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ID 32090
本文ファイル
著者
キーワード
Environmental research joint venture
Environmental R&D
Time-consistent emission tax
Competition policy
Cournot duopoly
NDC
経済
内容記述
This paper presents an examination of the socially desirable formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emissions tax. The results reveal that if environmental damage is sufficiently small, alternatively if there is severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially desirable. However, if environmental damage is sufficiently extensive, and if a firm's environmental R&D costs are sufficiently limited, then, in contrast to previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more desirable than environmental R&D cartelization and ERJV cartelization, although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing" and “NO R&D coordination."
掲載誌名
IDEC DP2 Series
2巻
6号
開始ページ
[1]
終了ページ
18
出版年月日
2012-02
出版者
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
SelfDOI
言語
英語
NII資源タイプ
紀要論文
広大資料タイプ
学内刊行物(紀要等)
DCMIタイプ
text
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
publisher
部局名
国際協力研究科
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