although international field officers of OSCE and other major agencies have a wide variety of managerial, legal and policy implementation skills, the small number of officers in regional offices restricts the numbers of cases they can take on. Language barriers and cultural differences also remain a barrier to the operation of many offices at a local level.

In general, organizations, in charge of military and police missions, reach all the way down to the tactical level. On the other hand, OHR, OSCE and UNHCR heavily use implementing partners to put their programs into effect because their operational functions do not penetrate effectively beyond regional offices. In addition, some service-oriented organizations find it difficult to set up a local infrastructure to implement their programs in a short time. These agencies rely on NGO implementing partners to have a direct impact. The skills and structure to address communal conflict largely reside with NGOs.

V. The Role of NGOs

Since NGOs began to be hailed as being capable of bringing peace and development to war-torn societies through grassroots level activities, many NGOs have been given a contractual responsibility for specific programs or activities as implementation partners.

The OHR, for example, contracted the International Crisis Group (ICG) to gather information and prepare reports. The OSCE democratisation branch works with local NGOs to develop civil society and build links between communities. While many NGOs often work as subcontractors, some large international NGOs can set up priorities, raise and distribute their own resources rather than operating under the direct control of their government or UN agencies. It is not unusual that NGOs cooperate as either parallel or contracting managers of food deliveries and other humanitarian services.

The operational/tactical split between international agencies and NGOs has been particularly common for humanitarian relief and development work. In its co-ordinated scheme, many NGOs serve as sub-contractors who deliver specific goods and services. In running programs to support its activities, the UNHCR contracts many of the basic services. NGO partners implementing UNHCR programs provide packages for returnees who need to mend or re-build houses without roofs, windows or furniture and farmers stripped of tools, seed and livestock.

Some NGOs are engaged in working on unarmed accompaniment and assistance to returnees. When returnees face hostility, threats and intimidation, NGO members accompany them to their houses and assist them with repairs. The presence of an international witness helps deter threats and harassment. NGOs can provide information that allows IPTF or OSCE Human Rights officers to follow up on specific incidents. The United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), serving as a partner implementing the UNHCR programs, developed collaborative relationships with the IPFT and SFOR in identifying new returnees in Northwestern Bosnia where they have low presence.

International organizations deal mainly with official government institutions, but have less contact with civil society. As discussed earlier, their capacity to collect and disseminate information and take action at the tactical level is enhanced by entering into partnership with NGOs. NGOs possess valuable information about the relative dependability of local groups and individuals and can easily establish logistics for various projects due to their long-standing relationship with local communities.

NGOs have unique advantages in the areas of civil society building through their conscious efforts to establish relationships between adversarial communities, foster mutual confidence and provide peaceful mechanisms of dispute resolution. 'Major

international agencies tend to embody organizational skills, while therapeutic and psychosocial skills often reside in smaller NGOs' (Last, 2000, p. 85). In promoting reconciliation, various NGO programs have been active in strengthening inter-personal and inter-communal communication skills.

The substance of peace building often hinges on conflict resolution skills, embedded in knowledge of the community. Owing to cultural and communication obstacles, the intervention of international staff is difficult at the community level. The same barriers also cause difficulties in developing plans at the operational level to support widespread action. Thus major international organizations develop or support local NGOs capable of carrying out projects in their own areas.

For instance, in the areas of reconciliation, the community center model, with mixed local and international facilitators, provides a framework for deploying key interpersonal skills at grass roots level. The networks of community groups can be established across ethnic boundaries to explore indigenous knowledge and skills (Belloni, 2001). Both existing and potential groups, such as youth, women, pensioners, displaced people and refugees, can be organised as local grassroots groups for certain geographic areas. They can be linked together at a regional level to permit broader understanding and pursue common interests.

In working with NGOs, flexibility in partnership arrangements is critical (Patrick, 2000). Donors should not insist too much on formal and institutionally verifiable goals on the part of any recipient operational body. Overall, the efficiency of small operation oriented NGOs depends on a minimum administrative overhead without the necessity of a formal management structure. Especially in the areas of development and civil society building, hierarchical structures with links to central headquarters are less effective at developing appropriate local strategies. Nor is it desirable to manage and control NGOs that can operate autonomously within their mandates.

One group may get involved in overlapping areas of legal assistance, business development or psychosocial counseling, but diverse programs have to serve shared goals since the limited pool of resources constrains the activities of each project. It is critical that a project needs to take an integrated approach, for instance, by linking the provision of health care and development assistance to community reconciliation. Minority integration and return projects can be more effective when they are supported

by health or legal assistance programs. Community reconciliation, inter-cultural communication and education can be integrated into all aspects of social service programs.

VI. Community Building

Peace building initiatives are made more effective by a coherent campaign plan, which incorporates the skills of appropriate NGOs and utilizes their contacts embodied at the grass roots level. Infrastructure building has to be closely linked to the 'social components' of confidence building and community organization. Participation in public and volunteer works and informal contacts through neighbourhood programs has been suggested as a means of increasing confidence within the community. The exchange of supplies and equipment between former enemies can lead to the development of common concerns affected by destruction.

Various professional sectors such as education, religion and social welfare can be adapted to community reconciliation programs. Professional services in legal, health care and other areas have to promote dignity of the victims, a climate of mutual understanding, tolerance and respect for different cultures. More attention needs to be paid to linking social service programs to resolving tensions and disputes at an inter-group level.

(1) Social and Legal Services

Multiple agencies get involved in the mobilisation of resources for repairing houses as well as the prevention of vandalization or looting. Rebuilding the communal links requires efforts to assist estranged neighbours to share apartment blocks or streets again. At the same time, counselling and physical protection have to be provided for displaced minorities who prepare for return. A comprehensive program for a large-scale return of minorities has been supported by such international NGOs as Norwegian Refugee Council's Minority Integration and Return Project.

Advocate groups support and represent the rights of evicted elderly minority citizens and accompany their clients to local authorities. Legal assistance was provided

for vulnerable pensioners, refugees and displaced people who had basic questions about their rights and how to pursue them. Since the returnees' rights are not compatible with the needs of displaced people or refugees occupying houses, support for population return may be perceived as adversarial. Legal expertise is needed in such classified areas as property and occupancy rights, elections, pensions, family law, communal access and contracts.

Owing to contradictory laws about property rights and procedures, Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL), a Spanish-based international NGO with programs in more than forty countries, solicits support from an international legal community. As an implementing partner for UNHCR, it assists with return and resettlement. Their work depends on an extensive network of legal aid in advising refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons and eventually representing them in court. In the areas of Banja Luka, lawyers provided help at their offices, or a mobile team was dispatched regularly to visit near-by municipalities with the concentration of one thousand displaced persons and refugees.

The goal of reconciling interests and preferences at a personal level and rebuilding stable neighbourhood relationships cannot simply be achieved by enforcing eviction. The perception of minority groups as infiltrators should be reduced through community building projects. In order to understand complex social and interpersonal issues beyond legal classification, the assistance of social workers is needed. Local social workers help categorise various concerns such as repossession of former homes and other properties and non-discriminatory housing not only on legal but also social terms. That helped MPDL implement psychosocial programs for refugees and displaced people in Northwest Bosnia.

(2) Health Care

The practical interaction on common welfare provides a context for sustained co-operation between communities. Humanitarian action in the field of health care can be designed to provide an incentive for continued engagement of formerly estranged communities with each other. Health Bridges for Peace is a project that supports the prevention of inter-communal conflict with health care programs. It has been visible in

several communities in the former Yugoslavia, and its activities were endorsed by the World Health Organization. Health care delivery is combined with training in psychological skills as part of a conflict-management component.

In delivering primary health care, medical professionals representing diverse communities can develop inter-communal communication, promote trust and create avenues for the peaceful resolution of differences (Beigbeder, 1999). Through medical functions, the Medical Network for Social Reconstruction for ex-Yugoslavia (Ex-Y Medical Network) advocates a model of inter-ethnic reconciliation and co-operation. The creation of training programs across political and communal boundaries resulted in the establishment of 'Health and Reconciliation Teams'. Various service programs implemented by foreign donors should support local programs, which pursue the goal of overcoming ethnic or racial prejudice.

VII. Conclusion

Peace building activities in Bosnia suggest complexities of various operations and the roles of different actors at different levels (strategic, operational and tactical). While co-ordination for activities at operational and tactical levels in the areas of relief work and conduct of elections can be considered effective, more support for OHR policies toward the corruption of Bosnian government officials and the nationalist Croat resistance to the efforts to establish a more integrated country is needed at the strategic level.

Although some agencies such as UNHCR rely more on co-ordination for effective operation, the quality of an inter-agency framework at every level has a significant impact on the success or failure of the entire operation. Different expectations about the relationship make co-ordination among agencies difficult. Each international agency operates according to its own understanding of the situation, intervention policies and practice. Interagency dialogue is necessary for promoting mutual understanding of differences in organizational norms, values and beliefs as well as past practice. Inefficient co-ordination at higher levels can be compensated by 'focusing on building peaceful communities from the bottom up, where structures have the most impact on people's lives' (Last, 2000, p. 88).

References

Y. Beigbeder, 'The World Health Organization and Peacekeeping', in J. Whitman (ed.), *Peacekeeping and the UN Agencies* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 31-48.

R. Belloni, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 2 (2001).

D. Bosco, 'After Genocide: Building Peace in Bosnia', *The American Prospect*, no. 39 (01 July 1998).

L. J. Cohen, 'Whose Bosnia? The Politics of Nation Building', *Current History*, vol. 97 (March 1998), pp. 103-112.

E. M. Cousens, 'Building Peace in Bosnia', in E. M. Cousens, et al. (eds), *Peace Building as Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2001), pp. 113-152.

T. Findlay, 'Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC,' *SIPRI Research Report No. 9* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

D. Last, 'Organizing for Effective Peacebuilding', in T. Woodhouse and O. Ramsbotham (eds), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 80-96.

T. R. Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Oliver Branch?* (Westport: Praeger, 1999).

S. Patrick, 'The Donor Community and the Challenge of Postconflict Recovery', in S. Forman and S. Patrick (eds), *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 2000).

R. Vayrynen, 'Economic Incentives and the Bosnian Peace Process', in David Cortright (ed.), *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 150-180.

T. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

J. D. Whaley, 'Improving UN Developmental Co-ordination within Peace Missions', in J. Ginifer (ed.), *Beyond the Emergency: Development within UN Peace Missions* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 107-122.

J. Whitman, 'The UN Specialized Agencies, Peacekeeping and the Enactment of Values', in J. Whitman (ed.), *Peacekeeping and the UN Agencies* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 120-137.

J. Whitman and I. Bartholomew, 'Collective Control of UN Peace Support Operations: A Policy Proposal,' *Security Dialogue*, vol. 25, no. 1 (1994), pp. 77-92.

M.C. Williams, 'Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping', *Adelphi Paper 321* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).