

Much Ado About Something: the Factors that Induced Reagan and Gorbachev to Conclude the INF Treaty*

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Prologue

On 8 December 1987 the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR signed in Washington, DC a treaty on the elimination of the two countries' ground-launched intermediate-range (1,000–5,000 kilometers) and shorter-range (500–1,000 kilometers) missiles and the related documents governing the elimination of the missile systems and regarding inspection (INF Treaty).¹⁾ The treaty went into effect on 1 June 1988 with the exchange of the instruments of ratification which took place on the occasion of the Moscow summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

By 1 June 1991, if the treaty implemented as agreed, a total of 2,669 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and 1,134 launchers will have been destroyed along with their support facilities installed in five countries (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as well as in three countries (Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union) of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO).²⁾

Nonetheless, the INF Treaty exempts both 'nuclear warhead device' and 'guidance elements' from destruction and allows them to be reused in whatever way possible.³⁾ The treaty does not provide anything for the ground-based systems with ranges shorter than 500 kilometers, neither does it apply to any missiles launched from the aircraft or submarines and surface ships.

These limitations notwithstanding, the two dominant nuclear powers, for the first time in forty-two years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, agreed on some 'disarmament', albeit very limited, of their nuclear arsenals. The INF Treaty set a precedent for the two countries to deviate from their traditional 'arms control' formula which merely made a set of rules by which nuclear arms build-up could be continued. The treaty demonstrated that nuclear disarmament could actually be achieved once the parties concerned determine to carry it out.

What were the factors that induced Reagan and Gorbachev to conclude the INF Treaty? The present essay will briefly review the circumstances in which the USSR and then the US began to deploy their missiles which they were to scrap ultimately. It will then examine the original, official rationales for the deployment in light of recent arguments in favour of the INF Treaty. Further, this essay will try to identify general and specific factors that seemed to have contributed to inducing the US and Soviet leaders to finally agreeing on concluding a treaty.

1. The INF Treaty Negates the Official Rationales for Deployment

Even before the USSR began deploying its new medium-range missiles, the SS-20s, from late in 1977, the first public attention was drawn to its threat by a September 1976 statement of Fred Iklé, then the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who warned that the specter of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber was growing like 'a towering cloud over Europe and Asia'⁴).

About a year later, a lecture delivered by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London caused a growing concern over the SS-20 and more generally over the credibility of 'extended deterrence', the US commitment to defend Western Europe. When he pointed out that the then ongoing Second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) between the US and the USSR would neutralise strategic nuclear capabilities, thereby magnifying 'the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons', Schmidt was alluding to the deployment of the SS-20 and the lack of comparable missiles in NATO. And 'the principle of parity' must apply to 'all categories of weapons', the Chancellor said, meaning that some measures has to be taken to fill the gap.⁵

The Reasons of Soviet Deployment and NATO's Counter-Development

What were the reasons for the USSR to deploy the SS-20s? The USSR seemed to have pursued to match its nuclear capabilities against those of the US and of the other nuclear powers in the Eurasian theatre while moving to codify in SALT II parity with the US in the strategic, intercontinental nuclear systems.

Specifically, the USSR is observed to have traced a series of inter-connected considerations. First was a military requirement to counter the growing British, French and Chinese strategic nuclear missile forces, and the US and allied nuclear delivery forces based in Europe and the similar US forces on its bases in the Far East and the Pacific.

Second was a military-technological need to modernise the obsolescent SS-4 and SS-5 systems.

Third was a new politico-military constraints imposed by the arms control talks with the US. The replacement of the older systems by VRBM (variable-range ballistic missile) systems (the SS-11 and SS-N-6) would count against the Soviet intercontinental force levels in SALT under the November 1974 Vladivostok agreement and would deprive the USSR of the right to maintain parity in numbers of launchers under an agreement assumed in SALT II.

And fourth, while preparing to forgo a mobile ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) in a SALT II treaty, the USSR now succeeded in remodelling the SS-16 ICBM into a new SS-20: a mobile, solid-fuelled, rapidly reacting, and accurate IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile) with three MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) warheads on each missile.

The Soviet decision to deploy the SS-20 was thus a natural one *per se* and was 'fully compatible with SALT negotiations'.⁶⁾

On the American side, on the other hand, there was little constituency in favour of the military justification for deploying new missiles in Europe until after the Schmidt's October 1977 lecture. The US had not seen a military requirement to replace Thor and Jupiter IRBMs which it withdrew in 1963 from forward bases around the Eurasian periphery. For some 400 warheads from its Poseidon submarines were now committed to the European theatre, in addition to more than 1,000 bombs on nuclear-capable aircraft stationed in Europe or aboard carriers within range of the USSR.

It is true that in response to the call by President Carter at the NATO's summit meeting in London in May 1977, the Nuclear Planning Group at its meeting in Bari, Italy in October 1977, had decided to set up an *ad hoc* committee called a 'High Level Group' made up of national officials from eleven member states with the mandate to examine the need for NATO TNF (theatre nuclear forces)⁷⁾ modernisation, and the technical, military and political implications of alternative NATO TNF postures.⁸⁾

Nonetheless, NATO's debates over the TNF modernisation might have dragged on and reached a conclusion somewhat different from the actual decision were it not for the Schmidt's lecture and its repercussions.

In fact, an argument for new Euromissiles began gaining support as behind-the-scene manoeuvres developed both in Europe and Washington, DC. The actors were members of a small group called a 'European-American Workshop', chaired by Albert Wohlstetter, a veteran strategic analyst. They were a dozen or so galaxies in the strategic community on both sides of the Atlantic, all connected with the London-based IISS. While rumors were spreading in Europe that the US was going to trade the cruise missile away at the ongoing SALT negotiations, some of them began to work hard to retain the missile as they saw in it options capable of revolutionising NATO's military potential. The point Schmidt emphasised in his lecture at the IISS is said to have been derived essentially from these people. Americans in Washington, DC, too, then had taken shape a theatre nuclear lobby whose members were either with the European-

American Workshop or strongly connected with it.⁹⁾

President Carter was vulnerable to criticisms by West Germans, largely because they felt he was not sensible enough to handle such delicate questions as nuclear weapons and the future of their country. A Presidential Review Memorandum, PRM-10, leaked to the press, revealed that the Carter administration was prepared to give up large areas of West Germany in the event of war with the USSR in order to establish a stronger defence front near the Rhine.¹⁰⁾

Another, more critical affair concerned the neutron bomb, a weapon which would kill people but would not destroy property. Carter had been advised that the weapon was ideal for stopping Soviet tanks in a European war. The President, however, wanted allies' request for its production and deployment prior to a US decision. After much difficulties during February and March 1978, the Schmidt government managed to form a consensus to meet Carter's demand provided one other NATO country in the European continent would also accept the neutron bomb. Then, in April, Carter suddenly halted the project.¹¹⁾

The difficulties the Chancellor encountered as the result alarmed Washington and decisively changed the course of debates there. By the end of 1978, the Carter administration had concluded that a positive decision on the deployment of new Euromissiles would serve several purposes. Such a decision would re-establish domestic confidence in the handling of alliance and nuclear weapons affairs and restore European confidence in the US leadership in NATO and in its security guarantee, in addition to showing the Soviet leaders US firmness in maintaining military programmes necessary for ensuring parity.

The subsequent months saw intensive diplomatic efforts by the Carter administration to form a NATO consensus on the deployment of new Euromissiles. Carter personally committed himself to these efforts, beginning with a summit meeting in Guadeloupe in January 1979 where he met with Chancellor Schmidt, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estang and British Prime Minister James Callaghan.¹²⁾ Thus, NATO's political processes began to gain momentum towards a decision on 12 December 1979.

The Official Rationales for Deployment

The USSR's rationales for the deployment of the SS-20 went along these lines.

When NATO was on the eve of formulating its decision, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who also was Chairman of the Defence Council of the USSR, warned that NATO's plan for the deployment of new types of Amer-

ican nuclear missiles in Europe, if implemented, would 'change essentially the strategic situation in the continent'. NATO's aim was to upset the balance of forces that had taken shape in Europe and to try to insure 'military superiority for the NATO bloc', he said. Brezhnev, on the other hand, defended the Soviet deployment of SS-20s, because it was 'not [to] seek military superiority'. The Soviet strategic doctrine was 'purely defensive in nature', he said.¹³⁾

The SS-20, according to the Soviet statement, was intended for carrying out 'the same tasks as medium-range missiles of old types which it now replaces'. The deployment of such missiles was caused by the presence in the territories of NATO countries in Europe of a powerful grouping of 'American forward based means' and of 'corresponding arms systems of Great Britain and France', all capable of reaching the territory of the USSR, the statement said.¹⁴⁾

Further, the number of Soviet medium-range missiles on the European part of the USSR has 'not been increased by a single missile, by a single plane' during the past decade, pointed out the Soviet General Secretary. On the contrary, the number of nuclear charges of these missiles have even been 'somewhat decreased' and that of medium-range bombers 'diminished', too, he added.¹⁵⁾

And Brezhnev now declared that the USSR was prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear means deployed in Western areas of the USSR as compared to the present level but 'only in the event no additional medium range nuclear means are deployed in Western Europe'.¹⁶⁾

What were the NATO's rationales for a counter-deployment? Meeting in Brussels on 12 December 1979, NATO's foreign and defence ministers decided to pursue 'two parallel and complementary approaches' to modernise NATO's LRTNF (long-range theatre nuclear forces) by the deployment in Europe of US systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers and 464 GLCMs (ground-launched cruise missiles) and let the US negotiate with the USSR on the limitation of these types of missiles.

The NATO ministers noted that the situation created by 'the continuing Warsaw Pact military build-up' was being aggravated particularly by the deployment of the SS-20 missile, which they regarded as offering 'significant improvements' over previous systems, and the Backfire bomber, which they saw had 'a much better performance' than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role.

In contrast to the Soviet build-up, pointed out the NATO ministers, Western LRTNF capabilities had 'remained static', and were increasing in age and

vulnerability, and lacked land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems. These developments prompted 'serious concern' within the Atlantic alliance that 'Soviet superiority' could 'undermine the stability' achieved in intercontinental systems and 'cast doubt on the credibility of the alliance's deterrent strategy' by highlighting 'the gap' in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression. This was why the ministers concluded that concrete actions were required on the part of the alliance if NATO's strategy of 'flexible response' was to remain 'credible'.

The lines set by the NATO ministers for US-USSR negotiations included: 'agreed limitation' on US and Soviet land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems which should take the form of '*de jure* equality' both in ceilings and in rights between the sides, and must be 'adequately verifiable'.

The NATO ministers also did not fail to state that 'as an integral part of TNF modernization', 1,000 US nuclear warheads would be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible.¹⁷⁾

Thus, each side made out its case for deployment on the ground that the other side was taking such steps that would undermine each side's security and that a counter-measure was therefore justified. Apparently as a gesture of gaining public support, the USSR offered to reduce part of the missiles already deployed on condition that no new missiles were deployed by NATO, while the NATO ministers declared to unilaterally withdraw part (though obsolete ones) of the existing nuclear warheads.

Eight years later, however, the world was to hear rationales for the conclusion of the INF Treaty which negate the official rationales for deployment.

The Rationales for the INF Treaty

When the USSR agreed first to the 'zero' option to eliminate the Euromissiles of the two sides, then to the 'second zero' to destroy shorter-range missiles as well, and finally to the 'global zero' not to retain these missiles in Asia either, it substantially negated its own official rationales for deployment presented by the Brezhnev leadership.

What had happened? Dramatic as it was, the Soviet turnaround was evolutionary, and yet it was dynamic. After experiencing a crucial turning point reached at the US-USSR summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland in October 1986, the Gorbachev leadership frequently met with European leaders. It had come to realise that certain changes were taking place among ruling circles in Western Europe in their opinions on international affairs. New attitudes to

security and defence policy were being worked out by socialist and social democratic parties there. Their views on international security and disarmament were closer to or even identical with the Soviet view, it was found. The concept of 'common security', a central theme put forward by the International Palme Commission, had much in common with the Soviet concept of 'comprehensive security'.

Over the question of Euromissiles, in particular, the Soviet leadership took into serious consideration in its policy some of the specific concerns expressed by many leaders of European countries including those of Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. In the course of policy review, the Soviet leadership seemed to have rediscovered the existence of a common 'European home' where it hoped for creating a new situation by the elimination of Euromissiles.

In connection with 'common security', Gorbachev began to emphasise the concept of 'reasonable adequacy' or 'reasonable sufficiency'. In his view armaments should be reduced to 'the level of reasonable sufficiency', that is, a level necessary 'for strictly defensive purposes'. The Soviet General Secretary now believes it is time the two military alliances amended their strategic concepts to gear them more to the aims of 'defense'.¹⁸⁾

But why did the USSR want to conclude the INF Treaty by finally agreeing to the elimination of the missiles deployed in Soviet Asia in such a hurry when it would have to eliminate much larger number of missiles and launchers than the Americans? It was a new awareness of the 'need to do something', and concretely, to take some real steps so that 'the process of disarmament might actually start', however slow it might be, Gorachev explains.¹⁹⁾

At the time when the Soviet leaders went ahead with deploying the SS-20, they must have done so on the ground of politico-military justification as they saw it at the time. However, they did not give prior explanation of this justification, neither did they announce what they were going to do. What was of critical importance politically was that the Soviet leaders were not prudent enough to have proper assessment of reactions that might probably be taken by the other side.

The US case was rhetorical as well as specific. On the eve of NATO's summit meeting in 1988, President Reagan addressed citizens of the North Atlantic alliance and said the INF Treaty represented 'a step toward world peace and world freedom'. In an effort to reassure them of the continued US commitment to the Atlantic alliance, Reagan declared: 'An attack on Munich is the same as

an attack on Chicago.²⁰⁾ The US President considered it necessary to emphasise this point in particular reference to the INF Treaty.

A more specific case for the INF Treaty was presented by Paul H. Nitze, special arms control adviser to President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz. In a rebuttal to those who argue that the elimination of US INF missiles from Europe would undercut NATO's doctrine of flexible response and decouple US defences from the NATO deterrent, Nitze said this kind of argument was hard to accept when one considered 'the capabilities NATO would retain'. In Europe, he pointed out, the US would maintain 'over 4,000 nuclear warheads for a variety of U.S. and allied delivery vehicles—nuclear capable aircraft'. These include F-111s with range longer than the Pershing II, short-range missiles, and nuclear artillery, in addition to several hundred SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) re-entry vehicles which would also remain dedicated to NATO. Furthermore, British and French systems would remain, with their modernisation programmes proceeding as planned. Last but not least, US strategic forces would continue to provide 'a robust foundation for nuclear deterrence', Nitze declared.

Then rhetorically asked Nitze: 'Would the United States and NATO be decoupled?' Given the systems remaining in Europe as well as America's extensive conventional contribution to NATO's defence, including over 300,000 US troops deployed in Western Europe, 'talks of decoupling is unjustified', he replied.

With regard to the original rationales for the NATO's decision to deploy Euromissiles, Nitze said US INF missiles were intended to 'reassure the allies' about the continued effectiveness of the NATO's deterrent strategy in the face of SS-20s. Now, however, as the allies themselves made clear, 'such reassurance would be unnecessary', given the other US contribution to NATO's defence, 'if the SS-20s were eliminated', he said.²¹⁾

Indeed, the very capabilities which the NATO ministers feared would cast doubt on 'the credibility' of the NATO's deterrent strategy had been retained even prior to the deployment of the new Euromissiles and would be retained after their withdrawal pursuant to the INF Treaty.

What about 'the gap' in the spectrum of NATO's 'strategy of flexible response'? Doesn't 'the gap' matter any longer because the SS-20s are to be eliminated? But doesn't NATO's 'strategy of flexible response' require to retain all means available for 'every spectrum of response', from conventional to battle-field, tactical, theatre to intercontinental weapons?

If NATO could continue to employ the 'strategy of flexible response' in the

future even without the Euromissiles, it could have done so without deploying the Pershing IIs and GLCMs irrespective of whether SS-20s were there or not. NATO's capabilities have existed throughout, and the targets covered additionally by the newly deployed Euromissiles had already been covered by other redundant means long in existence.

As it was, President Carter narrowed down his choices solely to the deployment of new missiles and made it the major goal of American diplomacy to rally an alliance consensus on the deployment decision. Other options available were not pursued at all.

2. The Factors that Brewed Political Climate for an INF Treaty

In the wake of NATO's December 1979 decision, the US and the USSR conducted some negotiations in Geneva which naturally ended up inconclusively because the US was soon to elect the new president. After Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, it took full eleven months before his administration was barely able to formalise its arms control policy of a sort. While the negotiations dragged on, the time came for the US to bring its new missiles into Europe. In protest the USSR withdrew its negotiators from the Geneva talks towards the end of 1983. It was in March 1985 when Reagan just began his second term that a new round of US-USSR arms control talks was resumed in Geneva with three items placed on the agenda in a package: INFs, strategic nuclear systems and space weapons.

A set of general factors seemed to have gradually had their impacts on negotiating postures of the two sides. Meanwhile, the policies and measures taken by the Reagan administration and the Gorbachev leadership began to bring about some specific factors. Added to these were some unpredictable events and setbacks from which both the new Soviet leadership and the soon-to-be outgoing US president were to suffer to varying degrees. These appeared to have given rise to certain incentives for the two sides to pursue a path towards an agreement of some kind.

General Factors

First, there was an unprecedented growth of nuclear disarmament movements during the late 1970s and the early 1980s in Europe, the US, and the Asian-Pacific regions. These movements had been fuelled by the nuclear policies of the US and the USSR in particular. In Western Europe, the neutron bomb fiasco by the Carter administration and the NATO's dual decision in 1979 came

as 'gifts from heaven'. The movements had time to mobilise before the deployment of missiles was due to begin late in 1983. By nature the movements were neither pro-Soviet nor anti-American. In fact, they demanded a nuclear-free Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' or 'from Portugal to Poland'. Numerous initiatives were taken ranging from grassroots activities to pronouncements by leaders of certain non-aligned, neutral countries. In the US the Nuclear Freeze movement spread across the nation and the Catholic bishops challenged the ethics of 'nuclear deterrence'.²²⁾

In the course of these movements, recurrent clash of opinions over the 'credibility' of US nuclear deterrence came to the fore among the ruling elite on both sides of the Atlantic.²³⁾ The assurance of 'nuclear deterrence' could no longer command the mythical faith what it had appeared to do among the public at large.

Second, there were changes taking place in the political, economic and social foundations supporting the leaders of the US and the USSR.

The revival of 'a strong America' which President Reagan promised to achieve as the essential precondition for undertaking arms control negotiations with the USSR was being pursued, among others, in the form of the five-point strategic nuclear forces modernisation programme (which included: modernisation of the strategic nuclear triad, that of the means for command, control and communications plus intelligence or C³ + I, deployment of sea- and air-launched cruise missiles as the strategic reserve and development of the B-1B bomber).²⁴⁾

Nonetheless, the Reaganomics, coupled with continued dramatic increases in military spending, began to undermine the US economic foundation, deteriorating chronic twin deficits in trade and budget. In December 1985, US Congress adopted the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget reduction legislation, which brought about serious consequences for Reagan's military build-up programmes.

Furthermore, strategic issues such as technological survivability of the long controversial MX and 'Midgetman' missiles and the political acceptability of these missiles to the American public made the doubtful Congress even more recalcitrant.

Reagan's pet project, the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), not only suffered from technological uncertainties but began to give rise to a growing concern both at home and among US allies that the administration might undercut the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by going ahead with SDI-related

testing. Revelations of mismanagement and waste within the armed services added to criticisms of the administration's weapons acquisition policy.

Last but not the least, no fruitful results had ever been achieved in arms control talks conducted from 'the position of strength'.

In the Soviet Union, the new leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev set about undertaking ambitious programmes for complete overhaul of the Soviet economy along with plans for restructuring political, cultural and social institutions that had long plagued the Soviet society. The 27th Communist Party Congress in February–March 1986 endorsed a set of foreign policy priorities.

However, the new Soviet leadership, with replacements of certain key figures, has had age-old obstacles to overcome. An extremely serious accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986 added to the difficulties faced by the Gorbachev leadership. Further, signs began to emerge in some republics that historically less well-off ethnic minorities might threaten uprising.

In foreign policy, the Gorbachev leadership took one new initiative after another particularly in the field of arms control and disarmament and in seeking an early solution to the war in Afghanistan.

Third, changes were evolving in NATO as well as in WTO with respect to both intra- and inter-alliance relationships.

Clash of interests often came to the fore between the US and its European allies. The Reagan administration had not held prior consultations with them, for instance, with regard to the announcement of SDI in March 1983 even though Reagan claimed that the idea was to protect US allies as well.

Despite the Reagan-Thatcher agreement at Camp David in December 1984 that the deployment of strategic defence would be a matter for negotiation, senior US officials began to suggest that the US might now adopt a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty apparently to enable it to carry out SDI-related testing and deploy some defences at an early stage. European concern was heightened by unilateral US measures to undercut the SALT II limits and by the US stand for a termination of the ABM Treaty after ten years.

In negotiations to renew agreements on the use of military bases, the Reagan administration found itself faced with new conditions put by Greece, Portugal and Spain—a sign that the NATO alliance was undergoing a transformation.

The USSR and its allies in WTO had to go through a series of coordination with respect to possible repercussions of *Perestroika* in these countries, thereby gradually readjusting themselves to evolving new relations. Lessening of political

and military tensions between the East and West had long been awaited. Attempts were being made to work out a new defence posture *vis-à-vis* the NATO countries.

Fourth, both the Reagan administration and the Gorbachev leadership began to adjust their perspectives for the future of bilateral and international relations.

The President and the General Secretary met for the first time in a 'fireside' summit in Geneva in November 1985 to discuss arms control, human rights, regional issues and bilateral relations. There was linkage among the four areas in one way or another. Arms control seemed to have claimed the decisive importance, for other issues were dependent largely on its success or failure.

Specific Factors

Against the background of the general factors as such, and from differing motives and considerations, both Reagan and Gorbachev needed to achieve something tangible in relations of their two countries, preferably in the field of arms control and disarmament.

As the rest of his second term grew shorter, Reagan seemed to have felt an increased need to accomplish something in international affairs that would put his name on record. By a historical coincidence he now had an option to deal, if he would, with the new leader of 'the evil empire'. This suited Gorbachev who was embarking on an ambitious undertaking to formulate new security and foreign policies based on the new thinking while at the same time carrying on domestic restructuring.

Of the three areas of the bilateral negotiations in Geneva comprising the INFs, strategic nuclear systems and space weapons, the first appeared to have offered the greatest prospects for compromise. The Soviet SS-20 could not threaten the US homeland. US interests in INFs had primarily been political, mainly in terms of reassuring its European allies of the credibility of 'extended deterrence' which, in turn, could be guaranteed by other redundant means. By contrast, Soviet interests in INFs had been greater than that of the US in that the US INFs in Western Europe could strike major targets in the Soviet homeland.

But three areas had been negotiated in a package. Any agreement on reductions in strategic offensive systems could only be achieved depending on mutually acceptable compromises on the SDI, and hence, on the treatment of the ABM Treaty, which proved most difficult to achieve. Only at a later stage,

did the two sides decide that INFs could be settled without necessarily affecting their vital interests in the other two areas.

Even on INFs, however, both sides had by no means been prepared from the outset to go the whole way up to a 'double' and a 'global' zero solution. Various interim and partial solutions had long remained in their intentions, as evidenced by the tentative agreement to leave 100 warheads for each side. The 'global zero' solution emerged for the first time in July 1987 only as a result of a step forward taken to give an added impetus towards a final accord on principle.

A brief review of the course of events during a period of eleven months beginning in the autumn of 1985 would show that initiatives taken by Gorbachev gave an impetus to overtures leading up to a critical showdown in Reykjavik.

At their first summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed on the principle of fifty per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear arms of the two countries as well as on 'the idea of an interim INF agreement' which would leave some missiles in this category on both sides in Europe.²⁵⁾ During his visit to Western Europe a month earlier, Gorbachev had hinted that the USSR was willing to conclude a separate agreement on INFs aside from strategic and space weapons.²⁶⁾

In a letter to Reagan and in a public statement on 15 January 1986, Gorbachev put forward a sweeping proposal on nuclear disarmament which included: total elimination of nuclear weapons by 1999, a 'zero' INF option in Europe during its first stage for five to eight years, renunciation of the right to retain Soviet INFs equivalent to the same category of weapons held by Britain and France, and acceptance of an 'on-site inspection' as a means to verify the reduction of INFs.²⁷⁾ The last three represented a decisive compromise to the position of the US and its European allies.

On 23 June 1986 the Soviet General Secretary addressed another letter to the US President stating his willingness to compromise on INFs. Gorbachev now showed new flexibility by amending the Soviet position on the SDI to allow research, development and testing in the laboratory if both sides agreed not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for fifteen to twenty years. He also suggested that both sides reduce their strategic weapons by only thirty per cent. (Formerly, the USSR took the position that all space weapons and research, development and testing of such weapons should be banned, in return for an agreement on the fifty per cent reductions in the strategic weapons capable of striking the other side's homeland.)²⁸⁾

A month later, on 25 July 1986, Reagan responded with a letter in which he

suggested a complicated scheme that would permit either side to deploy strategic defences within seven and a half years while both sides remained within the bounds of a modified ABM Treaty. In these years, the two sides would be negotiating a plan for 'sharing' the benefits of strategic defences and for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles.²⁹⁾

Towards the end of August 1986, however, the arrests of Soviet UN employee Gennady Zhkarov in New York and of US journalist Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow both on spying charges heightened tensions between the two countries. In this atmosphere Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrived in Washington and forwarded a letter from Gorbachev to Reagan on 19 September.

In his reply to Reagan's letter of 25 July, Gorbachev modified the latest Soviet proposal on INFs advanced at a Washington meeting of US-USSR arms control experts early in September that token number of INFs be retained in Europe. Gorbachev now suggested that the INFs be eliminated from Europe totally and also hinted that Soviet INFs in Asia might be reduced. The Soviet General Secretary, nonetheless, rejected Reagan's proposal for a seven-and-a-half year transition to a state where either side could deploy strategic defences, and insisted instead on fifteen years of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.³⁰⁾ He now judged the situation was such that Reagan and he ought to put aside all affairs for a day or two and 'meet without delay'. The place suggested was either Iceland or London. The Soviet leadership had concluded that a new 'powerful impetus' was necessary to break through the 'practically deadlocked' arms control talks, Gorbachev writes.³¹⁾

It is not clear exactly to what extent and in what way the agreement to hold a summit meeting in Reykjavik had been connected with the release of the arrested Soviet and US citizens. It is clear, however, that the two sides wanted to save the situation and that they seized upon the arrest-and-release episode towards that end. The summit took place for two days, 11–12 October.

As it turned out, the Reykjavik meeting was of historic importance in the sense that the two leaders were faced with one of the two choices—whether to embark on nuclear disarmament, however limited it might be, or to remain within the traditional realm of arms control with no hope of finding a way out of the impasse. The Reykjavik summit exerted significant impact on the subsequent progress of negotiations both in terms of the new impetus given, albeit it produced no communique, and of the points of agreement and disagreement there as they were revealed later.

A Reykjavik Saga

The US seems to have expected that the agenda in Reykjavik would be limited to: setting a date for a Washington summit, working out an outline agreement on INFs, and making some progress on problems of nuclear tests. '[T]he little interagency discussion' held on INFs had concluded that the US 'should not go beyond' its most recent proposal tabled on 18 September 1986 in Geneva, an interim agreement, built on the Soviet idea for 'token' deployments, to a global limit of 200 long-range INF warheads for each side. Both the US and the USSR would retain 100 in Europe and the remaining 100 in the US and Soviet Asia, along with collateral constraints on shorter-range missiles including the SS-12/22, SS-23, and Pershing I. A new US position on nuclear testing was a comprehensive test ban to be achieved 'on a step-by-step basis' in parallel with reductions in offensive weapons. The US considered 'no fallback position' on these two issues, nor were examinations made of any new positions either on the reductions in strategic offensive systems or on SDI.³²⁾ Moreover, 'neither specific nor general consultations were held' with the NATO allies in the eleven days prior to Reykjavik.³³⁾

The Gorbachev leadership, on the other hand, even before it received Reagan's consent to come to Reykjavik, had carried out 'extensive preparatory work', with the participation of the Politburo, the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, plus some other departments, representatives of science, military experts, and specialists from various branches of industry. In addition, leaders of the socialist countries were consulted as well.³⁴⁾

Gorbachev and Kremlin's Washington watchers must have closely followed changing constituencies of the Reagan administration including the division among the president's aides over the course of arms control talks and of US relations with the USSR. They must have studied how not to be dragged into a new round of the arms race such as the SDI. The Kremlin leadership must have critically reviewed the measures previously taken including the deployment of SS-20s and the walkout from the Geneva negotiations towards the end of 1983.

Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik 'a whole package of major proposals' concerning strategic arms, medium-range missiles, the ABM Treaty and nuclear testing. Gorbachev emphasised to Reagan that these were 'a definite package of measures' and should be considered as such.³⁵⁾

On INFs, the Soviet proposal was to go back to the earlier American proposal on 'the total elimination' of US and Soviet INFs in Europe. The USSR

now completely left aside the British and French nuclear potentials and proposed tentative 'freeze' on INFs in Asia for further talks. The US side, however, was 'not willing' to remove their missiles from Europe, according to Gorbachev. The Americans asked the Soviets to accept their 'interim option'. Gorbachev did not fail to call Reagan's attention to the fact that the US President seemed to be 'abandoning his brainchild, the "zero option", which at one time he was offering [the USSR] with such insistence, even though [the USSR] had now decided to take it up'.³⁶⁾

Then, Gorbachev made a compromising suggestion that if the US and Soviet missiles were eliminated the USSR would agree to have 100 warheads left on its INFs in Asia while the US would have as many on its on US territory.³⁷⁾

It was only at this point that Reagan for the first time authorised his aides to give a series of telephone calls to the European leaders whose governments had been committed to deployment of the Euromissiles, informing them of the US intention to agree with the USSR on the elimination of these missiles.³⁸⁾

Eventually, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed on this interim solution to INFs. Furthermore, they once agreed even on the 'elimination of all strategic offensive weapons'.³⁹⁾ In the light of Reagan's rhetoric and in line with his own 15 January proposal, Gorbachev seems to have tried to find out the extent of leeway allowed to the US President. Nonetheless, differences of opinion on the SDI divided them.

Post-Reykjavik Initiatives

Immediately after Reykjavik, Reagan found his presidency seriously weakened as a result of the Democratic control of Senate in mid-term elections early in November 1986. Worse still, Speaker of Iran's Parliament Rafsanjani on 4 November revealed that former US National Security Adviser McFarlane had visited Iran in May for negotiations on arms sales and release of US hostages in Lebanon. This was followed by another revelation on 19 November by Attorney General Meese that some money paid by Iran for US arms had been diverted to Nicaragua's Contra group, a covert operation as part of the 'Reagan Doctrine' to support anti-Communist counter-revolutionary groups in the Third World. The Iran-Contra scandal began to cast dark shadows over the conduct of the Reagan administration.

The Gorbachev leadership should have seriously examined the entire negotiating record in Reykjavik, studying steps to be taken to get out of the post-Reykjavik impasse. The new difficulties Reagan began to face might have been

one important factor to be reckoned with, despite denials by the Soviet side.⁴⁰⁾ With eyes on the urgency of a host of domestic and foreign policy agenda, the Gorbachev leadership seems to have adopted new flexibility in negotiating stance.

In a statement released on 28 February 1987, Gorbachev suggested that the problem of INFs in Europe be 'singled out' from the package of issues, and that a 'separate agreement' on it be concluded 'without delay'. Talks on other theatre missiles could begin immediately. The Soviet General Secretary reminded that there was a 'ready accord' for such a step as was 'agreed in Reykjavik'. Upon the signing of such an accord, the USSR would withdraw its long-range theatre missiles from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, Gorbachev declared. He pointed to an opportunity to 'free [the] common European home' from a considerable portion of the nuclear weapons within the shortest possible time, and called on the US not to miss '[t]he historic chance'⁴¹⁾.

Meanwhile, President Reagan was reaching a new height of his difficulties at home when a Special Review Board (the Tower Commission) he had appointed reported to him on 26 February 1987: having examined the proper role of the US National Security Council, the board found that the so-called Iran initiative 'ran directly counter to the Administration's own policies' on terrorism, the Iran-Iraq war and military support to Iran, and that congress was 'never notified'.⁴²⁾ And Reagan himself had to admit that the initiative was 'a mistake'.⁴³⁾

In Geneva there was every reason now, so it appeared, to believe that the 'zero' option would actually be agreed upon for Europe. For NATO leaders to abandon the whole idea at this point might risk making themselves look like hypocrite, and so they brought up problems to which solutions should be found prior to reaching an agreement. The problems included: shorter-range missiles, missiles in Asia and verification.⁴⁴⁾

Then, on 15 April 1987 at a meeting in Moscow with US Secretary of State Shultz, Gorbachev surprised the West by proposing that the shorter-range systems should also be reduced to 'zero'.⁴⁵⁾

Now it was the turn of NATO foreign ministers to reply. In a communique issued after their meeting in Reykjavik on 11–12 June, the NATO ministers called on the USSR to 'drop its demand' to retain part of its SS-20s in Asia and reiterated their wish 'to see all long-range land-based missiles eliminated'. They also came out with 'the global and effectively verifiable elimination' of all US and Soviet land-based shorter-range missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000

kilometers 'as an integral part of an INF agreement'.⁴⁶⁾

The Kremlin leadership apparently saw the wisdom of applying the new thinking to its relations with the Asian countries too. In an interview given to Burhanuddin Mohammed Dian of the *Merdeka*, an Indonesian press on 21 July 1987, Gorbachev for the first time announced the USSR's preparedness to 'agree to eliminate all of its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country as well'. This was an effort on the part of the USSR to 'accommodate the Asian countries and take into account their concerns', he said. Proceeding from the concept of 'global double zero', the USSR 'does not link this initiative in the case with the US nuclear presence in Korea, the Philippines, on Diego Garcia', Gorbachev declared.⁴⁷⁾ He seemed to have omitted the name of Japan perhaps inadvertently.

After Gorbachev's acceptance of 'global double zero', four problems remained: the Pershing IAs, actual destruction rather than conversion of the missiles, the pace of destruction, and equal rights in verification inspections.

After taking pains over coordination within the Federal Republic and over negotiations with Washington, Chancellor Kohl on 26 August 1987 announced regarding the FRG's missile systems Pershing IAs (whose warheads are under US lock and key) that 'with the definitive elimination of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles', the Pershing IAs would 'not be modernized, but scaled down'.⁴⁸⁾

Both sides still had to carry on tough talks to work out all the details of complicated questions. Nonetheless, in a joint statement issued on 18 September 1987 in Washington, US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced an 'agreement in principle to conclude a treaty'.⁴⁹⁾

3. The Irony of a 'Killer' Proposal being Accepted

How did President Reagan come up with his 'zero' option? The proposal was a product of bureaucratic infighting between the State Department and the Pentagon's civilian officials which reflected differences of strategy and tactics in dealing with the USSR. The latter finally won the President over its stand against the former's 'zero plus' negotiating stance. The Pentagon civilians' 'zero' option was premised on no deals other than 'zero'.⁵⁰⁾

In a November 1981 letter to Brezhnev, Reagan laid down a four-point proposal on INFs, strategic weapons, reduction of the conventional forces in Europe, and reduction of the risk of a surprise attack and the prevention of war, in which he placed utmost emphasis on INFs. The US was prepared 'to cancel

its deployment' of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles on the condition that the USSR 'dismantle' its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, Reagan said.⁵¹⁾

But the 'zero' option itself had been worked out as a 'killer' proposal designed either to prevent the other side from accepting it or to give them enormous disadvantage should they accept it. As Reagan unveiled the 'zero' proposal wrapped in his rhetoric, it might have been intended to be 'propaganda tricks' in anticipation of Soviet refusal, in the observation of a former US official.⁵²⁾ Testifying to this were not only the Soviet position at the time but also several 'intermediate' solutions later proposed by the Reagan administration. Reagan himself should have anticipated immediate Soviet refusal since his 'zero' option was proposed shortly after he announced his programme of strategic modernisation in October 1981 which would naturally have heightened Soviet vigilance.

In a rebuttal to the Reagan's 'zero' option, the USSR said that it would mean 'unilateral disarmament' for the Soviet Union because it said 'nothing' about US forward-based nuclear weapons and disregarded the British and French nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.⁵³⁾

Both the US and the USSR pursued various 'intermediate' solutions. Among others there was a secret unofficial agreement tentatively reached between US negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart Yuri Kvitsinsky in July 1982 during their 'walk in the woods' down the Jura Mountains in Switzerland. This formula permitted both the US and the USSR to retain 75 launchers for the US in Europe and for the USSR in its European region, in addition to 90 launchers permitted for the USSR in its Asian region. In March 1983, Reagan put forward another proposal for the US and the USSR to retain 40–450 INF warheads. In September the same year, the US revised its proposal to give up its right to deploy the same number of INFs in Europe in proportion to the Soviet deployment while withholding the right to deploy in other regions.⁵⁴⁾

The Implications of Reagan's Decision

Both the 'zero' and various 'intermediate' options resulted from long persisted disarray on arms control among Reagan's advisers. There were 'squeeze' and 'deal' strategists competing against each other. While the two factions were roughly in agreement in the assessment that changes were taking place in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favour of the US, they came forward with different conclusions and policy options. The 'squeezers' held that the US should not compromise with the USSR in any area of the three-package negotiations in Geneva, making only minor adjustments so long as such were deemed

necessary in relation to the domestic and alliance politics. The trump card held by the 'squeezers' was SDI, which was by no means a bargaining chip but the means by which to compel the USSR to compete and drain it of its resources while the US was still superior to it in related technologies. By contrast, the 'dealers' took the position that the US should take a certain initiative in trying to find a way out of the arms control impasse, because a new round of the arms race might incur unbearable burden upon the US as well and might impose an immeasurable risk upon it for an indefinite period. They thought that the USSR's fear of the new arms race would provide an opportunity for it to consider some basic deals in arms control.⁵⁵⁾

The SDI has proved to be most controversial in US-USSR negotiations. For the SDI proponents to be able to play their trump card, however, they would have to jump over difficult hurdles, technological and politico-institutional. In its development stage, SDI would need to be tested. To do that, the Reagan administration faced one of the two choices: either to withdraw from the ABM Treaty which prohibits such tests or to revise and enlarge the traditional interpretation of the treaty to allow the necessary testing. The administration moved to argue for the latter case, contrary to the understanding between the Nixon administration and the Senate that gave its consent to ratify the treaty. SDI is yet to be proved to be successful or not, and even if it could be deployed partially it would be almost close to the next century. Hence, SDI is still a hypothetical being as a weapons system but is sowing the seeds that could grow into a new round of the arms race.

Meanwhile, many of the President's closest aides left the administration. Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane resigned and later was found involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Richard Perle, Secretary of Defence Weinberger, and Deputy Secretary of Defence Fred Iklé, all left the administration in 1987. These moves reflected that there had been reviews and adjustments of policy with regard to the USSR in general and arms control in particular.

In military and strategic terms, the INF Treaty would not affect the existing US strategic forces; they would be kept intact and continued to be modernised with the doctrine of their employment updated accordingly.

In addition, the number of missiles and launchers the US has to scrap is far smaller than that the USSR has to eliminate—less than half in missiles and less than one third in launchers.

In overall political terms, the 'zero' option was Reagan's own proposal

while the deployment of the new Euromissiles was simply implementation of the decision taken by the previous administration. President Reagan would go down in history as the US president who concluded with the USSR a treaty for the first time eliminating the entire class of nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the two countries. He could also claim that this was achieved by the US firmness under his presidency on the strength of the arms build-up he had carried out.

As noted earlier, however, the INF issues involved contradictory interests between the US and its European allies. In November 1981 Reagan said that the missiles to be deployed in the five European countries would provide a 'vital link' between conventional and shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe and inter-continental forces in the US.⁵⁶⁾

The 'zero' solution, however, would 'decouple' or at least weaken this 'vital link', the Europeans might feel, in exchange for the scrapping of Soviet SS-20s. Because the loss of the Euromissile in the NATO's strategy of 'flexible response' would mean that the assumed use of battlefield and tactical nuclear weapons would lack the next rung of escalation ladder, a condition existed before the INF deployment. Then, whether such a use might or might not escalate straight to the employment of the central strategic systems would remain even more obscure.

In terms of the alliance politics, therefore, the US would try to reassure its European allies of the continued US commitment to their defence by means other than the INFs, by attempting to rectify inconsistencies in the NATO's proclaimed strategy.

In all likelihood, however, the US nuclear strategy, with the central strategic systems at the top of its pyramid, would be kept under the even firmer single integrated command of the US president, irrespective of whatever measures NATO may be taking in an attempt to rectify inconsistencies in its strategy of 'flexible response'.

The fear of decoupling still persists in Europe. It is part of the wider theme of recurrent trans-atlantic debates over the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella so long as it is held over Europe.⁵⁷⁾

The Implications of Gorbachev's Initiatives

What were the reasons for the USSR to have accepted elimination of missile systems much larger in number than the US even by reversing its earlier rationales for deployment? The military merit for the USSR of the INF Treaty is observed to be in the eradication of the threat posed by the Pershing IIs. As a

matter of fact, Yuri Kvitsinsky once agreed with Paul Nitze during their July 1982 'walk in the woods' to 'reduce' part of the SS-20s in exchange for non-deployment of the Pershing IIs.⁵⁸⁾ The USSR is said to have chosen a minimum gain in the form of the INF Treaty by setting aside, for the time being, solutions to problems of the SDI and the ABM Treaty because the Pershing II is far superior to the SS-20 and is an extremely accurate missile capable of striking important targets in the Soviet homeland within several minutes after launch.⁵⁹⁾

It is true that the Pershing II posed a formidable military threat to the USSR and its elimination would therefore mean a substantial military gain. It was not the Pershing II alone that concerned the USSR, however. The USSR had the means available to retaliate against Pershing II strikes if it had to.

To put it more accurately, there seems to have been a greater political aim in the Soviet decision to conclude the INF Treaty, when the matter is seen in light of the facts that the treaty's 'global double zero' solution being contradictory to the USSR's earlier position, that it tried to reach an accord in the shortest possible time, that it conceded to the elimination of the larger number of missile systems, and that it agreed on the very intrusive on-site inspection for which there had been no precedent.

Gorbachev writes that a success in the solution to the INF issue would have 'a great significance and important impact on the whole processes of disarmament'.⁶⁰⁾ It seems that the Soviet leadership sought for an INF treaty so that it might give 'a powerful impetus' to the conclusion of a second treaty on the reductions in strategic nuclear systems and, if at all possible, to a tentative accord on the question of SDI and the ABM Treaty. The Soviet leadership might have also assumed that improved relations with the US that would ensue in the wake of an INF treaty would suit its conduct of new foreign and security policy including an early ending of the war in Afghanistan which would certainly involve US cooperation.

Gorbachev's new thinking has already exerted a great impact on US-USSR relations. Nonetheless, such concepts as 'common security' and 'reasonable sufficiency' are still in the process of development, and so are their application to the facts of life in international relations. The Soviet decision on the 'global zero', for instance, came for the first time as late as in July 1987 and it should have been made with the wider perspectives of the INF issue for improving USSR's relations with the Asian countries concerned.

With regard to the concept of 'reasonable sufficiency', questions remain. What should be regarded as 'reasonable'? What are the criteria of 'sufficiency'?

and who make them? These points are still to be developed theoretically, and they should be applied to the Soviet scene first as a convincing example, albeit partially, if the concept is to be accepted with established common criteria in the international society.⁶¹⁾

Moreover, 'reasonable sufficiency' itself is premised on the possession of a certain quantity of nuclear arms.⁶²⁾ The Gorbachev leadership is required to answer to another question of how the concept could be reconciled with the USSR's 'concrete programme aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world' by 1999.

Epilogue

The USSR was lacking political prudence when it began to deploy the SS-20s without properly assessing probable reaction by the other side. So were the US and NATO when they reacted to it first by a decision on the counter-deployment of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs and then by its implementation.

The missiles deployed soon turned out a liability for all parties concerned. For the USSR the Pershing IIs posed a formidable threat from the heart of Europe capable of striking targets within the Soviet homeland. For the NATO's European countries the existence of the new US missiles in their countries merely added to the number of targets in their own countries to invite strikes there. And for the US the Euromissiles proved to be increasingly cumbersome since the NATO's strategy of 'flexible response' is premised on going up the escalation ladder, including the Euromissile rung, reaching the ultimate employment of US strategic systems, a scenario which has been read more and more dubiously. The credibility of US nuclear deterrence has been on the wane. The existence of the Euromissiles, be they American or Soviet, threatened to reactivate the dormant volcanoes of anti-nuclear movements.

Gradually, both the US and the USSR were made to realise that their liability, the INF issue, could be converted into an asset for both. They once appeared to be going beyond the INFs on to the strategic reductions.

But conditions for such a treaty were much more complicated as many of them would cut across the most vital interests of the two sides. So they were not yet prepared to go that far by the time President Reagan's term of office had expired.

So far, therefore, the INF Treaty remains a rare case made possible in the context of an exceptional situation in which the two sides, albeit from differing motives and considerations, found it advisable to converge on the conclusion of

a specific treaty.

Nonetheless, the general factors are still there, however varying in appearance. The anti-nuclear movements can never fail to exist so long as the threats are there, though these movements are much calmed down in recent years than their heydays during the early 1980s. The division among the ruling elite in Western Europe and the US over the question of nuclear weapons and their credibility as the deterrent is persisting with ever shifting line-ups. The domestic constituency supporting the US administration is about to change while the Soviet leadership is going ahead with its domestic restructuring and foreign policy initiatives. The intra- and inter- alliance relations will have to undergo relevant changes. And both the US and the USSR will have to keep on readjusting their relations.

Prospects for future agreements would depend largely on the vision and leadership of the new US president as well as on the political character of his constituency. For in the US there have been backlashes against the INF Treaty and much stronger warnings against a treaty on the reductions in strategic offensive systems, the bulwark of the US sanctuary.⁶³⁾ The new US president would need to form a consensus not only in the US but also among its European allies should he find it advisable to enter any treaty with the USSR.

The Gorbachev leadership would also be required to give full play to its new thinking by taking fresh initiatives in all fields of foreign and security policies if continued successes are to be achieved in disarmament. Such initiatives would particularly be required in a new round of conventional arms talks, in breaking through the cold war setup in Asia, combined with persuasive proposals for actually materialising its programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

Notes

- 1) Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems, Protocol Regarding Inspections, and Corrigendum [of the Memorandum of Understanding and the Protocol Regarding Inspection], in *US Department of State Bulletin*. Vol. 88, No. 2131 (February 1988), pp. 24–30, 31–63, 64–69, 70–77, and 23. respectively.

- 2) The figures of the missile systems to be eliminated are based on the above Memorandum of Understanding with its Corrigendum as well as on the corrections made in: John M. Joyce, Minister-Counselor, US Embassy, Moscow, to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. MFA/130/88, 21 May 1988, in *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (June 1988), p. 403. D. 54.
- 3) Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems (note 1).
In a congressional testimony late in January 1988, US Secretary of Defense Carlucci said it was 'in [US] interest' to be able to retain the nuclear warheads and this was taken care of in the treaty 'at [US] behest'.
One reason for the retention of the warheads is observed to be a shortage of 'special nuclear material' projected for the 1990s because of the reduced production capacity due in part to environmental and safety concerns about the military production reactors. Jeffrey Smith, 'U.S. Sought Recycling Of Warheads in INF Pact', *International Herald Tribune*, 28 January 1988, p. 1.
- 4) Quoted in Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces* [henceforth cited as: Congressional Research Service, *The Modernization of NATO's LRTNF*], Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 31 December 1981), p. 16. Iklé's statement had not been authorised by the Department of State.
- 5) Helmut Schmidt, 'The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture', 28 October 1977, *Survival*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (January/February 1978), pp. 3–4.
- 6) The Soviet considerations are based on the reasoning by Raymond L. Garthoff, 'The Soviet SS-20 Decision', *Survival*, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (May/June 1983), p. 112.
- 7) TNF, for 'theatre nuclear forces', was referred to the nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe in support of NATO. TNF tended to replace an earlier term, TNW, for 'theatre nuclear weapons'. LRTNF, for 'long-range theatre nuclear forces', referred to also as 'Euro-strategic' or 'grey-area' weapons or more popularly as 'Euromissiles' because of their capability to strike targets in the USSR. Since 1981, LRTNF has been termed INF, for 'intermediate-range nuclear forces'. The Soviet side continued to use 'medium-range missiles' in reference to the Western term of 'INF'.
- 8) Congressional Research Service, *The Modernization of NATO's LRTNF*, pp. 19–20; Paul Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 157, 162.
- 9) Fred Kaplan, 'Warring Over New Missiles For NATO', *New York Times Magazine*, 9 December 1979, pp. 55, 57.

- 10) Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, 'Conceding Defeat in Europe', *Washington Post*, 4 August 1977, p. A19.
- 11) David S. Yost and Thomas G. Glad, 'West German Party Politics and Theater Nuclear Modernization Since 1977', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1982), pp. 525–60, gives a detailed account of the event.
- 12) Raymond L. Garthoff, 'The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 98, No. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 203–04.
- 13) Brezhnev's Speech in Berlin, 6 October 1979, quoted in Congressional Research Service, *The Modernization of NATO's LRTNF*, p. 51.
- 14) *Pravda* editorial based on an interview with Brezhnev, 17 November 1979, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 52.
- 15) Brezhnev's Speech in Berlin, 6 October 1979, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 51.
- 16) *Ibid.*
- 17) Communique issued at a Special Meeting of the NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979, printed in *ibid.*, pp. 65–66.
- 18) Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, a Cornelia & Michael Bessie Book, 1987), pp. 201–04, 206–07. The concept of 'reasonable adequacy' was first suggested in his speech in Paris in October 1985 and was presented in the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986.
- 19) Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, pp. 247, 248.
- 20) President Reagan, Address to Western Europe, 23 February 1988, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 24, No. 8 (29 February 1988), p. 243.
- 21) Paul H. Nitze, 'INF Negotiations and European Security', address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 28 September 1987, *US Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 87, No. 2129 (December 1987), p. 42.
- 22) The figurative phrase, 'gifts from heaven', is of Ben ter Veer's, 'New Peace Movement in Western Europe', *International Peace Research Newsletter*, Vol. XXI, No. 3 (1983), p. 10. Description of the peace movements is based on the author's essay, 'A Threat of Nuclear War and People's Perception—Resurgent Factors of the New Peace Movements in Western Europe' (published in Japanese), Nihon Heiwa Gakkai (Peace Studies Association of Japan), *Heiwa Kenkyu (Peace Studies)*, Vol. 9 (November 1984), pp. 28–43.
- 23) These are dealt with in the author's essay, 'A Recurring Delusion: Views on Security of the Atlantic Alliance Elite' (published in Japanese), Nagasaki Heiwa Bunka Ken-

- kyu Sho (Nagasaki Institute for Peace Culture), *Heiwa Bunka Kenkyu (Studies of Peace Culture)*, Vol. 8 (1985), pp. 53–101. The division of the elite may be found, for example, in International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Defence and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security*, Part I, II and III, Adelphi Papers, Nos. 182, 183 and 184 (London: IISS, 1983).
- 24) Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on the Announcement of the United States Strategic Weapons Program, 2 October 1981, in Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* [henceforth cited as: *PPPUS*]: *Ronald Reagan 1981* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1982), pp. 878–79; US Secretary of Defense Weinberger's Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Reagan Administration's Strategic Programme, *Survival*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (January/February 1982), pp. 29–31.
 - 25) Joint US-USSR Statement in Geneva, 21 November 1985, in *Survival*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (March/April 1986), p. 155.
 - 26) Excerpts of Gorbachev Speech to the French Parliament, 3 October 1985, in *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 4, No. 10 (October 1985), p. 403. D. 43.
 - 27) Statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, 15 January 1986, in Mikhail Gorbachev, *For a Nuclear-Free World* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987), pp. 7–22.
 - 28) Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, *The Reykjavik Process: Preparation For And Conduct of the Iceland Summit And Its Implications For Arms Control Policy* [henceforth cited as: Defense Policy Panel, *The Reykjavik Process*] (Washington, DC: USGPO, January 1987), pp. 2–3.
 - 29) *Ibid.*, p. 3 and footnote 3 on p. 21.
 - 30) *Ibid.*, p. 4 and footnote 5 on p. 22.
 - 31) Mikhail Gorbachev, *For a Nuclear-Free World*, pp. 189–90.
 - 32) Defense Policy Panel, *The Reykjavik Process*, p. 6.
 - 33) *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 - 34) Speech by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on Soviet Television, 14 October 1986, in Mikhail Gorbachev, *For a Nuclear-Free World*, p. 212.
 - 35) *Ibid.*, p. 221.
 - 36) *Ibid.*, pp. 191–92.
 - 37) *Ibid.*, p. 192.
 - 38) Defense Policy Panel, *The Reykjavik Process*, p. 10.
 - 39) The news of this agreement struck West European leaders with dismay. As a result, statements by Reagan administration officials on what was agreed on and what was

not were contradictory to each other. See Defense Policy Panel, *The Reykjavik Process*, footnote 8, pp. 22--23. Also see White House Press Release, 'Transcript: Press briefing following the President's meeting with the congressional leadership on his meetings with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland—by Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd, Senators Richard C. Lugar of Indiana and Sam Nunn of Georgia, and House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel', 14 October 1986.

In a 'Statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on Soviet Television' on 22 October 1986, Gorbachev corrected post-Reykjavik distortions: 'the President did, albeit without particular enthusiasm, consent to the elimination of all—I emphasize—not just certain individual ones, but all strategic offensive arms', in Mikhail Gorbachev, *For a Nuclear-Free World*, p. 240.

- 40) Soviet negotiator Victor Karpov is quoted to have said: 'Our policy does not depend on the political crisis experienced by the American government', Bill Keller, *New York Times*, 3 March 1987, in *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 1987), p. 403. B. 435.
- 41) General Secretary Gorbachev's Statement on INF, 28 February 1987, *Survival*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4 (July/August 1987), pp. 361–63.
- 42) Report of the President's Special Review Board (the Tower Commission), 26 February 1987 (excerpts), in *ibid.*, pp. 364–74.
- 43) Speech of President Ronald Reagan, 4 March 1987 (excerpts), in *ibid.*, pp. 374–76.
- 44) International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1987–1988* (London: IISS, 1988), p. 23.
- 45) *Ibid.*
- 46) NATO Foreign Ministers' Communique, 12 June 1987, in *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 6, No. 7 (July 1987), p. 403. B. 503.
- 47) *Ibid.*, p. 403. B. 502. There was an earlier hint dropped by Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Head of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party, who on 2 April 1987 said in an interview with West German journalists that the USSR had changed its position on INF, considering the 'interests of the Asian countries', in particular those of the People's Republic of China and Japan, 'who want the presence of that type of weapon on their continent to be radically reduced'. Werner Holzer and Pierre Simonitsch in the Federal Republic on 2 April 1987, cited by FBIS-SU 8.4.87, in *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (April 1987), p. 403. B. 459.

The fact that it took almost four months for the Gorbachev leadership to formally adopt the 'global' zero after the first hint was dropped indicates that there had been serious internal discussion and policy reviews on this point.

- 48) Chancellor Kohl's statement, 26 August 1987, in *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 6, No. 9 (September 1987), pp. 403. B. 535–36.
- 49) *Ibid.*, p. 403. B. 546.
- 50) The birth of the 'zero' option is elaborated in Strove Talbott, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Arms Control* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), Chapters 3–4.
- 51) Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, 18 November 1981, *PPPUS: Ronald Reagan 1981* (note 24 above), pp. 1065–66.
- 52) William G. Hyland, 'The United States and the USSR: Rebuilding Relations', in Arnold Horelick, ed., *U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 295.
- 53) Soviet Defence Ministry, *Whence the Threat to Peace*, January 1982, excerpted in *Survival*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (May/June 1982), pp. 136–37.
- 54) The abortive 'walk in the woods' formula is in *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1983), pp. 403. B. 33. 1–2. For later US proposals, see Statement by President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, 30 March 1983, in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament 1983* (Washington, DC: USGPO, February 1986), ACDA Publication 125, pp. 223–25, and *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 1983), pp. 403. B. 116–17; Address by President Reagan Before the U.N. General Assembly, 26 September 1983, in *Documents on Disarmament 1983*, pp. 805–11.
- 55) The characterisation of 'Squeeze' and 'Deal' strategists and their relations are based on Arnold L. Horelick and Edward L. Warner III, 'U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control: The Next Phase', in Arnold L. Horelick, ed., *U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase* (note 52 above), pp. 250–51.
- 56) Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, 18 November 1981, *PPPUS: Ronald Reagan 1981* (note 24 above), p. 1065.
- 57) An example of recent debates are reflected in: *Discriminate Deterrence*, Report of The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy (Co-Chairmen: Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter) (Washington, DC: USGPO, January 1988); Michael Howard, Karl Kaiser and François de Rose, 'Deterrence Policy: A European Response', *International Herald Tribune* [henceforth: *IHT*], 4 February 1988, p. 6; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry A. Kissinger, Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, 'Discriminate Deterrence Won't Leave Europe Dangling', *IHT*, 24 February 1988, p. 4.
- 58) *Arms Control Reporter*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1983), pp. 403. B. 33. 1–2.

- 59) John Steinbruner, 'Will the Reagan Administration Accept Its Own INF Proposal?' *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (April 1987), p. 5.
- 60) Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (note 18 above), pp. 248, 249.
- 61) 'Reasonable sufficiency' is defined also by the Soviet Defence Minister, General Dmitri Yazov as meaning precisely 'the magnitude of armed forces necessary to defend oneself against an attack from the outside'. It could be achieved by reducing East-West forces to such 'a level where neither of the sides, while insuring its defense, has the forces or means enabling it to mount offensive operations'. Yazov's article in *Pravda*, 27 July 1987, quoted in Don Oberdorfer, 'U.S. Sights Soviet Shift in Arms Policy', *IHT*, 1 December 1987, p. 1.

The process of the concept of 'reasonable sufficiency' being adopted in international practice is assumed to be 'long and difficult', however. What is recommended by some Soviet researchers therefore is 'the gradual creation of a political and military climate (primarily in Europe) in which neither side would stand in fear of surprise attack'. Towards this end they suggest 'the flexible combination of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures in the sphere of arms limitation'. Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, and Andrei Kortunov, 'Reasonable sufficiency—or how to break the vicious circle', *New Times*, No. 40. 87 (12 October 1987), pp. 13–15.

How will the concept be developed still further remains to be seen in light of the Soviet scene. At present Gorbachev is turning for new ideas of his foreign and security policy to non-military professionals in the Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee staff, and the Academy of Sciences who are in a kind of competition among themselves and with the traditional security policy bureaucrats. However, the Ministry of Defence will continue to be an essential actor in security policy option formulation and implementation. Stephen M. Meyer, 'The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security', *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 131–132.

- 62) For example, 'Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions', a semiofficial Soviet study circulated among foreigners in Moscow in 1987, concludes that about 600 mobile single-warhead ICBM on each side, a total of 1,200, would be sufficient to achieve strategic stability in the absence of anti-missile defence. Don Oberdorfer, 'U.S. Sights Soviet Shift in Arms Policy' (note 61). Although this would mean radical reductions by about ninety-five per cent in the roughly 25,000 warheads on the strategic triad on each side, the remaining five per cent could still do an immeasurable destruction.
- 63) A traditional 'national' security version of such backlashes is reflected in Brent Scowcroft, John Deutch and R. James Woolsey, 'The Real Danger Is in the Next Arms

Treaty', *IHT*, 5-6 December 1987, p. 4. An example of the more comprehensive version is *Discriminate Deterrence* (note 57 above).