Challenges of Inclusivity in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Lessons from Asian Cases

Daisaku HIGASHI
Associate Professor, Center for Global Discovery, Sophia University

Good morning. I am now teaching at the University of Sophia—primarily conflict peacebuilding. I am very grateful for being invited to this wonderful symposium. Thank you, Mr. Sato, Professor Nishida, and the staff of Institute for Peace Science. Thank you very much indeed for having invited me to this meeting.

Well, the research area that I am interested is how to build a legitimate government. I have been studying this topic for 10 years. I would like to walk you through what I have learned and what we could learn from conflict peacebuilding efforts about constructing a legitimate government.

Road Map
1) My Argument on “Challenges of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding”
2) My Experience in Afghanistan on Peacebuilding and Reconciliation
3) Cambodia and East Timor
4) Conclusion

Also, I published a book last year so I would like to talk on the challenges of constructing legitimacy in peacebuilding as my first topic. I also lived in Afghanistan for a year, so I would like to take you through my experience. Finally, I will briefly touch on Cambodia and East Timor, before concluding.

Well, I have had a strange career. Not many people call their career strange, but I’ve done a lot of things. I graduated from university in 1993, and for 10 years after that I worked as a director at NHK TV network, which is like the BBC, and it was quite interesting. After the 30 years of the Vietnam War, I created a documentary film where the leaders of the war reflected on the reasons they were involved in it. Also, I created another program on the topic “How Far Will the Chain of Hatred Continue in the Middle East?” And a third called “The Struggle of South Korea to Avert Nuclear Conflict.” Most recently there was “Rebuilding Iraq: the Challenge of the UN,” for which I was awarded the Silver Medal from the UN Correspondents Association. This award is given each year.

Well, I’ll not dwell on my personal
background, but this is Hiroshima, so I have to mention this. My parents were born in Hiroshima, and they both were A-bombed at 4 years old and 5 years old, respectively. My mother was 2.4 kilometers away from the hypocenter. So, I heard a lot about the A-bombing from my parents and that actually motivated me to work toward peace. My parents met each other at Hiroshima University through a discussion club, then they got married in Hiroshima. Thus, I had a hope to work for the issues of peace and war since the childhood.

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<th>Academic and UN</th>
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<td>2004-06 MA in Political Science at UBC</td>
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<td>2006-2009 Ph.D. in Political Science at UBC</td>
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<td>2009-2010 Dec; Political Affairs Officer in UNAMA (Team Leader for Reconciliation)</td>
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<td>2011-2012 Associate Professor, U of Tokyo</td>
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<td>2012 Aug-2014 Aug: Minister-Counsellor in Japanese mission to the UN (Directing PBC and mediation activities)</td>
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<td>2014 Aug-2016 March: As Professor, U of T</td>
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<td>2016 April- As Professor, Sophia Univ.</td>
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After I completed making many documentaries at NHK, I was about 35 years old and I was quite interested in becoming directly involved in peacebuilding. I moved to British Columbia together with my wife and child and earned a Ph.D. there. In 2007, I studied Afghanistan and East Timor and my work was published in Japanese by a Japanese publishing company; it is still available for ¥700 in bookstores now. And I actually became involved in a UN mission in Afghanistan. Then, I joined the University of Tokyo as an associate professor. After that I served as Minister-Counselor in the Japanese mission to the UN. Actually, at this time I was involved with the UN Peacebuilding Commission. And in April of this year I became a professor at Sophia University. Thus, I have engaged in peacebuilding issues with multiple hats through academia, public TV, and the UN.

1) Question of My Book and Argument

**Question:**
How can local legitimate governments be constructed or eroded in peacebuilding process under the assumption of creating democratic regimes?

**Legitimate Government**

The government under which the majority of people obey with its rules and institutions not by coercion but by the conviction that complying is the right thing to do.

Once the governments in post-conflict settings become legitimate in the eyes of local people, they are very likely to achieve sustained peace and stability.

Also, I published a book in English, which I will talk about. It is very expensive, at ¥17,000, so, I can't ask you to buy one, but in this book I wrote something about legitimacy in government.

Legitimacy is a very difficult word, but in short, the legitimate government means the government under which the majority of people obey the government's rules and institutions—not by coercion but by conviction that compliance is the right thing to do. If people obey the rules and institutions because of their conviction for compliance, then the government is legitimate. Once the governments in post-conflict settings become legitimate in the eyes of the local people, they
are very likely to achieve sustained peace and stability. All those things are written on the book.

My Argument

The contemporary arguments emphasize resource distribution (money) and level of forces (gun); I argue that in addition to these two factors, role of the UN (or credible IOs) and the inclusive political process are crucial in creating repeated compliance with major political programs such as elections, constitutions, and disarmaments, then in creating legitimate governments.

This is the theme I have been working for a decade. I demonstrated my own argument on how the legitimate government can be constructed or eroded in post-conflict settings. I argue that four factors are crucial. First, as His Excellency Mr. Nishida mentioned, the parties to the conflicts have doubts about each other, even after the conflicts are over. So even if an election is over and the results are clear, the loser may not believe the bad results. So, at the initial process of peacebuilding, involvement of the UN (or if not the UN, a reliable third-party) is necessary.

The second factor is what we call the inclusiveness of various political factions from different backgrounds, who should all be included.

Third is the improvement of the government and public services. We must have the resource distribution to raise people’s living standards.

The forth is level of forces or coercion. We should control the unstable status by creating effective police and military.

So far, policy and academic discussion have been more focused on the third and fourth factors: resource distribution and the level of forces; but I think the first, the role of a reliable third-party, and second, the creation of an environment that includes all people to political process, are equally important. So actually, in Afghanistan and Iraq, government legitimacy seems to be eroding because the first and second factors are not being fully satisfied. That’s my argument, which I wrote about in my recently published book.

Case 1) Afghanistan

Research in Afghanistan 2008

Well, in 2008 I conducted an investigation in Afghanistan. Also, the peacebuilding efforts started in 2001, but Taliban and antigovernment forces were very powerful and the UN personnel could not really...
go to many parts of the country. With the full support of the UN, I conducted interviews in Kabul, Kandahar, Wardak, and Kapisa. In these locations I conducted person-to-person interviews and opinion surveys with 260 villagers.

Individual Interviews in Kabul
70 interviews with top leaderships of Afghan government and the UN (and UN agencies.)
Mr. Zia (Minister of MRRD)
Mr. Ahadi (Minister of Finance)

Opinion Survey
Kandahar Province: 50
Wardak Province: 102
Kapisa Province: 108
• Group meetings in the centers of the provinces.
• Pashtun and Dari version of questionnaires

And this shows the meeting in Kandahar. Usually, opinion surveys cannot be conducted in dangerous countries. Sometimes interviewers end up being kidnapped in insecure countries, particularly when ransom is sought. With UN and government cooperation in the centers of the provinces, villagers from various areas of the provinces were gathered, and we had the questionnaires translated into Pashto and Dari. There were around 50% illiterate people, so staff read every question and answer, and people identified the answer by oral communications.

Well, although Ms. Kumamoto said that the situation is better in Afghanistan from the Afghans’ point of view, they are still not secure in some areas, and there is a big gap in security between different regions within Afghanistan. In the southern part of the country where Pashtuns are overwhelming majority, 60% of respondents said security under the Taliban regime was better than now. Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara people say otherwise. They live much safer lives nowadays. In 2010 an American NGO also conducted an opinion survey of 6000 Afghans, and it found that the majority of Pashtuns perceived that the pre-Taliban era were safer, but the rest said that it’s better now. So there is a big gap in perceptions of safety between Pashtuns and other ethnic peoples. So what should be done?

The Taliban mostly consists of Pashtun people, so at the earliest stage it could have been included in the government, but actually the Taliban was excluded and that was a failure. That’s what the UN representative Brahimi said. I met with the ministers in 2008 and they also argued that in 2002 and 2003, the Taliban was not very strong, and if it had been invited to reconciliation there could
have been success; that’s what the ministers emphasized.

**Consensus on need of reconciliation with the Taliban in early stages**

The Taliban was excluded from political process from 2001. Brahimi argued that it was the biggest mistake for him not to engage with the Taliban in 2002-2003.

According to researchers who contacted the Taliban, in 2002 or 2003, the Taliban leadership actually made a decision to talk with the government for reconciliation, but the Afghan government didn’t respond; current members of the government admit that that was a mistake.

But what about the future? The general majority opinion is that the country should be reconstructed in a joint effort with the Taliban. I think the same results came from my survey. Both Pashtun people in Kandahar and Wardak and Tajik people in Kapisa supports a coalition government with the Taliban.

**Majority of Afghan People Support Reconciliation in 2008**

94% Kandahar (Pashtun), 98% Wardak (Pashtun), 86% Kapisa (Tajik) in 2008 responded that “Reconciliation with Insurgent groups, including Taliban, is the first priority to establish peace.”

98% Kandahar, 98% Wardak, 70% Kapisa support the coalition government between Karzai and the Taliban.

**Proposal and Policy**

2009 June – 2009 Nov: Presentations about my policy proposal to top leadership of Japan and some in the US.

2009 Nov: The Japanese government announced that it would support the reconciliation and reintegration as one of three key strategies for assisting Afghanistan.

After that, I published an English report from the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) in 2998 and a Japanese book on peacebuilding in 2009. In these publications, I showed policy recommendations: First, the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), the Afghan government, the US, and the United Nations mission should get together to create a new reconciliation program and committee to talk with the Taliban. Second, it should create a new international reconciliation trust fund that many donors can contribute and support the reconciliation process. Third, the Afghan government should establish job creation and job training centers for both normal villagers and former Taliban soldiers: Forth, UN should remove the Taliban leadership if they join the reconciliation program. Fifth, the government and the international partner should start political

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**My Proposals in 2009 (report to DPKO and Japanese book)**

1) Create New Reconciliation Program and Committee funded and supported by all key actors: Afghan G, ISAF, US, UNAMA.
2) Create New Reconciliation Fund
3) Job Creation and Job Training Centers
4) Remove the Taliban leadership from Sanction List if entering the Program
5) Talk with Afghan Taliban leadership to reconcile, inviting them to G positions.
negotiation with the Afghan Taliban leadership. This is what I proposed.

After I published a Japanese-language book in June 2009, I met with the Foreign Minister of Japan and five director generals of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and also senior officials from the United States to explain my policy proposals. As a result, the Japanese government announced that it would support reconciliation and reintegration, and the aforementioned proposal was worked into three key strategies toward Afghanistan.

The following year I stayed for a year in Kabul as UN political affair officer, in charge of supporting the Afghan government to establish new reconciliation mechanism. After one year service, the new reconciliation committee (the secretariat of Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program) was established, with US participation. Also, the Afghan High Peace Council to advance political negotiation with the Taliban leadership was established and the US, Japan, UK, and other countries funded the reconciliation Trust Fund. Thus, the Afghan government, the ISAF, and the UN became ready to start the political talk with the Taliban. I assisted those efforts for one year in Kabul as UN team leader for reconciliation and reintegration. After that, I left Afghanistan and started to work as an associate professor in University of Tokyo in Japan; I began following Afghan peace process as an academic researcher.

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<tr>
<td>(I worked for UNAMA from Dec 2009 to Dec 2010 as a Team Leader for Reconciliation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Afghan High Peace Council (negotiating with top leadership of the Taliban)</td>
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<td>• Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>• APRP Trust Fund funded by USA, Japan, UK, Australia, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Spain, and South Korea (About 200 Million USD).</td>
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<th>Development and Suspension</th>
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<td>2011: President Obama announced that it need political solution in Afghanistan.</td>
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<td>2012: Taliban announced that it will open the Qatar office to negotiate (Suspended)</td>
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<td>2013: Taliban opened the Qatar office (objected by President Karzai)</td>
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<td>2014: Presidential Election</td>
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<td>2015 (July): Pakistan hosted a formal talk between the Taliban and Afghan G.</td>
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<td>2015 (Late July): There was a leak that the Taliban leader (Mullah Omar) was actually killed two years ago.</td>
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<td>2015 (Oct): There was a split of the Taliban leadership between Mullah Mansour and Mullah Rasool.</td>
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<td>2016 May: Mullah Mansour was killed by the US.</td>
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<td>2016 July: Obama announced that 8300 US forces will remain in Afghanistan after 2017 to keep training and supporting Afghan security forces.</td>
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President Obama announced that a political solution is needed in Afghanistan in 2011. Also, in 2012 or ‘13, the Taliban announced that they were ready to open a Qatar office for negotiation. But in 2013, the
Taliban hoisted its flag at the Qatar office, and that infuriated President Karzai and the efforts were suspended. Last year, for the first time, Pakistan hosted a formal talk between the Taliban and Afghanistan in July 2015.

Well, this gave us some real hope, but in the following weeks it was announced that Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, was actually dead two years ago, and a power struggle within the Taliban leadership began and the talk again was suspended.

As you may know, Mohammad Mansour was killed in May 2016. And 2 months later, President Obama mentioned that he will keep 8300 US troops in Afghanistan, although he wanted to drawdown at the end of the year.

I continue to argue that there are four key players for this peace negotiation: the Afghan government, the US, the Taliban, and Pakistan. How to create sustainable framework for the negotiations will be an ongoing challenge with the current situation in Afghanistan.

But President Obama also emphasized that the only way to end this conflict and achieve a full drawdown of foreign forces from Afghanistan is through a lasting political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. That's the only way. And that is why the United States will continue to strongly support an Afghan-led reconciliation process.

Even if sustainable peace talks by these key actors start, would the Taliban be ready to accept a democratic election? This could be a big and central question with regard to the content of political agreement in the future.

I am running out of time, so I will
finish my talk by demonstrating two cases quickly.

**Case 2) Cambodia**

- The peace process of Cambodia admitted members of Khmer Rouge to participate in elections and nation-building processes, with other three factions. Although Khmer Rouge boycotted 1993 election, it was critical that the most of Khmer Rouge members were allowed to return to society and participate in its nation-building.
- UN played a central role in Cambodia.

As for Cambodia, Professor Katayanagi will talk about it, but since 1993 it was critical that the majority members of Khmer Rouge were allowed (although the Khmer Rouge boycotted the election in 1993) to return to society and participate in nation building. So, the Khmer Rouge were allowed to join the nation building effort since the beginning of peacebuilding effort there.

**East Timor**

- UNTAET and local leaders in East Timor used a Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation to advance reconciliation with pro-Indonesian militias.
- The Gusmao Government continued to respect FRETILIN, the leading opposition party since 2007 election.
- UN played a central role in East Timor.

And as for Timor-Leste, the UN played a very important role, and President Gusmão thoroughly respected FRETILIN(Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente) as a legitimate opposition party and worked together to construct the country. So, inclusiveness, or an inclusive process, was adopted by the president, and that was one of the factors in its success.

**Conclusion**

1) I argue that the inclusive process is crucial in creating sustainable peace in post-conflict states.
2) There is need to accumulate lessons from Asian peacebuilding cases on creating inclusive process. (some cultural values?)
3) There is need to accumulate lessons of different mechanisms to support victims of wars.

To conclude: What I mentioned here may be very important—particularly in the Asian context. There seem to be some value systems involved in Asia where we can forgive what happened in the past. With such a value system, probably inclusiveness has been introduced to some extent. So, the question is: how could that lesson from Asia be translated into other regions? Probably Hiroshima is a very good place to convey those messages. In particular, I feel that way because my parents experienced the atomic bomb in Hiroshima 70 years ago.

Thank you.