Political Implications of the “Withdrawal Strategy” of African States from the International Criminal Court (ICC)

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Abstract

This essay is intended to analyze the debate on the withdrawal from the ICC by African states. First, it examines the background of the debate. Second, it carefully looks at the contents of the Withdrawal Strategy Document by the AU. In so doing, this essay illustrates the nature of the issue as the dilemmas between politics and law, peace and justice, and regionalism and universalism. There is a general growing trend of multi-layered security structures of international society in relation to the principles of local ownership, empowerment and partnership. The essay argues that there is room for the ICC’s endeavors to advance “positive complementarity.”

Introduction

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been suffering from threats of withdrawal by African States Parties from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Some African states including those which traditionally supported the ICC have begun to speak critically of the ICC. The criticisms culminated in 2016 when Burundi, South Africa and Gambia expressed their intentions to withdraw from the Rome Statute. Since then, Burundi has officially withdrawn. Gambia has taken back its intention to withdraw as a result of the ousting of Former President Yahya Jammeh in 2017. The government party of South Africa, ANC, is still pursuing the completion of the domestic procedure for its
withdrawal request to the ICC, even after its Supreme Court decided that the consent of the Parliament is required for withdrawal. The impact of the resignation of President Jacob Zuma in February 2018 remains to be seen.

Their criticisms are about not only the ICC’s handling of some specific cases, but also its overall attitudes towards Africa. This means that their criticisms are addressed toward not only legal procedures, but also political standpoints of the ICC. The African Union, where States Parties and non-States Parties of the ICC gather, has adopted some decisions to discourage its member states to comply with the arrest warrants of heads of state of African states issued by the ICC. 1

It is too early to find whether the discussion about the withdrawal will continue. The movement for withdrawal is certainly an expression of frustration with the ICC among African states, but not yet a substantive move toward mass withdrawal. There are a significant number of pro-ICC states in AU influencing the course of the debate. It is rather important to recognize structural issues behind the scenes of the debate. If the ICC where many European lawyers are working takes harsh attitudes toward Africa constantly, it is natural that many would revitalize the memory of European colonialism in Africa. Whether the ICC is biased or not, then African leaders tend to expect the ICC to change or reform.

This essay aims to explore the causes and nature of such frustration among African states with the ICC. In so doing, the essay seeks to identify the way to go forward for the ICC. The essay does not want the ICC, legal institution, to be politicized. It does not blame African leaders for narrow-mindedness. Rather, the essay tries to identify the manner the ICC can constructively improve its relationship with African states and even more clearly present itself as a universal international criminal court.

This essay will later illustrate the contents of the “Withdrawal Strategy Document” adopted by the AU, which succinctly shows the attitudes and requests of AU to the ICC. This essay understands the Document as the basis of its examination of the issue.

This essay takes into consideration the nature of contemporary international society in examining the issue of the withdrawal strategy. It is true that Africa is one of the significant areas where the application of international humanitarian law through channels represented by the ICC is being tested. But universalized international society after decolonization in which sovereign nation-states have become a norm is still an unfinished attempt in the sense that many newly

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independent states remain fragile. The universalization of international humanitarian law should proceed to resonate with the development of the structure of universalized international society. If the development of such universalization loses ground, structural tensions arise as in the case of the criticisms by African states to the ICC.²

It should be noted that the ICC is inevitably operating in the environment of the War on Terror in 21st century international politics as an international institution to respond to atrocities during armed conflicts. Responses to international crimes during armed conflicts are understood in the context of international politics. From the perspectives of those states which are interested in fighting terrorists, the ICC’s utility is its contributions to the War on Terror. If the ICC mismanage such expectation, it could be downgraded as an aimless institution of simplistic legalism.

It should also be noted that the withdrawal issue is related to a growing need for “partnership peacekeeping” in our age. Contemporary international peace operations tend to from partnership styles between the United Nations and regional or sub-regional organizations especially in Africa. UN peacekeeping operations deployed in Africa have institutional linkages with AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and other sub-regional organizations in addition to extra-African regional organizations like the European Union (EU). African states gathering at the AU are demanding that the ICC recognize the trend of the time in universalizing international humanitarian law.

The essay examines the relationship between the ICC and Africa by focusing on the withdrawal issue by taking into consideration these points in international politics. First, it shows the chronological development of the withdrawal issue by African states. Second, it seeks to identify what African states expects from the ICC by illuminating the contents of the AU’s Withdrawal Strategy Document. In so doing, it argues that the ICC can respond to the concerns of African states without jeopardizing its integrity as an international legal institution.

1. Why do African states criticize the ICC?

The first task for this essay is to consider the reasons why not a few political leaders are now so critical of the ICC. In order to answer the question, it is necessary to look at the practices of the

ICC since its establishment in 2003. Almost two thirds of the African states have joined in the Rome Statute, as they supported the ICC. In 15 years, some states changed their attitudes towards the ICC.

As of January 2017, the ICC is investigating 11 cases. 10 out of the 11 cases are in African states: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Central African Republic I and II, Darfur (Sudan), Kenya, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Burundi. The only exception is Georgia, which became the situation under investigation only in 2016. This number can be said to be a reflection of the fact that there have been many armed conflicts in Africa in the last 15 years. But there are also armed conflicts taking place outside of Africa and the number of armed conflicts in Africa has not necessarily increased for the last 15 years. It is true that the ICC is investigating and as a result indicting the disproportionate number of Africans, which could give the impression that the ICC is targeting Africa while ignoring criminals outside of Africa.

It goes without saying that one of the main reasons of this tendency is the high rate of participation in the Rome Statute of the African states. There are at this moment 123 States Parties to the Rome Statute after the withdrawal of Burundi. There are 33 African states among them. Even if there are high numbers of States Parties from Europe and Canada (43 states), Latin America (28 states), and the Pacific (13 states) where only a few number of armed conflicts have been recorded since 2003. There are only a limited number of Asian states, Jordan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, South Korea and Japan. Only if more States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia had joined in the ICC, it would have been less concentration on African cases. The ICC’s extensive involvements in Africa is to a great extent a result of the participation in the ICC of such a large number of African states. Given that the states in other conflict-torn regions tend to avoid the ICC, the high participation rate of African states strongly shows that Africa was a great supporter of the ICC.

As long as this observation applies, it does not make sense to blame the ICC for being biased. It would not make sense that African states misunderstood the ICC. When they need it, they joined; if they do not need it any more, they would withdraw from it. It would not be absurd to say that the ICC has been dealing with African cases in a disproportionate manner, even if it is not purely a result of its own discretion. The ICC handles Africa due to the structural circumstance of international politics including disproportionate participation rates among various regions. It is thus necessary to examine political

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circumstances to understand the shifts of the positions of African states toward the ICC.

2. The Impacts of Sudan and Kenya

African states were not necessarily critical of the ICC from the beginning. Not all the cases on African states frustrated them. Rather, there are two particular outstanding cases in the history of the ICC are Sudan and Kenya, where the incumbent governments are under investigation due to formal or informal requests by outsiders of the ICC’s normal activities.

Out of the formally expressed intentions to withdraw from the Rome Statute, Gambia took back its position after the regime change. Burundi, the only state which actually withdrew from the Rome Statute, is now the country under investigation and many believe that the government wanted to withdraw in order to avoid criminal investigation into themselves. The AU does not necessarily refer to Gambia and Burundi when it expresses critical views; it usually illustrates Sudan and Kenya as the ICC’s problematic involvements in African affairs. South Africa, significantly influential state in Africa, considers its withdrawal due to the controversy over its engagement with the case of Sudan.

Sudan and Ethiopia, non-States Parties to the Rome Statute, are acute critics of the ICC in the AU. They represent the intersection between pro-ICC states and anti-ICC states may create tensions between themselves. When anti-ICC states are big regional powers in Africa, tensions entail grave political implications. Kenya and Uganda have expressed critical views on the ICC, although they are States-Parties to the Rome Statute. They became critical because they have troubles with the ICC over their own cases respectively. But in the surrounding environment of their neighboring powers in East Africa more or less being critical of the ICC, they can also become critical rather easily.

This situation makes a clear contrast with the pro-ICC bloc in West Africa. The regional power in East Africa, Nigeria, is a strong supporter of the ICC. The other states in West Africa are generally supportive of the ICC and critical of the anti-ICC states in the AU. The Southern African states are traditionally very supportive of the ICC, as in the case of Botswana still now. South Africa is an exception as a result of the incidental involvement in the case of Sudan.

The list of the situations under the ICC’s investigation tells the reasons why there are regional gaps even within Africa. Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, DRC and CAR spread from East Africa to Central Africa. It should be noted that this list includes regional powers in East Africa and Central Africa. Libya in North Africa is an example
in which the collapsed former regime is under investigation. The remaining countries, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa, are the cases in which the ICC investigates the crimes of anti-government or former government groups. The ICC receives critical responses when it investigates governments, especially, of regional powers. It is natural to argue that political circumstances determine attitudes toward the ICC.

It should be noted that Uganda, DRC, CAR, and Mali are the cases where investigations started in response to the requests by their own governments. They take modest attitudes toward the ICC. The only problematic case is Uganda, whose attitudes towards the ICC drifted significantly. The government sought to take back its request in vain in accordance with the progress of its peace negotiation with the rebel group, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and then it began to criticize the ICC.

In the history of the ICC, there are three cases in which investigations started *proprio motu* and two cases in which investigations started as a result of requests by the UN Security Council. It is significant to note that such controversial cases are all in Africa.

The investigation into Côte d’Ivoire started *proprio motu*. But the fact is that the AU requested the ICC to start the investigation in response to the ousting of former President Laurent Gbago. Over the turmoil at the time of the presidential election in 2010, both Gbago and Alassane Dramane Ouattara declared victory with the backing of the Constitutional Council and the Electoral Commission respectively. After the four months of confusion, Gbago was detained by Ouattara’s associates in April 2011. In half a year the ICC started the investigation and arrested Gbago for the crime against humanity in November 2011. The AU was a catalyst in this development of events, while Côte d’Ivoire is not mentioned in the debate over the AU’s relationship with the ICC.  

The case of Kenya is more controversial, even though the circumstance is more or less similar from the perspective of the ICC. There occurred the violent incidents which killed around 1,300 people due to the turmoil over the contested result of the presidential election in 2007-2008. Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, sought to bring about a political settlement. Annan demanded that the government should arrest those who were involved with the violence. Annan suggested that if it failed to do so, he would submit the list of the suspects to the ICC. As the government did not take actions to indict suspects, Annan actually submitted the list to the ICC. He made a de-facto request to the ICC for its

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4 See, for instance, ICC website “Côte d’Ivoire”, [https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi](https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi).
indictment of the suspects as a result of the failure of his political mediation.  

Luis Moreno Ocampo, First Prosecutor of the ICC, decided to indict Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the first president of Kenya, John Kenyatta, and Finance Minister as well as Deputy Prime Minister, in 2012. Later, Kenyatta won the presidential election with another indicted man, William Ruto, as vice-president. After they assumed office in April 2013, they launched the campaign against the ICC. Fatou Bensouda, who had become the Prosecutor of the ICC in June 2012, decided to terminate the investigation into Kenyatta due to the lack of cooperation of the government of Kenya in 2014. She terminated the investigation into Ruto in 2016. But until that time, the debate concerning sovereign immunity for heads of government had become a hot issue in Africa, which left a serious blow to the relationship between the ICC and African states.

The two cases referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council are Libya and Sudan whose political implications differ. Libya is not widely discussed within the AU. It was originally a controversial issue. The destiny of the political leader in Libya marks a clear contrast between Libya and the cases of Sudan and Kenya. Only three months after the referral by the Security Council in March 2011, the ICC announced the indictment of the supreme political leader, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi. But he was killed soon after the announcement and the ICC took back the indictment. The ICC could not have any presence over Libya and as a result did not have any criticisms.  

By contrast, the Darfur case of Sudan is the most controversial case in the history of the ICC. With the intensification of the conflict in Darfur, the UN Security Council decided to refer the case to the ICC in March 2005. The George W. Bush administration of the USA did not exercise veto power despite its long-standing antagonistic attitude toward the ICC. The Indictment of President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir was announced in March 2009. The indictment against President Al Bashir was made also in July 2010. Since then he was not arrested although he travelled abroad frequently. The countries of his visits include some ICC States Parties like South Africa, which have not yet fulfilled their obligations.  


7 Such ICC States Parties are Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Uganda. President Al Bashir has often visited non-
the ICC stipulates that “The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.” On the other hand, Article (2) stipulates that “Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” There are some legal technicalities behind the scene that African states insist on sovereign immunity of heads of states, while the ICC does not admit it.  

The principle of sovereign immunity originates from the understanding of international law as a “horizontal” normative system. The traditional understanding of international law being a collection of treaties and customs of equal sovereign states concluded that equals would not be able to punish each other. There is room for legal discussions about how the Rome Statute as a multinational treaty can override the traditional understanding of sovereign immunity procedurally.

The manner of applying the principle of sovereign immunity has been changing due to the practices of international criminal courts since 1990s. The International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted the head of state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President Slobodan Milošević, in 1999. He was transferred to The Hague and detained in 2001, after he lost power. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) indicted President of Liberia and head of state, Charles Taylor, in 2003. After taking refuge in Nigeria, he was detained in 2006. He was found guilty in 2012. There are some such precedents of heads of state being indicted, arrested and sentenced.

But the fact is that both Milošević and Taylor were arrested only after they were ousted from office. ICTY had the enforcement power of the UN Charter Chapter VII. The relationship between the UN Security Council and member countries is not necessarily equal as regards Chapter VII enforcement measures. The referral to the ICC over the Darfur Case was made by the UN Security Council. Thus, even if the ICC is based upon the multinational treaty, it is not impossible to assume that the referral by the UNSC may entail higher

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States Parties in Africa like Ethiopia and Egypt. 

8 Abel S. Knottnerus, “The AU, the ICC, and the Prosecution of African Presidents” in Clarke, Knottnerus and de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC.

authority. In such a manner, the controversy over sovereign immunity remains unresolved.

When AU members discussed ICC related issues in October 2012, they argued that the ICC should admit participation in the court by President and Vice-president of Kenya through video-conference system from their home country. In addition, they requested the UN Security Council to take measures to postpone investigations into political leaders of Sudan and Kenya. At that time, Ethiopia’s prime minister, then chairperson of AU, Hailemariam Desalegn, pointed to the flaws of the ICC system and even its racism.10

As a non-State Party to the Rome Statute, Sudan claims that it does not have to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. Sudan argues that the ICC does not have the authority to indict non-State Party’s head of state. Sudan appeals to other African states so that they all protest against the ICC. As a result, other non-States Parties in the same region including Egypt and Ethiopia in particular became outspokenly hostile toward the ICC. They all influenced other countries especially in East Africa and the Great Lakes. When President Al Bashir visited South Africa for the AU summit meeting in 2015, the government of South Africa did not comply with the arrest warrant by the ICC despite the request by the supreme court of South Africa. South Africa became an acute critic of the ICC after the incident, which led it to declare its intention to withdraw from the ICC.11

The ambitious referral by the Security Council to the ICC stimulated tensions and frustrations among African states toward the ICC. It is ironic that the ICC being conscious of keeping apolitical standpoints as a legal court had to compromise its reputation as a result of the referral by the UNSC. The political nature of the ICC’s actions in such cases as Darfur makes blurred the boundary between law and politics. The ICC was not ready to cope with such a complex circumstance; it even lacked methodology to handle it.

3. AU’s Withdrawal Strategy Document

The Withdrawal Strategy Document issued by the AU on January 17, 2017 is an important document that explains how AU members are critical toward the ICC.12 It is not true that the Document simply advocated mass withdrawal from the ICC. Rather, it shows how AU members are frustrated. In the sense the Document is a guideline to identify possible manners to improve the relationship between African

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states and the ICC constructively.

At first, the Withdrawal Strategy Document accuses the ICC of its double-standard. But then it calls for reforms of the ICC by insisting on regionalization of international criminal law. It emphasizes the need for African solutions for African problems in the manner dignity of African states is maintained.

To the great extent, the AU believes that empowerment of Africa is the solution. According to the AU, the ICC should not only rectify its attitude, but also increase the staff from Africa. The AU discusses the need for reforms of the Security Council by implying that the African presence ought to be increased in decision-making. The AU asks the question about the ICC’s potential contributions to enhancing capacities of domestic judicial activities in African states.

The Withdrawal Strategy Document states: “In order to limit the intervention of the ICC, there is need to strengthen the legal regulatory frameworks and judicial mechanisms in AU member states to try international crimes. These may include developing continental, regional and national strategy such as model national laws, capacity building programmes (i.e. trainings, experience exchange programmes, etc.).” 13

The Withdrawal Strategy Document indicates that the AU does not simply pursue mass withdrawal. The AU asked for various levels of reforms inside and outside of the ICC. It even demands more attention from the ICC in the area of capacity building programmes for African states. The AU pursues regionalism, empowerment and partnership as regards the development of its relationship with the ICC.

It should be noted that this attitude of the ICC highlights the nature of its withdrawal strategy. As shown in the previous section, the triggers of the debate about the withdrawal were the cases of Kenya and Sudan where the ICC was used as a tool for intervention to mediate political conflicts. To some extent African states have been responding such a political use of the ICC by influential external figures. The inevitability of politics, even if the ICC is a legal entity, complicates its activities and relationships with external actors. In a way the debate about the withdrawal arose out of such inevitability of politics in the activities of the ICC.

This indicates the complexity of politics hidden behind the legalism of the ICC. When political intervention is pursued for the sake of peace, the ICC’s legalism could be regarded as a tool for peace. But those who insist on more contradictory nature of politics and law would feel that the need for peace should

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13 Ibid., p. 12.
be prioritized over legalism in the sense that African political leaders should be immune from indictments and arrests. It is fair to say that prioritization of political leaders is not the way for peace for ordinary people in Africa. Still, it would also be true that the ICC’s legalism does not really guarantee peaceful settlements of any conflicts in Africa.

It is noteworthy that these dilemmas between politics and law and between peace and justice are highly connected to the antithesis between regionalism and universalism. The ICC’s complex nature of universalism through a multidimensional treaty tends to involve dynamism between regionalism and universalism. The voluntary nature of the framework of the Rome Statute creates room for regionalist approaches toward international criminal law, while the universalistic status of the ICC as exemplified by its relationship with the UN Security Council does not accommodate such regionalism. The AU does not attempt withdrawing from the regime of international criminal law. It is crying for multi-layer implementations of international criminal law at the levels of states, regions and the entire international community. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights should be regarded as part of such overall attempts. This does not mean that the regional court is a simple substitute for the ICC; rather it represents a vision of more multi-layered international system. African regionalism is now based on the principles of local ownership, empowerment and partnerships.

The issue of capacity building can be understood as an agenda of “positive complementarity” even from the perspective of the Rome Statute. According to the original understanding of complementarity, the ICC’s judicial intervention is justified when national legal systems are not capable enough to prosecute criminals. But if so, the principle of complementarity should also mean that the ICC promotes enhancement of capacities of local judicial systems. In fact, some of the countries under the ICC’s Statute of the African Court.”


16 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights <http://www.african-court.org/en/> was supposed to be merged with the Court of Justice of the African Union. See the “Protocol on the
investigation are the target areas of capacity building programs provided through development aid agencies and UN peace operations. The sense of normative orientation towards “positive complementary” exists within the international policy community.

Conclusion

This essay has sought to analyse the circumstance behind the debate about the withdrawal from the ICC by African states. The essay has suggested that some particularly political cases created by external interventions have accelerated critical views on the ICC among African states. Thus, the debate should not simply be regarded as a phenomenon of mass withdrawal. There are structural issues of the relationships between politics and law, between peace and justice, and between regionalism and universalism. The AU is seeking to address these issues as inevitable concerns for those working for the ICC.

This does not mean that the AU confronts the ICC for the sake of politics, peace and regionalism against law, justice and universalism. Rather, the debate illustrates the fact that the ICC must survive in such complex reality instead of avoiding it. This could be regarded as an observation of the current state of the world where many political complexities exist as challenges to liberal international order in the process of implementation of international criminal law.

This essay thus has suggested that the ICC should face such complexities of reality and expectations from African states. Without compromising its legal nature, the ICC should be able to pursue various practical activities in the name of “positive complementarity”. The ICC should be able to handle the dilemmas between politics and law, peace and justice, and regionalism and universalism. Even if it would have to do so very carefully, it does not have any other options than living in such a complex world.