Russia’s Security Policy from the Bucharest NATO Summit and Russia-Georgia War through the Brussels NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting

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1. Introduction

NATO refused to give Georgia and Ukraine the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at a foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on December 2, 2008.¹ It was the second time this year that the Western alliance hesitated at giving Georgia and Ukraine the MAP, a plan for military and political reforms needed before formally becoming the member of NATO.²

Both at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 and at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels in December, NATO seemed to withdraw in the light of Russian resistance to Georgia and Ukraine. NATO was deeply split between the United States, Great Britain, and a group of East European countries supporting expansion, and France, Germany and Italy opposing it.³ The divisions between both sides are clear. These disagreements will deepen every time NATO tries to extend.

So is the NATO Brussels foreign ministers' meeting which again denied Georgia and Ukraine MAP status the end of NATO expansion into the former Soviet countries?

The main purpose of this paper is to consider whether or not the NATO Brussels foreign ministers' meeting means the end of NATO expansion into the former Soviet countries and what Russia’s security policy against NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine is.
2. The Bucharest NATO Summit's Decision to Suspend the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia and Ukraine

On April 2 at the Bucharest NATO summit, U.S. President George W. Bush insisted NATO should welcome Georgia and Ukraine into the Membership Action Plan. He said: Here in Bucharest, we must make clear that NATO welcomes the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine for their membership in NATO and offers them a clear path forward to meet that goal. …NATO should welcome Georgia and Ukraine into the Membership Action Plan.4

In contrast, Russia strongly has opposed NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. In a speech to the State Duma in Moscow on April 2, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued: what is absolutely unacceptable is a possible attempt by Georgia to use force for conflict resolution and especially to use its accession to NATO for these purposes. This would radically change the circumstances of the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and most of them are citizens of the Russian Federation.5

At the same time, Germany and France have repeatedly pointed out the failure of Georgia to insist control over its two separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the weak public support for NATO membership within Ukraine. French Prime Minister Francois Fillon reiterated that accepting both countries into NATO would disrupt the geopolitical balance with Russia. Germany has a particular interest in maintaining a good relationship with Russia which is a supplier of oil and gas in Europe. Germany has so-called the “North Stream” pipeline plan that will pump Russian natural gas directly to it.6

As it turned out, when the Bucharest NATO summit closed its official part on April 3, the summit of hopes as it was called before turned into a summit of frustrated hopes in one day.7 Obviously because Georgia and Ukraine failed to obtain the Membership Action Plan, some experts interpreted as a triumph for Kremlin diplomacy. The daily "Kommersant" wrote on April 3: Bush suffered the humiliating diplomatic failure Wednesday, when, led by France and Germany, the allies opposed his effort to grant the MAP to the former Soviet republics, Ukraine and Georgia.8
However, in spite of that, in fact Russia had lost in Bucharest, because the NATO’s decision to deploy ballistic missile systems in Europe would have more dramatic consequences for Moscow than the temporary defeat of Georgia and Ukraine.\(^9\)

NATO secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said: And they[Allies] have decided to task NATO to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all allied territory and population not otherwise covered by the US system for review at our 2009 summit.\(^10\)

In other words, this means from the viewpoint of the Russian paper “Kommersant” that the European ABM has turned from an American into a NATO project, therefore undermining Russia's ability to oppose it because it will now have to deal with the united Western community in the form of NATO.\(^11\) After Scheffer made his speech, the experts attending the summit said that the concession to Russia concerning Georgia and Ukraine was made in exchange for the missile defense decision. Dmitry Saveliev, director of the Sistema Effective Management Institute said: Apparently, the issue of granting the MAP to Georgia and Ukraine was intentionally overblown so as to make Moscow a little frightened. …It was clear from the very beginning that Ukraine will not get the MAP because it hosts Russia’s Black Sea Fleet base, and the Ukrainian nation lacks consensus on the issue of joining NATO. Georgia did not get the MAP due to its unsettled conflicts and Saakashvili’s unpredictability, for he might launch a special operation in Abkhazia even when already a NATO member. So, they prepared Moscow for the worst scenario, so as to make the missile defense decision seem not so scary. After all, Moscow is very glad that Georgia and Ukraine have remained in its sphere of influence so far.\(^12\)

President Putin protested in Bucharest at the April 4 meeting of the Russia-NATO Council, saying as follows: We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders, … as a direct threat to the security of our country. The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice.\(^13\)

Regarding the proposed U.S. missile-defense program, Putin argued: As you know, we have put forward our own initiatives, which were that we should first
examine the missile threat; secondly, together build a strategic missile defence structure for the future; and, thirdly, provide equal, democratic access to everyone in charge of it, namely the United States, Russia and Europe. In doing so, we proposed to create two centres for the exchange of operational information: in Moscow and in Brussels.¹⁴

Putin lambasted the idea that NATO enlargement helps promote democracy, saying: If a country is a member of NATO, it can insist on being considered democratic, and if not, that means it isn't democratic? … Or take Ukriane for example: it could have become a member of NATO yesterday, it could have become democratic. But today it isn't a democracy? What is this nonsense?¹⁵

In Sochi on April 6, Bush and Putin noted that Russia continues to oppose a proposed U.S. missile-defense system, components of which would be based in Poland and the Czech Republic which were members of former Soviet block countries. Putin said: I want to make it clear that as far as principle is concerned, our position regarding the U.S. plans remains unchanged. But there are nonetheless signs of progress. Our concerns have been heard by the United States. During the 2+2 meeting in March and again today during the talks with President Bush, we were offered a package of confidence-building and transparency measures in the missile defence area.¹⁶

He said that the two sides can eventually reach agreement. He added that the presidents have agreed upon a strategic framework(Sochi Declaration) guiding future U.S.-Russia relations.¹⁷

But Bush and Putin did not conclude a agreement to resolve disputes on missile defense and some other strategic issues before they leave office. In other words, the two leaders agreed to disagree.

3. Russia-Georgia’s Five-Day War in August

As Germany and France have repeatedly pointed out the failure of Georgia to insist
control over its two separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in April and the
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unsettled conflicts and Saakashvili’s unpredictability, for he might launch a special
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operation in Abkhazia even when already a NATO member, at last, Russia-Georgia’s
five-day war occurred in August 2008. It consists of an armed conflict between
France on the one side, and Russia and the separatist self-proclaimed republics of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia which are backed by Russia on the other. It involves
warfare of land, air and sea.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia gained de facto independence from Georgia in the
late 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The region was in a tenuous peace
monitored by Russian peacekeepers, but frictions with Georgia increased sharply in
2004, when President of Georgia Saakashvili came to power and made national
unification a centerpiece of his agenda. Since then an uneasy truce had reigned and
fighting between South Ossetia and Georgian forces had erupted sporadically.
Hostilities between the two parts escalated during late July 2008.

At past 0:00 a.m. of August 8, 2008, Georgia attacked South Ossetia's capital,
Tskhinvali, by using the ground and air armed forces. Russia responded by sending
troops into South Ossetia and bombing Georgia. Russian aircraft had bombed the
Georgian Black Sea port of Poti and military targets in the central town of Gori.
Saakashvili accused Russian forces of “ethnic cleansing” and hitting civilian targets
such as hospitals and apartment buildings around the country. On August 9,
Abkhazian forces opened a second front by attacking the Kodori Gorge, held by
Georgia.

On August 10, international society began to call for a peaceful solution.
The European Union and the United States expressed to try and negotiate a ceasefire.
Russia, however, requested talks with Georgia until the latter withdrew from South
Ossetia and signed a pact renouncing the use of force against South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin said on Sunday that there
would be no peace talks with Georgia till it pulled back its forces beyond the borders
of South Ossetia and signed a legally binding pact renouncing the use of force against

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South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another breakaway territory of Georgia.\textsuperscript{24}

On August 12, Russian President Medvedev said that he had ordered an end to military operations in Georgia. He said as follows: I have ordered an end to the operations to oblige Georgia to restore peace. The purpose of the operations has been achieved. The security of our peacekeeping brigade and civilian population has been restored. The aggressor has been punished and suffered very heavy losses. Its armed forces are disorganized.\textsuperscript{25}

Later on the same day, he met the President-in-Office of the EU, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and approved a six-point peace plan. Medvedev had endorsed six-point plan and read out six principles of the plan at a joint news conference with Sarkozy. Medvedev said: Now the actual results that we achieved. I will read out certain principles, then my colleague will do so in French.--- They are six. One. Do not resort to the use of force. Two. The absolute cessation of all hostilities. Three. Free access to humanitarian assistance. Four. The Armed Forces of Georgia must withdraw to their permanent positions. Five. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must withdraw to the line where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities. Prior to the establishment of international mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures. Six. An international debate on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security will take place. I think that these are good principles to resolve this problem and to go beyond the dramatic situation that arose. And these principles may be implemented both by Georgia and South Ossetia.\textsuperscript{26}

Following mediation by EU chairman, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, Georgia and Russia reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement on August 12. After five days of heavy fighting, on August 13, Georgian forces were ejected from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

This preliminary ceasefire agreement was signed by Georgia on August 15 in Tbilisi and by Russia on August 16 in Moscow. After the signing of the ceasefire Russia pulled most of its troops out of Georgia proper. However, Russia established "buffer zones" around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and check points in Georgia's
interior (Poti, Senaki). On August 26, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On September 9, Russia officially announced that its troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia would henceforth be considered foreign troops stationed in independent states under bilateral agreements. Despite numerous calls for a quick withdrawal from Georgia by western leaders, Russian troops occupied some parts of Georgia proper for about two months. On October 8, withdrawal from the buffer zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia was completed two days ahead of the agreed deadline when control was handed over to EU observer mission. 

4. The EU Emergency Summit on Relations with Russia after Russia-Georgia War and the Nice EU-Russia Summit

On September 1, the European Union held an emergency summit on relations with Russia after Russia-Georgia War. The EU as Russia's biggest trade partner refrained from imposing any economic sanctions on it. The EU summit’s resolution did not mention economic sanctions against Russia due to its armed conflict with Georgia. This may be considered a diplomatic victory for Russia from the standpoint of Russia.

On the other hand, the EU summit agreed to postpone talks with Russia on a new partnership pact scheduled for later September if Russia had not withdrawn its troops to pre-conflict position in Georgia by then. These two EU summit’s decisions not to mention economic sanctions and to postpone talks on a new partnership pact were bids to bridge broad differences among its 27 states on how to deal with Russia.

The new EU-Russia accord is due to regulate relations in the energy sector and on trade. France, Germany, and Italy said earlier punitive action against Russia would be premature, but Britain championed calls for the EU to suspend talks on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

In other words, France, Germany and Italy declared unanimously that
isolating Russia was not an option, and that it is necessary to continue dialogue with it. As a consequence, Britain and Poland, the main advocates of a tough line towards Russia, had to settle for the document's statement that "meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement will be postponed."33

A final summit statement strongly condemned Russia's move to recognize the independence of the rebel regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and urged other countries not to follow the step. It said: The European Council is gravely concerned by the open conflict which has broken out in Georgia, by the resulting violence and by the disproportionate reaction of Russia. …We are convinced that it is in Russia's own interest not to isolate itself from Europe. …this evaluation must begin now and continue in the run-up to the forthcoming summit scheduled to take place in Nice on 14 November 2008. …Until troops have withdrawn to the positions held prior to 7 August, meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement will be postponed.34

In contrast, before the summit opened, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov said Moscow's intervention in Georgia had set a new standard for defending its interests. He said: People living in the conflict regions in the post-Soviet space have found themselves in the “gray zone” through no fault of theirs, often never becoming citizens of states which arose as a result of the breakup of the USSR. It is incomprehensible why those speaking in virtually every corner about the “responsibility to protect” forgot about this when it came to the part of the ex-Soviet Union space where the authorities began to kill innocent people by appealing to sovereignty and territorial integrity. For us, the question in South Ossetia was one of repelling aggression and protecting our citizens directly on the borders of Russia and not in the Falkland islands.35

Lavrov declared, “Russia has returned to the world arena as a responsible state which can stand up for its citizens,” and added, “America needs to acknowledge the reality of the “post-American world” and to start adapting itself to it.36.

As scheduled to take place at the EU emergency summit in September, on November 14, the EU-Russia summit was held in Nice. The current President of the European Council Sarkozy welcomed Russian President Medvedev. At this summit,
the EU's French presidency publicly backed Medvedev's call for a new security architecture for Europe. So Russia has made a drive for recognition as one of the world's major powers.37

At the postsummit press conference, Sarkozy spent relatively little time criticizing Russian actions in Georgia. He appeared to speculate about ways in which the Russian-Georgian conflict could lead to changes in the existing pan-European security arrangements. The discussions focused mainly on Georgia, pan-European security and the international financial crisis.38

With regard to Georgia, the EU noted that Russia had fulfilled a very large part of its commitments: the ceasefire, the withdrawal, for the most part, the deployment of observers, and the beginning of international talks in Geneva.39.

On the issue of pan-European security, the EU expressed its concern with regard to President Medvedev's Berlin speech in June and his statements on the potential deployment of Russian missiles, stating that no missiles should be deployed until the new geopolitical conditions of pan-European security had been discussed. Sarkozy proposed holding a meeting in mid-2009, perhaps in the framework of the OSCE, to lay the foundations of what could be the future security of Europe. He emphasised the importance of involving the United States in this process, indicating that the NATO summit being held in April in Kehl and Strasbourg would be a perfect opportunity to prepare a summit on these issues.40

Sarkozy also stated his conviction that it was in the joint interests of the Russian Federation and Europe to work on the perspective of a common economic area, allowing the creation of interdependencies and common interests, thus banishing any form of confrontation. Medvedev noted that trade between the EU and Russia was increasing, and now represented over 50% of Russia's foreign trade.41

Medvedev thanked Sarkozy for the EU's support, maintaining that his recent decision to deploy new Iskander missiles came as a response to other countries "unilateral" encroachment on Russia's security. He said: In this context, I fully agree that until we sign a special global agreement on ensuring European security, we should all refrain from taking any unilateral steps that would affect security. Russia has never
taken any such steps on a unilateral basis. All of the decisions that we were preparing, including the measures I announced just recently, were but responses to the actions of particular European countries that, without even consulting with anyone, decided on the deployment of new defence means on their territories.\(^\text{42}\)

Medvedev has repeatedly said his plans are aimed at ending U.S. and NATO dominance in Europe. He said: I would like to thank the President of France for giving it his support. …The main thing is that we be prepared to meet and discuss these issues under the aegis of the OSCE and with the participation of all European institutions, including NATO, the European Union, the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and the CIS.\(^\text{43}\)

5. The Brussels NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting’s Refusal to Grant Georgia and Ukraine the MAP and NATO-Russia Council Resuming Informal Meeting

The main issue of the Brussels NATO foreign ministers meeting on the formal agenda was whether to give the Membership Action Plans (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. How NATO will treat Russia after its war with Georgia in August was another important issue.\(^\text{44}\)

The United States, Great Britain, and new member states such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states which were the members of Soviet block have strongly supported Georgia and Ukraine's bits to join NATO. On the other hand, Germany and France have opposed such a step because it would make a enemy of Russia. Both two countries think that Russia sees those two former Soviet countries, Georgia and Ukraine, as part of its sphere of influence. In Germany and France’s view, Russia and Georgia's five-day war in August has only deepened these differences and diminished Georgia’s chances of getting the MAP.\(^\text{55}\)

In the opinion of most NATO members, the Georgia war was not only an example of Russian aggression. It was also an example of the irresponsible behavior of the Georgian leadership. In this context, many NATO members think that they cannot
defend such a country as behaving in an irresponsible manner. Ukraine is in a constant conflict between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. In Ukraine a majority of the population opposes membership to NATO. Ukraine is also not expected to be granted the MAP.46

For that reason, NATO foreign ministers in Brussels have reiterated a commitment that Georgia and Ukraine will “eventually” join the NATO, but postponed granting the two countries the formal Membership Action Plan at this time.47

The issue of granting Georgia and Ukraine the Membership Action Plan (MAP) became a contentious issue for Russia, because the MAP are widely seen as the last step before full membership. The MAP is essentially a detailed blueprint of the political and military reforms as NATO standard countries must complete before full membership in the alliance.48

De Hoop Scheffer said NATO would step up its efforts to assist reforms in Georgia and Ukraine in an effort to get them ready for membership.49 He said: NATO will provide further assistance to both countries, in implementing needed reforms as they progress, the countries, towards NATO membership. What does it mean? It means that NATO will maximize, strengthen if you wish, its advice and assistance for those reform efforts in the frameworks of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Georgia Commission.50

The Russia-Georgia war in August has raised serious questions about Georgia's commitment to NATO principles. The statement adopted at the NATO foreign ministers' previous meeting on August 19 affirmed support for Georgia's territorial integrity and condemned the disproportionate Russian military response. At the same time, however, it criticized the Georgian leadership.51 It stressed: The conflict between Georgia and Russia has compromised regional stability and security. We deeply deplore the use of force in the conflict between Georgia and Russia. We reiterate that there is no military solution to the unresolved conflicts. We remind all parties that peaceful conflict resolution is a key principle of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.52

The question of whether and when Georgia and Ukraine will be given the
MAP has been left. Instead, both countries will be demanded to fulfill annual reform programs. NATO will be able to monitor Georgia's progress to correct the political shortcomings including the lack of media freedom and of an independent judiciary which were publicly identified by NATO Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer during his visit to Tbilisi in mid-September.53

On the other hand, the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in December agreed to gradually resume contacts with Russia, which were frozen after Russia's war with Georgia in August. It, however, stopped a full-fledged revival of the suspended Russia-NATO Council managing the relationship of both sides.54

Speaking at a press conference in Brussels, NATO Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer said that “informal” meetings of the NATO-Russia Council would resume. He stressed, however, that the alliance still has serious differences with Moscow.55 He said: This graduated re-engagement does certainly not mean that we do now suddenly agree with the Russians on the disproportionate use of force in August in the Caucasus. On the recognition, illegal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the fact that the Russians are still taking positions they should not take in that area.56

Russia has welcomed NATO's declaration that it wanted to repair ties after a war between Russia and NATO-aspirant Georgia. The Russian Foreign Ministry statement also said that NATO's decision not to hand Georgia and Ukraine a firm timetable for membership showed that NATO had now realized the risks linked with bringing these countries, the former Soviet states, into the alliance swiftly.57

It said: We are not supporters of a new Cold War edition. We will continue to work towards overcoming the confrontational logic in European affairs in order to prevent the appearance of new dividing lines or areas with different levels of security.58

6. Conclusion

In Bucharest, NATO made a formal pledge to Georgia and Ukraine that they would
eventually become members, although it denied them the Membership Action Plan (MAP) status. That pledge was repeated again in Brussels. NATO also said it would work with each country to help them accomplish necessary reforms through the NATO-Georgia Commission and the NATO-Ukraine Commission.\textsuperscript{59}

For eventually winning NATO membership, Georgia and Ukraine must reform their militaries to meet NATO standards and also have a lot of work to do on the political aspects before being granted the MAP. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili damaged his country's credibility of democracy and harmed its bid to be a member of NATO in November 2007. At that time, he dispersed massive demonstrations in Tbilisi and closed down independent media outlets. Georgia's five-day war with Russia in August 2008 and Saakashvili's often erratic conduct during that conflict have also given hesitation to many NATO countries. In Ukraine, a majority of the population oppose NATO membership and this country is in a political crisis and constant conflict between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.\textsuperscript{60}

So is the NATO Brussels foreign ministers' meeting which again denied Georgia and Ukraine MAP status the end of NATO expansion into the former Soviet countries?

It is the end of “rapid” NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia. At the same time, we should continue to see how hard NATO work on specific programs of military reform and political democratization for Ukraine and Georgia. NATO will try to expand to Georgia and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{61}

On the other hand, Russia will continue to resist NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine thoroughly. In other words, as a whole, Russia’s security policy is to keep the former Soviet countries except Baltic three states its sphere of influence. According to President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s security policy is “to create a polycentric international system” and “not to allow any one country to dominate in any sphere.”\textsuperscript{62}

Medvedev said in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on November 5, 2008 as follows: Incidentally, the settlement of the South
Ossetia crisis demonstrated that it’s possible to find solutions with Europe. We will deepen our relations with Europe in the field of security….the creation of a polycentric international system is more relevant than ever…. Together with all interested parties, we will create a truly democratic model of international relations, not allowing any one country to dominate in any sphere….The world cannot be run from one capital.63

In conclusion, Russia’s security policy from the Bucharest NATO summit and Russia-Georgia war through the Brussels NATO foreign ministers meeting is to find solutions with Europe and to create a “polycentric” international system, not allowing any one country including the United States to dominate in any sphere.

1 Chairman’s statement: Meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels (Official Website of NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-154e.html); Chairman’s statement: Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels (Official Website of NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-155e.html)
3 “Frantsiia, Germaniia i Italiaia vystupaiut protiv predostavreniiia Ukraine i Gruzii PDCh v NATO,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 December 2008.

10 Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, following the North Atlantic Council Summit meeting (Official Website of NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403g.html)
12 Ibid.

Main results of the EU-Russia Summit, loc. cit.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Dmitry Medvedev, Statement and Answers to Journalists’ Questions after the 22 Russia–EU Summit (Oficial Website of President of Russia, http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/14/2126_type82914type82915_209207.

Ibid.


Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers session (Oficial Website of NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s081202b.html)

Ibid.

Statement, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 19 August 2008 (Oficial Website of NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-104e.html)


“NATO Affirms Ukraine, Georgia Ties, Agrees to Resume Russia Contacts,” loc. cit.

Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers session, loc. cit.


Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers session, loc. cit.


Dmitry Medvedev, Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Official Website of President of Russia, http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/05/2144_type70029type82917type127286_208836.shtml)

Ibid.