The Use of the Particle *eva* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*

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Pāṇini’s use of the particle *eva* may be classified into six types.

**A. P8. 1. 62 cāholope *etety avadhāraṇam*. Note the phrase *etety avadhāraṇam*. The particle *iti* following the word *eva* indicates that *eva* is here used metalinguistically to refer to the word-form (śabdavārasa) “*eva*,” while the word *AV (adhāraṇa)* assigns the meaning “restriction” to the form. In this rule Pāṇini intends to specify the meaning of *eva* for a particular operation, thus implying that *eva* can bear meanings other than *AV*. Cf. Vārttika 3 ad P6. 1. 94 : *eva cāniyo-ge*. Kaiyāta, commenting on this, explains that *eva* can convey *anavakāṭṭi* (impossibility), a meaning the particle has when used adversatively, in addition to *niyoga* which is synonymous with *AV*.

The central meaning of *eva* is *AV*. Let us consider briefly what the Pāṇiniyas mean by this term. For Kātyāyana and Patañjali, “*AV*” and “*N(iyama)*” are equivalent in meaning and the synonymy of these terms is demonstrated in the argument on *pratyayāvadhāraṇa* and elsewhere. In the Mahābhāṣya two forms of *N*-formulation are found: For example, with reference to P2. 3. 50, Patañjali states: a) *seṣa eva ṣaṣṭhi bhavati nānyatra* [arthaṇiyama] or *seṣa ṣaṣṭhi eva bhavati nānyā* (pratyayaniyama) b) *yatra ṣaṣṭhi cāṇyā ca prāpnoti ṣaṣṭhi eva tatra bhavati. According to Nāgēsa, the *N* formulated in the first form, a), is an exact equivalent of *parisamkhya*, while the *N* of the second form, b), is equivalent to the term as used in the Mīmāṃśa system. Nāgēsa observes in Mīmāṃśa terminology *parisamkhya* and *N* do not differ in essence, since the function of excluding others (*anyaniértti*) is inherent in both. He interprets *eva* in such *N*-formulation as, standing for *anyayogavanyaccheda* (exclusion of relatedness to other things).

**B. P1. 4. 8, 2. 2. 20, 5. 3. 58, 6. 1. 80, 6. 2. 80, 6. 2. 148, 8. 3. 61, 6. 4. 145. Normally, the *AV* or *N*-function, namely, restriction, is served by *eva*. But in some
cases this function is fulfilled without it: in certain contexts where rule Y stands as a re-statement (anuvāda) of another rule X, rule Y is itself considered to constitute N. Patañjali states: evakārāḥ kimarthāḥ. naitad astiprayojanam. siddhe vidhīr arabhyamāṇo 'ntareṇaivakāraṁ niyamartho bhaviṣyati. This amounts to saying that when a vidheya (what is to be stated for the first time, viz., the new content) of rule Y can be seen as having already been established by rule X, then, rule Y becomes redundant in that it has the same vidheya as rule X; and so, in order to dispose of this charge of "redundancy," we must assume some purpose for rule Y which renders it meaningful. Consider P8. 3. 16. This rule enjoins that rU is replaced by visarjantya before the locative plural ending sup. But this operation is obtained from P8. 3. 15 which enjoins that r is replaced by visarjantya before kharādi (an item beginning with khaR), because rU (udit-repha) and sup are included in r in general and in kharādi respectively. For this reason, P8. 3. 16 cannot be taken as having the purpose of enjoining a visarjantya-substitution for rU. Accordingly, this rule only becomes meaningful when regarded as restrictive in purpose. We may assume two forms of N-formulation for this rule: {ror eva supi nānyasya supi} and {roḥ supy eva nānyatra}, since by P8. 3. 15 alone visarjanlya-suhstitxion for any r will take place before any kharādi. The question then naturally arises, what is the ground for judging which form of N is suitable? The answer is that P1. 1. 70 containing the sequence of h and s of saṁyoga shows that the first form of N is not acceptable.

Since any rule as such can be regarded as implying a N-function even without the occurrence of eva, the rules in this group are complicated by the fact that each of them makes use of the particle. Thus, we have to assume some function for eva distinct from that of N; otherwise, eva would become superfluous because its function, N, is already implicit in the nature of rule-making. To obviate this superfluousness, the Pāṇinīyas posit a special function for eva, viz. īṣṭato 'vadhāranārthaḥ (the function of gaining an AV in the desired way), or, to put it another way, visarjantya nānīsārthaḥ (the function of setting aside an inverted N). P1. 4. 8 is a case similar to P8. 3. 16, discussed above. Taking P1. 4. 7 into consideration, we have the following N-formulation concerning rephrased P1. 4. 8 patiḥ samāse: {patiḥ eva samāse} or {patiḥ samāsa eva}. Here we are not
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given any explicit authority like P1. 1. 70 on which to decide between these two 
N's. So the Pāṇiniyas are of the opinion that a desirable N is indicated by the 
presence of *eva*; in other words, this *eva* implies that the N of the latter form 
(*patih samāsa eva*) is preferable.

P6. 4. 145 is an exceptional rule in this group, according to the Kāśikā. Al-
though this rule seems to be of the same type as P1. 4. 8, yet the purpose of *eva* 
here cannot be taken as *iṣṭato 'vadhāraṇārthāḥ*, because the so-called *viparitaniyama* is cancelled on the authority of P6. 4. 169. Therefore, the Kāśikā main-
tains *eva* is used here for the sake of clarity (*vispaśārthāḥ*), that is to say, with a 
view to making clear a N expressed by the rule in question.

C. P3. 4. 70. This rule relates by means of *utsarga-apavāda* to P3. 4. 67. The 
uddeśyas of these rules show the *sāmānyaviveśa* relation, while their vidheyas, 
on the other hand, exhibit mutual exclusion (*bādhyābādha-kābhāva*). Takrakaun-
qinyanyāya applies here, so the exclusion of *kārty* by *bhāva* and *karman* is self-
evident. The Pāṇiniyas differ among themselves in their justifications for this 
use of *eva*. In the Kāśikā, it is explained as *kārty apakāraṇārthāḥ* (having the 
purpose of rejecting *kārty*), which is glossed in the Padamañjari as *spastapratipa-
tyarthāḥ* (having the purpose of clearly understanding the rejection), the net effect 
of which seems to be that *eva* is used to confirm the *nyāya* at hand. Patañjali, 
on the other hand, proposes *samāveśārthāḥ* (the purpose of co-applying the rules) 
which is taken up by Nilakaṇṭhadīkṣita who expounds *eva* here as *takrakaun-
qinyanyāya-śāntyavajñāpanārthāḥ* (having the purpose of indicating that the *nyāya* 
is not universally valid). Interestingly enough, in justifying this same *eva*, the 
author of the Kāśikā and Patañjali evaluate the above-mentioned *nyāya* in op-
posing ways.

D. P3. 4. 111. Here *eva* is described as *uttarārthāḥ* (serving a purpose in subse-
quent rules). This interpretation proceeds from the following two considerations: 
1) since rule P3. 4. 110 can be taken as stating N in relation to P3. 4. 109 and 
consequently the rule in question must count as an *apūrvavidhi*, *eva* thus beco-
mes totally meaningless as far as this rule is concerned, and 2) the subsequent 
rules such as P3. 4. 115–116, however, require this *eva* to exclude an item which 
would otherwise occur. In this case, *eva* is able to retain its N-function by find-
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E. P4. 3. 69. This rule is an *apūrvavidhi* like P3. 4. 111. Another way of interpreting *eva* in an *apūrvavidhi* is proposed for this occurrence of the particle. In the Padamanjari, this *eva* is characterized as *suvvakyaṇam savadhāraṇavājīpañpanarthaḥ* (serving the purpose of indicating that any sentence has an AV for its meaning). When a rule with *eva* is regarded as an *apūrvavidhi*, there is definitely no possibility of N induced from the context functioning in the domain of the rule's application. And unlike the case of P3. 4. 111, the necessity of *eva* is not recognized in other rules. Granting that there is something to be excluded by P4. 3. 69, the exclusion is a matter of cognition of the sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*), not of grammatical operation by the rule. In this case, no other rules pertain to exclusion or that which is excluded in the rule at issue. According to the Nyāsa, the same thing is true of *eva* in P3. 1. 88 *tapas tapaḥkarmakasyaiva*. This occurrence of *eva* is explained as *vispaṭārthaḥ* (serving the purpose of making an AV clear) on the grounds that no sentence fails to convey an AV irrespective of the presence of *eva*.

F. P1. 2. 65, P2. 4. 62. These rules are *apūrvavidhis*, but here the proper function of *eva*, viz., N, is recognized, although this *niyama* is not context-made in the sense that it is not induced from the context as in the case of P8. 3. 16. We can point to another *viśeṣa* in P1. 2. 65 and *bahutva* conditioned by an item different from that which is referred to by *tat* in P2. 4. 62. According to the Mahābhāṣya, P3. 1. 88 in the E group also might be included in this group in that *eva* there can be described as *niyamārthaḥ* (serving the purpose of restricting). Resorting to the method of *yogavibhāga* (splitting of a rule), Patañjali divides this rule into two: 1) *tapah sakarmakasya* and 2) *tasya tapaḥkarmakasyaiva*. In association with P3. 1. 87, 1) is hereby taken as stating N in the form {*tapa eva sakarmakasya*} which is then interpreted as signifying that the verbal root √tap, whatever it may mean, can constitute a *karmakartr*-construction, so long as it is transitive (*sakarmaka*). Under these circumstances, rule 2) is now required to provide a particular object (*karman*) for √tap and to exclude others so that √tap can constitute the construction, only when its object is *tapas*. This is how *eva* in 2) is held to perform the N-function. 

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