Disembedding Islamic Locale: the Spread and Deepening of Islamic Knowledge in Rural Bangladesh

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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to explore and conceptualize the mechanism of Islamization that is specific to Bangladesh, focusing on the cases of some villages in Tangail district. First, this paper reviews the theories and process of Islamization worldwide and in the case of Bangladesh. This review leads the hypothesis that the deepening of Islamic knowledge and practice in rural Bangladesh has been caused by the spread of modern religious education and Bangladeshi travelers to the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, as pilgrims and migrant workers. Second, changes in daily practice and religious activities along with the Islamization of the population and the landscape as well as socio-economic changes are described. Third, this paper explores the source of local people’s Islamic learning, the changes in religious education, and social and cultural impacts of travelers to the Middle East on local society. The significant triggers of the spread of Islamic knowledge are the achievement of a certain degree of economic status, modern Islamic education, and work by Islamic intellectuals including those who returned from Saudi Arabia. Finally, this paper provides a model of Islamization with the use of the concept of “Islamic locale” and examines the mechanism of Islamization that is specific to Bangladesh and its connections, as well as the similarities with and differences from Islamic revivalism worldwide.

Key words Islamization, modern religious education, overseas migrant workers, pilgrims, the Middle East, rural Bangladesh

I. Introduction

This paper seeks to explore how Islamic knowledge and practice have spread and deepened in rural Bangladesh. In doing so, it also strives to analyze the connections that the movement has with Islamic revivalism worldwide, with a focus on similarities and differences. We have observed a number of common phenomena among Muslims from Bangladesh and other countries, such as the increase in the number of religious institutions and activities and the rejection of music performances and the worship of saints (e.g., Otsuka, 2000; Kosugi, 2006; Sugie, 2016, 2017). Previous studies treating cases of South Asia describe the adoption of Islamic practice and terms and strengthening Islamic identity among Muslims and conceptualize those movements as Ashrafization or Islamization within the framework of the cultural contact between Hinduism and Islam (e.g., Bertocci, 1970, pp. 48–54; Ansari, 1960; Vreede-de stuers, 1968; Ahmad, 1978a; Misra, 1985). Previous studies on Bangladeshi villages understand the introduction of Islamic practice by Muslims as the efforts to climb up the social ladder (Jahangir, 1979, pp. 86–87; Areeen, 1986, pp. 90–92; Jansen, 1987, pp. 74–75; Karim, 1990, pp. 86–90). They consider the background of these movements only at a micro-scale or in the local context and do not examine the effects of the national and global political and social changes such as nation-building and the rise of Islamism, except for a few studies (Ahmed, 1996; Gardner, 1995; Takada, 2006). There is also a gap between the micro-level case studies and the political, historical, or theoretical studies (e.g., Roy, 1998, Roy and Brasted, 1999; Riaz, 2004; Mishra, 2012). Although the latter studies consider the national and global politics and historical backgrounds, they do not provide the way to understand Islamization of local people’s daily lives along with macro-level social changes. However, previous studies treating cases in other areas analyze Islamization in local society based on their relationship with the national policy and the network between the country and the Middle East or other Muslim majority countries (e.g., Tokoro, 1996; Miichi, 2004; Tawada, 2005; Nishii, 2012).

Although Bangladesh has one of the world’s largest Muslim populations with 90 percent of its population being Muslim, it had been considered as relatively secular and as a moderate Muslim country, with a low risk of terrorism. However, Islamists have gained power in the political sphere and society since the 1990s and terror attacks by militant Muslims have increased drastically since 2013. Therefore, Bangladeshi Muslims attract greater interest from the world these days. However, studies on
Bangladeshi Muslims are not progressing in comparison with studies on Muslims in other countries and do not understand the mechanism of Islamization of identity and daily practice sufficiently.

The purpose of this paper is to explore and conceptualize the mechanism of Islamization that is specific to Bangladesh by focusing on the cases of some villages with due consideration for the network with Muslim majority countries and macro-level social changes, and comparing them with cases and discussions on those countries. In the next section, I will first review cases and discussions on Islamic revivalism movements in other countries. After that, I will describe the three historical stages of Islamization in Bangladesh.

II. The Process of Islamization

1. The worldwide movements

Previous studies provide various theories on and models of Islamization. In this paper, I will focus on the theories constructed by Kosugi (2006) and Trimingham (1962). In Kosugi's theory, the first stage is "Islamization", which means the process of acceptance of Islam in a local area and the localization of Islam, namely the diffusion of Islam and cultural contact between the local culture and Islam. Here, not only does Islam infiltrate local society, but also actual Islamic practice is affected by the local culture. The second stage is "de-Islamization" where people in the local area find their way out of Islam. Islam becomes external and other ideologies such as secularism or socialism become mainstream. In the final stage, "re-Islamization" occurs, where the local area accepts Islam again and modernizes Islam in its own context. This process is complemented by the worldwide network that engages in Islamic revivalism promoted by globalization and the progress of the media.

The three phases of Islamization as indicated by Trimingham (1962) are partly different from those indicated by Kosugi. In the first phase, although Islam reaches a local area, it does not spread widely and remains purely without being affected by the local culture. Islam and the local culture mix in the second phase when Islam beings to spread into society. Finally, the syncretized Islam is gradually reoriented and purified. Although the first stage of Islamization in Kosugi's theory is similar to Trimingham's second phase, Kosugi's third stage of re-Islamization does not necessarily have the same characteristics as Trimingham's final phase.

Researchers have conceptualized and classified the movements of "re-Islamization" into the following two types: i) "the Islamic revivalism movements" or "re-Islamization from below" and ii) "Islamism" or "re-Islamization from above" (Naito, 1996; Otsuka, 2000, 2004; Kepel, 1994). The former refers to the bottom-up social movements that seek to obey and actualize Islamic orders both in public and private spheres as well as the social and cultural phenomena that generate such movements. The latter refers to ideas and policies that consider Islam as a political ideology that both uses military power and has some measure of power that is exercised by political dissidents or parts of the establishment. Although these two movements are connected or supplement each other (Kepel, 1994), this paper focuses on the former, that is, re-Islamization in rural Bangladesh.

Historically, the process of re-Islamization has been observed in two ages. The first Islamic revivalism or reformation movements emerged in the Middle East, Africa, and South East and South Asia during the 18th and 19th centuries. The movements sought to reform and purify the brief and practices within the Muslim community and were often involved in anti-colonialism struggles (e.g., Westerlund and Rosander, 1997; Tawada, 2005). Trimingham (1962) locates these movements in the third phase of Islamization as mentioned above and Otsuka (2000, pp. 241–246) calls these movements "Puritanism Islam".

Generally, there is some disconnect between these movements and the later round of re-Islamization. After these movements, many countries experienced de-Islamization. Then, the movements of re-Islamization flourished since the late 1970s onward. The backgrounds of the latter re-Islamization were deeply related to modernization and globalization. Muslims have confronted the miscarriage and failure of Western modernization and secularism and became bound to Islam and saw it as an alternative ideology (e.g., Naito, 1996; Stump, 2000; Kosugi, 2006). Needless to say, Iran was established as an Islamic Republic by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami sought to establish the Islamic polity in some regions and countries (e.g., Yokota, 2006; Riaz, 2004; Mishra, 2012). The governments of some countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia used Islam politically to strengthen their support base and to facilitate national integration (e.g., Miichi, 2004; Tawada, 2005).

The spread of mass-education and print capitalism (Anderson, 2006) as well as the rise of the urban middle class vitalized social and religious reformation movements (e.g., Otsuka, 1989, 2000, 2004; Nagatsu, 2004). Traditionally, only a handful of privileged male scholars had domi-
nated the space through interpretations of the Quran and Hadith and the construction of Islamic discourse (Ahmed, 1992). However, mass-education and print capitalism have enabled people to access and read Islamic texts as well as various other religious books on their own, and this has opened up the Islamic discourse space for them. Today, the development of mass media and the Internet has made it easier to acquire global Islamic knowledge. Moreover, Nishino and Hattori (2007) discussed the presence of a supplementary relationship between Islamic revivalism and education, and argued that the Islamic revivalist movements led the national-level revision, namely the introduction or extension of modern religious education in the public educational system while the spread of education itself promoted the bottom-up Islamic revivalist movements among the people. The acceptance of foreign Muslim students into institutions of higher education in the Middle East, such as Al-Azhar University and the Islamic Azad University, has also played an important role in raising Islamic scholars and in facilitating the spread of Islamic knowledge in various countries (e.g., Kawashima, 2001; Sakurai, 2014).

2. Islamization in Bangladesh

Togawa (2000) classified Islamization in Bangladesh (East Bengal) into three stages. This subsection reviews the three stages in correspondence to the theories advanced by Kosugi (2006) and Trimingham (1962). The first wave of Islamization in Bangladesh is in line with Kosugi’s first stage and Trimingham’s second phase. The factors and processes encouraging the first wave of Islamization in Bangladesh has been a controversy for a long time. This is because there was an drastic increase in the Muslim population in Bangladesh from the end of the 19th century (Bertocci, 1970, pp. 48–54), particularly in the rural areas that were far away from the capital cities of the successive Muslim dynasties from the Medieval ages (Usuda, 1993). Further, there was also a lack of clarity on whether Afghan or Turkish Muslims had migrated into Bangladesh, or whether Hindus and local tribes had converted to Islam. This led to some confusion and conflicts around the Bengal Muslim identity (Ahmed, 1996; Usuda, 1993).

However, researchers and the general Bangladeshis rarely support the “migration theory” today. While the Mughal Empire had enabled the progress of Islamization in the political and administerate spheres since the 17th century, Sufi saints coming in from Arab countries and the surrounding areas had converted low caste Hindus and semi-Hinduised tribes to Islam since the 13th century and this movement had been accompanied by putting the frontiers of East Bengal to the plow, particularly since the 16th century (Eaton, 1993). During this time, a synchronized culture blending Islam and the local culture, which was generically named as ‘Hinduism’ by Europeans later, had developed and there was very little difference in the ways of life between Hindus and Muslims in the grassroots until the mid-19th century (Roy, 1983; Ahmed, 1996).

The second phase of Islamization began in the early 19th century, when it emerged as a socio-religious reformation movement aimed at the elimination of Hindu elements from the way of life and the purification of the Muslim community. That is, it corresponded to Trimingham’s third phase. Although those movements were anti-colonial and political struggles in the early days, they turned into non-political religious reformation movements through the intermittent suppression by the British Empire since the First War of Independence in 1857. Such socio-religious reformation movements took place all over British India. The British Empire called these reformists as “Wahhabi” because the movements were similar to the growth of Wahhabism in central Arabia in the mid-18th century. However, a direct connection between the two regions and their movements has not been proved. Among these reformation movements, the tablighi jamaat is well-known and has spread globally (e.g., Nishii, 2012); it is a missionary travel from mosque to mosque and was started by a Deobandi activist in North India in the 1920s (Mayaram, 2003; Stump, 2000, p. 66). Although several movements such as the Faraizi movement took place in East Bengal, their impacts were limited to certain areas (Banu, 1992).

By the latter part of the 19th century, about 40 percent of the population in Bengal was Hindu (Usuda, 1993). Of these, the upper caste Hindus, that is, the gentry class (bhadralok), had dominated society as influential landlords (zamindar) and colonial bureaucrats. On the other hand, although Muslims had also been stratified by jati at the time, Muslims of a higher status did not accept modern English education provided by the colonial government and a vast population of Muslims of a lower status and the cultivating Muslims remained uneducated (Ahmed, 1996). Thus, the socio-religious reformation movements by Muslims were often accompanied by class and religious conflicts between Hindu zamindars and Muslim tenant farmers as part of the Faraizi movement (Taniguchi, 1993, pp. 80–81). Religious conflicts structured in the colonial period had been one of the main causes for the foundation of Pakistan (Ahmed, 1996).
The third wave of Islamization involved the use of Islam in politics and development policy, which is what Kosugi (2006) called as re-Islamization. It does not mean that Bangladesh had never experienced de-Islamization, at least in the national political system. Sheikh Mujibur, the first president of Bangladesh, espoused secularism after independence from Pakistan in 1971 because the country had experienced an anti-liberation struggle and a massacre by an Islamist political party, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), during the war. However, Islam was gradually integrated into national politics from the end of the Mujib administration both under pressure from oil-producing countries in the Middle East who were significant donors for Bangladesh and out of the necessity to facilitate national integration (Huque and Akhter, 1987). For example, the Islamic Foundation was established in 1975 as a public organization whose mission was to spread Islamic ideals and values. Thus, secularism was insubstantial and had not become the dominant ideology among the people in Bangladesh at the time (Banu, 1992; van Schendel, 1982, p. 294). Ziaur Rahman, the seventh president, deleted the articles related to secularism in the Constitution and instead, inserted Islamic prayer words in its very beginning. He also removed the ban on Islamist political parties and implemented the "Imam Training Program" through the Islamic Foundation. However, that training program was a small-scale intent to involve the local religious leaders in rural development activities and therefore it had little impact on the local religious activities (Sato, 1990, p. 95). The use of Islam in politics was most remarkably prevalent at the time of Hussain Muhammad Ershad, the last president from the military. He integrated parts of Islamic educational institutions (aliya madrassah) into the public educational system and extended modern religious education into the public educational curriculum in the 1980s with financial support from the oil-producing countries in the Middle East. The Islamic Foundation provided grants for mosque construction or repair and implemented the "Imam Training Program" again under the government's slogan of "masjid kendrik samaj (mosque centered society)". However, direct interference by the governments was very limited (Sato, 1990, pp. 120–133). He officially promoted the overseas migration of labor and as a consequence, the number of Bangladeshi labor migrants in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, began to increase rapidly since the latter half of the 1980s. Islam finally was a state religion in Bangladesh between 1988 and 2011.

After the Ershad administration, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (Awami) took turns to run the government. It was largely thought that the former party was Islamic and the latter was secular. However, using Islam was deeply embedded in Bangladeshi political culture, regardless of the party in power. JI also increased its presence in national politics and political discourse although the number of votes it obtained has remained small (Mishra, 2012). The head of JI became the head of the Agricultural Ministry and the Ministry of Social Welfare by an alliance with BNP in 2001. The rise of Islam was remarkable not only in the political sphere but also in society and in people's lives at the grassroots, since the 1990s. Symbolic incidents of the movements include the return of a defected executive of JI, violence against and suppression of women through fatwabaji, and the Islamist conviction and death sentence of Taslima Nasreen, who depicted Muslims oppressing Hindus in her novel, "Shame" (Riaz, 2004). A conflict between Islamists and secular NGOs were clearly observed in the attack by an Islamist group on the independence ceremony in Brahmanbaria district in 1998 (Togawa, 2014). On the other hand, religious activities such as tablighi jammat and Islamic conferences flourished among both men and women since the same time (e.g., Rosario, 2006; Huq and Rashid, 2008; Begum, 2016). The government seldom interfered in those local religious activities. The number of both formal and informal Islamic educational institutions (aliya madrassah and qawmi madrassah) and their students have also increased; the number of students of the aliya madrassah increased from 0.4 to 3.43 million during 1972–2003 although a reliable estimate of the number of institutions and students of qawmi madrassah is nonexistent (Riaz, 2008, pp. 125–134). The background of the increase of madrassah and its students is not only by competition of madrassah construction between sects (maslaki) and government's financial support to aliya madrassha as an appeasement policy to Islamists, but also support by local people; madrassah provides the opportunity of education and employment as an imam of mosque or madrassah teacher to the poor as well as parents wish to fulfill religious good deed by sending their children to madrassah (Takada, 2006, pp. 410–416; Riaz, 2008; Kusakabe, 2009, 2010; Humayun, 2013).

The present government run by Awami has created a few policies that are directed against Islamic parties. The International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh established by the government in 2011 sentenced JI's executives to death, and convicted them as war criminals in the liberation war of 1971. Therefore, JI's power has been weakened. However, the government also takes appeasement policies
to Islamists such as elimination of secular poems from teaching contents of general education and promise for giving equivalent certificate with formal education to the students of qawmi madrassah.

Thus, Bangladesh has experienced Kosugi’s first and third stages of Islamization in parallel with modernization and globalization and Trimingham’s final phase of Islamization. The process of de-Islamization is relatively immature and not significant. However, we can find many unveiled women walking on the street in urban areas and secularization has also been proceeding with certainty, particularly among the urban upper and middle classes. The next section will discuss the connections, similarities, and differences between Bangladesh and other countries with respect to re-Islamization.

III. Hypothesis and Research Questions

The government of Bangladesh has implemented Islamization policies and has used Islam for politics and development. However, the power, influence, and functions of the government are far weaker in Bangladesh than in the Middle East and other autocratic countries. Direct interference in or lending support to local religious activities by the government had been limited as mentioned above. However, the indirect effects of government policies seem to be significant for the Islamization of the country. The increase and spread of modern religious education is likely to have promoted the process of Islamization, as previous studies emphasize the significant role of modern (religious) education in the rise of Islamic revivalism in various countries (Otsuka, 2000; Nagatsu, 2004; Nishino and Hattori, 2007). Although qawmi madrassah does not receive any subsidies from the government, some of its financial base is supported by donations from Bangladeshi migrant workers in foreign countries, particularly in the Middle East, as well as Islamic NGOs funded by those countries (Riaz, 2008; Kusakabe, 2009). Not only qawmi madrassah but also the construction and improvement of some mosques are also funded by these migrants and NGOs. Thus, the increase in the number of Bangladeshi migrant workers in the Middle East since the Ershad administration has brought about direct connections and has led to the formation of a network between the local areas in Bangladesh and those countries. However, previous studies focus on the economic impacts of migrant workers on individual households and the national economy (e.g., Siddiqui, 2003; Afsar, 2016) and little attention has been paid to their cultural and social impacts on Bangladeshi society, except for a few studies (Gardner, 1995; Gardner and Osella eds., 2004; Kibria, 2008). These studies report that returnees from the Middle East and other countries have begun to reflectively and critically reconsider their identity and Islamic practice in their hometown and accordingly, have begun to invest in local mosques and madrassahs to eliminate un-Islamic local customs as religious authority. Such changes in Muslims are what Eickelman et al. (2004, p. 42) called as the “objectification of Islam”. However, these case studies focus on individual experiences and changes and do not explore their impacts on local society adequately. Migrant workers have cultural and social impacts not only on the local society but also on the entire country because a large number of migrant workers have been to the Middle East from various classes and areas (Takada, 2006). Although previous studies have paid attention to the roles played by foreign students at universities in the Middle East in the spread of Islamic knowledge in their home countries and in the development of the global Islamic network and the sense of Muslim ummah through hajj, the impacts of overseas migrant workers have been overlooked. Moreover, previous studies on migration have concentrated on Muslim immigrants in the Western countries. Studies on South Asian migrant workers to countries in the Middle East have increased only since the latter part of the 2000s, particularly around the middle of the 2010s (e.g., Gardner, 2010; Rahman, 2016, 2018). Therefore, even their current situation has not been explored adequately, yet.

Bangladesh was traditionally dominated by Hindus in all aspects of their society until relatively recently. Upper caste Hindus had had an influence on the society until the foundation of Pakistan and even after the independence of Bangladesh in many parts. Indeed, Islamic practices, such as veiling or sexual separation (purdah) and construction of mosques has formed a part of Muslim social life in Bangladesh. However, it was often limited to Muslims of a higher status or to the rich Muslims as seen in previous studies (e.g., Hara, 1991; Jahangir, 1979; Arefeen, 1986; Jansen, 1987; Karim, 1990). The syncretized culture of Hindus and Muslims, manifesting in ways such as saint worship, can be seen broadly even today (Togawa, 2008). Moreover, primary education has spread in Bangladesh since just the 1990s (Kusakabe, 2007; Minamide, 2016). The Islamization of daily practice and local customs at the grassroots has begun relatively recently. For example, veiled women were not a common site in rural areas at one point (e.g., Nishikawa, 1995; Rosario, 2006). However, it is difficult to find unveiled Muslim women in public spaces in rural areas today. Thus, when we survey the process of Islamization in a local society, it is necessary to
trace the local history of Islamization with respect to the population and the landscape as well.

Based on the above discussion, I advance the following hypothesis: the deepening of Islamic knowledge and practice has been caused by the spread of modern religious education and Bangladeshi travelers including migrant workers in the Middle East. This hypothesis is also formulated with the help of my fieldwork in rural Bangladesh from 2011 to 2015. The concrete research questions are as follows: what is the source of Islamic knowledge for the local people?; what is taught by whom in the madrassah and as the religious subject in general schools?; how do people’s experiences in the Middle East affect the religious knowledge and practice of Bangladeshi migrant workers and pilgrims?; how do those who have returned to their hometown exert influence on religious disciplines there? In addition, changes in the daily practice and religious activities along with Islamization of the population and landscape will be also described. Among the Middle Eastern countries, this paper focuses on Saudi Arabia according to statistical data on Bangladeshi migrant workers (BBS, 2013, p. 18). Saudi Arabia has accepted the highest number of Bangladeshi migrant workers. There are approximately 1.1 to 2.1 million Bangladeshis in Saudi Arabia (De Bel-Air, 2018). The remittance coming into Bangladesh from Saudi Arabia is the highest amount of foreign remittance entering Bangladesh. Today, more than a hundred thousand Bangladeshis go to Saudi Arabia for hajj every year. In addition, migrant workers in Saudi Arabia have also performed umrah (short form) hajj and/or hajj. Migrant workers who have performed hajj are respected in their hometown and are known as “hajji” (Takada, 2006, pp. 409–410).

IV. Study Area and Survey Method

The study area comprises seven villages in the Southern part of Tangail district, located about 80 km northwest of Dhaka (Figure 1). I conducted fieldwork intermittently from 2011 to 2018 and a very intensive survey in village B. Although the expansion of the industrial cluster from suburban of Dhaka is reaching this area, it was a remote place, situated far from the divisional capital of Mymensingh, until the construction of the Dhaka-Tangail highway in 1952 (Sato, 1985, p. 136). This area had largely been affected by Hindu culture and village B and the surrounding villages were dominated by powerful and rich upper caste Hindus (Sugie, 2014) while almost all Hindus in villages U and A were lower caste Hindus. Muslims have lived and built mosques in villages M, P, and parts of village D at least since the early 20th century (Sugie, 2017). Among them, some Muslims in village P enjoyed edu-
tion and relatively higher status. Most upper caste and rich Hindus moved to India or the urban areas of Bangladesh by the 1990s. Muslims have migrated to the areas where the Hindus left, since the 1960s. Similar cases of the migration of Hindus and Muslims are reported in various locations in Bangladesh (e.g., Arens and van Beurden, 1978; Chowdhury, 1978; Thorp, 1978; Arefeen, 1986).

Although social stratification based on lineage and titles (bangsha) among Muslims was not clear in this area (cf. Mannan, 2000), the Muslims who faced discrimination lived in villages B, U, A, and P at least since the end of the 19th century. They were locally called “Sanaidar” or “Dholi” and their traditional occupation was in the field of music – where they worked as musicians who played musical instruments in “band parties” on ceremonial occasions. Almost all of them were uneducated and suffered from poverty and struggled for food. They believed in a saint who was locally called “Madar” or “Zinda Shah” and held an annual ceremony on his death day. Their vague religious attributions and un-Islamic practices reinforced discrimination against them as they were considered as being of a different jati by other Muslims (Sugie, 2016). Aside from them, the other Muslims who faced discrimination had migrated into village A in the 1960s. They were locally called “Karigor” or “Jola” and their traditional occupation was in the handloom industry. They were much better off economically and in terms of education and were more devoted Muslims than were the Sanaidar. They abandoned their traditional occupation since they migrated to this area while some Sanaidars continued to work as musicians. Therefore, although they were also prevented from marrying other Muslims, the discrimination against them was not as intense as it was against the Sanaidars. Although there was no doubt that these groups were Muslims, I use the terms “Sanaidar” or “Karigor” to refer to them for the sake of convenience.

A household survey was conducted in village B, and a semi-structured interview was conducted to gather data from the local people, educational institutions, and the government office of the Educational Boards of Bangladesh. The participant observation method was also used. There were 45 people who had traveled to the Middle East, but I was able to interview only 8 of them directly. I took information from the others’ families because almost all of them were absent in village B. Although I also conducted supplementary fieldwork in Makkha, Saudi Arabia, in 2018, owing to visa restrictions, I was not able to access Riyadh, where most migrant workers from this area lived. In addition, I analyzed textbooks on the religious subjects taught in public schools and the religious texts used in local Islamic lessons. However, I have not obtained any textbooks that were used in the past yet.

V. Changes in Daily Practice and Religious Activities

This area had been dominated by upper caste Hindus as mentioned above and the daily practice of Muslims also contained activities that are deemed as part of Hindu culture today, such as wearing dhotis (loincloth). Dhotis are usually worn only by Hindu men these days. Aziz (1979, p. 16) also noted that many Muslims had worn dhotis in Comilla district until the 1940s. Particularly, the ancestors of the Sanaidar had worked under upper caste Hindus either as musicians or servants, and followed the same customs as them; for example, they performed puja (ritual of Hindus) and their married women wore bangles and bracelets (shakhari) made of conch shells, and also applied sindoor (orange-red colored powder) on their foreheads, until the foundation of Pakistan. Although many Muslims living in West Bengal continue to practice these customs (Kin, 2000), it was generally thought that these customs were Hindu customs and that no Muslim practiced them in this area.

Playing musical instruments has been considered an un-Islamic activity by most Muslims as well. Not only Hindus but also Muslims had been employed as musicians of Sanaidars for marriages and circumcision ceremonies until around the time of Bangladeshi independence. However, Hindus often hired them for their marriage and puja and some Muslims did only in very limited occasions such as a ritual in a tomb of saint (mazar) or a big football game. Sanaidar musicians talked about their music performance in the following words: “Past generations respected and valued this work. People respected it because we used to play at big houses such as palaces, the houses of zamindars, and high class Hindus’ houses. Now, anyone can offer us an opportunity and we have to go to be able to feed ourselves”; “There were various occasions on which musical performances such as operas (jattra) and dramas (natok) were performed in villages. Now many mosques have been built in villages and people are adverse to us if we play these musical instruments.” Some Sanaidars also tried to be more Islamic and emphasized their identity as Muslims by criticizing these musical performances and other un-Islamic practices of others in more recent times (Sugie, 2016).

Saint worship also became to be regarded as a deviation from Islam. Some Muslims criticized the ritual of
the saint’s death anniversary marked by the Sanaidars for its Hindu characteristics, such as worshiping bamboos and using sindoor while others considered it as a part of Islamic culture. In addition to saint worship by the Sanaidars, local people in the area, regardless of their religion and caste, believed in the supernatural powers of a mentally-disabled Brahman who was born and had died in village B. Although they had also celebrated his death anniversary in his tomb, a Muslim who built a house in the land surrounding his tomb prohibited the performance of the ceremony, claiming that it was an un-Islamic activity. Even milad, requesting an imam to pray when one opens a shop, began to be thought of as un-Islamic in village P.

Moreover, Arabizing of names and terms derived from Bengali or Sanskrit was commonly seen such as from sirni to tobarok. A man in village M gave an Arabic and Islamic name to his child because he was dissatisfied with his name which was given by his parents because it was derived from Bengali.

Not only individual daily practice but also collective religious activities had changed. As mentioned above, although Muslims migrated to this area since the 1960s, they did not build mosques by themselves, but prayed at the existing mosques in other villages. Only a few rich Muslims built and maintained mosques on their own in the early days. However, the cooperative construction of mosques by the samaj increased since the 1990s. The number of mosques has increased four times, and the Muslim population has grown along with the division of the samaj over a century, namely from 1918 to 2018 in the area (Sugie, 2017). In 2013, almost all samaj maintained a mosque and employed imams using their own funds. Concretely, each samaj had a committee for the maintenance of a mosque and each household in the

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**Table 1. Imams and donations from outside**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Jati of samaj members</th>
<th>Samaj number</th>
<th>Imam (See Note 1)</th>
<th>Donation for mosque and madrassah from outside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Sanaidar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Sanaidar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Sanaidar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sirajganj</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B and U</td>
<td>Sanaidar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Sanaidar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Karigor</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Sanaidar</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Sanaidar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern part of D</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern part of D (including a part of A)</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Donations from outside</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: “Near village” means the villages located within the same or the neighboring union. Educational qualifications are as follows: maulana is equivalent to a university graduate and alim is equivalent to HSC of aliya madrassah; iftaj refers to one who learns about fatwas (Islamic scholarly advice or recommendations based on Shari’a) and graduate from qawmi madrassah; hafez is one who can recite all the verses of the Quran completely; qari is an expert who can recite the Quran according to tajweed (a set of rules governing proper pronunciation and recitation); and dawra-e-Hadith is equivalent to the master of qawmi madrassah.

Note 2: Outside means individuals or groups outside of the samaj. These data are based on interviews and therefore those who answered "none" might receive donations.

Source: The author's fieldwork in September 2014.
samaj donated a fixed amount of rice or money (chada) for the maintenance and upkeep of the mosque or the salary of the imam. It was a matter of status or standard in this area to maintain a mosque only using the samaj’s own funds while it was shameful to collect chada from any other samaj toward mosque maintenance. The Sanайдars in village B and U had had congregational prayer only on Friday after noon and regularly collected chada from other samaj. However, they have set five times congregational prayers with the imam in a day and collected chada only from the households belonging to their samaj since 2013. There are also several cases of the construction of mosques where overseas migrant workers made a large donation and where a mosque committee got a donation of about 24,000 USD from Saudi Arabia (Table 1). However, official subsidy or training of an imam was seldom provided through a public organization such as the Islamic Foundation as Sato (1990) noted.

The older samaj had more luxurious and beautiful mosques and frequently held local Islamic conferences called “saba”. The beauty and sufficiency of the mosques and other religious buildings symbolized a higher degree of development of the samaj and the extension and improvement of those buildings were competitively conducted. Such a situation was common across various locations in rural Bangladesh (e.g., Bertocci, 1970; Islam, 1974; Karim, 1990) as well as in the Middle East (Hada, 1994). Thus, religious activities became increasingly prosperous, while other functions of samaj declined.

A few rich Muslims in other areas also built and maintained mosques on their own wealth until the 1980s (e.g., Bertocci, 1970; Thorp, 1978; Hartman and Boyce, 1983; Karim, 1990; Nishikawa, 1995; Khan, 1999). Mukai (2003, p. 177) also stated that cases of cooperative mosque construction had increased in recent times. Thus, Islamic activities were conducted more cooperatively and had been increasing in rural Bangladesh. Such changes in their religious activities were mainly because of the macro-level economic growth since the late 1980s, as a result of which rural people were able to use their money and time for religious activities. It may also be because the government had rarely interfered with local religious activities and dispute settlement increasingly began to be conducted by the formal union court (Sugie, 2017).

VI. Factors that led to the Spread of Islamic Knowledge

1. The source of Islamic knowledge

Mosques and madrassahs were the most important sources of Islamic knowledge in village B (Table 2). Imams usually preached sermons on the Hadith (records of the Prophet Muhammad’s words and deeds) and details of Islamic rules before the congregational prayers were held.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Those who can access</th>
<th>number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mosque</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam of the mosque and his wife</td>
<td>See Note 2</td>
<td>men/women</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maktab</td>
<td>School for reading the Quran in Arabic</td>
<td>boys/girls</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrassah</td>
<td>Islamic religious school</td>
<td>boys/girls</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic lessons in Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Migrant workers in Saudi Arabia answered</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic conference</td>
<td>Locally called ‘saba’</td>
<td>men/women</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talim</td>
<td>A weekly lesson on Islam</td>
<td>women</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons on Islam in a learner’s house</td>
<td>Missionary travel to the mosque</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tablighi Jamaat</td>
<td>Missionary travel to the mosque</td>
<td>men/women</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known person/relative etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>anyone</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home teacher</td>
<td></td>
<td>anyone</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent</td>
<td></td>
<td>anyone</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book</td>
<td></td>
<td>literate</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Quran</td>
<td>Including the Bengali version</td>
<td>literate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hadith</td>
<td>Records of Prophet Muhammad’s words and deeds, including their translation in Bengali</td>
<td>literate</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: There is generally no space for women in the mosques in rural Bangladesh, including the mosques in this area.
Note 2: The imam of the mosque in village B and his wife lived in a house that was constructed by the mosque committee on the site of the mosque.

Source: The author’s fieldwork from December 2017 to February 2018.
on Friday after noon. In addition, the imam in village B held an Islamic lesson after the daily congregational prayers before dawn. Even some men who usually did not pray attended the congregations on Friday because their presence there symbolized their membership in samaj. However, imams or madrassah teachers hardly claimed fatwa or judged local disputes and had little political power in the area. Although some elderly people in village B went around and visited the houses belonging to their samaj to encourage people to pray, there was no punishment for those who did not attend the mosque or fast during Ramadan.

The most important source of adult women's Islamic learning was talim, namely a weekly Islamic lecture for local neighborhood women, which was given in a house by a female preacher. There were two types of talim in the area: one was held weekly by a fixed female preacher in her house from 10 a.m. until the prayer after noon; and the other was a more irregular occurrence, held by a family that brought in a female preacher, and treated the audience to snacks in their house. The preachers of the former were from villages M and K, and were both the wives of imams. They were housewives and relatively rich; both of them owned at least two acres of farmland and a house in urban areas. They themselves did not have higher educational qualifications, and the male members of their families passed dawra-e-Hadith (equivalent to a master) or maulana (equivalent to a university graduate). They taught not only how to pronounce Arabic words and words of prayer correctly, but also taught the legitimate way of religious practice and offered knowledge on the honorable status and rights of women in Islam. Talim was held in village K at least for 25 years, as it was the earliest talim to have started around this area. Talim was unfamiliar in this area until it was introduced from a village in the neighboring subdistrict. The irregular type of talim has increased in number over the last decade. Although most participants came from the neighboring houses, women also came from the neighboring villages, and around 50 or 60 middle-aged women usually gathered for these meetings. While the preachers encouraged practicing what they preached in talim, they did not force anyone to do so, and left things entirely up to the participants' will.

It was unexpected that no one in the Muslim households in village B mentioned digital media such as the television and the Internet as sources of their Islamic knowledge. This is because of the lower Internet coverage ratio and prohibition of Islamic TV channels after the notorious terror attack in Dhaka in 2016. Those who had learned directly from the Quran, Hadith, or other religious books were in the minority as more people learned from their parents, relatives, and other people they knew. Moreover, local Islamic conferences that usually invited preachers from other areas and tablighi jamaat were also minor sources; Islamic knowledge was not likely to be conveyed translocally in the case of this village. Thus, most villagers acquired their Islamic knowledge from the local people, and not directly from the texts or other media, in contrast to the case of Huq and Rashid (2008).

2. Religious education

Almost all the local people were aware of the spread of Islamic knowledge over several decades, although many said that people did not practice Islam much due to the rise in modes of entertainment. They often pointed out that the reasons for the spread of Islamic knowledge were the change in religious education, such as the increase in the number educational institutions and the consequent rise in the number of those who had higher degrees in religious education. A woman said, “There were few places to study, once. Just one munshi (a religious person without any educational qualification) used to lead congregational prayers. Now, people have come to know many things. Highly educated maulanas are available. One can no longer be employed without an educational qualification (as imams and madrassah teachers). (Maulana) knows about the Quran and Hadith, as well. (They) learn everything”. Other people also made similar statements. The significance of education and other important factors were demonstrated by the case of Sanaidar. As mentioned above, almost all of them were uneducated and could not afford to spare time for religious activities, such as attending a mosque or talim and sending their children to school. This was because of their daily struggle for food – where their children helped the families work. Sending children to school was an expensive deal because although tuition in primary school was free, parents had to pay the examination fees and buy stationery as well. A Sanaidar woman claimed that they could not send their children to school because they could not feed them properly. Thus, a certain degree of economic status was a necessary precondition for receiving education and learning Islamic knowledge properly.

There were 16 mosques and 5 madrassahs in 6 villages except village K (Table 1 and 3). The hafizia and furqania madrassahs are informal Islamic educational institutions and were maintained by samaj in the same way as mosques. “Hafez” means a person who can recite all verses of the Quran in Arabic. Among 22 imams and teachers, only 3 imams had no religious educational qualifica-
### Table 3. Madrassah and the religious subject in public schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Teaching contents and methods</th>
<th>Exam (See Note 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number, Village, Age</td>
<td>Village, Age, Sex, Education</td>
<td>Content/methods/textbooks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exam (See Note 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Hafizia madrassah (for boys)</td>
<td>12, Near, 13–16</td>
<td>NA, 20s, M, Dawra-e-Hadith</td>
<td>Reciting the Quran, 40 Hadith, and their meanings taught by the teacher</td>
<td>Oral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deobandi qawmi madrassah (for boys)</td>
<td>60, From districts near and far, 12–21, M, 40s, M</td>
<td>M, Maulana</td>
<td>Arabic grammar and basic Islamic knowledge by using various books</td>
<td>Writing/oral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deobandi qawmi madrassah (for girls)</td>
<td>40–50, Near, Class 2, 20s, F, Hafez/dawra-e-Hadith</td>
<td>Khulna district, 20s, F, Hafez/dawra-e-Hadith</td>
<td>How to read the Quran and to pray, Arabic taught by the teacher, above Class 3: using textbook</td>
<td>Writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>140, Village M and the three neighboring villages</td>
<td>Class 1–5, Three people including a woman, from nearby villages, BA or MA</td>
<td>Class 1–2: Basic Islamic knowledge taught by the teacher, using manuals, Class 3–5: Using government designated textbooks</td>
<td>Class 1–2: oral, Class 3–5 writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Hafizia madrassah (for boys)</td>
<td>27, From districts near and far, K, 30s, M, Hafez/dakhil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reciting the Quran, some Hadith, and their meanings taught by the teacher</td>
<td>Oral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Furqania madrassah</td>
<td>19, P, 5–14, Bagerhat district, 30s, M, Hafez/maulana</td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Islamic knowledge and the meanings of the verses of the Quran and the Hadith as taught by the teacher, Using an Arabic textbook</td>
<td>Writing/oral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>The government</td>
<td>NA, Village P and the three neighboring villages</td>
<td>Class 1–5, Near, 30s, M, BA</td>
<td>Class 1–2: Basic Islamic knowledge taught by the teacher using manuals, Class 3–5: Using government designated textbooks</td>
<td>Oral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>223, Village U and the three neighboring villages</td>
<td>Class 1–5, M, 40s, F, BA (degree from Islamic studies)</td>
<td>Class 1–2: Basic Islamic knowledge taught by the teacher using manuals, Class 3–5: Using government designated textbooks</td>
<td>Writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>540, Village U and the eight neighboring villages</td>
<td>Class 6–10, All teachers including women</td>
<td>Using the government designated textbooks</td>
<td>Writing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Established years of primary and secondary schools are when individuals or the samaj informally established schools.

Note 2: The qawmi madrassah for girls mainly taught students below Class 2 and students above Class 3 went to primary schools or other madrassahs. However, the qawmi madrassah accepted students above Class 3 if they did not go to any other school.

Note 3: Although the written exams were prepared by the teachers at the madrassah as well as in the public schools, the JSC, SSC, and HSC exams were conducted by the Education Boards of Bangladesh.

Source: The author’s fieldwork in January 2018.
tion and the 2 of them were ex-students at madrassas. Madrassah committees in villages M and P selected those who had enough Islamic knowledge, after conducting an interview. Almost all the imams and teachers were hafez and/or degree-holders with either alim or fazil (equivalent to the Higher School Certificate or HSC), or higher degrees. However, no one had ever studied abroad. Three-fourth of them were from around this area and those who came from other districts had either studied or been employed in madrassas or mosques in this area. Thus, local people rarely brought a person with higher Islamic education from far. It appears that there were enough opportunities to learn and to be employed in the madrassas and the mosques in the study area.

Memorizing the Quran is the core learning component in the hafizia madrassah although the Hadith and its meanings were also taught. The furqania madrassah provides basic knowledge of Islam and Arabic as well as the meanings of some verses from the Quran and Hadith. The students of hafizia madrassah came from both nearby villages and distant districts because they were fed, housed, and taught in the madrassah without paying any fee. On the other hand, furqania madrassah did not have any room for accommodation and its students were limited to the children living in village P.

As mentioned above, qawmi madrassah is independent of the public educational system and each madrassah has a unique curriculum that focuses mainly on Arabic grammar and speaking. There were two Deobandi qawmi madrassahs in village M. They were maintained by two teachers, with the help of their own funds. They were the founders of the madrassahs and were a couple. They did not belong to any big madrassah or groups such as the qawmi madrassah education board (Al-Haiatul Ulya Lil-Jamiatil Qawmia Bangladesh). However, the male teacher had graduated from the Hatjahari madrassah, which is a well-known and influential Islamist madrassah in the Chittagong district. Therefore, the teaching contents might have been affected by of the teaching styles of the Hatjahari madrassah although I could not interview the male teacher or observe his lessons directly because I am a woman and purdah was strictly obeyed in the madrassah. The female qawmi madrassah taught women how to pray and to read the Quran in Arabic, besides giving them information on the obligations and good deeds expected of Muslim women. The students also read a Bengali translation of the Quran. The male students of the furqania madrassah came from areas far and wide because it provided accommodation, such as hafizia madrassah. However, the female students came only from the neighboring villages and did not live in the madrassah.

Aside from those madrassahs, each mosque had a maktab where the imam taught children basic Arabic and short verses from the Quran to help them read the Quran and begin praying in Arabic.

Religious subjects for Muslims were taught in primary schools and provided them with basic knowledge of Arabic and Islam. Students of Classes 1 and 2 learned how to pray and imbibed basic ideas of Islam from their teachers without textbooks. The textbooks published by the National Curriculum and Textbook Board, and the system of writing examinations were applied from Class 3 onward. Then, the students learned how to perform the five basic duties of Islam, some verses of the Quran, and a few words of prayer in Arabic and their meanings, besides the history of the Prophet Muhammad. The textbooks also spare many pages for moral content, offering information on what is good and what is wrong. Secondary schools provided higher level content, such as Hadith in Arabic and their meanings, the basic knowledge of Hadith studies, and how Islamic rules are derived from the Quran and Hadith. The religious subject is also part of the examination subjects for the JSC (Junior High School Certificate), SSC (Secondary School Certificate), and HSC. Therefore, students had to study religious subjects with just as much effort as they studied their other subjects. Thus, children studying in public schools were able to acquire knowledge to perform their Islamic duties and on what the Quran and Hadith say, although their parents could not teach or send them to the madrassah.

Although the teaching style followed in hafizia madrassah and maktab has centered on memorization, the teaching styles of other educational institutions shifted to teaching the meanings of the verses of the Quran, Hadith, and the words of prayer in Bengali. An elderly person in village P said, “We did not know the meaning of the words of a prayer (dua). Now the meaning of the Hadith is also taught at furqania madrassah. (Such a change took place) some eight to ten years ago. We used to just memorize verses in the past”. Most teaching methods and preparations for the examination at the madrassahs depended on the teachers’ own knowledge. Therefore, there is some possibility that what was taught included content that had no grounds in the Quran and Hadith. On the other hand, local teachers indicated that the contents and the quality of the religious subjects were expanded and improved during the Ershad regime. The subject name changed from “Islamic education” to “Islamic and moral education” since 2013, although most content was not likely to have been changed. A deeper and more detailed survey is nec-
ecessary to make changes in the way religious subjects are taught in public education.

3. Migrant workers in and travelers to the Middle East

Almost all travelers to the Middle East from village B were migrant workers although about one-third of these migrant workers had also performed umrah hajj and/or hajj (Table 4). Only two men and a woman in their fifties and sixties had experienced a pilgrimage to Makkah without being migrant workers. About one-third of the male workers in village B had experiences of staying at the Middle East countries.28 Saudi Arabia was the most major destination (Table 5). Migrant workers during the author’s survey were aged between 20 and 50 years, and the group comprised both unmarried and married individuals. Migration for work to Saudi Arabia began in the 1990s, to the UAE (Dubai) began in the 2000s, and to Qatar began in the 2010s, and the duration of stay in each country corresponded to the travel period (Tables 6 and 7).

There were who themselves or whose families answered that their religious knowledge, practice, and piety increased or deepened since their travel to the Middle East. This paper named them as “reformed travelers”, and they amounted to less than one-third people in all (Table 8). Thus, not all travelers to the Middle East became religious, and such a change in religious mind was an approximate trend with a lot of exceptions although Kibria (2008) emphasized only the presence of reformed travelers. However, it is worthy to note that most reformed travelers have continued to stay in Saudi Arabia.29 Reformed travelers (returned migrant workers) in Saudi Arabia said the following: “I began to pray more frequently than I did before. I did not understand Islam well. I have come to consider about Islam more deeply since I was in Saudi Arabia”; “I did not offer daily prayers before going to Saudi Arabia. However, I began to pray five times a day after going there.”

The background of such changes was the distinct socio-religious environment in Saudi Arabia, which, as Kibria (2008) called, was the “institutionalization of Islam”. Most reformed travelers mentioned Muttawa (the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice), namely the Islamic religious police which is relatively independent of the government despite being

### Table 4. Type of travelers to the Middle East from village B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of travel</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajj</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performed hajj while working</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performed umrah hajj while working</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performed hajj and umrah hajj while working</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 5. Destination of travelers to the Middle East from village B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Continue</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE (Dubai)</td>
<td>Continue</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Continue</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those who went to the Middle East more than once were counted repeatedly.

### Table 6. Travel age of migrant workers from village B in the Middle East (person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>UAE (Dubai)</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th><strong>Total</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010s</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 7. Duration of stay of migrant workers from village B in the Middle East (person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>UAE (Dubai)</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th><strong>Total</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 8. Changes in religious knowledge and practice of travelers to the Middle East from village B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic knowledge, practice, and piety increased</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice Islamic duties eagerly from before</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so religious and no change</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author’s fieldwork in January 2018.
a public organization. Muttawa supervised people’s conduct and arrested those who broke Islamic rules based on Wahhabism. Muslims had to offer prayers five times every day and people had to close their shops during prayer time. If the Muttawa found that a Muslim migrant worker missed a prayer several times, their visas would be withdrawn and the migrant worker would be deported. Therefore, Bangladeshi migrant workers had to pray regularly in Saudi Arabia regardless of whether they were willing or unwilling, and praying five times a day became a habit for them.

Moreover, pilgrims from Bangladesh learned the proper way of prayer and the manner in which one had to conduct themselves during pilgrimage at hajj camps in the international airport in Dhaka for about 40 days. Other reformed travelers also mentioned the opportunities available to adults to seek Islamic education, as some migrant workers listed educational institutions in Saudi Arabia as their source of Islamic learning (Table 2). For example, a father and son in village B learned Arabic in a public their source of Islamic learning (Table 2). For example, a father and son in village B learned Arabic in a public learning center without paying any tuition fees. Some companies and organizations employing migrant workers also provided them with weekly Islamic lessons. Moreover, it was well-known that Bangladeshis held regular Islamic study meetings and conducted missionary activities regularly on their own in Riyadh. Tablighi jamaat was also performed secretly although it was prohibited in Saudi Arabia. Rich Bangladeshi migrants who had lived in Saudi Arabia for a relatively longer duration were invested in similar activities, such as the distribution of free books translated in Bengali to facilitate Islamic learning. Although I could not conduct a survey in Riyadh, I heard that at least 700 Bangladeshi migrant households were concentrated in Makkha, and a rich person among them had constructed a mosque and madrassah not only in his hometown, but also in Makkha. These religious activities by Bangladeshi migrants in Saudi Arabia need to be surveyed more intensively.

How do reformed travelers have social or cultural impacts on local society? First, all the reformed travelers encouraged their families to pray and fast properly and to send their children to madrassahs. Second, they gave additional donations to the mosque in village B. Moreover, a reformed traveler and a woman whose son was working in Qatar said the following: “I speak to everyone at our mosque for the sake of removing their misunderstandings about Islam as a person who went to Saudi Arabia and learned about Islam there”; “I had a niyyah (intention sworn to Allah) to hold an Islamic conference at our house if my son could get a good job in Qatar before he went there. I actually carried out it.” However, there was little difference in the participation and investment in religious activities between those who stayed in the Middle East including the reformed travelers and the others, except the above several cases. Most of them were not able to participate in local religious activities directly because they were either setting up their business using the income they earned from their work as migrants or they went abroad to work, again. Furthermore, there was no significant rise in their social status. The two men who performed haj were commissioners of the mosque committee before they went on their journey. Thus, the influence of the reformed travelers is likely to be limited to the individuals themselves and their families in the case of village B.

However, there was an influential person, locally called as maulana, who had stayed in Saudi Arabia for five years and had performed haj in village K. He was in his sixties and was the husband of the female preacher of talim, which was held in village K as mentioned above. He obtained the degree of dawra-e-Hadith from a domestic qawmi madrassah influenced by Deobandi. He said that there was no madrassah without Deobandi in his time as a student and that all of his teachers had learned in the Deobandi madrassah in India. He had taught in two madrassahs in Tangail district for about 11 years after graduation. After that, he had worked in Saudi Arabia for five years. He described the differences between Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh and mentioned the un-Islamic characteristics of Bangladeshi in the following words: “Saudi Arabsians are more religious than are Bangladeshis. Everyone prays properly and does not lie”, “(Bangladeshi are) jealous (hinsha) and do not to pray properly” He had been employed as the imam of a mosque in village M for nearly ten years and as a madrassah teacher in the neighboring village for several years. During this time, he offered regular Islamic lessons at several houses in villages B, M, K, P, and U as two people in village B said that they had learned from his sessions (Table 2). One of the participants said, “The maulana instructed us on what Muslims should do and taught us about prayer. I was very wrong about many things (until then), so I corrected myself. There were many falsehoods in the books that were translated into Bengali. (…) I learned about the kinds of deeds and things that were un-Islamic.”

The maulana and his family lived in Tangail city and did not conduct any lessons during the author’s study period. However, on a weekly basis, the maulana visited his house in village K with his wife for talim. Sometimes, he preached in talim and counseled the local people,
such as by teaching them Arabic words for prayer (dua) and giving them tabiz, which is a charm with a verse of the Quran written on a piece of paper. Moreover, he had also performed hajj many times, taking local people along, because he had a connection with a hajj agency and was able to apply for a hajj visa at a specially reduced price. He took five people including his wife and the man and woman who lived in village B for hajj in 2017. Thus, it seems that he has contributed to the spread of Islamic knowledge in this area particularly when he lived in village K after returning from Saudi Arabia. Although such cases may not often be observed, the existence of such a person is a symbol of the significant role played by modern religious education and the network with other Muslim majority countries, particularly where Islam is institutionalized like in Saudi Arabia, in the deepening of Islamic knowledge and practice.

VII. Conclusion

In conclusion, I will first summarize what has been explored above and then add an analysis. Second, I will present a conceptual framework and model of Islamization based on the cases presented in this paper. Finally, I will consider the mechanism of Islamization that is specific to Bangladesh and its connections, and identify its similarities with and differences from the worldwide Islamic revivalist movement.

Based on the cases presented in this paper, national-level politics and policies have had indirect impacts on religious activities at the grassroots. Direct interference or support by public organizations seldom reached local Muslim communities (samaj). However, Muslims including Sanaidar, abandoned Hindu customs after the migration of the upper class Hindus along with the foundation of Pakistan. It is in contrast with cases in West Bengal where Muslims in general, not only in particular groups, have maintained Hindu customs (e.g., Kin, 2000). Moreover, the extension of modern religious education and financial support for it are likely to have significant impacts. Local people certainly identified the increase in the number religious educational institutions and the opportunity that it presented for people seeking higher education in Islam. They generally gained Islamic knowledge directly from imams of mosques, or from teachers at madrassas, or through local Islamic lessons taught by Islamic intellectuals. Almost all of those imams and teachers were authorized by the higher degrees they had obtained from domestic madrassas.

Although the experience of living in the Middle East did not necessarily reform one’s religious knowledge and practice, most reformed travelers either worked or performed hajj in Saudi Arabia, where Islam is institutionalized, and had an influence on at least his family’s religious life. Indeed, their impact on local society was not significant, although one of them became a key person in the spread of Islamic knowledge in this area. Moreover, I could directly interview only 8 out of the 45 travelers to the Middle East and most of the information derived came from indirect sources, such as their family members. Therefore, a more intensive and long-term survey is necessary for the examination of the social and cultural impacts of travelers to the Middle East on Bangladesh.

On the other hand, publications including the Quran and Hadith and contemporary digital media were very minor sources of Islamic knowledge. Therefore, the Islamic discourse space was likely to be more divided in this area in comparison with the case of Mahmood (2005) in Cairo, whose Islamic discourse space was described homogeneously through the spread of digital media. Here, Islamic discourse means the generally accorded norms based on Islam, irrespective of whether its source was the Quran or Hadith or neither.

The imams and teachers were the most important sources of Islamic knowledge in this area. However, they were not rigorous religious authorities that forced or punished people to attend to mosques, to take Islamic lessons, to practice what was taught, or to perform their Islamic duties. It seems that Islamic intellectuals and reformed travelers led the deepening of both Islamic knowledge and practice of individuals by providing opportunities to gain Islamic education and by encouraging their families and the local people, rather than disciplining the local society and space by using a top-down approach through the exercise of religious authority.

The deepening of Islamic practice was derived from individual piety and intention that went beyond this world and was dedicated to Allah and his/her future world after death. Most local people pointed out that people no longer performed their religious duties these days. However, political and social pressure that a certain standard of religious practice by individuals or groups guarantees or improves their social involvement and status also played a role, although they did not have an absolute compelling force. This pressure worked at multiple levels: the global Muslim community (ummah or international network of Muslim majority countries), nation-state, local society, samaj, lineage, family, and individual. For example, the government of Bangladesh had to turn from secularism to introduce Islamic elements to the public system under

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pressure from the Middle East countries (i.e., global level). The foundation of Pakistan gave Muslims an opportunity to abandon Hindu customs (i.e., national level). It was shameful to maintain a mosque on donations from other samaj, so this led to the competitive construction of beautiful religious institutions (i.e., local society level). Previous studies on Bangladeshi villages noted that adopting Islamic practices such as purdah improved the social status of both the individual and the family (Jahangir, 1979, pp. 86–87; Arefeen, 1986, pp. 90–92; Jansen, 1987, pp. 74–75; Karim, 1990, pp. 86–90). Similar examples were also observed in the study area in this paper.

The evidences of political and social pressure working on the local society represents the disembedding and mainstreaming of an Islam-centered local social system wherein individual Muslims and their groups or organizations seek to decide their code of conduct by referring to the Islamic rules or what is locally connected with Islam in their system regardless of whether they are motivated by their piety or by political and social pressure. This paper calls such a local social system as the “Islamic locale”. The word “locale” here, means a spatial context where agents act based on their knowledge and resources, as well as a local social system that is not limited to particular spatial range (Johnston, 1991; cf. Giddens, 1990b). A locale is generally considered as a material context or a physical setting. However, it is a spatial context or a setting for action that comprises material elements as well as sets of social norms and culturally shared values that are meant to be understood as material, socio-economic, and socio-cultural constellations of actions with content that holds inter-subjective shared meaning (Werlen, 2009). Although the material context such as the locations of mosques and madrassahs is important as well, inter-subjective shared norms and views are significant elements in constituting an Islamic locale.

Although the Islamic locale provides the daily routines and rituals and imposes a certain degree of political and social pressure on individuals and groups, it does not necessarily regulate all practices by people because the Islamic locale is no more than one of the local social systems based on various values. It is similar to what Komaki (1997) called “selective Islamization”. She concluded that Muslims did not abandon all indigenous customs and shift completely to Islamic practice, and based this argument on the prevalence of a local dowry system called jahez. Jahez was considered an un-Islamic practice, but nevertheless prevailed recently among Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, because it was considered important in maintaining the social status of and relationships between families (Komaki, 1997). Khan (1999, p.xxi) also denoted a similar opinion based on the case where Muslims in Sylhet district continued to worship saints and ghosts for fear of their curse or for fear of losing benefits from them even though they knew that such worship was an un-Islamic practice. Thus, some people seek more legitimate ways of practicing Islam, while others dare to disobey Islamic rules. Some others are in positions where they cannot obey these rules due to their practical problems such as for example, they have no way around paying a dowry while performing the marriage of their daughter. The degree to which Islamic practice is adopted depends on individual intention and local social context rather than on the progress of Islamization with a primary shift from indigenous customs to Islamic practice based on the Quran and Hadith.

According to the case of Islamization in the study area, the process of disembedding of Islamic locale can be theorized in the following manner (Figure 2). The first stage is that the Islamic locale is embedded in the local social systems. Adopting Islamic practices is one of the means to climb up the social ladder. However, the elements adopted by Muslims are what they think of as essential to their self-definition of their identity as Muslims of high social standing and are not necessarily drawn upon from the Quran and Hadith as Ahmad (1978b, p. 191) said. Some of

![Figure 2. The process of disembedding Islamic locale](source: Author)
the elements are often social and cultural customs that are derived from upper class Hindus. In other words, Muslims do not deeply consider what is based on Islam and what is not and do not question the legitimacy of the prevailing Islamic discourse.

The second stage is the process of disembedding the Islamic locale. The triggers of disembedding of Islamic locale are the acceptance of modern religious education and the acceptance of Islamic intellectuals who construct and spread the Islamic discourse. Muslims learn what is based on Islam and what is not and seek to classify their existing customs and practices into one of those two categories. However, this categorization and classification are constructed not by an individual Muslim's own Islamic knowledge but by some intellectuals and the prevailing local Islamic discourse. Here, Islamic discourse space is segmented at the micro-level and the local Islamic discourse sometimes or often includes local rules and practices that do not have their source of law in the Quran and Hadith. Most Muslims do not have a means to trace the source of law and to make an inquiry on the legitimacy of Islamic discourse on their own. I believe that Muslims in the study area experienced the process at this stage during the author's survey period. At this time, the students were learning the meanings of the verses in the Quran and Hadith and gained intellectual resources to make their inquiries on the legitimacy of the Islamic discourse.

Islamic locale is disembedded from the local social systems in the final stage. Individual Muslims have the intellectual resources and a means to survey the sources of law of Islamic discourse and to judge their legitimacy by themselves without depending on other people. In addition to the spread of modern Islamic education, they are easily able to access global and diverse Islamic discourse and its source of law through the spread of digital media and the Internet. Thus, the legitimacy of Islamic discourse come to be contested more intensely. However, this stage does not mean that everyone deepens their Islamic practice or that Islamic locale is prior to or regulates other local social systems. There are still many Muslims who dare to break Islamic rules although they have collected enough Islamic knowledge.

The process of disembedding Islamic locale is different from what Kosugi (2006) called "re-Islamization". Rather, it is an elaboration of the third phase of Islamization as presented by Trimingham (1962). The experiences of the cases in rural Bangladesh cannot be understood as the process of "re-Islamization". Furthermore, Kosugi (2006) defined the first stage of Islamization as a supplementary process of Islamization of a local area and the localiza-

tion of Islam as mentioned above. According to the above model that I constructed, the classification of "Islam" and "local", and the social significance of such classification are not essentially determined but differ with different regional historical backgrounds and social contexts.

Finally, I will discuss the mechanism of disembedding Islamic locale that is specific to rural Bangladesh based on the historical backgrounds of the cases in Tangail and their connections, similarities with, and differences from the worldwide Islamic revivalist movement. In the first stage of the embedded Islamic locale, the population and landscape had been Islamized; mosques and madrassahs that were necessary for Islamic practice and learning for all Muslims were constructed in such a way that Muslims could access them easily. The social and cultural influence by Hindus declined along with the migration of the upper class Hindus and Muslims became a dominant social group in the local society. It was a distinct process in Bangladesh. Although I noted that one of the triggers of disembedding the Islamic locale is the acceptance of modern religious education. There is a condition for it: the achievement of a certain degree of economic status is necessary for Muslims to spare time to receive education and engage in religious activities. Rural Bangladesh has experienced economic growth since the late 1980s and has also been supported through economic contributions by overseas migrant workers. The wealthy class who could engage with religious activities including both learning Islamic knowledge and providing Islamic lessons had increased. The spread of modern religious education was promoted by the government and the oil-producing countries in the Middle East, and this led to an increase in the number of Islamic intellectuals with higher degrees. Thus, Islamic knowledge spread and deepened among individual Muslims and the Islamic locale was disembedding. Although whether Muslims follow Islamic rules or not depended on individual piety and intention, travelers to Saudi Arabia tended to be more religious and encouraged their family to be so, as well.

However, almost all Sanaidar did not benefit from the economic growth since the late 1980s and did not accept modern religious education or travel abroad. Therefore, Islamic locale remained embedded for them. However, they were also under social and political pressure from the disembedding of the Islamic locale among Muslims and sought to achieve the standard of Islamic practice, such as conducting congregational prayers five times a day in the mosque and maintaining the mosque on their own finances.

In this process of disembedding the Islamic locale,
adopting Islamic elements in public systems such as the extension of modern religious education under pressure from the Middle East donor countries can be regarded as an effect of the worldwide Islamic revivalism movements. Although travelers to the Middle East including migrant workers and pilgrims maybe also influenced by those movements, their experiences in those countries, specifically with what they were taught in their Islamic lessons there and the impact they had on their hometown, needs to be studied more intensively. The similarities of Islamization in Bangladesh with other Islamic revivalist movements worldwide include the increase in the size of the wealthy leisure class along with economic growth and the spread of modern religious education. The Islamization of Bangladesh differs from worldwide revivalist movements in the following three ways. First, although religious activities flourished in rural Bangladesh in parallel with modernization and globalization, it cannot be considered as a reaction to secularism. Rather, secularization had proceeded in parallel with the disembedding of the Islamic locale in respect of what Taylor (2007) called as the “nova effect” of secularization, as local people had the opportunity to choose whether to obey Islamic rules or not, on their own. Second, direct interference in or support for local religious activities by the government was rare. Finally, the Islamic texts including the Quran and Hadith and digital media made a very small contribution to the spread and deepening of Islamic knowledge. Thus, Islamic knowledge still remains embedded in the local context. However, digital media and modern religious education will increasingly spread in the near future and the Islamic locale will be disembedded further along with it.

Acknowledgment

I had the opportunity to make a presentation on the essence of this paper in the first research meeting in FY 2018 organized by HINDAS. My heartfelt appreciation goes to those who attended to the research meeting, whose comments and suggestions were of inestimable value for my study. I would also like to express my gratitude to those who were living in the Bangladeshi villages and Makkha which I visited during my fieldwork for their warm cooperation. Finally, this work was supported by the JSPS under Grant Number 16J05363. I thank JSPS for the grant that made it possible to complete this study.

Notes

1. As a rebuttal to such a framework, several studies attempt to construct models or theories specific to Islam (e.g., Arefeen, 1982; Vatuk, 1996; Mannan, 2000; Komaki, 2000, p. 306).
2. Modern religious education refers to learning religious contents not only by memorizing religious terms or prayer words, but also by understanding the meaning of those terms and words through the use of textbooks and educational qualifications available for graduates.
3. Deobandi is a reformist group of the Sunni sect that seeks to revise Muslim beliefs and practices by emphasizing the strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith. Its origin is a higher Islamic educational institute built in North India in 1866 and it was one of the key actors in the anti-colonial movements organized by reformist Muslims.
4. Needless to say, the successive governments have never committed only to Islamic policies and have retained secular aspects in order to maintain a good relationship with Western donor countries.
5. Fatwa originally meant Islamic scholarly advice or recommendations based on Shari'a, which has no binding power. However, it was strongly enforceable and not necessarily based on Shari'a in rural Bangladesh and therefore, the newly coined term fatwabazi (fatwa abuse) spread rapidly in the 1990s.
6. These previous studies as well as this paper do not mean that the Middle East is the central point of the Muslim community where the legitimate or typical Islam can be observed. Rather, Kibria (2008) explored the fact that Bangladeshi migrant workers were disappointed with un-Islamic conduct and attitudes displayed by Muslims in the Middle East. What is important here is that Bangladeshi Muslims came to reconsider their Islamic practice in their hometown by staying in different social environments involving Islam.
7. BRS refers to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
10. The administrative units in rural Bangladesh are district, upazila, and union which consists of one or several mouzas (the lowest revenue collection unit), in ascending order of rank. On the other hand, a spontaneous village called gram consists of one or several paras. A para consists of one or several baris or homesteads composed of one or several households or families. The administrative units were introduced during British India and do not often correspond to the spontaneous ones. However, grams almost correspond to mouzas in the study area.
12. The religious subject teaches students about each religion, such as Hinduism and Christianity. This paper only treats the religious education meant for Muslims. The PDF files of textbooks currently that are used are available online: https://www.coachinghomebd.com/nctb-book-download/ (accessed February 3, 2019)
13. Although there is a possibility that Sanaidars converted from Hinduism against their own theories on their origin, they were Muslims at least since the end of 19th century. This is because I found Muslim names such as “Ali” and “Uddin” in their ancestral names in the Cadastral Survey books that were edited in
1918.

14. Both words mean “treating to a meal on ceremonial occasions”.

15. “Mosque” in this paper, means the jame masjid where an imam offers prayers five times every day (BBS, 1985), including one after noon on Friday.

16. Although samaj generally means “society” or “association” in South Asia, the term is used to refer to the informal social unit that conducts dispute settlement and religious activities cooperatively in Bangladesh.

17. The number of mosques in Bangladesh has nearly doubled in 25 years. It was 131,641 in 1983 and 250,399 in 2008 according to BBS (1985, p. xiii) and the author’s interview with the Islamic Foundation. However, the former included mosques without jame mosques (the number of jame mosques was 89 percent of the above) while the latter counted only the jame mosques.

18. Local people clearly distinguished between “onudan” from “chada”. The former was a relatively higher amount of donation made by people or organizations at a higher level such as a member of parliament, a foreigner, or the government. The latter refers to a fixed subscription or voluntary donations from people of an equal level. Asking or receiving onudan was not shameful for them (Table 1).


20. The Mujible administration founded the Islamic Foundation, which provided a fund to construct mosques or to train imams in 1975. However, the Islamic Foundation had only a branch office in each division and district (the total estimated number was 72), while the union court was introduced to all unions (4,554 in 2018) https://bangladesh.gov.bd/index.php. (accessed February 3, 2019)

21. See note 5. on fatwa.

22. However, the Sanaidar in village P was threatened to withdraw their membership in the samaj by the mosque committee because they did not attend to the mosque and did not fast during Ramadan, while the other members of samaj had never been asked to do so even though they also did not perform these religious duties. Such discrimination was based on the weak political and economic status of Sanaidar and jati thinking (Sugie, 2017).

23. This article mentions talim only briefly. I will present the details in another paper.

24. It also demonstrates the disobedience of Islamic rules, as many people used microfinance and got/paid the interest on saving/loans, which is prohibited in Islam.

25. I was not able to survey the mosques and madrassas in village K.


27. In addition, the past mode of pronunciation of Arabic words came to be considered as wrong and a different one was taught during the author’s survey period.

28. The number of male workers in village B was 111 in 2012.

29. Ten of the fourteen reformed travelers. Two of the ten had only experienced hajj.

30. The father said that the center was run by the government, but it might have been run by non-governmental organizations such as The Muslim World League (Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami).

31. Although tabiz is often regarded as the sin of practicing idolatry (shirk), Deobandi allows it.

32. The view of regarding Islam as discourse is common among many researchers (e.g., Ahmed, 1992; Mahmood, 2005). Muslims interpret the Quran and Hadith and construct various Islamic discourses.

33. I use the terms “embedded” and “disembedded” by relying on Giddens (1990a) in this paper.

34. While secularization is generally thought of as privatization of religion from a public system or the decline of religious creeds and practice, Taylor (2007) suggested a third view wherein people get to make their choices on whether they believe in god or not on their own, rather than blindly believing in the absolute existence of god and calls this aspect of secularism the nova effect.

References


