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ID 35233
本文ファイル
著者
キーワード
Offshoring
Intermediate input trade
Emission spillover
Environmental standard
Incomplete contract
JEL Classification Numbers: F12
JEL Classification Numbers: F13
JEL Classification Numbers: F18
JEL Classification Numbers: L24
JEL Classification Numbers: Q56
NDC
社会科学
公害・環境工学
抄録(英)
This study develops a two-country model, Home and Foreign, with offshoring and environmental spillover. A final good producer in Home can produce (homogeneous) final goods using customized inputs produced by its partner-supplier in Foreign. The intermediate input price is determined by Nash bargaining, presenting a hold-up problem. Additionally, input production causes transboundary pollution. Home and Foreign governments can set trade taxes. Moreover, the Foreign government can set the environmental standard. This model demonstrates that, under no international policy agreement, both the environmental standard and the quantity of the intermediate input are lower than the first-best levels. This ine¢ ciency persists even if both governments conclude an agreement.
掲載誌名
IDEC DP2 Series
3巻
8号
開始ページ
1
終了ページ
33
出版年月日
2013-12
出版者
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
SelfDOI
言語
英語
NII資源タイプ
紀要論文
広大資料タイプ
学内刊行物(紀要等)
DCMIタイプ
text
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
publisher
部局名
国際協力研究科
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