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The South Pacific in the Changing World Era

Edited by
SATOW Yukio

THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE SCIENCE,
HIROSHIMA UNIVERSITY

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Preface

The following research report is a revision of a previous report, "Preliminary Research on non-aligned movements and nuclear-free movements in the South Pacific Islands" carried out from November, 1990 to October, 1992. From the outstart, the purpose of this research was to search for the political and economic conditions necessary for harmonious, non-nuclear development of the Pacific (including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) through a dynamic analysis of the transnational grass roots anti-nuclear movement.

To summarize the major points and techniques of this paper, part one is an overall analysis of the upsurge of nuclear weapons and militarization in the South Pacific. With the purpose of understanding the heretofore elusive strategies of the U. S. and U. S. S. R. concerning the region, I attempt a precise analysis of information pertaining to nuclear arms.

In part two, I give pertinent information from my investigative
research on the activities and characteristics of the transnational nuclear—free movement as a whole. At the same time, I examine the specific case of Fiji. The examination includes a look at the relationship between the structure of these networks and any background history of damage caused by nuclear weapons and experiments. Furthermore, I make an effort to demonstrate concretely the cooperative relationships and antagonisms between members of this transnational network and those implications.

In the third part, I look at the impact of national political and economical developments on transnational movements as part of my preliminary research and go on to discuss case studies of Vanuatu, Kiribati, and Micronesia. I try to reveal the actual living conditions of the various localities.

In part four, the roles and issues of neighboring sovereignties are investigated. In particular, I look at the state of existing regional cooperative organizations in order to determine the proper mechanisms for regional cooperation. In conclusion, I propose among other things a better way to interrelate with the nations of the South Pacific.

A Summary of Results:

The Pacific region is extremely militarized with a large presence of nuclear arms; however, this development has not received the attention that Europe's militarization has. Therefore, I set out to examine the militarization of the Pacific concentrating on trends in nuclear naval forces. Currently, Russian nuclear armed surface vessels in the Pacific number in the area between thirty—three and forty—two. The U. S. has thirty—three such ships. Including submarines, atleast 120 nuclear armed vessels are in operation in the Pacific. These numbers are estimates of the number of ships carrying nuclear weapons. However,
with the U. S. navy increasing its dependance on sea—launched cruise missiles, it is difficult to know the real number, and, unfortunately, it is impossible to further clarify the issue. Needless to say, the superpower navies control the Pacific Ocean, and no less than ever America's nuclear umbrella continues to be a central element of its military strategy.

As for the transnational networks, in Fiji the anti—nuclear movement's relationship with political change was concretely analysed. One obvious conclusion is that although its start heralds back to the independance of the country, the movement has developed neither in size nor in intensity. Lack of funds is a major reason. Another is that the government's strong anti—nuclear stance has taken the steam out of the nation's grass roots anti—nuclear movement.

Additionally, in the section on domestic political and economic changes and their impacts, I investigated the following three subjects: the state of affairs regarding Micronesia's constitutional amendment, the background and prospects for Vanuatu's nuclear—free policy, and the structure of Kiribati's domestic economy.

For the issue of Micronesia's self—sustenance, I carried out on—site surveys in the Micronesian states of Ponpei, Kosrae, and the Marshall Islands and collected information through the anthropological method of in—depth interview. Differences in the political structures were revealed by examining the various constitutional amendment proposals. The main object of these constitutional revisions is the expansion of "traditional rights" within the courts to protect traditional values.

I also examined the background of and prospects for Vanuatu's nuclear free policy under the Rini government and within the context of current political change. It is clear that under the Rini administration, the nation's anti—nuclear policy is a strong, government—led initiative.
As such, it is inevitably influenced by the political climate.

On the subject of Kiribati's island economy, I considered its present conditions and sustainability from the perspective of the common man's everyday life. The conditions which predetermine the viability of traditional lifestyles can be summed up as two factors.

First, the existence of ground water is necessary. The second condition is an abundance of fish in the lagoons. I believe that it is the ample natural resources of their aquatic commons which allows Kiribatians to maintain their traditional existence in this area. In fact, it is under these living conditions that their economic life has taken shape.

The traditional economy of Kiribati is based on small scale farming and forestry, and fishing. Only a few wild and a few cultivated plants (babai potato, coco, bread tree, and pandanas) are combined with the bounty of the lagoon and outer sea to allow food production and related tasks to be done within family—units. These units then become the social basis for other interactions.

Furthermore, use is made of various organic products, but in the end everything is returned to the earth, so the cycle of life is unbroken. Since the local economy is based on small family units, ecological destruction is avoided and the environment as well as their lifestyle is preserved. Despite this, the current Kiribati economy shows a strategy of combining a cash and subsistence economy.

Finally, I will present the views from this research on regional cooperation in the South Pacific and the pre—conditions for peace.

In order to make the following research possible, I received the assistance of countless others. Especially, I would like to thank the Toyota Foundation, from whom I received a research grant, and its many associates for their help. I am also indebted to the many people
in Japan and abroad who helped me with research and on-site surveys.

In particular, I would like to give a special thanks to Professor Vijay Naidu, Director of the Department of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific, Professor R. White, Director of the Center for Peace Studies, Department of Physics, University of Auckland, and Professor P. King, Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Government, University of Sydney, without whose ungrudging cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

I would also like to mention that the purpose of this study, to study popular—based transnational networks, was further served in the sense that, during the process of carrying out my research, connections between the various peace institutes and researchers in the region were strengthened.

Finally, I would reiterate that the Toyota Foundation's previous report on this subject is used in part as the basis for my new study. Once again, I thank its many staff and associates for their critical support.

April 1993
Satow Yukio
Project Coordinator
INTRODUCTION

The Pacific is highly militarised region. It is also a region that encompasses and is bordered by a large variety of countries and peoples with a wide diversity of cultures, backgrounds and interests. Not surprisingly, sources of tension and conflict developed in the region and persist there, and others continue to develop. Some of these have expressed themselves through military conflict or confrontation. The most important source of tension was for many years interactions between the superpowers. But other serious tensions have been associated with, for example, the Korean Peninsula, Japanese concerns regarding Soviet military forces in the Far East and the ownership of the Kuril Islands, the future roles of Japan, China and India, and control of oil and other resources in the region.

Following the very recent and rapid fundamental changes in superpower relations, many aspects of security in the Asia – Pacific region are also undergoing change, and are at present in a state of flux. Some
changes that are emerging are positive in the sense of offering hope for a more peaceful region. Relations between North and South Korea appear to be improving very significantly and the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons potential may soon be resolved, developments which hopefully will ultimately eliminate one of the most feared flash points in the region. Japan and the Russian Federation are working to resolve the Kuril Island problem and the threat to Japan from Soviet forces must be seen as decreasing. Relations between many other countries are also improving, China and Japan, Vietnam and China, Japan and the United States, and Japan and ASEAN countries for example, following high level visits and other developments.

Some problems in the region have not diminished. There is continuing widespread fear of possible expansion of Japanese militarism despite protests by the Japanese that their intentions in the region are peaceful. China and India are major powers whose future intentions are not yet clear. Following recent announcements of planned reductions in the US military presence in the region, there are concerns that some tensions may increase, and that other powers such as Japan, China or India may see this as an opportunity to expand their own position as a regional power to fill what is referred to as the 'power vacuum' resulting from this US withdrawal. The reality of this power vacuum will be considered below.

A fundamental element in Asia-Pacific security dynamics in the past has been the presence of the naval and associated forces of the two superpowers, and the balance between them. They represented by far the largest naval systems and the strongest nuclear navies in the region. A number of factors have produced major changes in these forces in the last year or so which will impact on the security situation in the region, contributing possibly to a power vacuum there
for example. It is argued here that four factors have been particularly significant in influencing developments in the two superpower navies since mid—1991. There have been important reductions and changes in the deployment of naval nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the former Soviet Union (FSU) are facing economic constraints, at a seemingly disastrous levels for the FSU at present, and making cuts in their military forces. The United States has demonstrated the power of its high technology conventional weapons arsenal, and has announced significant changes in its military strategy that are already being manifested in the region.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of these four factors on the superpower navies in the Pacific, and how these navies now reflect the future roles of the United States and the FSU in the region. These future roles are also examined briefly.

THE SUPERPOWER NAVIES IN THE PACIFIC MID—1991

Despite the enormous changes in superpower relations that have occurred, and the fragile state of political, social and economic conditions in and among the member states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), the navies of the United States and the Russian Federation remain the largest in the region. It is assumed here the former Soviet Pacific Fleet is now controlled in its entirety by the Russian Federation. Less than one year ago these fleets also represented by far the most heavily nuclearised navies in the region. To appreciate the changes that have occurred in the last year it is useful to review the structure of these navies around mid—1991. This is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1


The following table showing the structure of these fleets was compiled using lists of the US Pacific Fleet as of 31 May 1991 supplied by the US Navy, and other recognised sources for the FSU Pacific Fleet, but for the FSU fleet exact numbers are difficult to obtain and to keep up to date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type—Surface</th>
<th>Former Soviet Union</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleship</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carrier</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruiser</td>
<td>10—15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>7—10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>44—55</td>
<td>11—20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>64—82</td>
<td>33—42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Craft</td>
<td>about 400—450 some</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type—Submarine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile</td>
<td>23—26</td>
<td>13—26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>70—90</td>
<td>70—90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>93—116</td>
<td>83—116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC Means nuclear capable. NP Means nuclear powered.

This table shows 33 to 42 Soviet and 33 US surface ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons, nuclear capable ships, in min—1991 and over 120 nuclear capable submarines.

These fleets carried long range submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intermediate range nuclear sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and a mixture of short range tactical nuclear missiles. It is difficult to provide exact numbers for the loadings of these weapons mid—1991. A recent analysis using normally reliable sources gave for the US Pacific Fleet a maximum of 1,536 warheads of 100 kilotonne on 192 Trident 1C4 SLBMs and possibly up to 200 Tomahawk SLCMs.
with single 5 – 150 kilotonne warheads, with each of the 6 aircraft carriers carrying typically some 100 tactical nautical nuclear weapons, nuclear bombs and depth bombs of varying capacity from sub – kilotonne to 1000 kilotonnes. The FSU Pacific Fleet mid – 1991 was estimated to carry 330 to 370 SLBMs of three types with a possible total of 1,300 warheads of several hundred kilotonnes each, up to 300 SLCMs of various types and capacities, some unclear, and a variety of nuclear capable anti – submarine weapons and two types of nuclear capable surface to air missiles. But these were all estimates for both fleets and, as will be seen, appear to have been in error at least for the number of SLCMs and tactical nuclear weapons in the US fleet.


Four recent developments are considered of importance in relation to changes in these superpower Pacific navies and their nuclear capabilities since mid – 1991. These are:

1. Important reductions in the tactical and SLCM nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers have been announced and, as far as is known, are being or have been implemented. Further reductions in naval nuclear weapons have been proposed.

2. Reductions in military force deployments, including naval forces, have been announced by the United States and the FSU.

3. The effectiveness of its SLCMs and smart airborne weapons was demonstrated by the United States during the Gulf War.

4. A shift in United States strategy away from reliance on overseas bases to cooperative security arrangements and the development of fast sea lift and other facilities required to deploy military forces overseas in a crisis has been announced.
1. On 27 September 1991, President Bush announced that the United States would make a number of unilateral reductions in its nuclear arsenal together with some changes in nuclear weapons deployments. For the US Navy, all tactical naval unclear weapons and nuclear SLCMs would be removed from surface craft including aircraft carriers, and attack submarines. About 500 nuclear weapons would be removed, including 100 Tomahawk SLCMs. Some of the nuclear bombs and depth charges would be destroyed, but some would be stored for redeployment in a crisis. The nuclear Tomahawks would also be stored. The resulting US Navy tactical nuclear weapons reserve arsenal is reported to consist of 350 nuclear Tomahawks, and more than 1,000 B57 and B61 bombs, and the United States has said that it might deploy some of these again in a crisis. The capability to use these weapons is also to be retained by maintaining suitably trained personnel. The deployments of Trident SLBMs in US fleets were not affected by this announcement, but Poseidon SLBMs were taken off alert. However, in January 1992 the US offered to reduce the number of warheads on its SLBMs by one-third if the Community of Independent States (CIS) agreed to eliminate all its multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles and reduce the level of its military forces. The present status of this offer is not known. The United States also terminated the production of W-88 warheads for its Trident 2 SLBMs.

The FSU responded rapidly to the 27 September announcement. Again considering naval forces only, then President Gorbachev on 5 October 1991 said that they also would remove all tactical nuclear weapons including SLCMs from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines and store them in central warehouses where some would be destroyed. He also said that they had already decommissioned 3
nuclear missile submarines with 44 SLBM launchers and in addition would decommission an additional 3 submarines with 48 launches. In response to the January 1992 initiative it is reported\(^2\) that President Yeltsin announced the dismantling of the launch systems on 6 submarines, but these may be the same 6 referred to by former President Gorbachev. President Yeltsin also said that 600 strategic land and sea—based missiles carrying 1,250 warheads would be taken off alert, one—third of Russia’s sea—based tactical nuclear missiles would be destroyed, and production of SLCMs would cease.

2. The United States has stated its intention to reduce its military presence generally, and in the Asia—Pacific region\(^3\), with 15,000 forward deployed personnel, about 11%, to be withdrawn from the region by the end of 1992. Since this US presence is projected to a significant degree by its naval presence, this intention should also be reflected in a reduction in its Pacific Fleet. The US Navy overall is to be reduced from 546 ships to 451 by 1995, a 17% reduction\(^4\). Concern has been expressed in a number of countries in the region that these changes will result in a ‘power vacuum’ these, and that other regional powers may move to fill this vacuum with disturbing consequences. Whether the actual changes in the US Pacific Fleet, and in the proposed US presence in the region, justify such suggestions is considered below. Reductions in FSU forces are also discussed below.

3. The Gulf War allowed the United States for the first time to test a number of its high accurate technology conventional weapons in combat including the sea—launched Tomahawk cruise missile. They appear to have proved very successful\(^4\), and the roles of Tomahawk SCLMs and air defence as major components of the US Navy’s conventional arsenal now seem assured. United States Secretary of Defence Cheney, following an address to the Australian Defence
Association Symposium on 2 May last in Melbourne, Australia, said in answer to a question concerning the future certain of US bases in the region:

We have still got significant numbers of air units deployed in the region....

We can now, with either submarines or surface ships, launch Tomahawk cruise missiles that will fly hundreds of miles and literally come in and hit a target in this room. They are that accurate and that precise. And we can do that either from the surface of the ocean or we can do it from submarines. Nobody even knows we are in the area before we launch. That kind of capability, that kind of strategic reach, that kind of capacity to respond rapidly in a crisis, means that the basing structure is not nearly as important as it was.

4. This leads to the fourth development that it is claimed here relates to recent changes in the US Pacific Fleet structure. This is a move by the United States away from its traditional reliance on an extensive military base system to a strategy based more on cooperative security agreements and an ability to move significant military forces rapidly to crisis points. At the same Melbourne symposium Cheney said, in answer to a question concerning the loss of the Philippine bases:

Ultimately we cannot reconstruct precisely what we had at Subic and at at Clark but that is not nearly as important as it once was. And one of the lessons we have learnt in recent years, given the way we operate now, and given the mobility, for example, of our aircraft carrier battle groups, it that traditional bases that were vital fifty years ago are not as significant as they once were.

We operate, and have operated for years, in the Mediterranean
with an aircraft carrier battle group and marine amphibious units on an almost continuous basis, and we have no bases inside the Mediterranean, no US bases.

In an article on a press conference in Singapore dated 28 May 1992 he is reported as saying:

Increasingly we rely on the kinds of cooperative relationships with friends and allies around the world, with access to facilities for ship repairs purposes, for example. We rely on the opportunity to train and participate jointly with the forces of our friends and allies. Those kinds of arrangements we find are more than adequate to allow the United States to continue to be involved in terms of our military capabilities when it is necessary to do so.

At the Melbourne symposium referred to earlier he also said, discussing this move away from the traditional base structure:

Clearly we need Pearl Harbour... a major facility. Clearly we want to stay forward deployed in Japan. We can do all of that, but we do not need as big a network as we had. The other thing that we are doing is even though we are reducing the size of the force and cutting the defence budget, one of the growth areas of our defence spending is in maritime lift. The kinds of fast ships that will allow us to move heavy forces in a crisis so that we can deploy even more rapidly than we did the last time we had to go to the Gulf. For the first time, we are going to have all the equipment for a heavy brigade of the Army — full of tanks and infantry armoured personnel carriers and artillery have that prepositioned at sea. Better to have it at sea than some place on land. Because it takes time if it is on land — and it might not be in the right place might take a number of weeks to get loaded up and move it. But if we have got it at sea, as we do now, with
equipment, for example, for the Marine Corps, we can be just about any place in the world in a matter of a week or two. And marry up by air, personnel from the United States with that heavy equipment, and be ready to go on short notice. So the whole structure and style of operation is changed enough that I think it is perfectly accurate for us to say Subic was a great facility — we wish we still had it, but it was by no means essential to our being able to maintain our presence in the region, or to operate in any crisis that anybody might be able to dream up that could conceivably require the deployment of US forces.

These rather lengthy statements by Cheney have been given in full as they present in some detail fundamental changes in aspects of US strategic policy that will almost certainly affect the Asia — Pacific region significantly. These changes are quite recent since in an address to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in Tokyo on 22 November 1991 Cheney himself said that six principles for US security policy in Asia included a ‘sufficient overseas base structure’, and that ‘access to overseas bases is an irreplaceable force — multiplier’, Other US spokesmen have discussed these changes previously, but they have not been seen presented in such detail before.

These changes, from what Cheney said in Melbourne, explain the absence of a very strong reaction by the United States to being denied continued use of its Philippine bases, and, possibly, the recent return of three bases on Okinawa. They explain the care taken by Cheney and other US representatives recently to emphasize that the arrangement they have with Singapore is not a basing arrangement, but a cooperative servicing arrangement, and that recent discussions with Australia were over access to new facilities, but not bases, there. It is also clear that the valuable supply, storage, servicing and other facilities in Pearl Harbour, and important forward deployed forces in
Japan, form vital elements in this new strategy and will therefore be retained. Again, during the Melbourne symposium Cheney said:

A vital part of our presence in the Western Pacific, of course, is the kind of thing we do here in Australia, but also our forward deployed forces in Japan. The Independence... comes right out of Yokosuka, Japan. That is where that aircraft carrier battle group is maintained. It is cheaper for us to keep it in Japan than it would be in San Diego because the Japanese pay part of the cost. And, of course, it is forward deployed so that when it is time for us to deal with a crisis, as we had to a year and a half ago in the Gulf, the first carrier on the scene was the Independence. So we are continuing to maintain that presence but the loss of the Philippines, while I think it is unfortunate, primarily from the standpoint of the Philippines, is not debilitating from the standpoint of US military operations.

The logical development for the US Pacific Fleet would be to strengthen the fleet. It will form a fundamental element of this new rapid response strategy and, it would appear, of new Pentagon goals. A leaked copy of a Pentagon document entitled Defence Planning Guidance for 1994—1999, signed by Cheney in May this year, sees United States and other interests in Asia and the Pacific being best served by the United States maintaining its status as a military power of the first magnitude in the region.


The changes that have occurred in the structure of this fleet between mid—1991 and mid—1992 are now examined in the light of the preceding discussion using US Navy lists of its fleets dated 31 May 1991 and 31 March 1992. The source of these is given in reference 4.
### TABLE 2
United States Pacific Fleet mid−1991 and mid−1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carrier</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruiser</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Craft</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces (FF/FFG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type−Submarine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FLEET</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>74+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC Means nuclear capable. NP Means nuclear powered. NA Means nuclear armed.

† It is assumed here that all tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear SLCMs have now been removed from this fleet, and that *the 8 Ohio class* ballistic missile submarines carry some nuclear SLBMs. It must be remembered that tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear SLCMs may be redeployed in a crisis by the US Navy. All or most nuclear capable vessels in the mid−1991 fleet are assumed to have carried some nuclear weapons.

The major changes in the fleet are that while it has been reduced from 240 to 221 vessels, an 8 % reduction, 3 ballistic missile submarines,
SSBN 617 Alexander Hamilton, SSBN 656 George Washington Carver, and SSBN 659 Will Rogers have been transferred from the Atlantic Fleet to this fleet to join the 8 Ohio class SSBNs. Two more aircraft carriers, CV 63 Kitty Hawk and CV 64 Constellation have entered the fleet. The battleship Missouri was retired late in 1991, and 4 guided missile destroyers and 7 frigates have left the fleet. Two Permit class non-nuclear capable attack submarines and one other have also left the fleet.

The number of vessels in the fleet considered to carry nuclear weapons has dropped significantly from 74+ (to include nuclear capable light craft in the 1991 total) to only 8 ballistic missile submarines as a result of the 27 September 1991 reductions in naval nuclear weapons. The three SSBNs that joined the fleet since mid–1991 have, in the past, carried Poseidon SLBMs. According to Dr W. Arkin, Director of Military Research for Greenpeace, all Poseidon missiles have been removed from their launch tubes, and these three submarines are awaiting decommissioning (private communication). So these submarines are not classed as carrying nuclear weapons. The total number of weapons and warheads removed from the Pacific Fleet can now be estimated. The 27 September announcements included the statement that about 500 naval nuclear weapons would be removed, 100 of these being nuclear Tomahawk SLCMs. This refers to the combined US Atlantic and Pacific fleets.

From the US Navy lists used for compiling table 2, these fleets were of nearly the same size in 1991, 83 and 82 surface ships respectively and 6 aircraft carriers, and similar composition although the Atlantic Fleet included considerably more attack (52 to 36) and ballistic missile (25 to 8) submarines at that time. Assuming that about half of the 100 SLCMs and the other 400 weapons were removed from each fleet, the Pacific Fleet lost approximately 50 nuclear Tomahawk SLCMs and 200
nuclear bombs and depth bombs, considerably below the estimates
given earlier of up to 200 nuclear Tomahawks, and about 100 tactical
nuclear weapons on each of the 6 aircraft carriers in the mid-1991
fleet or 600 in total. These are all single warhead weapons, so a total
of about 250 weapons and warheads are assumed to have been removed
from the Pacific Fleet.

This fleet now has the ability to unleash a maximum of 154 megatonnes of
nuclear firepower as Trident 1 SLBMs, or more if some Trident 2 SLBM are
deployed in the fleet. Estimates of the nuclear firepower in the 1991
fleet are difficult since this quantity is very sensitive to the numbers
of each nuclear weapon type carried at the time. The capacities of the
nuclear bombs and depth bombs formerly carried on US aircraft
carriers varied from sub-kilotonne to 20 kilotonne for B57 bombs up
to 1000 kilotonne for B43-1 bombs according to reliable estimates',
and the relative numbers of these and B61 bombs formerly carried is
not known. The total nuclear firepower in the 1991 fleet is estimated
to have been in the range 100 to 250 megatonnes depending on the
actual SLBM and other loadings. The nuclear capacity of the fleet
may have been reduced somewhat since mid-1991, but is still very
large and is now entirely represented by the most formidable leg of the
US strategic nuclear deterrent triad. The Pacific Fleet's war fighting potential
is possibly greater now than it was in mid-1991 according to some analysts,
because the removal of nuclear Tomahawks with pre-programmed targets gives
the Navy much more flexibility and mobility, and the removal of tactical
nuclear weapons allows a shift from time-consuming planning for nuclear war
at sea to training with conventional weapons and joint operations with other
nations'.

These views reflect the formidable conventional capability of the Navy as
shown by the success in the Gulf War of Tomahawk and other smart weapons.
The US Pacific Fleet has the capability to carry up to approximately 1100 Tomahawk SLCMs, usually as a mixture of the 2, 500 kilometre and the 460 kilometre variants, on cruisers, destroyers and attack submarines\textsuperscript{5,7}. The aircraft carriers provide air strike capabilities that proved very effective when used in combination with SLCMs in the Gulf War, the latter being used to destroy heavily defended targets that pose a serious threat to air strikes\textsuperscript{4}.

Having cruise missile capability on vessels other than carriers also reduces the need to have a carrier at every hot spot around the globe. The effectiveness of SLCMs should increase if improved guidance systems and cruise missile versions are introduced.

The overall conclusion is that the US Pacific Fleet has definitely not become a less powerful fleet since mid—1991, and now represents a very strong offensive force in the Asia—Pacific region, a force not designed for defensive roles only. This is what would be expected to match the new elements of US strategy discussed earlier, and conforms with the recent Pentagon goals stated. It should be noted that the United States has not abandoned its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons (NCND)\textsuperscript{17}. This means that countries like Japan that have non—nuclear principles or policies and have US Navy ship visits will still have to accept visits by US nuclear capable vessels on trust for the present, as they have in the past.


As stated earlier, it has proved difficult to obtain accurate and current information concerning this fleet and current Russian or CIS military policy relevant to the present discussion. The material given in the following table is taken from reliable sources, The Military Balance 1991—1992 (MB) and Jane’s Fighting Ships 1991—1992 (J) (see
ref. 5), but may not include all very recent developments in the fleet. Entries for both sources are included to show the extent of agreement between them. It is again assumed that the removal of tactical and SLCM nuclear weapons announced in October 1991 has been completed.

### TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type—Surface</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MB J</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleship</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carrier</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruiser</td>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>7-10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>45-55</td>
<td>11-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>64-82</td>
<td>33-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Craft</td>
<td>about 450(MB)</td>
<td>some</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type—Submarine</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile</td>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>13-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>70-90</td>
<td>70-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>93-116</td>
<td>83-116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC Means nuclear capable. NP Means nuclear powered. NA Means nuclear armed.
* See table 2 comment.

These sources show no change in the number of ballistic missile submarines in this fleet. The Military Balance gave 24, and Jane's gave 23 in their 1990-1991 editions. Yet both Gorbachev and Yeltsin spoke of the removal of 6 such vessels, but possibly not from the Pacific Fleet. The reduction in the total fleet, excluding light craft since these are difficult to categorise, is from 174 to 157 according to The Military Balance, and from 180 to 154 according to Jane's,
changes of about 10% and 14% respectively compared to a reduction of 8% in the US Pacific Fleet.

As with the US fleet, the major change in nuclear capability for the Russian Pacific Fleet has resulted or will result from the removal of tactical and SLCM nuclear weapons. Estimates of the numbers of these in the 1991 fleet were given earlier, but these may not be very reliable and were not very detailed. It is not possible to give a meaningful estimate of the number of warheads removed from the fleet, or their equivalent firepower.

From the data given in table 3 there has been no obvious reduction in the number of SLBMs the fleet can deploy. The mixture of warhead types carried by these submarines is not known, nor is the status of the steps announced by President Yeltsin early this year and described above. So any estimate of the firepower carried as SLBMs is very approximate, but this could be extremely high, hundreds of megatonnes for a fully armed fleet.

This fleet also has the ability to deploy SLCMs and other conventional weapons, an estimate of possibly up to 300 SLCMs was given earlier. The actual numbers and distribution of weapon types is so uncertain in the light of recent developments that no assessment of the conventional capability will be given for the fleet. Further, as far as is known, these weapons have not been tested in conflict in the way their US equivalents were in the Gulf War.

These estimates seem rather meaningless in any case when statements concerning the present state of FSU forces and navies are considered. Richard Solomon, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, reported to the Senate subcommittee on that region on 30 October 1991 (18):

Even before the failed coup of August 19, the Soviet military
threat in the region had significantly declined. Moscow is reducing troop strength in the Northern Territories, continuing to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay, and decreasing the Soviet Pacific ocean activities of its naval forces. Nevertheless, there remains in the Far East substantial Soviet military assets which have not been reduced, and modernization of Soviet forces there continues. We anticipate, however, further reductions in the Soviet military presence in the region in the light of the on-going transformation of the Soviet Union.

Other reports confirm the reduction in FSU presence in Cam Ranh Bay, the last major warship having returned to Vladivostok on 22 December 1991. The complete evacuation of the base may be completed very soon, if it has not occurred already.

Writing in the US Naval Institute Proceedings in January 1992, Norman Polmar, a recognised authority on the Soviet Navy, said:

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to massive disarray in most Soviet institutions, including the Soviet Navy. A fleet that a few years ago was impressive for its size and war-fighting potential, is today mostly tied up or riding at anchor in Russian and Ukrainian ports. Shipyards that a few years ago were producing a veritable stream of surface warships and submarines, as well as high tech naval ships and ‘vehicles’, today appear to be grinding to a halt. Indeed, for the first time since the late 1950’s there are no cruiser type ships under construction in Russian shipyards. In fact, the future of the Soviet Navy’s aircraft carrier program is in doubt.

Captain W H Manthorpe US Navy (retired), frequent commentator on the Soviet Navy, in the February 1992 issue of the same publication wrote:

...the fate of the Soviet Navy is now in question. That navy,
viewed as a strong, modern, blue-water force when it was inherited by Admiral Chernavin six years ago, is now scrapping ships, declining in readiness, and staying close to home waters.

He noted that the Northern and Pacific fleets are based wholly within the territory of the Russian Republic, and thus do not face the same command and control problems evident for the Black Sea Fleet. This supports the earlier contention that the FSU Pacific Fleet is now a Russian fleet. It appears to face serious support problems according to the Red Star which on September 6 1991 reported after discussions with the Chief of Combat Training for the Soviet Navy²,¹₈:

...the cut in funding for defence has produced a growing wave of problems. The Navy was not pampered, even in the past, with ship repair services, and the periods between repairs now have increased even more. There is not enough oil, fuel, and paint... They have to worry about even emery paper, not to speak of sets of spare parts, instruments and accessories, targets, simulators, and different technical and other equipment essential for combat training... The ships are no longer dispatched to sea to practice some individual combat exercises. A system of in-base exercises has been introduced for example... There is a shortage of simulators at the bases, however.

Captain Manthorpe reported sources confirming plans to stop the production of aircraft carriers for the FSU navy, and concluded with the statement, 'Perhaps at this time there is no good news for the (FSU) navy'.

Cheney summed up the situation in his 28 May 1992 Singapore press conference:

It is true the Soviets are withdrawing from Cam Ranh Bay, but they are withdrawing all over the globe. They no longer operate
in the Indian Ocean. They have very little naval activity of any kind any place in the world, including the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. They are withdrawing all of their forces from Europe.

In the face of such statements, it is meaningless to attempt to make assessments of weapons numbers and naval strengths for the Russian Pacific Fleet. Furthermore it seems clear that this fleet, although it may still be large numerically, can no longer be classed as a superpower fleet as it was only a few years ago.

THE ASIA – PACIFIC POWER VACUUM: REALITY OR MYTH?

The possibility of a power vacuum developing in the region following the superpower reductions discussed was raised several times during Cheneys May 1992 visit to Singapore, Indonesia and Australia. His answer was always the same.

There are those who are concerned, and rightly so, about what might happen were we to withdraw from Asia. It is no one’s interest for power vacuum to withdraw from Asia. It is one’s interest for a power vacuum to develop or for the regional balance of influence of influence and power to be destroyed.

Again, ‘we do not believe the withdrawal from the Philippines will create a vacuum in the region’. The withdrawal ‘should not be interpreted by anyone as indication that the United States is going to withdraw from the region or leave a vacuum’. ‘We do not perceive a vacuum here in this part of the globe at all.’

Regarding US commitment to the Asia – Pacific region he said in Australia, echoing numerous other recent US statements:

‘...there will not be any reduction in the US commitment to the region, in our ability to participate with our friends and allies, in our capacity, if you will, to deploy military forces to protect our
interests and those of our friends.

And in Singapore when asked how the United States would respond if Japan, China and India were to fill a power vacuum there, he said:

The United States, first of all, I would argue, does not perceive a vacuum in this part of the world. I would restate that again if I might. I do not believe that our friends perceive that there is a vacuum here with respect to the kinds of activities that are undertaken by our friends in terms of their military— to—military relationships. Those are matters for them to discuss and to decide on. We have got excellent relationships with Japan, with Thailand. We have got, I think, improving relationships where India is concerned. We have got historic relationships with Pakistan. I do not see that there is any fundamental change underway in those relationships or any need for the United States pursue policy other than the ones we have pursued in the past, which is we want good relationships with all of the nations in this region. We are eager to develop good working relationships with as many as possible, and we will continue with those policies.

On the basis of these statements, and frequent recent pronouncements of US determination to remain a strong regional for a considerable period, it is argued that the feared power vacuum in the region is a myth. No change is envisaged in the foreseeable future as Cheney confirmed when speaking to the National Press Club on 20 May 1992 in Washington. Regarding Asia, He said the United States plans to maintain military forces in the region because it is in the interest of everyone. If US forces were to withdraw from the area, he said, 'we would create a vacuum and sooner or later someone would come along and try and fill it.'
CONCLUSION

There is no power vacuum developing in the Asia-Pacific region as a result of superpower force withdrawals. The United States does not want this, and has no intention of letting such a situation develop with some other regional power becoming too dominant. The FSU is in no condition at present to exert superpower influence. While the United States is reducing its fixed forces and bases in the region it is developing compensating capabilities adequate in its view to deal with any crisis in the region. As Cheney said in Singapore this May, ‘The US has the capability to now to operate our military forces... around the world often with minimal reliance upon bases.’

Changes in the US Pacific Fleet reflect this new strategy. The fleet now has formidable deterrent capacity in its long range SLBMs, and demonstrated conventional strike capacity in its intermediate range and short range high technology SLCMs and other weapons. These far outweigh the power of any other regional navy, and represent major elements, some forward deployed, in this new US strategy. The 27 September 1991 nuclear weapons reductions, while very praiseworthy, have not yielded a significantly weaker US Pacific Fleet.

The Russian Pacific Fleet is almost certainly in a state of increasing disarray. It will not be capable of becoming a superpower navy again, should this ever be intended, until the economies of the CIS partners improve very significantly. This seems likely to be a slow process in which military spending could, if anything, decrease further in importance. China is the only other declared nuclear weapons power in the region, and has some nuclear capable naval forces, up to three submarine that can carry SLBMs. But China is far from attaining superpower naval status, although it would be a formidable military foe.

There is only one superpower in the region now, and one superpower
navy, and the United States seems determined that this is how the situation will remain, to safeguard US interests. Referring to his May visit, Cheney said that:

the purpose of my trip... is to reassure our friends in the region that the US remains firmly committed to our continued in security arrangements in Asia and the Pacific.

At the Melbourne symposium referred to earlier he said:

The US will continue to strengthen an already strong system of bilateral security arrangements. Over the last four decades these arrangements have been remarkably successful.

In addition, he, and President Bush in January 1992 in Singapore, both indicated that the United States will seek new access agreements and arrangements with countries in the region like Australia and ASEAN members. Bush noted that, 'The ASEAN nations are working with the US to craft new and flexible arrangements to ensure the common defence.'

At the same time the United States position regarding proposals for multilateral security arrangements remains unclear. Cheney would not answer directly questions relating to such proposals this May. By contrast, Richard Solomon in a presentation entitled, 'From Cold War to Hot Economies: America and Asian Security in an Era of Geoeconomics' to the Pacific Rim Forum in San Diego on 15 May 1992 said, speaking of the sort of access agreements already referred to, that as well as these, 'We are prepared to discuss appropriate security issues in the ASEAN - PMC forum - And Hot Economies.' The Post - Ministerial Conference (PMC) forum is effectively a multilateral forum.

The basis for this strong US concern with security in the region was also emphasised in May by Cheney. In Melbourne he said:

We have a large and a growing economic stake here. We are
committed to the promotion and expansion of human rights and democracy. And we believe that no single state should assume unchecked power over this important region. Power that could threaten peace.

This echoed a statement by Bush in South Korea in January 1992 that:

an unstable Asia does not serve our interests, nor does a poverty stricken or a repression ridden Asia. We need an Asia – Pacific region that is free and productive, and our security presence provides a foundation for mutual prosperity and for shared defence.

The material presented in this study and a preceding study in August 1991 (8) make it clear, however, that a single state now has unmatched power in the region, the United States. How this situation should be viewed by region is a very important question that needs urgent attention, but is outside the scope of this study.

This US military dominance will, nevertheless, have to be exercised with caution and restraint. The United States no longer enjoys the same level of economic dominance in the region, and needs good relations with other strong economies there. Further, it is increasingly clear that economic and environmental considerations are rapidly becoming important factors in the security dynamics of the region, and this will modify military relationships and influence.

Solomon in his 15 May presentation said in relation to the recent period of tremendous change following the end of the Cold War:

Amidst the uncertainty and turbulence that characterizes this period of dramatic transition, however, one fundamental trend is clear: we are entering the age of geoconomics, with flows of trade, finance and technology shaping the power realities and the politics of a new era. To be sure, military power remains a
significant component of national strength, but in today’s world technological and commercial capabilities as much as military strength are the defining elements of national power and influence.

In Japan in January 1992 President Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa agreed to a detailed action plan called, ‘A Strategy for Would Growth’ to promote bilateral trade and the economic strength of the two countries, referred to as the Tokyo Declaration.

Solomon on 15 May said:

Japan remains the keystone of our engagement in East Asia – and the world. With some 40% of the world Gross National Product between us, a cooperative US – Japan partnership can be – and must be – a major factor in shaping the post – Cold War world. This was the vision embodied in the Tokyo Declaration of global partnership issued... in January.

Regarding rapid developers in Asia that present daunting challenges for US policy he said, ‘We have a gameplan for meeting these challenges. Economics is in command!’

These are important matters for the whole region, but must be the subject of another study.

REFERENCES


Conflict Resolution in Melanesia: West Papua, East Timor, Bougainville — and Australia

Peter King

Conflict Resolution in Melanesia: West Papua, East Timor, Bougainville — and Australia

The most delicate challenges for Australian security policy lie in relations with PNG and Indonesia, our nearest neighbours. The conventional wisdom in Canberra is that Australia must prop up the post-colonial state in PNG at almost any cost against threats from within (such as Bougainville) and without (such as Indonesia), while simultaneously building the best possible relationship with Jakarta. Two nightmares haunt this policy:

— a falling out between PNG and Indonesia over West Papua — or the disintegration of the PNG state — either of which would almost certainly embroil us with Indonesia; and

— an escalation of violence and repression in East Timor, which might force Australia to take the kind of principled human rights stand

which has been so loudly proclaimed and even followed by Canberra in remoter places like South Africa and the Middle East.

This chapter argues that Canberra's 'prop up the state' PNG policy arises out of a concept of security which is short-sighted, elite-centred, state-centric, militarized and 'law-and-order' driven. Having linked a priori the security of Australia with that of the PNG state, Canberra appears blind to the fact that the PNG elite, and many of the foreign companies with which it cooperates, are becoming a major source of insecurity for the people of Papua New Guinea. It is PNG's politicians and bureaucrats who profit when foreign companies exploit PNG's forests for timber, whatever the impact upon local communities and the ecology. It was the PNG government which failed to make the required regular reviews of the 1974 Bougainville mine agreement, thus allowing grievances on the island to escalate until they exploded in 1989. It is the government's own 'security' forces which now loom as a threat to PNG's fragile and much abused constitutional order. Yet Canberra continues to offer remarkably uncritical economic and military support to this government. In response to threats from secessionists and 'raskol' gangs, Canberra augments police as well as military aid, thus ignoring Bougainville's profound grievances about the behaviour of the security forces, and accepting a definition of 'law and order' which largely ignores elite corruption and misbehaviour.

Canberra’s ‘befriend Indonesia’ policy is likewise focussed on a friendship between states rather than peoples. Like the PNG state, the Suharto regime is a significant source of insecurity for its people: notably for the East Timorese and West Papuans – neither of whom accept rule from Jakarta – but also for the many other groups who have suffered from repressive, corrupt and authoritarian rule. In the interests of realpolitik, commercial advantage and short-run tranquillity Australia has turned a blind eye to these problems. Yet they will not go away, and have the potential to wreck the ‘befriend Indonesia’ policy entirely.

Also casting doubt on the ‘befriend Indonesia’ line is an Australian defence policy whose principal aim is to defend Australia’s north against a campaign of harassment coming ‘from or through the archipelago to our north’.¹ The policy has been coupled with an unprecedented peace-time build up of Australian naval and air strike capacity, and an ongoing transfer of military assets to the north and west. Although assiduous Australian reassurance since 1986 appears to have largely quelled Indonesian concern over a possible ‘threat from the South’, the policies which have been called the new Australian militarism also jeopardize the ‘befriend Indonesia’ policy.

In this chapter I make the case for a major rethinking of the security dimension of Australia’s relations with both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. I will provide the background behind a series of policy proposals, which are offered as a contribution to what should become an intense debate. One might sum up these proposals as they relate to Indonesia with the phrase ‘speak harshly, but carry a small stick’ and, as they relate to PNG, with ‘keep the bastards (in Port Moresby) honest and the foreign rip-off merchants at bay’.

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Australia and Indonesia

I shall argue that there are two principal kinds of conflict resolution applicable to the vexed relationship between Australia and Indonesia as it has developed over the past 40 years. First there are settlements of state-to-state disputes or potential disputes-settlements which seek to avert trouble developing in diplomatic and strategic relations by applying principles of realpolitik to conflicts involving the suppression of self-determination and the denial of human rights. Examples of this would be Australian acquiescence in the Indonesian annexations of West Papua in 1969, and, especially, of East Timor in 1976. In December 1989 Australia's recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor was carried a stage further with the conclusion of the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty, which drew a new maritime boundary of 250 kms. with Indonesia and included an agreement on resource exploitation (with a substantial zone for joint exploitation of oil and gas resources) in the Timor Sea. The other kind of conflict resolution—of which there are no examples yet—would address the aspirations and rights of minority peoples in Eastern Indonesia, whose suppression and denial by governments in Jakarta has almost continuously troubled Indonesia's bilateral relationship with Australia since the 1960s.

Unless the profound commitment of the people of East Timor and West Papua to self-determination and independence is respected by Australia and accommodated by Indonesia, there is a long-term danger, not only of perpetual trouble in the Australia–Indonesia bilateral relationship, but of upheavals ahead in Timor, West Papua and Papua New Guinea itself, which could wreck that relationship. A form of Australian preventive diplomacy is required which would involve addressing rather than sidestepping human rights issues. To
this end, I shall argue, Australia must relate to Indonesia in a radically new way to build a sound long-term relationship between peoples as well as governments. In view of looming political instability in Indonesia with the passing of the Suharto regime, Australia must also strive to avoid over-identification with any particular ruling clique, pending the democratisation of Indonesia’s highly repressive, authoritarian and corrupt politics, which will come in time.

In the Hawke government’s view as of mid-1991, the relationship with Jakarta has fully recovered from the shock which derailed it in 1986, the so-called Jenkins Affairs. In that extraordinary episode, a front-page article in the Sydney Morning Herald, ‘And Now for the Suharto Billions’, which likened the Suharto family’s corruptly acquired corporate and financial empire to that of the recently deposed Marcos family in the Philippines, precipitated a stormy patch between Canberra and Jakarta lasting for many months in which correspondents were expelled and barred, ministerial visits cancelled, ongoing negotiations suspended and the Australian government blamed for its presumed collusion with Jakarta’s Fourth Estate enemies in Australia.²

Since this unfortunate episode the relationship with Jakarta has become more substantial than ever before, in Canberra’s view, thanks to the diligence and determination of Australian diplomacy and the influence of moderate civilian counterparts in Indonesia, especially successive Foreign Ministers, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas. Apart from the Timor Gap treaty (ten years in the making) there has been collaboration rather than competition in efforts to move the Cambodian civil war towards a settlement;³ the Labor government’s regional economic initiative, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), has met with approval among ASEAN countries, including Indonesia,⁴ and an Australian media presence has been restored in Jakarta, while

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an Australian–Indonesia Institute, launched by agreement between the two governments in 1989 has placed high priority on promoting journalistic exchanges and training programs between the two countries.₅
(The new Institute, modelled on the pre-existing Australia–Japan Foundation and Australia–China Foundation, has been set up inside the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade with an initial budget of $700,000, and a brief to support, subsidise and facilitate cultural, business and academic activities and exchanges. A counterpart institution is to be established in Jakarta eventually.₆)

Treaties: Australia–PNG and PNG–Indonesia

Finally, the government points to new developments in both PNG–Indonesia relations and PNG–Australia relations which seen to stabilise the two PNG legs of the much discussed (if existent) Australia–Indonesia–PNG triangle, which have shown signs of shakiness often in the past. The Joint Declaration of Principles agreed between Canberra and Port Moresby in 1987 replaced a much less formal and onerous Australian security commitment of 1977 with a new agreement that the two sides will consult and consider action together in the event of aggression against either.₇

This ANZUS–like undertaking to PNG was adopted in the teeth of opposition from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and its then Minister, Bill Hayden. DFAT has traditionally contended that a formal security guarantee of PNG might offend Indonesia or over-encourage Port Moresby and lead to trouble and even collisions in the handling of sensitive Irian border issues. But in fact the security provisions of the JDP seem to have had little influence one way or the other up to now, although they may have marginally reassured those disgruntled nationalists among PNG's elite who have been

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arguing for years that Australia cannot trusted.  

The JDP may also be construed in retrospect as symbolising Australia’s rather dubious commitment to PNG unity at any price, which was shortly to become manifest in the Hawke government’s seemingly open-ended military and financial support over the next four years for PNG’s disastrous ‘security’ operation against the secessionist rebels of Bougainville in the North Solomons province.

The other item of triangular reinforcement was Port Moresby’s new agreement with Jakarta—the Treaty for Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation, initiated at Port Moresby’s request and signed in 1986. This treaty foreshadowed a more intense effort at avoiding a repetition of the border and refugee problems which followed the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka: West Papuan liberation movement) uprising in Jayapura and elsewhere in Irian Jaya during 1984; a commitment to more cross-border trade and more social and political interaction centred on the northern border towns of Jayapura (in Irian Jaya) and Vanimo (capital of PNG’s West Sepik province), and a new determination to achieve more intimate understanding between military and political elites in the two countries. PNG also hoped to solidify its ASEAN relationships generally, free of Australian tutelage as far as possible.

Australia applauded the new ‘maturity’ of PNG relations with Jakarta—and PNG’s policy has indeed shown the kind of toughness at the expense of the West Papuan liberation movement which Canberra has been urging on Port Moresby for nearly 20 years, just as Canberra’s own policy towards East Timor recently has shown a new level of toughness at the expense of the Timorese people. Thus by 1991 it was Canberra’s perception that a positive ledger balance in the Australia–Indonesia relationship has been achieved—albeit somewhat painfully—
since 1986. However, it can quite readily be demonstrated that none of the bureaucratically gratifying developments sketched above have solved or even salved any of the deep problems in the bilateral relationship—especially not the conflicts and injustices and incompatibilities which give rise to those problems.

East Timor

In East Timor the Fretilin resistance to Jakarta's occupation survives all attempts by Defence Minister General Benny Murdani to talk and repress it out of existence. Indeed, since 1989 there has been an upsurge of nationalism among the students of Dili, with strong support from the local Catholic hierarchy; and the former colonial power, Portugal, remains adamant that the Timor Gap treaty is illegal—that it denies the right of the Timorese people to dispose of their own resources. Portugal is determined to take Australia to the International Court of Justice.

Australian official spokespersons, from the foreign minister on down, have been forced into erroneous, self-contradictory and otherwise shifty discourse on the Timor issue: Australian opinion remains inflamed 17 years after the unexplained killing by the Indonesian army of four Australian journalists who witnessed the takeover of Bacau. Thus Gareth Evans argues that, while abuses continue in Timor, they are moderating—partly under the influence of Australia, whose quiet human concern should now take the form of directly aiding development programs and encouraging the Timorese to accept their fate. Canberra still ostensibly accepts Benny Murdani's line that Fretilin is an insignificant force in decline, and that its struggle is hopeless.

For Richard Woolcott, permanent head of Foreign Affairs and Trade and former ambassador to Indonesia (1975–8), exonerating Indonesian
over Timor is an important sub-plot in the larger drama of celebrating President Suharto's 'New Order' for giving Indonesians '22 years of relative calm':

It was only that he [Suharto] was concerned that a chaotic situation was developing [in Timor]—a civil war starting, and Fretilin's connection with Cuba and the Soviet Union. They [sic] simply took the decision that they were not prepared to allow... Indonesia to be threatened by, a weak, unstable mini-state in East Timor.¹³

It is hard to decide whether to be more offended here by the tendentious historiography or the slightly scandalous (however unconscious) identification with a regime which began with a bloodbath (for Dick Woolcott, 'a massive upheaval'),¹⁴ and has always had the worst democratic and human rights credentials in our neighbourhood—above all in Timor, where there have been upwards of 200,000 deaths as a result of invasion, occupation, resistance, repression, dislocation (often deliberate), famine and avoidable disease.

The Dilli massacre of 12 November 1991—when security forces fired on unarmed mourner—demonstrators without any direct provocation—merely confirmed what close observers of the scene had long known: that thousands of Timorese are prepared to die for independence and that the key players in Indonesia's military leadership (Murdani, Sutrisno) will condone indiscriminate killing in order to block the resistance.¹⁵ It is the murderous attitudes in Jakarta which clearly disqualify Indonesia as a legitimate ruler—and now, since the events of November 12, create an opportunity for international action to bring about self-determination for the Timorese.

Irian Jaya/West Papua

Timor is one long-running conflict which will not go away at any
time soon. The former Dutch colony, West Papua (Irian Jaya), is another. Indonesia occupied West Papua in 1963 and annexed it after the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969. Following PNG’s independence in 1975 Canberra’s fundamental attitude has been one of neutrality on border and related issues as between its two friends, Port Moresby and Jakarta. The Foreign Affairs Department line has been to discourage PNG from showing Melanesian solidarity with West Papuans, on the one hand, and to avoid conflict with Indonesia at almost any cost, on the other. And indeed, as I have suggested above, despite the 1987 Joint Declaration of Principles which seemed to undercut this traditional line, the Namaliu government since 1988 has made a rather ominous rapprochement with Jakarta over border and refugee issues.

There has been a PNG consulate in Jayapura since 1989, and an Indonesian consulate is planned for Vanimo. In August 1990 PNG foreign minister Michael Somare announced that the Derence Force would destroy OPM camps on the PNG side of the border, while Defence Minister Ben Sabumei promised co-ordinated joint patrols with Indonesia’s armed forces (ABRI) in the border region—something which PNG had prided itself on avoiding or rejecting for 15 years.

These commitments were undertaken in the same week that Somare make a formal protest to Jakarta about Indonesian military incursions into PNG and the killing of PNG citizens, and they followed an episode in which PNG and Australia acted ingloriously in concert to cope with a fresh upheaval in Jayapura. A planned OPM flag-raising demonstration was nipped in the bud by police and red beret commandos, who arrested hundreds of people and detained a number of Cenderawasih University students indefinitely. Four Irianese who sought asylum inside the PNG consulate in Jayapura were handed over to the Indonesians, apparently after the Australian Embassy in Jakarta
weighed in against them.” (They ‘left of their own volition’, according to Gareth Evans.)

When in July 1990 PNG deported OPM deputy leader Melky Salosa to Jayapura, criminal charges against him had actually been dropped—and deportation to a third country is a recourse which PNG has quite often used in more humane and temperate times. This point did not deflect Gareth Evans from condoning the deportation on the ground that Salosa did not have refugee status. Salosa was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. In mid-1991 his body was found on the PNG-West Papua border. The Indonesian authorities say that he died from hunger one week after escaping from prison; but, according to West Papuan sources, the Indonesian military executed him and fabricated the escape as an excuse.21

Indonesia and ‘Stability’ in PNG

What we might call Austral-asian convergence on Melanesian issues advanced a step further on another front in early 1990. During a visit to Jakarta Australian Federal Opposition leader John Hewson was told by Benny Murdani that PNG lacked the troops required to crush the Bougainville rebellion, and that Australia should give more help. ‘It would not be healthy for the region if Bougainville was allowed to secede’, said the Indonesian Defence Minister.22 (Such a development would be particularly unhealthy for Indonesian control over East Timor and West Papua). Actually the Federal government, which had delivered military helicopters to the PNG Defence Force in 1989, had no disagreement with Murdani, as a spokesperson for foreign minister Evans made clear.22 Whether attempts to devise a political solution based on constitutional autonomy for Bougainville will meet with Indonesian (or Australian) disapproval remains to be seen. But clearly
the Australian government is not prepared at present to actively promote this kind of solution for Bougainville, let alone West Papua or East Timor.

Benny Murdani pretty clearly envisaged that Jakarta might feel responsible for ‘stability’ in PNG in certain circumstances—if Australia appeared to be defaulting on its responsibilities. And there is indeed a worrying pattern in PNG—Indonesian relations over recent years, which lends colour to the possibility of Indonesian intervention. Senior PNG military officers—both whilst in office and after retirement—have been a conduit for subversive pressures emanating from Indonesia. In 1987 Tony Huai, Defecne Force Commander in the Paias Wingti government, admitted accepting gifts from then Indonesian Armed Forces Commander Benny Murdani during an unauthorised trip to Jakarta in return for leaking confidential details of Australian negotiations with PNG over the Joint Declaration of Principles which was achieved in that year—and which Huai opposed.24 Huai has been especially vociferous in speaking out against the OPM—which is of course a thorn in Jakarta’s side, and one which PNG has been repeatedly pressed to help eradicate.

Ted Diro was also on Benny Murdani’s gift list during his fund-raising efforts as People’s Action Party leader before the 1987 national elections. Murdani’s contribution, during Diro’s visit to Jakarta for the signing of the new PNG/Indonesia cooperation treaty in 1986, was US$139,400, no less. In 1987 Diro was charged with perjury over evidence he gave concerning this gift before the Barnett inquiry into forestry corruption; but he escaped punishment on a legal technicality. Would it be unreasonable to see at least a potential pattern of Indonesian interference in these episodes—and might not the ruling Indonesian generals be especially sympathetic towards a military-controlled and
anti-OPM government in PNG?

Defence Minister Sabumemi and Foreign Minister Somare are now closer to the Australians than any government leaders PNG’s independent history. During the visit of ABRI Commander-in-Chief General Tri Sutrisno to PNG in December 1990—the first by an Indonesian army leader since 1975—Ben Sabumemi called for joint military exercises with Jakarta, and made a remark which puzzled some observers, but which in fact simply reflects a history of close communion (often at the expense of the POM) between the two military services: ‘Our two armed forces must be seen as an instrument or catalyst to bring about change in the attitudes and preconceived views that exist between the people of our two countries’, said Ben Sabumemi. How better to bring about such change than through military predominance in PNG politics?

The new Jakarta/Jayapura-Vamino/Port Moresby honeymoon is ostensibly one that Canberra favours: it certainly represents a substantial diversification in PNG’s foreign relations as well as some potential for reduced dependence on Australia. But the long term implications are troubling not only for PNG itself but for Australia and regional peace as well. Ethno-nationalism in Irian, in Timor and in Bougainville cannot be repressed in the long run, not even by a grand triangular collusion of the Big Three of the Western South Pacific—and in any case the human rights implications of such collusion could be intolerable, not least inside PNG itself.

Papua New Guinea and Security

The revolutionary changes remaking the face of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and hence the very structure of superpower relations, have been slow to yield a ‘peace dividend’ in the South-East Asia/
South-West Pacific region. But in the second half of 1991 the prospects for big power demilitarization brightened with the Philippines Senate’s rejection of US bases and President Bush’s new global anti-nuclear initiative. If US ‘forward defence’ of Asia Pacific was in retreat there was still some continuing potential for outside military intervention in the South Pacific, at least—for instance from France, Indonesia and Australia.

Nevertheless, an impressive consensus has developed over the past few years that the security problems of Pacific island states such as PNG are much more than military. Paradoxically, but not unexpectedly in view of experience elsewhere in the Third World, in both PNG and Fiji the forces established to secure society from threats without have recently become prime threats to social and political stability within.

Security, as many peace researchers have begun to argue, has ecological, social, political and economic as well as military dimensions. Threats to security can develop internally as well as externally. Even if they originate externally, they may readily leapfrog the conventional defences of the state and of society: military forces, customs regulations, investment and taxation regimes, labour and immigration laws, resource protection measures, laws against foreign political funding of elections and so forth.

The most vital external security issues facing PNG arise out of Jakarta’s continuing rule across the border in Irian Jaya/West Papua. These have an important military dimension, whether security is pursued by cooperating with Indonesian efforts to crush the West Papuan liberation movement (as at present), or by a PNG effort (ideally backed by Australia) to uphold the rights of West Papuan refugees and to encourage a negotiated settlement between the OPM and Jakarta. Yet General Murdani’s corrupt payments to PNG leaders
suggest that one kind of Indonesian threat has already leapfrogged PNG's conventional defences and subverted state policy.

Having already dwelt on this issue, I will now focus on two other dimensions of threat of PNG: resource destruction, environmental degradation and economic failure on the one hand, and political decay and disintegration on the other. The two are in fact becoming closely linked, and they are being driven by international pressures and connections which we are only now beginning to adequately comprehend. The pressure is coming from large international companies which are hungry for resources, especially timber; and which can readily, corrupt connections with local political, business and bureaucratic elites. The corporations include both ostensibly respectable ones and overtly cowboy ones—they are or have been Australian and Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese, Singaporean and (above all, in PNG) Malaysian. The list of past and prospective damage to be assessed is lengthy—from irreversible destruction of forests and fauna to massive avoidance of tax and royalty payments; from the debauching of political and administrative processes to the contamination of village water supplies. Even where corruption is not significantly present, as in the mining industries, the multinational corporate assault on national resources involves a close bond with the local modernizing elite which is in charge of parliaments and public services and is responding to popular hunger for 'development' at almost any cost. When local industry is exiguous or unprofitable, and external aid is declining, the short cut to a balanced and expanding budget—with sustainable salaries for demanding bureaucrats, and schools, clean water and aid posts for the people—is a big mine. Papua New Guinea will soon have (or have had) five—Bougainville in North Solomons province and Ok Tedi in Western province (copper and gold), and Missima in Milne Bay
province, Lihir in New Ireland province and Porgere in Enga province (gold). The downside of mining dependence of course is that a mine leaves a nasty hole in more than one sense if shut down. In North Solomons the Bougainville Revolutionary Army has dug a 17 per cent hole in the PNG budget.25

The other large problem of mining is ecological damage which can entail loss of livelihood for the people, and thus unemployment, urban drift, social division and political turmoil. On Bougainville the end result of large-scale mining in a closely knit traditional community has been rebellion, civil war and de facto secession. No one knows whether the secession can be overcome and the mine reopened. At Ok Tedi in the Western province the bills are just starting to come in. The mine, which is in very remote, wet and rugged country, has only recently turned a profit after almost ten years of production. The mining company management has forced the PNG government, as 20 per cent owner of the company, to waive the expensive but ecologically essential requirement of a permanent tailings dam. The result will probably be massive chemical pollution and poisoning of the Fly river and devastation of the livelihood of tens of thousands of river dwellers who have had nothing but vague promises of compensation from the government. Ok Tedi mine, with its near-total dependence on the Fly for supplies and for export of copper, is as vulnerable to blockade as Bougainville was to rebellion. In January 1992, a clear indication that Bougainville problem is not ‘one-off’ emerged with the closing of the (comparatively) small Mt. Kare gold mine in Enga province (half owned by CRA), following a destructive assault by an organized gang apparently representing dissatisfied landowners. The huge Porgera mine nearby was immediately perceived to be under threat.

In Papua New Guinea forestry is the resource industry with the
biggest potential for causing ecological and social breakdown. It has become an essential case study in the business of resources plunder, ecological devastation and political and administrative corruption. What is ultimately at issue in the light of such gross (and still unchecked) exploitation, destruction and abuse of office as has now been documented in PNG is the survival of democratic political processes. According to the findings of Judge Tos Barnett's commission of inquiry into the forestry industry (1987–9), PNU's forest industry is totally out of control.

A magnificent resource is being devastated by foreign interests in corrupt collusion with local and national political notables, senior civil servants and comprador businessmen—and in the process the livelihood and well-being of entire communities of traditional landowners are being set at naught. The foreign companies—the worst offenders are Malaysian companies which have already devastated the forests of Sarawak and Sabah—employ divisive tactics and make fraudulent promises to local landholders, and then set up landowner front companies which are used to pressure the national government into granting timber leases. Once leases are granted—and often before they are—the following rules of the game are normal for the foreign companies:

1. Having promised the earth in the logging agreement—sawmills, wharves, permanent roads, schools, housing, reforestation—you should actually deliver nothing or next to nothing. Licenses are never fully withdrawn in practice for failure to fulfil the terms of a logging agreement.

2. When logging is in progress you should continue to bribe politicians, civil servants, and other 'elites', who should be given concealed shareholdings in the landowner companies. You should also
continue to play off landowners against each other; but make sure that you defraud your own ‘friendly’ landholders by, for instance, illegally charging royalty payments to their share of profits, which in any case will be grossly understated. (Only one of the companies investigated by Judge Barnett had ever declared a profit in PNG.)

3. Plunder, rather than husband your resource—and as rapidly as possible, in case the political wind changes. You should log near waterways and on steep slopes, clear felling where possible; but at the same time don’t hesitate to let valuable logs rot if they fail to meet the exacting standards of Japanese importers. (Rip out and rip off practices are particularly prominent where companies which are grossly undercapitalised meet their initial capital requirements by rapid plunder of the most valuable rare timbers).

4. Mis-state the quality (species) and quantity of logs exported in order to minimise your royalty payments, and then sell the logs to yourself off-shore at around 20 per cent below the world market price, which will minimise earned revenue and lower your taxation. (Only one—Australian—company in the history of the PNG timber industry has not undertaken transfer pricing, and the Barnett report has made little difference to the practice, apart from the payment of a few million kina in back taxes by a few major offenders.)

Thus in PNG an industry which earns a modest 70 million kina in export revenue has totally devastated the timber resources and greatly damaged the ecology and agricultural prospects of one province (New Ireland), and bids fair—or did until the PNG government announced a U-turn in 198928 to do the same for the whole country. At the same time the foreign companies involved have flagrantly corrupted leading members of two national governments and brought government itself
into deep disrepute. The attempt to discipline Minister of Forests, Ted Diro—local sponsor and secret shareholder in the PNG subsidiary of a Singapore logging company—led to the downfall of the Paias Wingti government in July 1988.29

Despite damning criticism of him in the Barnett report, Diro was made Deputy Prime Minister by Wingti's successor, Rabbie Namaliu, in May 1990. Diro had the second largest following—of Papuans—in the Namaliu government after the Pangu Party, and he clung to office until, in September 1991, a leadership tribunal finally found against him on 70 out of 81 charges of official misconduct. On 20 October Diro resigned in the midst of a constitutional crisis brought about by the refusal of the (Papuan) Governor General, Sir Serai Eri, to dismiss him from office.30

Political Decay in PNG

The spectre of corrupt political and business bigmen operating in league with unscrupulous foreign interests to rip off resources, revenues and local people is not, of course, irrelevant to the question of social and political stability. Politicians frequently claim that their clan, tribal, regional or party followers expect them to flourish by fair means or (by Westminster standards) foul; but the end result—traditional group prosperity in particular—is loudly held to justify the means. This is a thoroughly disingenuous claim. Diro himself was found culpable by the leadership tribunal for 'representing' landowner groups in dealings with a logging company in which he had a concealed interest.31

Social resentment is growing rapidly in PNG. I have heard students at the University of PNG defend the redistributive effects of rascal gangs and praise the Bougainville rebellion as a legitimate protest of
traditional landowners against a corrupt and self-serving elite in Port Moresby whose unscrupulous pursuit of power and personal profit needs to be checked.

Some responsible members of the PNG elite have begun to take real alarm at the paralysis to government brought about by the never-ending parliamentary votes of no-confidence based on the curse of party-swapping and side-swapping which lower the political time horizons from years to months, weeks and even days. One signal success of the Namaliu government has been to change the Independence Constitution in order to give incoming governments 18 months grace (previously six) before they must face no-confidence motions in the unicameral Parliament. The 18 month interval would also apply to any government formed after a successful no-confidence motion.32

For Tony Siaguru—former Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, former Pangu Party Minister and now Deputy Secretary General of the Commonwealth—this reform was the one most needed in Papua New Guinea for political stability. Siaguru has noted the rising interest among the people in what he calls ‘extra-constitutional ways’ to remedy social and economic ills. One is political rebellion, of course; but equally important is social rebellion by that strange underclass—which is also an overclass in some ways—of urban rascal and their rural counterparts, organised highway robbers. The gangs, having mastered the gentle art of turning a profit from car theft and break-and-enter, have now begun to make political connections, as unruly and irresponsible politicians find their services indispensable for spoiling a rival’s campaign or for payback after its success, and for intimidating officials or purloining evidence of criminal behaviour. Meanwhile in the rural areas the void where the state should be—in dispute settlement and the provision of services which the colonial
state maintained quite easily—remains despite the traditional substitutes of compensation politics and the rough ritualistic justice of the tribal fight.

‘Law and order’ problems generally are now a source of profound social tension and malaise: a great and growing cost burden for business, government and the individual (including poor Melanesians), and a greater threat to sound ‘development’ than persistently low commodity prices. In PNG as elsewhere in the Pacific (notably Fiji) the forces of law and order (in PNG parlance, ‘the disciplined forces’, meaning the police as well as the military) have in fact become prime elements of instability and insecurity (for governments and people alike). The Defence Force leadership itself has defied the government openly on several occasions since the ‘coup that never was’ in 1977: troops have rioted and vandalised Parliament on pay issues (in 1989), and at least one former PNG Defence Force Commander (Ted Diro) has in recent times talked up a military coup as a legitimate response to the country’s present malaise. The Police Commissioner who made a chaotic coup attempt after the government ordered the withdrawal of all police and military forces from Bougainville in March 1990 still enjoyed sufficient support among the police to make his trial for felonious treason the occasion for more coup talk than ever. In mid 1991 the government was forced to dismiss yet another Defence Force Commander, Colonel Leo Nuia, who boasted to the ABC TV program, Four Corners, of his unauthorised efforts to reconquer Bougainville island for the PNG government in defiance of the peace accords of the Honiara Declaration which had been reached between the Bougainville secessionist leaders and the PNG government in January 1991.33

The ‘disciplined forces’ are part of Australia’s post-colonial legacy. Today they are nurtured by Australian military aid totalling $52m. in
1990–91, including a substantial emergency supplement spurred by the Bougainville crisis.34

This supplement included:

— helicopters, grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, small arms and ammunition;
— a Special Air Services counter-insurgency training team;
— training and equipment to expand the forces by 450 soldiers.

I estimate that total Australian aid to PNG’s military in 1990, allowing for this supplement and the portion of Australian budgetary aid which PNG directs to defence, was around $70m.: more than PNG’s own defence budget.

Of course the biggest law and order problem of all is the secession movement on Bougainville, and here again the ‘disciplined forces’ performed poorly and became part of the problem—this time in a counterinsurgency role. Both police and military forces were involved in gross abuses of human rights in late 1989, and especially during the attempt to crush the rebels in January and February of 1990. The then commander of the counter-insurgency operation has admitted that Australian-supplied helicopters were used as gunships, and to dump the bodies of executed Bougainvilleans at sea. The Four Corners program which was referred to above established that the helicopters were used to strafe ‘suspect’ villages. They so alienated the local population that at least a short term victory for the Bougainville rebels soon became inevitable, even though the Bougainville Revolutionary Army of Francis Ona and Sam Kauona has had almost as much trouble controlling grass roots vandalism and ‘rascalism’ as the PNG police have had throughout the country since independence.

The depredations of the military and the police and the suffering imposed on Bougainvilleans by the military-enforced blockade of the
island were supposed to end with the Honiara Accords of January 1991, but they have in fact continued for over a year. On the other hand the BRA rebels are evidently not born—again Greens, as outside supporters have rushed to assume, and they show keen interest in reopening the mine on suitable terms—without Bougainville Copper Limited and its parent Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia if at all possible. CRA and, even more, the Australian colonial government and the independent government of PNG have a lot to answer for in failing to carefully protect the economic and ecological well—being of the Bougainville people.

A Policy for Australia

The above examination of key security issues confronting Australia as it relates to its two closest neighbours reveals the inadequacy of the current ‘befriend Indonesia and prop up the PNG state’ line being pursued by Canberra. An agenda for the reform of the security dimension of Australia’s relations with Indonesia and PNG, which I promised at the outset, is set out below.

The pursuit of this agenda will not be easy: it has pitfalls of its own, and there is no guarantee of success; but it is essential to acknowledge that, although Australia itself is in some ways a part of the security problems of Melanesia, Australia does also have levers for promoting benign change in the region which it has been historically reluctant to exploit. These must now be applied if we are to avoid a combination of PNG militarization and disintegration, and Indonesian repression and expansionism.

1. Australia should dedicate itself to regional self-determination and support for democratic, non-corr upt and civilian forces in Indonesia and PNG in the years ahead. In particular Australia should:
- formulate and promote proposals for imaginative, resolution of the conflicts in East Timor, West Papua and Bougainville. In each of these cases, creative use of multilateral forums, and/or a 'quasi-state-solution, could be useful. Rather than actively condoning Jakarta’s effort to repress the OPM and coopt the PNG state into doing likewise, Australia should encourage PNG’s involvement in efforts at resolving conflict in West Papua;
- suspend the provisions of the Timor Gap Treaty providing for joint development in the zone of cooperation, pending an acceptable settlement of the Timor problem;
- phase out military aid to Indonesia.

2. Australia should pursue a two-track form of preventive diplomacy toward Indonesia, with much more emphasis on the non-state track (person-to-person, NGO-to-NGO). In this way controversial issues such as human rights, self-determination and the environment can be addressed more directly.

3. Australian should commit itself to back PNG militarily, if necessary, over the border with Irian Jaya/West Papua—something which is already implied by the 1987 Joint Declaration of Principles, and will be required during the period of diplomatic manoeuvre recommended here.

4. Notwithstanding any commitment to PNG, Australian should forestall an arms race with Indonesia, both by unilaterally curbing its naval and air strike capacity, and by seeking arms control understandings with Indonesia.

5. Australia should use what influence it has over PNG, for example through the leverage of its $300m. aid program, to preserve PNG from the two major (and interwoven) non-military security threats it now faces: resource destruction and environmental
degradation on the one hand, and political decay and disintegration on the other. In particular, Australia should:

- make clear that current aid levels cannot continue under conditions of parliamentary paralysis and gross corruption;
- phase out Bougainville-related military aid to PNG, and make police ('law and order') aid conditional on a serious attack up on elite illegality and disorder;
- redirect Australia's economic aid, if necessary by channelling it through non-government organisations, so that more of it goes to the empowerment of the people rather than the aggrandisement of the state;
- press for a peace of reconciliation, devolution and reconstruction on Bougainville. Given the Australian stake in the Panguna mine, these efforts could perhaps most usefully be pursued through multilateral agencies such as South Pacific Forum, or through steps to revive the Multi-national Supervisory Force envisaged in the Honiara Declaration;
- encourage and resource an effort by the South Pacific Forum to monitor, document and police the activities of resource-plundering companies at work in the region.

6. Contribute to an international fund for establishing a conflict mediation service run by the South Pacific Forum: a clearing house for professional help to governments where local resources for conflict-avoidance or resolution are demonstrably inadequate or perceived (by the parties) as biased. One argument in favour is to contrast the abject failure of PNG's effort to resolve the Bougainville crisis by force, with the partial successes achieved by ad hoc efforts at conflict resolution—first by a Swedish expert, and later courtesy of third parties such as New Zealand and the Solomon
Islands (respectively the Endeavour Accords of August 1990 and the Honiara Declaration of January 1991, discussed above).

What the Australian approach to the Indonesian relationship lacks at present—under the influence of the still-ascendant Indonesia Lobby (with strong roots not only in the government bureaucracy, but in federal politics, the academy and the media)—is a long-term, principled strategy to cope with issues of human rights and political upheaval, not only in Melanesia but in Indonesia itself—issues which are likely to reassert themselves decisively before long. This is the burden of items 1.—4. above.

A clear commitment by Australia to regional self-determination could have averted the tragedy and nightmare of Timor, and would lead the Australian government to seek a peaceful resolution of the protracted conflicts in Timor and West Papua instead of constantly averting its gaze. As a high priority, Australian and international NGOs—such as the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) and its constituent voluntary aid organisations (not forgetting the Indonesia—Australia Program for Co-operation which ACFOA has sponsored since 1987 as a bilateral NGO forum35); Amnesty International; the International Commission of Jurists; the Australia—West Papua Association; the various Timor support groups, and the Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore (which is campaigning against rapacious logging in Eastern Indonesia)—need to be given more space and resources to reshape the Australia—Indonesia relationship.

There is no need for Canberra to carry the full burden of human rights and ecological concern in its bilateral relationship with Jakarta—there’s room instead for a two track diplomacy, both official and demotic (popular, populist, person-to-person, NGO-to-NGO). But it is disheartening, and even shameful—and certainly counterproductive
in the long run—for the government to adopt a knee-jerk adversarial attitude towards activist groups and concerned advocates who point out the dangers and abuses of Indonesia's policy towards its regained (but cruelly exploited and deeply alienated) province, Irian Jaya, and its 'first colony' (to use the words of a leading Indonesian scholar), East Timor.

If peace on Bougainville Island needs to be negotiated between rebels and a remote capital, so does peace in East Timor (negotiation was tried briefly in 1985, after all) and also in West Papua, whether the UN continues to recognise Indonesia's annexation or not.37 No third party is in a stronger position than Australia to promote these three necessary exercises in peace-making or the devising of (at least) federal, confederal or other new constitutional arrangements to guarantee local autonomy in vital areas like resource management, immigration and cultural and linguistic survival. If Poutugal's rights in the East Timor dispute should be acknowledged with a view to revoking, unravelling or rolling back Indonesia’s brutal occupation, so should PNG's rights in relation to Irian Jaya. West Papua was annexed to Indonesia before PNG had a say, internationally—and the Irian conflict has been a source of profound insecurity (military, political and cultural) for PNG since 1975.

At the height of the 1984 border refugee crisis PNG's then foreign minister, Rabbie Namaliu, flew to Jakarta and offered his services as cultural intermediary and mediator between the Melanesian people of Irian Jaya and the Indonesian government.38 The offer was spurned; but if the Republic of Ireland can be fruitfully accorded a consultative role in the constitutional politics of Northern Ireland by the British government, why not accord such a role to Papua New Guinea in the constitutional politics of Eastern Indonesia, or at least of Irian? Of
course the present Indonesian regime may take deep offence at any such suggestion; but by supporting such initiatives, and new policy departures which seek systematic protection and support for the victims of 'development', Indonesian style, Australia can begin to rebuild its international reputation (and its credibility with the Suharto regime), so gravely damaged by the events of 1974–75. That is why the provisions of the Timor Gap treaty providing for joint development in the zone of co-operation should be suspended pending an acceptable international settlement of the Timor problem; and why military aid to Indonesia should be phased out, as a discreet signal that authoritarian military regimes practising various forms of neo-colonial exploitation and repression are not ultimately acceptable in a region which should be democratic and tolerant of social and cultural diversity as well as economically vibrant.

As for economic aid, the voluntary aid organisations dedicated to basic human needs should be funded generously and supported diplomatically to play a much larger role in aid disbursement, in the human rights area and in the overall Australia–Indonesia relationship. In fact ACFOA has complained that the subsidy extended by ASDAB (the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau) for NGO aid programs has been in decline while the government increases contributions for 'aid' disbursed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

The pursuit of the above agenda will inevitably offend the ruling Indonesian generals. Should Australia therefore trim its policy periodically to manage the degree of outrage in Jakarta? Is there a danger of Australian military involvement in new collisions on the PNG–Indonesia border if official PNG ends its long honeymoon with General Murdani? Is there a danger of a rerun of the Australia—
Indonesia arms race of the early 1960s, which gave us the F-111 bombers, an excessive naval capacity and some extravagant military infrastructure in PNG? All of these dangers need to be taken seriously, whether Australian policy takes a turn towards principle and a long run perspective or not. Australian policy needs to combine an almost contradictory degree of flexibility – readiness to back PNG militarily (over the barer, not on Bougainville), but also readiness to seek arms control understandings with Indonesia (over nuclear, chemical and missile proliferation; naval and air strike capacity; submarine capabilities, and so on).

Defence Minister Kim Beazley flew to Jakarta in early 1986 to explain that the forthcoming Dibb review of Australia’s defence capabilities (commissioned by him) should not be construed as foreshadowing an Australian threat to Indonesia merely because it legitimized and proposed an unprecedented peace-time build-up of Australian naval and air strike capacity, and identified the Indonesian archipelago as the likely source of any attack upon Australia.41

Unfortunately for Mr Beazley the Jenkins affair erupted within weeks of his return to Australia and led to considerable speculation in Indonesia precisely about a ‘threat from the South’42 – speculation which, as noted previously, the Hawke government had largely quelled until the Dilli massacre threw relations between Jakarta and Canberra into turmoil once more. Nevertheless it is important to commit Australia to peaceful change in the region, and it would help considerably if our defence budget was not almost equal to the total for all the ASEAN defence budgets combined – something of which our (civilian) Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister has actually boasted.43

Speak harshly (i.e., critically, but also constructively, in favour of change), but carry a small stick – it sounds demanding, but it’s the
policy which we must make work in our own long-run security interest.

Australia and Papua New Guinea

In late 1991 there were more grounds for optimism about the future of PNG than there had been for some years. The country was on the brink of a gold, copper and oil boom which promised to more than compensate for lost Bougainville mine revenues, at least until the late 1990s. Legal processes targeted against corruption had worked in so far as ex-Brigadier Ted Diro had resigned the Deputy Prime Ministership. Actual and projected constitutional changes promised a measure of political predictability and better prospects for long-term government planning. The cancer of urban lawlessness and disorder was in remission to the extent that the curfew in Port Moresby had been lifted.

There was a downside to these developments, however. Even with the chief hawk on Bougainville (Diro) gone from the Namaliu Cabinet the government still seemed both complacent and paralysed by its own divisions and inability to curb the Defence Force’s reoccupation of the Bougainville mainland by stealth from its off-shore base on Buka Island. The Task Force set up to restore services under the Honiara Declaration was unable to function; the peace process was stalled, and, with the prospect of an alternative cornucopia in other new mining revenues, Bougainville was becoming forgotten land.

As for Australia, the government through its intensified military support; its growing ‘wedge’ of project aid, and its still substantial budgetary aid held several keys to resolving PNG’s troubles, but seemed just as paralysed as the men around Rabbie Namaleu. No initiatives on Bougainville were forthcoming, but the Defence Force was still being boosted by Defenc Cooperation Program aid for its
undeclared mission of destroying the Honiara accords and preparing to fight civil wars.

Elite corruption may have been checked by the leadership tribunal’s verdict on Diro, but was certainly not in retreat, and there were no signs of Canberra realising that a serious assault on ‘Big Man’ malfeasance is a *sine qua non* in tackling the ‘law and order’ problem. Significant long-term aid must be made conditional on a clean-up of high level political and bureaucratic corruption. As things stands, Australian police are in effect assisting over-privileged, irresponsible and corrupt black *mastas* to repress their less fortunate brethren. And, finally, the Australian government continues to chivvy PNG along the dead-end path of constraining and where possible persecuting West Papuan nationalism at the behest of the brown *mastas* in Jakarta, when our diplomacy should be directed to conflict resolution for the long term.

This is the agenda that must be seriously tackled between now and the end of the century.

NOTES


3. In 1984–5 Foreign Minister Bill Hayden’s efforts to sponsor negotiations for a Cambodian settlement were viewed with suspicion in the ASEAN capitals — even in Jakarta, which feels more affinity with Hanoi than the ASEAN mainstream for reasons to do with suspicion of China and a shared nationalist revolutionary experience.

4. See Gareth Evans ‘Australia and Indonesia: a Developing Relationship’, Address to a conference on Indonesia’s New Order — Past, Present and Future. Australian National University, December 4, 1989 in
Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade: the Monthly Record (AFAT), 60, 12 December 1989.

5. Australian Associated Press has an office in Jakarta; but no Australian newspaper has a resident correspondent. Persistent efforts by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation to establish a presence in Jakarta were rewarded in 1991.


7. ‘The two Governments will consult, at the request of either, about matters affecting their common security interests. In the event of external armed attack threatening the national sovereignty of either country, such consultation would be conducted for the purpose of each Government deciding what measures should be taken, jointly or separately, in relation to that attack’. Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Papua New Guinea and Australia, reproduced (with zoological art work) in *Australian Foreign Affairs Record (AFAR)*, 10, 58. November–December 1987.

Compare this with the following articles of the ANZUS treaty: ‘The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific’. (Article III) ‘Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes’. (Article IV) The treaty is reproduced in J. Bercovitch (ed.), *ANZUS in Crisis*, Macmillan, London, 1988.

8. When asked by the members of a Sydney University study tour in 1985 why a formal defence treaty had not been offered to PNG at
independence, Australia’s then High Commissioner, Michael Wilson, responded that it was important to keep the PNG government in a ‘constant state of uncertainty’ about Australia’s protective intentions. A treaty could ‘encourage imprudence and recklessness’ in relations with Indonesia. (Interview, Port Moresby, May 16, 1985)

9. Background Briefing (ABC Radio National, April 15, 1990. Reporter: Mark Aarons; transcript published by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library’s Media Information, Current Awareness and Hansard Service) Background Briefing also reported these words from an informal address by General Murdani to a closed meeting of civil servants, Dili, February 3, 1990: ‘Don’t dream there will be a nation called Irian or Ambon, or a nation called East Timor – there won’t be. In the past there were small nations which wanted to be independent but, without a moment’s thought [sic], the Indonesian Goverment prevented this from happening’ (ibid.)

See also ‘Don’t Dream, or Else’, Inside Indonesia, No. 23, June 1990.


11. … ‘overall, over the passage of time [in East Timor], things [“crook” things – Evans] have been generally improving… under the kind of pressure that we, among other countries, are putting on the Indonesians’ (Gareth Evans quoted in Background Briefing, April 15, 1990. See Note 9 above.) Mark Aarons’ report casts grave doubt on the Minister’s claim of improvement, and one wonders how the pressure which Australia supposedly exerts might be distinguished from support. For example: ‘there are many claims of abuse which are made, which prove not to be well founded’ (Evans, ibid.) Now East Timor was a closed province until 1989, and the military pressure inhibiting investigation of anything going on there remains almost as heavy as ever. By attacking the critics of abuse Evans is in effect rewarding the Jakarta regime for its secretiveness and repression – we can be confident that the human rights abuses in Timor which come to light are only the

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tip of the iceberg. I would also like to challenge the Minister through this end note to cite one example of an ill-founded claim of abuse in Timor.

12. ‘Timor Rebel Leader Asks Hawke to Step In’ *Sydney Morning Herald* (citing AAP), 11 February 1991. When an Australian parliamentary delegation visited East Timor in February 1991 the Fretilin Leader Xanana (‘Sha–nana’) Gusmao appealed by letter (passed to the parliamentarians) for Prime Minister Bob Hawke to pressure Indonesia into seeking a peaceful settlement of the Timor conflict. Gareth Evans replied that Fretilin (‘some group that is still contesting...the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia’) should ‘accept the reality of the situation’, take up Indonesia’s amnesty offer and surrender.

Xanana had made headlines in Australia during November 1990 when Melbourne lawyer Robert Domm managed to interview him in the mountains. The Timorese students and others who helped him make the contact were hunted down by Indonesian security. See Robert Domm ‘Xanana Face to Face’, *Inside Indonesia*, No. 25, December 1990.


14. Woolcott calls the massacres a ‘traumatic experience’ (*ibid.*) for Indonesia Traumatic for the Indonesian people, perhaps; but, if this was trauma for Suharto regime, it was a trauma meticulously planned and executed by the murderous generals (including Suharto) who set about wiping out the Indonesian Left after September 30, 1965.


with the Indonesians about OPM operations in the border region (The Australian, 29 October 1990), and, during a visit to Port Moresby, ABRI (Armed Forces) Commander in Chief, Sutrisno proposed 'joint military land and maritime exercises' with PNG. AAP Report by Chris Falray, 11 December 1990, —reproduced in West Papua Update (Australia West Papua Association, P. O. Box 1148, Collingwood, Victoria, 3066), No. 10, December 1990.

A closer military relationship was finally given the formal imprimatur of a Status of Forces Agreement signed by Rabbie Namaliu and Benny Murdani in Jakarta. 'Namaliu hails Jakarta Border Pact', The Australian, 15 January 1992.


22. The Age (Lindsay Murdoch), July 26, 1990. In a conversation with Foreign Minister Bill Hayden in 1984 I learned that Murdani (then ABRI Commander in Chief) had told Hayden in several official encounters that Indonesia (or at least Murdani himself) regarded the political and social stability of PNG as Australia's strategic responsibility.


27. Commision of Inquiry into Aspects of the Forestry Industry, Final Report, Port Moresby, 1989. The full collection of Justice barnett’s reports are fast becoming a collector’s item. The government has only printed s few of the more than 20 volumes tabled in Parliament and there are no plans to print more. Barnett himself now works in Western Australia after his term on PNG’s National Court. He was assaulted and seriously injured in Port Moresby during the Commission of Inquiry — by persons so far unknown.


The 1987 consultation recommended ‘that Australian goveunment
funds should be made available to Indonesian NGOs in such a way as to strengthen and further develop linkages between Australian and Indonesian NGOs' (p. 7)


38. See Beverley Blaskett, Papua New Guinea—Indonesia Relations: a New Perspective on the Border Conflict, (ph. D thesis), Australian National University, Canberra 1989, p. 280

39. Mr. Hawke's brave and vociferous stand in favour of resisting aggression in the Persian Gulf during recent times has brought into sharp relief an earlier—and much closer to home—Australian failure to act on this salutary principle.

40. ACFOA, Briefing Notes on Cuts to the Australian Aid Program, 1990 — 1. ACFOA explains how the Hawke government contrived to represent a $100 m. cut in the aid budget as a 1.6 percent increase in real terms.


43. Gareth Evans, Australia's Regional Security, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989, p. 17.
Mediating Political Response: a case study of political change in Fiji—1987–1991

Satendra Prasad

Fiji regained its independence from Britain in 1970, adopting a Westminster system of Government. The process of social change and evolution in Fiji has been closely underlined by the politics of ethnicity.

Fiji has a multi-ethnic population of roughly 736000. Demand for large scale labour at the time of colonisation (1874) led to the importation of large scale migrant labour from colonial India. Colonialism thus created a characteristic “bipolar multi-ethnic formation” in which the two dominant ethnic groups roughly equal in numbers became economically and politically polarised over time. Fiji Indians have historically dominated sugar cultivation, which is confined to Western Viti Levu, and Northern Vanua Levu, while Melanesian Fijians have dominated other agricultural activities such as copra production and fishing. Economic polarisation made the emergence of multi-ethnic political solidarity or integration particularly problematic (Norton; 1989, Howard, 1991). Economic polarisation, resulted in a particularly divisive socio-political formation, in which first the colonial state, and then the post-colitical state
mediated competing interests through ethnic group manipulation (Howard, 1991; Naidu, 1990). The colonial state (acting through the functionaries such as Colonial Secretary, District Commissioners and others) for example, used traditional Melanesian Fijian chiefs to enhance colonial rule, and often visibly set impediments against the emergence of Fiji Indian and Melanesian Fijian political solidarity which could in turn have undermined the very basis of colonial rule (Howard, 1991; Robertson, 1989).

Economic polarisation, as a result of conscious colonial state policy quiet logically resulted in political polarisation (Howard, 1991).

POLITICAL EVOLUTION

Melanesian Fijians had largely aligned themselves with the Alliance Party (led by Melanesian chiefs such as current Prime Minister, Ratu Mara) which ruled Fiji since independence.

This party evolved in the period of Fiji's decolonisation. By the time of independence in 1970, it came to symbolise a coalition between the traditional Melanesian Fijian chiefly elite, a small but economically powerful European and part European community that had benefited most out of colonialism, and an entrepreneurial/merchant segment of the Fiji Indian community.

Fiji's mainstay during the colonial period was sugar, which for the most of the colonial period was under monopoly control of the Colonial Sugar Refinery, an Australian giant. Struggles by workers and small holder and mainly Fiji Indian growers against the monopoly eventually led to the formation of the National Federation Party (NFP). Sugar industry workers and growers provided the initial backbone of the NFP, but it extended its support by the late 1960's as dissatisfied Melanesian Fijians joined its ranks. Colonial rule in Fiji
upheld a traditional chiefly (feudal) order that was dominated by chiefs from Eastern Fiji. Thus many Westerner Fijians felt that while colonialism had benefited Chiefs and Melanesian Fijians in Eastern Fiji generally, the benefits that accrued to Western Fijians and commoner Fijians more generally were far fewer. This provided an avenue for NFP to expand its Melanesian Fijian support which was vital if the party was to win the “cross-voting seats”.

However, while Fiji inherited a broadly Westminster system of politics, the electoral political process led to a gradual intensification of ethnicity as the dominant factor in party politics. The cross ethnic appeal of both the parties were most intense at around the time of independence. As economic development failed to keep pace with the growing aspirations of people, the Alliance Party began to lose some of its Fiji Indian support, and similarly the Melanesian Fijian support for the NFP also began to decline (Prasad S, forthcoming). As the two dominant parties increasingly began to articulate the interests of the ethnic communities that supported them, ideological difference between the parties began to become less significant. Indeed, parliamentary debate throughout the 1980’s (until the time of the military coups) was characterised by a remarkable degree of ideological convergence between the two main parties and a remarkably high degree of cooperation on economic policies.

Such developments led to the formation of the Fiji Labour Party in 1985. Fiji’s economic decline in the 1980’s in the wake of falling prices for sugar, decline in tourism and natural calamities saw the implementation of several anti-trade union measures. Foremost amongst these was the unilateral imposition of a national wage freeze in 1984: a measure supported by the NFP. This, and several other anti-trade union measures saw the radicalisation of the Fiji Trades Union Congress,
which in 1985 took the momentous decision to sponsor the formation of the Fiji Labour Party.

The Fiji Labour Party (FLP) was an exiting addition to Fiji's electoral political makeup. In the first instance, as its roots lay in the trade union movement, it acquired a firm multiethnic base, particularly in Fiji's urban FLP provided an alternative electoral platform that was useful in breaking the ideological homogeneity in Fiji's politics. The FLP was thus excellently situated in helping depolarise Fiji's political make up a mission that it had set for itself at the time of its formation.

A narrow electoral defeat in a crucial by-election in late 1986 forced the FLP to review its electoral strategy. For the 1987 general elections, it formed a coalition with a segment of the NFP. The FLP dominated Coalition went to general elections in April 1987, and resoundingly defeated the Alliance, thus bringing to an end its almost 17 years of continuous rule.

This Government was led by a commoner Melanesian Fijian, the late Dr. Timoci Bavadra who had been President of the Fiji Public Servants Association and a senior executive of the Fiji Trades Union Congress for more than a decade. The Cabinet consisted of 7 Fiji Indians, 6 Fijians Melanesian and 1 person of mixed parentage, and it included some of Fiji's foremost unionists.

MILITARY COUP OF 1987

The popular Coalition Government was removed at gunpoint by an almost exclusive Melanesian Fijian Military Forces, led by the Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka in May 1987 which effectively restored the Alliance leadership to power. After a period of otsight military rule, the Military gave up power formally to the President (Governor
General before the coups) in December 1987. The President, Ratu Peniaia Ganilau appointed the Alliance leader and former Prime Minister, Ratu Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister who in turn appointed an almost wholly Alliance Party cabinet.

The period of after the first coup in May 1987 and December 1987 was one in which the worst excesses of military rule were unleashed upon the country. Coalition leaders at first, and later supporters and activists were subject to repeated harassment by the military and police, subject to period detention without trial, torture and assault.

Trade unionists and peace activists were particular target of military’s retaliation. The new government had championed a democratic socialist economic agenda, a policy of non-alignment and a firmer commitment to a nuclear free and independent Pacific movement. Fiji’s military groomed under characteristically Western traditions interpreted these as markedly anti-Western policies and thus threatening Fiji’s position in the Western alliance. Peace activists and unionists thus were made particular target of military harassment.

The period also saw the almost complete marginalisation of Fiji Indians and Coalition Government loyalists and sympathisers from the Government bureaucracy and other important executive positions in the country.

Ethnic polarisation that underlined much of Fiji’s socio-political development since independence was only further intensified since the military coups of 1987.

Since May 1987, the Military and traditional Melanesian Fijian chiefly institutions such as the Council of Chiefs have begun to play a much more prominent role in national affairs. An enlarged military, under the command of the coup-leader Sitiveni Rabuka has spread its influence throughout society. Traditional Fijian institutions such as
the 'Great Council of Chiefs' (Bose Levu Vakaturaga) have assumed prominent roles under a recently promulgated constitution (July, 1990). Both Fiji's current President (former Governor General), Ratu Penaia Ganilau and current Prime Minister, (and Prime Minister from 1970 to April 1987), Ratu Sir kamisese Mara are high chiefs in the traditional Melanesian Fijian social order. The Bose Levu Valaturaga, under a constitution promulgated in July, 1990 will directly appoint the President and 24 of the 37 members to the Upper House, thus making it the most important power brokers in the country. The coups 1987 have hence resulted in a powerful reassertion of traditional Melanesian Fijian structures which is dominated by traditional chiefs. This has often resulted in visible disadvantages to large categories of commoner and urban Melanesian Fijians and to the very obvious disadvantage of the non-Melanesian Fijian population — which still constitutes the majority of the population.

Fiji's colonial development had left her hopelessly dependent upon few primary commodities, in particular sugar and copra and later gold. Thus Fiji had an extremely narrow base from which to chart its post-independence economic development. Fiji's narrow economic base also meant extreme reliance upon foreign aid, initially upon United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand; with United States, and Japan becoming prominent in the 1980's (Prasad, 1991).

Fiji, along with most other South Pacific states has historically been part of the Western Alliance. Before the military coups it enjoyed close defence ties with United States, United Kingdom and increasingly Australia and New Zealand. While much of defence assistance from these countries remains suspended currently, as a protest against the coups, and the absence of an elected Government; Fiji's foreign policy still is conservatively pro-western alliance, and has not adjusted to
the new geopolitical reality brought about by changes in Soviet Union and the socialist world generally.

However to reduce its reliance on traditional friends, Fiji is currently establishing new military links with Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia and Israel and the two China's.

Countries such as France were quick to capitalise on Fiji Military’s isolation as a result of bans embargoes placed by unions in australia and New Zealand. France gave a substantial grant to the Fiji Military Forces for transport equipment and for setting up of an airwing in 1988. It has pledged further assistance to set up a naval workshop for Fiji’s navy. Since 1989, France has also offered to provide ariel surveillance facilities for Fiji’s 200’s mile zone (Prasad, 1991). This was looked after by Fiji’s traditional ally New Zealand prior to 1987.

The massively increased French assistance to the politically isolated post—coup regime in Fiji is obviously tied to France’s own agenda in the region. France has long been isolated in the region for its continued nuclear testing programme on the Polynesian atoll of Mururoa, against sustained opposition from the South Pacific island states. France suffered further isolation after the revelation of its connection with the bombing of a GreenPeace anti—nuclear protest ship (Rainbow Warrior 3) in New Zealand. Most island states have also voiced their continued opposition to the continued French colonisation of the Melanesian islands of New Caledonia and the Polynesian islands administered as French Polynesia. France moved quickly after the coups to establish political alliance with a politically isolated regime created out of the military coups of 1987 to blunt regional opposition to its nuclear testing programs and its continued colonial presence in the South Pacific region a case of undisguised conventional checkbook diplomacy.
Such developments helped stabilise the weakly entrenched military regime after 1987, and gave confidence to the military backed regime since December 1987 to deal with continued opposition within Fiji more confidently. Further the support of such important powers as France and Communist China gave Fiji a lot more confidence in dealing with international efforts to isolate and reverse the political developments in Fiji.

RESPONSES TO THE LABOUR VICTORY

Transition after the electoral victory for the Labour led Coalition was relatively smooth, partly because the Alliance had not anticipated an electoral defeat. It was only after the Bavadra Government was able take charge with confidence and commitment, that destabilisation began to rear its ugly head.

Destabilisation campaigns were led by several defeated Alliance ministers such as Apisai Tora and Viliame Gonelevu and Filipe Bole; all three have become prominent ministers in current cabinet. They were joined in their ranks by staunch Alliance supporters and party activists.

Destabilisation initially took the form of disorganised violence targeted against supporters of the Labour Party. Several Labour Party supporters were assaulted in the Western Town of Lautoka by Alliance campaigners (Fiji Times, 13/4/87; 2). A series of firebombings occurred in the Western towns of Lautoka and Nadi in the last week of April and two aimed at the offices of the Coalition Deputy Prime minister and Attorney General raised particular concern (Fiji Times, 10/4/87; 1). By the end of April, these apparently unconnected events began to accrue a momentum and direction. An Alliance Senator was the first to be charged for the firebombing – thus implying heavy and high
powered Alliance involvement in the violence.

Destabilisation campaigns took a new pattern when traditional Melanesian Fijian villages were mobilised for other forms of protest. Tavua villagers in the Western mining region of Tavua set up “road blocks” on the main highway “protesting a change in government”. Mobile police squads had to be mobilised to remove the road blocks and ease tension in the mining town (Fiji Times, 20/4/87; 1).

A larger meeting a Veiseisei Village in Nadi saw the campaign gain yet greater momentum. The meeting was attended by over 3000 Melanesian Fijians and was addressed by three prominent Minissters of the previous Alliance Government, Apisai Tora, Sir Josia Tavaiqia and David Pickering. This was the first time when calls were explicitly made to “change the constitution so as to ensure Melanesian Fijian domination”. The meeting also called for the cancellation of Indian leases” (Fiji Times 22/4/87; 3).11

The Taukei Movement, aimed essentially at destabilising the new Government managed to get representatives from the major Melanesian Fijian institution under a broad banner of indigenous nationalism. Representatives from the Army, Police, the Great Council of Chiefs and the Fijian Association (The Melanesian Fijian wing of the Alliance Party) formed the inner core of this new movement.

After the Veiseisei meeting plans were revealed for a massive march through Suva to present a petition calling for constitutional changes. The possibility of Police and perhaps the Army not being able to control a crowd of over 10000 provoked an appeal for restraint by Fiji’s then Governor General. Over 5000 Melanesian Fijians participated in the march calling for constitution changes to ensure Melanesian Fijian political dominance and a rejection of the newly elected Coalition government — making it one of the largest protest marches in Fiji’s
post-colonial history. The march was led by prominent Alliance Ministers and Senators. This was the first time that some prominent Methodist church ministers joined the destabilisation campaign.

Immediately after the massive march, more marches were proposed for other towns and a plan for a campaign of "civil disobedience" for May 7, 8 and 9 was unveiled by a former Alliance minister and prominent organiser, Apisai Tora.

Over the next weeks a spate of firebombings hit Suva and Lautoka cities. These bombs were targeted at business houses randomly. The Fiji Trades Union Congress National centre was damaged extensively.

While these increasing violence was rocking the law and order situation, most Alliance members of Parliament continued to maintain an active boycott of the new Parliament. It was such experiences that provided to backdrop to the coup of May 14 1987, when Lieutenant Colonel Rabuka stormed into Parliament and took all Coalition Parliamentarians into military custody.

Immediately after the takeover, he appointed a Cabinet initially led by himself, but dominated by former Alliance Party (this included the Alliance Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Minister for Education, Filipe Bole, and several other senior ministers) — thus suggesting connivance of the Alliance hierarchy in the coups.

An effort at political reconciliation in September 1987 failed when the Military refused to accept a Government of National Unity. Major General Rabuka scuttled the reconciliation process by carrying out a second coup and installing a fully military dominated Cabinet. In the aftermath of this coup the military unleashed a campaign of harassment, torture and detentions upon supporters of the previous Government, human rights and peace activists, senior judicial officers and others.\(^2\)

It was the second coup of September 25 1987 that demonstrated that
Fiji's military had become a truly independent political powerbroker—willing to depart from even its conservative supporters in the Alliance Party and able to venture into Fiji's political arena independently.

For those concerned with restoration of the democratic process, the military's intervention a second time, and even more powerfully than the first, this was a unmistakable signal that the restoration process was going to be a long one. Experiences from other Third World nations have shown time and again, there wherever the military has intervened in the political arena, the period of return to civilian rule has taken a very long time.

RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY: CONCILIATION AND STRUGGLE

As has been the experiences of other countries that have experienced military intervention, the process of restoration of genuine civilian rule and democracy in Fiji has proved to be a long and arduous one. Citizens movements are resigned to this fact and most have shaped their strategies on long to medium term plans.

In the case of Fiji, initial public reaction to the military coups was largely spontaneous and unorganised. This was so because a "military intervention had not been anticipated" as Fiji's military had an almost "spot free" record of political interference to that date. This is despite the fact that Fiji's military was an almost wholly Melanesian Fijian institution.

Spontaneous people's movements spearheaded initial public defiance of the military coups. These included several rallies organised by University students, peace activists and unionists in Capital Suva immediately after the coups. Small activists groups also set off crude explosive devices against military and Government targets. Protests were quickly diffused and curfews, roadblocks, and other devices were
used to ensure that a popular resistance movement was not allowed to evolve.

The Military had quickly neutralised the Coalition’s network of branches and hence there could not be mobilised for large scale nation wide “non-cooperation” movements immediately after the coups.

The trade union movement, that had sponsored the formation of the Fiji Labour Party in 1985 remained the most powerful and effective base for challenging the post coup regimes. International trade union pressure through the Australian Council of Trade Union, New Zealand Council of Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ensured that union rights were respected and union were allowed to operate relatively freely. The post coup Government’s have tried to curb the power of unions through numerous legislative reforms. At the time of writing the powerful Fiji Trades Union Congress was in the process of organising a national strike and rallying for international solidarity action, including trade bans on Fiji to protest the new labour legislaton that are obviously aimed at weakening the power of unions. Fiji’s eventual return to a democratic system will closely be influenced by the continuing ability of unions to withstand such pressures to decimate them.

However, in the short term, unions have suffered some setback as the Interim Government has used its influence to set up breakaway “ethnic based” unions. It has set up a powerful exclusive Melanesian Fijian union in the public sector — and through such efforts the Interim Regime is able to blunt some of the trade union opposition.

Fiji’s coup’s also demonstrated the short sightedness on part of domestic pressure groups in mobilising the support of foreign Government’s so as to force a reversal of developments in Fiji. New Zealand and
Australia, both led by Labour Party Governments hand lent visible support to the democratic movement led by late Dr. Timoci Bavadra, the deposed Prime Minister. But neither were willing to go the full distance of imposing complete trade bans on Fiji which the Fiji Labour Party had requested. Narrow economic interests of the two countries guided their policy towards one of raising the Fiji issue at international forums such as the United Nations and withholding defence aid to Fiji. However, strong “Restoration of Democracy in Fiji” lobby groups have developed in both these countries, and these maintain a constant pressure on the Government’s of these countries so that the Fiji issue is not allowed to die as a foreign policy concern of the two Governments.

More recently, with the return of the Conservative National Government in New Zealand in 1990, there has been a reversal in the New Zealand policy towards Fiji. The new Government has reversed the previous policy of low level official contact to one of high level contact. A high powered Ministerial delegation from New Zealand visited Fiji soon after the last New Zealand elections. The last remaining unresolved issue is the question of Military contact. New Zealand has said that Military contact and defence aid will be re—considered after elections are held in Fiji sometime in 1992.

Fiji’s Interim Regime has promised to hold national elections in early 1992. It has promulgated a new constitution in 1990 that will guarantee Melanesian Fijian supremacy in parliament, and that gives widespread constitutional powers to the Great Council of Chiefs and the Fiji Military Forces. This constitution has been widely rejected and condemned, and, has been described as “feudal, racist and undemocratic” by the Fiji Labour Party/ National Federation Party Coalition and various other pressure groups. 13 The Fiji Labour Party has already said
that it will be “boycotting the next general elections to be held under the 1990 constitution”. While these two key political parties will maintain their struggle by refusing to endorse the 1990 Constitution, other groups have chosen separate means.

Fiji Labour Party’s Coalition partner, the Fiji Indian dominated National Federation Party will be contesting the next elections, but is using its participation as a referendum on the constitution. It is likely to boycott parliament after the elections, and thus keep the crucial Fiji Indian seats empty in the new House of Representatives.

The post coup period also saw the emergence of several pressure groups within the country. Two of these; the Fiji Youth and Students League and Group Against Racial Discrimination need special mention. The Fiji Youth And Students League has adopted a much more active form of struggle, organising protest meetings, and holding illegal rallies. It has also publically burned Fiji’s 1990 Constitution on three separate occasions since 1990 and has invited the wrath of the interim regime on each of these occasions. The Group Against Racial Discrimination has been trying to isolate Fiji’s Interim Government internationally by making comparisons between Fiji and Apartheid South Africa. So far, given its narrow resource base, it has met little international success, but given its enormous credibility within Fiji and internationally, it is bound to grow into an important pressure group.

Fiji until 1987 had been a part of the Commonwealth as a grouping of independent nations that includes Britain and its former colonies. After the unilateral declaration of a Republic in September 1987, Fiji’s membership of the Commonwealth has lapsed. Fiji has historically cherished her association with Britain through the Commonwealth, and since 1987 has tried to regain entry into this association. However, it is unlikely that with the current constitution, Fiji’s membership
could be approved. It is likely, however, that the Commonwealth may yet be able to play a useful role in mediating the ongoing constitutional crisis in Fiji.

The peace movement in Fiji attracted substantial interest of the Military in 1987. Several Fiji Anti Nuclear Group (FANG) activists, including its President were detained and beaten up in 1987 and 1988. FANG had played a central role on shaping some of the foreign policies of the short lived Bavadra Government in 1987. Many peace activists left the country in the wake of the military harassment. However, the movement has remained alive and very vibrant. The Fiji Anti Nuclear Group (FANG) played a central role in 1988 and 1989 in isolating the pockets of support that Fiji’s Interim Regime enjoyed in various indigenous people’s movements. The 1987 Military Regime had launched a very effective campaign to decimate Fiji’s peace movement and the trade union movement, but minus the loss of individuals as a result of emigration: the movement has regained much of its strength.

Post coup regimes in Fiji have treid to sell the military coups and the 1990 constitution as “necessary to ensure the survival of the indigenous Fijian people in Fiji”\(^\text{14}\). Indigenous peoples movements in several countries found such “rhetoric useful and fashionable in their own struggles for indigenous sovereignty”. FANG played an important role in educating such groups about the “real” reasons for military coups in Fiji, and about the “real” intentions of the 1990 Constitution. Indigenous rights, it must be stated were more than adequately protected under Fiji’s post Independence constitution. It was only after the defeat of the Alliance Party at the 1987 general elections that the issue of “indigenous peoples rights” became the single most important issue in Fiji’s political arena\(^\text{15}\).

To some extent, the post—coup regimes have won moderate successes
in legitimising it self, but only unfairly projecting the Fiji Indian community as an “immigrant” and a coloniser type of community. The Fiji Indian community, as much as the Melanesian Fijian community is a victim of British colonial history, imported into the country some 100 years ago by force, deceit, trickery and other means. Indigenist nationalism will continue to be the basis for continued political rule by an indigenous elite that has narrow popular support. In the process, the current elite will continue to further fragment the nation — if only to maintain its own monopoly on political power that it fought herd to regain.

Howard (1991: 375–6) sums up the future prospects for democracy in the following manner:

Obviously in the short run, any meaningful form of democracy in Fiji is unlikely... Yet the democratic principles espoused by so many Fijians have not disappeared from the political horizon. Democratic opposition to the regime persists and has proven to be resilient. Before April 1987, it seemed impossible that a non-racial, democratic socialist party could assume state power in Fiji. Yet this is precisely what did happen, if only for one month. It would therefore seem presumptive to deny the future prospects for democratic forces to regain state power on a more lasting basis — just not any time soon.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


ENDNOTES

1. Fiji’s population in March 1991 was estimated at 736000 of which 360 100 (49.9%) were Melanesian Fijians 338 000 (46.2%) were Fiji Indians. The other 5% were made up of Europeans, Part-European, Chinese, Pacific Islanders and others.

At the time of the 1986 Census, the racial composition was as follows: Melanesian Fijians 46%, Fiji Indians 48.7%, Other races 5.3%. Fiji Indian population has declined significantly since 1987, because of the much higher rate of migrations. The coup of 1987 carried out by an almost exclusive Melanesian Fijian military restored an almost exclusive Melanesian Fijian Government to power. (*Current Economic Statistics*, Jan 1990:3, and *Fiji Times; 10/ 5/ 90; 3*).

2. Between 1879 and 1917, when the “inhuman and degrading” “indenture system of labour” was finally abolished over 60,000 people were recruited from colonial India for work in Fiji. While roughly 40% of indentured labourers returned after the end of their indenture, the majority stayed back and made Fiji their home. The majority of Indians continue to work the sugar fields.

3. Neither the Melanesian Fijian, nor the Fiji Indians are ‘pure’ ethnic groups in an anthropological context. But we use the term to denote popular usage and wide acceptance of the concept in Fiji.
4. For a discussion of Fiji’s cross voting seats, and pre 1987 electoral system, see Prasad S., 1990.

5. For a discussion of the factors leading to the formation of the FLP, see Howard, 1991: 146–242. Howard assesses the multiples pressures that led to the formation of the FLP, which along with the anti-labour police of Alliance Government, also included a radical shift in Fiji’s foreign policy of allowing visits by US nuclear ships, a more open pro-US international postuer, increasing marginalisation of women’s interest groups and so on.

6. Prasad S (forthcoming), “The Contradictory Foundations of Fiji’s Post Colonial State”, examines state mediation of “ethnic crisis”. The article argues that in mediating ethnic crisis (and reconciling contradictory interests exerted upon the state structures) the state continually reproduced the ethnicity as the more important vehicle for interest articulation. The paper argues that by 1987, ethnicity as the basis for interest articulation had permeated all sectors of society.

7. Cases of torture and general human rights violations are well documented in Fiji Voice (various issues), a newsletter produced by Fiji Independent News Service in australia. Amnesty International Annual Reports of 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990 have documented many of such cases and have consistently expressed concern about the human rights situation in Fiji since May 1987.

8. The Great Council of Chiefs is an institution initially created by the Colonial State with the intention of administering indigenous affairs concerning land, education, employment and governmental administration generally. In post independence period this administrative system has been retained and expanded. At the helm of this separate administration system – sits the Great Council of Chiefs. The Ministry for Fijian Affairs, which is one of the largest Government Ministry’s is the administrative arm of the Great Conucil of Chiefs (the Boselevu Vakaturaga).
9. Coup leader, Major General Rabuka has now joined the Cabinet as Co–Deputy Prime Minister with ministerial responsibilities for the Military and Prisons. The military is now headed by Ratu Epeli Ganilau, the son of Fiji’s President Ratu Sir Peniaia Ganilau and a high chief in his own right.

10. A comparative discussion of Fiji and Malaysia can be found in Milne (1984), *Politics in Ethnically Bi Polar States*, UBR Press.

11. Over 88% of all land in Fiji is owned by Melanesian Fijian through communal landholding groups. Such lands are made available to non land owners on leased terms. Leases for agricultural production normally run for 30 years at a time. “Native Land” as they are called cannot be sold and hence permanently alienated.

12. There have been dozens of reports of torture and harassment in Fiji since the first military coups. Some of these attracted international attention. In May 1988, Dr Som Prakash (Lecturer in Humanities at University of the South Pacific) was detained by the military for almost two weeks. Dr Prakash had published a review of Major General Rabuka’s biography in the book Prasad S. (ed) *Coup and Crisis: Fiji – A Year Later*. Dr Prakash was repeatedly beaten during his confinement. He had to seek medical treatment in Australia.

Five military officers abducted Dr. Anirudh Singh (Lecturer in Physics at the University of the South Pacific) in September 1991. Dr Singh who is also a founding member of a human rights organisation, the Group Against Racial Discrimination was repeatedly beaten by the officers for almost 11 hours. He was hospitalised for several weeks and was eventually referred for medical examination in Australia. Dr. Singh has given a detailed picture of his experiences in his book *Silent Warriors*, Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, Suva, 1991.


Vanuatu’s Nuclear Policy: Evolution and Prospects

Yoko Ogashiwa

Introduction

Since independence in 1980, Vanuatu had consistently taken very outstanding nuclear policy among the Pacific Island States. It had vigorously protested against French nuclear testing and the Japanese proposal for nuclear waste dumping in various regional and international conferences (Ogashiwa, 1991:15, 60). It passed a nuclear—free state resolution at parliament and banned the nuclear—armed ship visits to its ports. Furthermore, it declined to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFW) Treaty tabled to the South Pacific Forum meeting in Rarotonga, the Cook Islands, in 1985, claiming that the treaty was incomprehensive and ineffective.

Vanuatu’s nuclear policy led to two different views to foreign observers. One warned it would erode regional security which was protected by the ANZUS umbrella; Vanuatu was a radical dissident which rebelled against the “Western” powers in the region. The other regarded Vanuatu as a leading and prominent nuclear—free state in
the Pacific in spite of its small size and vulnerability.

Comparing with these views, this paper examines the background of Vanuatu’s nuclear policy, clarifying how it was generated in the domestic political context. The next part of the paper will investigate how Vanuatu had carried out a remarkable nuclear policy since independence, focusing on the period of Walter Lini’s government. The prospects for Vanuatu’s future nuclear policy is discussed in relation to the recent political upheavals in the country.

**Background: Road to Independence**

Unlike the other Pacific Island States, Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides governed by a joint British and French administration in what was called a condominium, experienced political turmoil at independence. Vanuatu’s strong anti-nuclear policy after independence was mostly generated by this bitter historical experience.

Dual systems of Anglo-French administration over the years divided the Vanuatu population into the Anglophones and the Francophones. With the tide of decolonisation in the Pacific, the Anglophones, who constituted about 70% of the population, formed the New Hebrides National Party in 1971 to promote independence movements. The Francophones, about 30% of the population, feared their minority status after independence and set up several political parties, usually known as the Moderates, to oppose independence movements. Both deployed nationwide activities which created heated arguments between rival groups, sometimes ending up with violence.

The victory of the Vanuaaku Pati (formerly the New Hebrides National Party) in the November 1979 election of the Representative Assembly made a critical step towards independence. The Assembly set the date of independence as 30th July 1980 and the British and
French governments eventually approved it. The Vanuaaku Pati government led by Walter Lini was to take full responsibility for the independent country.

However, the blasts of secessionist movements in Santo and Tanna threatened implementation of independence on the proposed date. Lini expected the British and French governments to suppress the movements, but both did not take any effective action. France gave tacit support to the secessionists who were composed of the Francophones (including French colons) in collaboration with private American interests. The British government was reluctant to take action without the French participation. Eventually Lini asked Papua New Guinea for military intervention and suppressed the secessionist movements with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.

The traumatic process of independence imprinted Vanuatu politics with the dissension between the Anglophones and the Francophones. Under such a political situation, the Anglophonic Vanuaaku Pati government had been continuously sensitive to foreign forces which would give support to the Francophonic opposition party, the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP), and adopted a series of progressive foreign policy to demonstrate that Vanuatu was a sovereign state which repelled foreign interference and kept its independence. Nuclear policy, along with support for independence movements in the Pacific, particularly for that in New Caledonia, had played an important role in the foreign policy of Vanuatu as an expression of its sovereignty. Hence, it should be stressed here that Vanuatu's nuclear policy was mainly a product of domestic political dynamics. It was far from an unchangeable doctrine. It could be altered by the domestic political situation from time to time.
Vanuatu's Nuclear Policy Under Lini's Government

Since independence, Lini's Vanuaaku Pati government had taken active nuclear policy. At the South Pacific Conference in October 1981, a Vanuatu delegate proposed its own South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone idea. The idea prohibited: 1) all tests of nuclear explosive devices including those described as "peaceful"; 2) all nuclear weapon test facilities; 3) all tests of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and systems; 4) all storage, transit, deployment or any other form of presence of nuclear weapons on land or aboard aircraft, ships or submarines within the zone; 5) all bases carrying out command, control, communication surveillance, navigation and other functions which aid the performance of nuclear weapon delivery systems; 6) all nuclear power reactors, excepting very low capacity experimental units, all nuclear powered satellites, surface and sub-surface vessels and all transit, storage or dumping of radioactive material, irrespective of whether it complies with the London Dumping Convention, OECD guidelines on dumping or any set of similar conditions; 7) uranium mining, processing and transport (Vanuaaku Viewpoints, Vol. 11, No. 64, 1981). Though this comprehensive idea could get few sound reaction from other Pacific Island States, it succeeded in demonstrating that Vanuatu had a very strong stance on nuclear issues. Among the Pacific Island States, except Fiji, Vanuatu was the only country which presented its own nuclear-free zone idea.

The strong anti-nuclear position of the Vanuatu government was also shown in banning the visit of a US nuclear-armed ship to its capital, Port Vila, in February 1982. Before the decision, the Vanuatu government offered diplomatic clearance to the US frigate, as long as there were no nuclear weapons aboard the vessel. But the US embassy in Suva, Fiji, answered that it was US policy not to confirm or deny
the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships. Receiving this answer, the Vanuatu government declined the US frigate visit, arguing that:

The Vanuatu government would find it extremely difficult to enter into such a policy while at the same time maintaining its strong position on the nuclear-free Pacific zone (*Fiji Times*, 13 February 1982).

This was the first decision in the Pacific Island States to ban the US nuclear-armed warships.

The Lini's government also strongly supported anti-nuclear movements of the NGOs. In July 1983, the government backed the third Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) Conference held in Port Vila, which was co-sponsored by a local organisation, the Social Concerns Committee, which was composed of the Vanuaaku Pati-appointed members from church ministers, chiefs, women's group leaders, youth group leaders, trade unionists, lawyers, civil servants, politicians and university students. Deputy Prime Minister of Vanuatu addressed the opening ceremony of the conference. The conference drew considerable attention of local community as well as international circle. A march organised by the conference in support of its aims attracted more than 2000 people, a huge crowd for Port Vila (Ellis, 1983:29).

Meanwhile, the relation between Vanuatu's nuclear policy and its domestic politics was well revealed when a nuclear-free state resolution, which declared its land, sea and airspace nuclear-free, was adopted at the Vanuatu parliament in March 1983. The opposition UMP abstained from voting for the resolution which was introduced by the Vanuaaku Pati (*The Australian*, 9 July 1983). For the UMP which was supported by the Francophones, the resolution conveyed an implicit message that Vanuatu rejected the influence of nuclear powers, including France.

Vanuatu's refusal to sign the SPNFZ Treaty at the Forum meeting
in August 1985 highlighted its most intense anti-nuclear stand of the Pacific Island States. Even though Vanuatu attended all the working group meetings of the SPNFZ Treaty and contributed to the discussions, it was not satisfied with the treaty which was presented by the working group. Prime Minister Lini stated at the Forum meeting:

Vanuatu feels that if there is such a comprehensive treaty signed by all member countries, it will enable the superpowers to show more respect for the South Pacific region (Vanuatu Weekly, 17 August 1985)

Although all other Pacific Island States, except Tonga, but including the Melanesian brother countries (Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands) which used to advocate anti-nuclear policy, signed the treaty, Vanuatu alone has kept criticizing it. At a press conference held in January 1987, Lini argued that the parties who signed the treaty should respect it (Vanuatu Weekly, 24 January 1987).

Nuclear policy of Lini’s government, along with other foreign policies like supporting independence movements in the Pacific, joining the Non-Alignment Movement and establishing diplomatic relations with “troublesome” countries (for example, Cuba, the Soviet Union and Libya), has been commonly seen as radical and aggressive. Nevertheless, once again, it should be pointed out that nuclear policy was an expression of sovereignty by the Vanuatu government. Lini made this point clear:

...when a country like Vanuatu maintains a foreign policy posture which is inconsistent with the normal trend in the region as those countries [the “Western” countries] would expect, then they become rather disturbed. It’s like trying to keep people under your toe or in line. This we cannot accept. We are independent and sovereign state, we decide for ourselves

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and we shall not let others decide for us (Vanuatu Weekly, 25 August 1984).

Significantly, however, “ourselves” did not necessarily mean all the people in Vanuatu. Rather, it meant the government, more precisely, Lini’s government which tried to reject foreign interference to the domestic politics. There were some groups in Vanuatu which did not share the same view with the government in pursuing outstanding foreign policy. In this regard, nuclear policy of Vanuatu was in a highly arbitrary context.

Domestic Political Upheavals and Prospects for Vanuatu’s Nuclear Policy

In 1987, Vanuatu was rocked by a severe political upheavals. The Vanuaaku Pati under the leadership of Lini, who recovered from a stroke, won the victory in the election held in November though its vote dropped to 47 percent compared with 56 percent in 1983 and 63 percent in 1979 (Dunn, 1988:15). Just after the election, the Vanuaaku Pati was attacked by an intense internal dissension. The Vanuaaku Pati secretary—general, Barak Sope, challenged Lini for the leadership of the party questioning Lini’s health. Sope was the one who inspired Vanuatu’s outstanding foreign policy and a leading figure in the Vanuaaku Pati. Lini defended his post at the party congress. Later, he offered Sope the post of Minister of Tourism, Immigration and Transport to avoid the split of the party. But the dissension once created between Lini and Sope never faded.

Tension between both political figures erupted in May 1988. Protesting against the decision made by the government of closing down the Vila Urban Land Corporation, which was in charge of collecting rents for the custom owners of the public land in Vila town, the custom
owners of land organised a demonstration in Port Vila. Sope, a board director of the corporation and himself a custom owner of the pubic land, was among them. The demonstration ended up with the rampage. A group of demonstrators wrecked the properties of public sectors and private business in town. The damage was estimated $A2 million (Robie, 1988:13).

Accusing that Sope was involved with the riot, Lini dismissed Sope from the cabinet. For a counter-action, Sope prepared to present a no-confidence motion to Lini's government along with the support of opposition UMP members. Lini further reacted by expelling Sope and his four supporters from the Vanuaaku Pati, and subsequently from parliament under the law which defined member of parliament who resigned from his party to vacate his seat (Fiji Times, 13 August 1988). Moreover, he sacked all 18 UMP members from parliament claiming they should lose their seats because they missed three consecutive sittings (they boycotted parliament in support of Sope).

In December, by-elections were held for the vacant 18 seats which were formerly held by the UMP members. The seats held by Sope and his supporters were retrieved by the court decision in October, but the members of the Melanesian Progressive Party (MPP), which was founded by Sope, resigned shortly after. Since the MPP and the UMP boycotted by-elections, the Vanuaaku Pati gained the victory and consolidated the majority in parliament.

However, the Vanuaaku Pati government was shaken by a dramatic declaration of President George Sokomanu at the opening of parliament dissolving parliament and calling for general elections in February 1989. Though Sokomanu was one of the founders of the Vanuaaku Pati, he had been criticizing Lini saying that by-elections would lead to a one-party system. Two days later, he swore an interim government

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whose prime minister was Sope and deputy prime minister was Maxime Carlot Korman, the UMP leader. Lini reacted swiftly. Backed by the Supreme Court, he succeeded in claiming Sokomanu’s action as unconstitutional and invalid. Sokomanu, Sope and the other “rebels” appeared in court charged with sedition. Although they got sentences at the Supreme Court decision, the Court of Appeal discharged them in April 1989 declaring there was insufficient evidence.

Political upheavals in Vanuatu which started at Sope’s challenge to Lini’s leadership took a new stage in 1990. In November, Lini reshuffled the government positions and took some key portfolios to his hands saying that he was not satisfied with the performance of the ministers responsible. Lini’s action created resentment in the sacked ministers and secretaries, including his long associate, sacked finance minister, Sela Molisa. Further reshuffle of the government by Lini in February 1991 mounted dissatisfaction of the people who were excluded from Lini’s circle.

At the Vanuaaku Pati congress in April, a dissident group led by secretary—general of the party and foreign affairs minister, Donald Kalpokas, and Molisa called for election for new executives of the party. Their move was declined. As expected, Lini sacked Kalpokas and his supporters from the cabinet.

Notwithstanding, anti—Lini faction went forward and called mini—congress of the Vanuaaku Pati in August. At the congress, election for new executives was held in which Kalpokas was elected as the new president of the party and Molisa as secretary—general. Lini condemned mini—congress as illegal and tried to prevent parliament from holding the session in which it was anticipated no—confidence vote in Lini. However, his attempts failed and he was ousted by no—confidence motion tabled by the coalition composed of anti—Lini Vanuaaku members and Tan

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Union (a party led by Vincent Bouleikone). Lini, then, set up a new party called the National United Party (NUP). Kalpokas head a short-lived new Vanuaaku Pati government until the general election.

Political situation of Vanuatu entered a new stage at the general election in early December. In the election, the UMP gained the largest number of seats, but could not form the majority by itself. It formed a coalition government with Lini’s NUP after unsuccessful approach to Sope’s MPP. Yet it was still uncertain that political crisis had been completely resolved by the establishment of the new government.

The leader of Francophone-based UMP, Carlot Korman, made it clear before the election that it was reluctant to take strong anti-nuclear policy which condemned France for nuclear testing in French Polynesia (Cook, 1991: 11). Not surprisingly, the new government quickly retrieved cordial relationships with France. In January 1992, the government sent a mission to New Caledonia and made an agreement with the French government for financial aid to Vanuatu through New Caledonia (*Vanuatu Weekly*, 25 January 1992). It was followed by the statement of Prime Minister Carlot Korman in February saying that he had asked France to assist in safe-guarding Vanuatu Waters (*Vanuatu Weekly*, 8 February 1992). He also suggested that the government might consider the possibility of signing the SPNFZ Treaty (*Vanuatu Weekly*, 8 February 1992).

On the other hand, the junior coalition partner in the government, Lini’s NUP, has kept strong anti-nuclear stand. In a broadcast statement in January 1992, Lini reiterated his party’s continuous support for nuclear-free Pacific and independence for New Caledonia. In the same statement, he warned that the coalition government could be comfortable if law and order were respected and Vanuatu’s sovereignty was maintained (*Vanuatu Weekly*, 25 January 1992). For the NUP,
anti-nuclear policy still remained valid for providing the logic that policy was an outcry to demonstrate sovereignty of Vanuatu which was vulnerable to external influences.

Though both parties clarified that they would maintain the coalition government until the next election, the emergence of policy differences casted a cloud on the future of the government. It would be no wonder if the coalition splits before the election and hence, new change is introduced to Vanuatu’s political scene. In the meantime, one thing clear is that Vanuatu’s nuclear policy has notably reduced its significance as an expression of sovereignty under the new government. Vanuatu’s nuclear policy will shift to a much softer line as long as the UMP-dominated coalition government holds power.

Conclusion

As the above review illustrated, the Vanuatu government had carried out outstanding nuclear policy as an expression of sovereignty because of its traumatic birth. This underlying motive helps to explain why Vanuatu took much tougher anti-nuclear policy comparing with other Pacific Island States which attained independence without turmoil. However, recent upheavals in Vanuatu’s domestic politics have dramatically changed the foreign policy. Accordingly, Vanuatu’s nuclear policy would inevitably face a considerable change under the new coalition government.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that one can neglect the impact of Vanuatu’s nuclear policy on regional and international political scenes. Vanuatu’s strong anti-nuclear policy made the other Pacific Island States much more aware of nuclear issues in the region. Vanuatu had continued to be the vanguard of nuclear awareness in the Pacific Island States. Its nuclear policy also attracted attention of outside
world which did not to have so much interest in the Pacific Islands. In a sense, it played a significant role in promoting a regional image as a nuclear-free fighter.

Vanuatu’s nuclear policy was an initiative genuinely generated by Vanuatu. It was not a foreign-originated or -inspired slogan. It was born and raised in the particular context of Vanuatu politics. Ironically, however, because of that, it is strongly and inevitably bound to the domestic politics and it could not escape from the influence of domestic political changes.

* This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Conference on Legitimacy and Sovereignty in the Pacific Islands, sponsored by the Pacific Islands Political Studies Association, held at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, December 16–18, 1991.

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POSTSCRIPT

In August 1993, Lini announced the NUP’s withdrawal from coalition and negotiated a new agreement on coalition with UMP President Serge Vohor while Prime Minister Carlot Korman was abroad. On his return to Vanuatu, Carlot Korman formed a new alliance with NUP breakaways led by Deputy Prime Minister Sethy Regenvanu. This event indicates further political upheavals take place in Vanuatu and Vanuatu’s nuclear policy would possibly undergo some changes.
1990 Referendum on the Constitutional Amendments of the Republic of Marshall Islands

Akitoshi Shimizu

On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Marshall Islands held a referendum on the constitutional amendments proposed by the Constitutional Convention (ConCon) and the Nitijela or the Marshallese legislative body. As long as the constitutional system of the Republic is concerned, virtually no change came out of the referendum: only two among fourteen questions, which proposed very minor and symbolic amendments, were approved with more than the necessary two-thirds of the voters.

But the result of the referendum will surely have grave influences on the Marshallese politics. Apparently two different views of the Constitution clashed with each other, and the majority of Marshallese citizens who supported one of the two won; the referendum revealed that there is a sharp cleavage between the Nitijela and the ConCon on the one hand and the majority of Marshallese citizens on the other.

The proposed constitutional amendments well document what defects Marshallese dominant political leaders think the current constitutional
system has. The present paper tries to analyse the text of the proposed amendments to the Marshallese Constitution and briefly discuss certain historical backgrounds which lead to the proposal and the influences the referendum will probably have on the Marshallese politics. As a source of data for analysis, the full text of the 1990 constitutional amendment proposal will be presented at the end of the present paper.

1. The proposed constitutional amendments

The ConCon proposed forty amendments to the Constitution, which were grouped into fourteen questions, and the voters were to cast votes on each of the questions. The fourteen questions can be classified, according to their contents, into the following five groups:

Group One, questions which try to improve the make-up of the Marshall Islands as a sovereign state. The questions in this group also exhibit nationalist assertions. Question no. 1 proposes to change the name of the state by adding ‘the Republic of’ to the current name, ‘the Marshallese Islands’. Despite the naming by the present Constitution, however, the proposed name of the state has customarily been used by the Marshallese government. Question no. 2 is concerned with the definition of the national territory. By inserting ‘the traditional boundaries of this archipelago’, the proposal intended to include Wake into the ‘the Marshall Islands’(1). Other Questions classified in this group are: no. 14 which gives precedence to the Marshallese text of the Constitution over the English text; no. 7 which eliminates English words from the naming of the Council of Iroij both in the Marshallese and English texts; and no. 13 which allows only Marshallese citizens and agencies to hold land in the Marshalls.

Group Two, a question which tries to improve institutional consistency
of the Constitution and make the government more functional and efficient. This group happens to comprise only one question, no. 3.

Group Three, questions which are supposed to improve institutional consistency of the Constitution and make the government more functional and efficient, but which need further analysis on their effects, implications and backgrounds. The questions in this group are: nos. 4 to 6 concerning Article II, 'Bill of Rights'; no. 9 concerning Article XI, 'Citizenship'; no. 10 which intensifies the cabinet's authority over the Public Service Commission; no. 11 which makes the members of the Nitijela benefit more when their compensation is increased; and no. 12 which changes the term of the office of the Auditor-General from the age limit of 72 years to the fixed term of six years.

Group Four, a question which is analysed as enhancing the authority of the iroij or the chief class. Amendments no. 8 and 38 in question no. 7 are included in this group.

Group five, questions which entirely reconstruct the judiciary, particularly the Traditional Rights Court. Question no. 8 and a part of Amendment no. 36 in question no. 9 belong to this group.

Questions in Group One are only concerned with the Marshallese relationships with the external world, but introduce no change within the domestic politics. Nationalist assertions implied by these questions are reasonable in view of the current trend in the world. Questions in Group Three remain to be analysed further, since the implications of intensified authority of the cabinet and the Nitijela are not altogether apparent and simple. Anyway, the questions of Groups One to Three refer to institutional details, leaving the structure of the Constitution intact.

On the other hand, the questions in Groups Four and Five occupy almost one half of the total pages of the proposal and contain structural
changes of the Constitution. It can reasonably be said that the questions in Groups Four and Five represent the most important part of the proposal.

2. Amendments to the Council of Iroij

All three amendments in Question no. 7 are concerned with the Council of Iroij, among which Amendment no. 7, as mentioned previously, tries to change the name of the Council. Amendment no. 8 proposes two changes in the membership of the Council. The first of the two is a minor adjustment: the Mili district—although a small atoll it has five Iroijlaplaps, an exceptionally large number among atolls in the Ratak chain—is given two seats in stead of one.

On the other hand, the second half of the amendment tries to introduce a more serious change. The 'mojen' means the lands in an area to which an Iroijlaplap owns the chiefly right. According to the present Constitution, the membership of the Council represents the chief class of each district, but the amendment pays more attention to those Iroijlaplaps who have rights to lands in more than one districts. It means that each named office of Iroijlaplap in the latter half of Amendment no. 8 is given two seats or votes in the Council. Among the five named offices of Iroijlaplap Murjel is the Iroijlaplap of Aur, Maloelap (excluding Airok), etc. of the Ratak Chain, and the other four the Iroijlaplaps of the Ralik Chain excluding Ujelang and Eniwei. This amendment apparently tries to give a larger say to a limited number of Iroijlaplaps with large landholdings.

Amendment no. 38 guarantees to the chief class the same number of seats in a Constitutional Convention as in the Council of Iroij. The motivation of this amendment is self—evident when compared with the present Constitution; it simply prescribes that a Constitutional
Convention should be composed of elected members numbering at least ten more than the total membership of the Nitijela, but it does not make any mention to the representation of the chief class in a Constitutional Convention (Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 2).

3. Amendments to the Traditional Rights Court

As mentioned previously, Question no. 8 concerning Article VI, 'the Judiciary', quantitatively occupies nearly a half of the proposal; five out of the total six sections of that Article are to be replaced by new sections. The judiciary should be considered the most important focus of the proposal.

Amendment no. 15, concerning the first section, 'the Judicial Power', of that Article, comprises two revisions. First, it groups the Traditional Rights Court (TRC) together with the Supreme Court (SC) and the High Court (HC), thus redefining the TRC as one of the superior courts in stead of an subordinate court.

Secondly, the same Amendment restricts the non-citizen judges of superior courts to hold office for six years, whereas in the present Constitution they are guaranteed their positions until they reach the age of 72, the same condition as that for citizen judges.

These two revisions in that Amendment do not appear to be correlated with each other, as long as the literal expression of the Amendment is concerned, but actually they prove to be in the light of the recent dispute involving the chief justice of the HC, which will be analysed later.

Amendments no. 16, 17 and 18 change the relationship pattern among the SC, the HC and the TRC from a linear hierarchical one to a triangular one with the SC at the top and the HC and the TRC at the bottom. In the proposed pattern, although the HC and the TRC
are assigned different jurisdictions, they are in an identical relationship with the SC, and the relationship between the HC and the TRC is redefined entirely in terms of symmetry and reciprocity.

Thus the proposal tries to raise the TRC up to the equal status of the HC. At the same time, it adds two important alterations to the TRC. The present Constitution prescribes that the TRC 'shall consist of panels of 3 or more judges selected so as to include a fair representation of all classes of land rights, including, where applicable, the Iroijlaplap, Iroijedrik, Alap and Dri Jerbal' (paragraph(1), Section 4, Article VI); the proposal entirely eliminates this prescription of 'a fair representation' of different classes in the TRC. As another alteration, the proposal, by inserting the new section (4A) on 'Procedures of the Traditional Rights Court', recommends the persons or groups disputing land rights to resolve the dispute by themselves.

The traditional Marshallese landholding system distinguishes three basic land rights on the basis of which the three classes—the Iroijlaplaps (or great chiefs), the Alaps (or tenants) and Dri Jerbal (literally 'labourers', relatives of the tenants) —are distinguished(2). The latter two classes are categorised as the Kajors or commoners.

In ordinary social life, an Iroijlaplap is apparently in a superior position to the tenants of the lands to which that Iroijlaplap holds the chiefly title. Let the persons or groups disputing land rights resolve the dispute by themselves means let the Iroijlaplap involved in the dispute exert his or her prerogative authority over the commoners concerned. Hence, as prescribed by the present Constitution, the resolution of land disputes through judicial procedures, to which the TRC is the relevant court, and the panel of the TRC fairly representing all the classes concerned are necessary. Whatever motivations behind those two alterations will be made clear in the light of the aforementioned
dispute involving the HC chief justice. This point will also be detailed later.

Amendment no. 9 replaces the HC with the TRC as the relevant court in charge of disputes over the membership of the Council of Iroij. Since Iroijlaplaps are only eligible for the seats of the Council, this amendment appears to be in line with the other amendments which raise the status of the TRC. The aforementioned dispute involving the HC chief justice, however, will shed light on this amendment, too.

4. Background and implications of the proposed amendments to the Constitution

There is one factor which makes the amendment proposal, particularly that part of it specifically concerned with the judiciary, more understandable, and that is the lawsuit called 'Kwajalein iroij title dispute'. In light of this dispute, the amendment proposal appears as if it was meant as a solution of the dispute worked out by the ConCon and the Nitijela in order to support one party of the dispute.

Two of the four Iroijlaplaps in the Ralik Chain, Kabua Kabua and Imata Kabua, were involved in the dispute. Kabua Kabua is the son of Laelan Kabua, whereas Imata Kabua is a grandson of Jeimata Kabua, and Laelan and Jeimata were the sons of Great Kabua. Imata Kabua is elected as a 'Senator' or a member of the Nitijela and Amata Kabua, an adopted son of Imata's father's brother, is the President of the Marshall Islands. Thus, Imata Kabua is far more influential than Kabua Kabua in the Marshallese politics.

According to the interpretation of Imata Kabua and his side, Great Kabua's title of Iroijlaplap was divided and each son inherited the title of Iroijlaplap and a share of Great Kabua's lands. Kabua Kabua
brought a suit against Imata Kabua and claimed the title of Iroijlaplap, together with the lands on Kwajalein under that chief title, both of which have so far been held by Imata Kabua and his predecessors.

Both party had disputed for seven years and the lawsuit had apparently reached an impasse when Philip Bird—a judge and later the chief justice of the HC—took charge of it in February 1990. In June, another Senator elected from Kwajalein organised a meeting, to which Kabua Kabua, Imata Kabua and the tenants (alaps) of the disputed lands attended. The tenants supported Imata Kabua as their Iroijlaplap and requested the two Iroijlaplaps to resolve the dispute in the traditional Marshallese way(3).

The Nitijela passed Bill 163 into law at the end of August. This law prescribes that the successor to a title of Iroijlaplap should have the recognition and support of the kajor before he or she may hold the title. It also states that the lawsuit between Kabua Kabua and Imata Kabua should be dismissed and a traditional settlement arrived at. In September, Chief Justice pressed both parties for out-of-court settlement but Kabua Kabua did not agree with his recommendation. Throughout this development of the lawsuit, Imata Kabua’s party insisted that the dispute should be resolved in the Marshallese way without any interference from outsiders. Foreigners, lawyers and even the court were suggested as agents of such external interference(3).

Now it should be evident that the assertions of Imata Kabua’s party had already been recapitulated in the proposed constitutional amendments to the judiciary. Thus the development of the dispute strongly suggests that the proposed amendments to the judiciary were no so much motivated to raise the status of the TRC as to place the traditional land rights outside the jurisdiction of the judiciary, or outside the influence of non—citizen judges, or outside the jurisdiction of the HC.
5. The result of the referendum and its percussions

To follow subsequent developments of the Kwajalein iroij title dispute, early November 1990, Chief Justice Bird ruled that the new law (163) is unconstitutional. As the reason for this rule, he pointed out that by ordering the dismissal of the particular lawsuit the section three of that law 'invades the province of the judiciary' (4).

The referendum on the constitutional amendment proposal was held on December 11, and the outline of its results was reported a week later (5). Only two questions were supported with approval ballots of more than the necessary two-thirds. These were Questions no. 1, which changes the name of the state (the unofficial vote was 4117 yes to 1291 no), and no. 2, which implicitly claims Wake as part of the Republic's territory (4053 yes, 1361 no).

On the contrary, three questions were disapproved by a majority of negative votes. These were: Question no. 8 which proposed an overall revision of the Article VI, 'the Judiciary' (2665 yes, 2761 no); no. 9 concerning the citizenship (2546 yes, 2791 no); and no. 11 concerning the compensation of the Senators (2288 yes, 2912 no).

The rest of the questions were approved by more than one half of the votes but failed to achieve the two-thirds approval. Among them, Question 14, which makes the Marshallese text of the Constitution prevail over the English text, obtained the largest number of approval votes (3095 yes, 2121 no). In contrast, Question no 7 concerning the membership of the Council of Iroij collected the fewest approval votes over negative ones (2730 yes, 2647 no).

The variations of approval votes from question to question suggest that voters decided yes or no on each question separately. Those questions which make nationalist assertions concerning the Marshallese
external relations were supported by majority votes. On the other hand, Marshallese voters responded to those questions which reflected split interests of different classes with emphatic no.

In the latter case, one of the split interests was associated with the ConCon and the other with approximately one half of the Marshallese citizens. By proposing the constitutional amendments, the ConCon and the Nitijela tried to protect the traditional land rights and the traditional class system, and to protect the prerogatives of the Nitijela itself, the Council of Iroij, the chief class, and particularly the predominant Iroijlaplaps who benefit most from those traditional systems.

The Marshallese Constitution provides the basis for a representative legislature and an administrative body headed by the President who is elected from among the members of that legislature; it means that the Marshallese have a modern democratic polity. But the 1990 proposal of constitutional amendments and the referendum on that proposal revealed the fact that, despite its democratic constitution, the Marshallese legislative and administrative bodies do not fairly represent the people.

To follow further what happened after the referendum, in February 1991 the Nitijela passed Resolution 123 calling for the removal of Chief Justice Bird. He abandoned the attempt to fight any further and worked out a deal with the Nitijela; in March it passed Resolution 129 which rescinded Resolution 123 and Bird resigned(6).

In May 1991, the policy declaration of a new party called ‘Ralik–Ratak Democratic Party’ was issued. The declared policy is a moderate one; it asserts ‘protection and enforcement of the Constitution’, ‘protection of the environment’ and ‘sound investment and responsible fiscal management’(7). The declaration apparently was based on the recognition of general criticism against a particular circle which virtually dominates the Nitijela and the government. Rumours are current about corruptions,
arbitrary managements of the national budget, private use of public funds, etc. by that circle. Some members participating in the establishment of that party interpreted that the result of the referendum emphatically indicated grass-root criticisms of the long-term dominance by a particular group of politicians.

The Marshallese politics is still far from a mature multi-party system of democracy. The future of the 'Ralik-Ratak Democratic Party' remains uncertain; it is just at the embryo stage. The Marshallese politics, however, apparently began to change after the referendum held in 1990, and whatever changes should be kept observed.

NOTES
(2) For the Marshallese chieftainship, see Akitoshi Shimizu, 'Kinship-based groups and land tenure on a Marshallese atoll', in Cultural Adaptation to Atolls in Micronesia and West Polynesia (ed.) E. Ishikawa. Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., Tokyo. 1987.

Appendix: 1990 Constitutional Amendments
The English text of the proposal is presented below. In order to make the amendments clear, those words which are added to the present Constitution are italicised, whereas those words which are
eliminated from the present Constitution are put in brackets (\langle \rangle).

1990 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

[p.1]

Question No. 1 (Amendments 1 and 4[0])

1. The Constitution is amended by inserting the words “Republic of the” before the words “Marshall Islands” where they appear, or appear for the first time in the Title, the Preamble and any Section of the Constitution, and by substituting the word “Republic[\"] for the words “Marshall Islands” where they appear for a second time or more in the Preamble and any Section of the Constitution, except in the case of Article X, Section 1(4) and the definition of “existing law” in Article XIV, Section 1(1); and the effect of this amendment shall be as if the constitution had always so referred to “the Republic of the Marshall Islands” or “the Republic”.

40. Any amendment to the constitution adopted by this Constitutional Convention and duly certified by the Speaker in accordance with Article XII, Section 4(1), as having been approved by two-thirds of the votes validly cast in a referendum of all qualified voters (a)shall, as provided by that Section, be valid for all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution, subject only to such grammatical and numerical changes as may be necessary to enable the text of the Constitution as amended to be read as a consistent whole; and (b)shall enter into force on the date of the Speaker’s certificate[sic].

Question No. 2 (Amendments 2 and 35)

2. The third paragraph of the Preamble of the Constitution is amended as follows:

“This society has survived, and has withstood the test of time, the
impact of other cultures, the devastation of war, and the high price paid for the purposes of international peace and security. All we have and are today as a people, we have, received as a sacred heritage which we pledge ourselves to safeguard and maintain, valuing nothing more dearly than our rightful home on the islands within the traditional boundaries of this archipelago.

35. Article X[?], Section 1 of the Constitution is amended by adding the following new paragraph (4[3?]):

“(4) Nothing in this constitution shall be construed so as to preclude its application to every place within the traditional boundaries of the archipelago of the Marshall Islands.”

Question No. 3 (Amendment 3)

3. Article I, Section 4 (c) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

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“(C) the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and any local government shall not be immune from suit in respect of their own actions or those of their agents in any court of the Marshall Islands: but nothing in this provision shall be taken as affecting the validity of any law prescribing procedures or conditions for the bringing of suit or the extent of any legal obligation, and no property or other assets of the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands or of any local government shall be seized or attached to satisfy any judgment.”
Question No. 4 (Amendment Number 4)

4. Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"Section 3. Unreasonable Search and Seizure

(1) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

(2) A search or seizure shall be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law if no warrant has been obtained despite adequate time to obtain one.

(3) Any seizure of a person shall be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law unless the person is promptly informed of the cause of such seizure and is ensured a prompt opportunity to contest its legality before a judge.

(4) A search of premises not belonging to or occupied by, the person who is believed to have committed a crime shall be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law unless the person whose premises are searched has been given a prior opportunity, in an adversary hearing, to challenge or comply with a subpoena identifying the persons or things to be produced, or the officer issuing a warrant for the search has reasonably determined that such prior notice and hearing would create an undue risk that the persons or things sought would be removed or otherwise made unavailable.

(5) Evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure, or pursuant to an invalid warrant, cannot be used to support a criminal conviction.

(6) In determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure, the factors
which should be considered include:

(a) Whether a warrant ought to have been obtained;
(b) Whether a search or seizure without a warrant was justified in the circumstances;
(c) Whether the search or seizure was accomplished by the use of force unreasonable under the circumstances;
(d) Whether a person aggrieved by a search or seizure had an adequate and prompt opportunity to contest the reasonableness of the search or seizure;
(e) Whether the search or seizure violated a statute or an administrative rule; and
(f) Whether the importance of obtaining relevant evidence by a search or seizure without a warrant outweighs the importance of the privacy interests involved.”

Question No. 5 (Amendment Number 5)
5. Article II, Section 4(5) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

“(5) There shall be a right to trial by jury, unless knowingly and voluntarily waived by the accused, whenever the applicable law makes the offense punishable by 5 <3> years in prison or, in the case of an offense for which no maximum is specified, whenever the sentence actually imposed is 5 <3> years or longer.”

Question No. 6 (Amendment Number 6)
6. Article II, Section 4(6) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

“(6) No person shall be held to answer for an offense unless a
writing specifying the charges, and giving adequate notice of their basis, is filed in an appropriate court, and a copy given to the defendants. <a crime except on presentation or indictment or criminal information.>.”

Question No. 7 (Amendment Numbers 7, 8 and 38)

7. Article III, Section 1(1) of the Constitution is amended by deleting the reference to “Council of Iroij” in the English text and “Council an Iroij” in the Marshallese text and inserting “Mweo Imon Iroij” in its place in both texts of the Constitution. The title to Article III; Article III, Section 1(2) through(8) and Sections 2 through 11; Article V, Section 12; Article X, Section 2; Article XIII, Sections 2 and 4; and Article XIV, Section 1 are consequentially amended by deleting all references to “Council of Iroij” or “Council” in the English text and to “Council an Iroij” or “Council” in the Marshallese text of the Constitution and inserting “Mweo Imon Iroij” in their place in both texts of the Constitution.

8. Article III, Section 1(2) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

“(2) The Mweo Imon <Council of> Iroij shall consist of 5 eligible persons from districts of the Ralik Chain and 8 <7> eligible persons from districts of the Ratak Chain of the Republic <Marshall Islands> selected as follows:

from the Ralik Chain excluding Ujelang and Enewetak … 4 Iroijlaplap
from Ujelang and Enewetak ..................................................1 Iroijlaplap
from Mili .................................................................2 <1> Iroijlaplap
from Arno .................................................................1 Iroijlaplap
from Mejit ...............................................................1 Iroijlaplap

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but so that, where an Iroijlaplap possesses land rights in more than one of those districts, each of the following mojens is represented in the Mweo Imon Iroij:

mojen eo an Iroijlaplap Jeimata Kabua
mojen eo an Iroijlaplap Laelan Kabua

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mojen eo an Iroijlaplap Murjel
mojen eo an Iroijlaplap Litokwa; and
mojen eo an Iroijlaplap Loeak.”

38. Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution is amended by adding the following new paragraph[12]:

“(1[2]) If the Nitijela under paragraph[5] or the Chief Secretary under paragraph[10] makes specific provision for the representation of the Iroijlaplap in a Constitutional Convention, that provision shall require the election of 5 eligible persons from districts of the Ralik chain and 8 eligible persons from districts of the Ratak chain on the basis set out in Article III, Section 1[2] and[3].”

Question No. 8 (Amendment Numbers 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 30, & 32)

9. Article III, Section 1[8] of the Constitution is amended to read as
follows:

"(8) Any question that arises concerning the right of any person to be or to remain a member, or the deputy of a member, of the Mweo Imon (Council of) Iroij, or to exercise the rights of a member, shall be referred to and determined by the Traditional Rights (High) Court."

15. Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"Section 1. The Judicial Power.

(1) The judicial power of the Republic of the Marshall Islands shall be independent of the legislative and executive powers and shall be vested in a Supreme Court, a Hight[sic] Court, a TRaditional[sic] Rights Court, and such District Courts, Community Courts and other subordinate courts as are created by law, each of these courts possessing such jurisdiction and powers and proceeding under such rules as may be prescribed by law consistent with the provisions of this Article.

(2) Each court of the Republic (Marshall Islands) shall have power to issue all writs and other processes, make rules and order(s) and promulgate all procedural regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may be required for the due administration of justice and the enforcement of this Constitution.

(3) The authority granted in paragraph(2) of this Section shall include, in the case of the Supreme Court, (and) the High Court, the Traditional Rights Court and such subordinate courts as are created by law, the power to grant bail, accept forfeit security therefor[e], make orders for the attendance of witnesses with or without documents, make orders for the disposal of exhibits, and punish contempt of court.

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(4) Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, every judge of the Supreme Court, or of the High Court and of the Traditional Rights Court shall be a person with qualifications prescribed by or pursuant to Act; shall be appointed by the Cabinet acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and with the approval, signified by resolution of the Nitijela; may, pending such approval, discharge the duties of his office until the expiration of 21 days after the commencement of the next ensuing session of the Nitijela; and shall hold office during good behavior, in the case of a judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court or of the the [sic]Traditional Rights Court who is a citizen of the Republic, until reaching the age of 72 years or, in the case of any such judge who is not a citizen of the Republic, for a term of six years. Unless, in the case of a judge who is not a citizen of the Marshall Islands, the judge has been appointed for a term of one or more years, or in the case of a sitting judge in another jurisdiction, for a particular session of court.

(5) Until the Nitijela prescribes by Act the qualifications for judges of the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Traditional Rights Court, such judges must be persons qualified by education, experience, and character to discharge judicial office.

(6) No judge shall take part in the decision of any case in which that judge has previously played a role or with respect to which he is otherwise disabled by any conflict of interest.

(7) The compensation of the Chief Justice and any other judges of the Supreme Court and of the Chief Justice and any other judges of the High Court and of the Chief Justice and the other full-time or
part—time judges of the Traditional Rights Court shall be specifically prescribed by Act.

(8) A judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court or of the Traditional Rights Court may be removed from office only by a resolution of the Niti jela adopted by at least two-thirds of its total membership and only on the ground of clear failure or inability faithfully to discharge the duties of such office or for the commission of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or abuses inconsistent with the authority of his office.

(9) If the Niti jela is not in session, the Cabinet may suspend any judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court or of the Traditional Rights Court until the expiration of 21 days after the commencement of the next ensuing session, but only for such cause as would justify removal of the judge by the Niti jela.”

(10) Whenever [sic] the office of any judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court or of the Traditional Rights Court is temporarily vacant, or any such judge is disabled or disqualified from performing the duties of his office, or it is for any other reason not possible to constitute from among the permanent judges of the Traditional Rights Court a panel complying with the requirements of Section 4(1), the Cabinet, acting on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or, if the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is disabled or that office is vacant, on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the High Court, Judicial Service Commission, may appoint a person qualified within the meaning of paragraph(5) of this Section as an acting judge to discharge the duties of the affected office for the duration of such vacancy, or disability or
disqualification or of a particular session of court, or particular case or controversy. (a person qualified within the meaning of paragraph[5] of this Section.)"

16. Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"Section 2. The Supreme Court.

(1) The Supreme Court shall be a superior court of record, shall consist of a Chief Justice and such number of other judges as may from time to time be prescribed by Act, and shall have appellate jurisdiction, as to both law and fact, with final authority to adjudicate all cases and controversies properly brought before it, in accord with this Constitution and other applicable laws of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

(2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court:
(a) as of right from any final decision of the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction;
(b) as of right from any final decision of the Traditional Rights Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction;
(b) as of right from any final decision of the High Court in the exercise of any appellate jurisdiction, but only if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation or effect of any provision of the Constitution;
(c) at the discretion of the Supreme Court, subject to such conditions as to security for costs or otherwise as the Supreme Court thinks fit, from any final decision of any court.

(3) The High Court may, on its own motion or on application of any party to the proceedings, remove to the Supreme Court any question arising as to the interpretation or effect of the Constitution
in any proceedings of the High Court, other than proceedings set
down for trial before a bench of 3 judges.

(4) In any case in which a question [h]as been removed to the
Supreme Court under paragraph[3], the Supreme Court (it) shall determine
that question and either dispose of the case of remand it to the
High Court for disposition consistent with the Supreme Court's
determination." [sic]

(5) The Traditional Rights Court may, on its own motion or on application
of any party to the proceedings,

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remove to the Supreme Court any question arising as to the interpretation or
effect of the Constitution in any proceedings of the Traditional Rights
Court.

(6) In any case in which a question has been removed to the Supreme
Court under paragraph[5], the Supreme Court shall determine that question
and either dispose of the case or remand it to the Traditional Rights Court
for disposition consistent with the Supreme Court's determination."

17. Article VI, Section 3 of [the] Constitution is amended to read as
follows:

“Section 3. The High Court.

(1) The High Court shall be a superior court of record, (having
general jurisdiction over controversies of law and fact in the Marshall
Islands;) and shall consist of a Chief Justice, and such number of
other judges as may from time to time be prescribed by Act.(,,)
Subject to Section 4(3) of this Article, the High Court shall have general
jurisdiction over controversies of law and fact in the Republic of the

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Marshall Islands and shall have original jurisdiction over cases duly filed in the High Court. \(\text{and}\) The High Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over cases originally filed in subordinate courts; and, unless otherwise provided by law, shall have jurisdiction to review the legality of any final determination by a government agency at the behest of any party aggrieved by such determination.”

\(\text{1A) Where proceedings in the High Court give rise to any question within the jurisdiction of the Traditional Rights Court, the High Court shall refer that question to the Traditional Rights Court for its determination thereon, and the High Court’s final decision disposing of the case shall be consistent with the Traditional Rights Court’s determination of that question.}\)

\(\text{2) At any time when the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court number 4 or more, any judge of the High Court may convene a bench of 3 judges to decide any case in the High Court’s jurisdiction, if the convening judge has determined that the case involves either a substantial question of law as to the interpretation or effect of a provision of this constitution \(\text{(sic)}\) or any other matter of public importance; and, if an insufficient number of judges of the High Court is available, then\(\text{, without prejudicing to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme court (sic) in relation to that case, the remaining members of the bench shall be judges of the Supreme Court.}\)"

18. Article VI, Section 4 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

“Section 4. The Traditional Rights Court

(1) The Traditional Rights Court shall be a \textit{superior} on \langle\text{court of} \)
record; \(\textit{any case or controversy}, \) shall consist of \(a\) panel\(\langle s\rangle\) of 3 or more judges \(\text{sitting}\langle \text{selected so as to include a fair representation of all classes of land rights, including, where applicable, the Iroijlaplap, Iroijedrik, Alap and Dri Jerbal; and shall sit}\rangle\) at such times and places and \(\text{be}\langle \text{chosen on such a} \rangle\text{geographical}\rangle\) basis, as to ensure \(\text{the}\) fair and knowledgeable exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by this Section.

\((2A)\) \(\text{Consistently with paragraph}\langle 1\rangle, \text{there shall be a Chief Justice of the Traditional Rights Court, who shall have the same qualifications as those required for a judge of the High Court and two other judges of the Traditional Rights Court, who may be full—time or part—time judges, as specified in each case in the instrument of appointment, together with such additional number of full—time or part—time judges of the Traditional Rights Court as may from time to time be prescribed by Act; but nothing in this Article shall prevent the appointment of any qualified person to serve concurrently as a judge of the High Court and also as a judge of the Traditional Rights Court.}\)

\((2B)\) \(\text{The decision of a majority of the members of a panel shall be the decision of the Traditional Rights Court.}\)

\(\langle 2\rangle\) \(\text{The size, membership and procedures of the Traditional Rights Court shall be consistent with paragraph}\langle 1\rangle\text{of this Section, and shall be determined by the High Court unless and until the Nitijela makes provision for those matters by Act.}\rangle\)

\(\langle 3\rangle\) \(\text{The}\langle \text{jurisdiction of the}\rangle\text{Traditional Rights Court shall have}\)

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original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases duly filed in the Traditional Rights Court concerning titles or land rights or related legal interests depending wholly or partly on the customary law and traditional practice in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and shall have such other jurisdiction as is expressly conferred on it by this Constitution or by Act.

(4) The jurisdiction of the Traditional Rights Court may be invoked as of right upon application by a party to a pending judicial proceeding; but only if the court in which such proceeding is pending certifies that a substantial question has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Traditional Rights Court.

(4A) Where proceedings in the Traditional Rights Court give rise to any question within the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Traditional Rights Court shall refer that question to the High Court for its determination thereon, and the Traditional Rights Court's final decision disposing of the case shall be consistent with the High Court's determination of that question.

(5) When a question has been certified to the Traditional Rights Court for its determination under paragraph (4), its resolution of the question shall be given substantial weight in the certifying court's disposition of the legal controversy before it; but shall not be deemed binding unless the certifying court concludes that justice so requires.

19. Article VI of the Constitution is amended by adding a new Section 4A to read as follows:

"Section 4A. Procedures of the Traditional Rights Court

(1) The procedures of the Traditional Rights Court shall require the prior
reference of:

(a) any dispute concerning the Alap or the Dri Jerbal rights in land to the Iroi jlaplap, or the Iroijedrik where necessary, of that land; and

(b) any dispute between an Alap and an Iroi jlaplap to the Alaps in the Iroi jlaplap's mojen, acting as a group; and

(c) any dispute between two or more Iroi jlaplap to the Alaps in the mojens of each Iroi jlaplap concerned, acting as a group;

and shall allow a reasonable time for the person or group to which the dispute has been referred to make a determination resolving the dispute, and, where any such determination has

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been made in relation to the dispute, any proceedings before the Traditional Rights Court shall be by way of appeal from that determination; but the procedures required by this paragraph shall not be applied so as to deprive a claimant who has not been able to comply with them after taking all reasonable steps to do so of the right to pursue the claim in the Traditional Rights Court.

(2) Subject to this Constitution and to any Act, the Traditional Rights Court shall otherwise determine its own procedures."

20. Article VI, Section 5(3) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

“(3) The Judicial Service Commission shall:

(a) make recommendations on judicial appointments on its own motion or at the request of the Cabinet;

(b) recommend or evaluate criteria of qualification for judges on its own motion or at the request of the Speaker or the Cabinet;”
(c) appoint and remove judges of subordinate courts, and of the Traditional Rights Court if authorized to do so by Act;
(d) exercise such other functions and powers as may be conferred by law."

21. The term of office of any judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court who is not a citizen of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and is holding office immediately before the effective date of the amendment to Article VI, Section 1(4) of the Constitution shall be six years from the date on which that judge took office.

22. The term of office of any judge of the Traditional Rights Court who was holding office immediately before the effective date of the amendments to Article VI, Section 4 of the Constitution shall be the remainder of the term for which that judge was appointed but without prejudice to the appointment as soon as practicable after that effective date of a Chief Justice of the Traditional Rights Court in accordance with Article IV, Section 4 (2A).

27. Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"Section 6. Tenure of Office of Members of the Public Service Commission.

A member of the Public Commission may at any time resign his office by writing signed by him, addressed to the President; but he shall not be removed or suspended from office except on the like grounds and in the like manner as a judge of a superior court."

<the High Court or of the Supreme Court.>
30. Article VIII, Section 11(1) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"(1) The compensation payable to the holders of the offices of judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court or of the Traditional Rights Court, of a member of the Public Service Commission and of Auditor-General shall be a charge on the General Fund."

32. Article VIII, Section 13(3) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"(3) The Auditor-General may at any time resign his office by writing signed by him, addressed to the Speaker; but he shall not be removed or suspended from office except on the like grounds and in the like manner as a judge of a superior court."

〈the High Court or of the Supreme Court.〉

Question No. 9. (Amendment Numbers 10, 11, 36, and 37)

10. Article IV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"(1) Subject to Article XI, Section 3(2),〈E〉elections of members of the Nitijela shall be conducted by secret ballot under a system of universal suffrage for all citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands who have attained the age of 18 years, and who are otherwise qualified to vote pursuant to this Section."

11. Article IV, Section 4(1) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

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"(1) Subject to Article XI, Section 3(2), every qualified voter who has attained the age of 21 years is qualified to be a candidate for election as a member of the Nitijela."

36. Article XI, Section 2(1) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"(1) Unless disqualified pursuant to paragraph(3) of this Section, any person who is not a citizen of the Republic of the Marshall Islands shall become a citizen by registration if, upon application, the Traditional Rights Court is satisfied either:

(a) that he has land rights; or
(b) that he has been resident in the Marshall Islands for not less than 3 years, and is the parent of a child who is a citizen of the Marshall Islands; or
(c) that he is of Marshallese descent, and that in the interests of justice his application should be granted."

37. Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"Section 3. Powers of the Nitijela Regarding Citizenship.

(1) The Nitijela may make provision by Act:

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(a) for the acquisition of citizenship of the Republic of the Marshall Islands by registration in cases not falling within Section 2 of this Article;
(b) subject to subsection(2), for the acquisition by any class of persons of citizenship of the Republic of the Marshall Islands by naturalization;
(c) for depriving of citizenship of the Republic

<Marshall Islands,> consistently with Article II, any class of persons who are citizens of the Republic

<Marshall Islands> only by reason of provision made by Act pursuant to this Section;

(d) for depriving of citizenship of the Republic

<Marshall Islands> any class of persons who are citizens of the Republic

<Marshall Islands> and are or have become citizens of another country otherwise than by marriage;

(e) for the express renunciation by any person of citizenship of the Republic <Marshall Islands>.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in Article II or in Article IV Section 3{1} or Section 4{1}, the naturalization of any person under any Act for the purposes of subsection(1)(b)

(a) shall not confer on that person any right to be a candidate for election as a member of the Nitijela; and

(b) if the Act so provides, shall not confer on that person any right to vote in any election of members of the Nitijela;

but no person whose right to be a candidate or to vote in any election or members of the Nitijela was not restricted by this subsection or by Act at the time of that person's naturalization shall be deprived of that right on the ground only that that person is a naturalized citizen.”

Question No. 10 (Amendment Numbers 12, 14, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29)
12. Article IV, Section 14{1} of the Constitution is amended as follows:

“(1) There shall be a Clerk of the Nitijela who shall be an officer
of the Public Service, shall be appointed by the Public Service Commission after consultation with the Speaker, and shall have the functions conferred on the holder of the office by this Constitution or by or pursuant to Act or to the Rules or a resolution of the Nitijela."

14. Article V, Section 12(1) of the Constitution is amended as follows:

"(1) There shall be a Clerk of the Cabinet who shall be an officer of the Public Service, shall be appointed by the Public Service Commission after consultation with the Cabinet and shall be responsible for arranging the business for and keeping the minutes of meetings of the Cabinet, and for conveying decisions of the Cabinet to the appropriate person or authority, and shall perform, with respect to the Cabinet, such secretarial and other functions as may be required."

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Service Commission after consultation with the Cabinet and shall be responsible for arranging the business for and keeping the minutes of meetings of the Cabinet, and for conveying decisions of the Cabinet to the appropriate person or authority, and shall perform, with respect to the Cabinet, such secretarial and other functions as may be required."

23. Article W, Section 2(2) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"(2) In addition to the other functions and powers conferred on him by law, the Chief Secretary shall be responsible to the Cabinet for the general direction and co-ordination of the work of all Departments and offices of government and shall monitor the implementation of decisions of the Cabinet on personnel policy and other matters which have general application to all Departments and offices or to all members of the Public Service."

(The head of any such Department or office shall account for the work of that Department or office to the Chief Secretary, as well as to the Minister primarily responsible for that Department or office.)
24. Article VII, Section 2 of the Constitution is amended by inserting the following new paragraph (2A):

"(2A) The Chief Secretary shall carry out his advisory, coordinating and monitoring function in consultation with the Ministerial Secretaries of the Departments and offices concerned, shall account for the work of that Department or office to the Chief Secretary, as well as to the Minister primarily responsible for that Department or office."

25. Article VII of the Constitution is amended by inserting the following new Section 2A:

"Section 2A. The Ministerial Secretaries

The functions of a Ministerial Secretary of a Department or office of government are to advise the responsible Minister on the work of that Department or office in carrying out, under the general direction of the Minister, the policies and programs for which the Minister is responsible. Ministerial Secretaries are accountable to the responsible Minister for the implementation of all such policies and programs and for the proper management of the department or office."

26. Article VII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"(1) There shall be an officer of the Public Service to be called the Secretary of Finance who shall be the head of the Finance Department. A Secretary of Finance who shall be an officer of the Public Service and shall supervise the work of the Finance Department."

28. Article VII, Section 9(1),(2) and(3) of the Constitution are amended to read as follows:

"(1) The Public Service Commission shall be the employing
authority for the Public Service, *advise on its organi—*

[p.13]

*zation and management* (and shall have the general oversight and control of its organization and management)

and shall be responsible for reviewing the efficiency and economy of all Departments and offices of the government.

(2) Subject to any law, the Public Service Commission may, *with the approval of the Cabinet*, prescribe and determine the conditions of employment of employees of the Public Service and shall have such other functions and powers as may be conferred on it by or pursuant to Act.

(3) Except as provided in paragraph(2) of Section 10 of this Article, the Public Service Commission shall be responsible to the Cabinet for the carrying out of its duties and the exercise of its functions and powers. *This responsibility shall be discharged primarily through the responsible Minister, but* (and) the Commission shall, as necessary, *have the right and duty directly to inform and advise the Cabinet in relation to any matter affecting the Public Service."

29. Article VII, Section 10 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"Section 10. Appointments within the Public Service.

(1) All employees of the Public Service shall be appointed by or under the authority of the Public Service Commission and, subject to any law, shall hold office on such conditions as may from time to time be prescribed or determined by the Commission *with the approval of the Cabinet*.

(2) In all matters relating to decisions about individual employees
(whether they relate to the appointment, promotion, demotion, transfer, disciplining or cessation of employment of any employee or any other matter) the Public Service Commission shall not receive any direction from the Cabinet or from any other authority or person, but shall act independently and in accord with criteria relating only to the individual's ability to perform his duties.

(3) Before appointing, promoting or transferring any person to a position in the Public Service in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (2), the Commission shall consult with the Ministerial Secretary of the Department or office in which any candidate is presently employed, and, in the case of a senior position or employee, shall consult also with the responsible Ministers. Such consultations shall have the purpose of enabling the Commission to be fully informed about the contribution to the work of the Public Service being made by candidates in their existing positions, the career opportunities and responsibilities for which such candidates are suited by training and experience, the duties of the position to be filled and the qualities required to carry out those duties effectively."

[p.14]

Question No. 11 (Amendment Number 13)

13. Article IV, Section 17 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"Section 17. Compensation of Members of the Nitijela

The compensation of the President, the Ministers, the Speaker, the Vice—Speaker and the other members of the Nitijela shall be specifically prescribed by Act. An Act increasing the compensation of any member of the Nitijela shall take effect on the first day of the first
session of the Nitijela held after the general election next following the session of the Nitijela in which the Act was passed."

Question No. 12 (Amendment Number 31 and 33)
31. Article VIII, Section 13(2) of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"(2) The Auditor—General shall hold office during good behavior for a term of six(6) years."

<untill he reaches the age of 72 years."

33. The term of office of the Auditor—General who was holding office immediately before the effective date of the amendments to Article VIII, Section 13(2) of the Constitution shall be the remainder of the term for which that Auditor—General was appointed.

Question No. 13 (Amendment Number 34)
34. Article X, Section 1 of the Constitution is amended by adding the following new paragraph(3):

"(3) Title to land or to any land right in the Republic of the Marshall Islands may be held only by a citizen of the Republic, a corporation wholly owned by citizens of the Republic, the Government of the Republic or a local government or a public corporation or other statutory authority constituted under the law of the Republic."

Question No. 14 (Amendment Number 39)
39. Article XIV, Section 5 of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

"Section 5. Authentic Text

The Marshallese and English texts of this Constitution shall be
equally authentic, but in case of difference, the *Marshallese* (English) text shall prevail."
Kiribatese Strategy of Household Economy

Taisuke Miyauchi

1. Islands with poor resources?

From the view of the natural environment, the Pacific Islands can be classified into two groups. One is a group of volcano islands and the other a group of atolls. Atolls are generally regarded as places with scarce natural resources and poverty. This notion is well illustrated by, for example, an article in *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* on Japan's fishery aid to Kiribati, which consists of atolls. It states, “Kiribatese are poor although the surrounding sea is rich in tuna and bonito” (*Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 12 September 1990). In the perspective of Japanese government or fishing industry, the only resources of Kiribati are marine resources like tuna and bonito, and Kiribatese are poor because they have not used these valuable resources. The question we wish to consider here is: does Kiribati really lack resources?

Phosphate in Banaba (Ocean Island), Kiribati’s most profitable material, was exhausted at the very time when Kiribati won its
independence. Since that time Kiribati has never been able to achieve a trade surplus. Kiribati's trade loss in 1990 was A$30.7 million\(^2\), which resulted from A$3.7 million of export and A$34.4 million of import (Statistics Office of Kiribati, 1991a). Many argue that an economic development is needed to make up for the loss. But we wish to consider some questions with regard to the validity of such an argument.

First, a subsistence economy, which does not make money by itself, forms a large proportion in Kiribati society. We must analyse this substantive economy\(^3\), otherwise we would fail to analyse Kiribati's economy. Second, we should distinguish between a nation's and people's economy. The notion of a nation's economy reminds us of GNP, trade balance or national revenue. But people's economy lies in other areas, where the main concern is survival and welfare. Truly a nation's economy and its people's economy are related, but the two should not be confused. A nation can be rich while its people are poor, and a people can be rich while their nation is poor. We must recognize the difference in criteria between nation's and people's richness. We should also note people have a different economic strategy from that of a nation. Third, when thinking of sustainable development, we should move beyond monetary measures such as GNP or trade balance. Finally, we should not be prejudiced by the myth of "affluent subsistence". This myth sometimes leads us to fail to understand societies like contemporary Kiribati. What is important is to understand the precise nature of the contemporary subsistence economy, not to praise it.

This paper will not start with the nation's economy. The paper starts by reviewing natural resources, which Kiribati society utilizes to sustain its subsistence economy. Then we analyse Kiribatese household
economy where we find out that households have a strategy of co-existence between subsistence and cash economy.

2. The Natural Environment and Subsistence Economy of Kiribati

Most islands in Kiribati are atolls, where the Kiribatese are said to have settled for 4,000–5,000 years (Macdonald, 1982:1). Many who visit this “tiny and infertile” place for the first time must wonder why the Kiribatese have settled such a place, where only infertile lands exist. We point out two main reasons why they have settled these atolls.

One is the existence of ground-water. In the Kiribatese atolls ground-water forms so-called water lens, which shapes a form of lens. Human could not survive here without it. There are some places in Kiribati without ground water and these place are not inhabited.

The other reason for the atolls being inhabited is the rich marine resources, particularly in the lagoons. Population density of Kiribati is very high and seems in the first instance to be unsustainable. Population density is 83 persons per square kilometer, and is as high as 236 persons per square kilometer in the Gilbert Islands, where most Kiribatese live. But we should not be prejudiced by land-oriented thought. Suppose we replace lagoons by mountains behind villages, Kiribati would have greater land and the population density is not so high. In any case lagoons as the “sea commons” enable human to settle atolls.

Kiribatese have established their subsistence economy on the basis of their natural surroundings. The subsistence economy exists today in Kiribati, particularly in the outer islands, although it has been modified.
### Table 1: Households by Food Grown and Livestock Owned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households with -</th>
<th>Bread</th>
<th>Babai</th>
<th>Bananas</th>
<th>Pawpaw</th>
<th>Pumpkin</th>
<th>Veg.</th>
<th>Garden</th>
<th>Poultry</th>
<th>Chicken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Tarawa</td>
<td>2,907</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7,186</td>
<td>5,935</td>
<td>6,427</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>6,138</td>
<td>4,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,093</td>
<td>8,009</td>
<td>6,847</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>4,465</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>8,376</td>
<td>5,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We should start with *babai* (swamp taro or giant taro, *Cyrtosperma chamissonis*). Kiribatese establish wet pits by digging and then plant *babai*, surrounded by mud and rotten plants. This is the only intensive agriculture in Kiribati, where there is only infertile coral sands. This kind of planting with moist pits can be seen in many Pacific atolls (Barrau, 1961; Thaman, 1984). However, many *babai* pits in Kiribati have been neglected for some years. The fact is that many Kiribatese prefer to eat bread or rice, causing the deterioration of *babai* pits.

Coconut trees are an important part of the Kiribatese way of life. Most Kiribatese families own coconut trees and have various uses for them. An informant said, "Coconut trees are very important. We would die without them". Leaves are woven into mats which are often used as walls. Leafstalks are used for walls and floors. Albumen of coconut is used in cooking and dried to make copra (dried albumen) which is sold to earn money. Husks of coconuts can be used as fuel. Toddy (*karewe*), which is collected from the inflorescence of coconuts, is used as a drink. It also becomes a liquor and can be boiled to make a syrup called *kamaimai*, which is used in cooking.

Few coconut trees are natural here. The planting of coconut trees
spread especially after the start of the coconut oil trade in the 19th century. The coconut trees in Kiribati can be classified into two groups: often-used and rarely-used. Roughly, coconut trees close to houses are frequently used, mainly for toddy and copra, and those distant from houses are irregularly or rarely used.

Families own coconut trees. Strict borderlines of coconut gardens exist. However, interestingly enough, people are allowed to use as fuel old leaves from others' coconut gardens. Macdonald (1982:208) reports that Kiribatese can use coconut wood for building a house if they obtain the owners' permission. The private land tenure system in Kiribati includes something like a commonland.

Land belongs to each family and is inherited ambilineally. The selling of land has been reported. For example, land has been sold since the 1960s in Abemama Atoll (Watters, 1077:43). But reportedly it is regarded as a shame to sell your land.

Breadfruit trees (Artocarpus altilis) and pandanus trees (Pandanus tectorius) are also very useful. Most families have breadfruit trees, mostly one for each family in the dwelling. They eat the fruits from the tree as snacks. Pandanus leaves are dried and in combination with coconut midrib are used for roofs. The wood from breadfruit trees are good for building houses. Most houses in Kiribati are of traditional design. Statistics shows that 89.3% of houses in the outer islands and 39.8% in South Tarawa are of a traditional design and construction. In addition, most families keep pigs for eating, particularly in feasts. These things indicate that Kiribatese effectively utilize their scarce natural surrounding resources.

Fishing has a great importance to the Kiribatese subsistence economy and it consists of three types. One is fishing in lagoons. People handle single out-rigger canoes without motors. They use lines and nets.
Another type of fishing is done in lagoon flats and reef flats. It includes collecting shells and crustaceans like crabs. Fish traps also exist which are made from piles of coral limestones and laid on reef flats. The third one is fishing in the Ocean. Generally fishing in lagoons and the ocean is men’s work and collecting in flats is women’s and children’s work. “Most men had their own favoured fishing ‘spots’, including spots good for ninimai, mullet etc. Although some men tried to keep their favourite spots secret, most were known to others” (Watters, 1977:38)

Table 2 reveals that lagoon fishing forms a bigger proportion than ocean fishing. The fishing activities in lagoons does not pursue large amount or single species. They catch various kinds and small amount of fish. This smallness is supposed to fit Kiribatese ecology. The one exception to this is some of the fishing activities in South Tarawa. Some people in South Tarawa are engaged in small—scale commercial fishing, although not permanent, because of the increasing demand of wage workers for purchasing fish. Kiribatese also have started or will start soon to collect sea cucumber and seaweed for commercial use,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 Weekly Fish Catches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Tarawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagoon islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No lagoon islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Lagoon islands include Butaritari, Malakei, Abaaiang, North Tarawa, Maina, Abemama, Aranuka, Nonouti, Tabiteuea, Beru, Onotoa. No lagoon islands include the others. The research was done in different times from 1984 to 1987 in each island.
which we will examine later.

We should add one interesting point regarding marine resources. In Maiana Island, one informant said to me, "We walk around the seashore along the Ocean side after strong east winds. It is because there could be drift things there such as big coconuts, bottles or fishing gear. Sometimes we can collect large pieces of timber which could be good material for canoes". Surprisingly even drift things are part of the Kiribatese subsistence economy. Garbage is not garbage here.

Several observations made in the last few paragraphs show that the subsistence economy in Kiribati can be described as small-scale complex of agriculture, forestry and fishing activities based around families. We can also say that the economy consists of the methods of production that effectively and sustainably use limited range of species and marine resources. Furthermore, it supports a recycling system where the people make use of organic matters in various ways and stages, and return them to the land.

We should also stress that the way of production in Kiribati is combined with a way of living. Toddy drinking shows a good illustration of this. Most Kiribatese do not eat vegetables, while in—take of vitamin is mostly from the consumption of toddy. Toddy cutting and drinking is a daily part of work of most Kiribatese. This habit of toddy drinking is essential to the subsistence economy.

We will now attempt to extend the observation into the division of labour. In the subsistence sector labour tasks are divided mainly among family members. Inter—family division of labour exists only to a limited extent. The notion of "egalitarian tradition" is often said to explain the Kiribatese society. Equality exists among families. In traditional economies self—containment of individual family is well
obtained. It is regarded as a shame to hire or be hired by others (Macdonald, 1982: 207, 211).

The tradition of family independence is linked to features of the subsistence economy. The fact that each family attempts to maintain their own subsistence at a family level and does not invade others', leads to stability and sustainability. Moreover, to maintain the stability of the sustainable economy it is essential to keep the sea, reef flats, lagoons and lagoon flats as commons for the Kiribatese families.

We now return to our original question; Is Kiribati a economy with scarce resources? Many regard “resources” as those necessary for industrial societies or for making money. In this sense Kiribati lacks resources. However, given the same “objective” amount of resource, the virtual amount of resources varies depending who uses the resources, how they use them or for what they use them. We argue that it is social relations that determine the substantial amount of resources. Toddy is not a resource if people do not use it. Kiribatese social relations are such that they use “limited resources” with great effectiveness. It would be better to say that “resources”, in the exact sense of the

Figure1 Population By Economic Activity

(Source) Statistics office (1986)
word, are social relations, not materials. Given this definition, Kiribati is rich in resources. The social relations which Kiribatese have established in the process of production, use and disposal are in themselves resources or “stocks”.

3. Co-existence of subsistence and cash economy

The Kiribatese society has been incorporated into the capitalist world—economy since 1840s when a number of Westerners, later called “beachcombers”, settled there and started trading coconut oil. Before then whalers came, stopping at Kiribati to barter goods. The coconut oil trade started because coconut oil had become essential to make soap and candles in Western countries. Whalers began this trade and then Westerners who settled in Kiribati opened stations engaged in the trade. In 1880s copra (dried coconut albumen) trade replaced coconut oil trade. Kiribatese obtained tobacco for the coconut oil and copra they traded. The trades were not equal from the beginning because smoking became a habit of the Kiribatese soon after trading began. (Maude, 1968:233–283)

Phosphate mining in Banaba (Ocean Islands), where some Kiribatese lived, began by Europeans after discovering phosphate in 1900. But it

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867-1883</td>
<td>Tahiti and dependencies</td>
<td>2,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868-1895</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>2,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877-1886</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-1892</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>c.1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894-1895</td>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Munro, Doug (1990)
did not have a great influence on the Gilbert Islands, where most Kiribatese lived, although some migrants did go to Banaba to work.

British declared a protectorate over the Gilbert Islands in 1892. Yet no typical colonist land use, such as plantations, were introduced. We can only point out some of the reasons for this. First, the natural environment was viable only with the delicate involvement of Kiribatese themselves. In addition, the land was not spacious. Therefore, it did not fit to any preconceived colonial or centralized management structure. Secondly, it was difficult for the colonial power to rule the islands economy because the native people relied on the sea. Lastly, there was no feudal land owners with whom the colonist could ally themselves.

Let us now turn to another question regarding the relations formed between the capitalist world—economy and Kiribatese society. The question may stated as follows; how did the Kiribatese society chang? We shall discuss this in the context of a broader sense of economy.

We wish to consider one interesting question relating to poverty. Has the “marginalised” Kiribatese society become poor as the classical dependency theory would suggest? Truly, the Kiribatese society has been placed in the periphery of the world system and been involved in unequal trade. Yet it does not seem to have become poor, though it does not seem to have become rich. We would argue that this is caused by the fact that Kiribati has kept the basic way of production, including its involvement with its natural surroundings, and further because the land and the sea have not been destroyed. Moreover, its dependency on traded goods has had a limited effect on the society.

The greater the connection with the world economy, or the more goods enter into a society, the more likely it will influence the
inequality in the society. Kiribati is no exception to this. The popular notion is that “intrusion of the cash economy” will invade and destroy traditional societies. But this statement is misleading or invalid for several reasons.

To begin with, traditional societies are not necessarily persistent. So-called traditional societies can change and probably have changed due to situations inside or from outside. What is important is whether the society changes independently or dependently.

Next, “cash economy” has several stages or types. Roughly, it has four stages; one, where the people use money in exchanging with outsiders, second, where they use it for exchange inside village, third, where money is used for saving or investment, and finally, where the trust economy develops. Karl Polanyi reveals that several money types emerged independently for four purposes; paying, stock, calculating and trade (Polanyi, 1980:186–227). Although Polanyi’s argument does not directly apply to the Kiribatese contemporary cash economy because his explanation is about self-generated money systems, it is suggestive for such societies as Kiribati.

Today both subsistence economies and cash economies exist together in Kiribati. Elwert and Wong (1980), who study mainly West Africa,
offers two models of the articulation between subsistence and commodity production. We can apply their models to Kiribati. One model is mixed production, where the same producer is engaged in both in subsistence and commodity production. The other one is concerned with migration.

We shall first look at the latter model as it applies to Kiribati. For example, many Kiribatese work for foreign shipping companies. In 1985 the number of seamen was 1,040, which forms 2.5% of the population of 15 years old or more. In the same year the total money remitted by them to their families was A$37.4 million, excluding remittances in kind and money they carry home. The percentage of households remitted by seaman was over 10% (Statistics Office of Kiribati, 1989: 199). Kiribati has a Marine Training Centre, funded by U. K., UNDP, and British and German shipping companies. Most Kiribatese seamen have been trained there. Most of the seamen are employed by German shipping companies through the South Pacific Marine Service (SPMS), founded by a group of German shipowners in 1969 (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Labour, n.d.). Seamen do not work permanently on the sea. They return after contract works and go again if needed. It can be said that they temporarily, not persistently, sell their labour. In addition their families take part in keeping the subsistence economy while other members are at sea.

Remittances are not only by seamen but also by those who work for the phosphate mining industry in Nauru (next to Kiribati). Statistics Office of Kiribati (1989:198) estimates this number in 1987 at 220 person excluding their families. We should add that remittances by workers in Tarawa to the outer islands occurs.

There is a long history of Kiribatese migrating. Table 3 shows that
it started as early as 1847 when twenty-two Kiribatese were recruited to work in New South Wales (Australia) (Munro and Bedford, 1990). Later relatively large number of workers were recruited from the estimated Kiribati population of 35,100 at most (Macdonald, 1982:198). Labour migration towards Banaba (Ocean Island) and Nauru for phosphate mining began early in this century.⁹

Munro and Bedford (1990) suggest some relevant points to the migration flows. First, in 1870s and early 1880s Kiribatese regarded recruiting as a means to escape the harsh circumstances which brought on by droughts and warfare. Additionally Kiribatese tended to treat recruiting as a family affair and unmarried women were permitted to engage in labour migration. Secondly, "Contrary to popular belief (...) the labour trade from Kiribati did not result in a massive population decline. Most of those who departed eventually returned" (Munro and Bedford, 1990:173). Much of the migration occurred through strategies devised by the Kiribatese themselves.

Another form of migration can be seen in South Tarawa. Extensive migration did not start until after World War II. Still they have stuck to their home islands, which is not necessary their birth places⁹. The habit of returning from South Tarawa to his/her homeland after retirement is well known, despite no statistics available about the returning population.

South Tarawa holds many public servants and private workers. On the other hand, statistics of the labour population reveal that there are many people engaged in "village work" (Figure 1). Moreover many "cash workers" are involved in "village work" like toddy cutting and fishing. And we should notice that most of the housework done by women and children are far from "shadow work". Housework, such as making mats from coconut leaves or pandanus leaves, supports subsistence

—155—
economy. We should notice that even in South Tarawa the subsistence economy, though modified, exists.

In the outer islands, people enter into both subsistence production and cash production, mostly copra making. Copra trading is now carried out under the Kiribati Copra Co-operative Society, affiliated by the government. At the time of my research in August 1991, the Copra Society bought copra for A$0.32 per kilo. Statistics (Statistics Office of Kiribati, 1989) shows that on Maiana Island the average production of a household is 1,091kg, which equals A$326\textsuperscript{ii}.

Many households are also selling small products like mats or food to others. For example, in Maiana Island they sell bread for A$1 per pound or for 4 coconuts, a pumpkin for A$0.50, a chicken for A$3–5 and sour toddy for A$0.30 per cup. This kind of small-scale selling is also observed in South Tarawa, where they sell, for example, a mat of coconut leaves for A$0.50, a mat of pandanus leaves for A$3.50, kamaimai (toddy syrup) for A$0.50 and seashells for A$5 per small plastic bag. It may be said that through exchange, money from outside is redistributed to create more equal incomes. Further the trading in Kiribati is equivalent to the so-called "informal sector," observed in many third world countries.

Collecting sea cucumber and seaweed farming has just begun in the outer islands. Collecting sea cucumber began because a Kiribati-born Chinese trader started the trade in 1991. I observed in Raweai Village on Maiana Island, that villagers collected sea cucumbers but they just kept them at home because the price the Chinese trader offered did not satisfy them. Kiribatese do not eat sea cucumbers, but there was a small trade of them in 19th century (Maude, 1968:239). The present trade can be said to be its revival. Villagers might like to work on sea cucumbers rather than copra making, because at the moment sea
cucumber seems profitable than copra.

Seaweed, known as agar-agar (Malay words) in South East Asia, is exported to Denmark and used for food processing. In 1985 the Kiribatese government started to encourage the people to farm seaweed (Ministry of Natural Resources Development, 1990). The Atoll Seaweed Company, affiliated by the government, was founded to work on the trade.

It is hard to predict if sea cucumber collecting and seaweed farming will be successful. Villagers seem to think of them as alternatives to copra making, whose price is relatively low. In any event, sea cucumber collecting and seaweed farming are equivalent to copra making in the sense that these activities could be an extension of subsistence production and harmonize with a subsistence economy.

Today, commodities like rice, tea, sugar, tin meat, soap, oil and tobacco are vital to the Kiribatese. They are part of their life and culture. In addition the people also have to pay for school fees. Toddy cutting cannot make money for them. Copra making, seaweed farming or remittances can and do. The money earned from these activities has a specific purpose, such as school fees. It rarely goes to savings or investments.

Lawrence (1985) reports some interesting examples relevant to our discussion from a different angle. The government introduced the Coconut Improvement and Replanting Schemes in 1970s, before independence. The scheme intended to offer villagers subsidies to encourage coconut replanting and boost copra production. But villagers were reluctant because the price of copra was low. In Tamana Island the people persuaded the government officer to recognize the “Tamana Working Agreement”, which allowed all landowners to work communally with the subsidy going to the group rather than the landowner and
being used for community projects like the re-roofing of meeting houses.

Lawrence reports another example in Tamana concerning people’s attitude to development. It is about a primary school, which the government intended to provide. While the government provided only four classrooms, the Islands Council (the local government) paid and built night classrooms. This was welcomed and supported by the community. Additionally the government’s attempt to introduce education more relevant to rural life, by teaching local skills and environmental studies, did not satisfy the people. It is because the people regarded school education as a means of gaining employment, which appears to be viewed as separate from rural life.

Lawrence also shows a successful project generated by Tamana community. The project was not a kind of rural development on

**Table 5 Export by Commodity (AS’000)**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>2,158</td>
<td>6,987</td>
<td>4,718</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>4,203</td>
<td>3,127</td>
<td>1,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicrafts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shark Fins</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>1,718</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaweed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,018</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,689</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,768</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,790</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,294</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,118</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,848</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,973</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,009</strong></td>
</tr>
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*source: Statistics Office of Kiribati (1991a)*

production. It was a project to build a shop in South Tarawa. “The emphasis of the project is on employment generation and there is not strong expectation that profit will accrue to the individual” (Lawrence, 1985:560). Reportedly, it was also important for the project not to cause conflict with the traditional value systems (Lawrence, 1985).
We can conclude from these examples that for the rural residents wage employment, which is separate from subsistence economy, is the basic means of making money. Also school education is no more than a means for gaining employment. For the people the cash economy appears to be the way they buy commodities from outside by the use of money from outside. That is how the subsistence economy has survived and the cash economy has not greatly invaded the subsistence economy.

Some problems remain, such as whether the people are purposely aware of this co-existence strategy, or whether such a situation emerges only in a period of transition from subsistence to a cash-dominated society.

We should add that we can trace the money the people earn to the origins of remittances, exports, including copra, and importantly the government activities. The government revenues are mainly from fishing royalties from foreign fishing nations, Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund (RERF) from the past phosphate mining income and aid from foreign countries including UK, EC, Australia and Japan. This leads to the thought that the above-mentioned peaceful co-existence can be kept so only by past income and foreign aid.

Truly, this situation is not “healthy” for a modern nation. But in the perspective of the Kiribatese households’ strategy, the principle or the logic that they buy commodities from outside by money from outside and keep a subsistence economy, perpetuates. We should point out that the notion of a modern nation does not originated from the Kiribatese. It is forced on the Kiribatese. We should re-examine the above-mentioned situation as a strategy for survival by the Kiribatese³⁹.

We cannot neglect the fact that there exists instability. It is the outside world that determines the means in which the Kiribatese earn
money. It is uncertain how long foreign aid and fishing royalties will continue. In this sense dependency exists. If, for instance, foreign aid boost up unnecessarily and a great amount of commodities rush in, the peaceful co-existence may collapse. We can observe such situations in some other Pacific Islands.

4. Conclusion and Some Relevant Problems

The Kiribatese society has social relations that lead to the use and recycling of the natural surroundings of atolls and this allows the continuing of a hold subsistence society. The social relations on production, use, disposal and recycle of natural resources are in themselves “environment” or “stocks”. Kiribatese households have held strategies of co-existence between subsistence and cash economy since copra trade linked the Kiribatese people with the capitalist world-economy.

There are several relevant problems left to be examined. First, the subsistence economy itself has changed (for example, the deterioration of babai production). We should make a further examination into such changes. Secondly, we should evaluate the government’s development policies mainly from the view of the people’s household strategies. We should also examine the roles and characters of bureaucrats relevant to the development policy. Thirdly, as Hau’ofa (1987) suggests, the Pacific islands form a single economic region dominated by Australia and New Zealand. We should re-examine Kiribatese economy through this viewpoint. Lastly, on the basis of our argument, we should examine the possibility of internally-generated development.
Notes:

* This paper is mainly based on my fieldwork in South Tarawa and Maiana in July and August 1991. The fieldwork was supported by Toyota Foundation. I wish to thank Takaio, Buaneang, Koiria and their families for taking care of me during my stay.

1 The name of Kiribati (pronounced Kiribas) is from Kiribatese pronunciation of the “Gilbert Islands”. The independent government named Kiribati for the nation including the Gilbert Islands, Banaba (Ocean Island), the Phoenix Islands and Line Islands. But in this paper we shall limit the word “Kiribati” to Gilbert Islands excluding other islands.

2 The currency in Kiribati is the Australian dollar.

3 Some recent attempts have been made to take into account for subsistence economy when calculating GDP. Sato (1992: 35) collects statistics indicating proportions of subsistence activities in GDPs of the Pacific countries. The statistics office of Kiribatese government also tried this but confesses its difficulties, saying, “For example should urban or rural prices be applied to the estimated catch of fish? Or what is the most appropriate market value of the toddy produced for own consumption?” and also saying, “In belief, estimates of subsistence are to some extent subjective in nature and any interpretations of such data should be undertaken with due caution” (Statistics Office of Kiribati, 1989:150). Statistics Office of Kiribati (1989) does not make open how much they actually estimates fish or toddy.

4 What we call “taro” has various species. Well known is Colocasia esculenta, known as satoi mo in Japan. Others are Xanthosoma and Cyrtosperma chamisonis.

5 Coconut liquor drinking began after Westerners settled in Kiribati (Macdonald, 1982: 4).

6 Statistics Office of Kiribati (1986a:208) indicates that the proportion of household owning canoes is 46.6% and the one owning outboard motors is 7.2%.
A coconut has a hole containing coconut juice, surrounded by white albumen. Copra is dried albumen, which one can squeeze and make oil. Coconut oil has been used widely as material for soap, detergent, edible oil and so on.

The centre used to be called Marine Training School.

Connell (1980) reviews and examines migrants and remittances in the Pacific Islands including Papua New Guinea. Connell emphasizes that the effects of migrants and remittances vary depending how strongly urban people and rural people have ties. Karakita (1989) analyses migrants from Western Samoa and examines their impacts into Western Samoan society. He argues that through migration Western Samoa has experienced both sustenance and change at the same time.

Census of Kiribati has the questions of both birth place and home island. It means that the place of birth and the home island of the same person are not necessarily the same. For instance, according to the census in 1985, among the residents in South Tarawa numbered 21,070, the number of those born there is 8,094 (38.4%), while the number of those who regard South Tarawa as their home island is only 2,847 (13.5%) (Statistics Office, 1986a). It means that 64.8 of the people born in South Tarawa regard other islands as their home.

This indicates that the fortnight income of a household from copra is A$12.5, while average income of a government servant is A$150 for a fortnight.

Shimizu (1982) is much suggestive in discussing the relation between cash economy or modern nation and traditional economy, value and culture. Sato (1991,1992) argues that Pacific micro—states such as Kiribati can survive through collective self—reliance and internal development cooperated with other island countries.

Nevertheless, the Kiribatese government is seen to be deliberate on foreign aid. Former prime minister Tabai said, “Despite these grave problems, we were also aware that we must aim to be able to meet our basic needs and to reduce our dependence on the
goodwill of others. A very important element of this is to try and live within our own means. It is priority to the productive sector of the economy” (Islands Business, July 1989, p.13). The government has stressed small or medium scale industries like sandal manufacture or biscuit manufacture. Twenty—one projects were in process during my fieldwork in August 1991. They also introduced rural area projects like seaweed farming or small—scale fishing development project. There is no space in this paper to examine or evaluate such development policies.

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Searching for a Route to Co-Existence and Nuclear Disarmament in the Asia and the Pacific

Satow Yukio

I. Overview of the Problematique

As shown in the United Nations’ Rio Summit on the environment, the history of modern civilization has been one of increased energy consumption and the creation of extreme disparities brought on by the global spread of capitalism — disparities existing between not only the North and South, but within them as well. It was further shown that along with the expansion of the market economy these problems are occurring on a global scale and will be hard, if not impossible, to solve.

In fact, the legitimacy of the status quo in places throughout the world is being shaken at the roots. The inevitability of change taking place today is interpreted by some as a sign that the modern world can only be headed towards an era of globalism or regionalism. In conjunction with interpretation, terms such as human rights, justice, international welfare, and environmentalism are gaining fashionability. However, despite the radical changes in the world’s state of affairs,
the framework for understanding this change is based on old precepts and outdated ways of thinking. Especially, there is a strong tendency to discuss global change only from the perspective of the West.

For example, the immediate post-cold war era is often described as a Pax Americana. In the name of international responsibility or international cooperation, the goal here is to create a new world order based on an oligarchical hegemony of the North, to move from a global hierarchy to a global heterarchy. Another idea is to strengthen the global power structure of the North through burden sharing and mutual interdependence, i.e. a Pax Consultus. Within such a world order, maintenance of the status quo's vested interests would be rationalized as the protection of the "common good" while the North/South problem would be neglected.

The problem goes to the idea that end of the cold war was a single, independent global event and that world change has been brought about by the cold war's termination. The opposite is true. Amidst the turmoil of global change, the end of the cold war came about as merely one aspect. Such a perspective makes understanding the current state of world affairs much simpler. Furthermore, in the post-cold war era, the tide of global change has already swept us beyond the creation of a world order based on U.S. hegemony and towards the establishment of a multi-layered, non-military, anti-hegemonical world order. Consequently, awareness of the limits of the principle of nationalism has been heightened by recent global change. At the same time, a new scholarship emphasizing equality and human rights has arisen. The realization is gradually that different ethnic groups deserve equal rights and that building ethnically plural societies is the only road to achieving this goal.

However, without the implementation of racial equality, mutual
co-existence of different ethnic groups within the same nation can not be achieved. The recent eruption of democratic uprisings (which have crossed national borders, divided nations, or sprung up without a national identity) should be taken as a harbinger of the shape of our new world order. Of course, creating equality among races, nationalities, and people is contingent upon the right of the individual to live freely without threat of poverty, hunger, discrimination, displacement, and environmental destruction.³

Though these uprisings are partly remnants of superpower dominance and protests to that rule, there is also another aspect. Current struggles for ethnic independence are partly against a nation-state system imposed from without that is not adequately suited to local histories. In other words, few of the 170 countries in the world today are populated by a homogenous people. Even in those cases, it is rare that they are truly only a single race. However, ethnic groups struggling against minority status within a sovereign nation are everywhere to be found.⁴

Within the vortex of global change, the nations of the Pacific islands have confronted the inevitable structural adjustment occurring in the aftermath of the cold war and the collapse of socialism. For the most part they have followed along with the rest of the Third World in introducing democratic reform on the simple assumption that democracy leads to capitalism which guarantees the plentiful existence of consumerism. Furthermore, tied in with the end of the cold war and world wide debt, the advanced nations have imposed conditionality on development aid — especially, structural adjustment requirements. Thus, they have demanded better government from the South in the form of democracy, free elections, and higher regards for human rights. Consequently, many countries are moving from authoritarian
regimes to multiple party systems.

Actually, starting with Berau and Fuji, in the Pacific islands region, elections are being held and a new era of government is taking hold.

This report provides an overview of political movements related to development in the Pacific and scrutinizes the diverse impediments to construction of a new, peaceful order in the aftermath of the cold war.

II. Development Politics in the Pacific Island States

As a region left behind in the disarmament race of the U.S. and former U.S.S.R., the Pacific has promoted neither base reversion nor arms reductions. Many nations including New Zealand, Palau, Vanatua, and Fuji are ending their cold war anti-nuke policy. On top of this, the U.S. Navy is still practicing off Tonga Bay and the Australians have recently joined them. White the rest of the South is enjoying its peace dividend, this area is as militarized as ever, if not more so.

Despite the ease in East-West tensions, it appears that the U.S. is strengthening its presence in the Pacific to serve as a base from which it can respond to regional conflicts. There are a number of facts that support this interpretation.

First, in the European theater, the U.S. arms reductions were focused mainly on air and ground forces. However, in the Pacific, the U.S. maintains its formidable navy which has not been the target of either domestic or foreign disarmament proponents. Also, although an economically weakened America's influence in the region has declined, it has — as a Pacific nation — to face the emergence of Japan as an Asian economic superpower. Despite Japan's alliance with the West, the U.S. feels that it must resubstantiate its overall committment to Asia in order to emphasize the mutual ties and complementability.
of Japan and the U.S. within Asia and maintain the mutual advantages of the current bilateral relationship.

Japan also revealed a strategic policy towards the Pacific and a desire to bolster its presence in the region when it broke with its post-W.W. II peace constitution and dispatched its Self-Defense Forces abroad. This is part of the U.S. and Japan’s attempt to create a security network in the Asian Pacific rim in order to be constantly prepared to respond to regional conflicts (low intensity conflicts in U.S. jargon) foreseen in the post–Cambodian Asian Pacific region.\(^5\)

U.S.–Japanese cooperation in the region is an attempt to reduce their own economic, political, and social friction by concentrating on pursuing mutual interests under the pretense of global cooperation. It means no less than a new policy of trying to manage and control the South, and represents one of the many aspects of the North–South problem.

In the aftermath of the U.S. pullout from the Phillipines, this new Asian Pacific security network stretching from Japan (especially Okinawa) to Korea, Singapore, Guam, and Alaska, represents a multinational security zone based upon the principle of collective security. For Japan this means that its newly created P.K.O. troops can be dispatched freely under the auspices of an Asian security network in the name of international cooperation and contribution, without having to resort to \textit{GAIATSU}.

Within the new security network enclosing the Asian Pacific, naturally a new role is being given to the island states and other bodies in the region. For example, practice ranges, materials depots, and supply routes are needed. These responsibilities are linked to local economic development promotion plans. By trying to draw these peripheral military issues into the center of the development debate,
the advanced nations reveal their true intentions in regards to the region. A classic example of how the Pacific island states have uniformly acted in accordance with the strategic imperatives of the advanced countries is the domestic militancy of Papua New Guinea.⁶

During the Bougainville Crisis a (a local rebellion), the struggle was over not only local economic entitlement, but the maintenance and expansion of the vested interests of the state through its own organs of control. A result of the conflict was the expansion of the government's ability to violently control and suppress opposition. Indeed, the tendency is part of a widespread emergence of development dictatorships in all of the South. The crisis also further complicated the between land ownership rights for development concessions which receive government priority and weakening traditional patriarchal and family ownership. (This makes the problem all the more important from the perspective of advanced nations.)

Government militancy has taken root in Fiji and is spreading to the other islands. In Fiji, the government is beginning to utilize its organs of suppression to implement development policies. This emphasis on development reveals that the tendency towards the Pacific and Asian integration is not only from outside the Pacific but is also receiving internal support. In other words, the Pacific region is moving from the periphery of Asia to becoming an integral part of it. This transition is important to realize.

On another note, the collapse of socialism has meant the loss of a prospective development model for the indigenous peoples who have attained independence within the region. A prime example is New Caledonia where a national referendum on independence was held in 1988. The fall of socialism especially hurt the independence party, FLNKS, which was the focus of mass media attacks. Its people lost

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their enthusiasm for socialist revolution and the movement collapsed. It was especially a blow to the mostly indigenous people living under the American influence in the region.7

This syndrome is tied in with the problem of structural reform policies promulgated by the advanced nations and multinational lending institutions. Many nations are pursuing democratic reforms in order to receive aid money without fulfilling other important preconditions. The question is whether democracy is a result of development or a consequence of meeting the demands of advanced nations and multinational lending institutions. It is currently being asked whether political reform is occurring only for the sake of carrying out economic reform. Moreover, it is necessary to question the wisdom of the precepts upon which such policy decisions are being made. They are based on the Western European experience of democracy which showed that political freedom will provide the stability for enjoying the benefits of economic development without the continued threat of violent oppression. However, is this history pertinent to other regions? It is optimistic to think that European cold war ideology is relevant in the post-cold war rest of the world. It also deserves mention that between nations there exists societies where culture is separated from politics, economics and societies where it is not. It is important not to mix such nations up. For example, the military coup d’etat in Fiji and later constitutional revision is often treated simply as a breakdown in democracy.8

Actually, the emergence of Colonel Ranuka’s administration—which gave priority to Fijian natives—offers from the perspective of ensuring protection of minority interests a direct challenge to democracy. Because of the strength of Fijian society’s fundamental principles and customs, it is difficult to understand the dynamics of the political world by examining party politics. Even more so, it is

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important to point out the inadequacies of defining patriarchal systems as a hindrance to the modernization (i.e., democratization) of contemporary society.  

In a linked sequence of events, Third World countries including the Pacific island states were defeated by debt and forced to turn to the IMF which imposed structural adjustment policies upon them. Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Western Samoa, and Vanuatu fell into this trap. A vicious circle has ensued. Market orientated reform policies lead to production of identical stuffs which are supplied to the same world market which inevitably experiences a price slump that reduces domestic purchasing power and worsens poverty. In addition, the haphazard introduction of democracy and economic liberalization has worsened structural problems. Without social reform to alleviate disadvantage and unfair distribution of income, the introduction of free market reform has caused structural change that put the burden of its cost on the shoulders of the weakest segments of society.

Although affected by political traditions, it can not be denied that through collapse of rural agricultural power and the politicalization of society, political change in the Pacific Islands region offers a hitherto unseen outlook. With the emergence of development orientated politics, the people have no choice but to earn their living in the growing informal sector. Furthermore, there is no escaping the growth of the bureaucracy which is promoting modernization and the emergence of a urban middle class political consciousness along with the creation of a modern general public.
III. Economically Harmful Development in the Pacific

The tradition of wageless production of goods and non-goods is strongly rooted in the Pacific as in most of the rest of the South. Production of convertible agricultural goods, miscellaneous labor in the informal sector, and subsistence activities are dominant. Within the development process of the world's economy during the past few centuries, the compatibility of these activities has been borne out in their development. More importantly, historically, the emergence of differences in production methods gave rise to the theories of comparative production cost and comparative advantage which are used to justify the concept of trading. However, the various minority groups of the Pacific island states were denied the opportunity to become independent nation states with their own national economies. Instead, they have turned into welfare states whose nationhood was forced upon them. This was part of the divide and rule subjugation of the Pacific Ocean.

In turning to Japan's comprehensive economic development aid for the Pacific island states, assistance to their international fishing industry stands out. The object of this assistance is to cooperate in the development of Pacific region fishing industries by providing capital and technology. However, one must realize that Japan's domestic fishing industries are facing adverse implications from the worldwide trend of each nation to claim two hundred nautical miles of coastal sea as territorial waters and from Japan's exclusion from the fishing grounds of the North Sea. In response, Japan made a priority of confirming its access to existing fishing grounds in the territorial waters of developing countries and of developing new areas within those waters. Economic assistance became a means of attaining these goals. For example, pork barrel aid grants and technical assistance (centered on processing, ice-making, and freezing facilities) for the
fishing industries of Pacific island states became available in return for access to fishing waters. Consequently, in the South Pacific region (especially, the Solomon Islands) tuna and skipjack face severe depletion. Particularly conspicuous was the absence of the bait fish used for skipjack fishing. It has literally been stolen of the hook.

On top of this injustice, governmental aid to establish fishing industries led to the creation of oil tanks, sea walls for commercial fisheries, extremely low frozen storage units, freezers, ice-makers, simple lodging and other amenities in each region for the sole purpose of preparing tuna and skipjack flash frozen at more than $-50^\circ$ for direct export to Japan. Recent annual harvests of tuna and skipjack have been in the area of 40,000 tons. A ton of it is canned and sent to Europe. Besides the frozen fish and dried skipjack, the rest is sent to Thailand or Fiji for processing into canned petfood to be exported to Japan. Clearly, this is pure profit making on the part of Japan in the name of international cooperation.

Because of the adverse impact of this “international cooperation” on the local lifestyle of the people in the Solomon Islands, the right to maintain their traditional existence is in danger. On top of this, the impact on the modern economy is negative as well. Large scale construction projects built with aid money require maintenance costs that is borne entirely by the government. It in turn raises the necessary revenue through increased taxes on the local population.

Of crucial importance is the fact that the traditional subsistence economy of the Solomon Islands which was made possible by its abundant environment is being destroyed at the roots by a cash economy that is springing up around business opportunities made possible by foreign assistance. Countless examples of destruction of forest resources and the environments of indigenous peoples by
Japanese ODA and Japanese corporations can be found in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Guadalcanal. Such is the true state of international cooperation.

IV. The Nature of the Debate on the Structure of the "Asian Pacific Rim"

It is impossible to separate the successive political incidents which rocked the Pacific islands during the nineties from the overall international political landscape. There is no doubt that a connection exists, however, the peoples of this region are attempting to preserve the thread of their existence by striving for self-autonomy. The debate about the endogenous, yet transnational and interdependent nature of this movement is forced to occur within the context of global change.

For the record, it is worth noting that the key words in discussing the post-cold war era are globalism and regionalism. The Asian Pacific Rim is composed of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the ASEAN nations which represent a multiplicity of states and regions, yet there is an irresistible attraction to describing them as one unified region.

Nonetheless, to use a trite expression, the Asian Pacific Rim is like a lake surrounded by a superpower military network and multinational corporations. It is the playground of superpowers who bully with their economic might. The concept of the Asian Pacific Rim only exists as a way of linking the entire region to the political and economic considerations of some of its more powerful members. Therefore, it reflects the dominance of superpower thinking in establishing an Asian Pacific order. No attempt is made to establish the Pacific ocean as a collective good for all or to give consideration to the many smaller countries which compose its geography.

What regions does the Asian Pacific Rim actually cover? Why is it
inevitable that we should consider it now?

To start with, the U.N. defines the Asian Pacific as stretching from Afghanistan to New Zealand. This area is the responsibility of the U.N.'s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and literally covers all of Asia and all of the Pacific. Yet, the question remains, "why should the Asian Pacific region become such a hot topic now?" The answer is tied in with the direction of the post-cold war order. With the weakening of U.S. world domination, the economic rebuilding of Europe through E.C. unification, the prominence of Japan as an economic superpower, the economic arrival of the NICS, etc., the regional structure of the global system is undergoing profound change within which the direction of the next dominant world order is being thrashed out. The reason that a dialogue about the Asian Pacific has occurred is that Japan's economic power and the arrival of the NICS has turned it into a Pacific economic sphere centered in Asia. With the exception, of course, of America, the rest of the Pacific is as out of the picture as ever. Looking at movement within the Pacific economic sphere, it is impossible to ignore the involvement of Asia. Because the level of development is different between Asian Pacific regions, the labor markets of Pacific island states have taken shape under the direct influence of the vertical division of labor within the overall Asian Pacific economy. Especially, the successful industrialization of the NICS has spurred further international division of labor in the region. The increasing disparity between the successful industrial nations and the less developed countries of which the Pacific island states are included is a horrible development. As the difference between the wealthy and impoverished increases, it manifests itself in such forms as development dictatorships and development racism which are behind many problems such as the
crises in the traditional agricultural and fishing sectors. In addition, as integration with Asia proceeds, the danger of various mechanisms of development nationalism wreaking havoc have grown greater. Problems such as forced assimilation, genocide, exploitation, and isolation are the by-products of prejudiced development nationalism.

Nonetheless, integration proceeds. The concept of an Asian Pacific is closely tied in with the following regional integration schemes:

1. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
   Canada, Mexico, U.S.A.

2. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
   – ASEAN, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, U.S.A.

3. South China Economic Zone
   – Hong Kong, south China, Taiwan

4. East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC)
   – ASEAN, Japan, Republic of Korea, South China Economic Zone

5. Japan Sea Rim
   – China, North Korea, Republic of Korea, Russian Far East

6. East ASEAN Triangle
   – east Indonesia (Suraweshi), east Malaysia (Saba), Philippines (Mindanao Island)

Moreover, it is important to note that fierce competition exists to claim leadership to these regional economic cooperation councils. Such economic unification plans continue to be unfolded while domestic disparities within the member countries and the will of their peoples are ignored. We can also see in their ambiguities that it is still not clear how the post-cold war Asian region will reorient itself to create a framework for handing international conflicts in the face of the
American military withdrawal and its own security needs.

It is clear that as it gropes towards a redefinition of itself, this region certainly is one area of the globe in the midst of an arms race. This has made the area (especially established trade partners) an attractive market for U.S. and European arms dealers who are flooding the market despite the world trend towards disarmament. Asia is not just one of the world's largest arms depots. It has also become a clearinghouse for weapons disposal. The danger is that not only has the Asian Pacific been left out of the world trend towards arms reduction, but that it will miss the opportunity to do so in the future.

The concept of an Asian Pacific security network based upon the regional powers is a regional order which allows for authoritarian regimes in the various smaller countries and a background of militarization which is not to prevent the conflagration of regional conflicts spurred by local expansionist policies, but is designed to enforce a regional unification imposed by the superpowers of the region. For that unification to be centered on Japan's economic might can not help but stir up images of a second Great Eastern Co-Prospertiy Sphere. In particular, as Japan gropes for a framework for conducting a political dialogue for the whole region, it is already advancing economically into the Pacific region in a manner reminiscent of its navy's South Sea island strategy during the war. It is hard to tell if the war is over or still continuing.

Consequently, current attempts to create a Asian Pacific regional order hinge on military, hegemonical remnants of the cold war. How do the prospects for such an order look from the perspective of the inhabitants of the Pacific? Considering that such a region includes not only Canada and the U.S. but also Argentina, Chili, Mexico, and
Peru, it is difficult to expect a new regional order to spring up without any aspects of hegemony to it.

V. Seeking a New Vision of Asia and the Pacific

Will the end of the cold war not contribute to a reduction of tension in the Asian Pacific theatre? Has the collapse of the cold war structure unleashed every nation to selfishly pursue its own gain in a regional balance of power game? For the sake of regional security in the Asian Pacific, is the U.S.–Japan security treaty a source of stability? Through its sustained implementation can a new regional order arise? Through such a narrow view of the world can the intransparencies and complexities of regional problems be adequately dealt with? These questions need be asked.

The tide of post-cold war global change has brought us to a point where the establishment of a multi-layered, non-military, non-hegemonical world order is ready to replace the simple domination and hegemony of the U.S. This historical turn of global events is the reason that the limits of hitherto universally accepted nationalism are being recognized and that scholarship promoting the establishment of human rights and equality is achieving orominence. It is being broadly recognized that different ethnic groups must be allowed to co-exist in harmony and that multi-ethnic societies and nations are the only viable road for the future.

It needs to be pointed out that mutual coexistence of different ethnic groups and races can not be attained without accelerating the spread of equality between groups. The eruption of crossborder, international, and anti-national democratic movements are the first sign of a fundamentally different and new world order. Of course, the concepts of equality between men, between races, and between ethnic
groups are meaningless if the people are not allowed to live without fear of poverty, hunger, prejudice, displacement, and environmental destruction. Accepting this is the only viable means for addressing the world problems and worldwide internal affairs (Welt-Innenpolitik) of the post-cold war.16

Similar precondition hold true for arms reductions. It is no longer enough to settle for a reduced nuclear threat and international policing of weapons technology and weapons flows. Dismantling, defusing, and destruction of nuclear weapons must be safely carried out. The spread of nuclear materials must be prevented. Conversion of weapons industries must be carried out. Policies to ease unemployment in defense related industries must be devised. Developing countries must break out of the vicious circle of development and militarization. They must be helped by providing debt relief. Such are the wide range of global socio-economic problems which must be tackled in order to pursue real arms reductions.

Research surveys carried out for a two year period from 1989 to 1990 on the direction of various indigenous, yet transnational networks that were promoting a nuclear free policy and local self-determination yielded preliminary results that are summed up below:

1. For the people in the region an anti-nuclear policy and self-determination are two sides of the same coin.

2. The relationship between the two changes when self-determination becomes an economic struggle. Particularly, when pressure for the economy to attain economic self-sufficiency at a national level begins to replace pressure on a grass roots level, the relationship becomes extremely tense.

3. Consequently, as part of any regional anti-nuclear stance on the government level, such policies are not allowed to interfere with
domestic militarization or government-backed domestic oppression by any of the region's members.

4. On the other hand, domestic pressure for self-determination and abolition of nuclear weapons maintains its tenaciousness and manifests itself in the concept of a borderless commons which gives the movement a transnational character.

5. Depending on how these local movements link up in the future, their internal dynamics could become the vehicle for pushing forward de-militarization and abolishment of nuclear weapons in the region.

Based on these results we must reconsider the relationship between the nuclear free movement and popular struggles for self-determination from a socio-economic context in order to gain insight into the nature of our original problem, creating a new regional order based on co-prosperity and freedom from the fear of nuclear weapons. The direction of this dialog must be determined. Our research recognized an urgent need for efforts to create a new regional order to be based upon social pluralism and a development policy that reflect the inseparable nature of self-determination and anti-nuclear sentiment in the region.

Moreover, our research was focused on the microstates that make up the region. In other words, our examination was concerned with the collective body of local mini-states and not with only superpower relationships. Specifically, the research points to a need for a regional collection of states and areas starting with Okinawa and including the Southeast Asian island states (Sumatra, Java, Philippines, and the Malay Peninsula) and the island nations and groups of the South Pacific. These areas need to be the focus of research which can then be carried on to the subject of the region's economic unification. At
that point it is proper to bring into debate the relationship with the Asian continent. Such an approach reveals that the normal tendency to lump Asia and the Pacific together misses important aspects.

Taken from another perspective based on the notion of a physical commons, the region's societies could mutually inter-relate according to a code of conduct which prohibits interfering with another person's living space, another person's activities and allowing the person their freedom to exist. Dr. Mushakoji who has advocated the concept of a commons as appropriate for a new Asian Pacific regional order defined it as follows:

A commons is the internal development of direction for separate communal bodies based on the concept of pluralism. It requires the mutual acceptance of each other's identity and cultural values. It is a collection of humans as well as other living beings who form loose groups which interact and cooperate as equals. It is economic, political, social, cultural, ecological, and technological development attained through such relationships.

It is an outstanding definition of a regional world order which rejects the role of hegemony. The ultimate meaning of a commons is symbiosis, i.e. the mutual existence and mutual prosperity of its inhabitants. When the state of affairs in the Pacific island states is inspected under such a light, the "irregularities" of its "backward socio-economic system" can be seen as sustainable social systems which deserve the opportunity to be re-examined for their potential development value. It reveals the dominating nature of the western development schemes and creates an alternative development model based on traditional ways.

To take the definition even a step further, commons could mean not just sybsis but a heterogenous, yet united society based on "conviviality".

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Individuals act according to their own will, free to pursue their own human potential in whatever form. They struggle together and through ceaseless effort are allowed to enjoy the benefits of their environment. It would be a adaptable, communal society in which human rights, justice, and democracy were encouraged and in which all of its members would be free to participate.19

This communal society of the commons would be useful in redefining the concept of sustainable development. This idea is often associated with the Brundtlandt Report, but it is often circulated in a way which invites misunderstandings. The report is important in that it proposes that some of the processes within the complex activities of human society that are causing environmental destruction could be halted. Based on that concept and an examination of the characteristics peculiar to the microcosm of the Pacific island states such as their traditional lifestyles and local ecology, a new debate could be started which would entertain possibilities impossible to consider from the usual analysis of political systems and per capita income that occurs in most of the world.

Thus, when the tide of global change carries us to the day when the concept of a "commons" is needed to guide us, the traditional diversity and plurality of the Asian Pacific could become the key to unlocking a new world order in the post-cold war. In the short run, it is imperative that scholastic efforts be made to envision a loosely organized body of states in the Asian Pacific region which are free from military and power relationships. Clearly, if one is to view the Pacific island states as one group, it is necessary to fulfill their historical destiny as a nuclear free and de-militarized region.20 This would symbolize the principle of a commons which would allow them to internally preserve their economic, and cultural development.
Turning the Pacific into a peaceful ocean and a collective ocean would transform its modern misfortune of location into a geographical blessing of opportunities. Thus, for the first time a truly peaceful Pacific Asian hemisphere might be realized. This would be the next issue I would like to examine.

NOTE


18. MUSHAKOJI, *ibid.*, P. 69.


