

**Abstract:** This article retraces the infamous controversies between the *Edinburgh Review* and Oxford in the early 19th century. It seeks to broaden the understanding of the origins and background of John Henry Newman’s idea of a university by analyzing the connections and differences on both sides of the controversies, drawing from writers such as Sidney Smith, E. Copleston, W. Hamilton, and Newman himself. The article suggests that the controversies were one of the important bases for the formation of Newman’s idea of a university, particularly Hamilton’s idea of a combined model of a professorial and a tutorial system. Additionally, the philosophical view of intellectual training had a significant influence on Newman’s educational thought. In other words, Newman’s educational thought actually was a comprehensive multi-dimensional synthesis from a number of contemporary debates in the transformational era of modern society rather than a one-dimensional structure of mind solidification. Consequently, Newman’s defense of religion and the traditional university model should be seen as a development and adaptation that contained some elements of modernity.

**Keywords:** John Henry Newman, Edinburgh Review, Idea of a University, University of Oxford, William Hamilton, liberal education, 19th century English universities

**Introduction**

In the introduction of his influential *Idea of a University*, John Henry Newman states that he witnessed a series of controversies both domestic and with strangers to Oxford for fifty years and that the formation of his concept of University Education and of the subject and principle of Liberal Education, “bear . . . upon it”. Controversy “brings out more clearly to its own apprehension the views on which its reformation was proceeding, and throws them into a philosophical form”. “The course of beneficial change made progress” and “afford[s] fuller development and more exact delineation to the
principles of which the University was the representative”; therefore, “to that great cause in which we are here so especially interested, to me personally it will afford satisfaction of a peculiar kind” (Newman, 1907, pp.1-2).

According to Newman, these controversies involved two issues. One was the topic of admission of dissenters, namely, religious exclusiveness, and the other was the great debate between professional education and liberal education, namely the problem of inutility in English Universities (Newman, 1907, p.2). Undoubtedly, these themes indeed constituted one of the consistent threads running as main consideration through *Idea of a University*. Discourse VII cites abundant quotations from pamphlets and articles on both sides in the controversy, particularly from Dr. Edward Copleston, Provost of Oriel, and Mr. John Davison, Fellow of Oriel, to defending his concept of liberal education (pp.153-177). Simultaneously in *Rise and Progress of Universities*, which was written almost at the same time while at the Catholic University in Ireland, he also mentioned the controversies and linked the debates with the point of “whether a University should be conducted on the system of Professors, or on the system of Colleges and College Tutors” (Newman, 1909, p.181).

These points suggest that the controversies between the *Edinburgh Review* and Oxford were one of the important bases for the formation of his idea of a university. The studies of the origins, resources and factors that influenced the formation of Newman’s idea of a university were considered, particularly compared with the relatively substantial studies on influences from his personal learning experience during his Oxford period. His religious thought in the Anglican Church and Oxford Movement, from Noetics and Tractatian’s idea of a university, and even from the Irish background and mode of the Catholic University of Louvain,1 were also considered. These controversies, which not only bear on the nature and essence of University Education but also relate to social, religious, and educational reform in early 19th century Great Britain, have not previously been studied in detail. Culler and McGrath have both addressed controversies between Oxford University and the *Edinburgh Review* in their studies. McGrath thought those controversies were the historical starting point of Newman’s *Idea of a University*, but there were fewer discussions on the second attack, which was raised by Sir William Hamilton. He has examined some impacts of Hamilton on two themes of Newman's idea of a University, but he did not treat the controversy as a whole and did not analyze several articles from those two debates (Culler, 1955, p.179,220; McGrath, 1951, pp.134-136,340; 1 Concerning Newman’s personal learning experience, see A. Dwight Culler, *The Imperial Intellect: a Study of Newman's Educational Ideal* (Culler, 1955, p.228). Concerning the influence of his religious thought in the period of the Anglican Church and Oxford Movement, of Noetics and Tractatian’s idea of a university, see H.C.G. Matthew, “Noetics, Tractarians and the Reform of the University of Oxford in the Nineteenth Century”, *History of Universities* (Matthew, 1990); Peter Nockles, “An Academic Counter-Revolution: Newman and Tractatian Oxford’s Idea of a University”, *History of Universities* (Nockles, 1991); Wang Chen, “Oxford, Oxford Movement and Newman”, *Tsinghua Journal of Education* (Chen, 2005); Stephen Morgan, “The Oxford Origins of John Henry Newman’s Educational Thought in the Idea of a University”, *Newman Studies Journal* (Morgan, 2012). Concerning the Irish background and mode of the Catholic University of Louvain, see Fergal McGrath, *Newman's University: Idea and Reality* (McGrath, 1951).
1962, pp.5-45,95,110-111,122,129). The most detailed study of these controversies thus far was by Isaac A. Tillyard (1913, pp.19-68). His study cited plentiful quotations from the original documentation of the controversies and analyzed the role of Sir William Hamilton in the history of university reform in England, calling him “the Father of University Reform” (p.67). However, Tillyard treats Newman as a rival to university reform, and his book eventually focuses on the process of university reform in England and suggestions for the reform of Cambridge. Therefore, he did not analyze Sir William Hamilton’s ideas of a university, which formed in the controversies, or their influence on Newman’s idea in detail, particularly the similarities and differences between the thoughts of Sir Hamilton and Cardinal Newman. Furthermore, some details of the controversies are worth examining.

Thus, this paper traces the controversies between the *Edinburgh Review* and Oxford; it draws a detailed history of these events and broadens our understanding of the origins and background of Newman’s idea of a university by analyzing the connections and differences of ideas of a university on both sides of the controversies.

**The first attack from the *Edinburgh Review* 1808-1811: Its background, course and themes**

The culture and scholarship of academic life in Oxford from the 18th to the early 19th century were in a state of stagnation, barrenness, meagerness, and abjectness. There were many complaints about the low level of academic studies, the torpor of institutions, and the degeneracy of University teaching in 18th and 19th century literature. Adam Smith, Johnson, Swift, and Gibbon all castigated the idleness, inefficiency, unprofitability, and low standards of University education and the poor quality of the system of tuition at that time. Even Newman (1907) himself also believed that “[the university] was giving no education at all to the youth committed to its keeping” (p.1); he had little tutorial assistance or guidance in his studies and was obliged to teach himself. However, although always busy and working hard, he spent four years to no benefit and failed to achieve either mental advancement or academic honors while being continuously anxious and exhausted (Newman, 1955, pp.47,50-53; Morgan, 2012, pp.36,39). Correspondingly, “… broad constructive ideas and ‘encyclopedic spirit’ … had little or no place in the University of Oxford” (Brodrick, 1886, p.178). Compared with Cambridge and new cultural, scientific and academic centers that had risen, for example, in London, “The nation at large had lost confidence in Oxford education” (p.177).

This situation compelled some insightful people in Oxford to launch reforms, and Oxford “[woke] from its long neglect” (Newman, 1907, p.154). The first reform was to develop the new Examination Statute of 1800, with the subsequent introduction of the class system. The standard and discipline of studies of the University were initially raised from their abject state by the Statute, which inspired the

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2 James Arthur and Guy Nicholls also mentioned the first attack (Arthur & Nicholls, 2007, pp.136-139).
fear of rejection and the pursuit of excellence and distinction. The sponsors of the Statute and system included Dr. John Eveleigh, then Provost of Oriel, and Dr. Edward Copleston, then fellow and thereafter Provost of Oriel and therefore among the foremost of University reformers; Oriel became the leader of the movement for university reform. However, although the method and procedure of examination had been changed by the Statute, the essential subjects and content were still based on the traditional liberal arts, particularly the medieval Trivials and Quadrivials, emphasizing grammar, rhetoric, logic, moral philosophy, mathematics and Latin and Greek literature. Dr. Copleston also changed the system of college tuition and selected fellows and tutors of Oriel strictly by examination and based on merit instead of personal relationships or regional sources, as the other colleges did at the time. Oriel thus gathered most of the best minds of the University and become the center of intellectual life, intensely attracting young talent to Oxford early in the 19th century (Culler, 1955, p.26).

However, the causes of those aforementioned conditions at Oxford: (1) lack of strictness and abuse of the system of examinations; (2) the inefficient tutorial and fellowship system of the college; (3) the contradiction between persistence of the classical discipline monopoly and introduction of modern subjects, i.e., liberal arts and professional skills; (4) the complicated relationship of the university with colleges and halls; and (5) religious exclusiveness and a politically conservative attitude. The fifth listed was last but not least; the Anglican position and attitude influenced the ideas, actions, explanations, and directions of members of Oxon so strongly that they would discriminate against reforms of religion, politics and education to the extent that any might harm the status of the Church of England.3 Actually, these five topics were not only the main themes in subsequent controversies but also present in Newman’s mind when he was thinking about the idea and practice of a university.

In such an atmosphere of Anglicanism, the reform in the first ten years of the 19th century, although it ignited the passion of life in academics and intellectuals in some parts of the University, was conservative and eventually strengthened the sectarian characteristics of Oxford.

This limited reform, which did not match the lofty prestige of Oxford as the most exalted seat of learning in the eyes of outsiders, aroused discontents. The first attack of the Edinburgh Review was launched. It was founded in October 1802 by four young men: Sidney Smith, Francis Jeffrey, Henry Brougham, and Francis Horner. All four were dissatisfied with the traditional and political atmosphere of the Tory society then dominant in Edinburgh and England. Instead, they drew ideological resources from the 18th century Scottish Renaissance and Enlightenment; shaped their liberal and scientific opinions with Whigish characteristics and criticized political, religion, law, 3 The University petitioned in 1810 against Catholic Emancipation, in 1831 against Parliamentary Reform, in 1833 against the Irish Church Temporalities Bill, and in 1834, against the grant of a charter to the new London University. “No doubt, in this last case the instinctive hostility of Churchmen to a non-religious academic body was quickened by a less honorable jealousy of a rival institution to be invested with the power of granting degrees” (Brodrick, 1886, p.189).
economic, and education issues widely. The Edinburgh Review was very influential, exalting the idea of public opinion because it met the need for reforms from the middle class and served a new public anxious for enlightenment and moral guidance (Clive, 1957, p.184; Coser, 1997, pp.75-76). It also had “much reputation with … the gentlemen Commoners of Oxford” (p.181). This is why Dr. Copleston and Mr. Davison replied to Edinburgh so seriously.

According to the content of the articles, this attack was elaborately organized. Jeffrey’s article Don Manuel Escriella’s Letters from England was the comprehensive one in which his ironic context was the whole of English society. It gave an unsatisfactory and satirical description and contained covert insinuations and sarcastic sneers concerning the defective, decayed state of living attire and mode, particularly of learning, science, and mathematics at Oxford. It alluded to Oxford’s bad reputation and the rigid and archaic way in which it inculcated and perpetuated established, leftover opinions and knowledge of the world, of the men in it, and of University education; to its monopoly status and education for only one profession; to the idleness of its professors compared with Edinburgh; and even to an Oxford reform that imitated Cambridge and its institutionalized stagnancy. “We (Cambridge) are bad enough…but not so bad as Oxford” (Edinburgh Review, 1808, pp.378-379) — this was a sentence which could provoke anger from two Universities.

From its angle of natural sciences, Playfair’s erudite article Treaty of Celestial Mechanics, after a lengthy but clear explanation of how integral calculus changed celestial mechanics and promoted the development of physical astronomy based on the introduction of La Place’s great work Mécanique 4

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4 Charles Kirkpatrick Sharpe to Walter Scott, March 5, 1809 (Partington, 1930, p.13) cited by Clive (1957, p.181)
Céleste, praised the progress of human knowledge, complained about the absence of British mathematicians studying it, and then openly railed in a few natural and poised sentences at the inattention and lack of concern for modern higher mathematics in two Universities and at the persistence of Aristotle at Oxford. Conversely, Knight’s review of the *Oxford Edition of Strabo*, from its corresponding angle of classical disciplines, after demonstrating the undoubted role of Greek and Latin in cultivating imagination, judgment, taste, eloquence and political capacity which has ever been esteemed as the infallible criteria that can distinguish a gentleman, proceeded to criticize the Oxford edition of Strabo, noting that of late, Oxford ignorantly added nothing of their contributions on improving the publication, research, teaching and learning in those languages except what it derived from the superior skill of British manufacturers and the superior wealth of their establishment, which was good for the vanities of the ostentatious and decorations. “Oxonian Latin” Knight called it, “…which is no other than the vulgar English of the present day” (Edinburgh Review, 1809a, p.435).

This was a sharp spear thrown at the most beloved and proudest place of Oxford.

Sidney Smith followed Knight in his review of *Essays on Professional Education*, boldly accusing the excessive abuse of classical learning in England and the ecclesiastical tutors of Oxford who used classical learning, “the great object at Oxford,” (Edinburgh Review, 1809b, p.51)⁶ of preserving the safe and elegant imbecility of their pupils from religious skepticism.⁷ He held that a young man under this education could write verses with good taste and imagination but would have no perceptions of practical knowledge or talent for speculation and original inquiry “nor has he formed the invaluable habit of pushing things up to their first principles, or of collecting dry and unamusing facts as the materials for reasoning”. Sidney suggested that “We would place it (classical) upon a footing with many other objects of study; but allow to it no superiority” (Edinburgh Review, 1810, p.49). Furthermore, he stated, “if all liberal arts and sciences useful to human life had been taught there (Oxford), chemistry … mathematics … experimental philosophy, and if every attainment had been honored in the mixed ratio of its difficulty and utility, …the system of such an University would have been much more valuable, but the splendor of its (classical literature) name something less” (p.51; see also Newman, 1907, pp.160-163).

Obviously, Edinburgh reviewers were unsatisfied with not only the decayed state of Oxford at that time but also the institutional nature of Oxford. Oxford was based on the Church-State model of England (ancient regime) and the associated social and political systems,⁸ although not a national foundation but rather a congeries of foundations originating some in royal munificence and more in private piety and bounty in the eyes of Oxonians. These characteristics determined that Oxford

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⁶ He added a note: “We speak merely of reputation. Sad, indeed, is the fate of this University, if its object has been classical literature alone; and it has failed even in that.”


⁸ Cf. *English Society, 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political during the Ancient Regime* (Clark, 1985, pp.408-420)
inevitably relied on its original path and associated with conservative religious and political attitudes. This path-dependence also made Oxford naturally emphasize classical learning and liberal education matching its model, features and roles; thus, it was difficult for the university to respond to the new or to reform demands from the external society then in progress. Therefore, it was logical that the Edinburgh reviewers, who were dominated by the ideology of progressivism and secularization that stemmed from the Enlightenment and classical liberalism, would require a new model for professional education that could benefit the development and modernization of the country and meet the new needs of society. They preferred the utility of an education that differentiated a variety of professions and modern society itself instead of education for its own sake, which fit the Church-State model. This is why the criticisms largely involve three interrelated themes: (1) the decadent status of Oxford, particularly the backward situation of modern disciplines such as natural sciences; (2) the sectarian characteristics of Oxford; and (3) the inutility of a classical education, and ultimately focused on the debate between professional education and liberal learning.

Encouraged by John Parsons, then Vice-Chancellor, Copleston engaged in nearly five weeks of hard labor and responded quickly to this “malevolent” attack. Actually, Copleston (1810a) recognized that education at Oxford was not perfect and that each of the twenty Colleges’ constitutions could not be the best (pp.181,183). However, he continued to defend the writings of Aristotle as the highest and most productive effort of human intellect (p.28). He also gave the Latin criticisms the longest single element of refutation in Reply, intending to prove that Oxford still had the best reputation in this field. He also discussed the key issue of concern here, classical learning and utility, as a repudiation of the more lively and clever article by Sidney. His main point was that, from an individual angle initially and avoiding narrow views and petty interests, the knowledge acquired from classical learning expands and enlarges the mind and excites its faculties and that “[this liberal education] fits a man ‘to perform justly, skillfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war’” (pp.111-112). Furthermore, “to exercise the mind of the student is the business of education, rather than to pour in knowledge … It is also the business of education to make young men read over and over the same things, multum, non multa” (Copleston, 1851, p.38; see also Culler, 1955, p.38), because classical literature that connected with the system of nature and of human affairs has usefulness and advantages in the cultivation of men. Copleston (1810a) argued that “the improvement of the faculties which God has implanted in us, is surely itself a virtue” (p.130). Additionally, “a cultivation of mind is itself a good: a good of the highest order,” but this cultivation, “without any immediate reference to bodily appetites, or wants of any kind … must not be allowed to interfere with duties of a plainer kind” and “[does] not immediately tend to what is called practical good” (p.168).

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9 The sentence within single quote marks was extracted from Milton on Education. Newman thought Copleston had traversed this topic rapidly (Newman, 1907, p.158). Copleston (1810a) gave more details in Chapter 5 (pp.168-169).
On another issue, the public lectures from professors and the mode of instruction by the Colleges Lectures and Tutors system, Copleston demonstrated that, as a means of instruction and a characteristic feature of university education, the system of College Lectures was more effectual because pupils can obtain more individual attention and the choice of the lecture may be adapted to each pupil’s peculiar wants. Moreover, the tutors can classify and instruct them according to their capacities and the stock of learning and science they bring with them (Copleston, 1810a, p.146). However, he also admitted that some peculiar advantages attend each method, stating, “The best method perhaps would be that which should unite both more completely than is the case with any modern university” (p.145).

Playfair, Knight and Smith responded to Copleston Reply in one joint review article. This article and Copleston’s Second Reply and Third Reply repeated and expounded their earlier statements, even quarreling on trivial issues and controversial details of texts and Greek grammar, which finally led this controversy to end with few issues defined further. However, note that Davidson’s articles, which Newman quoted (Newman, 1907, pp.169-177), provided an initial shape to a philosophical form on the demonstration of usefulness and importance of a liberal education.

As seen, Newman cited several passages from Sidney, Copleston, and Davison in his Discourse VII. In this chain of idea’s development, Newman extracted several opinions from both sides to help form his own statement on what a university education should be. As an internal reformer seeking to change the status of Oxford education, on the one hand, Newman had to respond to external challenges and to answer criticisms involving the three interrelated topics raised by the Edinburgh Reviewers concerning effecting adaptive changes and developments at Oxford. On the other hand, he needed to persist on some characteristics and patterns of Oxford education that he thought immutable such as religion, theology and liberal education. In other words, he had to take a Via Media, addressing several topics: (1) the usefulness of liberal education, (2) the scope, nature, and

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10 A letter of June 1810, from J. W. Ward to Mrs. Dugald Stewart (she and her husband were intimate friends of Playfair) refers to the article; “Playfair’s part of the review is, like everything Playfair does, quite excellent. Of Knight’s I am no judge, being not proficient in ‘the silly art of verbal criticism.’ Smith’s has a good deal of wit, but he has followed the example of his antagonist too much in using coarse, ungentlemanlike language. But when a couple of parsons or a couple of fish-women fall out, there is no setting any limits to their vocabulary. To be sure, my reverend tutor began first, but that is no excuse for Smith. But the truth is that he is naturally coarse, and a lover of scurrilous language.” Cf. Letters to “Ivy” from the first Earl of Dudley (Romilly, 1905, p.111) cited from Modern Philology (Griggs, Kern & Schneider, 1946, p.208).

11 Colin Matthew confirmed that there were four groups in the constitutional reform in 1828-9 and subsequently the reform to the religious exclusiveness characteristic of Anglican Churches in Oxford. These groups included (1) the traditionalists and evangelicals who opposed any changes, now often described as “old-fashioned high-church” or “orthodox”; (2) some clergymen from Noetics at Oriel who were called “moderate liberal conservative” and approved the limited internal reform but disagreed with the principle of a broader non-sectarian university. The main representative of this group was Edward Hawkins, who succeeded Copleston as provost of Oriel at that time; (3) “arbitrary reform advocates”, who support thorough reform for radical change. The leading people included Baden Powell, Thomas Arnold and R. D. Hampden; (4) Tractarians and some followers of the Oxford Movement. They were dissatisfied with the status quo at Oxford, but against external revolutionary groups and thorough reform. They tried to find a unique way for reform; Newman was a member of this group. The ideas of a university of Tractarians had an important impact and unique contribution to the formation of Newman’s idea of a university (Matthew, 1990).
nexus of knowledge, and (3) the relationship of the role of religion and the institutional nature of a university.

In his demonstration of the usefulness of liberal education, Newman undoubtedly disagreed with the Edinburgh reviewers, who emphasized how modern sciences and professional education should be given status equal to liberal learning, how modern education should function, and how to cultivate a man for his immediate role in society. However, he readily granted that the cultivation of a “talent for speculation and original inquiry” and of “the habit of pushing things up to their first principles”, the goal being mind cultivation or intellectual training in support of the study of knowledge worth pursuing, was a principal portion of a good or liberal education (Newman, 1907, p.163). He also agreed with Smith, who placed classical studies upon a footing with many other objects of study; however, he allowed it superiority because of this principal portion (p.167). Smith thought that all liberal arts and sciences useful to human life should be taught at Oxford, and every attainment should be honored in the mixed ratio of its difficulty and utility. However, Newman went further with the philosophical form, mixing its own end and its useful end of liberal knowledge and education. “… [I]ntellectual culture is its own end; for what has its end in itself, has its use in itself also”(p.162). Moreover, “if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too”(p.164). This was one of the key revisions in his liberal education analysis compared with his predecessors (Newman, 1976, p.613; Culler, 1955, p.222; Vargish, 1970, p.132). The latter, particularly Copleston, were opponents of Edinburgh reviewers. Copleston felt that education for its own sake, i.e., mental training and the cultivation of man, and education for a utilitarian end, i.e., a professional role in society, were antagonistic rivals. In other words, just as rationality confronts the subordinate bodily wants, so the end of liberal education should be the training of rational, intellectual pleasure and improvement, and suppression of desire as in ancient times (Copleston, 1810a, pp.165-168,181-182; 1810b, pp.108-109).12 “It is only when we are called upon to make a choice between two, when we cannot have both”(Copleston, 1810a, p.167). With this opinion, although Copleston had a hazy sense of a holistic view of knowledge and a budding concept of liberal learning as a basis of professional education, he still could not make a full argument to mix them in philosophical form but instead made some discrimination between ends and means (Copleston, 1810a, pp.165,170-177).13 As Copleston did, Newman also applied the famous analogy, mind and body, to explain the differences between education for its own sake and for utility purposes, but he did not express these as opposites as Copleston did; instead, he used the significance of bodily health to prove the rightness of pursuing a liberal education as the basis of utility. Obviously, this adaptive alteration allowed his argument for

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12 This demonstration, based on discrimination between intellectual improvement and bodily wants, was criticized by Sidney Smith. He argued that the pursuing of modern sciences was not only for bodily wants but also for plain truth and pure knowledge. (Edinburgh Review, 1810, p.185-186).

13 Newman cited several passages, in his Appendix to Idea of a University (1852 edition), from Copleston’s article, which has been published in Quarterly Review, Dec.1825 and expressed more clearly this point of view. (Newman, 1976, pp.436-437).
liberal education to obtain a more solid and more eloquent foundation in the modern age.

Logically, the mix of its own end and the useful end of liberal knowledge and education must address subsequent issues of the scope, nature, and nexus of knowledge, all branches of knowledge, as the content of education. Newman needed a philosophical form to demonstrate why and how to mix every branch of knowledge, including modern disciplines as a whole based on liberal learning and intellectual training. This was the key and basis of reasoning in his thought of a university. Even Smith proposed that all liberal arts and sciences useful to human life should be taught at Oxford, but he obviously did not have a systemic or philosophical view of knowledge as a whole. He also saw liberal arts and the sciences as two antagonistic parts. Davison gave some thought on this topic and considered that the foundation of cultivating a person is cultivating faculties of the mind. The mind would be exercised “by taking a wide and liberal compass, and thinking a great deal on many subjects with no better end in view than because the exercise was one which made them more rational and intelligent beings” (Newman, 1907, pp.175-176). Thus, they could become good members of society and professionals rather than only specialists in their own professional field, a concept that was also stressed by Newman in his concept of a gentleman (p.177). According to Newman, this train of thought on his idea of a university originated in his theological and philosophical visions, both of which conceived pursuit of truth in systemic, integral and encyclopedic pattern or form.

In the Appendix to Idea of a University, 1852, he cited a number of authors to support his opinion that “the branches of knowledge form one whole”; these authors included Coleridge, Hugo de St. Victore, St. Bonaventure, and Lord Bacon (Newman, 1976, pp.446-450). Bacon held that the unity of the sciences lay in their method, whereas Coleridge held that it lay in the unity of the mind itself. Davison agreed with Coleridge, whereas St. Bonaventure felt that it lay in their derivation from the single science of theology. However, Newman (1907) believed the reason that encyclopedic knowledge forms a whole, with all parts complementing the others, is that their subject-matter is one (p.50, see also Culler, 1955, pp.181-182). For Newman, the identical subject undoubtedly was that God and his works constituted all reality. The reality finally belongs and tends to the ultimate one; therefore, the branches of knowledge involving the reality integrate and finally tend to the ultimate one too. The reasons different disciplines and sciences can be seen are the limitations of the human mind and the facilitation of research. The human mind cannot grasp it all at a glance; “the great Universe itself, moral and material, sensible and supernatural, cannot be gauged and meted by even the greatest of human intellects.” Therefore, human intellects abstract the aspects of reality for inspection individually; we call this abstraction is called discipline. Newman (1907) took man himself, for instance, as the object of this contemplation (pp.45-49). Within this contemplative form, Newman built a unique framework to conceive the specific composition of knowledge. He used three terms, universal knowledge, liberal knowledge, and professional or scientific knowledge, to cover and classify branches of knowledge such as theology, philosophy (physics, ethics, metaphysics), liberal arts (grammar, logic, rhetoric, geometry, astronomy, Greek, Latin), literature, science, history, law, and
medicine in terms of how well they achieve two objectives, i.e., cultivation of intellect and acquisition of knowledge. That was the content or curriculum of Newman's university education. As evidence, in Report on the Organization of the Catholic University of Ireland, October 1851, Newman (1896) presents a complete structure including modern languages, economy and politics, chemistry, mineralogy, even engineering, all of which should of course rest on the foundation of liberal education (pp.77-78; see also McGrath, 1951, p.116).

Concerning the relationship of the role of religion and the institutional nature of a university, it is easy to discover that both sides of the controversy bore it in mind but treated it very carefully; it was lightly touched. In this first attack, the Edinburgh reviewers satirized sectarian characteristics at Oxford University and argued that “an establishment should have nothing to prevent the reception of truth … To this great object, indeed, all its arrangements, all its laws and forms, should be subordinate; and to this they should always be ready to give way.” (Edinburgh Review, 1810, pp.167-168) However, they did not directly dwell much on this theme. Copleton (1810a), in Reply, also emphasized the importance of religion for universities and society on ethics, but was relatively vague in his statement (pp.176-181). Thus, at that time, they both remained restrained; this topic was not the subject of focused discussion and was not being considered a focus of controversy by either side. However, as the arguments above show, theology and religion play a fundamental role in the construction of Newman’s thoughts on liberal education, the nature, scope and nexus of knowledge, and university education. Actually, on a larger scale, theology, with classical learning, was historically attached to the religious profession of the established church and personnel training for ancient regime. Therefore, when reformers and dissenters required the reallocation of resources for transition to a new regime focused on a social-professional system instead of solely for the State-Church model, this theme would inevitably become the focus of reformations and debates. Hence, this issue generated more acrimony in the second attack, which arose in the period of radical religious and political reform from the 1820s through the 1830s in England and provided some inspirations for Newman’s thought.

The first attack also clearly shows some clues to the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. The Edinburgh reviewers, who held the modern standpoint, used Bacon's assertion to argue,

the present, not the past, must be deemed of superior authority … we must not go back to the remote ages of antiquity for our knowledge concerning nature or its laws. The human race is older and its experience much greater…. We are therefore much more likely to be made acquainted with new facts and to obtain an insight into the laws of nature, and the methods of conducting our studies, by studying the works of the moderns, (rather) than those of the ancients (Edinburgh Review, 1810, pp.161-162).
The reviewers attached importance to the relationship between knowledge and the wants, desires, and comfortable life of human beings. Copleston, in contrast, held the ancient stand. He stressed the opposition between intellect and desire and moralism that requires suppression of desire. He thus revealed his regard and esteem of ancients, the classical significance of liberal education and the importance of emulating those ancients, whom he saw as an active, steady, and commanding principle and the great secret of liberal education (Copleston, 1810a, pp.133-134,137).

Here, the essential point is to investigate the position that Newman conceived in the Quarrel.14 Undoubtedly, Newman opposed modernism, liberalism and individualism, all of which have too strong a self-consciousness. However, he instead transformed his ideas to adapt to the new conditions of modern society. For example, he confirmed the value of certitude and the illative sense of the individual to agree with and affirm the role of science and other disciplines. With subtle and sophisticated thought and attitude, he learned the important point that both were worthy of further exploration. However, this topic is obviously beyond this article and must be left to a later discussion.

The second attack from the Edinburgh Review 1831-1836: Its figures, focus and impact

The second attack began in June 1831. Between the two attacks, however, two episodes appeared in the Edinburgh Review with notes: (1) D.K. Sandford’s (1821) criticism of the Oriel fellowship election in 1821 (see also Culler, 1955, p.27) and (2) the attack from Dr. Thomas Arnold (1836) on the University and the Tractarians during the theological controversy of teaching of dogma and the admission of dissenters between Hampden and Newman, 1834-1836 (see also Ward, 1948, pp.296-297; Gilley, 1991, pp.149-150). Although the former was an incidental personal criticism, it showed the dissatisfaction with the classical learning and examination system of Oxford at the time. The latter was not directly related to educational issues, but it concerned the role of religion in university education, which Newman applied to his educational idea as a principle and related to the religious and political reform debates in the 1820’s and 1830’s.

Just as the context shaped the first attack, the appeals, oppositions, and unrest of religious and political reform from 1828 through 1832 shaped the precondition and status quo of the second attack. Followed by abolition of the Test Acts in 1828 and adoption of Catholic Emancipation in 1829, the waves of reform reached their peak when the Reform Act was passed in 1832. These successful challenges of the Parliament to the sectarian character of the Established Church in British society inevitably threatened universities linked to the church-state model of the ancient regime. Oxford was exposed to the potential influence of hostile secularism which had not appeared in the past. This new secular challenge eventually would focus on the fight to approve or refuse the admission of dissenters.

14 Newman’s religious position against and beyond the contemporary modern age was expressed relatively well in his sermon “Faith and World” (Newman, 1902, pp.78-94).
Conversely, near the time of the first attack, the new examination system of Oxford began to play its role. However, the tuition system of colleges could not meet the increasing study demands from pupils. The result was a shortage of teaching resources wherein tutors obtained more revenue while reducing performance; they were unable to provide adequate education to prepare their students for the new exam. This led to the development of private instructors who became an important component of the academic system. This situation inevitably led to further emphasis on the university teaching function and caused severe criticism of the institution, resulting in a lack of quality faculty and instruction, particularly concerning the controversy of public teaching of the professorial system and private tuition of the collegial system.

The second attack was originated by Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh University (1836-1856) and a graduate of Oxford (Balliol B.A. 1811, M.A. 1814). Due to unpopularity with the Scots, he, like Sanford, did not obtain a fellowship even after he was in the first class of Literae Humaniores and gained the reputation of being the most learned in Oxford. From 1829 to 1836, Hamilton contributed several essays to the Edinburgh Review on “Cousin’s course of philosophy”, “The philosophy of the conditioned”, “Perception”, and “Logic”. These articles made his reputation as a philosopher in several countries. As a reform advocate and an inside marginal man, Hamilton (1853) hoped to be able “to work out an effectual reform in church and university by elevating in both the standard of competency and in both securing merit its legitimate preferment” (p.viii). He tried to analyze the causes and manner in which these vices of the university were generated rather than writing only descriptions, discussion, and criticism of the phenomena. Additionally, he was a natural realist and a Scottish philosopher who carried on the tradition of the national philosophy of common sense and agnosticism, which pronounced the absolute and infinite to be unknowable but justifiable by our moral and religious feelings. Thus, his analyses were based on the history, reality, and legislation of universities within a novel narrative context and on logic related to national state, public utility, anti-monopoly, competition, and the interests of science rather than the principles and concepts of the ancient regime.

In his articles, Hamilton criticized the low quality of teaching in colleges and its fellow-tutor system, as did Newman. However, he attributed the degeneracy of Oxford to an illegal state that was inconsistent with the statutory, a result of usurpation of interests and rights from the university by dispensations and perjury of the present collegiate political system that was affected solely by the influence, and exclusively for the private interest, of the colleges. Consequently, he held that the
system needed to reform, i.e., to return to the purposes and merits prescribed by the original statutory. He felt that the university ought to be able to answer the question, “How does the English University execute its one greatest, [in fact,] only educational function—[to] cultivate, in general, the mental faculties, prepare its alumni for any liberal pursuit in life, by concentrating their awakened efforts, in studies (objectively) the most important, and (subjectively) the most improving?” (Hamilton, 1853, p.743) This question was also the fundamental one that Newman had to answer. However, obviously, Hamilton’s argument, as the first to denounce the illegality of Oxford breaking the traditional model and reallocating resources, needed to be based on a different premise and to give a different solution. Hamilton resorted to a meritocracy and competition strategy, presenting a package plan for institutional reform that expressed far more political and interests tendencies and looked as though it fit better with the modern social-professional system than with the old one. However, illegality and competition, as consequence and manifestation, had become distinctive terminology appearing repeatedly in his essays.

Along these lines, the premise of his whole position was that English universities consist of two elements; one is the public instruction and examination in the several faculties afforded by the University Proper, whereas the other is the private superintendence exercised in the Licensed House and the private tuition afforded by the Licensed Tutor. The University Proper is “a public instrument. . . founded, controlled, and privileged by public authority, for the advantage of the nation” or “the accomplishment of certain public purposes”. However, the Houses or Colleges “are created, regulated, and endowed by private munificence, for the interest of certain favored individuals”. Therefore, the former, as the national establishment, is original, essential and necessarily open to the lieges in general, but the latter, as private institutions, are accessory and contingent. They might close their gates to all except their foundation members,

sacrificed to private monopoly and to the convenience of the teacher . . . the privileges accorded by the nation to the system of public education legally organized in the University cannot…be lawfully transferred to the system of private education precariously organized in the Colleges, and over which neither the State nor the University have any control. They have, however, been unlawfully usurped. (Hamilton, 1853, pp.404,455,480)

That was illegality.

This premise was directly opposed to the fundamental point of view from Copleston in Reply to the Edinburgh Review: “The University of Oxford is not a national foundation. It is a congeries of foundations…” According to his historical analysis, Hamilton saw this uncontradicted assertion not only as simply wrong but also as diametrically opposed to the truth (Hamilton, 1853, p.413). Therefore, he demonstrated the relevance of the legal relationship between university and colleges to the quality of education from a different angle than did Sidney Smith.
Hamilton (1853) recognized that, under the control of the colleges system and its institution, “no measure of reform, or improvement, or discipline, however necessary, could be initiated, or even mentioned”(p.435). Thus, “the great interests of the nation, of the church, and of the professions, were sacrificed to the paltry ends of a few contemptible corporations; and the privileges by law accorded to the public University of Oxford, as the authorized organ of national education, were by its perfidious governors furtively transferred to the unauthorized absurdities of their private, of their domestic discipline”(p.441).

Hamilton gave his solutions, which consisted of a new reform of the university to pursue the ends of liberal accomplishment as envisioned by Newman. He said,

[A] University in ordinary, and in ordinary acceptation, involves two very different things: (1) What is properly the University, a school to wit, for liberal or general knowledge and (2) a collection of special schools, for one, two, three, or more of the learned professions. In the former respect, the student is considered as an end unto himself; his perfection, as a man simply, being the aim of his education. This is the end proposed in, what is academically known as, the Faculty of Arts or of Philosophy. In the latter respect, the learner is not viewed as himself an end, that end being now something out [of] himself: for not his perfection as a man, but his dexterity as a professional man—in a word, his usefulness as an instrument, has become the aim of his scientific preparation. This end is that proposed in what are academically known as the Faculties of Theology, Law, Medicine, &c. (Hamilton, 1853, pp.763-764).

Therefore, he wanted to recover the liberal education at the university level and combine it with professional education of special schools that all educated in professions, while presupposing always a liberal accomplishment. However, different from Newman, Hamilton proposed three necessarily abstract ends of a university: 1) to supply competent instruction; 2) to excite the requisite exertion; and 3) to grant a true certificate of proficiency (p.764). To fulfill these ends, he introduced the institutional reform, on Examination of Degree, and redesigned the academic honor system, which could commit in an open and beneficial contest, and applied equably the stimulus of emulation to all and “would prepare the candidate, subjectively and objectively, to remedy his defects, and render . . . it a more effectual and certain test of his proficiency” (p.830).

Hamilton proposed that adequate and impartial reform and improvement can only be received by the recovery of the professorial system, the one essential organ of all academic education, and a combination with tutorial systems. This opinion, that this combination is implied in the constitution of a perfect university, was also acknowledged by Copleston, the most intelligent individual of the collegial interest, the ablest champion of the tutorial discipline, and Newman, the advocate and reformer of the tutorial system. However, Hamilton thought that “such an opinion cannot, however, be expected to induce a majority of the collegial bodies voluntarily to surrender the monopoly they
have so long enjoyed and to descend to a subordinate situation, after having occupied a principal. All experience proves that universities, like other corporations, can only be reformed from without,”(Hamilton, 1853, p.448; Copleston, 1810a, p.146) specifically by reforming politics and society. In Hamilton’s (1853) view, a general scholastic reform will be one of the greatest blessings of the political renovation and, perhaps, the surest test of its value (p.472). However, in his later revised plan of Restoring the University, he did not want to rescind or supersede the Colleges or Tutorial System even though they themselves were defective; rather, he wanted to reform them and “enable the best to do far more than they can now accomplish, and compel the worst to become the rivals of the best” (p.801).

In his later-modified opinion, Hamilton realized the countervailing evils of the professorial system and the improbability of its rebuilding. He did not maintain that the professors and the large classes collected by them were the necessary condition of students’ exercise; he admitted that, “were the tutors merely raised to their proper level as instructors”, they, “in their plurality, could discharge it better than is possible by all the exertions of any single exerciser, of any professor.” However, he was convinced that the competition between tutors and professors would inspire their reflection and give impetus to their improvement (Hamilton, 1853, p.806-807). Therefore, his general opinion on this issue was, “Nor was the union useless; for beside combining the advantages of the two systems of teaching, professorial and tutorial, it comprised others of far higher consequence, in an unexclusive employment of all the means of exercise and excitation” (p.808).

Consistent with this opinion, Hamilton proposed a mode of instruction that varied by the various character of its objects. First, he divided the knowledge into two categories, one being knowledge that depends on sensory perception of costly collections and experiments, and the other being knowledge which requires understanding and thought. The teaching of the former, i.e., the natural or physical sciences, which can be fully taught to all at once by one competent demonstrator ought to be Professorial. The latter are not restricted to individual teaching. If many teachers can more effectively generate enthusiasm in learners than only one, then these subjects are best taught by a faculty of teachers, i.e., a good Tutorial system. “This good tutorial system, which supposes always a competency in the individual, is a combination of the private instruction by Tutors in the College, and of the public discipline by these tutors in the university.” In the end, he emphasized, “The most important academic sciences—the cognitions, best in themselves, best as preparative for others, and best cultivating the mind of the student, are all of this latter kind. I would, therefore, prefer for them, perhaps absolutely, and certainly under the circumstances of Oxford, the improved tutorial system” (Hamilton, 1853, pp.809-810).

The ideological essence of Hamilton’s view can be found in Newman’s discussion and practical writing on this issue. In Report on the Organization of the Catholic University of Ireland and Rise and Progress of Universities, Newman recognized the merits of a blended mode of the professorial and tutorial systems. He said “It would seem as if a University seated and living in Colleges, would
be a perfect institution, as possessing excellences of opposite kinds” (Newman, 1909, p.229).

The two systems have each advantages, which may perhaps thus be united. For their application depends much on the subject matter; for instance, the Physical Sciences require a Professor, the Languages a Tutor. Again, a Professor is required to set forth the objects and limits of a Science and to provide a preliminary view upon it, to those who have not thought on it. Professorial lectures are also valuable as bringing the Professor before external judges and keeping him up to the mark. Conversely, the work of a Professor is not sufficiently itself to form the pupil. The catechetical form of instruction and the closeness of work in a small class are needed besides. Without these, even supposing the Professor to be a man of genius and to interest his hearers, the acquirements carried away from him will often be very superficial. No doubt, whenever the mind is really interested, it is also led in some degree to exert itself, and there is fruit, but if this is trusted to, the result will be undisciplined and unexercised minds, with a few notions, on which they are able to show off, but without any judgment or any solid powers. Therefore, . . . the principal making of men must be by the Tutorial system” (Newman, 1896, p.84).

McGrath (1951, p.341) has noticed the similarity of Newman and Hamilton on this issue, but compared with Hamilton, Newman more strongly emphasizes the religious, moral, and spiritual dimensions of a tutor’s functions. He said,

When I was Public Tutor of my College at Oxford, I maintained, even fiercely, that my employment was distinctly pastoral. I considered that, by the Statutes of the University, a Tutor’s profession was of a religious nature. I never would allow that, in teaching the classics, I was absolved from carrying on, by means of them, in the minds of my pupils, an ethical training. I considered a College Tutor to have the care of souls... (Newman, 1905, p.184).

He believed that a tutor was not only an instructor in the work of academic honors but also a guardian in moral and religious terms of any young men entrusted to him. Newman (1955, pp.90-91) therefore focused more on the establishment of closer ties between pupils and tutors individually. However, different from his Oxford predecessor, he gave a definite status and more legislative and administrative powers to professors on his design of the university in Ireland as Hamilton hoped (Newman, 1896, p.78).

The above discussion demonstrates that in addition to these institutional and practical issues, there were also some important differences and similarities on aspects of Idea and thinking of how a university ought to be. The most important of these was the different emphasis on philosophy and theology. In his remolding of university instruction, Hamilton attached great importance to
yet is Philosophy (the science of science, the theory of what we can know and think and do, in a word, the knowledge of ourselves) the object of liberal education, at once of paramount importance in itself, and the requisite condition of every other liberal science. . . Philosophy, the thinking of thought, the recoil of mind upon itself, is the most improving of mental exercises, conducing, above all others, to evolve the highest and rarest of the intellectual powers. By this, the mind is not only trained to philosophy proper, but prepared, in general, for powerful, easy, and successful energy, in whatever department of knowledge it may more peculiarly apply itself (Hamilton, 1853, p.789) . . . the instructor should possess not merely an empirical knowledge of his subject, but a philosophical; that he should know it, not merely as a complexus of facts, but as a system of effects and causes; and that, besides his synthetic comprehension of the whole, he should have analytically examined how the parts are dependent on one another, and how they mutually concur to the constitution of the whole (p.765).

Obviously, a similar philosophical vision can be found in Newman’s description of Thought and Reason, i.e., the end of his liberal education. He takes for granted that “the true and adequate end of intellectual training and of a university is not learning or acquirement, but rather, is thought or reason exercised upon knowledge, or what may be called Philosophy (Newman, 1907, pp.138-139) . . . the philosophy of an imperial intellect, for such I am considering a University to be.” (Culler, 1955, p1) Furthermore, neither Hamilton nor Newman placed too much emphasis on natural sciences or knowledge of fact, even including classical study. They both focused much more on the philosophical or liberal knowledge that would help the learners form a universal and systemic perspective called by them, science of sciences or architectonic science. Nevertheless, there exists a greater difference between Newman and Hamilton. Although Newman uses a philosophical form and comprehensive way of thinking, and although Hamilton takes “Know thyself” as a heavenly precept in Christianity as in heathenism and recognized “We can know God only as we know ourselves,” (Hamilton, 1853, p.787,823)16 Newman did not take philosophy per se as the ultimate goal instead of theology. In other words, he only used a philosophical approach to demonstrate the basic position of theology in the university education. In his drafts of an unsent reply to W.G. Ward (1862), he disagreed with Ward’s conclusion, which, drawing from his words but not contained in them, was, “A truly great intellect, you see, according to Father Newman, is not one which is eminently fitted for keenly contemplating the supernatural; but that which possesses knowledge considered as philosophy.” Newman said,

16 Hamilton’s view of religion and theology was negative generally, although he wholly acquiesced to the views of the Oxford legislature. He admit that a certain amount of theological information should be required of candidates, but that theology ought not to be proposed as a study in the faculty of Arts, from which academic distinction should be won. He also objected to too-mechanical teaching, and proposed that if an instructor teaches a doctrine, he must be acquainted with it, not merely in itself, but in its connections, scientific and historical.
When I speak, as you quote me, of intellect being philosophy, I do not mean philosophy as opposed to the supernatural mind, but as opposed to acquirement, as formal knowledge contrasted with material. There may be a supernatural philosophy, or perfection of the intellect; and that I have drawn out in the foregoing Discourse, p.185, under the name of wisdom. There is a natural love, and a supernatural; a natural exercise of the intellect, and a supernatural. Human faith is at least analogous to divine faith; the former comes of pure intellectual exercises, and the latter from above. Human faith lies in the intellect and divine faith; but the former is created by previous acts of mere human reason, the latter is creation of supernatural grace.

Obviously, Newman makes a distinction between some philosophers such as W. Hamilton and himself by expressing his disagreement. He said: “there is a class of minds, such as your own (Ward), Sir W. Hamilton’s, Lord Brougham’s, and the Academics, to whom exercises of Intellect are simply keen and constant pleasure, I cannot think it is more than one class” (Newman, 1970, pp.170-171).

Hamilton saw that Christian theology is, as a human science, a philology and history applied by philosophy and that the comparatively ineffectual character of our British theology has, for generations, in the case of England, primarily resulted from the deficiency of its philosophical element (Hamilton, 1853, p.790). This expression implies that Hamilton gave Priority to human intellect and philosophy instead of to supernatural exercise of intellect and theology.

Hamilton also used the term *illegality* to link his second issue, i.e., the right of dissenters to admission into the English universities. In articles published in 1834 and 1835, he built the basis of argument on the law and reason, and demonstrated that the right of dissenters to admission was not only endowed in the statutory of Universities but also demanded by reason because this state was proved by the history of universities (Hamilton, 1853, p.480). Therefore, the opposition to dissenters enrollment is undoubtedly illegal and a betrayal of trust. He gave evidence in his criticism, which was an historical explanation of the term “STUDIUM GENERALE”. He said this term “did not mean originally, that all was taught, but that what was taught was taught to all” (p.496). That implied that the university, as a community of scholars, should accept scholars from everywhere rather than confine itself to a certain region or social origin as the ecclesiastical and monastic schools did. Newman read this article on its first appearance, and helped his friend Rose develop a reply for *British Magazine* (Newman, 1980, p.378). However, when he went into the subject for himself and came to write the university discourse, his friend Hope, an amateur historian of the university, warned him that the term was most likely wrong. Nevertheless, Newman distinctly stated “a University…is a place of teaching universal knowledge”, reflecting his new position and explanation, rather than following the derivation of the word (Culler, 1955, pp.179-180). In other words, the uniqueness of Newman's thought was that he eloquently used a new interpretation and discourse to build a new relationship between education and religion from the angle of knowledge and truth, “basing his plea for religion in
university education on the nature of true intellectual culture”, specifically to avoid some problems arising from special circumstances in Ireland (McGrath, 1951, p.136). This narrative approach was not only a rhetorical response of his complex attitude to mixed education but also an adaptation against the development of modern knowledge and society. Clearly, this statement would help religious education find its own position and horizon in the new era. Compared with the first attack, both sides had a more distinctive position on this issue.

Conclusion

The Idea of a University was valued as the first book to consider and discuss the ideal of a university systematically, completely and rigorously. Therefore, Newman is also considered the founder of a discourse and canon on the demonstration of the idea of universities in the English-speaking world. However, as was analyzed above, Newman was not completely original in his educational thinking. His thoughts were formed in part based on the circumstances of his struggle for the Catholic University of Ireland. He also developed some initial ideas from his predecessors at Oxford based on the traditional background of a university. Additionally, he was affected by and adopted some valuable opinions from critics and opponents concerning modern circumstances rather than rejecting what someone thought before determining whether he was totally opposed to and against them. In other words, Newman’s educational thought actually was a comprehensive, multi-dimensional synthesis from a number of contemporary debates and educational notions in the transforming era of modern society rather than a one-dimensional structure of mind solidification.

Thus, the following inference can be made: although Newman was opposed to the erosion and invasion of modernity based on his traditional stance of defending religion and the traditional university model, his defense was a development and adaptation that contained the nature of modernity. In fact, his arguments led from modernity into the ancient regime while he fought with the past and paved the way for a victory of modernity. The most typical testimony is his introduction of liberal knowledge and professional knowledge to replace universal knowledge to rescue the traditional leaning style and leave sufficient room for liberal education. However, the unexpected result was that because of the division and counter positioning between liberal knowledge and professional knowledge, he gave the latter a higher status and laid the foundation for its overwhelming strength. This was exactly the complexity and paradox of Newman’s thought.

As has been seen, Newman developed a method to balance different approaches when he synthesized the variety of ideas as a conciliatory thinker. He would reject some parts of ideas outright if they did not fit his thoughts and transform or reorient some concept to adapt it to his special purpose or structure for explanation and demonstration. This helped him to absorb the advantages of various viewpoints and to synthesize a unique and profound ideological system to rebuild the educational process and resolve the problems of universities. To some extent, this method has
become a significant characteristic or symbol of reasoning form of Newman’s thought.

Based on this method, Newman developed a new philosophical overview in the contexts of truth and theology, addressing university education with originality and systematic thinking. Nurtured and driven by this philosophical form, Newman considered the purpose and meaning of a university from his melded perspective of religion and philosophy and tried to establish a new coexistence model between liberal education, reason, faith, and truth in an emerging new era of modernity. Therefore, the university becomes a humanoid organism that draws spiritual and ideological power from a passive object, and converts into an idea filled with exciting emotions and principles from an institutional congeries that has privileges and donations because of knowledge. Obviously, Newman succeeded because he retained a positive ideological structure which was different from modern rational thinking and emphasized the ultimate goal and spiritual life of a human being. That has become the starting point for criticism and understanding of modern universities and their predicament. Consequently, Newman's work has become a code and permanent literal form that will be difficult for future generations to ignore in discussions on university education.

References

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