New Challenges to International Development Cooperation in Education* ¹

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An analysis of changes in international development cooperation in education is inseparable from the more general changes in development assistance that have been becoming evident in the mid to late 1990s. The purpose of this article is to underline just how significant some of these tendencies may potentially be, and how they have the possibility to alter out of all recognition the shape of the aided educational universe as it is presently known.² On the other hand, it seems entirely possible that some of these new trends may remain more at the level of rhetoric rather than implementation, with the result that the older patterns of relationship between donor and recipient will continue.

The article sets out some of the main elements of potential change in international cooperation, looking first at these in the North,³ and then at their implications for the South. The sources of these changes are not to be found in a single text on cooperation, or in the proposals of a single agency. Rather, this new thinking about North-South relations can be identified in the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), in the multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and especially in several of the bilateral agencies. In respect of this last, we shall where appropriate seek to illustrate the particular trends from Japanese bilateral material.

However, in this new phase of development cooperation, it is not as straightforward as noticing a series of trends coming from the North and being imposed on the South; the role of the South in the identification of the new thinking must also be assessed.

Development cooperation and change in the North
We start with one of the more far-reaching changes of all - the recognition that development cooperation is not just about new actions in the South and by the South; it is also about change in the North. It is appropriate that this should be the first sub-heading in this series of changes, because it is tempting, otherwise, to conclude that any new aid paradigm is principally to do with the better coordination of donors in the Southern countries, with new modalities of delivering cooperation in the South, or with renewed commitment and conditions being present amongst the aid recipients.

i Decline in proportion of official development assistance
By contrast, it is worth recognising that there are several apparently almost contradictory trends becoming visible in the North. The first of these is not strictly speaking a change at all, but it is worth mentioning it right at the beginning since it sets the background against which to measure the feasibility of some of the other changes. It is the fact that, for OECD countries as a whole, official development assistance (ODA) has been falling, from a high of 0.61 per cent of GNP in 1961 to a low of 0.27 in 1995. Not only is this proportion of ODA still falling on average, despite the handful of relatively small countries that have for several years far exceeded the UN target figure of 0.7 per cent set as long ago as 1970,⁴ but the number of potential recipients of development assistance has greatly increased in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Forster 1998). Thus, Germany was
putting up no less than 0.13 of its GNP for the benefit of Eastern European countries in 1993, and as much as 5% of Germany's GNP has been transferred to its own developing Eastern sector (around 150 billion DM), annually from the union of the two Germanys until the present.

This latter figure for some 15 million people in Germany is 40% higher than the entire development aid effort of all donors for all recipients world-wide (3 billion people), and it raises a timely question about whether aid efforts can, on their present basis, really be concerned with transformation or only with reaching some minimalist poverty alleviation goals (Theil, 1996; King, 1996). There is increasing concern at the disturbing gap between the North and the South, and between the aspirations of the global conventions such as Jomtien, on the one hand, and the reality of what seems like a Northern weariness with aid, and an inward-looking tendency, on the other. Even in Japan, the world’s largest bilateral donor for many years, a series of substantial cuts in ODA began in 1996, and these have continued in 1998 and will again be applied in 1999 during the period of intensive fiscal reform (Financial Times 1997:22; Sawamura and Ninomiya 1998:1).

ii The emergence of the partnership discourse
Despite the evidence of continuing aid reduction from the North, a second trend which has become very evident in the North in recent years is an expressed desire to develop more symmetrical inter-relations or partnerships between the North and the South. The thinking about these new partnerships takes different forms in different OECD countries, and has perhaps gone furthest in the Nordic countries, and especially in Sweden, with the work it has generated, collaboratively with Africa, in the 1997 report Partnership with Africa: proposals for a new Swedish Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter PWA). But there is a parallel discussion about new relationships evident in the British White Paper, Eliminating world poverty (DFID 1997), as well as in the Japan's Official Development Assistance Summary (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997a). Multilateral agencies and organisations such as the World Bank and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD have also adopted the discourse about partnership, most notably in World Bank President Wolfensohn’s New directions and new partnerships (World Bank 1995) and in DAC's 'Development partnerships in the new global context' (OECD 1996). The thrust of these initiatives is to imply that beyond the older world of donor conditionalities and forced structural adjustment policies, there is a brave new situation where 'genuine' partnerships (DFID 1997) and ‘a more equal and respectful relationship’ (PWA 1997: 22) between North and South can be anticipated. This new language of symmetry suggests things are going to be different in the aid relationship. For example Sweden has proposed that there be a new Code of Conduct for itself as donor (PWA 1997: 21), and this implies that there has to be quite a fundamental change in the North. And even the World Bank, in Wolfensohn’s own words, has accepted the idea of listening to recipients in what sounds like a new moral economy:

To be a good partner, we must be ready to listen to criticism and respond to constructive comment. There is no place for arrogance in the development business (Wolfensohn 1995:20).

The source and rationale of this new language of partnership are not easy to be dogmatic about. It
may, in part, reflect a continuing tendency in the formal bilateral and multilateral agencies to take over the aspirational language of non-governmental organisations, whose discourse for years has described the South as partners rather than recipients or counterparts. In part, it may also be a recognition that too many development co-operation initiatives have in the past been accepted under financial pressure, and have not been locally or nationally owned in the South. In this sense the term partnership is an essential corollary and complement to ownership. Of course, ownership has also become a standard item in donor language, and, on its own, it may not always signify that anything has changed in the aid relationship except at the rhetorical level. But in the new partnership discourse, recognition of national ownership of projects and programmes by the south is an important counterbalance to the admitted financial dominance of the north. A third source of the partnership discourse is almost certainly the South itself. There has in the late 1990s been a good deal of talk about the emergence of a 'New Africa' with a new generation of leaders and policy people determined to engage with the world on equal terms (Olukoshi 1997). This Southern dimension of the partnership discourse has been a very evident element in the Swedish exploration of new policies towards Africa. Indeed, it could be argued that this Southern insistence on a new relationship with the North must itself be a crucial ingredient of any meaningful concept of a development partnership.

It is much too early to know how the kinds of aspiration to achieve what Wohlgemuth (1998: 42) calls 'a real negotiation where both parties give and take and where no one dictates the conditions for the other' transfer into the reality of day to day discussion in recipient countries. But it is sobering to compare the ideal of 'new cooperation relations' and 'genuine partnership' laid out generally for Tanzania in 1996 in its joint cooperation with Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1997b), with the particularity of donor coordination and the challenge to local ownership so evident in the detailed (and often frustrating) education sector negotiations in Tanzania described by Buchert (1998) or in the NGO partnership sphere (by Elu and Banya 1998).

It has been suggested that the new partnership paradigm may not remove selectivity or indirect conditionality. It could merely shift the conditionality from the macro-economic terms associated with the structural adjustment era to a situation where the North chooses partners according to whether they fulfil certain other essential criteria.

In what we may term the 'development texts' in which the new approaches are embodied, it is already evident that there has emerged a set of preconditions for partnership. These include at minimum: pro-poor economic growth strategies in the South; pro-democracy and pro-human rights policies; pro-gender and equity policies; and a pro-environmental sustainability commitment. The emphasis on these partnership criteria differs somewhat from agency to agency. Thus Japan would certainly underline the crucial requirement of local self-help within any such list of priorities:

In particular, the idea that serious self-help efforts by developing countries are the most important element in development's success is based on Japan's own post-war experience and on the experience of the Asian countries that primarily Japan has supported in these development efforts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997b: 17).

None of this enumeration of criteria is meant to suggest that these elements are not important to populations in the South itself. Indeed, they very clearly are, and civil society in many developing
countries has been marked by an increasing intolerance of corruption and autocratic rule, and an insistence on access to basic human freedoms.

**Partnership and selectivity**

Even if these criteria are powerfully shared by the South, there is a danger that it is the North that is seen to be doing the choosing. Very graphically illustrated in Clinton's choice of just six African countries to visit in 1998, this tendency towards selectivity could result in a new set of divisions amongst developing countries and their relationships to the North. Already there is some evidence that the new approaches may lead to the North having these 'genuine partnerships' with a smaller number of countries.

**Expanded version of bilateralism**

The proof of the pudding may well be whether a country such as Britain or Sweden can indeed implement what may be called this new bilateralism, based on agreed criteria and shared values, and end up choosing very different countries from those they have traditionally and historically partnered. If part of the partnership conditions must be to have in place the kind of rich, historical legacy of connections between two countries that is laid out in Partnership with Africa, then it may well prove difficult to take on quite new bilateral partners even if they do meet the new pro-poor and other pro-democracy criteria.

But the partnership discussion is not just about this version of bilateralism closely linked to the policies of a Northern and a Southern government. There is another, expanded, version of bilateralism emerging, and this points not only to the rich historical legacy of connections between two countries, but also to the possibility of multiple connections at many different levels of two societies, and not just central government to central government.

There is thus a tension at the heart of the rediscovery of partnership, at least in bilateral relations. In the old (Cold War) version of bilateral relations, it was possible to argue that a long-standing aid relationship (e.g. between Sweden and Ethiopia, Belgium and Zaire, or between the UK and Malawi) should in some way be maintained despite the changes of government towards more or less democracy. In the new criteria-based version of bilateralism, the shared values which are the explicit bedrock of the partnership include such issues as human and gender rights, freedom of expression and political pluralism, accountability, uncorrupt government and the rule of law. The absence of these, and of other concerns such as pro-poor and pro-equity development strategies may now appear to put at risk the whole basis of the bilateral relationship. On the other hand, the new expanded version of bilateralism insists that the new partnership should not be entirely a matter of state-to-state relations, but about strengthening all manner of civil society linkages between two countries. This latter vision of bilateralism encompasses North-South contacts between churches, popular movements, cultural and educational exchanges, environmental cooperation, trade, industry and tourism, and lastly, but, very importantly, cooperation between those from the particular Southern country domiciled in the North and their homeland.

This extended vision of bilateralism may also cover local authority linkages with the
developing countries, as well as North-South school and town twinning. And it may well be that this broader, more multifaceted partnership will eventually come into conflict with the narrower criteria-based state to state version.

### iii Coherence and consistency in partnership

The tension between the broader and narrower connections between Northern and Southern countries underlines a third dimension of development cooperation that is beginning to impact on the North. The discovery of coherence. This concept suggests that the multiplicity of connections with a particular Southern country should be complementary and consistent across the different ministries of a Northern country rather than being at variance. In other words, a partnership relationship mediated by the Development Cooperation ministry, such as DFID, should ideally not be undermined by the trade policy of the Department of Trade and Industry, for instance. And as a corollary, the severing of partnership on account of human rights and other criteria should not be paralleled by a continuation of the transfer of weapons or other military expenditures (Forster 1998). On the other hand, it can be anticipated that there will be an important issue about which should be the lead agency or ministry on matters of coherence. If it is Development Cooperation, that could present real problems for Foreign Affairs or Trade and Industry. And similarly the other way round. This may pose a particular problem for a country such as Japan where the aid budget is actually owned by no less than 19 separate ministries (See also Sawamura and Ninomiya 1998). This question of what might be the lead ministry or agency in the North for partnership coherence is inseparable from a series of changes in Northern ministries concerned with aid, trade, development and foreign affairs that are currently being rethought in several OECD countries.

### iv Global sustainability and development targets for both North and South

A last change beginning to impact on the North concerns the whole question of whether international development targets, pro-poor growth and sustainable livelihoods are primarily relevant only for the South, or whether they must be globally meaningful. This particular change has implications for the focus of development education and development studies as well. The recognition that development is not exclusively about the South, and that poverty is not a condition over which the South has a monopoly suggests that the kind of development education encouraged in OECD schools should increasingly not just be about commitment to and awareness of the South, but equally about global responsibility for both North and South (Dower 1998).

The same is true, a fortiori, about the role of development studies - that they have begun to shift from a preoccupation only with the South to a concern about common development problems in the North and South (Forster 1998).

The impact of thinking about sustainable livelihoods has similarly had significant implications for the North. There has been a tendency in the North to project on the South the importance of convergence in respect of human rights and governance issues but to be very much less clear about the South's natural aspirations for Western style patterns of consumption. In the post-Cold War world, there has, of course, been strong encouragement from Northern donors and from the World
Bank/IMF for the South to pursue free market growth and trade liberalisation, but in general it has not been the development cooperation ministry that has spelled out the implications for the North itself of what may be called pro-sustainability economic growth. In fact, it is worth noting that the new development texts do discuss the importance of stable and vigorous economic growth for the developing world, but they tend to steer clear of the question of whether Southern growth should aspire to Western standards of living (DFID 1997: 15). It can be argued, however, that equitable distribution on a global scale has much more radical consequences than rich countries (or their Development Ministries) are prepared to admit.

The value of this thinking is that it suggests new preconditions (or 'conditionalities') for change in the North if there is to be global sustainability or meaningful partnership. The powerful metaphor in Caring for the Future (the Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life 1996) which talks of the 'carrying capacity of the earth' is certainly not anticipating that equity and sustainability will arrive without a fundamental rethink of Northern consumption and expenditure patterns. Thus the burden of responsibility in development education and development awareness (which several EU member states are concerned about) is not so much with re-igniting the 'caring capacity' of the Northern public for the South, which, incidentally, seems to have suffered in recent years. It is more a call for what might be termed 'ecodevelopment education' with direct implications for sustainable lifestyles in both North and South. This could mean that the very valuable mechanism of international development targets (derived from global conventions and synthesised by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD) should become less a set of minimum standards for economic and social well being in the South and more explicitly should be reworked also into a set of targets that change the assumptions about the continuity of non-sustainable growth in the North (DAC 1996).

Rethinking the delivery and coordination of development assistance

Even though the partnership paradigm has some of the above flaws and contradictions at its heart, it is already beginning to have some impact on aid delivery in the South. Once there had been an agreement on the kinds of criteria that lie behind the new partnership thinking, it followed logically that instead of there being a whole series of easily recognisable projects owned by donors, there is emerging a process of donors buying into a number of nationally owned sector development programmes.

From donor projects to sector development

This late 1990s donor preference for avoiding their own project enclaves and working instead with countries that have developed their own policies sounds very progressive. No more British, World Bank or Danish flags flying over their own well-known projects. Or in the words of a 1996 Danish source:

This means in principle that in the future there will not be a "Danida Sector Programme", but instead Danida will support a national sector framework and specific elements of this framework. Danida will consequently not perform its "own" projects or programmes in
developing countries but support national activities (Madsen 1996: 37).

The recent British White Paper, Eliminating World Poverty (DFID 1997) takes a similar line, in emphasising the role of sector programmes rather than British projects:

Where we have confidence in the policies and budgetary allocation process and in the capacity for effective implementation in the partner government, we will consider moving away from supporting specific projects to providing resources more strategically in support of sector-wide programmes or the economy as a whole (DFID 1997: 38).

Following through this same thinking, it can be anticipated, particularly within the European Union (EU), that there could be an extension of some degree of common policy approach across what are currently the highly differentiated traditions of development co-operation within Europe. Over time, this development of a European framework for co-operation may reduce the variety of Northern offers of aid. This will not be rapid - at least not in harmonising the distinctions between EU member states that can scarcely be said to have an aid programme at all and those that have had one for decades. The first major attempt at a policy paper - a 'Resolution on Education and Training in Developing Countries' - only took place in 1994 (NORRAG NEWS 17). But what is already clear is that, since the guidelines were adopted, there has been, paradoxically, a reduction in the scope for Southern countries to put forward their own aid preferences in discussion with the EU:

Guidelines were provided for policy and coordination of European support to VET. This meant that European Community aid to education and training should no longer be determined solely by the priorities of the recipient countries. Instead, the guidelines in the Council Resolution form a basis for dialogue (Working Group 1997: 8).

In other words, it could be argued that in the EU, and to an extent in the Danish and British examples above, the very process of the North carefully preparing its preconditions for partnership reduces the degrees of freedom for Southern partners. Thus, by 1996, the desire for coherence and co-ordination in EU aid, including in the education and training sector, had moved a stage further to what the Commission is terming Sectoral Development Programmes. The expected results at the country level are coherent strategic plans which, it can be seen from the following comment, also reflect external priorities:

Tanzania was selected for education. Simultaneously, the Horizon 2000 Education Experts agreed that the EU should be moving toward co-ordinated sectoral approaches to aid.

This has led to assistance to the Tanzanian Government in planning a Sectoral Development Programme. This will include a basic education masterplan, a secondary education masterplan, institutional improvements including the rationalisation of tertiary education, and improved education
of disadvantaged groups (Working Group 1997: 8).

There is no opportunity here to tease out further the consequences at a country level of this move towards mechanisms which are meant to put the recipient country greater ownership. We have already alluded to Buchert's discussion on Tanzania being a valuable commentary on partnership ideals; equally, it throws light on the processes that were actually involved in developing the basic education masterplan just mentioned (see Buchert 1998). Similarly, South Africa would appear to have been a perfect candidate for nationally owned sector programmes, since it had developed a mechanism which should have allowed the donors directly to support national sector frameworks, through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). But there is little evidence that this actually happened (King 1998b). Again, in India, the development of the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) can be looked at as a national umbrella for the coordination of almost all of the hitherto scattered donor initiatives in support of primary education (Tilak 1998).

In several different contexts, it is also possible to see how the concepts of donor coordination, national capacity building and local ownership translate into country specific actions (Kann 1998 and Kaluba & Williams 1998). But more generally, it can be anticipated that the very process of trust in the local partner's development priorities which has led also to the UK's notion of the sector development programme may somehow be at odds with the other tendency in the North - to specify the importance of particular sub-sectors, such as basic education. In other words, if a national government has the appropriate criteria for genuine partnership, then, we have seen, it is no longer necessary to insist, for example, on a basic education project. The sector of education as a whole can be supported. Indeed, it could then be argued that even higher education could and in fact should be included within the sector programme support.

ii Additionality, invisibility and technical assistance

Several further considerations flow from the programme support preference which has been emerging. First, there is the vexed question of whether the external support is adding to or replacing the existing national support to the education sector. The presumption, on the donor side, must be that it is adding to the budget, and yet in the discussion of DPEP in India, it has been suggested that 'An immediate fallout of DPEP can be reduced domestic efforts to finance primary education' (Tilak 1998). The same debate has surrounded the role of external assistance funds in South Africa, and whether they should be integrated fully into the budget (King 1998b). More radically still, it has been argued that in situations such as Tanzania’s where debt servicing takes some 40% of its foreign exchange earnings, true partnership might want to focus on debt relief by the North to the country in general rather than on the detailed development of specific sector development programmes (Williams, personal communication).

A second result of the sector development approach is reduced visibility of the North in the South. This is quite an important change but it is too early to anticipate the readiness of the Northern public to accommodate much less visibility for its own nationals in developing country projects. There is therefore a further connection between the sector development approach and the new approach to development education, discussed earlier. If aid is less concerned with highly visible Northern
volunteers (such as JOCV from Japan and VSO from the UK), NGOs and technical assistance personnel and more about support to ongoing government sector plans, the approach to the Northern public's participation in development may need to be revised.

A third consequence of these new mechanisms for aid delivery linked to partnership should be a rethinking of technical assistance and the use of national capacity. Clearly the technical assistance skills required for running a self-standing British or Danish project of the older generation of bilateral projects are very different from monitoring an external contribution to the government's achievement of its own goals and targets. The latter, as the Swedish Partnership with Africa states, must mean the adoption of the obvious: 'that African development requires African exercise of responsibility under African auspices' (1997: 152). Though obvious, this must also mean a new negotiation and compromise about accountability and capacity. Technical assistance is often involved in continuing to ensure that a Southern programme continues to be run according to the annual financial years and accounting procedures of Northern countries as opposed to the requirements of a long term investment programme.

iii Confidence and National Capacity

These three issues point to something else that runs through several of the most recent statements about development that have emerged from Northern donor countries. Apart from taking not dissimilar positions on partnership, and acknowledging the centrality of a poverty focus, development white papers such as the Swedish and British are confident about the task ahead. There is a strong 'can-do-ism' from the very first pages of Eliminating World Poverty (See the Secretary of State, Clare Short's, 'We can succeed') [DFID 1997:5]. That was echoed by Holland's Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk, in a paper of March 1998 - 'I see no reason to be pessimistic'. The Japanese also maintain a basic confidence in foreign aid - for very good, historical-reasons. The Swedish papers and reports are also optimistic, but their emphasis is slightly different; the basis for the optimism is not just the evidence of a new determination in the North to address the international development targets. It is an awareness that Africa is on the move. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Karlsson, is one of many to claim 'The African renaissance has begun. The African renaissance...actually is happening' (Karlsson 1998: 1). Interestingly, this is just what Nyerere claimed in Edinburgh in October 1997 (Nyerere 1997: 7).

The Swedish confidence has been founded on an exercise of 'listening' to Africa, and certainly as much to women as to men. This has led, in turn, to the realisation that the other crucial axiom of most donors in the 1990s - capacity building - is only too evident in the voices of African analysts, but here too it is being recognised that capacity, like democracy, cannot be created from outside, but 'essentially it is formed by internal dynamic' (Karlsson: 8). What is interesting in the Swedish papers is the recognition that little is really known about what sparks 'a capacity revolution' in society. However, a key external challenge for development may be to explore how best to support this essential internal creativity and self reliance once they become evident.

In this regard, Sweden, as the bilateral donor with the longest history of support to primary education and adult literacy, has nevertheless pinpointed the crucial role of secondary and higher
education in adding value to basic education provision. It argues that the African renaissance will need a parallel academic renaissance after the crisis of the last two decades (Karlsson: 8). Similarly in the British White Paper, there is an emphasis on the essential targets for universal primary and gender equity in both primary and secondary. But there is a recognition that countries will also need help to build capacity more comprehensively (‘Our priority is to assist partner countries to achieve the full participation of all children and adults in quality education at all levels.’ DFID 1997: 25).

What these insights may mean for development assistance from a partnership perspective is that there will need to be much more attention given to renewing and sustaining strategic centres of potential excellence in the developing world. Long term higher education partnerships could assist this process, but to do so, it may be necessary to rethink scholarships and training aid (King 1998b). In creative forms of new bilateralism, it will be important to explore how international capacity can be sustained in the North but also deployed more actively in parallel centres in the South that have been depleted by 20 to 30 years of both internal and external brain drain. Equally, development assistance may wish much more directly to consider reverse flows of academic and entrepreneurial capacity, including using the services of Asians, Africans and Latin Americans domiciled in the North (See PWA 1997: 79).

Behind these concerns with local capacity and creativity is a new recognition that the aim of donor funds is not to train more nationals to help with the implementation of external projects and programmes, but to give space for the development of locally owned versions of democracy, pluralism and enterprise. It may well be that, despite the 1998 financial turmoil in East and South East Asia, the Japanese model of development assistance - with its strong emphasis on local self-reliance - should be looked at more closely by other aid providers. It is still the case that other donors are relatively ignorant of Japan's contribution. Although it seems clear that the Japanese played an important role in promoting the notion of the international development targets (OECD/DAC 1996), they have continued to be diffident in promoting 'newer, more independent approaches based on Japan's own experience of providing aid' (Sawamura 1995: 170; King 1996).

**The Missing Partners - and a health warning**

In all the excitement about new North-South relationships and partnerships, based on shared ideals, there must be a level of concern about those countries which for reasons to do with internal armed conflict or political leadership lie far beyond the new narrower or broader versions of partnership. In many ways the fate of these countries may increasingly be left to the small scale assistance of humanitarian aid via NGOs, as more and more of the regular ODA goes through the new partnership routes. In other words, in Africa (and perhaps in other continents), there is a real dilemma about 'the Africa that doesn't work' and that doesn't qualify for partnership. In many ways, this Africa, e.g. Sierra Leone and Somalia, is often also poorer than the African that works.

There is, finally, also one very small danger in all this new Northern confidence about aid strategies, new partnerships, and the rethinking of the caring and carrying capacities of the world. The very newness of the new development texts we have been discussing may once again give the North a moral edge over the South, of the sort that we have seen in the rediscovery - by the North - of human
rights, multi-party democracy and much else. It would be a pity if the Jubilee 2000 campaign for debt relief was seen primarily as yet another example of Northern advocacy for Southern victims, or if Partnership with Africa or Eliminating World Poverty were fundamentally misread as encouragements to take up another version of the white man's burden. Their purpose must surely be as contributions to a more global vision of development in the North as in the South.

Notes
1. An early version of this article was presented for discussion in the Centre of African Studies Seminar attended by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, on March 10th 1998. The ideas were subsequently developed further in seminars in late March 1998 at the Centre for the Study of International Cooperation in Education in Hiroshima University, in JICA and in the United Nations University in Tokyo. I am very grateful to many colleagues in Japan for their reactions and comments. A later version will appear in King and Buchert 1998 Changing international aid to education: global patterns and local contexts UNESCO/NORRAG, Paris.
2. For these trends see particularly NORRAG NEWS NO 22 Special issue on International Development Cooperation, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.
3. North like South is a compromise term. In this article it is a shorthand for the OECD countries, but particularly those such as Japan, Sweden or Germany which have significant development assistance programmes.
4. Denmark, Sweden, Norway and The Netherlands have been notable for years in exceeding the UN target, and it is worth noting that Britain has with the new government of 1997 decided to reverse the decline in its aid budget. This will necessarily be gradual given the government's commitment to restricting its spending targets.
5. This selection of African states by Clinton was suggestively termed 'The Africa that works' by The Economist March 21-27, 1998.
6. Whether this will be the case with Japan as well is not yet clear, but, based in part on the 1996 DAC document, Japan has selected six countries as case study examples of the new partnership and ownership approaches. See Yokozeki and Sawamura 1998.
7. An example from a very different sphere which illustrates the importance of historical and cultural links would be the hesitations in the Commonwealth about admitting a country such as Rwanda, as a new partner/member since it lacks the essential English language tradition. (The admission of Mozambique was in some sense a strategic anomaly.) Equally a country like Japan can contrast the long-standing, large scale cooperation with Asian countries such as Indonesia with some of her newer aid recipients, e.g. in Africa.
8. A particularly rich illustration of the multi-faceted, bilateral web of contacts is to be seen in Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Sweden) 1997 Partnership with Africa theme 1: Sweden and Africa, pp 69-92. See also the discussion of 'citizen-led organisations' which have entered the aid arena in Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997b: 231).
9. See the Swiss discussions on Solidarity for the Future emerging from the North/South Conference for Sustainable Development in May 1998.
10. 'We must be mindful that the projects we finance are not World Bank Projects - they are Chinese, Haitian or Malawian projects. It is for the Bank to support them and advise them' (Wolfensohn 1995:20). A valuable bilateral statement about Sector Programme Support is Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida) 1998 Guidelines for Sector Programme Support: Final Draft (Copenhagen).
11. In a parallel to the Marshall Plan for Europe, Japan also takes a very positive view of the potential of aid: 'Fifty years ago, Japan rebuilt itself after World War II thanks to foreign aid. We Japanese must not forget that this is how we built the foundations of our present prosperity' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997a).

12. 'I believe that Africa is now on the move towards a new liberation. For there are quite definite signs that the people of Africa have resumed the struggle against tyranny, corruption and unrepresentative government' (Nyerere Africa: the third liberation 1997).

13. An interesting confirmation of the traditional Japanese approach of encouraging self-reliance comes from Eritrea: 'They've ... said to us and to others that they really don't want grant funds, thank you; they want loans, because loans you have to pay back and therefore you have to take ownership for them.' (Freeman in King & Caddell 1998: 19).

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