RESEARCH REPORT No.3
GLOBAL MILITARIZATION AND ITS REMEDY
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INTRODUCTION

Militarization is generally understood to be the militarization of a particular nation-state. Thus, in studying such a phenomenon, a historical analysis of the process of militarization of each nation-state is accepted as an important research tool. Comparative studies of various nation-states, too, helps illuminate the internal characteristics of militarization in each state, some been more prone to develop militaristic tendencies than others. What characteristics of the state have a high correlation with militarism? Such questions are frequently raised within the framework of comparative studies of different states. In the pre-war period, Japan and Germany provide the best examples of nation-states which developed into militaristic states. Compared with Japan and Germany, England and the United States were not considered militaristic because the national characteristics of the latter were democratic. Shumpeter's theory of imperialism is oriented to such comparisons in the difference of culture. (1) In contrast to Shumpeter's theory, Marxist theory illuminates the common characteristics of militarization in terms of the development of capitalism. Lenin added to Marxist theory by developing a universalistic theory of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. (2) If, as Lenin argues, im-
perialism ineluctably leads to a forceful division of the world, war is inevitable. Hence, insofar as war is conducted by such nation-states, then any involved in war would be branded as militaristic, or at least as incorporating some elements of militarization. Of course, Lenin himself emphasized in particular countries like Czarist Russia as examples of militaristic and feudalistic imperialism. A number of Japanese Marxists have applied Lenin's theory in analyzing pre-war Japan. The pre-war Japanese state has accordingly been branded as a combination—a militaristic and feudalistic imperialist state. In the light of such an analysis, it seems a revolutionary movement within the nation was essential in order to stop the militarization of pre-war Japan. Still, historical developments have not demonstrated the effectiveness of such revolutionary movements and revolution itself in stopping the militarization of a state. The Soviet Union, for example, was not at first militaristic. Yet at present it appears as a superpower incorporating at least some elements of militarization. In sum, comparative studies are weak for analysing the cause of militarization; moreover, no remedy for militarization has been discovered through such comparative studies.

Historically, it should be emphasized that, within the developmental process of society, militarization has its own structural dynamic logic. It has been the product of an
international political situation in which the achievement of independence and security by one country requires reliance upon the military method. The Oxford English Dictionary defines militarization as a "conversion to military status or military method."(4) However, once the military method becomes rooted in the domestic social structure as a normal thought pattern, militarization reaches a stage where it develops automatically within the domestic political, economic and social structure. On the other hand, contemporary militarization has distinct characteristics that are formed by the pressure of international politics interdependently intertwined on a global scale. This is one reason why the dynamics of militarization have been the subject of inquiry.(5)

There has been an attempt to discover to what extent militarization is a product of external relations and to what extent it is rooted in its own domestic inertia. Of course, the complexity of the issue prevents us from being able to answer this question for every nation and for every time period. However, in an age of global politics it is an undeniable axiom that the militarization of each nation-state is a form of interdependence in a negative sense. Quincy Wright emphasized that it is peace which produces democracy and not democracy which produces peace.(6) I think he is still correct even today. In fact, I would go beyond what he says to argue that it is demilitarization
which produces global democracy and not global democracy which produces demilitarization. To make this clear, I would like in this paper to illuminate the various causes of militarization and accompanying dangers by utilizing empirical findings. I will then proceed to discuss a remedy for global militarization.

THE HISTORICAL STRUCTURE OF PATHOLOGICAL LEARNING IN THE NATIONAL-STATE SYSTEM

The development of the post-Meiji Japanese state as a modern nation-state is one example we can consider. Development occurred under the banner of achieving "national wealth and military strength." Japan was forced to adopt this policy because its independence was threatened by the Western powers. In that sense, there was a possibility that Japanese militarization would change its goal from one of protecting independence by relying upon military strength to one of acquiring military strength through national wealth. Of course, it was originally true that national wealth did not automatically result in military strength. In England, both of these factors were viewed as different phenomena and, historically, industrialization was interpreted as a factor that replaced militarization. However, in order for the
means, national wealth, to serve the goal of the state, military strength, a number of different cases resulted along with the gradual enlargement of the Western state system. One such case was Japan, which unfortunately had by necessity to become militaristic. After the requisite period of establishing a social organization which could fill the gap between national wealth and military strength, so that national wealth could be considered the same as military strength, and also after an ideology for the social structure had taken root, militarism as an ideology flourished in Japan.

Masao Maruyama, the leading political scientist in post war Japan, in *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* defines "militarism" from its historical and empirical usage as: "A type of thought or behaviour which gives the highest priority to the system of and preparation for war semi-permanently, and which subordinates all other areas of the people's life—such as politics, economics, education, culture, and so forth—to the military value in a society or country."(8) Once national wealth and military strength are strongly intertwined with militarism and, after that, when the necessary international conditions that reproduce the tendencies toward militarization occur, then the pathological functions of militarization grow limitlessly in a vicious circle because of the interdependent relationship within society. What appeared in Japanese and German militarism symbolizes that militarism eventually turns into an "insane
situation with order," and as a companion of its own degeneration, militarism drives not only the people in the countries directly involved but also the people of many other countries to a destructive situation.

In reference to the international conditions for militarization, again the pathological vicious cycle process becomes operative. That is to say, militarization by one country first causes the militarization of its hypothetical enemy, and this also leads to the militarization of many periphery countries as a type of positive feedback. Further, this process also reinforces the conditions for increasing militarization in the first country. In cases where there is a strong asymmetrical ruler-subordinate relationship, the demands for liberation from militarized domination will increase and the nationalism of so-called "national liberation" will develop into explosive opposition against the domination by the great powers. The escalation of asymmetrical confrontation will result in a war of national liberation or a war among the great powers that support them.

The militarization of Japan after the Meiji period developed as a consequence of the necessity to join the world powers' ranks as a means, at the same time, of preserving the independence of the Japanese people against the Western great powers that had forced Japan to abandon its seclusion policy and open its ports. In Asia at the time only Japan
and Siam (Thailand) were able to maintain their independence from the Western great powers. Siam took a position, like a mathematical singular point, within the balance of power equilibrium between England and France and thus skillfully maintained its independence. Japan fought the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War under the policy of national wealth and military strength, and through the victories in both wars it enhanced its independence. Without both victories, there was a danger that Japan would also be reduced to a colony or semi-colony of the Western great powers as other Asian countries had been. Consequently, Japanese militarization became synonymous with protecting Japan's independence. The invasion of Asia by the Western powers, within the globalization process of politics, received its first counter attack from Japan. Japan's victory had the effect of spreading national revolution to the colonized Asian countries, but within the globalization process of politics this was nothing more than a natural interdependent development. What became clear in these influence processes was the pathological syndrome which strengthened Japanese militarization and, as could be seen in the case of Turkey, the establishment of the military character in national revolutions.

When Japan requested Korea to open its ports, Japan tried the very same methods that the United States had used at the time of Perry's arrival. In this sense, a metastasis
of method in international politics—the threat of force—was used very early by Japan against a weaker country. Soon this method, which Japan had learned from the great powers, encountered fierce resistance from Chinese nationalism.

After World War II the militarization of the nation-state is symbolized by the confrontation between the superpowers through competition in expanding nuclear weapons. The development of America's nuclear policy by the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the starting point for the bi-polar cold war structure of the early post-war era. At the same time, moreover, the dropping of the atomic bomb on these two cities was also revenge for Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor as well as to save lives of American soldiers by hastening Japan's defeat. (9)

The effect of the method employed at times when relations between nation-states reach the extreme condition of being in terms of enemies, there is the tendency to rationalize the method afterwards employed in relations between states.

America's cold war strategy towards the Soviet Union in the post-war era was strengthened by reference to the Munich appeasement policy—the starting point of World War II. As an example of a surprise attack, Pearl Harbor continues also to be a bad dream for the United States in its post-war strategy towards the Soviet Union. Thus, even if
the view which asserts that the United States was responsible for creating the cold war situation is correct, it is obvious that the prototype, which determined the evolution of America's nuclear strategy immediately after the war, was derived from the historical experience that the United States could not cope effectively with the significance of Chamberlain's Munich compromise and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. (10)

At the same time, Pearl Harbor was the inevitable conclusion to the development of the Japanese state's post-Meiji restoration policy. In a sense, the origins of Japan's behaviour can be traced to its pathological learning at the time of Perry's diplomacy by threatening the use of force. In this context, geopolitical logic becomes also appropriate as the explanatory principle for the security policy of the nation-state. The attack on Pearl Harbor by a maritime power, Japan, is certainly an example of a Japanese geo-political self-fulfilling prophecy.

The nature of this "evil logic" can be found in the criminality derived from the self-fulfilling characteristic of this logic. It is nothing more than acquired learning that has taken place through relationships between states. (11) When the International Military Tribunal Far East was opened the late Lieutenant Kanji Ishihara shouted at the prosecutor that Japan had simply copied Perry. Copying is simply the first stage of learning and there is certainly a second stage
following. This second stage begins from innovations in military technology which occur as a result of developments in scientific technology and is influenced by changing geopolitical arrangements of various states. At present, the United States-Soviet nuclear missile system is centered on the North pole.

Although at the outset of nuclear strategic thinking, a discontinuity and new meaning in power politics was introduced by the enormous destructive power of these weapons, strategy was not completely freed but, similar to magnetic hysteresis, conditioned by historical parameters. Thus, nuclear strategy pathologically increased the use of power politics that had existed before the outbreak of World War II.

In spite of the above, it should be noted that militarization is at present not supported by the kind of abuse of power characteristic of Japan and Germany in the pre-war period, nor by the militarized emperor system or fascist movement. Indeed, the contemporary ideology of the majority of the Japanese Opposition parties centers upon criticism of pre-war militarism and there is a strong tendency for questions of war and peace to be taken up. In such a framework, this type of analytical schema cannot be used successfully to analyse the problem of the fundamental characteristic of present day militarization. It is necessary to be aware
of the emergence in Japan nowadays of a strategic theory
type logic—a specialist's logic—which, in combination with
a new, modernly clad geopolitical logic, is being used to
support the slowly developing militarization of the Japanese
state. Needless to say, the base of this type of logic is
the confrontation between nation-state as systemized since
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Relations between sovereign states have naturally changed
a great deal in structure during the past three hundred years.
It is clear that such structural changes have been supported
by the tremendous increase in destructive power that has made
rapid strides based on the scientific revolution and also by
the development of mechanized warfare between states. On the
other hand, however, relations between states in the post-
war era are in a sense a summary of the historical develop-
ments in relations between states up to the present time.
In order to analyse present day militarization, therefore,
it is necessary to consider a tri-partite structure; namely,
technological, geographical and historical.

The worsening of the military confrontation between
China and the Soviet Union should also be viewed from the
perspective that there was a transformation in American
nuclear strategy beyond mere ideological or economic national
interests. The East Asian international environment, which
was created by America's nuclear strategy, became a symbolic
environment for China and the Soviet Union. For example, Dulles' nuclear threat on the Quemoy issue was a part of nuclear strategic software. With this event as a turning point, a gap concerning nuclear strategy against the United States developed between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung. That gap, through the key issues of the Soviet Union's nuclear technology aid to China and joint military command over the use of such weapons, precipitated a domestic debate in China over its military policy. On the other hand the Sino-Soviet conflict, which proceeded to the high level of nuclear strategy, had unprecedented political repercussions on the Soviet Union's domestic politics because China was successful in its military policy by developing nuclear weapons independently. Khrushchev's resignation and, at the same time, the announcement of China's first nuclear test were very symbolic events. In addition, the United States' strategy of escalating the bombing of North Vietnam intensified the Sino-Soviet conflict. During 1966, from a strategic nuclear perspective, China was in a rather insecure position. The escalation of bombing North Vietnam, which developed from the confrontation between America's global nuclear strategy and the Soviet Union's strategy against it, produced the threat of China's dismemberment by the two super-powers; that was also related to the Great Cultural Revolution's beginning in 1966. The formation of a symbolic environment
by the strategic nuclear software that encircled China can be regarded as an important factor which determined the type of militarization in China. The fact that radicalization, which accompanied the shift to militarism, progressed in China during the Great Cultural Revolution can be viewed as a response to the changes in the superpowers' global policies concerning nuclear strategy.

Whether it be NATO or the Japan-United States Security Treaty, however, neither can be anything more than a small compensation when looked at from the antagonistic situation of the United States and Soviet Union's nuclear missiles centered on the North pole. The structure supporting this is nuclear deterrence theory. In a sense, the contemporary result of militarization in the nation-state system has been a product of pathological learning. Without a radical change in the direction of learning, the nation-state system will be completely annihilated by the doomsday nuclear deterrence.

BEYOND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY

In the development of relations between sovereign nation-states in the post-war era, nuclear deterrence theory has generally come to be accepted. Communication of such a
theory created both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. A detailed theory can be developed in this regard. (13)

For example, pathological learning of nuclear deterrence theory which acts as the medium in the process of horizontal nuclear proliferation has principally been carried out based on relationships between sovereign states. In other words, nuclear deterrence theory has been passed on from the policy makers of one country to those of the opponent.

Present day nuclear proliferation is possible if there is simply a fulfilment of the necessary economical and technological conditions. In a democratic state, however, the support of public opinion is also essential in order to realize a process of nuclear development. In reality the manipulation of public opinion is occurring in the form of entrusting strategic military thinking to specialists. Not only the existence of the military-industrial complex, but also the change in the structure of public opinion is a factor contributing to a loss of resistance to militarization. Thus, intellectual and scientific criticism of militarization is becoming more and more important in the contemporary world.

It is certainly true that there are limitations to simply critical resistance to militarization. In reality, without the clarification of the conditions for disarmament, criticism simply ends in criticism. This is because there cannot
be the development of the conditions needed to positively prevent militarization by simply relying on intellectual criticism. Nevertheless, there arises the need for a reliable theory that can be used to develop a much broader critical resistance to militarization than up to the present. Active types of security theories which become expressed in the form of concrete policies are also a pressing problem to be tackled.

For example, the recent controversy regarding Japan's overall security has grown to encompass a broad interpretation of security—economical security and cultural security including resources, food and so forth. In fact, there is a tendency for proposals to be continually made in an attempt to rapidly increase overall security spending in the broader sense beyond the one per cent of GNP barrier. However, unimpressed by such arguments, specialists in the narrow sense have begun to argue in favor of breaking the one per cent of GNP barrier in the narrow sense of military spending. It should be particularly emphasized that this tendency is becoming stronger. In this, the tendency has clearly surfaced for the argument for overall security in the broad sense to be used as a cover for the increase in Japan's defensive strength in the narrow sense. In the pattern of this trend, the militarization of the economic giant, Japan, is taking place. We can here clearly observe a completely different type of militarization to that which
occurred in pre-war Japan. The important thing to be taken-up here is not, however, a comparative study of security policies, but rather the dynamic logic of the ideology of militarization. Of course, this does not deny that a well defined theory of comparative security policies is useful for development of militarization theory.

Takashi Inoguchi's unpublished paper, "Political Security: Towards its Broad Conceptualization," tries to establish three dimension variables and classify eight cells for analyzing eight different types of security policy. His classification scheme is cited below: (14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Strength</th>
<th>Level of Activity</th>
<th>Focus of Attention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Outward Looking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inward Looking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Weak</td>
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<td>Manipulation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Maneuvering</td>
<td>Finlandization</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Submission</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In his analysis, Inoguchi provides an explanation for illustrative cases of each security policy; however, the historical dynamics of structural changes of each security policy still needs to be explored. In the case of Japan, it seems to me that the dynamic development of the pre-war
state started from seclusion in the Tokugawa Era and developed to conquest during the period of the Pacific War through maneuvering, manipulation and hegemony. The post-war Japanese state, in contrast, started from submission to the United States Occupation Forces and developed to economic hegemony, mainly through maneuvering. The difference between pre-war and post-war Japan is clearly indicated by the fact that post-war Japan has concentrated on economic development, although military development was the main goal of the pre-war Japanese state. In both cases, the goal aimed at has been the result of the international environment and the stage of national development.

Even under nuclear deterrence, such characteristics continue to be operative. The problem here is to clarify the pathological impetus for each nation-state to pass the threshold of economic power and move to militarization. Of course, nuclear deterrence theory is one of the strong logical impetus for nuclear development and militarization. However, this is simply an international impetus for militarization; hence, it is also necessary to analyse the domestic impetus for militarization.
THE DOMESTIC STRUCTURE OF MILITARIZATION

Masao Maruyama, in his most notable work, has classified modern militarism into three stages. The first stage was the establishment of a "Standing Army" by autocrats; the second was the establishment of a "Citizens Army" or "Mass Army" as occurred in the American and French revolutions; the third was the bureaucratic process of Citizens Army after Napoleon. According to Maruyama, the bureaucratized process developed in connection with the anti-revolutions which occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century in several European countries, especially in Prussia, where it assumed a typical form under the feudalistic leadership of Junker. Also, in Japan, "the long political domination by the samurai class and the tradition of the martial spirit" were very favorable soil for militarism. In general "since the technology of modern war requires a high degree of organization and mechanization, the requirement for a Mass Army is based on the premise that the citizen's intellectual level is developed to a certain degree."(15)

In addition, militarism represses the development of a critical spirit and needs to inculcate a spirit of blind, absolute obedience. As Maruyama says: "In nations where the curves of the development of technological knowledge and the development of political consciousness are not parallel
but divergent, in general such (countries) are more favorable to the growth of militarism." Therefore, Maruyama concludes that "Modern militarism is a deformed child born from the gap between the mass nation and democracy." However, there are some problems in making such definite assertions. In Japan there was a superiority not simply in military values, but rather a superiority in the military value because it was the Emperor's army.

In other words, during the Shōwa period in Japan, "the major characteristic is not that the military was more powerful than other political groups and manipulated the people in order to spread its military value, but rather that it was the Emperor system, which was originally an integral authority system as well as a value system, which on the whole became militaristic."(16)

Therefore, in Japan the right wing movements only accelerated the reorganization process toward the militarization of the Emperor system, but they did not become independent carriers of militarism. An interesting comparison on this point is American militarization after World War II. The United States has proceeded with its militarization under a nuclear strategy that is based upon coherent coordination in the name of democracy. The militarization of Japan, under the coherent coordination of the Emperor system, clearly differed from the basis of American militarization.
However, both are similar in their political dynamics toward militarization. Furthermore, the United States organized dictatorial governments, which embodied neither democratic values nor systems, in order to build an anti-communist frontier because of the requirements of its world policies and, the positive feed-back energy, which was caused by the interactions with the dictatorial governments in that frontier, further strengthened the United States' syndrome toward militarization with the nuclear strategy system as its axis. The action of the CIA to build a cold war structure played an important role in accelerating militarization on a global scale. Thus, during the 1970's, in parallel with the new stage of horizontal nuclear proliferation there has been an astronomical increase in arms exports to the Third World by the great powers. In spite of the development of the world economy in the 1960's, the after-effects of the cold war structure still continue to promote militarization and pressure democracy, especially in periphery countries (eg. the persistence and reemergence of dictatorships.)

Without a significant change in America's world policy, it will be impossible to stop militarization on a global scale and revive democracy. The types of militarization vary according to historical phase and geographical conditions. Nevertheless, there is a characteristic, throughout the world, in that militarization occurs under structural interactions
on a global scale. In the inner dynamics of militarization, a common characteristic is its pathological social function. For example, in military organizations the elegant military uniforms, rank badges and decorations, splendid military bands, strict hierarchy, prompt unconditional obedience to authoritative orders, and so forth, are held up as ideals for other social relations.

Even in the United States, it can be said that militarism has made quiet, secret progress on a large scale since the purge of suspected communists under McCarthyism. Under the strategy of nuclear deterrence, therefore, the so-called "garrison state," as the final product of militarization, evolves regardless of the type of government. A measurement of militarization's maldevelopment can be achieved, to some extent, by conceptualizing and indexing its structural components. Nuclear war had lost its function as a means of attaining national objectives. Consequently, the "self-goal-orientation" of war (i.e. war leads to war) reveals itself as being parallel with the "self-principal-orientation" of technological innovation in both the hardware and software of military strategy. The change in the form of war which has occurred from World War I and World War II—that is, from wars applying chemistry to wars applying physics to wars applying mathematics—has produced a revolution in the techniques of war. War has become extremely
depersonalized and in this can be found a fundamental cause of the militarization of global politics under nuclear weapons. Moreover, militarization continues to become stronger and has, indeed, transformed itself within the structure of intra-national and inter-national interdependence. It is inevitable that under contemporary militarization the difference between professionals and amateurs has become extreme; thus, nuclear strategists do not have to be professional uniformed soldiers. In order to break through this wall and establish a new order of interdependence which will lead to demilitarization, a new learning process must be sought for throughout the world. This is intimately related to developing the potentiality for demilitarization at every level in the structure of global politics.

DESIGN FOR CREATING AN OVERALL PEACE

Now is the time when we must design an overall peace order which is of a completely different nature to designs for creating overall security. In such a new design, it is first necessary to ensure that any country's security designs become a functional part of the idea of global disarmament. The evaluation of last year's U.N. Special Session on Disarmament by the global hawk coalition tended to be completely
separated from the security designs of respective countries and regions. There was no exception in Japan.

Prior to the opening of the U.N. Special Session there had been a rapid shift to the right in discussions on defense in Japanese military specialist's circles. The Session was moreover simply treated like a festival and was not tied to the question of disarmament in Japan where security discussions now aim at speeding-up militarization. If information control of this tendency had been attempted, it may have ended in complete success before the start of a new resistance to this tendency by the Japanese Opposition, particularly the Japan Socialist Party.

Among the groups which supported and participated in the Special Session is the deep-rooted idea of simply calling for nuclear disarmament in areas unconnected with security issues. In this sense, both the military specialists and ban the bomb specialists contributed to the fact that Japan's defense discussions were isolated from the discussions at the U.N. This resulted in them both unexpectedly cooperating together for militarization within the narrow framework of specialization in which both remained entrapped.

In any design for creating an overall peace order we must search for the causes of militarization at the same time as establishing positive counter-proposals to each of these causes. This can become a tool to remedy militarization.
In the first place, if it is argued that present day militarization originates in international tension, then the relation of international tension is, above all, the first essential step to stop militarization. It cannot be denied that international tension is the cause of important local militarization as is occurring in such regions as the Korean peninsula. For this reason, various local conflicts that exist in the world at the present moment, for example, the Molo liberation area in the Philippines, the Thai-Malysian border in Southern Thailand, Palestine, Cyprus, Somalia, and so forth, should be solved by new efforts at a constructive way of community building. As contemporary peace research is increasingly becoming oriented to center-periphery type structural theories, and as an area of potential conflict is one of the most important fields of peace research, the combination of peace research, peace education and peace action in such an area has become a fruitful focus for future intellectual efforts.

However, in the 1970's the militarization of America and the Soviet Union should rather be called militarization under detente. In this case, present-day militarization is advancing on the level of the military-industrial-bureaucratic-labor-university complex with hardly any relation to increase or decrease in international tension or local conflicts in the periphery of the world. The more serious facotr here,
then, is especially the competition for advanced military technology. Secondly, therefore, a reinvestigation of science and technology policies on a global scale had become an urgent task. It is a disturbing fact that twenty-five percent of present-day scientists are devoting themselves to military technology and that in the super-power states this has reached sixty percent.

It is perfectly clear that the reinvestigation of science and technology policies has to be established as part of a grand educational reform which includes reform of the present day university system. In Japan, of course, we have the peace constitution and officially no militatry research is being carried out in the universities. Even so, it can be inferred that there are examples of such research being carried out in secret.

The view is held in some quarters of Japan that there is no particular need for concern about the militarization of the universities since Japan's defense expenditure is less than one percent of GNP and that this is very low when considered globally. Such a view, however, is quite shortsighted. When Japan's rate of military expenditure is confined to comparisons with other countries in the Asian region, then Japan is No.1. This is of course related to the high growth rate of Japan, but there is strong pressure to continue this tendency. The appearance of arguments in favour
of breaking through the one per cent of GNP barrier for defense spending, in a period of low economic growth, is definitely a result of such pressure.

Designs for creating overall security in particular provide easy cover for such pressure. In the design for creating an overall peace order there is the need for a logical structure which does not provide such cover. The logic must, above all, create an objective that can prevent the further militarization of countries throughout the world and clarify the process to reach this objective. Accordingly, as a base for the reinvestigation of science and technology policies on a global scale, there is *thirdly* the need for the realization of a new conception of university reform which goes so far as to include the position of the faculties of engineering and science. Clearly, the shape of peace research within the institutionalization of university reform is of tremendous significance. Despite the fact that we are entering such a period, however, there can hardly be seen any of this kind of awareness in designs for university reform.

Tokyo Imperial University was established in order to produce individuals of importance to the state. However, we have now entered a period, after the passage of one hundred years, when university reform should be reinvestigated from the perspective of creating an overall peace order to stop further militarization throughout the world.
In order to combat militarization, there is more than anything else a need to institutionalize within university reform a prototype science and technology policy for positively building peace. Peace research institutes should here have the courage to take the lead in this task.

The important distinction between peace research and medical research is, as Anatol Rapoport continues to emphasize, that peace research has been without a system that can be equated with hospitals or health centers. (17) This indicates that the birth of peace societies or peace research institutes, both inside and outside the university, can in itself become the first stage in building a peaceful order. A change in the quality of civilization is demanded on a global scale. Since this demand should be investigated in combination with the problem of stopping global militarization, the university reforms presently being considered in Japan need to be basically re-thought within the framework of a reexamined human civilization.

_Fourthly_, in order to build peace on a global scale, there needs to be not only a reinvestigation of science and technology policies from the institutional perspective, but also a thorough reexamination from the perspective of the actual qualitative content of the system itself. This is symbolically expressed by the fact that, at the U.N. Special Session, it was pointed out that economic aid and technological
aid to the Third World is still at a very low level at a time when world armament spending is close to reaching 400 billion dollars a year. The opinion was expressed at the U.N. that it would be best to reorganize science and technology which has, on a global scale, supported qualitative arms proliferation competition and promoted global militarization in order to build a peaceful, just order that includes the Third World.

There cannot help but be doubt concerning the goals of development up until this time. Is it in fact desirable that the goals of development be tied to the strengthening of the state's military power? This means that at the same time that there is a reexamination of this problem on a global scale, there also needs to be an inquiry into the nature of the goals of development. The central issues that must thus be tackled are the conquering of poverty, social justice, human rights and the environment, on the level of a new global community, and on the level of global disarmament. Problems such as resources, energy, food, population and urbanization, which have up until now been discussed in isolation from the environment, should be reinvestigated and include global relationships to an overmilitarized environment and global community demands. If this occurs, then there would also arise the question of whether the kind of economics, sociology, psychology, political science and
law that we have studied up to the present are suitable. The problem is thus not restricted to the problem of engineering, science or agriculture.

Fifthly, however, the problem of militarization virtually cannot be solved amid the conflicting sectionalism of the separate departments within the universities. Academic societies, too, cannot be said to be raising questions that are guided by new values or the creative development of scholarship. The bureaucracy, moreover, is strongly restricted by the classic objectives of the sovereign state. Unfortunately, there is also a tendency for pressure to be excercised on the intellectual ability of the bureaucrats, who are of high capability, for pathological learning. What about the possibilities of MNC's, U.N. non-governmental organizations, or local authorities tied together through sister-city relationships? If in this way can examine each actor one by one, we will be able to evaluate any advantages or disadvantages from the perspective of building a future peaceful order capable of stopping militarization. The problem is not to end with such a simply evaluation, however; there is a need to go on to search for a method by which the advantageous points can be strengthened and the disadvantageous points weakened and destroyed.

The problem of evaluating various actors is, at the same time, a problem of clearly distinguishing normal learning
in the direction of demilitarization and pathological learning in a negative direction, such as militarization, and development, until it becomes an issue of searching for the various conditions associated with those two learning processes. Thus, the methodology for building an overall peace order will permeate the education system through learning.

Since the end of the second world war it has been believed in Japanese scholarly circles that as long as there is no government control, scholarship will freely develop and contribute to peace. This is clearly expressed in the content of a statement a group of progressive scholars made concerning the peace treaty issue in Japan. The statement was made in response to the UNESCO's social scientist's statement of 1949. The group was known as the Peace Issues Discussion Group. (18) However, we have to say that, within the dynamics of present day international politics, when technology is left divided and allowed to develop on its own, the time when we can simply conclude that the development of science and technology in and of itself will contribute to the creation of a peace order has already ended. It can now be argued, therefore, that we have entered a time when there must be a serious reexamination of this point. It should moreover not be forgotten that in the excessive growth of the university engineering departments were strong
demands from business.

"In fact, the idea that arms are business is accepted as common sense throughout the world. That Japanese are the only ones to act in opposition to such common sense is a cause for the image of the Japanese as difficult to understand in foreigner's eyes. Despite the fact that Japan's Ban on Arms for Export policy is domestically tied to the image of Japan as a peaceful state, globally it simply reflects an extreme policy of gross stupidity and lack of common sense." This quote is from the May 1978 issue of Bungei Shunju by a Japanese specialist of international economics. It is an attempt at an objective demonstration of the necessity and desirability of ingenious arms exports taking advantage of the extremely avante-garde demand that Japan should become more internationalized. He continues: "If you are in a blind, there is no room to talk of 'not exporting arms' or other nice sounding phrases. Even among labor unions, which in principle protect the peace consitution, the executives of the Shipbuilding Labor Federation have ended-up making the pitiful cry that 'arms exports or anything is better than losing our jobs.' Given this stance by the labor unions, it cannot be expected that the opposition parties will emphasize 'opposition to arms exports;' the labor unions are the base of these parties." The author goes on to say that while publicity opposed "it is ninja
(human feeling) that deep down there is a growing feeling that arms exports cannot be helped." When the discussion has progressed to this extent, then the dynamics of a social structure which supports the self expansion of the military-industrial-bureaucratic complex will, in reality, clearly surface.

The logic developed in such a proposal is not that of the demand for militarization for ones own country, but that of looking to the demand for arms from other countries. However, if there is a change around, the logic can be transformed into a demand for the strengthening of domestic defense capabilities. The logic that an economic giant must inevitably become a military giant is, as can easily be imagined, simply one step beyond. This is perfectly clear in the following quotation by the same author:

It appears that Japan's manufacturing capability has already become too large. If we just take the example of tanks, then an annual production of 2,000—3,000 is really only a drop in the bucket when compared with an annual production of automobiles of 8.5 million. In regard to a shipbuilding capacity of 19 million, too, with an international market for warships of just 0.1 million per year, even if there is a large increase in price this will still be a far cry from completely digesting the Japanese shipbuilding industry's excess capacity. In the event of the recession becoming even more serious, if the means of escape is short through arms production, this must mean banking on a demand for domestic defense.

In the end, this is the same as proposing that we should
go beyond the bothersome opposition party's criticism of
defense arguments to willingly dash into arms proliferation
through independent arms production. The problem is that
such proposals are on the surface carried out coolly, scien-
tifically and objectively. Of course, this does not mean
that there has already been established in present day Japan
a military-industrial-bureaucratic-academic complex.
However, by using arms export approval as the occasion, or
by seeking reparation for arms exports and expanding produc-
tion, there is an attempt to open a road to establish a mili-
tary-industrial-bureaucratic-academic complex through increase of
defense capabilities and arms proliferation.

In order to stop this kind of militarization, there
is the need for a transformation of the domestic political
process and social structure. Moreover, in order to solve
the actual regional conflicts where U.N. peace keeping forces
are already stationed or the potential regional conflicts
that continue to be the most important accepted cause of
militarization, the type of aid provided by Japan, the
economic super-power, is a vitally important issue. At the
present time, however, the domestic political, economic and
social structures are significant obstacles to the provision
of appropriate aid from Japan for demilitarization. The
universities themselves, which should stand in the forefront
of any intellectual revolution, are in the position of not
taking the leadership in this question. So long as this remains the case, it can be said that the necessity for university reform to match the most progressive project of the U.N. University, the Project on Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development has become one of educational reformist's most important tasks in human history. In this sense, in the design for creating an overall peace order there needs to be the unification of research, education and action centering on new learning. The whole world is here a school. The presently strong resistance to stopping militarization is based on the fact that new learning on a global scale, which includes university reform, has not been created.

This argument is also supported by recent creative academic efforts towards building a new non-violent political science by Professor Glenn D. Paige at the University of Hawaii. He argues:

...a profound nonviolent paradigm shift in political science would create both intensified awareness of violence and unprecedentedly vigorous attempts to create alternative non-violent theories and policy applications. It would call for a thorough renovation of existing sub-fields. In essence it would mean a shift from a science that studies, philosophizes about, and accepts the eternal existence of disease (e.g. cancer, violent politics) to a science unambiguously committed to the eradication of that disease from the life
of mankind (e.g. basic and applied cancer research, non-violent political science).

According to Paige, a new learning process can be developed by the impact of the growth of a new, nonviolent political science. He concludes in the last part of his article on the implications of the social role of political science:

...the social role of political science will shift from the relatively passive, peripheral role of a 'proviolent service station' to the more active role of a central institution for creation and application of nonviolent political knowledge. It will seek to change its environment rather than to 'trouble shoot' its defects. One of the principal objectives of nonviolent political science will be the education of nonviolent political leaders and thoroughly skilled and committed nonviolent supporters of such leaders. It will maintain lifelong contact with these 'students' so that no gap should open up between knowledge and action, action and knowledge.

To accomplish this shift in its social role, political science will have to detach itself from its present dependent relation to violence-accepting institutions and to create new nonviolent institutions to which its academic support can be wholeheartedly given. (19)

We can fundamentally argue that militarization has been the product of the nation-state system. However, as I have already pointed out, there is still the possibility that the nation-state system can produce peaceful interdependence, if various interdependent actions are horizontal and do not
result in structural violence. The development of normal learning is of crucial importance. In order to achieve such peace oriented learning and peaceful interactions, various obstacles need to be removed and disarmament that leads to true demilitarization realized.

Whether such a remedy can be realized in the framework of a preserved nation-state system or in the creation of a new global system is still indefinite. However, if a remedy for militarization in each nation-state can be universally achieved, the question of whether the nation-state system is still to be preserved or not might not be clearly obsolete, because it cannot be denied that important changes in the character of the nation-state system may produce demilitarization in the world simultaneously the goals of development may also be successfully redefined.

POSTSCRIPT

The recent war between China and Vietnam raises several important questions regarding the concept of global militarization. Linkage structures between military establishments in different countries have already developed to a considerable degree and global cooperation among them is becoming an important obstacle to global disarmament.
After Helsinki in 1975, "Finlandization" has become an important target of criticism for countries wishing to reduce their military build-up. In the case of the war between China and Vietnam, the world military establishment including those of the U.S, NATO and Japan informally inspired the Chinese policy makers to initiate a limited attack on Vietnam. This was not manifested formally; formal statements by these governments indicated a reluctance to inspire China and seemed to aim at persuading a change in Chinese intentions. Although this was formally true, Ten Shao Pin was impressed by the informal attitude adopted by the military establishment of the USA, NATO and Japan. They were rather enthusiastic about China's plan in order to gain a stronghold over the USSR, should it decide to adopt a tough attitude (e.g. a military build-up) against a possible attack against Vietnam by China. Thus, it might be true to say that the world military establishments are now trying to concentrate their efforts transnationally to form a so-called global "Kuantung Army" to resist the so-called global "Shidehara Diplomacy", to borrow analogous terms from the pre-war days. Here Carter diplomacy might be compared to "Shidehara Diplomacy" which was seriously attacked by the "Kuantung Army" and other hawk groups in Japanese political circles at the time. The contemporary scene may be different from the 1930's because the global linkage of the military
establishment seems to be on a more abstract level of global structure and could create a more complex linkage among hawk groups. A clear illustration of the complicated nature of contemporary politics is manifested in the combination of hawks and doves in the Carter administration. Of course, analysis of this problem requires another historical as well as analytical paper on the global militarization process. It is in this area that further research needs to be carried out.
NOTES


(4) *OED*, p. 348.


(7) *OED*, p. 348.

(8) Masao Maruyama, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo (Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics)*, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1961). Note that this passage is not included in the English translation of this study.


(10) In other words, the United States rejected appeasement policy and became wary of sudden attack.


(13) Hiroharu Seki, "Metastasis of Nuclear Deterrence", *Peace Research*


(15) Maruyama, op. cit., p. 287.


