RESEARCH REPORT No. 16

Prospects for Demilitarization and Autonomy in the South Pacific

Edited by SATOW Yukio

THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE SCIENCE,
HIROSHIMA UNIVERSITY

August 1991

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FOREWORD

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For years, the Pacific Island Countries have suffered, great losses, a result of nuclear pollution caused by the nuclear tests by the major nuclear powers. The citizens living in the Pacific have a strong anti-nuclear sense and desire for independence from any outside intervention. In the 1980's, this desire for a nuclear-free and independent Pacific bore fruit, as typically exemplified by the conclusion of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in 1985.

However, it should also be noted that recently a series of political incidents have occurred which have been a grave menace to efforts for a nuclear-free, independent and peaceful Pacific. Some examples are the military coup d'etat in Fiji and the assassinations of anti-nuclear and anti-colonialist leaders in Belau (Palau) and Kanaky (New Caledonia).

The main purpose of this study is to clarify the structural background of the complicated development of the citizens' movements for autonomy and demilitarization in the Pacific.

This paper has been written under the auspices of the TOYOTA
Foundation and later revised and presented at the International Symposium on “Social, Political and Legal Problems of South Pacific Island States” held in 1990 from August 25 to 28 at the Faculty of Law, HIROSHIMA University. I am grateful to those who helped me inside and outside the country to make this paper a reality: Vijay NAIDU (USP), Satendra PRASAD (USP), Alex GARDNER (university of WESTERN AUSTRALIA), KASTUMATA Makoto (MEIJIGAKUIN university) and SATO Motohiko (AICHI university) Also Special thanks to Ronni ALEXANDER (KOBE university) for her article. Without their help this book would not have been written.

June 1991.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction  
   SATOW Yukio  ........................  1

   Militarization and Maldevelopment in the South Pacific

2. Nuclear Strategy and Non-Nuclearization in the South Pacific  
   Vijay NAIDU  ..........................  5

3. Decolonization of New Caledonia and Independence  
   KATSUMATA Makoto .............. 25

4. Fiji: Socio-Political Dislocation, Economic Maldevelopment and an Increasing Role for Japan  
   Satendra PRASAD  ..................... 45

   Prospects for Demilitarization and Autonomy and the Role of Japan

5. Security Issues of the Pacific Island States  
   Ronni ALEXANDER ............... 63

6. “Aid-Induced Dependency Syndrome” in the South Pacific  
   SATO Motohiko  ..................... 87

7. Citizens Movements for Autonomy and Demilitarization  
   Vijay NAIDU  ......................... 109

8. Concluding Remarks: The South Pacific in the Contest of Global Transformation  
   SATOW Yukio  ......................... 117
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Introduction

SATOW Yukio

Research Subject and Outline of the Project

This study aims at the reconfirmation or re-evaluation of socio-economic difficulties confronting the ‘maritime countries’ of the South Pacific. These difficulties are derived from the fact that they are island states (or micro-states). The focus will be placed particularly on the efforts of the regional peoples who are endeavoring toward autonomy and denuclearization. The perspectives of these efforts will be studied in relation to the social and economic environments surrounding the residents of the study areas.

As is well known, among these residents exists a strong consciousness toward de-nuclearization and regional autonomy. This is set against the historical background that these people have suffered an abominable scale of personal and physical damage derived from the fact that the region has been for over 40 years a site for nuclear testing practiced by the United States, France and the U.K. In the 1980s, these spontaneous efforts toward de-nuclearization and regional autonomy started bearing visible fruits (for example, the adoption of an nuclear-free constitution by the Republic of
Belau, and the adoption as well as ratification of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty by the member states of the South Pacific Forum).

On the other hand, however, it should also be pointed out that political instability has increased in those cases where movements for autonomy have been stimulated by outside intervention directly or indirectly. This is due to the external vulnerability found in the socio-economic structures of these regional societies. This tendency has been clearly indicated by political events in recent years such as the unfortunate overthrowing of one of the governments which supported denuclearization, the de-stabilization of a nuclear-free constitution, and assassinations of popular anti-colonial and anti-nuclear leaders in New Caledonia.

This project was based upon the above mentioned facts. The first stage of the study consists of careful investigation into the moves of the people of the region toward autonomy and denuclearization. These movements have a complex structure which reflects the internal solidarity and external vulnerability of the region. Discussion with overseas colleagues, interviews with related individuals from various circles of the states and areas concerned, sets of questionnaires and local newspaper articles are a fundamental component of this research project. These primary materials will be collected and analysed for first-hand.

The second stage of the study consists of structure analyses of the economic, political and historical factors which are thought to underlie the conditions mentioned above. This will be done for the purpose of unravelling the background of the dynamism which seems to be accelerating the tendency toward autonomy and denuclearization. Moreover, a general perspective will be given for the future of autonomy and denuclearization in the region, in terms of the desirable conditions for socio-economic development of the region as 'island' states. In addition, prospects for the future of relations with Japan will be considered, as the Japanese are likely to become
more and more closely concerned with the region in question.

The Process of Drafting the “Research Plan”

While the present era has been called the “Asia-Pacific Age”, until recently, detailed research and information concerning the Pacific Island countries has been remarkably limited. In addition, the ongoing discussion of Pacific cooperation has not given sufficiently realistic perspectives of those countries. A research group looked into this situation and created the “Micro-state Study Group” in December, 1986. This Study Group has continued to carry out research activities geared toward searching for effective frameworks to solve the economic and social difficulties which these nations are facing because of their position as “island states”. In addition, it has tried to construct an idea of Pan-Pacific Co-operation in which the position of the island countries is emphasized. In the course of this project, as described in Part I, many difficult problems have occurred in the movement for denuclearization and autonomy, especially in the last two to three years. Our research group considers these individual cases as not only preventing the spontaneous efforts of the people from pursuing their goals of denuclearization and autonomy, but also as undermining the foundations of the countries and of the region itself. The denuclearization and autonomy of the region was studied from the following four standpoints and assignments: 1) historical review of the citizens’ movements for autonomy and demilitarization in the 3 regions (Fiji, Kanaky and Belau), mainly though first-hand materials and interviews, 2) comparative studies of colonial hisitory of the 3 regions, chiefly based on the preceding works on this matter, 3) descriptive as well as statistical analyses of the present situation of vulnerable and dependent socio-economic maldevelopment in the 3 regions, with reference to the negative influence of Japan’s ODA and overseas investment, 4) studies of the structural factors which are serious obstacles to
the citizens’ efforts in the 3 regions, from a comparative perspective mainly based on studies 2) and 3) above.

Creative Character of the Research

The increased dynamism of the movement toward denuclearization and autonomy in the region has been reported in Japanese newspapers and other media, but the information has not been neither sufficient nor consistently supplied. It is therefore difficult to grasp the actual circumstances fully. Moreover, sociological studies of this region has generally been broad-based but superficial. There has been little research into the specifics problems or backgrounds, and attention has not been given to the deep causes of these problems.

Above all, no research has tried to apply sociological methods of analysis to the moves of the people of the region toward autonomy, in relation to those for denuclearization. Judging from the current situation of research concerning the theme, this research project would concern itself with this kind of theme in researching the region, to maintain sufficient originality in the research. The region’s social and economic problems have been considered in light of the factors regulating the complex movements of non-nuclearization and autonomous action. The traditional research of Third World “continental states” facing the same kinds of problems and same events is not uncommon. Accordingly, our present research focus will be placed on a specialized abstraction of the nature of “island states”. It is believed that this research will offer materials and viewpoints that have not been given before, and that these new approaches will underscore the originality of this research.
Militarization and Maldevelopment in the South Pacific
Nuclear Strategy and Non-Nuclearization in the South Pacific

Vijay NAIDU

The theme for today is “Environment and Independence in the South Pacific Island Nations”. This is an apt theme because political and economic colonialism and neocolonialism have deprived our micro-states of the ability to make their destinies.

In his book *Blood on Their Banners* (1990) David Robbie identifies colonialism, the heritage of colonialism and the nexus between corporate interests and political rulers as the sources of insecurity in the South Pacific. Colonialism of course includes nuclear colonialism and neocolonization. For a region that has gained hardly an iota of “benefit” from nuclearization the South Pacific has contributed tremendously to nuclear proliferation—all at the expense of the peoples of Oceania. Ironically, now that an element of sanity has crept into the superpowers’ dialogue to halt the proliferation of arms, the Pacific has been chosen by the Americans as the site to destroy chemical weapons inspite of the widespread protests from Pacific micro-states.
This paper outlines nuclear activities and overall strategies by super and middle ranking powers in the Pacific and makes the suggestion that active non-cooperation will lead to an end to nuclear activities in the region.

The French Nuclear Tests on Moruroa and Fangataufa in French occupied Polynesia and the traversing of our ocean and visits to our ports by nuclear powered and armed vessels expose our environment, natural resources and above all our people to the dangers of radiation. There are elements in French occupied Polynesia and in our own countries who support both the militarization and nuclearization of the South Pacific for their short-term self interests.

Besides endangering material and human resources, militarization and nuclearization at the world level waste such resources. An end to the worldwide race to mass annihilation is the single most important matter for the 5.3 billion people who occupy this planet. If the time, energy, resources and effort that are tied up with militarization and nuclearization are made available for resolution of such problems as food production to feed the one half our world's people who go to bed with empty stomachs; tropical diseases and natural disasters—these problems could be resolved and/or counteracted very quickly indeed.

To give you an idea about the amount of resources that is being expanded on strategies for the annihilation of humankind I will just give you the expenditure of the two super-powers on nuclear arsenal. In 1980 the stockpile of nuclear weapons was one million times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. As if this was not enough, between them, the United States and the Soviet Union were spending $100 million a day to upgrade their nuclear arsenal. This is $12.5 million for each working hour. These figures are almost 10 years old. A figure of one million dollar an hour for upgrading nuclear arsenal would not be surprising for the present period. In any case if we were to add the resources spent by other nuclear powers as well as
non-nuclear nations on militarization, this amount will be easily surpassed. (The world military expenditure was $US 750 billion in 1982). The proposal by the United States to develop its Star Wars Programme or Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) will lead to the nuclearization of the space. SDI is a multi-billion dollar project. The military expenditure of the United States has soared from 160 million dollars in 1981 to 280 billion dollars in 1984. It is anticipated that between 1984—1990, the Reagan Administration’s military budget will be $US 1.5 billion (Durutalo, 1984, 15).

With the enormous sums being spent on militarization there is little wonder that a significant proportion of the world’s scientists are employed to refine death-dealing devices. Already 50% of all the world scientists are involved in military related research and development.

Although various scientific bodies have warned about the dangers of such research and development bringing our world closer to a nuclear holocaust (for instance the debate over the first strike option and the notion of a nuclear winter after a nuclear exchange) the nuclear arms race is continuing. Many less powerful countries, both former imperialist nations and newly independent ones are participating in this arms build-up.

Our Pacific is increasingly incorporated into this global race to militarize and nuclearize (see Map on Military and Nuclear Installations). But this is not to say that the Pacific has been nuclear free of these dreadful aspects of our contemporary world. Indeed, the very first and only nuclear bombing was one Pacific nation against another Pacific nation. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, in August 1945. Tens of thousands died instantly and hundreds of thousands of survivors and their descendants, known as the Hibakusha continue to suffer the physical and social pains of being the first victims of nuclear weapons. The Second World War made the Pacific a theatre of war between the Allied and the Axis powers. The war was about the redivision of the world’s resources.
amongst the imperialist nations. Pacific peoples were caught up in this war. Several thousands of acres of land were made uninhabitable and many islanders lost their lives. Others, such as the Banabans were uprooted from their ancestral islands, never to return again.

Subsequently between 1946 to 1962 the United States tested 90 nuclear devices in Enewetok and Bikini in the Micronesian Trust Territories and Johnston and Christmas Islands in the Central Pacific. The United States violated then and continues to violate now the basic rights of the Marshall Islanders. In 1954 a huge explosion of the “Bravo” device contaminated 7,000 square miles of the Pacific and also radiated 236 Micronesians and the Japanese crew of the fishing boat, Lucky Dragon. Altogether “14 atolls were subjected to radioactive fallout from the 66 nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958” in Micronesia (Bello, 1984, 16). The presence of large areas of contaminated sites has resulted in “nuclear nomads”—Micronesians from Rongerik, Rongelap and Uterik who have suffered from repeated doses of radiation and associated diseases, who do not have a home island anymore. The tragedy of these Pacific Islanders is directly related to the development of nuclear weaponry. Dennis O’Rourke’s Half-Life documents the plight of the people of Rongelap. However, even this moving film is not able to portray the sufferings of the victims of thyroid cancer, leukemia, cataracts, miscarriages and still-births. The increasing incidence of jelly-fish babies which “breath and move up and down, but are not shaped like a human being but rather like a bag of jelly” (Ibid. 1984, 16) is another consequence of radiation. It is expected that the peak period of radiation related cancers will come in the 1990s, 40 years after the exposure.

The British also tested nuclear devices in the 1950s and 1960s in the Pacific. They exploded 35 such devices in Australia (at Monte Bello Island, Woomera and Maralinga) and in the Christmas Island. Technicians, scientists and military personnel who were present at the atmospheric test sites
have suffered from radiation and are presently taking court-action against the British government. Hundreds of Aboriginal people who frequented these sites or who were in the vicinity of these sites at the time when the tests were being conducted have been suffering and dying from radiation relation ailments. At the Pacific Peoples Solidarity Conference for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific held in 1986 in Suva, an Aboriginal participant, Shorty O'Neal spoke about the victims of these tests and the great difficulty in documenting the numbers involved.

More recently the plans to incinerate toxic substance in Central Australia have provoked widespread protest from Aboriginal inhabitats of that region.

Since 1966 the French have been conducting nuclear tests on Mururoa and Fangataufa in the Eastern Pacific. Up till 1974, the French, like the Americans and the British conducted atmospheric tests. There were 41 such tests and after the mid-1970s the French have conducted 50 underground test in these atolls. Altogether 166 nuclear devices have been tested in the atmosphere and a further 54 have been tested underground. In all more than 220 nuclear bombs have been tested in the South Pacific. None of these tests were conducted by Pacific peoples, they have been done by imperial powers. The consequences of these tests—both manifest and latent are suffered by Pacific Islanders.

The French stubbornly continue the tests, arrogantly disregarding the feelings of Pacific peoples. They are prepared to engage in terrorism to enforce their will on the Pacific as was exemplified in the RAINBOW WARRIOR incident. Their nuclear colonialism on the fragile atoll ecosystem has serious implications for our marine resources. According to Oscar Temaru, the Mayor of Fa’aa, several cases of radition related cancers have emerged in Tahiti but these have been covered up. The victims have been taken to France. One wonders if they are being handled as nuclear guinea pigs like their counterparts in the Micronesian Trust Territories.
The Pacific has been used to test Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMS) (see Map on Missile Testing on the Pacific). The United States has been bombarding Kwajalein for more than 25 years with missiles such as the Minuteman, Poseidon, Polaris, Trident and the MX. This atoll has the distinction of being the greatest contributor to the arms race. The Soviet Union and China also violate the rights of Pacific peoples by testing their missiles in the region. Between 1963 and 1985, the USSR tested 23 missiles in the Pacific. These missile tests make nuclear weapons more refined and accurate thereby contributing to the technologically sophisticated arms race. It has been pointed out that these missile testing powers have a tacit agreement to accept each other’s tests. The losers in this regards are the islanders whose wishes are ignored by these powers.

Meanwhile the indigenous inhabitants of Kwajalein Atoll live on Ebeye an island of 66 acres, with a population of 8,500. Overcrowding, insanitary conditions, and a lack of basic facilities make Ebeye, a slum. This is in sharp contrast to Kwajalein where 3,000 Americans live in comfort on 900 acres of land which is replete with air conditioned houses, shopping centres, bowling alleys, a golf course, basket ball and handball courts, baseball fields, swimming pools and free services. The inhabitants of Ebeye must have official passes to enter Kwajalein and must leave the island by sunset or face being arrested by the military police.

Most Pacific peoples would be aware of the Japanese and American design to dump low-level radioactive waste-materials into the Pacific. Both these nations had already dumped nuclear wastes into the northern Pacific but the unanimous outcry against dumping in the South Pacific has given us some respite. The London Dumping Convention has agreed to place a moratorium on all sea dumping for the next few years. The danger is not over yet because nuclear waste disposal remains a major problem and currently scientists employed by the nuclear industry are making strenuous
efforts to make radioactive waste-containers “safe”. The French have
dumped radio-active wastes on Mururoa for a long time. Cyclones in the
past have ripped open the asphalt cover on the waste and allowed waves to
carry radioactive elements into the surrounding sea.

Threats to Pacific peace are presented by the two super-powers, the
United States and the Soviet Union whose western and eastern boundaries
respectively is formed by the Pacific ocean. These two states have installed
over ten thousand nuclear missiles on land and in ships and aircrafts in the
northern Pacific. Unlike in Europe, where European states have mediated to
restrict the number of nuclear arsenals in their region, in the northern
Pacific there has been a free for all. The shooting down of the Korean
Airline 747, believed to be on an American-planned spying mission,
exemplified the lack of regulation in the northern Pacific.

The USSR has 85 major surface combatants, 118 submarines (half nuclear
powered and 30 nuclear armed), and 500 planes allocated to its naval avia-
tion in the northern Pacific. In the Soviet Far East there are 53 Army divi-
sions equipped with 14,900 tanks and 1,690 tactical aircraft (Jones, 1986, 4).

**Missile Testing in the Pacific**
The US has 350 bases in the Asia-Pacific region. In Japan alone there are 110 American military bases which nuclear capable warships use. The US has 200 ships (including 15 Aircrafts carriers) and submarines, 1,800 aircrafts and 223,000 military staff in the Pacific. On small Pacific islands there are 184 bases (167 US, 15 French, 1 Chilean and 1 Japanese).

Apart from the presence of these weapons and fighting forces, three other factors make a major confrontation between the two superpowers likely. Firstly, the United states under the Reagan administration, has moved towards the notion of a winnable nuclear war and as a result has supported the development of a new generation of weapons and delivery systems that make first strike, “winnable” proposition. To this end, an aggressive forward development policy based on equipping the navy with Trident submarines and Tomahawk missiles is being rigorously pursued. A staggering $62 billion of the defence budget has been allocated to naval ship-building since 1981. The US plans to have a 600 ship navy in the Pacific. Aircrafts such as the F14, F16, and F18 armed with Air Launched Cruise Missiles are being deployed. The Soviet Union is responding to this escalation by refining its own strategy and equipment. This includes the deployment of Delta SSBNs (ballistic missile—carrying nuclear powered submarine) and the sea-launched land attack cruise missiles, SS-N-21.

Secondly, under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of US Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC), some ninety annual joint-military / naval / airforce excercises of various sizes and type are held in the Asia / Pacific region. Some of these exercises are carried out at the doorstep of the most heavily armed regions of the Soviet Union. It has been noted that :“ships and planes of both sides sail and fly into each other's manoeuvres”, thereby increasing the probability of a major confrontation.

Thirdly, the situation in the Korean peninsular is a likely spot for critical trouble that may exacerbate to a nuclear confrontation. Within a mile of the
boarder between North and South Korea are located nuclear tipped land mines. Forty thousand American troops are based in South Korea and several hundred nuclear weapons are stockpiled there.

Against the wishes of the indigenous Hawaiians, the United States has turned that archipelago into a fortress. Sacred sites such as Kaho’olawe have been made into target zones; large areas of potentially arable land have been acquired by the military and Hawaii is one of the largest storage sites for nuclear arsenal. Similarly, Guam is a base for B52 Bombers and is used for storing nuclear weapons.

In the South Pacific, the Soviet military machine is not conspicuously present but American bases and warships are, The United States plans to establish bases and training sites in the Marianas and Belau. In spite of attempts to bully the people of Belau to change their nuclear free constitution, the United States has not succeeded. Recently the new President’s attempt to override the constitution was rejected by the courts. Plebiscite number seven took place in 1990.

According to a Disarmament Week poster prepared by the Ofis Blong Ol Meri, the “United States is expanding its influence in the Pacific by making its navy and airforce six times larger, inviting military officers from Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, New Zealand and Australia to defence seminars in Hawaii, persuading Tuvalu to sign a Treaty which gives the United States the right to set up bases..., developing a new jungle warfare training ground in Palau, and convincing Fiji to allow nuclear submarines to enter Fiji ports”. The US policy in the South Pacific is one of forward deployment and strategic denial ensuring its hegemony as a global naval power and limiting the USSR to a land-based power.

Fiji’s about turn in 1983 in relation to nuclear powered and armed vessels visiting our ports, at a time when Zealand was declaring itself nuclear-free, meant that the people of Fiji were incorporated into the global strategies of
one super-power. This in turn means that the Soviet attention will now be focussed on Fiji. The visits by USS Reid and Brooke, nuclear-armed frigates in 1985 and the nuclear-powered submarines USSP Portsmouth early in 1986 to Suva, obviously were monitored by the Soviets. The visits by USS Chandler and Whipple, both nuclear capable and HMS Manchester and RAF Bayleaf in 1986 have merely contributed to an escalation of this situation. The United States position of downplaying the illegal overthrow of the democratically elected anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear free Fiji Labour-National Federation Party government and the subsequent violation of basic human rights by the Fijian Military manifests a tacit support for this action. The gun-point government that has been installed in Fiji is led by Ratu Mara who was responsible for ending Fiji’s nuclear free status in 1983.

Before New Zealand declared itself a nuclear free zone, both Australia and New Zealand provided “unqualified access to port and other land support facilities” to the US. Since then US aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines and other nuclear capable naval vessels have been using Cockburn Sound, the Western Australian Naval Base (Mediansky, 1985, 77).

In addition, Australia provides the sites for US defence / offence communication facilities. At the North-West Cape is located the US Naval Communications Station which communicates with SLBM submarines. The presence of sophisticated military surveillance and missile guidance system at the Pinegap Defence Space Research facility amongst other things intercepts radar transmissions by the Soviets and the Chinese. Similarly the Nurranger defence space communications facility is part of a satellite early warning system. These facilities act as the central nervous system for nuclear missile warfare and therefore are targeted by the Soviets.

Two recent developments are especially worrying, these are the use of a new generation of submarines to carry sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and the arrival of NATO forces into the Pacific. The Trident submarines
and Tomahawk missiles mean a further escalation of the arms race in the Pacific. RIMPAC exercises, for the first time involved the British and therefore bring another actor into the Pacific.

The dubious 75 year celebrations by the Australian navy and the presence at these peculiar celebrations of six nuclear armed ships exposes the hypocrisy of Australia’s avowed aim to make the Pacific nuclear free. Australian Labour Government’s two-faced character has also been exposed by its approval of renewed exports of uranium to France. The Bank Line’s ships are abusing the right to innocent passage through our seas by carrying in their holds Australian uranium destined for Europe.

A remarkable feature of nuclearization and denuclearization is the impact of these two processes on the Pacific. The former has led to nuclear testing and nuclear fallout in the Pacific and global escalation of nuclear arms race. Now with the USSR and the US agreeing on cutting down short and intermediate range missiles, the peace dividend for the Pacific is using Johnston Island to incinerate highly unstable chemical weapons. It is apparent that European racism towards the “little brown people” of the Pacific puts the region in a no win position.

NON-NUCLEARIZATION

To keep our Pacific genuinely Pacific, there is a need for appropriate education to realize the present grave threats that are posed to global peace. A nuclear exchange anywhere will have very severe repercussions the world over, our Pacific region is particularly prone to such an exchange because of the military installations in the northern Pacific and the growing nuclearization of the South Pacific. As inhabitants of the region that has contributed (involuntarily) the most to the global arms race, Pacific peoples lack of awareness and concern is shocking. Much of this has to do with information control and flow which are not in the hands of Pacific islanders. We must

— 17 —
demand to know.

Nuclear weapons make no distinction between military and civilian populations. The Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters illustrate the scale what can happen. Innocent civilians, old men, women and children will die horrific deaths just as surely as those men who are involved in fighting the war. Subsequently the areas affected would not be fit for human occupation for generations afterwards. We already have such areas in the Pacific. The threats to Pacific peace have always come from the outside. Today the presence of such unjust regimes as the French administration in Eastern Polynesia and in New Caledonia and the arms race of the two superpowers provide the major challenges to Pacific peoples.

The utilization of sophisticated nuclear powered and nuclear armed vessels, especially submarines pose a serious threat to the South Pacific region. These submarines use the deep blue waters of the high seas to hide themselves. They could be located in these waters at any given time, thereby endangering the neighboring areas by possible accidents and nuclear attack.

Militarization in the Pacific is also manifested by the presence of standing armies in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga; joint military exercises and visits by warships (see Editorial, Samoa Times, 19 Sept, 1986); the training of rapid deployment ("Reaction") forces in the United States, France and Australia and New Zealand; and the probability of a regional peace-keeping force. The preeminence given to the military has implications for the enjoyment of economic and political rights by the civilian population. Limited resources, better spent on productive activities may be siphoned-off for an unproductive standing army. Political freedom may increasingly be constrained by authoritarian regimes backed by the military.

In Fiji, the predominance in the army of members of one ethnic category who are closely affiliated to the chiefly hierarchy that wields political power is a matter of concern. There is something immoral and sinister about the
arming and training of one ethnic category in a multi-ethnic community. It is obvious that the Fiji army underwrites political power holders in Fiji, the country failed the test of democracy when the incumbents were displaced through the electoral process and when, as a result they set in motion the military coups.

The use of Papua New Guinean military to suppress the aspirations of Bougainvilleans shows very clearly how a readily available standing army can be used when problems may be resolved politically.

To assure the survival of Pacific peoples and the efficient and productive use of their potential and of their natural environment, there is an urgent need to roll back the tide of militarization and nuclearization. The global corporations which have so ruthlessly exploited Pacific resources; the people, the minerals, the forests, the land, and the sea resources (for instance tuna), have done so because they were and are backed by the might of their states. A very significant element of this might is the possession of nuclear arsenal which were partly tested and refined in the Pacific.

The major violators of the desire of Pacific peoples to have a nuclear free region are the United States and France. Both these countries and Britain have refused to support the Rarotonga Treaty which seeks to make the South Pacific a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). The US has this far perceived attempts to create nuclear free zones as efforts at constraining its forward deployment policies and its projection as a global super power. American policy makers are not prepared to compromise their global nuclear and military strategy especially when the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1977 and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August (Hiroshima Day) 1985 create an area covering two fifths of the world's surface which bar nuclear weapons.

France, seen as an oppressor nation in the South Pacific, has shown itself quite insensitive to regional and international pressure to end its nuclear
device testing in Polynesia. It has ignored the 1974 International Court of Justice call to desist from further nuclear testing in the Pacific. It has also evaded the United Nations General Assembly resolution which sought to put an end to nuclear arms testing in this region in 1975.

The French ruling class perceives France as a mid-sized global power after the USA and the USSR. Like the US it has global network of military / naval bases supportive of its nuclear strategy. The nuclear outreach involves a "... Kourou-Moruroa-Noumea axis, linking the Ariane rocket testing centre in Guyana and nuclear testing centre with the continuing French presence in Kanaky" (Maclellan, 1990, 13). Besides prestige and glory, the French have strong economic and strategic interest in maintaining this global network.

Strategically New Caledonia lies to the north west of Australia and New Zealand and therefore access by sea and air to North America. Besides being the site for nuclear weapons testing, Tahiti-Polynesia provides control over sealanes to North and South America as well as access to the Atlantic via the Panama Canal and Tierra Del Fuego. Economically, France has been perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). On its own France has an EEZ of 32,000 square miles but once the EEZs of its overseas colonies are included French control of animate and inanimate sea resources extend over 2.86 million square miles (MacLellan, Ibid, 13). Specific resources such as Nickel, cobalt and platinum are found in New Caledonia giving the French access to space-age raw materials.

The French geo-political and economic interests have been transferred into maintaining colonies at enormous costs. Annually France subsidizes its Pacific colonies by nearly $1.5 billion. A substantial portion of this subsidy is in military spending. In 1986, "the French military budget in Kanaky represented 13.4% of its total subsidy of 2.4 million francs while military expenditures in Tahiti-Polynesia came to a stunning 60% of a total 4.8
billion francs (MacLellan, Ibid, 9).

As part of its global and Pacific wide projection, France proposes to convert the Southern portion of New Caledonia into a Guanteneromo Bay-like base. Tontouta airbase is to be extended to accommodate Jaguar fighters and other military aircraft. The naval port and dry docks in Noumea are to be expanded. Facilities at Plum and Nandai are to be extended to cater for larger army garrisons.

It is vital, however, that the French government be condemned for nuclear testing as long as these tests are continued. Peace Movements and governments of the region must develop links with metropolitan France-based organizations that are seeking to put a stop to France's nuclearization programme.

France should be isolated from the regional forums and made to feel unwanted. Unfortunately France has a strong ally in the US which also ensures Australian qualified concurrence to French presence in the Pacific. In both New Caledonia (Kanaky) and Tahiti-Polynesia, the indigenous people have manifested their strong wish to be freed of French colonialism and nuclear colonialism. An end to colonialism could mean an end to nuclearization.

Again, it is a pity that the military-backed regime in Fiji has established such close relations with the French government. Using what the former Prime Minister David Lange of New Zealand called and open cheque book diplomacy, the French quickly moved into Fiji. French aid to the Fiji military has strengthened sympathy for France in some quarters in Fiji. By buying-off regimes in this way, the French are seeking to divide and split up Pacific peoples opposition or its activities in the region.

New Zealand, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands have all expressed their desire to maintain their sovereignty by rejecting the visits of nuclear powered and nuclear armed vessels. The ANZUS Treaty has been shaken
because the denial of American free access to New Zealand ports. To make up for this rupture Australians have been drawn even more closely to their American ally. Fiji may be seen as providing the missing leg for a three-legged nuclear stool in the region for the US.

Unlike our fathers and our forefathers we are no longer under direct colonialism, we therefore must articulate in no uncertain terms, our wish to control our national resources for the betterment of our people. We need to protect our natural resources against wasteful usage and the threat of nuclear radiation.

There are anti-nuclear and peace movements in Australia, Belau, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Ponape, South Korea and Fiji. There is a need to support these movements and encourage the formation of such movements in other South Pacific Islands. The one thing that the film “Half-Life” tells us is that we cannot afford to be ignorant and naive in matters of militarization and nuclearization.

We should act to ban all nuclear facilities, nuclear resting, nuclear dumping and nuclear armed and nuclear powered vessels from our region. We must stop the Pacific from becoming the nuclear waste dump of the nuclear powers. This ban should be binding for all nations and therefore go beyond the current South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

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Decolonization of New Caledonia and Independence:
with a focus on the Matignon Accord of 1988

KATSUMATA Makoto

Introduction

At a time when most South Pacific Islands have gained independence, New Caledonia remains, with French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna Islands, a French colony that France calls Oversea Territory (territoire d'outer-mer). The existence of this French colony amidst the South Pacific island nations not only makes difficult inter-regional cooperation, one of the important conditions of regional peace, but also continues to deepen the split between the aborigine Kanaks and the immigrants, mainly from the French Metropole.

Although the basic law of 1956, provided that France would grant progressively the independence to her colonies, New Caledonia was excluded from the list of colonies to be becolonized.

National consciousness of peoples of the South Pacific Islands has been, however, growing. Moreover, French policy toward the South Pacific has become the focus of criticism in the South Pacific Forum, an association of
newly independent South Pacific island nations begun in 1971. This criticism has been directed at France's colonization of New Caledonia as well as its nuclear testing at Mururoa atoll. At its conference at Honihara in 1979, Papua Newguinea freshly independent since 1975 and composed of Melanesiens, the same ethnic group as Kanaks, took up for the first time the case of independence of New Caledonia.

Furthermore, at the 16th conference of the South Pacific Forum held in August, 1985, at Latonga in the Cook Islands, the following resolution was adopted concerning the independence of New Caledonia:

The forum reconfirms its support to a rapid transition of New Caledonia to self-determination and independence. Independence should be the recognition of the inner rights of aborigine people and their aspirations and guarantee the rights and interests of all the people in the plural ethnic society. (...) The forum requested that the French government institute electoral reform before a self-determination referendum in order to obtain the results which reflect accurately the aspirations of Kanaks as well as other people living there many years and having an interest in the territory.¹

More recently, in the General Assembly of United Nations, held in December 1986, the resolution for registering New Caledonia on the list of non-autonomous area to be decolonized was adopted with 89 for, 24 against and 34 abstention.²

Therefore, the problem of independence of New Caledonia became an international issue, which France could not escape from for one reason or another.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt clarify the nature and scope of the process of self-determination and independence for New Caledonia in the context of coexistence and progress in the South Pacific region. The
emphasis will be put on examining the Matignon Accords achieved on June 26, 1988. From this viewpoint, the following will be analyzed: first, the background leading to the Matignon Accord and its crucial points; second, the socio-economic conditions required to give real content to independence; and finally, the meaning of independence of New Caledonia in the context of cultural, political, and economical circumstances, in the South Pacific region today.

Historical Background of Matignon Accord and its Crucial Points

1 Decolonization Process in the 1980’s

Since the annexation of New Caledonia as a French colony in 1853, the aboriginal Kanaks have been resisting French colonial domination. However, it is only since 1981 with the arrival of the French socialist to power, independence has been discussed concretely.  

The post war period has been characterized by a tendency to reduce autonomy of the territory by Metropole or the official encouragement of immigration by non-Kanak people, this was especially the case during the nickel boom that occurred between the end of the 1960’s and the beginning of the 1970’s. During this period, French colonial domination of these islands was reinforced.

In 1972, under Pompidou’s presidency colonial policy toward New Caledonia was justified by a declaration as follows:

“Although blamed to hybridism in its multiracial society, New Caledonia, a colony of settlement, remains a unique tropical territory where a developed country could send its people. (...) In the long run, nationalist claims of the aborigine cannot be avoided unless the community of non-Pacific region people could represent demographically the majority.”

In the 1980’s, the period from the birth of the socialist government, untie
Matignon Accords can be divided into two periods: the first period of the socialist government (May 1981 – March 1986) and the second period of Chirac government (March 1986 – May 1988).

1) First period of socialist government

In 1981, when the socialist government of President Mitterrand started, it began to implement a series of reform measures tending to meet partially the claims of Kanaks such as a limited redistribution of their land. A new direction by the new government worth considering can be found in the communiqué on status of New Caledonia, which the Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories, G. Lemoine, made in July 1983. This communiqué is important in the sense that for the first time the French government recognized the principle of self-determination and independence of these islands. Its essential contents can be summarized as follows:

a) termination of the colonial status;

b) legitimacy of the Kanaky people's rights to gain independence within the context of French constitution;

c) extension of the application of rights of self-determination to other ethnic groups whom the Kanaks recognize the legitimacy;

d) necessity to formulate a new status for New Caledonia.\textsuperscript{5}

In this regard, the movement of the Kanaks requested that a referendum for the self-determination take place before 1989 and that the right to vote be limited only to non-Kanaks people born in New Caledonia and having an ascendant born in New Caledonia. Therefore, the plan of Lemoine was rejected by the movement's activists who judged it too passive. During the same period, different independence movements formed a union named Front de Libération Nationale Kanaks Socialiste FLNKS\textsuperscript{6}, which, boycotted territorial elections taking place in November 18th 1984 in great confusion.

Just after these elections, E. Pisani, appointed as a delegate of the French
government for New Caledonia, in order to break the deadlock, proposed a new plan for "independence-association", equivalent plan granted by France to French colonies of Black Africa at the end of the 1950's for maintaining French vested interests on that continent.

However, the plan for independence-associationals encountered strong opposition both from advocates for indepeendece and from those opposed to indepeendece. Pisani, promoted to minister in charge of Caledonian affairs, proposed the following amendment to the principle independence-association:

a) A referendum by the "concerned population" of Caledonia held before December 31th 1987, on the matter of independence in the association with France;

b) Instead of the 6 regions (pays) system New Caledonia will be divided into 4 constituencies (régions), with predominance of advocates for independence of advocates for independence in the three regions apart from Noumea and its peripheries being taken into consideration. (See the electoral district map for the different proposals)

c) Concerning regional development and promotion of local cultures, there is reinforcement of regional authorities. Meanwhile the competence of the high commissioner, representative of France, is strenghthen for other important issues.

2) The period of Chirac government (March 1986 — May 1988)

The Chirac government, which came to power with general election of March 16th, 1986 had as its ultimate goal the reversal of all efforts made by its predecessor. Therefore his strongly worded plan against independence further antagonizes the pro and anti-independence movements.

The Chirac government in order to weak the political and cultural influence of FLNKS instituted the law of July 17th 1986, concerning the
transitional period to referendum by the population. This law fulfilled largely the demands of the Alliance for New Caledonia within the Republic (Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la Republique, RPCR), formulated by the most influential leader of anti-independence movements, Lafleur.

It was natural that the new policy that tended to ignore openly Kanaky aspirations created much tension in Caledonian society. The Chirac government had to carry out "pacification" measures by reinforcing security forces, such as at the time of Algeria war for independence.

Therefore, the referendum of the population asking whether New Caledonia should remain in the French Republic or not ended up with an abnormal result. There was an abstention rate of 40,9% because of an appeal from the proindependence advocated to boycott. On seeing 98,3% against independence and only 1,9% for independence, a delegate of FLNKS commented thus on the results:

"From the evening of the referendum, there is only one legitimacy (in New Caledonia, Note by author): white legitimacy. There is no more Kanak's legitimacy. This shows us how important are in New Caledonia the racism, contempt, apartheid.""^8

It is under these circumstances that the Pons plan was represented on overwhelming victory of anti-independence in the Caledonian political process. The Pons plan had three features:

a) to revise the previous three regions-administrative division into a 4 regions system (See the map 1) in order to cut off the power of FLNKS;

b) to enlarge the competence of regional authorities so as to increase the power of newly elected local councils;

c) to ignore any evolution to prospect of independence.

This new provocative policy drove FLNKS to use force. While the Mitterrand left wing camp and the Chirac right wing camp were having
Ibid., Mathieu, p.108.
Figure 2
Financial transferts (1985 – 87)

unity: 1 Billion
CFP Francs
(1CFP.F = 0,055 Francs)

Ibid., Transferts privés
Transferts publics et privés
Extrait du rapport d'activite de l'exercice 1987 de l'Institut d'Emission d'Outre-Mer.
Mathieu, J. L., La Nouvelle Caldonie, Que-sais-je?, 1989, p.75.
Figure 3
Les trois provinces issues de la loi référendaire
(depuis le 14 juillet 1989)

fierce competition for the presidential election, a hostage case of military police in Ouvea island occurred. The operation to free the hostages by the French commandos resulted in many casualties.  

2 Matignon Accord

The Pons plan, which took a defiant attitude toward the feelings of nationalism, was buried without even being applied because of Mitterrand's election to the presidency. An alternative plan was formulated by the Roccard socialist government for New Caledonia, which had been on the verge of a civil war. Prime Minister Rocard began to talk with concerned representatives in Matignon Palais: RPCR and Liberation Kanake Socialiste (LSK), and advocates for independence, but not members of FLNKS. On June 26th of the same year, the reconciliation known as the Matignon Accord was settled.

The Matignon Accord is composed of one common declaration. It is sometimes called the Matignon-Oudinot Accord because the details of the Matignon Accord were discussed until August 20th, in the Ministry of Oversea Departments and Territories located in Oudinor street.

The Matignon Accord led first to the common declaration that for one year following the Accord, New Caledonia would be under the direct rule of French state. Essential points of the Accord are the following:

a) New Caledonia is divided into three regions, and the new administrative division is different both from the Pisani plan of 1985 and Pons plan of January 1988;

b) The right of self-governance is more restricted than before with the competence of the high commissioner being reinforced;

c) A national referendum asking the French people whether they agree with self-determination for New Caledonia would be held on November 6th 1988 in order to reach a national consensus on
in institutional reform concerning the coming decade of transition;

d) The right to vote in the referendum for self-determination in 1998 is restricted to those who resided in New Caledonia at time of the national referendum of 1988;

e) A package of projects for economic and social development will be started in order to reduce the socio-economic gap between the Kanaks and the French settlers;

f) People who are guilty of political crime during the conflict on the status of New Caledonia, except for serious crime, will be given amnesty.

Although the national referendum of November 6, 1988, recorded a high rate of abstention of 63%, 80% of the voters approved the self-determination scheme. But in New Caledonia, only 57% approved it, with a relatively low rate of abstention of 37% reflecting the anti-independence feeling of French settlers.

The Matignon Accord approved by national consultation evolved as the French socialist government expected. But it remains a profound frustration both in the extreme right wing of the anti-independence movement and in the pro-independence movement. Although we understand the natural reaction of the extreme right wing facing the socialist government, a split occurred within the independence movement over the Matignon Accord which has been making fragile the stability of the self-determination and independence process.

The main criticism made toward the Matignon Accord by those for independence can be summarized by two points: the first critique concerns the time of the referendum. Those who oppose to Matignon Accord within the independence camp find the waiting time of ten years too long. One of the main opponents, who belongs to the Front uni de libération Kanake (FURK) stated; “This means ten years more of imprisonment of the Kanak people.”
He advocated a National liberation struggle.

The second criticism related to eligibility for the 1998 referendum. Ten years residence required by the Matignon Accord may look better than the three years residence of the 1987 referendum. However it must be noted that there are still the following requirements:

- abolition of fiscal and economic privilege from which residents in New Caledonia can benefit;
- easing the departure of old and new French settlers with apremium;
- creating in this way an advantage for Kanaks in the electoral constituency of 1988.

Behind these arguments, there is an idea that the voting right for self-determination can be extended to the Caldoche people, early French settlers considered by Kanaks as "victims of the History" in order to distinguish them from recent settlers who came to New Caledonia for profiting from the nickel boom or privileged treatment. From this idea comes the claim that the voting right should be reserved only to non-Kanaky people born in New Caledonia or having an ascendent born in the territory.

**Economic and Social Characteristics of New Caledonia and Matignon Accord**

The question now is to know how the Matignon Accord, with its crucial socio-economic challenge of closing the regional gap, can overcome the historical dual structure between Kanak society and the French settler's world. For answering this question, first economic and social features of the territory will be surveyed; and second, various economic and social measures provided by the Matignon Accord will be examined.

1 Economic and Social Characteristics

Any colonization inevitably gives rise to economic dependence on the
metropole and to a social gulf within colonial society, New Caledonia is no exception. Table 1 shows the sectorial contribution of Caledonian to the gross product from 1974, the time of the nickel boom, to 1983. The following remarks can be drawn from the table.

a) The only existing valuable industry is the Nikel sector. Its annual production represents about 12.5% of the total production of the capitalist world. The portion of nickel extraction and smelting of the gross domestic product of the territory decreased from 18% in 1974, the height of the nickel boom, to around 10.5% in the 1980’s. It is empirically proved that an economy unless there is sufficient development of other industries which transform and are made use of in the local economy. The Caledonian nickel industry represents this typical characteristic.

Table 1
Sectorial composition of GDP (1974 – 83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industries alimentaires</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
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<td>Energie</td>
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<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
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<td>11.19</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>9.88</td>
<td>4.65</td>
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<td>12.86</td>
<td>10.88</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mécanique</td>
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<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries diverses</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTP</td>
<td>13.37</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>4.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>4.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>10.35</td>
<td>15.09</td>
<td>15.11</td>
<td>17.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>17.91</td>
<td>19.43</td>
<td>20.93</td>
<td>25.22</td>
<td>26.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrations</td>
<td>14.82</td>
<td>18.44</td>
<td>21.98</td>
<td>24.02</td>
<td>27.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaires domestiques</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ITSEE.

b) In contrast with the relative decline of the nickel sector, commerce, service, and administration have been increasing their share in GDP by rapidly increases from 42% in 1974 to 72% in 1983. These non-productive sectors are characterized by the mechanism of a “rentier” economy, an economy in which the colonial status of New Caledonia allows the local economy to receive retirely high salaries for officials and various subsidies from the metropole. This mass of money inflow results in high purchasing power for imported goods or investment abroad such in Australia, where more promising financial returns are expected. Figure 2, which retraces finansfers and balances from 1985 to 1987 notes that a huge amount of public inflow from the metropole is offset against an almost equivalent private outflow, with the amount in 1987 of about 10 billion Pacific French Francs (Communauté française du Pacifique, CFP, 1CFP franc to 0,055 Francs).

c) The production of agricultural needs remains extremely low. It decreased from 3.5% in 1974 to less than 2.5% in recent years. The stagnation of agriculture of the Caledonian economy is due to the fact that most of the Kanaks live in country side and produce their own food for subsistence, while the great number of Whites concentrated of Noumea depend largely upon imported food. The share of food for total imports reached about 20% in 1986.

This economic structure, based on the transfer of public funds from the metropole and the export of mineral resources without significant productive activities, has compounded the social gap within Caledonian society.

For understanding the background of this gap, two characteristics of Caledonian society are worth nothing. First, it should be noted that the proportion of Kanaks to non-Kanaks has been becoming in favor of the non-Kanak people. Table 2 which traces the demographic trend of ethnic composition for the past century (1887−1985) shows that the demographic superiority of Kanaks has collapsed since 1950’s due to immigration of
Table 2  
Demographic evolution (1887 – 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Année</th>
<th>Européens</th>
<th>Mélanésiens</th>
<th>Autres</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectifs</td>
<td>Effectifs</td>
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<td>Effectifs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887( * )</td>
<td>18,800</td>
<td>42,500</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>62,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>22,750</td>
<td>29,100</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>54,400</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>20,900</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>53,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>17,300</td>
<td>28,800</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>50,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>27,100</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>47,500</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<td>1931</td>
<td>15,200</td>
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<td>13,400</td>
<td>57,200</td>
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<td></td>
<td>26.6</td>
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<td>1936</td>
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<td>28,800</td>
<td>9,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1946</td>
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<td>28.9</td>
<td>49.4</td>
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<td>1951</td>
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<td></td>
<td>31.1</td>
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<td>1956</td>
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<td>8,351</td>
<td>86,519</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
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<td>41,190</td>
<td>11,974</td>
<td>100,579</td>
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<td></td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>41,268</td>
<td>46,200</td>
<td>13,111</td>
<td>131,665</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1974(D)</td>
<td>51,582</td>
<td>53,725</td>
<td>26,358</td>
<td>133,233</td>
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<td></td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>50,757</td>
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<td></td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>53,974</td>
<td>61,870</td>
<td>29,524</td>
<td>145,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
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</table>

Source : ITSEE (Institut territorial de la statistique et des études économiques).  
Ibid., p.25.

( * ) Estimation.  
(D) Dénombrement.
Europeans, other South Pacific Islands and South East Asians. The nickel boom 1969 to 1974 especially accelerated immigration of non-Kanaks population. Out of a total population in 1983 about 145 thousands, Europeans represent 37.1% and other immigrants 20.3%. This means in the Caledonian political context that the majority of the population is composed of 57.4% non Kanaks. The second characteristic lies in the extremely high population concentration in Noumea and its environs, where the Kanak portion is less than 20%. In fact, only Noumea area constitutes the center of the “rentier” economy reserved to Whites, who enjoy an unprecedented high living standard. The electricity and water systems reach almost 100% of this area. Moreover 124 medical doctors out of 159, and 42 pharmacies out of 49 for entire New Caledonia are concentrated on Noumea area.\textsuperscript{15}

2 Reform measures of Matignon Accord

In the Matignon Accord, it is provided that various economic and social measures will be carried out by 1988 in order to reduce the economic and social imbalance between the Kanak population and the non-Kanak population. Its mains points are as follows.

First, the Matignon Accord promises a budgetary allocation to corrected economic gap between the south area of the main island, where most of non-Kanak population lives and the rest of territory inhabited by Kanaks with the following portion:

- 40% for the south area of the main island;
- 60% for the north area and Loyalties islands.

Second, according to the law of November 6, 1988, approved by the national referendum, the three year development plan running from 1990-1992 will joint financing by the Metropole and the territory. The objectives are as follow:

a) Diffusion of all kinds and implementation of educational programs
taking into account the diversity of cultures;
b) Enlargement of the social infrastructure for all the Islands in order to correct the gap between the capital and the rest of the territory;
c) Improvement of health, medical conditions, and public housing;
d) Creation of employment by promoting agriculture, livestock, aquaculture, and tourism;
e) Promotion of participation by the young generation in development;
f) Implementing of a land policy taking into account local particularities;
g) Promotion of economic and cultural exchanges within the South Pacific.

These goals aim to achieve social integration within the territory by making possible a high living standing for the Kanaks, with has been so far reserved only to European settlers. It is clear that these reforms cannot be achieved without massive financial injection and large technical assistance from the Metropole.

Conclusion — A Reform of Apartheid without calling it that

If the apartheid system in South Africa consists of achieving a system in which the wealth realized by the use of land, natural resources, and labor in conquered land can flow back only to conquering settlers, the political, economic, and social gap found between Kanaks and European settlers is the result of an apartheid regime, though it is not called such.

Because the abolition by apartheid began with the claims for political rights, it is easy to understand that negotiation between Kanaks and French representatives over the process of Caledonian decolonization accelerated in the 1980’s and focused on the conditions for voting (timing, eligibility, and administrative division).

On this road of decolonization, what kind of independence do the Kanak
people aim to achieve?

Although it is premature to answer this, it seems that there is an ambiguity in the Matignon Accord. It is still uncertain regarding the following questions:

- does the new policy implemented by massive financial assistance for narrowing the regional gap aim at "making Kanak people' home-economics benefit from liberal individualism"\textsuperscript{17}, or
- does it preparing for real economic self-reliance by 1998?

The former way means the realization of independence by association with France or the European Economic Community. It consolidates the dependent economic structure which could not survive without financial assistance from France or the EEC. The latter can be assumed to be a scenario consisting of /minimizing the Caledonian culture rupture and using the economic and social assistance provided by the Matignon Accord at a pace of development in which Kanak people could take the initiative. This can be described as a scenario of coexistence within the South Pacific Forum with its neutral and nuclear free policy. In this regard, the late Tjibaou, leader of FLANKS, clearly expressed his vision of the country by pointing out that the future of kanky people was not confined within his country, but also lied on a neutral and nuclear free South Pacific:

'It is more important for our development and for regional development to negotiate a neutrality pact with the superpowers than it is to amuse ourselves learnings to play like big countries in a game made for big countries. We can be only be toys in this game.'\textsuperscript{18}

In any case, the Matignon Accord has only two years experience. Therefore, the important land issues and the problem of articulation of modes of production prevailing in New Caledonia should be the subject of future investigation in order to clarify the nature and scope of Matignon Accord.
Acknowledgement: I should like to express my gratitude to Visiting Professor J. E. Picknon, faculty of Law, Hiroshima University for his valuable advice on the English version of my paper.

Notes

1 Christnasht, Alain. La Nouvelle Calédonia, Note et études documentaires, La documentation francaise, 1987, updated 1990, p.35.

2 The voting behavior of main countries is the following: for; Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Japan, against; France, Spain, West Germany, Italy, Holland, abstention; United Kingdom, United States. In the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1987, despite maintain of a great majority of member nations voting for self-determination, there were 20 votes less than the pervious balloting: 69 against 89. This could have resulted from the pressure that France exerted on some developing countries by promising them greater aid. With this result, a number of small countries such as Niger, Mauritania, and Jamaica, who had previously voted for, might have voted against this time.

3 The history of the Kanaks against foreign domination has often taken the form of uprisings. The first was recorded in 1878 just after French annexation in 1878. A breif history which relates these events can be found in, Mathieu, Jean-Luc. Nouvelle Calédonie, Que sais-je? 1990.


5 Owed largely to Mathieu’s book, Ibid., p. 42.1

6 Its compositions are: Union Calédonienne(UC), Front uni de libération Kanake(FULK), Union progressiste mélanesienne(UPM), Parti socialiste Calédonien(PSC), Parti de libération Kanake(PALIKA), Libération Kanake socialiste(LSK) did not boycott the election on November 18, 1984.

7 Owed to resume of Mathieu’s book, Ibid., pp. 48—49.

8 Ibid., Mathieu, p. 53.

9 Atrocity and tortures practiced by the French army during this event aroused French public opinion greatly because of some similarities between the Algeria independence war and the Caledonian issue. For details of behavior of the

10 Extreme right wing party Front National, with the head office location in Paris and Front caledonien.


12 Concerning the constitutional issue on the limitation of voting rights, see: *Regards sur l’actualité*, No. 146, December 1988, p. 8 and *Ibid.*, Mathieu, Footnote in p. 44.

13 *Ibid.*, Regards sur l’actualité, p. 81


15 *Ces îles que l’on dit françaises*, préface by the Tjibaou, J. M., Harmattan, 1988, p. 117. The same book reports that there is one island only one doctor is provided for 2500 inhabitants.


Fiji:
Socio-Political Dislocations, Economic Maldevelopment and an Increasing Role for Japan

Satendra PRASAD

This paper outlines some aspects of Fiji’s contemporary socio-political crisis, and their implications for economic change and development. The discussion selectively stresses the position of Japan’s ODA in relation to Fiji’s economic development, and in relation to developmental assistance from Fiji’s traditional donor countries. It also comments on geopolitical, strategic, economic and other motivations that guide the content and volume of ODA to Fiji and to other small island stages generally. Comments about Japanese ODA to the wider South Pacific region are made only to illustrate wider trends and movements. Finally we examine ways in which ODA, and Japanese ODA in particular, contributes to, or has the potential to contribute to Fiji’s maldevelopment, and/or adoption of distored economic development priorities by the Fijian state.

Fiji with a multi-ethnic population of roughly 736000³ was a former British Colony and attained independence in 1970. Demand for large scale labour at the time of colonisation (1874) led to the importation of large scale migrant
labour from colonial India. Colonialism thus created a classic “bipolar multi-ethnic formation” in which the two dominant ethnic groups roughly equal in numbers became economically and politically polarised over time. Fiji Indians have historically dominated sugar cultivation, which is confined to Western Viti Levu, and Northern Vunua Levu, while Melanesian Fijians have dominated other agricultural activities such as copra production and fishing. Economic polarisation made the emergence of multi-ethnic political solidarity or integration particularly problematic (Norton; 1989).

Economic polarisation also resulted in political polarisation. Melanesian Fijians have largely aligned themselves with the Alliance Party (led by Melanesian Fijian chiefs such as current Prime Minister, Ratu Mara) which ruled Fiji since Independence. Its almost continuous 17 year rule was disrupted in April 1987 when a coalition of the newly formed multiracial Fiji Labour Party and the Fiji Indian dominated National Federation Party defeated it at polls. This Government led by a commoner Melanesian Fijian, the late Dr Timoci Bavadra, was removed at gunpoint by an almost exclusive Melanesian Fijian Military Forces in May 1987. The 1987 coups effectively restored the Alliance leadership to power. Ethnic polarisation underlies much of Fiji’s socio-political development since Independence, and has only been further reinforced since the military coups of 1987.

Since May 1987, the Military and traditional Melanesian Fijian chiefly institutions such as the Council of Chiefs have begun to play a much more prominent role in national affairs. A grossly enlarged military, under the command of the coup-leader Sitiveni Rabuka has spread its influence throughout society. Traditional Fijian institutions such as the ‘Great Council of Chiefs’ (Bose Levu Vakaturaga) have assumed a prominent role under a recently promulgated constitution (July, 1990), and this has enhanced the position of traditional chiefs in society generally. Both Fiji’s current President (former Governor General), Ratu Penaia Ganliau and current
Prime Minister, (and Prime Minister from 1970 to April 1987), Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara are high chiefs in the traditional Melanesian Fijian social order. The *Bose Levu Vakaturaga*, under a constitution promulgated in July, 1990 will directly appoint the President and 24 of the 37 members to the Upper House, thus making it the most important political power broker in the country. The coups of 1987 have thus resulted in a powerful reassertion of traditional Melanesian Fijian structures in Fiji's national political set up. This has often resulted in visible disadvantages to large categories of commoner and urban Melanesian Fijian people and to the very obvious disadvantage of the non-Melanesian Fijian population.

Fiji’s colonial development had left her hopelessly dependent upon few primary commodities, in particular sugar and copra and later gold. Thus Fiji had an extremely narrow base from which to chart its post-independence economic development. Fiji’s narrow economic base also meant extreme reliance upon foreign aid, initially from United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand; with United States, and Japan and France becoming prominent in the 1980’s.

With independence, Fiji became prominently involved in South Pacific regional affairs. It spearheaded the establishment of the South Pacific Forum; a regional agency made up of leaders of Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga, Western Samoa, Niue, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Australia and New Zealand. Since its inception, there has been a marked shift from bilateral to multilateral emphasis on matters relating to trade, aid, economic cooperation and related issues. Thus any examination of ODA in relation to Fiji must also be viewed in this wider South Pacific regional context.

**JAPAN’S ROLE IN FIJI AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC**

By the time of independence Japan had already become a significant
trading partner for Fiji. Roughly 17.1% of all imports to Fiji came from Japan in 1971 and it absorbed 3.4% of all of Fiji’s exports. In 1987, it accounted for 12.1% of all imports and 3.0% of all exports (Bureau of Statistics, 1989; iii–iv). Fiji’s other major trading partners are Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States.

Japanese position in Fiji and South Pacific generally is articulated in what is known as the ‘Kuranari Doctrine’7 The broad outline of this was first introduced during a South Pacific tour by Japan’s foreign minister in January 1987.

Generally, this ‘doctrine’ pledged to expand existing aid programmes, assistance and support for regional initiatives and arrangements and expressed a commitment to preserve regional peace stability. It was also apparent that increased Japanese interest in the South Pacific were aimed at “offsetting the growing Soviet ties” in the region (Fiji Times, 5/1/87:1).

By the mid 1980’s various new strands of Pacific-Soviet relations had developed. This included a fishing treaty between Soviet Union and Kiribati and a similar treaty between Soviet Union and Vanuatu. The treaty with Vanuatu also granted Soviet vessels port facilities and landing rights. Papua New Guinea had also begun to openly discuss the possibility of allowing the opening up of a Soviet Embassy. Trade unions in Vanuatu and Solomons had also established closer ties with the Soviet Union dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. Much of these new development had come in wake of Michail Gorbachev’s call for “reduced tensions in the Asia Pacific region” in 1985. Kuranari had repeatedly stated during his South Pacific tour that Japan viewed the “South Pacific as a region of growing tensions”, in an obvious reference to increased commercial contact between some South Pacific states and the Soviet Union (Fiji Times, 5/1/87:1: Fiji Times, 15/1/87:3)

Fiji, along with most other South Pacific states has historically been part
of the Western Alliance. Before the military coups it enjoyed close defence ties with United States, United Kindom and increasingly Australia and New Zealand. While much of defence assistance from these countries remains suspended currently, as a protest against the coups, and the absence of an elected Government; Fiji’s foreign policy still is conservatively pro-western alliance, and has not adjusted to the new geopolitical reality brought about by changes in Soviet Union and the socialist world generally.

However to reduce its reliance on traditional friends, Fiji is currently establishing new military links with Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia and Israel and the two China’s.

Countries such as France were quick to capitalise on Fiji Military’s isolation as a result of bans and embargoes placed by its traditional friends. France gave a substantial aid of just over $F2 million ($US1.6 million) to the Fiji Military Forces for transport equipment and for setting up of an airwing in 1988 (Robertson T and Tuimanisau A., 1988). It has pledged assistance to the tune of a further $11.0 million to set up a naval workshop for Fiji’s navy.

The massively increased French assistance to the politically isolated post-coup regime in Fiji has to be interpreted in terms of France’s own agenda in the region. France has long been isolated in the region for its continued nuclear testing programme on the Polynesian atoll of Mururoa, against sustained opposition from the South Pacific island states. France suffered further isolation after the revelation of its connection with the bombing of a GreenPeace anti-nuclear protest ship (Rainbow Warrior 3) in New Zealand. Most island states have also voiced their continued opposition to the continued French colonisation of the Melanesian islands of New Caledonia and the Polynesian islands administered as French Polynesia. France moved quickly after the coups to establish political alliance with a politically isolated regime created out of military coups of 1987 to blunt regional opposition to its nuclear testing programmes and its continued colonial
presence in the South Pacific region - a case of undisguised conventional checkbook diplomacy.

The important 1987 visit by Japan's Foreign Minister Kuranari coincided with a decision by the regional group, the South Pacific Forum, to include Japan as a dialogue partner. A South Pacific Forum delegation to Japan in 1986 had asked Japan to increase its economic links and assistance to the region. According to Kuranari, the foreign ministry visit to the South Pacific was a response to the 1986 request (*Fiji Times*, 5/1/87,1). Japan's further response to the Forum invitation was to invite the Chairman of the South Pacific Forum to Japan before, or after, each Forum meeting. Many foreign policy issues in the South Pacific are often determined collectively through the South Pacific Forum. This includes a common South Pacific position on decolonisation in New Caledonia, French nuclear testing, a nuclear free zone treaty and other matters.

Strategic and economic interests appear to underpin the coherent Japanese policy announced in 1987. Before 1986, total Japanese ODA to Fiji and the South Pacific was less than 0.5% and 0.9% (for 1984 and 1985) respectively. However, as is shown later, by 1988 this had increased substantially (Japanese ODA, 1988 & 1989 Annual Report). Japan's Foreign Minister had told the region that "peace and stability in the South Pacific could not be obtained without adequate thought to global security considerations": a principle which "did not make the South Pacific an exception". By virtue of the fact that Japan had become the second largest aid donor to Fiji, it was clear that it was in a position to remind Fiji of the need to its continued commitment to a Western/ free market dominated world order. Japan's increased profile in the South Pacific also coincides with its increased global and particularly Asian profile.
Table 1  JAPANESE TOTAL ODA TO PACIFIC COUNTRIES, 1984 & 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>8.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon is</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>25.10</td>
<td>24.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% or Japanese bilateral ODA  0.5  0.9


**STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE ODA**

Japanese ODA comes under 3 broad categories; being Grant Aid Programme, Technical Cooperation Programme and Soft Loan Programme.
Bulk of assistance to Fiji and the South Pacific is currently under the Technical Cooperation Programme which then comes under the following sub-categories; expert assignment, acceptance of trainees, equipment supply related to technology transfer, development survey (feasibility studies etc.), volunteer assignments and youth invitations. Currently there are approximately 20 experts and 40 youth volunteers engaged in Fiji. The implementing agency for all new projects is JICA which has an establishment in Fiji’s capital Suva.

Assistance under the grant in aid scheme has become significant after 1984. However, as yet there is no assistance under the soft loan programme (where $10 million outlay would from a rough sense of lower minimum). A 3% interest with a 25 year repayment period and a grace period of 7 years forms a rough guideline for the soft loan programme.

Only Papua New Guinea in the region has executed projects under the soft loan scheme. These have included 49.9 million yen funding for an inter-island highway project in 1985 and a 92.72 million yen funding for a hydro-electric project in 1986 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990; 259).

The Technical Cooperation Programme in Fiji has developed strongly as a result of the massive loss of skilled manpower after the military coups in 1987. Slowdown in the economy after the May 1987 coup, coupled with the heightened insecurity mainly for Fiji Indians and the implementation of racist employment policies by the post-coup military regime triggered this massive outflow.

By the end of 1989, roughly 12% of all professional and technical staff, 25% of administrative and managerial staff and 12% of clerical staff of the 1986 totals in these categories had left, mainly for Australia and New Zealand. Within selected professions, this represented 60% of all doctors, 50% of accountants and 45% of the architects, engineers and related occupations (World Bank, 1990; 94–98). It is in this period that expert project
assignments and Volunteer attachments through the Japanese ODA increased substantially. In the case of expert assignments, it grew from less than 5 in 1986 to over 20 at any single time in 1989 or 1990. Japan's assistance in this regards had thus contributed significantly in helping buffer a critical skilled/professional manpower situation in the post-coup period. Critics of the post-coup regimes have criticised such efforts as helping "stabilise the military and the military backed regime's grip over Fiji's people". Such arguments further held that a sustained effort by the international community to isolate the Fijian military or military backed regimes in all ways possible in 1987, 1988 and 1989 would have forced the post-coup regimes to enter into negotiations with representative groups such as the deposed Government to find a "broadly acceptable solution" to Fiji's constitutional and political crisis.\(^{11}\)

Under the Grant Aid programme, the programme for fisherles and related development is very closely tied to Japanese interests. Under the scheme, financial assistance is extended to fisheries and related development projects but such assistance is closely tuned to the needs of fishing companies in the region.\(^{12}\)

Because the whole issue of fishing licences is getting increasingly controversial as concerns about driftnet fishing, overfishing, etc., intensify, Japanese ODA under this scheme may be increased significantly in the 1990s, but at the same time come under increasing scrutiny and criticism. Japan, incidentally was the last country to respect the ban on controversial "drift-net fishing" in South Pacific economic zones.

Most of Japan's assistance to Kiribati falls under this scheme. In 1984, Japan financed a 5.8 million yen project for Fishing and Ship Building in that country. In 1985, it supported a 9.39 million yen project for commercial Artisanal and rural Fisheries Development. In 1985, Japan financed a 5.41 million yen Fish Marketing Project in Tonga being the largest Japanese
project in that country so far (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990; 259-261). Table 2 below illustrates Japanese ODA for the period 1984 to 1988 for Fiji.

Since 1985 Japan has become the second largest aid donor to the country. Its total disbursement to Fiji increased from $3.44 million in 1984 to $8.15 million in 1985. In 1986 it increased to $10.98 million and was $9.07 million in 1988. Japan’s share of total ODA received by Fiji in 1987 is given in table below. Continuing work on many projects were suspended as a result of political upheavals of 1987. It is only after 1988 that the government’s administrative arms again began to look at medium/long term policies which resulted in the reactivation of suspended projects and programmes, and hence the restoration or aid to their former levels.

**TABLE 2 JAPAN’S ODA TO FIJI 1984 — 1988**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LOAN AID</th>
<th>COOPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GRANT AID</td>
<td>TECHNICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(HUNDRED MILLION YEN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11.95</td>
<td>7.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>6.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>6.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>5.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source : Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990 ; 259)

In 1987, Fiji received $US 32.08 million in bilateral aid and $US 10.34 million in multilateral aid. Japan contributed just less than a third of all bilateral aid in the year.

From discussions with trade officials with Japanese Embassy in Suva, it appears that several aid projects under the soft loan programme may come on line in the next few years, and this may result in Japan surpassing and
Australia as Fiji’s largest aid donor. This would be a comfortable position for Fiji’s current Government, as Australian aid to Fiji is much more carefully scrutinised. Some part of the scrutiny is a result of pressures by domestic Australian lobbies to ensure that aid to Fiji is carefully controlled. With Japan there is no such scrutiny or domestic pressures currently, thus creating a comfortable negotiating position for the recipient country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>Others ($US million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td>10.34</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>20.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990; 257.)

**NON-GOVERNMENTAL ODA**

Concern has been raised in Fiji and South Pacific generally about the growing links of Japan’s world famous Sasakawa Foundation with South Pacific. The Sasakawa foundation has given $1 million (Fijian) assistance to help set up a post-graduate social science programme at the University of the South Pacific (USP). Given the controversial history of the founder of this programme, some concern was raised about accepting this package by many academics at USP. The Sasakawa Foundation has also set up a $12 million regional assistance programme for disaster relief. In a highly irregular manner, 3 regional leaders, including Fiji’s current Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara were to personally manage and administer this fund. However, the South Pacific Forum has now become involved in the administration of the fund. The same Foundation had given a $50,000 award to Fiji’s current Prime Minister, who was defeated in the last elections in 1987 for his involvement with disaster relief. This was awarded to him only
several days after the initial military coup of 1987 which eventually restored him to power (*Fiji Times*, 20/4/87), and has come under criticism from some quarters.

In 1988, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation hosted a meeting of South Pacific leaders in Tokyo. This high profile meeting was widely interpreted as having the official support and endorsement of the Japanese Government. The August 1988 meeting helped develop a South Pacific axis between the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, former foreign minister of Japan and then member of house of representative and senior South Pacific leaders including Fiji’s Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamiose Mara and the Foreign Minister of Papua New Guinea, Michael Somare. High level official Japanese involvement to the forum was expressed by the fact that Japan’s Prime Minister gave the opening address (which was delivered by Keizou Obushi; the Chief Cabinet Secretary). The focus of this convention was on establishing “relationships between the South Pacific states and Japan and an examination of the requests for Japan’s future cooperation with these states”. Conventionally such matters fall within the ambit of multilateral discussions that could have included an official delegation from the Forum Secretariat and Foreign Ministry and officials from Japan. It looked highly improper that such important multilateral matters, which among other things, would mean commitments for the government of Japan was left to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation to organise.

This view is further strengthened by the case of assistance to the University of the South Pacific. Initial meetings between Sasakawa Foundation representatives and USP officials were also attended, for example, by JICA officials which is a government agency.

The increased involvement of Sasakawa Foundation established through personal contacts with selected individual leaders of the South Pacific has come at a time when Japan’s ODA to the region has also increased.
substantially. This correlation has drawn some skepticism. What appears more disturbing is the nexus between the Japanese state and a private organisation with a somewhat dubious history, in organising and arranging high level relations with Fiji and the South Pacific generally.

AID, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL AGENDA

There is an almost insignificant flow of “organisation to organisation” aid or direct aid between Japan and Fiji. With the exception of a cooperation programme between the Fiji Trades Union Congress and the Japanese Institute of Labour and OISCA and government youth agencies, there would be few other ongoing cooperation programmes. It is in this way that Fiji’s aid relations with Japan is very different from its aid relations with countries such as Australia and New Zealand. There has been a marked shift from bilateral (Government to government) aid programmes to direct aid programmes after 1987.

Cooperation between NGO’s in Fiji and their counterparts in Australia and New Zealand has increased, as has the access of NGO’s and local organisations to the direct aid donor agencies of these two countries.

There are two specific problems with Government to government aid schemes in Fiji currently. The first has to do with accountability. In the absence of parliamentary democracy, or elections even at local levels, the post-coup regimes’ have been able to articulate and implement aid supported programmes without public discussion or scrutiny. Opposition political parties and trade unions have regularly voiced concern that many aid programmes are being siphoned off to low priority sectors. Many organisations have also levelled the criticism that the Fiji Indian community gets a disproportionately small proportion of assistance through aid programmes because of racialist developmental policies adopted by the post-coup regimes.\textsuperscript{14}
Similarly, many local NGO's have been marginalised from Government planning because of their opposition to the events of 1987. Such organisations continue to feature lowly in aid schemes administered or organised by the Government.

In situations such as this, an increase in direct aid programmes would be an appropriate response on the part of donor countries and agencies. While Australia and New Zealand have/ or are in the process of increasing their direct aid programmes, Japan has failed to respond similarly as yet. As a result its existing aid programmes will continue to be looked at with suspicion as long as they are administered solely by the state.

Generally then, because of the lack of either scrutiny or direct involvement of local organisations or representative groups, Japan's aid to Fiji will continue to be directed by the Fijian government. The current government has publically proclaimed many controversial policies for economic development without consultation with representative groups in the country. Thus Japan's aid could potentially be used to perpetuate the current system of government and further the racialist economic development designs set in place since May 1987. It is equally sinister that there have been no contacts between Japan's foreign ministry and Government leaders, and opposition political parties and community organisations in Fiji so that domestic concerns could at least be heard by those responsible for making decisions about Japan's policies towards Fiji. Such has not been the case with Australia, New Zealand, United States and United Kingdom; Fiji's other traditional donor countries.

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Notes

1 Fiji’s population in March 1991 was estimated at 736000 of which 360100 (49.9%) were Melanesian Fijians and 338000 (46.2%) were Fiji Indians. The other 5% were made up of Europeans, Part-Europeans, Chinese, Pacific Islanders and others.

At the time of the 1986 Census, the racial composition was as follows; Melanesian Fijians 46%, Fiji Indians 48.7%, other races 5.3%. Fiji Indian population has declined significantly since 1987, because of the much higher rate of migration. The coups of 1987 carried out by an almost exclusive Melanesian Fijian military restored an almost exclusive Melanesian Fijian Government to power. (*Current Economic Statistics*, Jan 1990: 3, and *Fiji Times*; 10/5/90;3).

2 Between 1879 and 1917, when the “inhuman and degrading” “indenture system of labour” was finally abolished, over 60,000 people were recruited from colonial India for work in Fiji. While roughly 40% of indentured labourers returned after the end of their indenture, the majority stayed back and made Fiji their home. The majority of Indians continue to work the sugar fields.
3 Neither the Melanesian Fijian, nor the Fiji Indians are 'pure' ethnic groups in an anthropological context. But we use the term to denote popular usage and wide acceptance of the concept in Fiji.

4 The Great Council of Chiefs is an institution initially created by the Colonial State with the intention of administering indigenous affairs concerning land, education, employment and governmental administration generally. In post independence period this administrative system has been retained and expanded. At the helm of this separate administration system – sits the Great Council of chiefs. The Ministry for Fijian Affairs, which is one of the largest Government Ministry’s is the administrative arm of the Great Council of Chiefs (the Boselevu Vakaturaga).

5 A comparative discussion of Fiji and Malaysia can be found in Milne (1984), Politics in Ethnically Bi Polar States, UBC Press.

6 The 'South Pacific Forum' has been responsible for numerous multilateral development programmes in the last 15 years. It has been responsible for drawing up initiatives for utilization of marine resources through regional fisheries and marine exploitation programmes. It has coordinated tertiary education needs and programmes through the regional University of the South Pacific. The SPF had also worked out the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Growing importance of the regional ties means that the SPF has attracted extensive international attention. U.K., France, USA, Japan and China have become dialogue partners for the SPF, and the countries increasingly attempt to work through to SPF. Very similar to the Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the SPF spearheaded the Ban on driftnet fishing in the South Pacific. While Japan and Taiwan refused to sign the treaty, Japan has now indicated that it will cease operations after the end of 1991 fishing season.

7 This was announced by the Japanese Foreign Minister in a visit to Fiji in January 1987.

8 Most of the material here is drawn from personal interviews with Japanese Embassy (Suva) ODA representatives.

9 From discussions with Japanese ODA personnel, there seems to be some willingness to encourage the soft loan programme in Fiji. However, Fiji Government has been slow in submitting proposals for larger projects. A turnaround time of roughly 2 years adds to the problem of articulating
programmes, particularly given the “interim nature” of Fiji’s government.
10 For a discussion of employment policies in the post-coup see Prasad S (eds.), 1989. The Fiji Labour Party and the National Federation parties have repeatedly described as racist, employment policies adopted by the post-coup regimes. Continued high levels of migration of particularly skilled and professional Fiji Indian workforce has been blamed upon the post-coup employment policies (see for example Chand G., keynote address to Fiji Sugar Milling and Staff Association Annual General Meeting, partly reported in Fiji Times 29/4/91;2 and Fiji Post, 29/4/91;3).
11 From discussion with Krishna Datt, Foreign Minister in the deposed Fiji Labour/National Federation Coalition Government. According to Datt such views were presented to Government’s of Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom and visiting foreign office delegations from United States and several other countries.
12 From discussions with Japanese ODA officials, Suva, October, 1990.
13 Japan’s delegation to the Program for Pacific Islands Nations Conference was made up of Tadashi Kuranari (seen as the architect of Japan’s South Pacific doctrine, Ryoichi Sasakawa (Honorary Chairman of Sasakawa Peace Foundation), Setsuya Tabuchi (Chairman of Sasakawa Peace Foundation), Saburo Kawai (President of Sasakawa Peace Foundation), Yohei Sasakawa (trustee of Sasakawa Peace Foundation).

The South Pacific Delegation was comprised of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (Prime Minister of Fiji, Jeremia Tabai (President of Kiribati), John Haglegam (President of the Federated States of Micronesia), Michael Somare (Foreign Minister of Papua New Guinea), Crown Prince Tupouto’a (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Tonga), Tomasi Puapua (Prime Minister of Tuvalu), Sethy John Regenvanu (Minister for Education), Youth and Sports (Vanuatu), Tuilaepa Sailele (Minister for Finance), Pupuke Ropati (Prime Minister, Cook Islands). The presence of such a high powered South Pacific delegation in any foreign country at any one time at the invitation of a non-government agency is obviously unprecedented.

14 Organisations such has the Fiji Labour Party, the Fiji Trades Union Congress, the Young Womens Christian Association, and others, have made representations to officials from Australia and New Zealand about the biased
use and allocation of aid funds. More recently, the Fiji Youth and Students League and the Group Against Racial Discrimination have highlighted the racially biased allocation of aid funds. Foreign Office and Aid officials, at least in these two countries are aware of the local sensitivities about aid.
Prospects for Demilitarization and Autonomy
and the Role of Japan
Security Issues of the Pacific Island States

Ronni ALEXANDER

INTRODUCTION

The history of security in the Pacific Islands, and to a great degree the history of the islands themselves, is a discourse on the meaning of being on the receiving end of someone else's security. That discourse has taken two distinct forms. On the one hand, ever since the Europeans became aware of the existence of the islands and decided that the resources and peoples of the Pacific were there for the taking, there has been a trend toward the usurpation of natural resources, especially land, but also sandalwood, phosphates, gold, copra, whales, and people. At the same time, there has been a trend toward what is today known as 'strategic denial', the retention of control over islands not so much for what they have to offer per se, but rather to prevent anyone else from getting ahold of them.

The usurpation of lands in the Pacific is relevant to the question of security in that land is of tremendous importance to indigenous peoples in ways which are difficult for European cultures to comprehend. The indigenous peoples do not own land, they are the caretakers; those living on
the land today have the responsibility to care for it and maintain its resources for future generations. In a sense, the indigenous peoples have been engaging in ‘sustainable development’ for centuries. In such a society, the security of the land is an integral part of the security of the people.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss security issues as they pertain to the peoples of the Pacific Island states. In this context, it is necessary to ask two questions—who is to be the object of security, and what is to be its purpose? These questions will be addressed first through a discussion of the meaning of security in its endogenous and exogenous forms. This will be followed by a look at security in the region in its most exogenous and militaristic form—nuclearism—and then attempt to outline a different approach—endogenous security—which addresses security concerns from the perspective of the people of the region, as opposed to the outside powers.

SOME FACTORS AFFECTING THE MEANING OF SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

The history of colonization and the struggle for independence are beyond the scope of the present paper, although the events which took place during both of these periods of island history are of crucial importance to our understanding of security in the modern context. In particular, it is important to understand the significance of the loss of lands to the indigenous peoples. It is therefore appropriate at this point to refresh the reader’s memory as to a few of the more blatant instances of European usurpation of indigenous lands in the Pacific. The Maori of Aotearoa / New Zealand at one time were the caretakers of 66 million acres of land; today they have lost all but the last 3 million. Colonization also meant the loss of lands in the smaller islands. For example, the Kanaks of New Caledonia and the Maohi people of Tahiti lost ownership of all their lands to the French, the Hawaiians lost most of theirs to the Americans, the Fijians lost the best
parts of theirs to the British, and the Australian Kooris (Aborigines) were deprived of everything, including in many instances their right to exist. Some of the peoples who lost their lands were able to regain control of them with independence, while others, like the Maori, continue to struggle for sovereignty within the framework of the Western nation-state. Still others, the peoples of the colonies, have yet to attain independence. Whatever the political status, however, the impact of foreign rule on the land distribution and caretaking system has been tremendous; every island country in the South Pacific is confronted with serious land disputes, made worse by the introduction of private ownership.

A second historical factor which bears mention is the role played by the Pacific Islands in the world-system as a whole. The consolidation of European control and ownership in the Pacific Islands during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries allowed for the exploitation of resources, but it also allowed for something else—it made the ocean accessible and provided a place beyond the borders of the world known to the Europeans in which to dispose of their unwanted social burdens—prisoners, exiles, ill and diseased persons, and maybe even overly zealous missionaries. The islands were useful for their resources, limited though they may have been, but in a broader sense they were important because they were there, tiny specks on a sea which covers a third of the globe.

Before the Europeans were even fully aware of the extent of the Pacific, the Latin American colonies were beginning to be incorporated into the world-system. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the colonies in Asia and Africa began to follow suit. The colonies provided essential primary products, and gradually became part of the global division of labor, although pockets of self-sufficiency remained. These colonies, the now independent countries of Asia and Africa, are generally viewed as being on the periphery of the world-system, contributing the resources for the manufacturing which takes
place in the industrialized world.

It was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that Captain Cook made his voyages through the Pacific, charting many islands previously unknown to, or forgotten by, the Europeans and opening the way for colonization. Thus, not only did the incorporation of the Pacific Islands occur later than that of other territories, but the process and objectives were different. As will become clear below, more than providing resources as such, these islands provided, and continue to provide, access to those resources, and to the ocean itself. Further, the incorporation of the Pacific Islands into the world-system occurred in cycles which were largely political in nature and were determined by the needs and interests of the European powers. While the procurement of natural resources such as sandalwood was significant, the main importance of the Pacific Islands was essentially military and political in nature. The supplies available on these islands enabled the ships of the Europeans to sail the great distances of the Pacific, and as the reasons for traversing the ocean changed, so did the use of the islands.

In light of this difference in the process and result of incorporation into the world-system, it is deemed appropriate to view the small islands of the Pacific region as being part of the outer periphery, as distinct from the rest of the more traditional periphery called in the terminology of this paper the inner periphery. This is significant for two reasons. One is that while the Pacific Islands may be very small in land area, they control vast sea areas, the implications of which have yet to made completely clear. The other is due to the tendency in recent years to view the Asia-Pacific region as a political, economic and strategic whole, although often that whole refers not to the islands of the Pacific Basin but rather to the larger powers of the Pacific Rim. It is proposed that there are significant differences between the island states of the Pacific and the archipelagoes of southeast Asia, and that
these differences must be taken into account when discussing security issues in the region.

The final factor which bears mention by way of introduction is a description of the Pacific region as it appears today. The region contains about 10,000 islands having a total land area of 550,000 km² and a total population of approximately 5 million. These islands are divided into twenty-five states and territories, and there are many variations of political independence and dependence, with the French colonies of New Caledonia,

### TABLE I. POPULATION AND LAND AND SEA AREA OF COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISION AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>POPULATION (mid—1978)</th>
<th>LAND AREA (km²)</th>
<th>SEA AREA (km²)</th>
<th>SEA AREA/ LAND AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>1,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1,830,000</td>
<td>7,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>607,000</td>
<td>18,272</td>
<td>1,290,000</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>141,000</td>
<td>3,265</td>
<td>5,030,000</td>
<td>1,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>Included in TTPI</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>3,550,000</td>
<td>5,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>15,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>19,103</td>
<td>1,740,000</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hebrides (Vanuatu)</td>
<td>101,500</td>
<td>11,880</td>
<td>680,000</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>1,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk Island</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>11,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>2,990,000</td>
<td>462,243</td>
<td>3,120,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitcairn Island</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>214,000</td>
<td>28,530</td>
<td>1,340,000</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokelau</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>1,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI)</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>6,200,000</td>
<td>3,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>34,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis and Futuna</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>153,000</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,798,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>551,033</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,390,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>(AVE) 33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Includes 200 nautical mile EEZs

**Source:** Sevele and Bollard (1979)
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, and the American dependencies such as American Samoa and Guam at one extreme and independent states such as Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands at the other. The total area claimed by the island states as part of their 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) is about 30,000,000 km² in an ocean with an area of 165,000,000 km² (see Table 1). While the islands comprise a mere fraction of the world's land area, they have jurisdiction over almost one-fifth of the world's largest ocean—jurisdiction which includes control of marine spaces, pelagic and marine resources, and also the mineral resources of the seabed.

Surrounding the Pacific Island states are the countries of the Pacific Rim. Three of these, the United States, Soviet Union, and China, are nuclear powers. A fourth, France, maintains a presence in the region through its colonies. To the east are the industrialized countries of north and south America; to the west are the dynamic Asian economies (otherwise known as the newly industrializing economies—NIEs) of south Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as the economic giant, Japan. In the south lie the two traditional regional powers: Australia and New Zealand. Since the late seventies, the political, business and intellectual leaders of the countries of the Pacific rim have been meeting regularly in such fora as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) in an attempt to create a more dynamic future for the region. It is interesting to note, however, that their efforts rarely give more than passing attention to the Pacific Island Countries, except to note the strategic significance of their ocean resources, primarily fisheries and seabed minerals. Perhaps the most telling example is the newly-established PECC Pacific Islands Task Force, which is coordinated by Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) with co-coordination by the United States, and which has no Pacific Island leadership. Even for the countries of the Pacific Rim, the Pacific Islands are truly the outer periphery.
ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS SECURITY

Most definitions of security, particularly those created since the beginning of the Cold War, have centered on the idea of military strength as the basic element of security. Militarily weak countries are seen as being unable to protect their borders and thus as being vulnerable, and vulnerability is equated with insecurity.

Most Pacific Island countries do not have much in the way of military strength. Some countries have no military forces at all, others have police forces which double as military forces. For a country like Kiribati with a vast EEZ, the cost of fuel for a patrol boat belies the meaning of patrolling in the first place. These countries are thus militarily vulnerable—but only if there is in fact a military threat which can be effectively dealt with through military force.

The Pacific region is comprised of small islands, many of which were turned into battlefields during World War II. That experience is sufficient to suggest what happens to small islands engaged in large wars—they get destroyed. There is probably little reason for Pacific Islands to engage in armed conflict with each other, although the Bougainville crisis, continuing violence in Papua New Guinea and the coups in Fiji indicate the potential for internal conflict in the countries of the region. If the Island states were to be involved in armed conflict with one of the other regional or metropolitan powers, they would stand little chance of surviving. Armed conflict does not really make sense in the Pacific Islands, nor do armies, except to the extent to which they function as defensive defence or perhaps double as police forces. This is particularly true because, despite a great deal of media coverage to the contrary, there is no serious military threat in the region.³

If security in the Pacific is not a military question, how can it be defined and interpreted? One solution is to look at security in terms of insecurity; to define security as the reduction of those elements which threaten the citizens
of a given country or make them feel insecure. People feel secure when they have control over their lives and environments. Accordingly, they become insecure when they feel unable to control these things. The same can be said for states, for while interdependence has reduced overall self-sufficiency, a country's ability to control its political, economic and strategic environment affects its overall sense of well being.

Generally, states are said to be powerful when they are able to control and manipulate their environment, and this power is intrinsically related to military strength. The underlying logic of military security is to reduce threat through deterrence. A state attempts to discourage a potential aggressor from attacking by being prepared to repel the most fierce of attacks with something equally fearsome, or worse. This is essentially a process of reducing one's vulnerability by reducing the threat, in other words, reducing the likelihood that one's enemy will attack.

Small island states have limited resources at their disposal with which to deal with threats and crises once they occur. They are thus vulnerable, but are ill prepared to lessen their vulnerability by reducing the outside threat. One interpretation of this state of affairs is to say that this makes them still more vulnerable; another is to say that it requires them to find a different, and more appropriate, set of rules.

As has already been suggested, for island micro-states, military defence does not work because the counter attack is likely to destroy that which it is designed to protect. For this reason, small and micro-states can not reasonably expect to respond to outside military threats with a similar military threat of their own. Moreover, it may often be impossible for these states to respond to other varieties of threats in kind, or even to make any substantial reduction of outside threats at all. Thus, if micro-states wish to enhance their security, they must find an alternative to reducing outside threats. One way would be to join in alliance with a larger power; another
would be to attempt to reduce not the outside threat but their own vulnerability. The former method involves guaranteeing security from without, a process which can be seen as being 'exogenous security'. The latter solution calls for developing security from within, and is the point of departure for what is termed 'endogenous security', an approach to security which is specific to each situation and which therefore examines security from the perspective of the state in question, rather than from that of the rules of power politics.

In thinking about endogenous security, or any security at all, it is necessary first to clarify some of the basic assumptions made about the way security works. For the purposes of this discussion, security policy is seen as being implemented through a relationship between actors, generally the state, and beneficiaries, generally the people. In some instances, such as in a relationship of associated statehood or free association, the actor responsible for implementing security policy is not the state but a third party. This is the case in a number of Pacific Islands. The third party may take the needs of the beneficiaries into account, but it is likely to give precedence to its own needs and to those of its own beneficiaries. Such a security relationship, because it comes from outside and addresses primarily outside needs, would be exogenous in nature, and would tend to give control over an island's environment to a third party, rather than contributing to the control of the inhabitants. Conversely, security which originates from within and focuses on the needs of the inhabitants can be termed 'endogenous.'

Security can be conceptualized as a continuum with one end being completely endogenous and the other completely exogenous. Most security policy falls somewhere in between, and has some elements which are relatively endogenous in nature and others which are relatively exogenous. If we view endogenous security as something which gives people (beneficiaries) more control over their lives and environments, then we can say
that security is endogenous to the extent that there is concordance between the actors (those creating and implementing security policy) and beneficiaries (those that are to be made more secure by the policy). Similarly, security is exogenous to the extent that concordance is lacking between the beneficiaries and actors. A good example of purely exogenous security in the Pacific would be the conducting of nuclear tests. The security of the islands in which nuclear tests have been, and continue to be, performed is supposedly guaranteed under the nuclear umbrella of the country performing the tests, and it is argued that nuclear tests are essential for the maintenance of a nuclear arsenal, and therefore essential for the maintenance of security. That may well be true for the country conducting the tests, but clearly the security needs of the island on which the tests are held do not include nuclear tests. Incidentally, the most recent variation on this theme is the US decision to use Johnston Island for the destruction of its chemical weapons. The Pacific peoples are pleased that progress is being made in disarmament, but they would prefer that the details be attended to elsewhere—like the US mainland, for instance.

In the Pacific today, there is a strong tendency toward exogenous military security which is affected, both directly and indirectly, by the external and large regional powers, and which is grounded in the logic of military security and power politics. Careful examination of island societies, however, raises the question of whether that kind of security is really secure.

EXOGENOUS SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Security in the Pacific has, since the advent of nuclear weapons, been linked with nuclearism in all its forms. The Pacific is the only region in the world to have provided all five of the nuclear powers with sites and facilities for the testing of nuclear weapons, missiles and/or delivery systems. First on the scene was the United States, who established a base on Tinian Island
at the end of World War II. That base enabled the US to drop the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then, before the final details of the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands were even worked out, the United States began nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands at Bikini Atoll and later Enewetak Atoll. Today, one of the most important US military facilities in the world is located at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This facility is used for testing missiles, communication, tracking and delivery systems, such as those used in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The British tested weapons in Australia and showed little concern at the time, or later, for the safety of the Koorie people living in the area. They also conducted tests at Christmas Island, before shifting their testing program to the US mainland. The French have been testing at Moruroa Atoll since the mid-sixties, despite international opposition and clear evidence that radiation from the tests and waste disposal is leaking into the sea. The French have claimed for years that there are no detrimental effects from the tests, but the evidence indicates otherwise. Moreover, the French presence in the Pacific is not merely military. There is a close connection between military and colonial policy, and the French nuclear deterrent "expresses and enshrines the French quest for power, status and modernity, in which nuclear technology and a Pacific presence perform an important instrumental and symbolic function".

China and the Soviet Union have also used the Pacific for missile testing. In addition, there has been an undeniable expansion in the Soviet fleet in recent years. As of 1989, the Soviet fleet was comprised of 75 major surface combat ships and two aircraft carriers, 80 attack submarines and 30 strategic missile submarines. According to the US, the Soviet ships and submarines in the Western Pacific already carry cruise missiles. There are some 50 Soviet divisions deployed in the Soviet Far East, Siberia and Central Asia, as well as 35–40% of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The increasing Soviet presence and military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam have provided the impetus for warnings of a Soviet threat in the Pacific, which has in turn been used to justify the American naval build-up in the region. The Soviet response to these accusations has been to claim that the build-up is necessary for national defence in the event of war, as well as for containing a rearming Japan, and for protecting Soviet shipping through the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Whatever the truth of these arguments may be, it is also useful to remember that in the words of former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange, “Cam Ranh Bay is closer to Rome, Italy than it is to New Zealand”.

The Soviet build up, significant as it may be, is no match for the US in the Pacific. The US has deployed its 3rd and 7th Fleets in the region. These are composed of 87 warships, 6 carriers, 44 attack submarines and 10 strategic missile submarines. In addition, the deployment of a new generation of cruise missiles, the Tomahawk, carrying a 200 kiloton warhead with nine times the destructive capability of the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, is indicative of the intensity of the nuclear arms race in the Pacific.

The external security arrangements in the Pacific include the United States, Japan, Australia, and France. Unlike the United States and France, China and Japan have no foreign bases in the region, and the only Soviet Base is in Vietnam. The only major power with substantial military bases and facilities in the Pacific is the United States, which has major installations on two Pacific islands—Hawaii and Guam, subsidiary installations on a number of islands in the north Pacific and important bases in Japan, Australia and the Philippines.

In sharp contrast to Europe, where the thawing of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States has paved the way for real reductions in weapons and changes in the military structure, the Pacific region remains
highly nuclear and highly militarized. While some steps have been taken on both sides to reduce troop deployments and scale down military facilities, as of yet there have been no real structural changes. In fact, Japan, Australia and New Zealand have all increased their military expenditures, the overall volume of arms transfers is increasing, and the repression of democratic movements is increasing both within the region and around the Rim.

In spite of the jubilant announcements that peace has finally come, the Pacific Island states are experiencing the increasing militarization of their relationships with the large external and regional powers. Militarization is defined as “the process whereby military values, ideology and patterns of behaviour achieve a dominating influence on the political, social economic and external life of the state and as a consequence, the structural, ideological and behavioural patterns of both society and government are ‘militarized’.”

This can be seen in external relations, such as the US reaction to New Zealand’s nuclear-free stance or the rapidity with which France approached Fiji with promises of aid and plans for a naval facility after other countries pulled out in response to the coups.

Militarization is not a phenomenon limited to external relations. In the past few years, there has been increasing internal unrest which has been accompanied by physical violence and military control. The coups in Fiji are clearly one example, but there are many more—violence and shootings in Belau and New Caledonia and war in Bougainville, just to name a few. These events have caused the external and regional powers to take another look at their involvement in the region, and are resulting in increasing linkage between political and/or strategic activities and concerns and economic assistance. Internally, military strength is being used to reinforce unjust class and racial structures, pitting races and tribes against each other and exacerbating tribal, religious, cultural and ethnic differences. Military exercises, military facilities, training, testing, and other military activities
are the physical evidence of militarism in the region. This militarism has been created with the express purpose of enhancing the security of the region, but in fact the reverse has happened. Militarism has spread throughout the Pacific, but “it has not resulted in increased security for the region for it has engendered a greater sense of insecurity evident in growing militarization of Pacific societies.”

Military security, particularly nuclear security, has produced a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby the presence of military hardware and personnel has created a situation which lends itself to military solutions. As the nuclear arms race winds down, and the United States begins to pay more attention to its role as the region’s self-appointed police force, rather than decreasing, the level of violence is likely to increase still further, as militarization has set the stage for low intensity conflict in many of the islands.

ENDOGENOUS SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

The above has demonstrated that exogenous military security does not seem to be the solution for enhancing security in the Pacific Islands, although it may serve the purposes of the external powers. It is therefore necessary to consider alternative forms of security. Endogenous security is one such approach.

Endogenous security is by definition specific to the situation and conditions of each country, and as such, policy which is endogenous in one country may not be so in another. There are, however, some general areas of convergence for endogenous security in the Pacific. It has been suggested that indigenous peoples view themselves as the caretakers of the land, and that they have, through a complex system of taboos and religious rites, managed to guarantee both that resources are not consumed beyond their ability to be replaced, and that population does not exceed the ability of the environment to sustain it. The earth is sacred, the Mother of all things, and
it is not possible to separate the security of the earth from the security of its caretakers.

Western society has taken a different approach to the environment, treating nature not as something to be cared for, but rather as something which must be conquered, overcome and tamed. The earth and its resources were believed to be without limit, and ownership was possible for those who dared. Gradually Western society has come to understand that in fact the earth's resources are not unlimited, and that all people have a responsibility to protect what is left of our common heritage. The idea of the environmental heritage is thus defined in Western terms as ownership by everyone, whereas in indigenous culture which has no concept of ownership, it means that which has been passed on to us to care for by our ancestors, and that which we will eventually pass on to our children and grandchildren.

These views differ in their approach to environmental sovereignty—the assumption that a people have the right to complete control over their environment—but overlap in the recognition that control and protection of the environment are essential elements of security. There is still a strong tendency in Western society to believe in technological solutions to every problem, including environmental destruction, but there is much that can be learned from the 'caretaker' approach to the environment as today, environmental problems exceed our ability to solve them. Problems such as acid rain, oil spills, and global warming are indicative of not only the size of the problem, but also the fact that the disasters and 'mistakes' of one country can often not be kept within its borders. Perhaps the most dramatic example of our time was the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, which spread radiation around the world. The small islands of the Pacific have limited land resources and almost all of the land capable of cultivation is currently being used. There is no place to run, no place to start over in the face of environmental destruction. Moreover, while more and more people
are switching to canned tuna (a tendency of at best questionable value), the people are still dependent on the ocean for their food, their livelihood, and their very survival.

One Fijian scholar who has been involved in the alternative security debate for many years, Suliana Siwatibau, has suggested that for Pacific Island peoples, there are three groups of "major security issues: issues of political independence, issues of economic development with social well-being, and issues of cultural integrity, resource conservation and environmental sustainability." Linking these issues with security is a departure from military security, and because they are issues of fundamental concern to the people in each individual island society, they can be said to be examples of endogenous security. These three groups have been proposed as an alternative to militarization in an effort to reduce the insecurity of the region.

The first group of issues pertains to political independence. In the Pacific, there are still a number of territories which are not independent and which have not been allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. The first step to security for these people is the freedom to determine their own future. Without the freedom to determine their own identity in not only cultural terms, but also politically, economically and socially, a people can not be said to be secure. Unfortunately, the metropolitan powers with the responsibility to provide for the exercise of true self-determination are more interested in promoting their own strategic and political objectives, and as a result, the peoples of territories such as New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Belau remain under foreign rule.

The reluctance of the metropolitan powers to allow true self-determination in their territories is a function of the fact that for those powers, security is fundamentally linked to the maintenance of stability in the world-system. From the perspective of the external powers, self-
determination and independence are a threat to stability. For the Island countries, however, while the difficulties of adjustment to independence may bring about a period of relative instability, the problems created are outweighed by the importance of the act of self-determination itself. Moreover, it is possible that a people could opt for an exogenous security arrangement as a result of a free act of self-determination. Even if the resulting security policy was of a completely exogenous military nature, the fact that it was chosen by a people rather than for them would make it a relatively more secure policy for those people.

The issues of economic development and social well being are perhaps the most important issues pertaining to security in the region today. Most of the Pacific Islands have achieved political independence, but most are also heavily dependent on foreign aid. As long as the countries of the region are dependent on external powers for the meeting of their basic needs, they can never be truly independent, for they are vulnerable to conflicting external influences as well as to overt political manipulation. Island countries behave in accordance with the wishes of the donor nations in the hope of getting more aid, and donor countries use aid as a way of buying friends and promoting their interests in the region. A good example of this is Japan, who prior to meeting with strong opposition to its plan for dumping low-level nuclear waste in the northwest Pacific gave almost no aid to the region.

Today, with the pressure on to stop driftnet fishing and increasing anti-Japanese sentiment in the region, Japan has increased its official development assistance (ODA) to the Pacific Islands to 1% of its total ODA budget – a relatively small sum for Japan, but with massive implications for the Pacific islands.\textsuperscript{13} The increases are making a difference, as for example in the case of Fiji, which is becoming less and less vocal on the driftnet issue.\textsuperscript{14}

Self-reliance is thus desirable, but in reality difficult for many countries.
The task is relatively easier for the Melanesian states—PNG, Solomons, Fiji, and Vanuatu—because they are composed of large volcanic islands which are rich in natural resources, have relatively large populations, and good soil. The Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa and Tonga have good soil, but limited natural resources. These countries are already heavily dependent on aid, imports greatly exceed exports and economic self-reliance would probably be possible but would certainly be very difficult. The small island states such as the Marshalls, Kiribati, Cooks, Niue, Tuvalu and Nauru, the real outer periphery, are heavily dependent on aid, and their imports are five times their exports. For these countries, self-reliance as modern states is highly unlikely.¹⁵

There is one element which has not yet been worked into the above equation and which could make a difference—the importance of marine and seabed resources and maritime space. This is where the 30,000,000 km² of ocean come into play. The islands, acting independently or in unison, have control over an immense area of very valuable resources. The day is not far off when the presence of cobalt-rich manganese nodules in the seabed will be of exploitable strategic value. Fisheries and fishing rights are bringing in more and more revenue including badly needed foreign exchange. Furthermore, the judicious manipulation of control over maritime spaces can do a lot to further the position of states with little land area but vast EEZs such as Kiribati.¹⁶ With the wealth of the ocean in their control, it is essential to the security of the Pacific Island states that the marine environment and its living resources be protected. Moreover, it is crucial that the wealth of the sea not be taken from the Island states by overly eager external and regional powers who move in before regional and local protective measures are fully in place. The protection of the marine environment is thus one form of endogenous security.

The final group of issues is those of cultural integrity, resource
conservation and environmental sustainability. As has already been suggested, Pacific cultures share a very strong tie to the land and the natural environment. This aspect of Pacific culture has been ignored for too long in favor of the elusive goal of ‘development’ and ‘modernization’.

One result of environmental abuse around the world is the phenomenon known as the greenhouse effect. It is now believed that a 2°C rise in average temperature and a four meter rise in sea level would result in severe or even catastrophic damage to many peoples, countries and communities, as well as agricultural and social systems. Tokelau, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Line Islands and Kiribati would cease to exist, and the economic zones of many island countries would have to be redrawn, as many outlying islands would disappear.

The above changes in temperature and sea level would also have a devastating effect on the world’s cultural heritage. While the entire Pacific region has a population of only 5 million people, it contains a rich cultural heritage, including one-third of the world’s known languages in Melanesia alone. The inevitable changes in agricultural and water systems would lead to massive migrations of refugees to places with more water and resources. This would in turn put pressure on those islands not as affected by global warming itself, and again result in environmental degradation, bringing about a recurring cycle of refugees and environmental destruction.17

The above problems are an indication of the kinds of issues which are truly affecting the security of the Pacific Island states today. These are threats of political, economic, cultural and social disruption brought on by the increasing militarization of the region and its societies. They are also threats created by dependence on foreign sources of economic assistance and by disregard for environmental and cultural integrity.

In the 1960’s and 1970’s, there were two concerns of overriding importance in the Pacific region. One was political and economic independence, and the
other was nuclear testing and nuclearism in general. The coming into force of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, as well as the easing of tensions and general decline of support world-wide for nuclear issues has made the nuclear issue seem less important in the Pacific in recent years. Yet in fact, the French continue testing at Moruroa, the people of Belau continue to be bullied by the United States for their nuclear-free constitution, the struggle of the people of New Caledonia and French Polynesia goes on unabated—nuclearism is still alive and thriving in the Pacific and as long as it is, the people of the region will fight in opposition to it.

For the decades of the sixties and seventies, the struggle for a nuclear-free Pacific became a unifying force for the region. It provided a slogan and platform which was able to unite the many different cultural entities in the region and served in a sense as a kind of nuclear-free nationalism. At the base of this nuclear-free nationalism was the threat not of nuclear destruction through nuclear war, but of destruction through nuclear peace. It was a type of nationalism unique to the Pacific region, and it took an endogenous approach to the question of security, both regional and local. Today, as the different island states become caught up in the militarization of the region, it has become more difficult to achieve a consensus about the role of military security in the Pacific. As a result, there has been an exogenization of security in many island states. As states on the outer periphery grow more and more incorporated into the world-economy and begin to move inward toward the inner periphery, it becomes increasingly difficult to adopt an independent security policy. Such states tend to develop more vested interests with the external powers, and become less willing to take risks. In spite of this, however, all of the states in the region are still unanimous in their opposition to France's nuclear tests.

It is interesting that just as local conflicts and internal disruption are beginning to affect regional unity, a new unifying issue has emerged—driftnet
fishing. The 1989 South Pacific Forum and the South Pacific Commission have made declarations calling for the banning of driftnet fishing, and Japan and the United States have come into direct conflict in the United Nations for the first time on this issue. This is on one level an issue of how many fish are caught, but on a much more fundamental level, it is a conflict between resource exploiters and resource caretakers. Thus the Pacific Island states have come together to protect their cultural and environmental heritage—the sea and its inhabitants. This is another example of endogenous security, and offers a glimpse of what the Pacific would be like when local concerns are given precedence over external ones. Until that truly pacific Pacific is attained, the struggle against exogenous military security and the search for endogenous security will no doubt continue.

Notes


2 The Japan National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (JANPEC) introductory pamphlet materials, Tokyo, 1990.


5 Pacific Magazine, July/August 1990, p.36.
7 Comment by former Prime Minister David Lange in a radio interview in Wellington, June, 1986.
9 ibid, p.9.
11 ibid, p.1.
12 Siwatibau, op cit, p.5.
13 Japan has decided to stop driftnet fishing in the Pacific a year before the deadline set by the United Nations. At the same time, it is working on developing a new variety of driftnet which would meet the requirements of UN Resolution 225. Pacific Islands Monthly, September, 1990.
16 This subject is discussed in depth in Anthony, op cit.
17 Hulm, op cit, pp.1–2.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES


"Aid-induced Dependency Syndrome" in the South Pacific

SATO Motohiko

Introduction
The inflow of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan to the South Pacific island countries has increased substantially in recent years. For example, the amount of Japanese ODA to those countries has multiplied by 6.8 times in nominal terms during the decade of 1979-88. It is, in particular, noticeable that the amount became more than double within one year from 1985 (US$24.09 million) to 1986 (US$54.69 million), and that its annual average growth rate since then reaches over 60.0%. Moreover, the share of it in the total amount of Japanese ODA began to increase, and is nowadays by far more than 1.0% (1987:1.3%, 1988:1.5%, 1989:1.4%) whereas it has never reached 1.0% until the early 1980s¹. This recent trend of the remarkable quantitative growth of Japan’s ODA to the South Pacific islands forms a sharp contrast to that of the traditional largest ODA donor country to the region, Australia, that has experienced a significant decrease since the early-1980s (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Recent Trend of a Bilateral ODA Inflow to the South Pacific Island Countries from Major Donors (1980 – 88)


Though the scale of Japanese ODA to the region still seems to be small to the Japanese side, it already begins to exert a serious influence over the economies of the South Pacific island countries since it is sufficiently large for their mini-scale economies. It is pointed out, for example, that a massive
inflow of ODA has led to excessive domestic consumption and imports without inducing corresponding domestic (private) savings and investment. As a result, those island countries can not avoid a further trade gap and dependence on a financial inflow from the outside. Thus a rapid increase of ODA may not assist their economic independence, but rather reproduce the structure of aid-dependency and thus make their dilemma of economic development more serious. Nevertheless, attention has been so far paid almost exclusively to a quantitative increase of ODA. In other words, Japanese commitment to the region through ODA still seems to be lacking in deliberate consideration, especially for the role of ODA in lessening the structural difficulties for ‘macroeconomic’ development with which those small island countries are confronted.

The purposes of this paper are, at first, to review and reconfirm where the structural difficulties for ‘macroeconomic’ development lie in those countries, and secondly, to examine briefly what kind of negative effects have been and will be caused by foreign assistance on their mini-scale economies, with special reference to the Japanese ODA. In the last part, it is considered tentatively mainly from a standpoint of economics what kind of consideration hereafter should be taken into the Japanese commitment to the region through ODA.

Structural Characteristics and Main Macroeconomic Difficulties of the South Pacific Islands

Though the other land-based Third World countries are also confronted with such similar economic difficulties as chronic trade deficits, their background is somewhat different between those countries and the South Pacific small island countries. That is, the latter countries’ capacity of transformation of their economies is much more restricted than the former because of the latter’s structural characteristics, namely smallness in size,
remoteness and fragmentation. While the key issue in economic development for the other land-based Third World countries is how they mobilize their natural and human resources for achievement of industrial development, for the South Pacific island countries it is whether or not they can do the same. In other words, absorptive capacity of financial assistance from the outside is extremely low and almost unlikely to be made higher in the latter, whereas it is not so low and much more likely to be heightened in the former.

How the above-mentioned structural characteristics restrict their capacity of transformation of the economies? Their smallness in scale of population as well as of the land area, first of all, leads to diseconomies of scale especially in production. In today’s highly industrial world, initial investment cost of production becomes higher and higher. As a result, industry can not easily enjoy benefits of economies of scale unless it goes into mass production. Thus a modern-type production needs a sufficiently large scale of market, but the South Pacific small island countries, which do not have a large domestic market and are also located far from large foreign markets, cannot afford to fulfill this prerequisite for modern industrial development. If a modern-type industry is introduced in spite of that, the average cost of production never fails to increase, thus imposing a costly burden on itself and consequently on the national economy. This kind of diseconomy of scale may be intensified in the case that the island countries are fragmented into many small islands.

Secondly, the smallness also limits their domestic availability of natural and human resources indispensable for industrial production. That is, their range of industrial production is extremely limited from the beginning. Of course, the range can be more or less widen if maritime resources under the control of those countries are developed. However, it is still uncertain to what extent such development will contribute to widening their range of industrial production. It seems that those countries have to import a large
amount of inputs anyhow if they seek for industrial development. Because of such a severe productive limitation, even a path of import-substitution industrialization, which was taken by many land-based Third World countries in their initial stage of industrial development, becomes so unrealistic for them.

Thirdly, it is also clear that building an the industrial infrastructure for a small scale of population is very costly and tends to offset the possible benefits of external economy. Under the condition like this, a modern-type industry itself has almost no interest in providing it. Therefore governments instead must invest a considerable amount for it if they have a strong desire to promote industrial production. This may result in deterioration of their financial conditions.

Fourthly, the problem of smallness in size is sometimes overlapped and/or intensified by another problem, namely the problem of remoteness and fragmentation. Because fragmented and scattered over a very wide sea area as well as removed from the neighbouring markets, the South Pacific island countries are faced with serious difficulties especially in transport and communications. Those difficulties not only impose the real cost upon an economy but also increase inefficiency of economic activities because of irregularity of supplies. This in turn leads, even if there is no balance of payments constraint on imports, to periodic shortage and erratic price movements.

These structural constraints on the capacity to transform their economies put a strong pressure upon the South Pacific island countries to concentrate on production of several primary products. However, on the other hand, those countries cannot avoid another pressure from the inside not to do so or to promote industrial development even with a considerable cost. That is, islanders’ expectations for industrial development have been raised and stimulated by what is called the demonstration effect of the Capitalist
Table 1: Total budget deficit as % of GDP (1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deficit as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Samoa</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.N.G.</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source) ADB, *Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB.*

World-Economy. The huge gap between the productive capacity of goods/-
services of the island economies and the rising consumption level of islanders
results in the following serious ‘twin’ deficits.

1) *Chronic budgetary deficits:*

Whether politically independent or not, almost all economies in the region
have suffered from a budgetary deficit. For instance, the total budget deficit
as % of GDP for seven independent island countries is as follows (Table 1).
Since these kinds of deficits have been in many cases compensated by
budgetary assistance (cash grants) from foreign governments, their budget-
detary degree of dependence on it often reached such a high level as those of
colonial territories. The Government of P.N.G., for example, depended
about 23% of its current revenue on financial assistance from the outside in
1987. This budgetary dependence degree was almost the same as that of New
Caledonia, a French colonial territory. This was also the case with Western
Samoa, which compensated its budgetary deficit (WS$ 19.2 million) by
foreign financial assistance (WS$ 36.4 million = 24.3% of its total revenue)
in 1989. Thus the financial conditions of the South Pacific island countries
are far from ‘autonomy’.

2) *Growing deficits in the trade balance:*

As exposed more and more to the Capitalist World-Economy, the South
Pacific island economies' degree of openness to the world markets has
increased remarkably. For instance, the trade (exports + imports)/GDP
ratio, which is most customarily used as the economy’s degree of openness,
Table 2: Total Exports, Imports and Trade Balance
(A$ '000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>278,665</td>
<td>411,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>4,353</td>
<td>30,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
<td>2,917</td>
<td>55,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>327,020</td>
<td>612,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>64,553</td>
<td>754,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>54,479</td>
<td>883,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>6,057</td>
<td>21,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>3,403</td>
<td>40,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>89,433</td>
<td>14,266</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>386,693</td>
<td>470,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Mariana Is.</td>
<td>17,036</td>
<td>62,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>34,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1,329,436</td>
<td>1,267,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>102,778</td>
<td>101,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokelau</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>7,941</td>
<td>60,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>4,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>42,930</td>
<td>85,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis and Futuna</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>23,657</td>
<td>75,212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPC, South Pacific Economies: Statistical Summary, No.11 (1987)

is more than 60% in 1985/86 for all independent countries in the region (e.g. Solomon:88.2%, Tuvalu:85.0%, W.Samoa:60.8%, Fiji:61.0%). Considering the fact that the average trade/GDP ratio in the Third World is 37.3% in 1986, we can easily see how vitally the South Pacific island economies are obliged to depend on the external markets even in the initial stage of industrial development. However, it should not be also neglected that this openness is in many cases characterized as asymmetric dependency. In other words, those island economies have suffered chronically from deficits in the trade balance. All South Pacific island countries and territories except P.N.G., Solomon and Nauru registered serious trade deficits both in 1985 and 1986 (Table 2). It is especially noticeable that the percentage of imports paid by
exports did not reach one-third in 1986 for all independent countries excluding these three. These huge trade deficits are mainly attributable to their vulnerable and less-diversified structure in production and export. Exportable goods of those countries are almost limited to food (e.g. fish and copra from many of them, sugar from Fiji, cocoa and coffee from Vanuatu, fruit and fruit juice from Tonga), mineral resources (e.g. phosphates from Kiribati until 1979) and other raw materials, whereas they import a wide range of consumer as well as capital goods. Because primary products suffers from a fluctuation of prices in the world markets much more than manufactured goods, those island countries are frequently faced with worsening terms of trade. In addition, their volume of export is also showing a tendency not to increase because most of their export goods are also exported from other developing countries. Thus it is extremely difficult for them to offset their huge amount of trade deficits by themselves.

By the way, these two gaps, a domestic financial gap and an external trade gap, have thus far attached a strong support to the argument that the increase of financial assistance, for example in the form of ODA, would expand developmental opportunities of the South Pacific island countries. However, it is indeed dubious whether or not financial assistance from the outside can remove the above-mentioned structural constraints from those countries. I would like to touch upon this question in the next section.

**Negative Effects of ODA on the South Pacific Island Economies**

Before going into the impacts of ODA, it would be better to make clear again the difference in absorptive capacity of foreign financial assistance between the South Pacific island countries and other land-based Third World countries.

When applied to small-scale island economies, the argument that financial assistance promotes 'macroeconomic' development through capital accumu-
lation runs into some insoluble contradiction. Those economies lack capital and foreign exchange since productive capacity and income-generating opportunities are extremely limited by their structural characteristics of smallness in size, remoteness, fragmentation etc. That is, those economies’ capability to heighten their productive capacity through financial assistance is strictly limited from the beginning. By contrast, there is a large possibility for the other land-based developing countries, which do not suffer from such structural constraints, to make good use of it to achieve a high productivity.

Under the situation like this, ODA may simply contribute to stimulate their already relatively high level of consumption. Especially easily earned ODA may make it possible for the islanders to consume over the level of their savings. The distortion of their consumption pattern thus caused seems to lead eventually to erosion of their capability of self-help. In fact, it is reported, for instance, that the Marshall Islands Feeding Program, initiated in 1984 after a drought which affected some of the islands, and involving the provision of free rice, flour, green beans, orange juice and milk to all lands, led to abandonment of local crops, and threatened a permanent crisis of rice hunger. This may be the most typical case and such massive erosion of self-reliance may not be found in the rest of the region. However, we are sure to see this type of aid-induced erosion of self-help much more extensively if a large amount of (grant-type) ODA is unchecked to flow into the region.

The aid practice also tends to be associated with the alienation of islanders from their traditional vocations of agriculture and fishery. In other words, it is becoming normal for the island people to depend constantly on external resources. An idea that development is something created by external assistance begins to penetrate widespread over the South Pacific region, and there is also a tendency among the islanders to regard such assistance as supplied unlimitedly and unconditionally. As indicated, for
Table 3: ODA Received by the South Pacific Island Countries

(1983—87)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>43,946</td>
<td>59,790</td>
<td>63,235</td>
<td>74,904</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>10,085</td>
<td>9,629</td>
<td>10,966</td>
<td>13,757</td>
<td>15,745</td>
<td>580r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>97,978</td>
<td>60,591</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>36,044</td>
<td>35,568</td>
<td>34,309</td>
<td>40,683</td>
<td>24,601</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>195,385</td>
<td>195,455</td>
<td>238,889</td>
<td>325,830</td>
<td>385,305</td>
<td>1,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>74,697</td>
<td>55,651</td>
<td>49,119</td>
<td>69,064</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>18,063</td>
<td>15,548</td>
<td>16,882</td>
<td>21,360</td>
<td>21,933</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>18,846</td>
<td>21,501</td>
<td>27,857</td>
<td>24,297</td>
<td></td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>199,890</td>
<td>148,295</td>
<td>201,944</td>
<td>139,442</td>
<td>113,288</td>
<td>1,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>6,154</td>
<td>3,636</td>
<td>5,099</td>
<td>6,651</td>
<td>7,255</td>
<td>2,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Mariana Is.</td>
<td></td>
<td>81,258</td>
<td>74,292</td>
<td>114,774</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>21,551</td>
<td>27,286</td>
<td>30,117</td>
<td>32,624</td>
<td>34,807</td>
<td>1,585</td>
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<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>365,714</td>
<td>365,682</td>
<td>342,798</td>
<td>429,985</td>
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<td>Pitcairn</td>
<td>328</td>
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<td>3,280</td>
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<td>Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>22,045</td>
<td>15,121</td>
<td>56,900</td>
<td>35,184</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tokelau</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>2,156</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>2,794</td>
<td>1,236</td>
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<td>Tonga</td>
<td>19,780</td>
<td>17,841</td>
<td>10,541</td>
<td>13,360</td>
<td>18,393</td>
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<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>4,615</td>
<td>6,250</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>5,566</td>
<td>7,438</td>
<td>577</td>
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<td>Vanuatu</td>
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<td>36,057</td>
<td>35,066</td>
<td>33,443</td>
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<td>Wallis and Futuna</td>
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<td>1,818</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>27,881</td>
<td>29,104</td>
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<td>29,451</td>
<td>22,955</td>
<td>17,320</td>
<td>25,137</td>
<td>25,793</td>
<td>186</td>
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</table>

Source) SPC, op. cit.

example, in the official document of the Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1980—84) of Western Samoa, some governmental leaders already identify this kind of dependency as the 'most significant' long-run disadvantage. However, it seems difficult for those countries to escape from a trap of aid-induced dependency, as typically shown in their continual strong demand for the increase of ODA.

Table 3 shows the recent trend of ODA inflow to the South Pacific region. We can easily see that ODA per capita was over A$ 100 during the period of 1983-87 for all countries and territories except Solomon Islands (1984-85), Fiji and Nauru. If we take into consideration the fact that the average ODA per capita in the Third World is A$ 12.6 in 1986, even the figure for Fiji is
Table 4: Japanese Bilateral ODA to the South Pacific Region

(Total until 1989, JPY '000'000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank/Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Loan</th>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Tech.Assist.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. P.N.G.</td>
<td>48,295</td>
<td>34,021</td>
<td>8,356</td>
<td>5,919</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Fiji</td>
<td>11,198</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,458</td>
<td>5,740</td>
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<td>3. W.Samoa</td>
<td>10,075</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,655</td>
<td>2,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Solomon</td>
<td>6,950</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,602</td>
<td>1,358</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Tonga</td>
<td>6,580</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,546</td>
<td>2,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kiribati</td>
<td>6,436</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,976</td>
<td>1,460</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. F.S.M.</td>
<td>5,108</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,276</td>
<td>832</td>
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<td>8. Marshall</td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,215</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Vanuatu</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,979</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Palau</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>187</td>
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<td>11. Tuvalu</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td></td>
<td>811</td>
<td>599</td>
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<td>12. Cook Is.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>13. Nauru</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>106,768</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,021</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,474</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,274</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA 1990.

extraordinary high. Moreover, it is not unusual even for independent countries that the level of ODA per capita is higher than that of GDP per capita, as shown in the case of Tuvalu. We can see again from these facts that the societies of the South Pacific islands are nowadays so highly dependent on external assistance.

In addition, there is another negative impact of ODA, namely an inflationary influence. Because overconsumption is made possible by easily earned ODA, those countries’ inflationary trend is increasingly unchecked. Though it is not easy to substantiate this point comprehensively, the prices’ upward movements of consumer goods in the islands are generally larger compared with those of the other land-based countries of the same per capita income level. For example, the annual average ODA per capita that Fiji received in the period of 1983-86 is about three times as much as that of Malaysia, whose per capita income level is almost the same as Fiji. And the former’s consumer price index during the period increased from 100 to 108, whereas in the case of the latter, from 100 to 104. It is suggested in this
example that a massive inflow of easily earned ODA pushed up the recipient island's consumption level without stimulating any activity of savings, and that this in turn easily promoted an inflationary influence.

These negative repercussions of foreign financial assistance on the South Pacific islands are not exceptional for Japanese ODA, major part of which to the region is a grant-type (Table 4). Though the idea is commonly shared among development economists as well as aid bureaucrats in Japan that a grant type of foreign assistance is free and that it unconditionally contributes to their economic development, the fact is that it is not free at all, but rather harmful to their economic independence. However, almost no attention has been thus far paid to these dangerous aspects of Japanese ODA. It is highly probable that the increasing inflow of ODA from Japan to the region, which already erodes self-reliance of small islands, will result in forming a structure of permanent aid-dependency in them, if preoccupied only with its quantitative increase.

On the other hand, Japanese ODA to the South Pacific is apt to widen the economic gap among countries in the region because of its concentration on a few relatively large countries such as P.N.G., Fiji. For example, P.N.G. alone occupies more than 45% of the total Japanese ODA disbursed to the region until 1989 (Table 4), while micro economies such as Tuvalu, of which salient physical circumstance is characterized by atoll (so there is almost no arable land) and which has no exportable good unlike Nauru (phosphates), share only a tiny portion. Though in terms of ODA received per capita, there seems not to be a large gap between them, it can not be denied that this distributional inequality possibly leads to disturbing the efforts of indigenous collective self-reliance in the region, represented by the South Pacific Forum [SPF] /South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation [SPEC] regime. Thus Japanese ODA disbursement, putting a latent gap of developmental capability among the island economies to the front, does not promote their
common and regional interests, but rather induces competition among them for their individual national interests. This is in particular making serious the problem of 'the Fourth World' in the South Pacific.

What is worse, Japanese ODA has recently been disbursed more and more from a strategic viewpoint, which has a double negative effect over the region. That is, on the one hand, though maybe unintendedly, Japan supports directly or indirectly through a large amount of ODA supply the militarized governments in some 'strategically important' large countries (e.g. Fiji, P.N.G.), thus accelerating internal oppression. On the other hand, its neglect of strategically unimportant countries puts their vulnerable and poor economies more and more in jeopardy. Japan's helplessness in the Tuvalu Government's recent effort for self-reliance, namely the establishment of the Tuvalu Trust Fund (TTF), is a typical case of this.

Concluding Remarks

In this final section, I would like to make a brief note on what kind of consideration should be hereafter taken into the ODA policies of external powers including Japan.

It is certain, as discussed so far, that the main economic difficulties peculiar to the South Pacific island countries arise from their smallness in size, remoteness and fragmentation. However, such physical characteristics do not cause those “macroeconomic” difficulties by themselves. Before becoming ‘independent’ members of the Capitalist World-Economy, island people in the South Pacific, though very frequently having suffered much from colonization, enjoyed the traditional “microeconomic” affluence of subsistence. They also enjoyed free and borderless economic interaction, while smallness of size of population or the land area and remoteness had almost nothing to do with their daily economic life. Thus many of “macroeconomic” problems they are facing today were not recognized as
keen problems for them before their independence as an European-type of nation-state and incorporation into the Capitalist World-Economy. It was not until then that their smallness and remoteness became a severe issue and those “macroeconomic” difficulties came to the front.

If we consider in this way the historical background of the issues in economic development of the South Pacific island countries, I think that at least the following two points should be reconsidered for their desirable development. Firstly, not a national approach, but an indigenous regional approach is indispensable for them to overcome their structural difficulties. Though there established already some regional networks of cooperation for economic development under the SPF/SPEC regime (e.g. Pacific Forum Line [PFL], Forum Fishery Agency [FFA], South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement [SPARTECA]), those are usually engaged in promotion of each national economy’s productivity, and still lacking in the idea to promote people-centered the ‘regional’ economic development through utilization of the traditional ‘borderless’ networks among islanders. In this sense, it is also important for the ODA donors to change their ODA policy of ‘bi-lateralism’, which has stimulated a nationalistic economic competition among the South Pacific island countries, into the policy based on multi-lateralistic way of thinking.

Secondly, it would be better to appreciate the islands’ traditional subsistence affluence again. In a typical labour surplus economy of a land-based developing country, a subsistence economy is usually characterized as dominated by ‘the Malthusian Trap’. By contrast, it is well known that it is characterized by affluence in the South Pacific islands. Though it is estimated that approximately 20–35% of GDP of those countries is still occupied by such subsistence economies, the meaning islanders attach to them in their daily life seems to have changed significantly along the process of their subordination to national economies, and consequently to the
Capitalist World-Economy. That is, people in the region nowadays put less importance on 'subsistence affluence' than before, and in so many cases it is replaced by 'aid-dependent affluence'. However, islanders could survive because of it even in a time of serious depression, thus it is considered to be a strong point for them. Therefore, for example, not a conventional import-substitution policy, but an import 'displacement' policy based on vitalization of this subsistence affluence seems worthwhile to be examined. I believe the ODA donors can also do many things to assist their efforts towards this type of subsistence affluence-based development.

Notes

* This is a revised version of the author's paper presented at the Hiroshima University Conference on “Social, Political and Legal Problems of South Pacific Island States” (26-27 August, 1990/Hiroshima International Conference Hall). The original title is ‘Japanese ODA and the Problems of

Economic Development of the South Pacific Island Countries'.

1 The ex-Premier Nakasone's visit to the region in 1985 and the doctrine on the Japanese foreign policies towards the region stated by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kuranari in 1987, seemed to play an important role in the rapid expansion of Japanese ODA in the mid-1980. In this sense, Japanese expanding commitment to the region through ODA can be said to be politically biased from the beginning.

2 If a service trade balance is taken into consideration, P.N.G. and Solomon also suffered from external deficits.

3 These structural difficulties in trade are typically indicated in the case of Cook Islands, of which historical trend of imports and exports is shown in the Figure above.

4 This information is due to my interview with an anonymous officer who works for some U.N. organization in the field of regional development planning of the South Pacific countries.

REFERENCES


## APPENDIX

Japan's ODA Disbursements to the South Pacific Island Countries

(JPN ¥ 00'000'000)

### <P.N.G.>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Loan Aid</th>
<th>Grant Aid</th>
<th>Technical Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>• Trans-island Highway Project (46.91) (Total 46.91)</td>
<td>• Language Laboratory System and Audio-visual Equipment to the University of Papua New Guinea (0.44) (Total 0.44)</td>
<td>(Total 3.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>• Yomki Hydroelectric Project (95.72) (Total 95.72)</td>
<td>• Equipment for Promoting Audio-visual Education (0.43) • Project for the Improvement of Radio Broadcasting Station (7.94) • Medical Equipment Supply Project (5.24) (Total 13.61)</td>
<td>(Total 4.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Project for the Establishment of the Forest Research Institute (19.29) • Equipment for Scientific Research and Education to the University of Papua New Guinea (0.47) (Total 19.76)</td>
<td>(Total 7.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>• Port Moresby International Airport Project (84.54) • Agricultural Development Program (26.82) (Total 111.36)</td>
<td>• Fire Service Improvement Project (4.13) • Project for the Improvement of Port-Moresby General Hospital (13.00) • Project for the Improvement of Radio Broadcasting Station (3.72) • Supply of lighting and Audio-visual Equipment to the National Entertainment (0.44) (Total 21.29)</td>
<td>(Total 10.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Project for the Improvement of Port-Moresby General Hospital (19.23) • Coastal Fisheries Development Project at Kikori in Gulf Province (1.50) • Small Scale Grant Aid (3 Projects) (0.10) (Total 21.29)</td>
<td>(Total 10.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>340.21</td>
<td>83.56</td>
<td>59.19</td>
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### <Fiji>

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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>• Project for the Construction of the New Fiji Nursing School (8.15) (Total 8.15)</td>
<td>(Total 6.78)</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Emergency Relief (0.10) • The Lautoka Fishing Port Improvement Project (13.12) • Emergency Relief (0.10) (Total 13.33)</td>
<td>(Total 6.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(Total 5.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Commercial Artisanal and Rural Fisheries Development Project (2.45) (Total 2.45)</td>
<td>(Total 5.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Commercial Artisanal and Rural Fisheries Development Project (3.43) • Small Scale Grant Aid (3 Projects) (0.10) (Total 3.52)</td>
<td>(Total 7.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>54.58</td>
<td>57.40</td>
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<th>Grant Aid</th>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Domestic Transportation Strengthening Project (4.33)</td>
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<td>• Project for Terminal Facilities of Faleolo International Airport (6.33)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Audio—visual Equipment to the Ministry of Youth, Sports &amp; Cultural Affairs (0.35)</td>
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<td>(Total 11.31) (Total 1.86)</td>
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<td>• Project for Terminal of Faleolo International Airport (4.49)</td>
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<td>• Musical Instruments to the Ministry of Youth, Sports &amp; Cultural Affairs (0.18)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Aid for Increased Food Production (2.00)</td>
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<td>(Total 6.67) (Total 2.50)</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Ferryboat Building Project (6.73)</td>
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<td>(Total 6.73) (Total 2.66)</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>• Project on the Development of Apia Port (6.90)</td>
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<td>• Project on the Development of Apia Port(II)(9.13)</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>• Musical Instruments to the Royal Solomon Police Force (0.16)</td>
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<td>• Improvement Project of Medical Transportation Equipment (0.96)</td>
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<td>(Total 1.12) (Total 0.63)</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Emergency Aid (0.21)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Display and Audio—visual Equipment (0.39)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Construction of Malaria Training and Research Center (6.23)</td>
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<td>• Project for the Improvement of Roads (2.06)</td>
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<td>(Total 8.80) (Total 1.50)</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>• Road Construction Improvement Program (4.34)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Noro Infrastructure Development Project (4.36)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Supply of Equipment for Recording Traditional Music and Dance to the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (0.27)</td>
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<td>(Total 8.97) (Total 2.92)</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>• Noro Infrastructure Development Project(II)(10.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>• Fish Marketing Project (5.41)</td>
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104
### Tonga (continued)

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</thead>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>• Project for Preservation and Extension Center for Handicraft Cultural Resources (5.16) (Total 5.16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<td>• Project for the Extension of Nuku'alofa Foreshore Protection (2.90) (Total 2.90)</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>• Project for the Extension of Nuku'alofa Foreshore Protection (2.70) (Total 2.70)</td>
<td>(Total 1.93)</td>
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| 1989 | —        | • Project for the Construction of New Terminal Complex for the Fuaamotu International Airport (7.84)  
• Emergency Relief (0.06)  
• Sports equipment to National Outdoor Stadium and National Indoor Gymnasium (0.34) (Total 8.24) | (Total 2.11)          |

**Total** | — | 45.46 | 20.54 |

### Kiribati

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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>• Project for the Construction of the Batio—Bairiki Causeway and Fisheries Channel (9.39) (Total 9.39)</td>
<td>(Total 0.60)</td>
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| 1986        | —        | • Project for the Construction of the Batio—Bairiki Causeway and Fisheries Channel (1.69)  
• Food Aid (0.40) (Total 2.29) | (Total 0.38)          |
| 1987        | —        | • Cold Storage Extension Project (2.53) (Total 2.53) | (Total 0.71)          |
| 1988        | —        | • Equipment for Marine Training Center (1.30) (Total 1.30) | (Total 1.18)          |
| 1989        | —        | • Project for Outer Island Aquaculture Development (0.90)  
• Project for the Construction of New Tungaru Central Hospital (0.21) (Total 10.11) | (Total 5.38)          |

**Total** | — | 49.76 | 14.50 |

### F.S.M.

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<td>• Project of the Traditional Fishing and Nutrition Improvement (2.75) (Total 2.75)</td>
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<td>• Yap Fishing Harbour Preparation Project (6.24) (Total 6.24)</td>
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<td>• Road Pavement Project in Pohnpei State (4.00) (Total 4.00)</td>
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| 1988        | —        | • Equipment for the National Fisheries Cooperation (1.00)  
• Project for Fisheries Development in Truk (4.15) (Total 5.15) | (Total 0.90)          |
### F.S.M. (continued)

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<th>Project of Infrastructure Improvement for Fishery Development in Kosrae (6.49)</th>
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### Marshall Is.

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<td>Project for the Construction of Regional Commercial Centers (3.96)</td>
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<td>Agricultural Land Clearance Project (1.50)</td>
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Citizens Movements for Autonomy and Demilitarization: The case of Fiji

Vijay NAIDU

This paper addresses the issues of decolonization and anti-nuclear activities in Fiji up to the contemporary period. Since 1978 the Fijian military has expanded and particularly after the coups of 1987 militarization has become a major problem for the people of Fiji. The argument in this report is that the ethnic factor poses a critical impediment to a broad based movement for demilitarization.

Fiji gained its political independence in October 1970 after 96 years of colonial rule. Colonialism caused profound changes in the pre-existing Fijian societies at the political, economic and socio-cultural levels. Politically, the British forcefully united the more than 40 or so polities including chiefdoms into the one crown colony of Fiji. A system of indirect rule ensured that the collaborating Eastern (Polynesian) Chiefs were given ascendancy over the less hierachially organized western and inland (Melanesian) people. Economically, plantation agriculture, sugar milling, goldmining and trading
were intensified, primarily by Australian capital. Fijian communal land was alienated and some 10% became freehold and a further 8% was designated as crown land. Peasant agriculture and wage labour became increasingly important. At the socio-cultural level, the arrival of Europeans contributed to a sizeable mixed race population. The importation of 60,550 Indian workers to labour in the plantations and public works further contributed to demographic changes. The Ethnic Fijian population declined to 87,000 in 1911 from an estimated 300,000 at the time of European incursion. Three languages, English, Bauan Fijian and Fiji Hindi became important.

The British followed a policy of divide and rule. In the colonial division of labour, Indians and Indo-Fijians worked on the sugar cane fields and in the sugar industry and when indenture ended, they also became peasant farmers, shopkeepers, transport operators and professionals. Ethnic Fijians were herded in villages and were allowed to cultivate crops for subsistence use and to make copra (from coconut) for sale. They worked as gold miners and dock workers. They were also recruited into the civil service and the Fiji Military Forces. The Europeans held dominant positions in government and in the private sector. They controlled and directed colonial Fiji with the collaboration of eastern chiefs.

**Militarization under Colonial Rule**

Military development during the colonial period may be divided into four periods: 1874–1900, 1914–1918, 1938–45, and 1950 to 1960. In the period 1874–1900, the British used the Armed Native constabulary (ANC) to forcefully put down the struggles of the inland people of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu who wanted to be free of colonial domination. Fijians were recruited as part of the colonial labour corps during the First World War. With the entrance of Japan in the Second World War, British and ANUS forces were established in Fiji. Ethnic Fijians were recruited in large numbers as
labourers and soldiers. Indo-Fijians objected to the differential treatment given to coloured people by the whites. They were seen as trouble makers and excluded from military service. Fijian soldiers fought in the Solomons. Subsequently, the Fiji Military forces participated with the British to put down the communist insurgency in Malaya. The Military's internal role was confirmed in 1959 and 1960 when it was called out to provide the police with armed support against workers and sugarcane farmers respectively.

Militarization in the Post-Colonial Period

Fiji gained its independence in October 1970. The electoral system and party politics polarized the people along ethnic lines. An oligarchy of Fijian chiefs and white business people ruled with the support of Ethnic Fijian peasants and workers. The Alliance Party represented them. In the opposition was the National Federation Party, (NFP) led by Indo-Fijian professionals and reliant on the vote bank of Indo-Fijian farmers and workers. The Alliance saw itself ruling indefinitely while the NFP was resigned to the role of being the opposition in perpetuity. In the general election of April 1977 however, Fiji underwent its first political crisis when the Alliance was defeated at the polls. The racist Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP) gained 25% of Ethnic Fijian votes. Many Ethnic Fijians did not vote. The NFP made gains across ethnic lines and secured 26 of the 52 seats in parliament against the Alliance's 24. The Governor General stepped in and reappointed Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister against the democratic mandate. It is believed that the military had threatened a coup.

Ever since 1978, the Mara led Alliance government has been sending troops to the Middle East for peace keeping duties. Fiji soldiers are part of the United Nations Interim Forces in the Sinai. As a result of these peace keeping assignments, the Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) have become well organized and well equipped with the latest military technology in small
arms. During the period 1978-1986 the number of soldiers fluctuated between 1500 to 2000. Fiji did not have an airforce and its naval unit established in the late 1970s was small and poorly equipped.

This was to change post May 1987. At 10am on this day the third ranking officer in the RFMF led 12 men into the House of Representatives chamber and overthrew the democratically elected Fiji Labour Party (FLP) and National Federation Party (NFP) government. The Prime Minister, Dr Timoci Bavadra, Cabinet members and backbenchers were detained. A military backed government was established. When negotiations to bring a government of national unity neared fruition another coup took place on 25 September, 1987 and a month later Fiji was declared a Republic.

A popular, middle class based movement - the back to Early May Movement had emerged during the intervening months and the military arbitrarily detained, physically assaulted and tortured its members. FLP/NFP leaders and supporters were treated in a similar fashion. Since late 1987 to the current time, Fiji has been ruled by a military-backed government. The Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara who had been defeated after 17 years of rule by the FLP/NFP Coalition is back in power.

During this period the exclusively Ethnic Fijian military in Fiji has expanded dramatically. From 2,000 odd military personnel in 1985/86, the number of military men and women jumped to 6,000/7,000 in late 1987. The current figure is between 5,000/6,000. An airforce wing has been created with a helicopter and plans for another helicopter and a fixed wing aircraft have been publicised. The navy has been upgraded. Military expenditure increased from $6,518,538 in 1986 to $35,263,168 in 1988. An almost 600% increase in two years at a time when the country was facing severe economic downturn.

In addition, the Fiji Military Forces have acquired new military partners including the French, South Koreans, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Taiwan. Australia and New Zealand have withheld military aid since the
coupsof 1987. South Korea and Taiwan have supplied weapons, uniforms and related gear and vehicles. Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan have provided training facilities for Fiji’s Military Officers. The French have supplied heavy duty trucks and a helicopter as well as assistance in building a military equipment maintenance workshop. The British have also contrived to support the military in Fiji.

It is not unusual these days to see armed soldiers jogging along the streets of Suva. Army personnel are also conspicuous in their military vehicles throughout the main islands of Fiji. The military has had direct secret negotiations with opposition groups in Vanuatu. There has been speculation on the subject of Fiji military being used in Vanuatu. This far nothing has happened.

Demilitarization

Citizen’s movements addressing the question of militarization have not become widespread as specific anti-militarization formations. However, given the ethnic nature of the military in Fiji, there is grave concern on the part of Indo-Fijians that the Ethnic Fijian military will continue to be the major force which will be used to oppress them. Various religious bodies, Christian and non-Christian have expressed their concern about the activities of the military and its continued expansion. The Back to Early May Movement collected more than 120,000 signatures in a petition calling for an end to military rule.

Since the early 1970’s, there has been an anti-nuclear movement in Fiji. Established by staff and students of the University of the South Pacific, the YWCA, the YMCA, the Student Christian Movement, the Pacific Theological College Staff and Students, Fiji Council of Churches and the Trade Unions, the ATOM (Against Tests of Moruroa) Committee strongly campaigned for an end to French Nuclear Tests in French Polynesia. ATOM
organized demonstrations and actively educated the Fiji public about nuclearization. Its members lobbied with the government and in fact was able to persuade Fiji to join Australia and New Zealand in taking France to the International Court of Justice in 1974. In the following year, ATOM was instrumental in organizing the first Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) Conference in Suva.

By the late 1970s ATOM was absorbed into the wider Pacific organization, Pacific Peoples Action Front (PPAF) based in Vila, Vanuatu. The Fiji Government had effectively taken over ATOM's position in opposing French nuclear tests. However, when in 1983, the Fiji Government reversed its policy and agreed to allow nuclear armed and powered vessels in Fiji ports, former ATOM members, civil servants, trade unionists, church-based individuals and staff and students of the University of the South Pacific formed the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG) to once again campaign for a nuclear free Fiji. As its predecessor ATOM, FANG had been actively pursuing a strategy to educate the Fiji public and to coordinate activities in pursuit of its nuclear free objective. FANG organized public talks, video-screening and demonstrations against visiting naval ships.

During 1987 with the military take-over, FANG members particularly its executive were subjected to house raids, arbitrary arrests and physical assaults. Fearing injury and long-term detention FANG General Secretary and Treasurer left Fiji to reside in New Zealand. The departure of these two officials and the loss of FANG documents were a major blows to FANG.

The organization continues to exist and is continuing its campaign to educate the Fiji public but is subject to surveillance by the police and military. It is hoped that as Fiji's citizens begin to become more aware of the wastage of valuable resources by the Fiji Military and its opportunistic association with French Military interests, there would emerge larger citizen's movements for peace in the future.
REFERENCES


Concluding Remarks:
The South Pacific in the Context of Global Transformation

SATOW Yukio

The theme of this research report has been to establish the reasons why the South Pacific Island countries are important in the international political economic arena. The South Pacific Island countries are caught in the middle of the super powers’ competition and have suffered the damages caused by nuclear explosions.

The Superpowers’ competition for military supremacy it is also a source of income for these countries. The economic assistance, conditions of barter and environmental problems brought about by these social and political conditions contribute to deepen instability.

Given these conditions, it is difficult to contribute to the effort for self-reliance and denuclearization. But at the same time, the purpose of this research is to aim at this independence and at the attainment of a nuclear free zone, while at the same time concentrating on the future in relation to the economic and political environment into which these states are likely to emerge. In other words, to freely develop the main objective of this research
project it is necessary to refer to "the end of the Cold War" and the Persian Gulf War. In particular, the end of the Cold War has important implications not only in Europe but also in the Asian-Pacific region, at both the regional-cultural and conscious levels, because the changing waves of this world have both a structure and a surface.

From this point of view, it is difficult to weigh the meanings and implications of freedom from half a century of Cold War dominated fears. People will not be able to go on dividing their world view between well-defined "friends" or "enemies." This factor alone forces the creation of a new world view. Moreover, after Gorbachev's New Way of Thinking Policy, the East Europe Revolution and its post-democratization not always can be taken as a further example of these attitudes. But as difficult as it may seem to link the end of the Cold War with a New World Order, the first step in creating a New World Order is to begin by changing the well established Cold War model. This is even necessary in order to recover from the consequences of the Gulf War.

We have to start moving closer to our neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific Region. The Cold War in the Pacific is closely related to, and developed through the "hot war" in Asia. I consider that rather than being East-West, the main field of the Cold War is now in Asia. For that reason, the Pacific is an extremely important strategic point. The starting point for this strategy lies in the Pacific as a nuclear explosion site. But there is little proof remaining under the sea of the effects of the tests. Nuclear testing did, however, bring about the idea of a sea free from the so-called nuclear colonialism.

Furthermore, the economic interests of the big countries in this area are increasing day by day. This trend, while emphasizing the borderless concept, remains part of the block of basic concepts of economic cooperation established among the big countries of the Pacific Region. In November of
1989, when ASPEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference) was held, the idea of the "Globalization of the Pacific" appeared on stage as a symbol. This globalization, with Australia as it core, aims at economic cooperation among Japan, the U.S. China and the ASEAN countries in opposition to the unified European Community, American-Canadian Free Trade Agreement and other organized members of the world-economy zone. Among these countries, Australia is developing in cooperation with Indonesia the sea bed oil fields of East Timor, although that area has been badly shaken by domestic trouble and instability.

Since July of 1990, Australia has been implementing a unified economic policy with New Zealand, a country with an economic structure similar to that of a third world country, through the so-called CER. In name and reality, Australia has started down its path as a Pacific State. Certainly this can be said to be the starting point for economic cooperation between Australia and ASEAN through the establishment of an "AUSEAN (Australia + ASEAN)" Pact. On the other hand, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mr. Mahathil, supports the regionalist concept of EAEG (East Asia Economic Group) as a stand against this policy.

In any case, moving behind the scenes as an undercurrent in the net of relationships of each country towards Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is the world economy zone. Without any doubt the Pacific Rim, due to its multinationalization through investment, trade, assistance and development, reflects the living image of a lake. But to look through the eyes of this net of economic interdependence, it is difficult to avoid thinking in terms of the new political phenomenon of the empowerment of indigenous peoples and minorities whose political, economic, cultural and social lives are considered a very important unit in world life.

Even so, some of the Pacific Island micro-states have achieved self-reliance. What is remarkable here, even if on a small scale, is that the
subsistance economy which has taken root in their life sphere has contribut-
ed to their world view and objections to the big countries' policies.

To coexist, there is a need to move to an environment which is
demilitarized and free from threat and a decolonized economic reality. For
that reason, the large countries rigid policies and superior attitude should be
put aside because it is spurring the instability in the Pacific.

For example, France gave direct and rapid military assistance to Fiji after
the 1987 coup d'etat, trying to justify its nuclear policy in the Pacific. Even at
the beginning of this year, there was a real change in French policy towards
New Zealand. What's more, Australia has provided military assistance and
intervened in the civil war which started in 1989 in Papua New Guinea, when
Bougainville Island, declared independence in order to claim its right to
exploit the copper mines on the island. America has pressed the free
associated Republic of Belau, to sign a Trade Agreement in exchange for
assistance through Japanese Enterprizes. Moreover, in the midst of in-
creasing waves of criticism in relation to the Japanese driftnet fishing in the
Pacific, large amounts of money in the form of official development
assistance (ODA) is being allocated in order to purify the tainted Japanese
image. But the voice of these micro states is hardly heard in Japan.

If we fail to look at the facts implied in the saying, "Small Country, Big
People", it will be difficult to sing the praises of the new age of the Asia and
Pacific Regions, much less to create the Pacific as a peaceful and free sea
area.

Notes

1. Yukio SATOW, "Sekai Sisutemu, Daisansekai, Kokka (The World—System,
the Third World, and the State: The Case of the Microstates and SICs )," 
2. Yukio SATOW, "Posto Reisen Sisutemu toshitenosakusugurobanika (Pax

—120—
