Paniniyas on Yogyatā and Šakti

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0. In VP 3.3.29 Bhartṛhari presents the view that the relation (sambandha) between word (śabda) and meaning (artha) is yogyatā, which he illustrates with the model of the sense-organ (indriya). The latest result of the study on Bhartṛhari’s notion of yogyatā as one of the relations holding between word and meaning is found in Houben [The saṃbandha-saṃuddeśa, 1995]. No doubt his attempt to elucidate the notion of yogyatā is conscientious one, but he fails to show what underlies such a notion, as do other Bhartṛhari scholars. What he lacks in dealing with the yogyatā as the word-meaning relation is the broader perspective on Bhartṛhari’s grammatical theory. Regrettably, Houben does not properly appreciate the significance of the fact that Bhartṛhari there draws a parallel not simply between sense-organs and words but between the act of perceiving some object and that of uttering some word. Having in view the participation of the word in the act of uttering leads to evaluating the word in relation to the kāraka theory, in consequence of which a new light will be thrown upon the conception of yogyatā. In this paper, in order to get rid of the preconceived notion of the yogyatā in question, I should like to propose a new angle: The yogyatā is that the notion of which is originally formed in the framework of the kāraka theory and Bhartṛhari applies it to the case in which the specific act of uttering words occurs.

1. Act of uttering words Now let us consider VP 2.405: “The relation between instrument (karaṇa) and object (karman) is observed to obtain through action. Therefore [the relation between] abhidhāna (i.e., śabda) and abhidheya (i.e., artha) is restricted through [the action of] abhidhā (kriyāvyavetāḥ saṃbandho dṛṣṭaḥ karaṇakarmanoḥ/abhidhāniyams tasmād abhidhānābh-
The word and its meaning are related to each other through the action of abhidhā, respectively, as abhidhāna (lit. the instrument relative to the action of abhidhā) and as abhidheya (lit. the object relative to the action of abhidhā). For the present discussion it is important only to note that taking a word and its meaning respectively as an instrument and an object presupposes the participation of an agent (i.e., abhidhātṛ, a speaker) in the action of abhidhā. Accordingly, considering that a verb denotes an activity of a kāraka which in turn is treated as an agent (kārtṛ), one may assume the following sentence that expresses the situation in which the accomplishment of the action of uttering a word is taking place: devadattah artham sabdena abhidadhāti ('D. speaks of the object x with the word y'), in addition to sabdah artham abhidadhāti ('the word y denotes the object x'). What then is the action of abhidhā that Devadatta performs? In MBhD 1:24-25, Bhartrhari states that the word is the instrument in that its meaning is conveyed by it; the meaning is the object in that it is what is conveyed; the understanding of the meaning is the fruit of the action involved. From this it follows that the sentence in question is taken to mean that D. is performing the activity of causing the word to convey its meaning. Then what activity does D. perform so that a meaning may be conveyed by the word? It is said to be pranidhi ('directing a word towards a particular meaning' in the present MBhD), viniyoga ('application' in VP 2.403ab, which the Vṛtti thereupon explains as pravanikaraṇa ('orienting a word toward a particular meaning')), ukti ('turning the speech organ towards the activity of producing sounds' in VP 2.403cd) or abhisandhāna ('aiming a word at a particular meaning' in VP 2.404cd). The activities called pranidhi, ukti and abhisandhāna here are the specific kinds of viniyoga-s to be found in the speech behavior, all of which are considered to be denoted by the verb abhi ṣdhā and hence to be synonymous with the term abhidhā. This is why Bhartrhari makes a general statement that without being employed or applied by an agent the word cannot reveal its own meaning (VP 2.403 ab: viniyogāde ṛte śabdo na svārthasya prakāśakaḥ).
Therefore, when he says that the word-meaning relation, which is nothing but the yogyatā, is restricted through abhidhā, he intends to imply that the relation is actualized as a concrete one through concrete activities of causing the word to convey its meaning, such as pranidhi.

2. Kartṛviniyoga and karana

Generally speaking, viniyoga is an agent’s function to appoint something to such a kāraka as an instrument, to set it in use and to activate it (vyāpāraṇa, pravartaka, prṣaṇa; Helārāja on VP 3.7.18: sādhanāntaraviniyogavyāpāraḥ kartā). All kāraka-s other than an agent contribute to the accomplishment of the action through performing their own activities and expect to be activated by the agent. It is commonly accepted and repeatedly emphasized by Pāṇiniyas that a candidate for the kāraka is unlikely to conduce to the accomplishment of an action without the viniyoga performed by an agent. Now let us take into account VP 3.7.92 in which Bhartrhari states that in order to bring the action to accomplishment agents repeatedly improve its instrument and apply it in various ways (karaṇeṣu tu sanskhāram ārabhante punah punah/ viniyogaviśeṣāmś ca pradhānasya prasiddhaye/). According to Helārāja [on VP 3.7.92], in the case of the firewood used for cooking, the viniyoga is the act of repeatedly laying it on the fire (punah punah upasthāpanam); in the case of the sword used for cutting, the act of wielding it (udyamanipatane); in the case of the sense-organ used for the act of perceiving, the act of directing it to a particular object (pranidhi). As, in asinā chinatti devadattaḥ ('D. cuts with a sword), the sword cuts when wielded by D. and the viniyoga is considered to be the act of wielding; similarly, the word conveys its own meaning when directed towards the latter and the viniyoga is regarded as pranidhi or abhisandhāna.

3. State of karana before receiving kartṛviniyoga

Now let us consider the following sentences: (A) dātreṇa lunāti ('He cuts with a scythe') and (B) dātraṁ lavane karaṇam ('The instrument of cutting is the scythe'). The fact that the dātra is the instrument of cutting can result in these two sentences. That is, they are used, as Patañjali [in MBh ad P2.3.50] explains, when a specific feature relative to the action of
cutting (*kriyākṛta-viśeṣa*), which Kaiyata says is nothing but the capacity of functioning as *kāraka*, is recognized in the *dātra*. According to Kaiyata, the sentence (A) expresses the active state of the scythe (*vyāpārāveśa*) and the sentence (B) its mere potentiality for functioning as instrument (*yogyatamātra*). It seems to suggest that in the stage where the *viniyoga* by an agent is yet to be received, a candidate for such a *kāraka* as an instrument is in the state of being potential (*yogyata*) for functioning as such in actuality. Only that which has the capability can be set in use (*Vṛtti on VP 1.13: yogyaṁ sābdaṁ prayarthāṁ upāddatte; yogyaṁ indriyam praṇidhatte*).

Furthermore, it is interesting, in this connection, to take into consideration the rule *P 2.3.23 hetau*. Concerning this rule, Bhartrhari states that what is regarded as a cause (*nimitta*) without reference to the activity is defined as *hetu* (*VP 3.7.24ab: anāśrite vyāpāre nimittaṁ hetur iśyate*) and Helarāja explains that what is regarded as a cause in terms of its mere potentiality (*yogyatamātra*) is called *hetu*. Consider the example *agninā pākah* (*'the cooking with the fire'*) which Helarāja gives. The given sentence conveys that potential participants in the act of cooking, like the fire, are inactive since they are not yet set into play by an agent. To borrow the phrase of *Nyāsa: anispādayann api phalant tatsādhanayogyah*, in the situation where this sentence is used, the fire may be said to have the potential of being conducive to the accomplishment of the action of cooking, though at the moment not bringing it to accomplishment in actuality. The point is: As is indicated by the contrast of *yogyatamātra* (*'the mere state of being potential'*) with *vyāpārāveśa* (*'taking on the activity'*), once it is set into play, that is, it receives the *viniyoga* by an agent, a candidate for the instrument becomes active and serves the accomplishment of an action; before being set into play, on the contrary, it remains simply in the state of having the potential of contributing to the accomplishment of the action.

4. *Yogyatā* and *śakti* Now let there be a scythe here. With this scythe, one could cut anything susceptible of cutting, rice plant or weed.
In this sense one may say that the scythe has the ability to cut. Now if one sets it in use with the aim of cutting weeds, it is proper to say, its potential capacity of cutting will be manifested in them.

As is well known, Bhartrhari has declared that a kāraka is a capacity on the basis of the view set forth in MBh that a kāraka is a property of things (guna). He states that all things are considered to be conglomerates of śaktis [VP 3.7.2], defining the śakti as nimittabhāva ( 'the property of being a cause') [VP 3.7.14]. According to Helaraja [on VP 3.7.24], the nimitta is of three kinds: kāraka as one that brings the action to accomplishment (kriyānirvartaka), hetu as one that is universally applied to something to bring about an effect (janaka), and laksana as one that indicates something (jñāpaka). Whatever the nimitta may be, therefore, the śakti is considered to be that which is conducive to the production of the result (Vṛtti on VP 2.441: śaktirūpa evāsau kāryaprasavavasūcitah).

The Vṛtti on VP 2.404 says that a word is capable of conveying many meanings (ankeśārthapratyāyanayogya) and Helaraja on VP 3.3.29 that its capability is regulated by convention (samaya, saṅketa), in other words, it is manifested by the convention (saṅketās tu tām [yogyatāṁ] dyotayati). The Vṛtti on VP 2.366, on the other hand, remarks that any name-word (saṃjña) has the capacity of conveying (pratāyanaśakti) anything to named (saṃjñin); anything has the capacity of being conveyed by any name-word (pratāyyaśakti); hence, for the sake of communication, the restriction (niyama) is made such that this is the name only for that; this is named only by that. Noteworthy is that the manifestation (dyotana; āvirbhāvayati in Vṛtti on VP 2.403) and restriction, whose notions are introduced here with reference to yogyatā and śakti, are two sides of the same coin, according to Vṛtti on VP 2.297 which says that manifestation (dyotana) has a twofold function: actualization (āvirbhāvana) and limitation (avadhāranā).

In addition, the Vṛtti on VP 2.432 states that a speaker's intention depends upon a word capable of conveying a particular meaning (yogyaśabdanibandhanā vivakṣā) and that following the capacity of the word to
convey the meaning (śabdaśakti), he conceives of a particular thing as meant. Moreover, the above-mentioned MBhD says that when uttering a word, a speaker has the praṇidhi: This word is capable of conveying this meaning (ayam yogyaṁ etam arthaṁ pratyāyayitum) and that without the praṇidhāna no word is capable of conveying its own meaning (śabdo vyavasthito 'rthe 'pi prayoktuḥ praṇidhānam antareṇa pratyāyane asamarthaḥ), in which is reflected the idea that candidates for kāraka-s other than an agent cannot serve for the action to produce its result without the activation by the agent, even if they are capable of doing so (Helaraja on VP 3.8.1: śaktatve 'pi vyāpārābhāve phalādarśanāt).

Reflection on these passages will make clear that yogyatā and Šakti are not distinguished from each other in that they both stand for the ability to produce an effect. In fact, Helaraja in his commentary on VP 3.3.29 treats them as synonymous with each other. However, the term yogyatā has its own peculiar aspect. That is, it signifies the potential state of the ability exhibited by the thing which is supposed to play a role in a given activity.

5. Summary 1) The notion of yogyatā is not limited to the context in which the relation between word and meaning is argued; it is universally accepted in the framework of the kāraka theory. The yogyatā as one of the word-meaning relations is merely an instance of the one which is fundamentally incorporated in that theory. That the word is treated as the instrument in the act of conveying the meaning admits of this interpretation. The underlying idea according to which the notion of yogyatā is introduced is that a kāraka functioning as agent sets into play other kāraka-s that are capable of bringing to accomplishment of an action, whereby the action is brought to accomplishment (yogyaśādhana-viniyoga).

2) ‘Yogyatā’ and ‘Śakti’ are synonymous with each other in that both of them denote the same concept of ability to produce the fruit. The kārta-viniyoga being introduced, however, ‘yogyatā’ gains its aspect of potentiality.

<Key Words> yogyatā, viniyoga, šakti, kāraka

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