Islamic Fundamentalism, Jihad, and Terrorism

Byung-Ock CHANG

Prof. of Iranian Dept., Hankuk University of Foreign Studies,
Imun-dong 270, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul 130-791, Korea

Abstract

This paper is on the relation between jihad and terrorism in the Islamic fundamentalism. Since September 11th, the nation's press, too, has made exclusive coverage of the attack and we have become more familiar with many relevant terms, one of which is Islamic fundamentalism. Radical Islamic fundamentalism is inherently militant in nature and poses a threat to the new world order that emphasizes democratic values, particularly after the establishment of the Afghan Taliban. Some Western observers, including policy makers, regard Islamic fundamentalism as a more dangerous ideology and political movement than communism after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups launched a fierce war against established authority through terrorist means such as kidnapping, assassination, and bombing. They not only attacked government officials and buildings, but also kidnapped and assassinated foreign travelers, journalists, and diplomats. Many Western politicians and scholars regard Islamic fundamentalism as a new global threat. The war between communism and the West has been replaced by a new war between the West and Islamic fundamentalists.

The concept of jihad has contemporary relevance as a defensive principle working for human freedom. Jihad can legitimately be employed for throwing off a foreign yoke-the principle of self-determination that modern international law endorses. We need to bear in mind that interpretations of terms vary according to nations. In this case, terrorism, from the viewpoint of minority ethnic groups or people from the Third World, is the fight for liberation and freedom. In the same vein, a terrorist is a patriot and hero. In Arab and Muslim countries, too, the struggle for liberation is not an act of terrorism but is jihad, holy war, and terrorists are regarded as champions of freedom. In many cases, terrorism is viewed more as an act of violence, not a political act, in that it targets innocent civilians and involves indiscriminate attacks. Moreover, even if the objectives of terrorism are justified, it is a criminal act since it does not abide by legal procedures.

How future events unfold, particularly the future course of the Islamic fundamentalism, jihad, and terrorism, greatly hinges on the U.S. administration's Middle East policy. I have one more suggestion: that the U.S. divert part of the huge amount earned by exporting military weapons to the Middle East region to raising living standards in those regions. This will put an end to the war against terrorism and thus bring everlasting peace around the world.

1. Introduction

One of the most discussed and important topics in Islam is the relation between jihad and terrorism. Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the United States, deemed by far the most-devastating incident inflicted on humankind, the Bush administration pointed to radical Islamist groups, namely, al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, and its supporters, the Afghan Taliban regime, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein as perpetrators of the attacks. Subsequently, President George W. Bush has made quick moves to wage an antiterrorism campaign dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom. Since September 11th, the nation's press, too, has made exclusive coverage of the attack and we have become more familiar with many relevant terms, one of which is Islamic fundamentalism.

Radical Islamic fundamentalism is inherently militant in nature and poses a threat to the new world order that emphasizes democratic values, particularly after the establishment of the Afghan Taliban. The six Islamic republics in Central Asia founded after the collapse of the Soviet Union are also likely to impact the new world order, in one way or another. Under these circumstances, it is imperative that we put Islamic fundamentalism in perspective. We need to look at what led them to declare jihad and become militant terrorists from the standpoint of both Muslims and non-Muslim. To do so, political, socioeconomic, historical, psychological, and theological implications must be taken into account.

2. Islamic Fundamentalism

Some Western observers, including policy makers, regard Islamic fundamentalism as a more dangerous ideology and political movement than communism after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The development of radical Islamic movements has been occurred in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War.

2.1. Islamic fundamentalism: origins

Although the term "fundamentalism" is now identified with Islam, it first appeared in the Christian world. Fundamentalism is in fact an Anglo-Saxon term. Christian (Protestant) fundamentalism which held that the Bible must be accepted and interpreted literally grew up in America at the beginning of the 1920s. Fundamentalism means "a Protestant movement emphasizing Christian life on the fundamentals and teachings of the Bible. "If we use this term for Muslims, the meaning of fundamentalism should be to call for strict observation of Islamic fundamentals and doctrines following the verses of the Qur'an. In this case, all Muslims who abide by Islamic fundamentals are called fundamentalists."

When people talk about Islamic fundamentalism, it is often equated with return to medieval backwardness and retrogression. Nowadays, it is looked upon as radicalism, extremism, terrorism, and incompatibility with Western democratic systems. Islamic fundamentalism means the religious and political movement that seeks a return to the golden age of the Prophet Muhammad and the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs on the basis of pure Islam. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalists as political activists endeavor to reconstruct the Muslim communities that are intoxicated by Western culture and neo-colonialism. Fundamentalists regard Western countries, especially America and Israel, as their main enemies. In their opinion, Western aggression, long-term colonialism, and Westernization resulted in the decline of the Muslim society and political corruption.

2.2. The doctrine of Islamic fundamentalism

The history of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism began in the 1920s. The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism was a very complicated social phenomenon. However, it was related to the expansion of imperialism and the colonization of Muslim society.

These historical antecedents continue to haunt the Muslim, and in particular the Arab, imagination. "Backwardness" with respect to the West is now called underdevelopment. Fundamentalism is resurfacing in all its forms (traditionalist in one part of the Afghan resistance, Islamist in the other, neo-fundamentalist in the Algerian FIS). During the second half of the nineteenth century, a current of thought within the framework of Islam endeavored to address the backwardness of the Muslim world. *Salafiyya*, the "return to the ancestors," was typified by three canonical authors, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1898), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Like all other fundamentalist reformist movements, it rejected common law (*adat, urf*), maraboutism (belief in the powers of intervention of certain individuals blessed with *baraka*, or divine charisma), and rapprochement with other religions (Roy 1996, 32).

In 1928, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In 1941, Mawlana Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) established the Islamic Society in India. These two pioneers of the contemporary Islamic movements shared many common political and religious ideas, although they lived in two separate countries (Zhang 1995, 662). First, the weakness and subservience of Muslim societies is due to the faithlessness of Muslims who strayed from God's divinely-revealed path and instead followed the secular, materialistic ideologies and value of the West or of the East-capitalism and Marxism. Second, restoration of Muslim pride, power, and rule (the past glory of Islamic empires and civilization) requires a return to Islam, the re-implementation of God's law and guidance for state and society. Third, science and technology must be harnessed and used within an Islamically-oriented and guided context in order to avoid the Westernization and secularization of Muslim society.

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), one of the main leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during this period, is the architect of militant and radical Islam. There are no obvious differences in religious and political ideology between Qutb and al-Banna, but they presented a sharp contrast to the established system in their methods of struggle. Qutb not only denied the legitimacy of the existing social and political order, but went so far as to suspect existent Islamic culture and tradition. As a result, organizing a vanguard and participating in holy war were every Muslim's sacred duty. Muslim society was facing more and more difficulties and challenges. Nationalism and other political ideologies in the Muslim world have experienced ups and downs since the 1960s (Zhang, 1995, 664).

First, most Muslim states failed to find a better way to enact revival and development of their economy and culture after the initial triumph of establishing independent states. Furthermore, state and society were involved in terrible crisis caused by blind Westernization and industrialization. Political corruption and autocracy, social backwardness and the deepening economic gap between the poor and the rich destroyed people's dream of Islamic resurgence. As a good example, the Islamic Revolution in 1979 brought hope to the Iranian people. Yet, more than ten years later, the victory has not performed any miracle for the Iranian economy and society. Western culture further threatened Islamic tradition under the urge of secular interests.

Second, Muslim states had to choose their own camps (the West or East) in the Cold War world order. For Islamic fundamentalists, the rulers of Muslim states actually became the agents of Western or Eastern interests and the victims of conflicts between the West and the East.

Third, Western support for Israel is one of the main reasons behind the failure and humiliation of Arab countries, despite the Arab leaders' subservience to the West. Therefore, the existing rulers of Muslim states now can neither safeguard Muslim interests nor revive the past glory of Islam. For Islamic fundamentalists, there is no choice but to overthrow the established system.

2.3. The causes of Islamic fundamentalism

a) Economic causes

The gap between rich and poor countries is one main cause of Islamic fundamentalism. According to the UN Human Development Report (1992), the income distribution in the world deteriorated, especially after 1980. The poorest 20% obtained 2.3 % of the world revenue in 1960, 1.7% in 1980 and 1.4% in 1990. The richest 20%, however, obtained 70.2% in 1960, 76.3% in 1980 and 82.7% in 1990. In other words, the richest were 30 times better off than the poorest in 1960, 45 times in 1980, and 59 times in 1990.

Domestically, there is an even deeper rift separating the rich classes from the poor in the Islamic countries. The richest 20% of the population in those countries has about 70-80% of the GNP, while the poorest 20% share about 5%. What is more important is the fact that the deterioration has continued to increased after 1980 (Kurkcuglu, 1996).

The Islamic fundamentalists certainly did not miss the chance to exploit the discontent of the masses, who in increasing numbers stuck fast to their religion. Islam, with its emphasis on equality and social justice, becomes a center of attraction for many people who have lost every hope in life.

b) Political cause

The anti-imperialist banner was in turn raised after World War I by movements that were more nationalistic than religious, even though the tradition of the fundamentalist jihad continues to our day (the Afghan Mujaheddin). The Arab defeat by Israel in the 1967 War was a turning-point for Islamic fundamentalism. The defeat was interpreted by Islamic activists as the failure of nationalist "secular" regimes in the Middle East. Secular nationalist ideologies had not been able to be a panacea to the people in Islamic countries. The loss of the prestige of Egyptian president Gamal Abd el-Nasser in particular-as the leader of Arab nationalism who had taken strict measures against the Muslim Brothers in Egypt-came as a moral boost to the Islamic fundamentalists.

After the Arab defeat in the 1967 War, another turning-point in Islamic fundamentalism was the Iranian Revolution in 1979 which brought to power an Islamic regime. The Islamic Revolution gave great encouragement to fundamentalists in the region. Because the Islamic regime in Iran could challenge America by means of the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran from November 4, 1979 until January 21, 1981, many fundamentalists in the Arab world thought they might just as well raise their heads against the West while Tehran was at loggerheads with America, otherwise known as "the Great Satan" in the new regime's terminology (Kurkcuglu, 1996).

When Afghanistan came under the invasion of the Soviet Union in December 1979, Khomeini branded it "the Lesser Devil." Under the banner of Islam, the Afghan Mujaheddin received support mainly from America, as well as from the Muslim bloc. Many Islamic fundamentalists from different Middle Eastern states who had joined the fight in Afghanistan returned to their homes as experienced "guerilla leaders." This was an additional reason behind the increase of fundamentalist terror, especially in the Middle East.

The last impetus behind the increase of fundamentalist terror in the Middle East is the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. The defeat of Iraq was deeply tormenting to all Arabs. It was a defeat of the Arab spirit akin to the defeats in Palestine in 1948 and in the 1967 war with Israel. Now, Islamists have come to the fore and staked out a role in the movement to regain Arab Muslim independence and Islamic dignity. So, in a way, today's Islamic fundamentalism is a continuation of the post-colonial, anti-Western nationalist struggle, couched in the language and garments of radical Islam. It is "the reincarnation of the nationalist movement with...an Islamic face." Thus, it has come about that the United States and its Western allies defeated Arab radicalism in the Gulf War only to give new stimulus to an Islamic fundamentalism which seeks to rid the Middle East of foreign hegemony-currently on view as the surrender to a Pax Americana that has been imposed on the region. Therefore, groups espousing the new Islamic rhetoric have become increasingly more seductive and influential in the post-Gulf War period (Faksh, 1994, 186-7).

The "anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism" of the Islamic fundamentalists gained many new supporters in such an atmosphere. Muslims in the Middle East became sacrificed to the super power rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR. The U.S. was more successful. The real winner, however, was Islamic fundamentalists. The Soviet failure to control Afghanistan war showed fundamentalists in the Middle East that they could challenge the other super-power, America, as well. Ironically, the Mujaheddin Islamic fundamentalists now pose a threat to America itself.

2.4. The threat of Islamic fundamentalism

The end of the Gulf War lashed the Muslim states in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Islamic fundamentalism faced some challenges and new opportunities to develop (Zhang 1995, 664). Because most Arab states supported the Western military action during the Gulf War, Islamic fundamentalists believe that Arab rulers have been reduced to the status of agents and accomplices of the West. There is no room for compromise in their struggle with them. Arab-Israeli peace shocked the Islamic fundamentalists greatly. The elimination of Israel had been one of the most inspiring political slogans of the fundamentalists.

Influenced by the complicated situation, there have been some changes in Islamic fundamentalism, especially in the diversification of its connotations and in challenges to authority. The first change is moderate Islamic fundamentalism. The second is legal Islamic fundamentalism. The third is radical Islamic fundamentalism.

Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups launched a fierce war against established authority through terrorist means such as kidnapping, assassination, and bombing. They not only attacked government officials and buildings, but also kidnapped and assassinated foreign travelers, journalists, and diplomats. In addition, they choose schools, hospitals, and other social infrastructures as targets of terrorist action. Moreover, they issued an ultimatum to some foreign countries. They sought to extend the battle field, forcing the West to stop supporting secular Muslim authorities, cutting off foreign financial aid, and preventing foreign investment. For the rulers of Muslim and Western states, Islamic fundamentalism is a threat because it rejects the legitimacy of the regime and Western cultures. The destructive activities of the radical Islamic movement puzzle the Middle Eastern states.

Many Western politicians and scholars regard Islamic fundamentalism as a new global threat. The war between communism and the West has been replaced by a new war between the West and Islamic fundamentalists.

Islamic expansion in history still is the nightmare of the Western mind; the clash goes back to the

Middle Ages. In history, the rise and rapid expansion of Islam proved to be a double threat to the West, both religiously and politically; the military forays into Europe shocked Christendom. A civilization can threaten another civilization through ethnocentrism and the culture-centralism of forcing one culture on another. However, a rising and advanced civilization is likely to threaten a declining one. Therefore, the Islamic threat is very limited to other civilizations. In general, Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Middle East are scattered. They have neither unified organization, nor a common program. They are sometimes in a state of mutual conflict and accusations (Zhang, 1995, 666).

The Islamic threat is very much exaggerated. On the one hand, most rulers in the Middle Eastern states have been trying to utilize the Islamic threat to ask for financial and military aid from the West, as well as to control power and society. On the other hand, some political confrontationalists and policy makers in the West, especially America, want to find a new enemy to replace the former Soviet Union and communism and to provide the basis for their own domestic and diplomatic policies.

3. Jihad and Terrorism

3.1. The conception of Jihad in the Qur'an

This section I cite the paper which has been written by Professor Shintaro Yoshimura of Hiroshima University is on Jihad in the Qur'an. In considering the relation between Islam and warfare, a concept that is easily called to mind is "jihad", that is, the holy war. The concept of Jihad can be said to reflect the nature of war among tribal groups before the advent of Islam in the region. And concerning this sort of jihad, the Qur'an says, for example:

"And fight in the way of God with those who fight you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors." (Surah 2.190)
"Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged...surely God is able to help them...who were expelled from their habitations without right, except that they say 'Our Lord is God'." (Surah 22.40)

In addition to the above revelations given soon after the Muslim migration (Hijra) from Mecca to Medina in 622, there are many revelations related to jihad in the Qur'an. These stipulate exemptions from military obligation, measures relating to prisoners of war, truces with enemies, treatment of those killed on the battlefield as martyrs (shahid), the promises of rewards in heaven, and so forth. Characteristically; the Qur'an recommends generosity towards the enemy and mentions the defensive nature of war against heathendom (Yoshimura, 2003, 4).

Of course, the defensive element is not emphasized in every verse of the Qur'an. For example, Surah 9.5 says, "Then, when the sacred months are drawn away, slay th idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent of their sins, worship and willingly give alms, then let them go away."

In the era of the Rightly Guided Caliph governing the Islamic community after the prophet Muhammad passed away, Islam entered the period of Great Conquest, during which it spread rapidly from the Arabian Peninsula to the world beyond. The characteristic of the wars during this period can certainly be said to be not defensive but rather expansionist jihad, which was driven by religious passion. And they stirred up the morale of Muslim soldiers through the distribution of the spoils of war.

Nevertheless, because of the stipulations regarding the above-mentioned defensive nature of jihad and the later diversification of its meaning, it is incorrect to regard Islam as a militant religion.

3.2. Internationalism and Jihad in Islamic Law

A great deal of misunderstanding regarding the attitude of Islamic law to international relationships has been created through confusion regarding the Islamic concept of the Jihad, or holy war. Some explanation of this concept is therefore necessary.

The term Dar-al-Islam was used to describe Islamic countries and non-Islamic territories held under Islamic sovereignty. The rest of the world fell within the Dar-al-Harb. The pax Romana and the pax Britannica were terms expressive of the prevalence of a certain legal system and its protection over vast areas of the globe, in the same way as the pax Islamica prevailed over the territories falling within the Dar-al-Islam.

In his book *War and Peace in Islam*, Dr. Majid Khuduri writes:
Jihad in Islam is a means by which the Dar al-Harb could be transformed into the Dar al-Islam. The time in which this ideal is realized is when the mission of Jihad is thoroughly accomplished, and there would exist no Dar-al-Harb. Jihad would then be waged against domestic enemies in the civil arena and would eventually be finished. In the theory of Islamic legislation, it must be accepted that "war" has not been the ultimate goal in itself. It has been known as the last attempt to secure peace and freedom" (Ilhami, 1991, 49).

What then was the attitude of the Dar al-Islam to the Dar al-Harb? Much has been written on this, with the strong tendency to suggest that attitudes prevalent in the early days of Islam are the attitudes that prevail even today.

It is clear that the proselytizing spirit of the early days of Islam led to an attitude of war towards the Dar al-Harb, for the ultimate objective was an Islamic world order.

In the first place, Islamic laws of war required respect for the rights of non-Muslims during the course of hostilities. This applied to both combatants and civilians. Second, during periods of peace or truce, which were both recognized in law, recognition was accorded to the authorities of the non-Muslim state. Third, the concept of jihad, the war by which the pax Islamica could spread to territories of the Dar al-Harb, did not necessarily mean war. It could be a war of words, an effort to make the doctrines of Islam accepted and acceptable. Jihad could therefore take place by persuasion. The Qur'an enjoins: "Invite (all) to the Way of the Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious" (16:125). Fourth, the Prophet Muhammad's practice and policy on matters of war was an attitude of defense and not offence. A jihad of aggression such as some of the classical writers argue for, is not, according to this view, supported by the precedents of the Prophet.

According to this view, the Prophet and his followers were furiously persecuted for years by the Meccans and other Arab non-believers and the Prophet's consistent practice was to fight in defense of the Islamic state and in response to aggression. Indeed, "it is well known that he [the Prophet] never fought foreign wars except on two occasions-once when he was compelled to do so because of the assassination of his envoy to the court of Busra and the second was when he invaded Tabuk, which was a defensive measure undertaken to counter the overwhelming and immediate danger of an attack by the Byzantine Emperor" (Weeramantry, 1988, 147).

In this context, and in the context of the geo-political realities of the need for coexistence with non-Islamic nations, the classical concept of the perpetual jihad or state of war became anachronistic. When, therefore, the concept of jihad is referred to in the modern world, the many limitations discussed above must not fail to be considered. The concept, like the application of the justum bellum concept to the Crusades, is outdated and anachronistic if it is considered to indicate a war of Islam against the rest of the world.

The concept of jihad has contemporary relevance as a defensive principle working for human freedom. Jihad can legitimately be employed for throwing off a foreign yoke-the principle of self-determination that modern international law endorses. Thus, in modern Afghanistan the concept is invoked by the liberation movement. The term mujaheddin incorporates the jihad concept.

Jihad as a cornerstone of general policy in the Islamic world has not survived into the modern world. Perhaps the best illustration of this was the failure of the call of the Turkish sultan in 1914 for a jihad under his leadership. The Muslims of French Africa, Asiatic Russia, and British India did not respond to the call, nor did even the Arabs and other Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

3.3. Prohibited atomic, bio-chemical and bacterial wars in the doctrine of Jihad

Now let us examine the opinion of Islam about modern weaponry. There is no need of an argument or further discussion that atomic, bacterial, and bio-chemical wars are strictly prohibited by Islam. The use of such dangerous weapons on the battlefield is naturally against morality-the principles of which are derived from Islamic doctrine. The Prophet, who emphasized the avoidance of uprooting fruit trees, putting fire to harvests, killing animals, mutilating the bodies of heathens, and disrespect for others, would not consent to the use of so many different weapons, especially such destructive ones.

These evil deeds are not compatible with the doctrines of Islam. Although such destructive weapons were not invented at the time of the leaders of the Muslims (the Prophet and his successors), yet a tradition (hadith) is narrated by Imam Jafar al-Sadiq who quoted the first Imam Ali as saying "the messenger of God has already prohibited the use of poison in the towns of the heathens (by the Muslims)." The late Allamih Hilli has mentioned the prohibition of the use of poisons to destroy the enemy in his book *Tabsiratul Muta'alimin*. Khalil, the Maliki jurist, also emphasizes that poisons are prohibited in the engagement of war (Ilhami 1991, 81).

The Prophet of Islam is actually the founder of the school of virtue and morality and always observed these humane principles. He did not permit his followers and soldiers to use poison in war instead of ordinary weapons, because it is quite obvious that the use of poison naturally has an danger which will kill people without exception. The Prophet used to remind Muslims about observing morality. If a Muslim combatant did something wrong which seemed to be against moral doctrines and principles, he was no doubt punished or reproached by the Prophet.

For this reason, the Prophet strictly forbade the poisoning of the infidels' cities. The word poison here means an awful weapon, and it actually represents and implies any horrible weapon used in war that may destroy anything or any flourishing place of living. In the early periods of Islam, fighters used poison in wars, an inhumane weapon that nowadays has been replaced by nuclear weapons.

We come to the conclusion that the Prophet, who did not consent to the use of poison-equivalent with anthrax terror of October 2001-in the engagement of war, would not agree with the application of nuclear, bacterial, and bio-chemical weapons which can bring about nothing but absolute annihilation.

3.4. Terrorism

Ironically, the origin of terrorism is traced to the Bible. There is a widely-held consensus that the very first terrorist act occurred when Cain, the eldest son of Adam, stoned his brother, Abel, to death. Since then, terrorism became nothing other than a political act of violence by strongman to maintain control and power. Following two world wars which triggered a shift in the global political paradigm, terrorism has turned more radical and violent as it served as an effective medium for the Third World, which sought to liberate itself from Western colonialism, as well as for minority ethnic groups, notably the PLO, which has struggled to establish a nation.

We need to bear in mind that interpretations of terms vary according to nations. In this case, terrorism, from the viewpoint of minority ethnic groups or people from the Third World, is the fight for liberation and freedom. In the same vein, a terrorist is a patriot and hero. In Arab and Muslim countries, too, the struggle for liberation is not an act of terrorism but is jihad, holy war, and terrorists are regarded as champions of freedom. Palestinian leader Yaser Arafat, who once was condemned by the international community as the de facto head of terrorist groups in the region, now is a proud winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and is greatly honored as a hero by Arabs in Palestine.

In many cases, terrorism is viewed more as an act of violence, not a political act, in that it targets innocent civilians and involves indiscriminate attacks. Moreover, even if the objectives of terrorism are justified, it is a criminal act since it does not abide by legal procedures. Contrasting those arguments, terrorists argue that terrorism is the most ultimate and most powerful means the weak resort to when they want to protest against the strong or make their voices heard around the world. No wonder we frequently hear news of suicide bombs, which the weak consider to be a nationalistic and heroic act committed for the sake of the nation. It is even idealized as a mystical and religious martyrdom by terrorists from Islamic fundamentalist groups. Since the mid-twentieth century, fundamentalists in the Arab and Muslim region used suicide bombs, symbolizing religious martyrdom, as their means to protest against the Western world, particularly the United States and Israel.

Whereas terrorism in the past tended to be limited to certain regions, since the 1960s threats of terrorism have penetrated everywhere, making everyone a potential victim of terrorist attacks. The turning point was the June War between the Arab world and Israel in 1967. The Arab world's defeat forced a setback for both the leadership of Nasser and a decline in Arab nationalism, dampening their hopes of founding an independent nation in Palestine. This sense of marginalization left the Palestinians and Arabs with no choice but to vent their frustrations to the international community.

In the beginning, they mostly targeted U.S. and Israeli embassies around the world, but they have become more sophisticated and have begun to include car bombings and hijacking as primary methods. The aforementioned terrorist tactics proved their prowess on September 3, 1970, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked commercial airliners and bombed the Dawson air base. Israel, too, was harshly criticized by the international community when it bombed PLO headquarters in Tunisia in 1985, which was nothing short of a terrorist attack on a national level.

The defeat in the Gulf War in 1991 was another big setback for Arab nationalism, which, in turn, prompted Arabs and Muslims to accept the Islamic revolutionary ideology advocated by Iran's Khomeini. The combined forces of Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, who were martyrs, at least from their own viewpoint, have become more radical in protesting against the Western world in the name of religion and nation. Suicide bombings, which were the most-used method of terrorist attacks by Islamic Hezbollah and Lebanon's Shi'is, have now spread to other groups, primarily Islamic

Jihad, Hamas, the PLO, and the PFLP, all terrorist groups of Islamic fundamentalists.

4. Conclusion

To keep Russia's southward expansionism in check in the nineteenth century, Great Britain mobilized and funded Afghanistan's Mujaheddin. The United States, too, supported the Mujaheddins' fight against the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. It went so far as to approve of an Islamic jihad to win the war and taught guerilla tactics that accompanied terrorism. It is ironical that the jihad, together with terrorist acts, once consented to by the United States, is now pointing against U.S. allies in the Arab world and the center of the Western world, namely the United States, as their victims.

How future events unfold, particularly the future course of the Islamic fundamentalism, jihad, and terrorism, greatly hinges on the U.S. administration's Middle East policy. That President Bush stayed away from his initial response and said that this is a war not against the Muslim world but against terrorists is commendable. The U.S. should not let this tragic incident develop into a clash of civilizations. It must not force others to accept Western values as universal values, but rather should respect and acknowledge the values and cultures of the non-Western world.

Following George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's recent announcement of helping the Palestinian Arabs establish an independent nation also signals a positive mood in the air. I, personally, have one more suggestion: that the U.S. divert part of the huge amount earned by exporting military weapons to the Middle East region to raising living standards in those regions. This will put an end to the war against terrorism and thus bring everlasting peace around the world.

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