The Sri Lankan Model of Peacebuilding?
The Principle of Local Society’s Ownership and the Validity of Developmental Authoritarianism

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Introduction

This article aims to ask a question concerning the nature of the peacebuilding process in Sri Lanka. The characterization of the ongoing peacebuilding process in the country is still underdeveloped. Sri Lanka’s case does not look like a typical peace process which the mainstream international community may envisage. The country did not experience a peace agreement on which major conflict parties agree to settle their conflict. There has been no United Nations peacekeeping operation. There was no success of international mediators. The conflict in Sri Lanka ended with an outright military victory of one party over the other. The central government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa won the war and politically prevailed over other political forces. Some may wonder whether there is a peacebuilding process in Sri Lanka in the first place under such a circumstance.

This article argues that there is a significant peacebuilding process in Sri Lanka, although it contains many unorthodox elements in light of the traditional understanding of conflict resolution with strong emphases upon the roles of international mediators, peace agreements, peacekeeping missions, electoral assistances, government reforms, and any other international interventions as proofs of the peacebuilding process. In short, ongoing peacebuilding in Sri Lanka is not an internationally-driven process. However, there may be some other kinds of peacebuilding processes.

However, this article does not necessarily argue that the ongoing peacebuilding
process in Sri Lanka is intrinsically justifiable, simply because it can be regarded as a peacebuilding process. There can be multiple courses of peacebuilding in the same country in the same period of time. Some courses are apparently better than others, while it is not certain that a best possible option is always pursued. That is the reason why we carefully examine and assess the way certain peacebuilding courses are selected.

It is noteworthy that the observation on the case of Sri Lanka makes an important suggestion to the discussion on the principle of ownership of local society in peacebuilding. Sri Lanka is making the way for peacebuilding without significant involvements by international actors. It is a desirable situation in the sense that local ownership easily develops without foreign influences and local stakeholders can be responsible for long-term peace based on their own initiatives. This does not mean, however, that the ongoing process of peacebuilding is inherently right. As the author argued somewhere else, the principle of ownership of local society should not be interpreted in a simplistic way. The fact that the national government is not under foreign control does not prove the full-fledge development of ownership of local society. Peacebuilding requires a social foundation to sustain long-term peace, which goes beyond a formal procedural sphere of national government. The case of Sri Lanka provides an important example of complexity of the way we identify and assess ownership of local society in light of its significance to peacebuilding.

The complexity of the peacebuilding process of Sri Lanka is understood in the context of broader discussions on the relationship between peacebuilding and state-building. It is true that Sri Lanka is not experiencing a typical internationally-driven state-building operation as in the cases of Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and so on. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka is certainly experiencing a form of state-building in the process of post-conflict peacebuilding led by its own national government. The question is not whether post-conflict peacebuilding/state-building is taking place in Sri Lanka. Rather, the question is what kind of state-building is taking place in Sri Lanka.

This question directly goes to the issue of the nature of governance in Sri Lanka. This article argues that the Sri Lankan model of peacebuilding can be characterized as a typical example of the model of Asian-style developmental authoritarianism. It is meant
to be a form of peacebuilding in which an authoritarian regime pursues economic development as a tool to alleviate conflict causes.

Looking at the case of Sri Lanka, it seems that the current government is more or less attracted by following suit of Asian successful examples. Its characteristic close tie with China seems to point toward this direction. It is the way the government may justify its authoritarian approach for domestic stability. In this context this article argues that the Asian-style developmental authoritarianism is one approach of peacebuilding, as shown by many other relevant cases in Asia. This article does not necessarily argue that this is the best possible approach for Sri Lanka or that the current government is taking the best possible policy to pursue the approach. Whether we take a favorable or critical view on policies of the government, we would like to understand them correctly in the context of the history of Sri Lanka, the political trend in Asia, and the more international need to examine peacebuilding from the perspective of the state-building process.

1. Asian-style Developmental Authoritarianism and the Issue of Local Ownership

This article describes the approach of the current government of Sri Lanka as a type of Asian-style developmental authoritarianism. This is distinguishable from the debate on neopatrimonial states in Africa. The patron-client system characteristic in a society where multiple clans co-exist and even compete for resources available at the national level does not necessarily exist in Asian countries in its typical form. Authoritarian regimes in Asia are quite often paternalistic in maintaining national integrity. They resort to the appealing power of economic development in justifying their special authorities in society. When people desperately need economic development, those who provide it should be the leader among them. And the measures the leader uses are justifiable in enhancing economic development, a majority of people would be happy to accommodate such measures. This is the logic of what this article calls developmental authoritarianism and it is widely spread around Asia.
The countries which could be described as countries of developmental authoritarianism usually have democratic electoral systems. But the same political leaders in the same political party tend to be elected in countries under Asian-style development authoritarianism. Compared to Africa, major conflict-torn area in the world, where Western style multi-party systems have been introduced and promoted in many post-conflict countries as key to peacebuilding, the different trend in Asia is peculiar. The model case of state-building in Asia is not a European or American democracy. Asians tend to look toward miracle economic development in East-Asia where armed conflicts were more prone than in African some decades ago.

Asian countries maintained authoritarian or paternalistic regimes throughout the period of economic development by highly respecting domestic stability. Even Japan, which is supposed to have established liberal democracy immediately after the Second World War, maintained a system of de fact one-party dominance for more than half a century; only after Japan’s high growth of economy stopped and the Cold War ended, did the Liberal Democratic Party lose a general election and a regime change occur in the 21st century.

Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea are all the areas which emerged from destruction and turmoil caused by disastrous wars by means of miracle economic development. In South-East Asia, ranging from non-conflict-prone countries like Singapore and Malaysia to conflict-torn countries like Vietnam and Cambodia in addition to the countries containing conflict-prone territories like Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, economic development has been the major promoter to maintain domestic stability. In these Asian countries, economic development worked to contribute to not only economic-social issues but also political agendas like peacebuilding. In such a context, authoritarian regimes in Asia were justified as a desirable system for economic development and for sustainable domestic peace.

It is very natural for Asian countries to be attracted by successes of neighboring countries in the region. Thus, Asians tend to look at the issue of peacebuilding as an agenda that will be solved when economic development brings tangible benefits to all sections of the people in their countries. Whether sufficiently democratic or not, the
national government in charge of these affairs need to make responsible policies to achieve such a goal of “peacebuilding through economic development.” The government should be assessed, supported and criticized for the way it effectively achieves such a goal of “peacebuilding through economic development,” even if the government is rather politically authoritarian. Some developed economies in Asia including South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia have experienced dramatic political transitions. But they did so, after they more or less reached a point of high-level economic development during the period of authoritarian regimes.

Developmental authoritarianism can be interpreted as a product of ownership of the national government. International actors usually would not dictate the nature of government to national stakeholders, even if they are keen to advance human rights and humanitarian law agendas. However, as shown by the examples of popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes in some Asian countries like South Korea, the lack of political foreign intervention does not promise the smooth automatic development of ownership of local society as a whole. If the government is oppressive in containing political voices in society, it can be said to hamper the development of local ownership. For a better development of ownership of society as a whole, it is likely that an authoritarian regime need to pave the way for more democratic governance at some point. But it cannot be determined whether or not this must really happen to a certain specific country. Even if it takes place, it cannot be determined how the previous authoritarian regime ought to be evaluated in the long history of the development of the country.

Developmental authoritarianism can be summarized in a succinct insight into political stability. When people have a serious sense of grievances, they may challenge existing social order and destabilize the country. So the government needs to bring economic development to the country so that those who have grievances will see realistic prospects for their betterment in the near future. In so doing, the government also shows hard security policies so that those who have grievances will actually find it more reasonable to gain benefits from economic development than from political confrontations. The combination of development and authoritarianism is logically solid,
not accidental at all. Especially under the circumstance of post-conflict society where social divisions are conspicuous, the form of developmental authoritarianism appears to be very attractive to those who want to maintain or restore social order.

Japan provided a very classic example of such authoritarianism in the regional history of modernization in Asia, when the country overcame the structure of internal conflicts in the nineteenth century after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The central government introduced policies to promote industrial development, while brutally oppressing continuous uprisings. In one decade after the Meiji Restoration, Japan was full of armed revolts and riots. After some more decades, Japan was a highly cohesive nation with rapidly introduced state-led industries. The imperial constitutionalism of Japan prevented it from being ruled by personality only, although the strong bureaucracy created a different kind of problem in Japan instead.4

In the history of political societies, this kind of approach of developmental authoritarianism is rather orthodox. Political and military strength combined with economic prosperity was always a dream of rulers. This traditional insight does not necessarily disappear with the advent of more liberal doctrines of state-building driven and sustained by external supporters in contemporary peacebuilding activities.

When local society obtains a sufficient level of political and military strength and economic development, the principle of local ownership can easily flourish. If local ownership is the way for sustainable peacebuilding, developmental authoritarianism is an effective way for sustainable peacebuilding. This kind of observation entails serious implications, as developmental authoritarianism is usually not favorably seen as an orthodox doctrine of liberal peacebuilding. But is it because developmental authoritarianism does not lead to desirable peacebuilding according to the observation by mainstream analysts? Or is it simply because liberalism does not usually support authoritarianism?

In order to better understand this predicament, in the next section we turn to the case of Sri Lanka on which we further examine the linkage between developmental authoritarianism and local ownership in peacebuilding.

There is a widely circulated view among external observers that the conflict in Sri Lanka is an ethnic conflict between the Sinhala and the Tamil. According to this view, the victory by the government against LTTE is tantamount to a victory by the Sinhala against the Tamil. This view leads to the observation that the Sinhala government dominates the Tamil community in the form of de facto military occupation. It is likely under such a circumstance that the government abuses human rights of Tamil people.

Unfortunately, this kind of view unnecessarily oversimplifies the situation in Sri Lanka. First of all, it is not so clear that the civil war in Sri Lanka was an ethnic conflict. It goes without saying that the level of ethnic mixture is very high in Sri Lanka. It is a genuine exaggeration to say that LTTE represented the entire community of Tamil; originally, it was just one radical faction of political associations in the Northern part of Sri Lanka. According to the government, not so much surprisingly to many observers, LTTE was a terrorist organization, against which the government conducted security operations. It is not correct to presuppose that the government officially represents the Sinhala community to the detriment of the Tamil community. The official explanation of the war was the confrontation between the government and the terrorist organization. Then, the government’s theoretical standpoint is that it pursues reconciliation among those who suffered from the prolonged war, not particularly between the Sinhala and the Tamil.

President Rajapaksa stated in his inaugural address for his second term that on “the 19th of May, we united this country achieving a victory over terrorism that had its global echoes.” Then, “our first task is to ensure lasting national unity and sustainable, permanent peace in our motherland,” while he believes that “the eradication of poverty is greater than the defeat of uprisings.” He emphasized that “rural areas that were ignored from the days of imperial rule are being developed and the nation’s doors open for new employment, industry, business opportunity and massive development.”
Development will increase the quality of work so that Sri Lanka “can be made the Wonder of Asia.” There is a clear logic that “There will be no development in the absence of peace, nor peace in the absence of development….The expectations of the people are not those of the terrorists. We have carried out development work in the North and East as never before in the history of these regions. All development processes carried out in the North and East, are a closure of the highways to terrorism. I strongly believe that this infrastructure to banish poverty is a major part of a political solution.”

The attitude of President Rajapakasa shows an orientation of what this article calls developmental authoritarianism. By increasing military capability, the government smashes terrorist organizations and rules the country even in an authoritarian way. On the other hand, the government promises fruits of economic development throughout the nation including the Tamil areas in the North and the East. These two dimensions are inseparable in the government’s policy on post-conflict peacebuilding.

President Rajapaksa also stimulates the nationalistic sentiment of Sri Lanka by saying that “We are not a miniature of a developed country. We are Sri Lanka. Our motherland is Sri Lanka. We have the inherited wisdom to tolerate all opinion and take mature decisions. We have a tradition of understanding our problems and conflicts and finding solutions for them.” He then describes his role as a national liberator in the long history of Sri Lanka, which “won our freedom from the world’s most powerful imperialism from struggles that lasted nearly four centuries; and, has defeated the most ruthless and savage terrorist of the world. It is where people who follow four different faiths live in harmony and where today many communities live in brotherhood; and where the world’s largest harbour and five other ports are being built, and the strides of development are proceeding to build airports, expressways and massive power stations. With such an abundance of greatness who would dare to say that this is a small island?”

President Rajapaksa’s brother, Defense Secretary Nandasena Gotabaya Rajapaksa emphasizes that “the defeat of terrorism in the country has allowed peace to return, freedom and democracy to be restored and the economy to thrive making Sri
Lanka one of the most secure and stable countries in the world….It is time to celebrate similarities and preserve the differences that in turn contribute to strengthening the national identity of being Sri Lankan.” According to him, “it is an identity that has resulted from the combination and cohabitation of the various identities. If each citizen sees that being Sri Lankan does not necessitate the need to give up their own identity or multiple identities but rather that the notion of being Sri Lankan subsumes all such identities, we will then reconcile our differences instantly.”

The understanding of the nature of the war by the government of Sri Lanka is different from a conventional understanding of the war in the West. The government consistently calls LTTE terrorists. For the government, the war was conducted by the government against terrorists. By contrast, for international observers, the war was about the majority Sinhala against the minority Tamil. The two different views on the war would differ as regards the way they look at post-conflict policies too. The government intends to develop national integrity by bringing more development projects in the North and the East. For international observers, such development projects are introduced as initiatives from Colombo and do not seem to be changing the lives of many of the ordinary Tamil residents positively. For the government, post-conflict policies would have to include the element of eradication of terrorist influence by treating former LTTE associates as such. For international observers, such policies would have to be described as the expansion of the dominance of Sinhala over Tamil. For the government, “There were thousands of LTTE cadres still at large with caches of arms and explosives dumps hidden in the former war zone and, therefore, the threat of terrorism persisted to some extent.” For international critics, the government is implementing policies of “Sinhalisation” and “militarisation.”

Alan Keenan, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst and Sri Lanka project director, even discusses “how de facto military rule and various forms of government-sponsored ‘Sinhalisation’ of the Tamil-majority region are impeding international humanitarian efforts, reigniting a sense of grievance among Tamils, and weakening chances for a real political settlement to devolve power in Sri Lanka.” The Crisis Group uses a very strong warning on the government’s “Sinhalisation” and
“militarisation” in the North by asserting that “By adopting policies that will bring fundamental changes to the culture, demography and economy of the Northern Province, the government of Sri Lanka is sowing the seeds of future violence there.”¹¹

This explains the controversy concerning the Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) of November 2011. Not only the International Crisis Group but also government of Western countries, EU, and a considerable number of members of UN Human Rights Commission are more or less very critical of the Report for the reason that it did not investigate much about war crimes committed by government forces during the final phase of the war in 2009.¹² The government is reluctant to deal with war heroes as if they were war criminals and it is true that the general tone of LLRC is also as such.

For instance, according to LLRC, the ceasefire agreement (CFA) brokered by the Norwegian government only “brought about a short lived respite to a country and people who had suffered decades of terrorism and counter violence.” With Norway's misleading role, the CFA “was not proven to be a successful model for peace making between State and non-State actors.” As regards the controversial issues of “allegations of violations of IHL [international humanitarian law], the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived, in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority.” The LLRC is also of the view that the government of Sri Lanka took “all possible steps in getting food and medical supplies and other essential items across to the entrapped civilians despite enormous logistical difficulties of the operation.” Instead, the LLRC stresses “the grave violations of Human Rights by the LTTE” and the “grave violations of core Principles of IHL by the LTTE.”

As regards post-conflict settlements, the “Commission recognizes the fact that although it is not an easy task to restore the pre-conflict status quo in a country immediately after a prolonged conflict, it is important to ensure that illegal land transfers and alienation triggered by violence, intimidation and ethnic cleansing are not allowed to be perpetuated or institutionalized.” While recognizing any “citizen of Sri Lanka has the inalienable right to acquire land in any part of the country, in accordance
with its laws and regulations, and reside in any area of his/her choice without any restrictions or limitations imposed in any manner whatsoever,” the “Commission appreciates the Government’s land policy concerning return and resettlement of displaced persons and the associated Programme proposed in July 2011, titled ‘Regulating the Activities Regarding Management of Lands in the Northern and Eastern Provinces’ designed to resolve problems relating to land documentation and disputes in ownership and user-rights of the displaced persons.”

As regards the issue of reconciliation, the LLRC “recognizes the fact that considering the protracted nature of the conflict spanning a period of thirty years, resolving all such issues would naturally take time and require significant resources and financing. The Commission also notes that the Government of Sri Lanka has in fact committed considerable funding and resources to the North and East and Sri Lanka’s development partners are contributing to these efforts and working in co-operation with the Government agencies.” “What needs to be done for reconciliation and nation-building is that the State has to reach out to the minorities and the minorities, in turn must, re-position themselves in their role vis a vis the State and the country. There must be willingness on the part of all political parties to give up adversarial politics and have consensual decision-making on national issues. In order to meet the challenges of this opportunity there has to be courage and political will on the part of all political parties.”

The LLRC also states that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of successive Governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people. A political solution is imperative to address the causes of the conflict” in addition to the “grievances of the Muslim community,” “grievances of Sinhalese in villages adjacent to former conflict areas” and “grievances of Tamils of Indian origin.”

In general terms the LLRC observes that “Along with an independent Judiciary and a transparent legal process a strict adherence to the Rule of Law is a sine qua non for peace and stability which is of the essence, if there is to be any meaningful reconciliation. It was stated that lack of good governance, and non-observance of the Rule of Law coupled with a lack of meaningful devolution were causes for creating tension between communities.”
The LLRC also states that “It is vital that the Government should provide leadership to a political process which must be pursued for the purpose of establishing a framework for ensuring sustainable peace and security in the post-conflict environment. In this endeavour the rights of all communities, including those who have been members of the LTTE, must be ensured. To this end a political settlement based on devolution must address the ethnic problem as well as other serious problems that threaten the democratic institutions. This political process should culminate in a constitutional foundation and mechanisms that provide opportunities for development and implementation of necessary socioeconomic policies.”

The debate on war criminals did not start with the LLRC. The way the war ended was not an expected outcome for many international actors, as the international community was committed to a negotiated peace. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was hailed by Western sources for his commitment to the war crimes issue in Sri Lanka in the form of the publication of the “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel on Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka” or the “Darusman Report.” The government of Sri Lanka is vigorously faced with international pressures from the UN and Western countries. The entire international community’s attitude toward the issue is somewhat ambiguous.

3. The Theory of Horizontal Inequality and its Implications

With the high popularity of President Rajapaksa especially in rural areas, domestic politics of Sri Lanka is complex. Domestic society is not perfectly united under the victorious government with anxieties among the Tamil and the Muslim community in addition to urban residents who tend to look at the government’s approach critically. General Sarath Fonseka, Commander of the Army at the final phase of the war and a presidential candidate in the 2010 election backed by a coalition of main opposition parties including United National Party (UNP) and Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), refused to accept the election result published by the Election Commissioner in the next
morning of the election on 26 January 2010. He was arrested on 8 February for committing military offences amidst the rumor about the possibility of a coup. Fonseka won a considerable number of votes not only in the North and the East (although the turnout was quite low), but also in the Colombo district.

The way the current government under President Rajapaksa handles national resources is a matter of controversy in the context of domestic politics. This article, however, focuses upon a more structural issue as regards the course of post-conflict peacebuilding. This article has described the government approach as “developmental authoritarianism,” while the West-oriented international community is suspicious about the ethnic balance of power after the war. To a great extent, the latter’s concern would be theoretically explained by the theory of “horizontal inequality” developed by Frances Stewart, who picks up the case of Sri Lanka as one of the vivid examples of the relevance of “horizontal inequality” in the context of armed conflicts.\(^\text{18}\)

The theory of “horizontal inequality” is concerned with inequalities between groups (horizontal inequalities - HIs) in addition to inequalities between individuals (vertical inequality - VI). HIs are supposed to matter from the perspective of the wellbeing of individuals within groups and through the impact of group inequalities in reducing growth potential and provoking violence. HIs are discussed well in the context of conflict analysis, since the issue of inequalities between groups is a matter of major concern in peacebuilding.

According to Stewart, when the Sinhalese gained power after independence, “they sought to correct the horizontal inequalities perceived as disadvantageous to them” during the British colonial period through educational quotas, the use of Sinhalese as the official national language, and regional investment policy. The consequence was a major change in the extent and even direction of horizontal inequalities, as from 1963 to 1973, for instance, the incomes of the Sinhalese rose while those of the Tamils fell quite sharply, eliminating the previous differential between the two groups.” Stewart thus observes that;

Sinhalese policies were undoubtedly effective in correcting prior horizontal
inequalities, but they overkilled introducing new horizontal inequalities in their favour. The result was to provoke the Sri Lankan Tamils, who felt excluded politically and economically threatened. The political impact of the district quota system [introducing quotas on University access] has been little short of disastrous. It has convinced many Tamils that it was futile to expect equality of treatment with the Sinhalese majority....It has contributed to the acceptance of a policy campaigning for a separate state....The Sri Lankan case indicates the care which is needed in pursuing policies to correct horizontal inequalities: sharp changes can create new sources of conflict, especially where they go beyond correcting prior inequalities and create new ones.  

Stewart did not specifically study the case of Sri Lanka in detail, but refers to it quite often as an instance to reinforce her argument. If her observation is correct, the matter of great concern among observers is whether the government of Sri Lanka is correcting the previous policies of the “Sinhalese” government.

For the government, however, the previous ethnically-controversial policies on education, language, recruitment, and so on, were all removed. Power-sharing under the assumption of the existence of the two clearly identifiable conflict parties is now outmoded. Stewart assumes that there are two or three separate communities in Sri Lanka and the whole issue is whether or not horizontal inequalities exist between them. Historically speaking, however, the existence of such clearly separable ethnic communities was in a way a creation of the British colonial policy of “divide and rule.” Tamil nationalism itself was a creation of modernization with the arrival of the British rule. The fact that the theory of “horizontal inequalities” is derived from British scholarship might not be very accidental from this perspective, but remedies for such inequalities would require subtle examinations.

One approach is “divide and rule.” Another is unification. When it comes to “horizontal inequalities,” it is sometimes not clear whether “horizontal inequalities” are the cause of a conflict or a consequence of a conflict in the long history of a society. It is
also not clear whether “divide and rule” is a cause of inequalities or a response to inequalities. The “divide and rule” approach would enlarge horizontal inequalities. After “horizontal inequalities” become apparent, secessionists would demand a modified version of “divide and rule” in the form of creation of a new state or a new autonomy, as in the cases like Kosovo and South Sudan, for instance. There should be some more balanced approaches and sensitive ways to implement them. But the discussion on “horizontal inequalities” does not need to exclusively focus upon just the refinement of “divide and rule.”

LTTE insisted that secession was the solution. The previous government sought for compromises. The current government denied it. There are no universally applicable theories of solutions. Only under the circumstance of the current situation of Sri Lanka, those policy-makers responsible for the future of Sri Lanka need to identify best possible options. Many countries’ histories of post-war development are similarly complex, as in the case of Japan, for instance.

As this article has examined, many other Asian countries have taken the approach of what this article calls “developmental authoritarianism.” This article has suggested at the beginning that the government of Sri Lanka’s approach seems to be inclined in such a direction. Whether it is simply a form of “Sinhalisation” and “militarisation” or something else requires careful considerations. All these issues including the agenda of devolution would have to be even more seriously discussed by the people in Sri Lanka themselves. Beyond the issue of the presence or absence of the goodwill on the side of the current government, however, there exist constitutional issues, which are really fundamental matters for discussions in Sri Lanka. This article suggests that out of such debates there will emerge much stronger ownership of Sri Lankan people for long-term peacebuilding.

4. Conclusion

This article started with the description of the current government of Sri Lanka’s
approach in light of developmental authoritarianism rather prevalent in Asia. This attempt was not particularly intended to attack or defend the government. This article aimed to illustrate the importance of the ownership of local society, and thus explore a wide range of possibilities of realistic approaches of peacebuilding. The article has argued that the case of Sri Lanka provides stimulating insights, which require careful considerations in the context of peacebuilding and state-building in the context of the contemporary international community. This article does not bring any definitive conclusion, but emphasize further examinations on this issue of the development of local ownership as a strategic imperative of peacebuilding.

2 See ibid.
4 Japan has its own complex history. With the end of the tragic internal war at the time of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the territories of those defeated by the new Meiji government, “Tohoku” (meaning “Eastern-North”) region, remained underdeveloped. Tohoku region continued to secure its position in Japan’s modernization by offering human resources, agricultural resources, industrial resources, and even nuclear power plants to supply electricity to the metropolitan area.


10 See Shinoda, op. cit. for the description of reactions of Western governments and the UN in contrast to China and India at the end of the war. See also Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer and Benedikt Korf (eds.), Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).


12 The most candid view of government sources is found in statements by Professor Rajiva Wijesinha MP, former Secretary General of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), Adviser on Reconciliation to President Rajapaksa, who uses the channel of SCOPP to prove critical responses to international voices, although it officially ceased to operate with the end of the war. “Many initiatives for reconciliation are happening through various branches of government. These are not sufficiently well known, so the website of the former Peace Secretariat will be used to communicate some notable developments.” See the official website of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) at <http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/home> for Rajiva Wijesinha’s harsh remarks against UN, International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, governments of US, UK, etc., see, for instance, “Media Reaction to the Darusman Report,” at <http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/for-the-record/media-reaction-to-the-darusman-report>. See also “See No Good, Hear No Good, Speak No Good: A Review of the Evidence in the Context of Past Realities and Future Plans,” available at <http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/for-the-record/the-darusman-panel>; and “The Road to Reconciliation and its Enemies: Documented Evidence and Logical Argument against Emotional Exaggeration and Soundbites,” available at <http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/for-the-record/the-road-to-reconciliation-and-its-enemies>.

13 The US sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Council to demand that the government of Sri Lanka take all necessary steps to fulfil its legal obligations and to present a comprehensive action plan was adopted with a narrow margin of 24 votes in favor out of 47 members: In favour (24): Austria, Belgium, Benin, Cameroon, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Italy, Libya, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, United States and Uruguay; Against (15): Bangladesh, China, Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kuwait, Maldives, Mauritania, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Uganda; Abstentions (8): Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia and Senegal. See “Human Rights Council adopts seven texts on Sri Lanka, Adequate Housing, Right to Food, and extends the mandate on Cultural Rights,” 22 March 2012, available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12001&LangID=E >.


16 See, for instance, Frances Stewart (ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies (Conflict, Inequality and Ethnicity) (London:

22 It is ironic that Stewart, Oxford Professor, tend to take many examples to discuss horizontal inequalities from former British colonies like Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Uganda, and South Africa and the Northern Ireland. See Stewart, *op. cit.*