RESEARCH REPORT No. 8

The Urban Type of Society
and
International War*

Keiichi MATSUSHITA
Hosei University

THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE SCIENCE,
HIROSHIMA UNIVERSITY

Jan. 1982

Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University
1–1–89 Higashiendamachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730 Japan
RESEARCH REPORT No. 8

The Urban Type of Society
and
International War*

Keiichi MATSUSHITA
Hosei University

* The Original version of this paper was orally delivered in part at the 4th Hiroshima University Symposium on Peace Studies Oct. 10–11, 1979, and its later version presented at GPID militarization workshop (Oslo, May 1981). Its Japanese version was published as an article in Chuo Koron in 1981.
Introduction

In order to seek a peace policy, it is today essential to examine, in a sociological sense, what are the underlying assumptions of international war. The deductive theory of peace (i.e., a normative approach) by itself is quite insufficient in building peace policies in actual terms.

Certainly, it is natural and important for us to consider military-technical conditions of war, the politico-economic structures of each government in particular, and international relations in general. However, it appears to be urgent under the contemporary context to create a new type of sociology of war to make peace research more productive and meaningful than ever before. Without these vigorous efforts, peace research will not become a policy science in the strict sense of the word.

As often said, military experts tend to have such strong psychological characteristic as is demonstrated in the saying that “Generals are fighting past wars.” Even at the time of World War Two developed nations had not fully developed an urban type of society. This type of society was still immature. As a result, theories by military experts, and ideas held by statesmen and commentators drawing upon theories of the former, have not understood sufficiently what the maturity of the urban type of society meant within the contemporary context. It is indeed the responsibility of men of the social sciences and policy sciences to try to clarify the substance of the sociological assumptions of peace and war as well as the degree of maturity of the urban type of society observed in developed nations. Hence, they should radically criticize the existing military theories. The purpose of this paper is therefore to tackle this task as objectively as possible.
II. Maturity of the Urban Type of Society in Developed Nations

It seems that we have shown little concern for the sociological underlying assumptions of war within the contemporary context. When we note the salient differences in sociological conditions between developed and developing nations, however, it is of great importance to pay much attention to the conspicuous contrast between urban and rural types of societies. Because of this structural change, sociological considerations are in fact very significant for the foundation of peace research. Why is this so? Because we have witnessed, at the time of World War One and even during World War Two, the characteristics of a rural type of society which still existed in Europe, the United States, Russia, and Japan. In other words, in these countries, an urban type of society had not been fully matured as it is today.

When we consider the matured stage of the urban type of society, an important question must be posed: what will be the logic of international war? One cannot predict with certainty what the logic is in actual terms. Bearing this in mind, it is today an urgent task for us to make efforts to build a model of peace based on the urban type of society. The earlier theories of peace and war whose focal point has been on the rural type of society must be clearly replaced by this new one.

We all know that if nuclear weapons were used, if only for regional defense, it would lead to total nuclear war between the two superpowers, and then to the annihilation of man kind at the global level.

Even if we consider the occurrence of conventional wars (in this case, the use of nuclear weapons cannot be excluded as a possibility), the logic of war within the context of an urban type of society would appear to be very different from that of a rural type of society. This difference would certainly be clearer in, for example, European countries and Japan whose populations are quite dense. It would be quite in contrast to the case of the Soviet Union, or the United States. Let us discuss this point more in depth.
What characterize the transition stages from the rural to the urban type of society? As I see it, first of all, this is characterized as a decrease in the population employed in primary industries (particularly in the agricultural sector). I would define the transition stage from the rural to the urban type of society as the period in which the share of primary industry drops to less than 30 per cent of the total population. Then I would regard the stage of maturity of the urban type of society as the period in which the population employed in the primary industries reaches a level of less than 10 per cent of the total population. (See, Table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1910 (%)</th>
<th>1921 (%)</th>
<th>1950 (%)</th>
<th>1951 (%)</th>
<th>1960 (%)</th>
<th>1977 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Kuznets and World Bank*

(There are some problems in the Japanese statistics. The agricultural population today is less than 10 per cent.)

The second indicator, the population concentration in cities, is related to the first. Particularly, the formation of a megalopolis is another important indicator.

As is shown in Table 1, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were in the transition period at the time of World War Two. However, they are now in the mature stage. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are still in the transitional stage from a rural to an urban type of society. It will take time for the latter to reach the mature stage.
Here, let us examine the typology of war after 1945.

(1) War between developing nations — Indo-Pakistan War, Vietnam-China War, War between African states, and the Iraq-Iranian War.

(2) War between developed and developing nations — the United States vis-a-vis North Korea, the United States vis-a-vis Vietnam, the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

(3) War between developed nations.

Among the types given here, there is no occurrence of international war of the third type. On the contrary, both the first and second types of warfare have tended to be, by and large, circumscribed in the rural type of societies. If this is actually the case, it is now most necessary to replace the earlier logic of war by the new logic of war based on the context of a matured urban type of society. This is apparently a new theoretical thrust.

Without considering theoretically the sociological underlying assumptions of war in an urban type of society, peace research in developed nations would lose its basic significance. This theoretical effort will conversely lead to clarification of the sociological underlying assumptions of war within the context of the rural type of society in developing nations. It is our first objective in this essay to consider through sociologically based assumptions what the dynamics of peace are and what the dynamics of war mean. Let us try to propose relevant hypotheses to be considered as a logical consequence of war in a mature urban type of society.
III. The Significance of Development (Democratization and Industrialization) and Military Ambivalence

Development processes are most likely to produce, whether under capitalism or under socialism, transition dynamics from the rural to the urban type, then to the maturity of an urban type of society. As is often the case, our theoretical concerns have been primarily with the processes of industrialization. However, one must note the fact that industrialization processes have of necessity produced, through urban concentration of the population, liberalization, equalization and democratization in the “formal” sense of the word.

Quite interestingly, both democratization and industrialization have ambivalent effects on the dynamics of war and peace.

(1) Democratization

What is the main result of democratization? Apparently, it is the formation of a mass democracy. It is this mass democracy that has led to the learning processes of bureaucratic controls and mass manipulation on the part of governments. These are, in other words, conditions for mobilizing people for international war. Mass democracy is really a prototype of war time totalitarianism. This is exactly what happened during World War Two.

As we will see later in more detail, mass democracy simultaneously brings about conditions for producing much criticism of governmental policies on the part of people, as well as conditions for producing anti-war and registance movements, and even revolutions. There is a likelihood that these movements would transcend national boundaries to create new international linkages between peoples of different countries.

In this sense it is very clear that the impact of democratization on war is ambivalent.

(2) Industrialization

First, progress in industrialization implies a growth in national productive power.
Industrialization is most likely to provide us with techniques for war-management because the military industries and communication techniques are fully developed by this dynamics. By-products of these processes are even more profound. For instance, automobile industries and tractor industries can be changed any time into the productions of tanks. Progress of motorization will make it easy to train a large number of tank personnel. Computers are also likely to produce many military personnel who can operate weapon systems. As with the case of democratization process, industrialization leads to the intensification of potential power to move towards militarization.

And as we will analyze later, industrialization will have also a negative effect on militarization processes. Industrialization is also likely to complicate the domestic and international division of labor more than even before, making nations more and more interdependent. With interdependence being expanded in scope, international war will cause crisis situations in national economies in the small and middle-sized developing nations. This will not be the case for superpowers such as the United States and the Soviet Union because they are continental powers. There is one more thing which we have to consider in this context. Namely, we can imagine a panic occurring in megalopolises.

The characteristics of industrialization have, therefore, indefinite and sometimes contradictory characteristics in the dynamics on war. In democratized and industrialized societies, war in the urban type of society will lead to the expansion of militarily negative factors. Therefore, the classic theory of war by Von Clausewitz, which emerged with the birth of the nation-state system in international relations, will lose its original significance. This is because the classic theory of war has presupposed the demarcated national boundaries, independent national economies, continuation of central governments and the monopoly of military forces by central governments.
IV. Military Issues in Democratization

(1) *Transformation of Personality Types*

With the process of urbanization through industrialization, democratization appears to transform human beings from a traditional (i.e., rural type) to a citizen type (i.e., urban type). What is clear is the change in the human personality (i.e., ethos). With this personality change, physical appearance will be transformed largely by improvements in nutrition and in labor conditions.

First, perseverance, stoicism, diligence, and self-sacrifice are virtues of soldiers in every country. These virtues were widely believed to be the ethics of a rural type of society. Men who are highly urbanized will lose the substance of virtue developed in the rural societies.

Secondly, rural man has been circumscribed by the traditional community in his way of life. Accordingly, he tends towards a closed type of feeling and a sort of chauvinistic nationalism. By contrast, the urban type of man tends towards cosmopolitanism (or Weltbürgertum). As a result, he is going to be transformed into a citizen type of human beings. Such a person is likely to be critical of chauvinistic nationalism, arguing that international exchanges must be expanded. He may have many “friends” in “enemy” nations. Thus, we will see a human confederation appearing in civic daily lives transcending national boundaries or nationalism between different peoples. This seems to be similar in operation to what had been observed among aristocrats in the Middle Ages in Europe.

So, in the urban type of society, soldiers may escape from the battle field; individuals may try to seek refuge not only within their own country but also in foreign countries as well. Others may involve themselves in anti-war movements beyond national boundaries. The latter has been already demonstrated as an embryonic case in international civil movements with respect to the nongovernmental organizations in the United Nations. American
citizens who were against the U.S. Vietnam War policy are considered to be such an urban type of persons. At the time of the Vietnam War, even a minimum standard of war ethics was virtually lost. It had been corrupted. And yet, one can say that there must be a distinction in physical appearance between the rural type of Vietnamese and the urban type of American. I find it necessary to examine the processes of the Vietnam War from the perspective of this personality type.

(2) The Birth of Articulated Democracy

Democratization processes which realize themselves ultimately as mass democracy have contributed to the growth of centralized bureaucratic institutions and military organizations which are institutional prerequisites of military mobilization. On the other hand, they produce the multipolarization of societies. This process will lead to the birth of articulated democracy. To put it differently, democratization processes have been associated with the progress of articulated democratic institutions. This has been observed precisely in the dynamic tensions between totalitarian and articulated principles.

Articulated democracy is characterized as follows:

(a) Civil liberty and the guarantee of liberty.
(b) A variety of civil movements and the emergence of pressure groups.
(c) Operationalization of a multi-party system.
(d) Expansion of the right of self-government by local governments.
(e) Independence of parliaments and establishment of court of justice within the central governments.

The multipolarization of society, and therefore, articulation of politics will, in fact, make the image of “total war” more and more unrealistic. The image of “total war” was a utopia once dreamed of by military generals like General Ludendorff who dreamed of a military state.
As was noted earlier, both democratization and industrialization, whether under capitalism or socialism, bring about conditions for totalitarianism. At the same time, however, these factors are conductive to institutionalization of articulated democracy. In matters of war and peace, articulation principles are realized in the following forms:

(a,b) Peace movements, anti-war movements, and formations of resistance.
(c) Policy confrontations among political parties concerning war.
(d) Counter-movements by local governments, for instance, in the declaration of free cities.
(e) A high priority on constitutional procedures with respect to war preparations, war declarations, and war mobilization.

When nations cannot appropriately deal with such a political situation, central governments are certain to be reactionary in their behavior. Without reactionary policies, governmental actors cannot execute war against adversary nations. This reactionary quality will produce in the long run a chance for revolution.

(3) **Difficulties Involved in Military Organizations**

Under the contemporary military establishment whose basic premise has been democratization, it is almost impossible for ruling elites to monopolize posts for the higher staff officers. While military leadership and diplomacy were once each in the King’s secret art or in state secrets, the institutionalization of civilian control is today appearing as a policy agenda in military leadership as well as in diplomacy. This implies that constraints have been more or less effective on the military establishment. The traditional feature of the military is reflected in the privileged thought of closed groups. Its thought is concerned with excessive militaristic statism.

(a) **Difficulties in the Execution of Conscriptions and the Maintenance of Discipline**
Who will today be considered as being subjects to conscription by governments? Unlike the rural type of society, those youth who are subject to conscription in the urban society are high in intellectual standard. And yet, they are blessed with a civic feeling of "freedom", and with a civic type of critical minds. Not only in peace time, but also particularly in time of war, we have to think about the way of dealing with conscientious objectors, internal or external refugees, and deserters, etc. If we do not deal with them properly, the legitimacy of conscription policies would be apparently lost. In countries where political party confrontations are always salient, one can assume that there must be also factionalism within the army. These factors will each contribute potentially to the slackening of the army.

Even if one cannot expect the army to be broken up, governments may not be able to force soldiers to obey orders through blind loyalty. This is simply because these soldiers are highly intellectual in thought as well as in behavior. Therefore, officers in the army will be often criticized by soldiers. Presumably, the right to resist against illegal orders, and the right to surrender will also become important issues within the military. These issues were, after World War Two, were widely discussed by international military courts.

(b) openness of military intelligence

Today, military intelligence in gradually becoming open in countries where freedom of speech and freedom of the press are guaranteed by governments, through a variety of media including daily conversation and the improvement of information disclosure system. Recall that at the international level, we have witnessed for the past few decades the increased mutual interaction between nations and the increased exchange of information between governments. Even reconnaissance satellites (satellites spying from new heights of altitude and sophistication) are now daily intelligence gathering activities. As a result of this,
the degree of openness of military intelligence is being expanded in scope. Military secrecy is only effective for the time being. In this sense, even military confidential matters are transitionary in nature. Almost all confidential matters are certain to be exposed to the public, though with time lags. Moreover, openness is most likely to be an issue for public argument. Consequently, requests for openness of information will increase more and more.

The prestige of the army—whose core lies in military secrecy—will be in all likelihood downgraded through politicization of the issue with respect to military intelligence.

Certainly, under the totalitarian system, issues mentioned above are likely to be oppressed by one party dictatorship, and by the privileged military establishment. Under these political regimes, one can find a heightened utility in terms of war preparations, war beginnings, and mobilization for war. Such an issue as openness of military intelligence is, however, oppressed only temporarily, and it may lead to the accumulation of human energy by which revolution can one day be triggered, depending on what military situations will be prevalent in those societies concerned. Defeat at war may call for social revolution. Therefore, we must emphasize that such regimes cannot be easily involved in total war, apart from localized war. It is precisely because, even in developing nations whose political systems are totalitarian, there has emerged a sociologically underlying premise of the transition to the urban type of society. To put it differently, a wave of liberalization has begun to emerge through the mass production of the urban type of personality.
V. Military Problems in Industrialization

(1) Expansion of the Domestic and International Division of Labor

In a rural type of society, people were able to sustain themselves in small-sized villages or regions. Autarky was possible in provincial places. However, industrialization has transformed such a primitive type of autarky into a national economy. This has led to the international division of labor. What is called "interdependence" has increased in contemporary world politics. As a result, international society itself has been greatly internationalized. When we look at national economies of developed nations in which the urban type of society is full-fledged, we should characterize them as only national frameworks which are simultaneously a part of the domestic and international network of the division of labor.

With greater industrialization, the division of labor is being expanded not only at the domestic, but also at the global political level. With this structural transformation, economic planning has progressed, whether under a market economy or under a controlled economy. But this increased division of labor at different levels has contributed to the breaking up of economic mobilization in times of war.

Disturbances in the international system of the division of labor caused by war appear to have a direct impact on the national economies of developed nations in particular. A principal reason for this lies in the fact that, although the continental powers (i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union) are exceptions, European countries and Japan have been heavily dependent for raw materials, especially for imported oil on foreign countries. Quite evidently, tanks, fighter airplanes, and ships would all be scrapped without oil. Moreover, industrial and agricultural production would be stopped if oil could not be supplied. Any sophisticated means of production would become meaningless. Then such primitive means as hoes and hammers would again be necessary. Moreover, urban life would
be destroyed. The destruction of this way of life would also be accelerated by the unwillingness to sell or by the hoarding of goods on the part of business firms and individual citizens.

It is true that both European countries and Japan have increased their political voices vis-à-vis the two superpowers. Despite this, both European countries and Japan have been militarily very vulnerable. We should recall the fact that the destruction of civil lives and military production was very apparent among the "have not" countries (Germany, Italy, and Japan) during World War Two. These had many characteristics of a rural type of society. Even victorious Britain had to face almost the same problem, though she had been economically supported by the United States. Urbanization has been similarly accelerated in Britain today. Hence, the situation is becoming more and more serious.

(2) Emergence of Megalopolises

The emergence of megalopolises in fact implies that the domestic and international division of labor has been deeply rooted among societies.

A megalopolis here means a combined bond of cities whose population each amounts to more than one million. A megalopolis is not a legally institutionalized big city. Today, we have a megalopolis whose population is more than ten million. For instance, the Tokyo megalopolis is 28 million, and the Osaka megalopolis is 13 million. (It seems of great importance to try to compare megalopolises with each other at the global level.)

People in each megalopolis can survive only when the daily supply of food and essential resources are supplied without interruption. If the supply route were disturbed, or rather if we only predict that it could be, megalopolises would certainly be put into a state of panic. For families in cities are supposed to hold food stocks for only few days. As stated earlier, unwillingness to sell and hoarding of goods would naturally occur due to
sense of crisis. Accordingly, collisions would become salient in the end of the supply route.

Added to this, a great number of the population, possibly one million to ten million people, would begin to flee in large numbers from the megalopolises in a state of panic. Rural districts or small-sized cities do not have enough capacity to absorb such huge number of people. Hence, those who escape from the megalopolises are very likely to become "boat people". In one way or another, some of them would also turn into mobs.

Self-destruction of the megalopolis would soon bring civilian lives and national economies into bankruptcy. This bankruptcy would have many adverse effects if the megalopolis was the capital of a country. These effects would certainly be associated with the breakup of the central bureaucratic organizations, and with the overthrow of the military. No matter how strongly the military, police, and the people's police try to strengthen domestic security measures, it could not deter the megalopolis from falling into a state of panic.

In particular, one should note the case of Japan. In terms of size, Japan roughly corresponds to California, or such European States as West Germany, Norway, Italy, or Poland. And yet, 70 per cent of the land in Japan is uninhabitable mountain-land. In spite of this, the Japanese population is about 124 million. It seems quite natural for us to characterize Japan as a overcrowded society (Table 2). If the Tokyo megalopolis were to be combined with the Osaka megalopolis, the population would amount to 40 million. In addition, there are five other cities whose population exceeds one million. Thus, a little less than 50 per cent of the Japanese population is concentrated in the megalopolises. One can say, therefore, that Japan is now at the stage of an over-mature urban type of society. If people in the megalopolises were to flee to the provinces, during a war, the local population would double in number. Each locality would not be capable of sustaining the population. And Megalopolises might become a very good target for nuclear attacks.
Table 2: Area and Population Density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Consumption</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Japan is especially different in politico-economic structure from West Germany, as well as from France. While West Germany is characterized as a decentralized system, France has had a tendency toward centralization. Japan is much more centralized than France, since in Japan it is something like one-point concentration, (being politically and economically centralized in Tokyo). All essential supplies for food, energy, and water are structured in Tokyo though a huge system. If only a part of that system were to be disturbed for a limited period of time, Tokyo would apparently be thrown into a state of panic.

Houses in the Japanese megalopolises are losing gardens due to the high price of land. When compared with the outskirts of European cities (green is really abundant in European cities), Tokyo’s critical weakness is in terms of the supply of vegetables. Finally, because Japanese house are primarily made of wood, they would be very vulnerable in times of war. These facts provide us with another serious problem when we consider the effects of war as well as big earthquakes. However, these problems are not yet fully recognized in Japan. Nor has it been fully examined among experts as an important theme in the sociology of war. Analyses of Japan (whose level of maturity as an urban type of society is extremely high) will represent an appropriate model, as I see it, for the formation of a “sociology of crises” in general, with the sociology of war being included.
VI. Factors Which Disturb Military Actions

(1) Breakup of Military Logistics

Unlike the case of the continental powers, the U.S. and the USSR, both civilian lives and national economies have been structurally quite vulnerable particularly in European countries and Japan. European countries and Japan are, as analyzed earlier, very much matured as urban types of societies. The deepening in the domestic and international division of labor has contributed to enhancing this structural vulnerability.

During World War Two, European countries and Japan had rapidly lost military capabilities when strategic stocks of weapons and goods were exhausted. At the same time, it was indicative of the destruction of national production power and of the willingness to continue fighting. Moreover, both for Germany and for Japan, access to resources, especially oil, had been a major objective of military operation. Military expeditions were principally motivated by the necessity to acquire oil and other resources. Without oil, present technology does not permit the operation of tanks, airplanes, and ships. Thus they would be just as well scrapped without oil.

The states of affairs observed during World War Two is more conspicuously emerging in European countries and Japan today. A vast amount of oil is required for a variety of weapons. The military mechanism is being expanded, it is inclined towards exhaustive wars. Factories are highly sophisticated. These factories could not be sufficiently operated without normal supplies of raw materials and energy. Soldiers and labor often come from the cities. The breakup of civilian lives would have city-born soldiers and labor return to their families. As a result, the war time mobilization system would break up.

(2) Problems of Boat-People

Wars are certain to produce numerous displaced people due to occupations, and the
destruction of cities and rural areas. Even if nuclear weapons were not used, the present
level of military destructive power far exceeds that of the conventional weapons used in
World War Two. As was mentioned earlier, when a megalopolis breaks up, from one million
to ten million boat-people (refugees) would be produced. Under these circumstances, the
army could not execute its military operations, because, it would be hindered by the emer-
gence of boat-people and have to deal with this problem.

(3) Possibilities of Domestic Turmoil

If civilian lives and national economies were actually disturbed and if the legitimacy
of war were totally lost, one can assume with a high probability that domestic unrest would
occur. Concerning the Vietnam War, we have to pose the question of whether the United
States was defeated by the Vietnamese people or whether it was defeated by domestic
unrest and peace movement.

Expansion of domestic turmoils will certainly spread to the military. Then it will
bring about a self-destruction of the military and, eventually, a revolution will occur. When
the battle becomes domestic unlike the case of external agression, soldiers can easily take
off their uniforms and run away from the army. If only a small per cent of the soldiers
deserted, there is likelihood that the military would break up.
VII. Factors which Hinder the Invading Army

(1) Preparations for Invasion

When a country is planning to invade another, there must be a long period of preparation with respect to the gathering of a huge army, and of the maintenance of logistics. It would be, in all likelihood, detected by intelligence activities or by reconnaissance satellites. The adversary nation must respond to this quickly. Thus an invading army will suffer from great damage caused by the enemy’s reactions.

(2) Continuity of Logistics

In a war of attrition, an invading army will have a difficult time putting large force into operation with an expectation of concentrated effects. The national economy of an invaded country will be destroyed. Procurement was once possible in a battle-field with a small-sized army. Today this is unthinkable. It is therefore particularly a difficult task for the army to preserve and maintain long-range logistics from the military base to the battle-field. This is even more difficult in sea-lanes or under air cover.

(3) Policy Measures for Citizens in the Invaded Areas

Even if physical forces were not to be used by the army, destruction of civilian lives will occur. In European countries and Japan in particular, a large number of displaced persons would emerge due to the high population density. Caring for these refugees will be costly for the invading army.

The invading army will suffer from the incooperativeness or resistance on the part of local people, along with the lack of legitimacy for a military intervention. Especially if the army whose cultural standard is relatively low tries to intervene militarily in a country whose cultural standard is high, the army could not expect to have citizens who would cooperate with the invading divisions. Thus, the invading army will face much pressure
in trying to keep occupied regions secure.

Particularly in Japan, almost half of the population live in a megalopolis. Japan is too much advanced as an urban type of society. I would like to add to this the following points:

(1) An Island Country

An army must prepare a great number of war ships when it intends to invade an island country. It is essential for the army to make efforts to preserve a sea-lane for logistics. Compared with an invasion of a neighbouring country, invasion of an island country is far more difficult. This was historically shown by Hitler's failure to invade Britain during World War Two. Landing in Normandy or in Okinawa only became possible because of the overwhelming industrial power of the United States in those days.

(2) Geography

More than 70% of Japan is mountainous and most of the agricultural areas are paddy fields. Therefore it would be difficult for a large number of tanks to engage in mobile operations. So far as the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) is concerned, the SDF has not tried to have army maneuvers at the division unit. In the mountainous lands where there are abundant bushes and trees, it would be advantageous for guerilla warfare as was demonstrated in the Vietnam War.

(3) Resources

There is a serious deficiency of resources including essential foods in Japan. Therefore, it must depend on external trade. An invasion of Japan implies a suspension of industrial production. Not only that, the Japanese national economy would categorically sustain great damage. Japan does not produce petroleum. An essential part of the food supply
is rice. An invading army could not take advantage of Japanese industrial power and agricultural productivity. On the contrary, it would have to depend on a large volume of imported oil and food supplies.
VIII. Policy Sciences towards Peace-Building

If peace research is to actually have some kind of significance, it will not be enough to deduce theories from peace principles. We must examine the relations between the logic of war and the maturity of the urban type of society in developed nations. There are very few studies on this important point. One must say that a theoretical distinction between the rural type and the urban type of societies is in fact an essential sociological premise in considering dynamics of military, technology, economics, and politics. Examination of sociological underlying assumptions are of great importance to us. It is really beyond ideologies. It is cardinal, either for defensive or offensive policies. If peace research tries to propose policies without having a scientific methodology of distinguishing the urban type of society from the rural type of society, it will certainly fail. Indeed, peace research will make a great mistake. This methodology is also significant in considering the place of guerrila warfare in the contemporary typology of war.

With respect to proposals for peace policies, it is naturally necessary for us to extend peace diplomacy based on peace principles, not only at the governmental, but also at citizen level as well. However, at the same time, domestic reorientation is an important step in creating peace policies. Reorientation of domestic structures necessitates the realization of peace principles through the application of the original Constitutional requirements. Beyond this, domestic structures must be further decentralized politically and economically. Articulation of national lands is also desirable. We have already referred to the possibility of an articulated political system. Below, I would make some suggestions concerning strengthening the independence of local self-governments. This has been more or less overlooked by many people.

In order for local self-governments to be independent of the central government, they must expand peace policies in scope as follows:
(1) Direct reflection of citizens' opinions.

(2) Criticism against war policies of central governments.

Then,

(3) Development of peace diplomacy between local governments.

(4) Protection of citizens by declaration of free cities.

Furthermore, local governments must transform themselves from a centralized to a locally decentralized system within the the political and economic structure of national land.

(5) This will work in such a way as to constrain the excessive development of an urban type of society.

In sum, local self-governments must expand a mechanism for crisis management not only during peace time, but at times of war as well which create a so-called civil minimum for freedom and security. From this point of view, Japanese national security should not move towards a military buildup, but towards the breakup of the Tokyo megalopolis (population; 28 million). Since Japan is indeed over-mature as an urban type of society.

In this context, a peace strategy for developed nations must seek *internationalization*, or *decentralization*, depending on the structural characteristics of each nation. This must be done, whether it is a socialist, or a capitalist country.

What I have noted here is not a direct policy proposal for specifically responding to current international affairs. It is in fact a peace proposal drawn from considerations on the sociologically important factors of war. This sort of sociological understanding should not be irrelevant in the contemporary context. For military experts in each developed nation have not paid enough attention to this problem. They tend to be much concerned with the rural type of society in proposing policies of defense and invasion. Military theory did not concern themselves with the essential differences between urban and rural types
of societies. Bearing this in mind, I am confident that this sociologically developed argument will indeed contribute to the understanding of the real politics in the world. It will contribute to the deterrence of military aggressive behavior on the part of certain countries and it will work for changes in domestic and foreign policies. Formation of a policy science of peace is therefore an urgent objective for our social sciences.