This research attempts to answer the main question of how the political dynamics of Grand Corruption in Afghanistan’s civil service sector are affected by the human capacity deficit. Throughout this research, we employ a combination of theoretical approaches such as public choice explanations, ‘rational irrationality’ concept, and ‘game theory’. These approaches attribute Grand (elite) Corruption to a number of important variables resonating with the current political, economic and social atmosphere in Afghanistan. The main part of our investigation and analysis draws on primary data gathered through our in-depth interviews, direct observations, in-country internal reports and surveys conducted across several regions of Afghanistan. Besides this, our research develops a theoretically sound and practically feasible foundation for absorbing the currently available and published data by international and national organizations and entities. We further supplement our research by policy document analysis, and by drawing on the direct and indirect experiences of international diplomatic missions and donors deeply engaged with Afghanistan’s problems via consultations. Our research hypothesis presumes a dialectical relationship between the human capacity deficit and institutional constraints directly affecting the level and magnitude of Grand Corruption in the public service sector in Afghanistan. This relationship is a non-linear, subtle and much more sophisticated than often expected one, and it could be partially undetermined.