INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION:
FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL

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Foreword Shingo SHIBATA

In June 1979 I wrote a paper entitled “For Human Survival — The Tasks of Marxism to Prevent Nuclear Extinction”** and sent copies to Professors Howard L. Parsons, Sidney Peck, Anouar Abdel-Malek and John Somerville, requesting for their critical comments. I also asked Prof. Seiitsu Tachibana of

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Nagasaki Institute of Applied Science to write on U.S. nuclear policy and its implications. I myself wrote another article mainly dealing with Soviet and Chinese nuclear policies and a perspective of the movement for human survival. The last two papers are printed here, along with the critical comments made and questions raised by Professors Parsons, Peck and Abdel-Malek, in the hope that they will help encourage further constructive discussions on the issues involved. The editor welcomes comments from readers.

**Opposition to SALT II: A Dangerous Illusion**

Howard L. Parsons

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I agree with those statements in Professor Shingo Shibata’s article, “For Human Survival,” in which he argues for the urgency of preventing nuclear extinction by eliminating nuclear weapons. I do not agree entirely with him on how this is to be done. He says it is not to be done by “the partial and progressive measures and the big-power centralistic ‘arms coordination’ program” of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but is to be done by “the non-aligned countries and the mass movements in the capitalist countries, for whom the NGO’s speak.” Professor Shibata says the first policy line is “unrealistic,” the second is “realistic.” By a “realistic” policy he seems to mean one that will achieve the complete outlawing of nuclear weapons. The question is whether such elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved without a series of steps toward that goal taken by the U.S. and the Soviet Union such as represented by SALT II. I believe such steps are necessary to achieve that goal, though they are not the only steps.

The most basic, determinative conflict in the world today is the class conflict between the working people and the monopoly capitalists. This
conflict takes many forms, but the most consequential form for the future of mankind is the conflict between socialist states and capitalist states. The two most powerful of these states—powerful in industrial productivity, political leadership in their respective camps, and military, nuclear might—are the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As Professor Shibata observes, they possess between them enough destructive power to wipe out all human life twenty-seven times. No other group or state has any power remotely approximating it.

It follows, therefore: (1) that the danger point at which nuclear extinction might be initiated lies in the political and military relation of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; (2) that the responsibility lies with them and between them to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race between them; (3) that if they do not do so the very probable consequence will be a rapid escalation of the nuclear weaponry on both sides, as well as among other nations, ending in nuclear war and species extinction; and (4) that if they do move in the direction of the reduction, control, and elimination of nuclear weapons between them the conditions will be more favorable than now for agreement among other nations on this goal and on steps to it. In short, agreement between the two nations is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for worldwide control and elimination of nuclear weapons; absence of agreement will probably lead to the nuclear genocide from which we all recoil in horror.

But given the conditions of the cold war and the feelings of antagonism which attend the clash of the socialist and capitalist systems, agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has been very difficult to arrive at. The accords that exist between the two nations—the treaty demilitarizing the Antarctic (1959), the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water (1963), the treaty on the non-placement of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies (1967), the treaty on the non-poliferation of nuclear weapons (1968), the treaty banning the placement of nuclear or other weapons of
mass destruction on the sea bed or ocean floor (1971), the treaty to limit ABM's (1972), the convention banning bacteriological weapons (1972), the agreement to aim at preventing nuclear war (1973), the agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (1973), the treaty limiting underground nuclear tests (1976), and the convention prohibiting military and other hostile use of environmental modification techniques (1977) -- all these have been negotiated tediously, cautiously and slowly. Yet they have come to pass, and they are in force. Without them, the world would be less safe than it is. For what this means is a certain fund of institutionalized accord built up in the world between the two most powerful nations -- a little spreading island of safety in an ocean of turbulent, uncertain, and perilous events. And it is not the only island. True, we are far from peace and a world freed of the threat of thousands of Hiroshimas and Nagasakis. But without these agreements and the shift in the balance of forces in the world, we would be closer to that holocaust.

Recall the days when the U.S. held a monopoly on the atomic bomb and people in high places like General MacArthur wanted to drop it on the People's Republic of China and others wanted a preventive war or a war of extermination against the Soviet Union. Take note of Daniel Ellsberg's observation that on seven occasions U.S. Presidents have seriously considered using nuclear weapons in a first strike, and President Carter has asserted the first nuclear-strike policy twice during his term of office. Why has this threat not been carried out? Because the socialist states have grown in power and numbers, because the Soviet Union has achieved rough military parity with a nation that consistently took the lead in escalating the arms race (with the atomic bomb, NATO, tactical weapons in Europe, the first missile submarine, testing and deployment of the first MIRV, and now the cruise and MX missiles), and because the two countries have reached a measure of agreement in negotiation on military matters.

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SALT II has taken more than six years to negotiate. On the face of it, it may seem to be only a small gain. It sets a ceiling on 2400 strategic weapons until the end of 1981; six months after the treaty goes into effect the Soviet Union will destroy 104 missile launchers or bombers and the U.S. will not increase its present arsenal up to the limit. To reach the lower ceiling of 2250 by December 31, 1985, the two nations will destroy the requisite bombers. Other restrictions are those placed on the numbers of multiple-warhead ICBM's and SLBM's and single-warhead missiles and bombers. "Even more substantial limitations and reductions" will be possible in SALT III.

As modest as it seems — and it is modest relative to universal disarmament — SALT II already has close to one-third of the vote in the Senate required to defeat it. It is quixotic to hope, as some liberal Senators do, that by amending it, for example, by a proposed moratorium on the production or use of nuclear weapons, it will get past the reactionary Senators like Jackson, Helms, Thurmond, and Hatch. And the U.S. administration would find such a change inconceivable.

It tells us something significant about SALT II when we look at the cold warriors, racists, and anti-unionists against it — when we note that, according to the Harris Poll, more than 75 per cent of the U.S. people favor it. Those supporting SALT II include the United Auto Workers, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, the National Education Association, the International Association of Machinists, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers, the United Steel Workers, and many others. With such support, can it then be so insignificant? Can three-fourths of the American people be laboring under a "dangerous illusion"?

Professor Shibata puts against the "big-power centralistic" line the "democratic mass movement" of non-aligned countries and capitalist countries.
But the support for SALT II, which he condemns as a hopeless "partial measure" of the "bankrupt" first line, comes precisely from the masses in the U.S. and western European capitalist countries. In the U.S. these masses repudiate the view of some members of Mobilization for Survival who hold that SALT II is a "dangerous illusion." The fact that the Japanese masses do not support it does not make it incorrect. But they are mistaken if they believe as Professor Shibata does that the U.S.-U.S.S.R. "partial measures" thus far "have resulted only in the escalation of the nuclear arms race." The fact is that these measures have been steps toward a stage where the major nuclear powers might begin to negotiate seriously for arresting the arms race, later slowing it down, and eventually ending it. That these measures have accompanied the escalation does not mean they have caused it. Have they served as a substitute, an inferior option for some more effective alternative? No evidence has been brought forward to demonstrate that such a practicable alternative has existed. The most powerful states today, a communist state and a capitalist state, are being criticized because they have not agreed immediately to general and complete nuclear disarmament. Criticism of failure to achieve nuclear disarmament is necessary; but for it to have full relevance it must be based on understanding of the historical, material, and ideological conditions of the failure and must propose a workable action toward the goal. To keep in mind the ideal of such disarmament is necessary, but to expect its realization apart from partial measures and steps is not "realistic."

Why do the working people of the U.S. support SALT II? They know that if it is not ratified by the Senate the consequences will be these:

1) The nuclear arms race between the two major nuclear powers will spiral out of control and will very probably end in an unthinkable genocidal war.

2) Impetus will be given to other nuclear powers to expand their
weaponry and to non-nuclear powers to develop nuclear weaponry.

3) The road of detente necessary for the nations to move toward gradual, multilateral, progressive, general, and complete disarmament will be blocked if not entirely closed.

4) The insane spending of the nations on arms will escalate and ever more foolishly rob the people of the goods and services that they need for survival and a fulfilled life. Senator Proxmire has estimated that if SALT II is not ratified by the U.S. American people will pay an extra $100 billion for arms. All the peoples – of capitalist, communist, and non-aligned nations – will pay more for governmental arms spending.

5) The funds and resources needed for the liberation and development of the developing and imperialist-exploited nations will be diverted into arms and destructive ends.

6) Inflation, unemployment, and taxes in the U.S. and other capitalist nations will be fueled.

SALT II is a recognition by both sides that “nuclear war would be a disater for all mankind.” It is an attempt by the two big nuclear powers to take one of many steps toward disarmament. It is done out of “self-interest.” It is not “appeasement.” It is not “secret diplomacy.” It is not collusion against the Chinese, the Third World, or the non-nuclear states. It is a careful, responsible agreement of two powerful nations aware of their parity in nuclear arms, nuclear destructive capacity, and the mutual obligation to themselves and mankind to control their arms. The recognition of obligation comes precisely because they have the power. This includes a consciousness that other present nuclear powers, as well as potential ones, must be brought into the process of agreement and control. Carter and Brezhnev agreed at Vienna that the matter of participants in future arms negotiations is a topical one. Does it not go without saying that the more any and every people and
government do for disarmament, the better? SALT II has received support from the overwhelming majority of western European people and all NATO governments because they view it as a necessary step toward getting out from under the threat of atomic destruction.

Does Professor Shibata believe that any and every agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is either conspiratorial or ineffectual? A study of the history of their relations from 1917 onward would, I think, dispel such a view. SALT II stands at the end of a long, complicated, tortuous, historical process. Any observant adult who has lived in the U.S. since 1945 realizes that the anti-communist hysteria of the cold war has effectively barred all far-reaching disarmament talks of any kind by the U.S. SALT II represents a qualitatively new and progressive step toward disarmament – a step that should have been taken decades ago, as early as June 19, 1946, when the Soviets, in answer to the one-sided Baruch plan, proposed the absolute prohibition of the use of the atomic bomb, destruction within three months of all atomic weapons, designation of the breach of the convention as a crime against humanity, severe penalties for any breach, application of the convention to all nations, and exchange of scientific information. Up until SALT I the Americans showed no interest in such proposals, repeatedly put forward by the Soviet Union. Now that the two sides are on the verge of agreement on a limitation of the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons, it is not helpful in explanation or practice to denounce this as “big-power centralistic arms coordination.” It is not.

To assert that the response of those who support the line of SALT II “is negative to the appeal for the immediate outlawing of the use of nuclear weapons and to the demand for the recognition of the rights of all states, big and small, to determine this issue” – that confuses matters. On September 6, 1971, in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Soviet Union proposed the convening of a World Disarmament Confer-
ence of "all countries," nuclear and non-nuclear, "on the basis of equality."
The resistance of the U.S. to this and similar proposals should not obscure
and confuse what the Soviet Union has done consistently for many years to
advance disarmament and nuclear weapons control, reduction, and elimination.
It is not fair to overlook its attempts, to criticize it for not obtaining com-
plete measure when it could not even get discussion on partial measures, and
to belittle the hard-won gains on agreement concerning the partial measures.

SALT II is not the only means to the goal. But I have tried to show that
it is one — a major one now. Many other actions are necessary, and Professor
Shibata mentions some: to work for an international treaty absolutely out-
lawing the use of nuclear weapons, to organize mass movements to this end,
to pressure one's own government to ban nuclear weapons, and to address
related problems.

SALT II is not a "dangerous illusion." It is a necessary step toward the
vital goal of nuclear-weapons-free world which Professor Shibata so eloquent-
ly upholds. Rather, the "dangerous illusion" is not to understand this. It
is to disregard the history of the nuclear arms race and the hard material
facts of class and national contradiction that have brought the world to the
brink. It is to suppose that unilateral disarmament is possible. It is, in con-
demning SALT II, to make common cause with the fascists and Pentagonians
who would rather be dead, and have mankind dead, than take gradual steps
toward disarmament.

For Human Survival — The Tasks of Marxists
to Prevent Nuclear Extinction

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Just as Professor Shibata made a profound contribution to an understanding of the international significance of the Vietnamese struggle for national independence, so his more recent writings on the threat of nuclear annihilation are to be genuinely appreciated. He has done an outstanding service in delineating the priority of political tasks in the international community, for Marxists and non-Marxists alike.

It is generally recognized among knowledgeable scientists that the likelihood of nuclear war occurring, *by chance alone*, at the end of this century will be fifty per cent, or the probability of a flip of a coin. The fact, as Professor Shibata notes, that the combined nuclear weapons stockpile of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (as of 1975!) could "wipe out all humans twenty-seven times over" is enough to give us concern about the survival of our species. There is just no question that the quantitative and qualititative increases in the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons threatens the very existence of humanity. As such, the abolition of nuclear weapons is a task of the first-order for progressive and socialist minded persons. For Marxists, specifically, the elimination of nuclear weapons from the global military arsenal through international legal machinery is fundamentally necessary for the attainment of a historical socialist future. Marxists are incapable of "bringing to birth a new world from the ashes of the old" if the international class struggle has escalated to nuclear conflict. Nor are Marxists assured that the rise of nation-state socialist societies will automatically initiate the era of peaceful coexistence. The danger of a nuclear war between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. is as real as the more apparent conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. To believe that a balance of international nuclear terror, such as the strategy of mutually assured destruction (M.A.D.), will serve as a deterrent to nuclear conflict is absurd and has proven to be unreal, given the recent developments in submarine and mobile land missile launching systems, as well as the improved delivery accuracy of multiple war-
heads to specified targets. The greatest danger that exists to humanity at this moment is the political acceptance of a strategic approach which argues that nuclear war can be fought and won. It is a strategic orientation that has surfaced substantially in the military of the U.S. and Western Europe. It most certainly exists among some of the higher circles of leadership in both the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C.

Therefore, Professor Shibata's central point that nuclear weapons must be outlawed in the world community through the international machinery of the United Nations is clear, unequivocal and reasonable. And, to underscore, it is a first-order priority political task for Marxists everywhere. It is also clear to me that this task cannot be accomplished except through truly international mass action. I want to come back to this point later because the inability of Marxists to develop a world majority movement demanding the abolition of nuclear weapons needs to be confronted and resolved.

Professor Shibata raises many more questions than he answers. And, I think that some of his responses are all too brief, or overly harsh or a little narrow. For example, he mentions that the "very advent of nuclear weapons became an important factor contributing to the division of Marxists and the international Communist movement." I wish that he had expanded in depth on that point. To what extent were the issues of international nuclear proliferation and national nuclear capability the fundamental source of the political split between the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C.? What were the respective positions of the Soviet and Chinese leadership on these issues? What Marxist reasons were advanced to rationalize their respective party and state lines? And, at the time, what were the attitudes of national Marxist parties on this question? I think it would be extremely enlightening for Marxists to understand how intrinsic the disputes and differences over nuclear weapons questions were to the world historic devotions in the socialist-communist
movement. To make only passing reference to this dispute and its international political consequences seems to me somewhat unfortunate.

I also believe that it is unwise to condense the differences over how and by whom nuclear weapons can be eliminated into two categorical political lines; namely (1) the big-power, centralist, elitist, and (2) the non-aligned, decentralist, mass movement. I think that Professor Shibata reduces the alternatives to its most simplistic and mechanistic form. In this regard, it is important to provide an understanding of imperial capitalism in the global political economy. The U.S. is the world’s leading imperial-capitalist nation-state. Since World War II, it has emerged as the most powerful military-state form in all of human history, having an initial monopoly of nuclear weapons. It continues to strive for nuclear weapons superiority even though it no longer retains a monopoly. The defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam marked a turning point downward for U.S. ruling capital in relation to competing capitalist powers, the East European socialist bloc and to the worldwide movement for national liberation and socialist transformation. In 1971, it became apparent the U.S. imperialism was in decline even though it continues to assert political and military hegemony on a global scale. In this decline, the class struggle proceeds internationally and nation-states, national liberation movements and national mass political movement (parties) line up accordingly. The conflict between ruling capital and unpropertied labor is thorough and international. In the objective sense, there are NO non-aligned movements, parties and states in the global class struggle.

On either side of the international class conflict there are serious and contentious internal differences that typically express the claim of national interests over the larger considerations of the international class. The divisions along these lines between capitalist nation-states, capitalist-led national liberation movements and capitalist mass political parties are mirrored in the antagonisms which prevail among socialist nation-states, Marxist-led national
liberation movements and socialist-communist mass political parties. These subjective national political differences reflect the objective international differences in the uneven rate of both capitalist and socialist development and decline. Therefore, it is important to know who is lining up with whom in the global contest. I repeat that there are no non-aligned states, movements or parties when it comes to whether or not, and over whom, the global interests of capitalist imperialism will prevail.

The class division in the world is also reflected in the reality of nuclear weapons umbrellas (shields) notably that provided by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to their known and respective allies. The proliferation of nuclear weapons means the possibility of more than two nuclear umbrellas, as France and China have each contended in their own way. The Soviet position on nuclear weapons proliferation has been to seek arms control between the two most powerful nuclear nations. The Soviet intention, I believe, is to isolate the most virulent U.S. proponents of nuclear first-strike and their leading European counterparts. It is no longer any secret that the Chinese leadership has identified its national interests with the need for a strong military, intelligence, economic and political alliance with the U.S. That development is one of the realities of global alignment that impacts substantially on the world balance of political forces. I believe that Professor Shibata is overly harsh in condemning Soviet initiatives for arms limitation without calling attention to the global line-up as well as noting that the Soviets have pledged never to use nuclear weapons first and have agreed officially and publicly to the principle of eliminating nuclear weapons.

I do not believe that there is an inherent or fundamental contradiction in struggling simultaneously for arms control and total nuclear disarmament. In fact, simultaneous struggle should be carried on in all international formations whether it is the Soviet-inspired World Peace Council or the anti-Soviet, pacifist-inspired International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace.
It is not a question as to whether a policy is politically real or unreal. Rather, it is necessary to recognize that the effort to isolate the most nuclear terrorist sector of world capital is essential to the building of an international mass movement that both condemns the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity and demands an international covenant to (a) outlaw the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and (b) supervise an environmentally safe-disposal of all existing nuclear weapons.

In this regard, the international mass movement should press forward on the demand for more geo-political zones to be nuclear weapons-free. Nuclear weapons-free zones on the ocean floor, in outer space, at the planetary poles, in the southern hemisphere, the Indian Ocean, Central and South America have either already been agreed to or could be immediately concluded in international covenants. These geo-political zones can be expanded and eventually incorporated in the final convention outlawing nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, every progressive, socialist and communist political formation in the world should be encouraged to take formal, public and demonstrable positions on expanding the global-zoning against nuclear weapons.

Mass opposition to the development and deployment of specific nuclear weapons are also important. The European based and Soviet-supported mass movement against the neutron bomb was a powerful international act. The European mass movement responded to both the threat of European devastation in a nuclear contest and the public outrage against the nature and character of the neutron bomb. These mass actions, whether they are focused on B-1 bombers, cruise missiles, Trident submarines or MX mobile units, all help to raise public consciousness and arouse organized concern among frightened and angry people.

The Japanese movement to abolish nuclear weapons has played a considerable role in the development of an international mass movement. It has given leadership, direction and momentum to people everywhere in the
struggle to abolish nuclear weapons. Atomic bomb victims from Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become tremendous international teachers in providing mass education for thousands about the catastrophic and criminal consequence of nuclear weapons. The collection of over twenty million signatures in Japan to outlaw nuclear weapons is testimony to the awareness of the Japanese people about their special role in the international mass movement. In order for the world movement to expand en masse and deepen politically, especially in Europe and the U.S., the Japanese movement must become organizationally unified and politically inspirational. The Japanese movement must be as one voice, speaking for the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people, demanding that their government assume the leadership in the U.N. for an international convention to abolish nuclear weapons. The Japanese movement must demonstrate to Marxists and others everywhere that the abolition of nuclear weapons is a first-order political task by escalating its political tactics to include mass civil disobedience and the general strike in protracted efforts to change governing policy. The Japanese movement must provide new models of mass action that go beyond the tactics of educational and political dissent. It is the only national mass movement capable of providing a qualitative stimulus to an international mobilization for survival.

Given the expression of new models of resistance by the Japanese movement, I believe it would impact on the left parties in Europe, East and West. I firmly believe that the dangers of nuclear war are felt most deeply in Europe where the eventual contest would be joined (Western Europe is the bedrock of U.S. multinational corporate investment). The people of Eastern Europe are especially receptive to demands which go far beyond arms control, but do not antagonize the felt concern of Soviet-influenced parties for putting a lid on nuclear weapons growth.

The many questions that Professor Shibata has raised must be on the political agenda of concerned Marxists everywhere. I hope that he and his
colleagues in Japan will be able to convene an international gathering of Marxists for the purpose of rectifying socialist theory and practice in light of the great danger of nuclear war. I suspect that we have only a decade to resolve the politics of human survival in an age of destructive nuclear overkill. Although the time is short, there is no alternative but to do it because our very humanity is at stake. Professor Shibata has sent us a clear and urgent message of alarm for which we are truly thankful.

A Comment on Shibata’s Paper “For Human Survival”

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Our senior colleague Professor Shingo Shibata’s “For Human Survival – The Tasks of Marxism to Prevent Nuclear Extinction” has met with a well-deserved interest among political thinkers and scholars alike, and represents a valid starting point to discuss some of the general orientations relevant to the problématique of the arms race, especially nuclear weaponry, in our times.

The following running comments are offered with a view to clarify the discussion, and contribute perhaps the dimension of critical realism to the understanding of the most complex field of world politics in our times, where geopolitics and the philosophy of civilizations interlink, at depth level.

1. The triad of categories, of political actors, so to speak, selected by Professor Shibata, shows, from the onset, the depth of the malaise obtaining in the field of geopolitics and political thought alike. This malaise can be characterized in the following manner: the non-aligned states, i.e. the active forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America, with the addition of Yugoslavia, and building upon the spirit of Bandung and of positive neutralism of this
period, have been and still are the most forceful active factor in today's world struggle for disarmament, as witness the special session devoted to disarmament by the United Nations in May-June 1978, the important resolutions submitted and adopted at that meeting, including the suggestions towards the creation of a United Nations Centre for Disarmament, stopping short of emphasizing the need for a convention outlawing the use of nuclear weapons. The author fully recognizes this formative aspect of today's problématique. Yet, repeatedly, and as a leitmotiv, he seems to put at par with this powerful factor a series of elements drawn from the traditional efforts of nineteenth century and early twentieth century Marxist thinking: the mass movements in the capitalist countries; "Marxism" as a socio-political category; and the NGOs though, in this latter instance, it would have been more proper to speak of international and transnational organizations, inasmuch as "NGOs" relate to formal institutions of the international system, not fully part of the UN system proper (like the ISA, IPSA, WAPOR, etc.); grassroots organization; not forgetting the revolution in advanced countries; and even the future withering away of the state. . . .

This ambivalence leads to the author's astonishment at seeing both the French CP and Santiago Carrillo opting for political realism in matters relating to nuclear armament and, more generally, to the defense policy of Western countries. And it leads him, regretfully, to formulate bitter accusations verging on deformation against the People's Republic of China (cf. his note 5), which can only be rejected by any careful student of China's policy on disarmament, the specific field of our discussion here (cf. the "Proposals towards a Global Program for Disarmament," presented on May 15th, 1978, by the Chinese Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, inter alia).

This soul-searching prospection of possibilities in that field is attempted against a background in which "Marxism" appears as a sort of untemporal
force, an ideal-typus capable, through its very personality, to play a role in preventing nuclear extinction. We shall refer to this question further on, but felt that it was necessary to indicate that, from the onset, the very position of the problem seems to be in need of serious reconsideration.

2. The position of the problem of disarmament, including the nuclear dimension, must be posited, so we feel, along two lines, at two levels:
   a) The level of the philosophy of history and civilizations;
   b) The level of realpolitik, of concrete geopolitical analysis.

At the level of the philosophy of history and civilizations, it is correct to state that the definite is a "possibility that humanity could be extinguished without any certainty of a future," and that therefore the "highest priority (is) thereby preventing human extinction and assuring mankind of a future." And it is also correct to state that unless we succeed in this first task, it would be futile to think of building "a better society for the future, if the future of humanity is thus assured."

The question immediately becomes: what is to be done?

It seems perilously limiting to think of the world as divided in two blocs around the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. — the situation obtaining as of Yalta in 1945 — as if the winds of history has suddenly stopped blowing, leaving us to this formalized reductionist rigidity. It seems clear that the sudden emergence of the bloc of non-aligned States is, itself, the immediate visible result of the powerful waves of national liberation and social revolution which have unfolded, precisely, through Asia, Africa and Latin America, to the exception of advanced Western countries in Europe and North America. And it can also be accepted by the author, no doubt, that the emergence of China as a third world center of influence, if not power for the time being, especially in its new relationship to Japan as of the Chinese-Japanese Treaty of August 1978, is a central factor in the transformation of the Yalta scenery.
Yet, the bi-polarity of the two major super-powers does obtain as the central influence, central but no more exclusive, in the international scene. This situation must therefore be taken into full account, if we are to speak seriously of disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. To remain at the level of mobilizing masses, that appear singularly unwilling to be mobilized in the West to that effect, will simply not do.

Here again, the ambiguity, fundamental and structural, in the author’s analysis is revealed by the fact that, as he correctly puts the anguished interrogations that chart the path towards a prevention of nuclear weapons, he completely overlooks the fact that the whole system of the United Nations and the international community is now officially committed – starting from the initiative of Afro-Asian, then Tri-continental and non-aligned States – to the quest for a new international order, in which, precisely, armaments are called to question, and the deadly budgets committed to nuclear weaponry singled for criticism and denunciation, with the aim of re-channelling resources of human societies in our times to the immense tasks of human and social development in a human manner.

3. Central to this re-posing of the problem is the importance to accept the primacy of the political, of the unfolding of the struggles for ideas and movements in the real-concrete world in our times.

a) The author wishes to speak quite naturally “not only as a Marxist, but also as a member of the human family.” He would also wish, no doubt, to speak not only as a Marxist, and a member of the human family, but also as, say, a citizen of his fatherland, Japan, of his civilizational mould, Asia, of the political alignment of Asia and Africa against imperialism, of the Tri-continental ensemble, of the non-aligned ensemble, etc. “Human family” is made of several families – civilizational ensembles; cultural-regional areas; nations
— in which different socio-economic and political-ideological systems obtain. Inversely, the preoccupations of a committed citizen of, say, the U.S.A. facing the armaments policy and nuclear weaponry of his country cannot fail to be different from that, say, of a committed Arab citizen facing Zionist-imperialist military expansion; nor could the concern of a responsible citizen of U.S.S.R. and China via the defense needs of their socialist fatherlands, be different from that of, say, very small countries committed to a history-long policy of neutrality in international politics; etc. Best can be preached. It is hard to believe that they can be convinced unless the real-concrete world, and within it, the balance of forces obtaining, does exemplify manifest changes, making it feasible to go towards concepts of disarmament and elimination of nuclear weaponry. What the author conceives as “big-power nationalism” in the Soviet Union and China is, in fact, a realistic political approach to the problems of disarmament, power struggles, and potential linkages between a realistic policy in those fields, on the one hand, and social, socialist progress, on the other.

b) If the non-aligned, Tri-continental, countries are in fact — and not only “appeared” — much more advanced in the domain of disarmament and the banishment of nuclear weaponry than major countries, this is for the historical-concrete reason of being in need of massive investments for development, coupled with reasonable defense expenditures, having at the same time no need for offensive armaments, let alone nuclear armaments, unless they begin to perceive that major oppressive forces are at work that can go to diminish their independence, sovereignty, and perhaps their very national existence.
4. The problem, really, is not that of "Marxism," and whether, or not, it needs to be revised. Obviously, like all bodies of social and political theory and philosophy, it does need to, is being revised, and will be so, increasingly year after year. After all, four fifth of the total populations living today under the banners of socialism are located in Asia -- a continent conspicuously absent from the very elaboration of Marxism in Central and Western Europe in mid-nineteenth century.

A happier formulation would have been to use the word "socialism" and see how socialism -- as a front of political and philosophic forces at work in the real-concrete world of power and culture in our times -- can tackle the problems of disarmament and nuclear weaponry. And the answer, here, should we so accept this position of the problem; would run along the lines, precisely, of a combination of protracted gradualism with a central core of radicalism, i.e., a combination of the campaigning towards the limitation of nuclear weaponry with an advanced sector clearly leading the match towards major disarmament policies and the banishment of nuclear weaponry.

Both do have their place in the world front of forces struggling for a less dangerous world. None can be discarded. For they do speak in terms of reality, and therefore of realism, in a world more than ever dominated by the demands of geopolitics, the imperatives of realpolitik, and yet, renouncing not its quest for a civilizational project where fraternity will find ways and means to lessen the inhumanity of the struggles for world power.

The Marxist Approach to Prevent Nuclear Extinction

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Professor Shingo Shibata's article, "For Human Survival - The Tasks of Marxism to Prevent Nuclear Extinction" is exactly the kind of realistic
examination which our contemporary situation demands. It is realistic in the best philosophic sense. That is, it not only describes the present reality frankly, and without illusions, but criticizes that reality in a constructive and creative way. This is especially necessary because of certain historical and contemporary facts from which Shibata takes his point of departure.

In the first place it is only natural for Marxists to approach problems from a Marxist standpoint. But the unfortunate part of this natural (in one sense, purely tautological) fact is that so many Marxists identify the Marxist standpoint with the conclusions reached by Marx in his own day rather than with the method by which Marx reached them. Moreover, even among those inclined to emphasize the basic method rather than the particular conclusions, the conception of method is often too narrow. These unfortunate conditions have contributed to the widespread tendency to overlook the significance of the cardinal historical fact which Shibata directly and fully confronts, that is, the fact that the founders of Marxism, or Marxism-Leninism did not address the problem of preventing nuclear extinction, for the obvious reason that the problem did not exist in their lifetime. Therefore, there is no responsible or fruitful way of dealing with this problem without going beyond the conclusions reached by Marx, though his method may certainly be used if it is broadly enough conceived, as it is conceived by Professor Shibata.

In this connection Shibata also understands that for one to use the method of Marx rather than simply repeat his conclusions, it is not enough, especially in this case, to take the conclusions Marx arrived at and project them into the future. For the problem of preventing nuclear extinction is not only new, but qualitatively new. This means that the present problem is not simply a larger version of some preceding problem. If it were, we might appropriately try to solve it by using basically the same strategy that was used to solve the preceding problem, only now on a larger scale. To take a
concrete example, World War II was in fact a larger version of World War I in the sense that the problem of winning it was solved on the basis of developing more weapons, more powerful weapons, and a greater variety of weapons, as well as more effective military strategies and tactics than were developed in World War I.

But consider the problem of World War III as a world nuclear war. Could the problem of winning it be solved by developing and using still more powerful weapons than those used in World War II? We are forced to answer in the negative because we know that such weapons have already been developed, and that their use could never lead to "winning." In other words, by a rational paradox of dialectical development which should surprise no Marxist, the quantitative increase in the number and destructiveness of nuclear weapons has produced a qualitatively new result: if they are used in war, neither side could win because both sides would be exterminated. Thus a formal contradiction is nevertheless actually true: the only way to win World War III as a nuclear conflict is not to fight it. Expressed in different language, the problem of winning World War III has, by the dialectical development of objective reality, been transformed into the problem of preventing nuclear extinction — a problem which obviously cannot be solved by nuclear weapons and military strategies, since these are precisely what lead to nuclear extinction.

Another set of historical and contemporary facts from which Shibata takes his point of departure concerns the significance of the changing role and position of the Soviet Union in the world development of socialism since World War I. Again, it should surprise no Marxist that the significance of the Soviet Union's role changed when it ceased to be the only socialist state, and new problems, new perspectives, new demands and new paths of development opened up. However, in regard to the uniquely urgent problem with which Shibata is dealing (and it must be admitted that if this problem of

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preventing nuclear extinction does actually exist, it has greater urgency than any other problem), it is indeed very significant, as he points out, that neither the new Marxist tendencies nor the older Soviet tradition has creatively addressed it, as a qualitatively new problem. This applies not only to the prevention of nuclear war, but to the question of whether to continue developing nuclear industry.

On the day these words are being written, the radio has broadcast a news report that Leonid Brezhnev will announce on his visit to Berlin a new program of economic cooperation between the USSR and the GDR bigger than all such previous programs, and that an important part of this new program will be to supply to the GDR the latest equipment developed in the USSR for the construction of industrial nuclear reactors. This announcement comes during the same historical moment in which world nuclear science, with increasing insistence, is warning us against the proliferation of industrial nuclear reactors because the plutonium which they produce remains lethally radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years of cumulative effect, while no way has been found to deactivate it or to dispose safely of this and other radioactive waste products. Not only are nuclear scientists and medical specialists increasingly warning us, on the basis of increasing confirmation, against these unprecedented dangers to humankind and its whole environment. The world peace movement is also calling, with increasing insistence, for the cessation and prohibition of industrial nuclear reactors which produce the same plutonium that is used for making the nuclear weapons.

In the United States the historical and contemporary facts to which we have been referring, and which form Shibata's point of departure, have contributed to strange and sad results which are especially noticeable in the academic world. One such result is the tendency, on the part of would-be Marxists, mainly if not exclusively to identify Marxism with the set of problems dealt with and conclusions arrived at by the founders of Marxism or
Marxism-Leninism in their own day. This primarily repetitive Marxism is certainly necessary for beginning students, as the initial stage in their development. But when the professors and teachers themselves remain at this stage, their would-be Marxism becomes the worst kind of idealism because it turns them away from the central problem of the present world, on the solution of which the whole future of humanity depends in the most literal sense -- the problem of whether humanity is to have a future or suffer annihilation.

This failure to direct most attention and effort to what is most urgent and important is especially regrettable in face of the fact that one of the most remarkable developments in American higher education during the past few decades has been the dramatic increase of the favorable attention given to Marx and Marxism. This can be seen in the sharp rise in the number of books and articles written, congresses, conferences and symposia held, new courses given, new journals and institutes founded. But when one sees the extremely small proportion of attention given to contemporary humanity's primary life-or-death problem in these new "Marxist" developments and activities, one cannot but feel a deep disappointment.

The meaning and necessity of creative Marxism (realistic Marxism) almost never comes through. Sometimes the attitude taken could be expressed in the question: since Marx did not have much to say about the peace problem why should we put it in the forefront? More often perhaps the attitude is, the world peace problem is a political matter, and the Soviet Union, as the most powerful socialist state, must take the lead in Marxist world politics; our Marxist obligation is to support the peace policies of the Soviet Union. In theory and practice this means that if any creativity is to be exercised it still be exercised by the Soviet leaders. Such an attitude makes the whole issue depend on the degree of creativity shown by the Soviet leaders in dealing with the peace problem, or, more concretely and realistically, the problem of preventing nuclear extinction.
I have been in close touch with the leading Soviet philosophers ever since the late thirties, and in recent years especially in regard to that particular problem. Let me try to state briefly my conclusion concerning their approach to this problem by referring to the special colloquium on Marxism and World Peace which I chaired at the XVth World Congress of Philosophy in 1973 during three sessions of papers and discussions. In my opening paper I emphasized that full-scale nuclear war can now end the human world, and argued that for this reason it is impossible to conceive of Marx or Lenin deliberately deciding to fight such a war; new concepts, approaches and strategies must therefore be created. Five Soviet philosophers took part in the colloquium, headed by the Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Professor P.N. Fedoseyev, whose lead the others followed. Fedoseyev argued that it was not possible to reject the use of nuclear weapons as a matter of principle, and that a nation attacked with nuclear weapons has the right to reply with nuclear weapons. In editing the Proceedings of the colloquium I had several exchanges of letters with Fedoseyev in the effort to understand fully his position on this point. I put the question in this form: Since the human world could not be ended by any single attack with nuclear weapons, but only by sustained exchanges of nuclear weapons between the two contending sides, would it not be better, even for the victim of a nuclear attack, not to reply with nuclear weapons, but with weapons that would not end the human world?

Fedoseyev refused to answer this question directly, saying that further discussion of it would not be fruitful. Presumably, then, we are all (including the Soviet public) to be kept in the dark, until the actual nuclear attack occurs, before we find out whether the Soviet leaders are willing to reply with nuclear weapons and thus bring the human world to an end, or use weapons that do not have this result. Meanwhile, during the past few years (from 1975 to the present, to be exact) the American leaders have been
telling us repeatedly, precisely and clearly that they will be the first to use nuclear weapons in case of anything they consider an "attack," even if the attack is made only with conventional weapons, against the U.S. or any of its numerous bases or allies scattered around the world. Dying imperialism is ready and willing to end the world if it cannot rule it. The latest of such statements was made by President Carter in his speech to the United Nations on October 4, 1977, and was entirely consistent with his repeated refusal to accept the Soviet offer made in 1976 and again in 1978 to sign a mutual agreement that neither side would be the first to use nuclear weapons.

All this makes the problem of preventing nuclear extinction more urgent than ever. It is obviously a problem that cannot be solved at the last moment by a few leaders behind closed doors. In any case, the world has too much at stake to wait until the last moment. Steps must be taken now, and they must be steps capable of assuring that humankind will have a future even if a first nuclear attack is made. They cannot be limited to steps which assure that the Marxist side has the same nuclear weapons as the anti-Marxist side, on the ungrounded assumption that this will frighten the anti-Marxist side into not using its omnicidal weapons. There is nothing Marxist about such an approach to the problem.

United States Nuclear Policy and SALT II: an Institutional Commitment to Qualitative Nuclear Arms Buildup

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Will SALT II be effective in curbing and reversing the strategic arms buildup by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.? Can it prove to be a substantial step leading to general and complete disarmament? These questions should be considered in the light of statements made by leaders of the two countries,
and of such factors as the status of weapons systems actually deployed, the priorities of research and development in military technology, and existing plans for the use of strategic arms. This essay is an attempt along these lines to study the initiatives in arms control negotiations taken by the U.S.

Addressing himself to SALT II prior to the signing of the treaty, President Carter said that "a strategy of peace" was the only rational choice for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union because of "the possibility of mutual annihilation." The U.S. was facing this choice "from a position of strength," he declared, as the strongest nation on Earth economically and militarily. The treaty would "slow the growth of the Soviet arms and limit the strategic competition." To alter the trends the Soviets launched to strengthen their strategic forces in the wake of SALT I, the President said, the U.S. was required to "move on two fronts at the same time": (1) to "modernize" its own strategic forces, and (2) to place limits on the arms race more stringent than SALT I. As efforts for such modernization, Carter suggested, equipment of U.S. submarines with new, more powerful and longer range Trident I missiles; deployment of new, even more secure Trident submarines in 1980; development of more powerful and accurate Trident II missiles for these submarines; promotion of the proposed cruise missile program; and improved accuracy and power of land-based Minuteman missiles. With regard to the Minuteman missiles based in fixed silos, which were said to be becoming increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack, Carter emphasized that the U.S. was preserving "adequate flexibility" in this important area even under the SALT II agreement. He confirmed that the Defense Department had under consideration a number of options for dealing with this problem. (1)

"Paradoxically," one State Department official had earlier explained of this mechanism, "only SALT can make the land-based mobile missile (MX) idea a viable one." For, without SALT, the Soviets could just keep putting
more warheads on their missiles every time the U.S. built a new hole in the
ground to hide its missiles.\(^{(2)}\)

1. *Arms Control and Political Contrivance of Nuclear Arms Buildup*

Arms control negotiations so far conducted and the agreements reached bilaterally and multilaterally have directly and indirectly stimulated subsequent reinforcement of nuclear forces.

After the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty (PTBT), for instance, the annual average number of tests by all nations increased from 40 in the pre-test ban period to 46 in the post-test ban period. The U.S. has increased its average annual number of tests from 24 to 32.\(^{(3)}\)

One factor contributing to this increase in the case of the U.S. was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented “Safeguards ... with regard to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” and President Kennedy accepted them apparently to win the support of some Senators who had threatened that they would oppose the ratification unless these safeguards were not to be applied. The safeguards included: A. continued underground nuclear test programs; B. maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs; C. upkeep in stand-by conditions of the facilities and resources necessary for a prompt resumption of atmospheric nuclear tests in the event of a break-down of the test ban treaty; and D. improvement of U.S. capability to monitor fulfilment of the treaty and Sino-Soviet nuclear activities, capabilities and achievements. Expenditures necessary to put these safeguards into operation have been met ever since.\(^{(4)}\)

The 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) permitted both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to continue their nuclear arms buildup, although it called for negotiations on strategic arms limitation. The NPT does not provide non-nuclear weapon states with an assurance that under no circumstances would they be attacked by nuclear weapons.
By winning support for a bill to go ahead with the development of Trident submarines in 1971, President Nixon foreclosed SALT I negotiations from placing a limit on qualitative development of strategic nuclear arms. By approving development programs of the first cruise missiles after the signing of SALT I agreement, the Nixon administration brought about a new phase in nuclear arms expansion.

Immediately after the signing of the SALT I agreement, Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense, Research and Engineering of the U.S. Department of Defense, presented a series of “SALT related adjustments to strategic programs” in placing Pentagon budget requests for FY 1973 before Congressional committees. In addition to these active and passive measures toward reinforcing U.S. forces, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird revealed the existence of another program for the development of improved re-entry vehicles for ICBMs and SLBMs. This was found to be within the program for advanced ballistic missile re-entry systems (ABRES), a program for the development of ICBM warheads which had then continued for more than ten years. Further requirements as “hedges against future threats” included mobile ICBMs, early warning radar for the SLBM threat, and the Sanguine VLF communication system for the Polaris-Poseidon-Trident fleet. These were in conformity with the assurances the Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested to guard the U.S. against “a degradation of its national security posture.” These programs were added and the pace to promote the existing programs accelerated, both in exchange for the ratification of SALT I.\(^{(5)}\)

On the occasion of the conclusion of the SALT II agreement, too, the Carter administration approved a program for the development of MX mobile ICBM systems, in addition to a series of modernization programs of the strategic forces. MX is regarded as “a highly provocative counterforce weapon” and as posing a serious threat to the Soviet missile silos which constitute Moscow’s major strategic forces.\(^{(6)}\)
In the light of the fact that improved accuracy of ICBMs and SLBMs, such as MX and Trident missiles, is a major aim of the U.S., pursued consistently ever since it began to develop and deploy missiles, the aim of sure capability to destroy major Soviet strategic nuclear forces, it logically follows that further efforts will be directed toward improved accuracy of multiple independently re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).\(^7\)

Improved accuracy of U.S. MIRVs as well as the ongoing development of MX missiles will give U.S. negotiators still another positional advantage in future arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. NATO's December 1979 decision authorizing the deployment of 572 sophisticated "theater" nuclear missiles in Western Europe by 1983 or 1984 must also be studied in this context.

One of the questions at issue in the course of debates in the U.S. Senate committees over the ratification of SALT II before the summer of 1979 is relevant to the differences of interpretation of article IV of the agreement. Some Senators regarded the provision, which says that each side may deploy only one "new type" of land-based missiles, as permitting modification of existing types as long as the changes do not increase or decrease the weight, size or lifting power of the missiles in excess of five percent. They regarded this as a loophole, allowing the Soviet Union to replace existing models with new systems which, according to intelligence officials, included five different systems.\(^8\)

At issue here is not so much the validity of these arguments but rather the exaggerated impression they give the public about the strength of Soviet strategic weaponry, which in turn could produce the worst case image of U.S. strategic forces and help create an atmosphere in favor of taking greater countermeasures. Indeed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed only passive support for the treaty, stressing instead the need for the modernization of strategic nuclear forces and for an increase in military spending.
These demands are joined by certain Senators who have tried to extract increased military spending in exchange for their support of the treaty. Pro and con testimony by retired military officers reveals differences of the strategic concept, and gives oblique expression to complicated interest relations within the armed services, corporations, Congress, and academic circles.\(^9\)

Yet very few challenge the worst case myth. Both inside and outside of Congress, the supposed vulnerability of U.S. land-based Minuteman missiles to a Soviet first-strike has already become “a political fact.”\(^10\)

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown claimed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1979 that the Soviet Union in the next few years was likely to achieve the ability “in theory” to launch a first-strike attack against U.S. land-based missiles. The Pentagon is studying possible remedies for this presumed weakness, utilizing new estimates furnished by the intelligence services. The 19 options under consideration range from a simple increase in the number of warheads on missiles to revived production of the B-1 bomber, along with the expenditure of well over 35 billion dollars for MX missiles. Meanwhile, immediate remedies to upgrade the efficiency of the existing long-range missiles and bombers reportedly include: an increase both in the bomb load of B-52s and in the number of bombers in readiness for quick take off; an increase in the number of Poseidon warheads from 10 to 14; deferred retirement of the 10 Polaris submarines and their re-equipment with the new Trident missiles; improved accuracy of the new Trident; an acceleration of the construction rate of the Trident submarine; and faster development and deployment of a plane specifically designed for carrying air-launched cruise missiles.\(^11\)

Thus, a qualitative nuclear arms expansion has been contrived on the basis of a “political fact,” the threat of Soviet nuclear forces.
2. The Policy of Nuclear Superiority governing Arms Control Measures

Arms control or arms limitation should be distinguished clearly from the reduction and elimination of armaments and armed forces or from disarmament. While disarmament process may involve the control of arms, under certain conditions as a necessary interim measure, arms control by itself does not automatically lead to disarmament. In the prevailing U.S. lexicon, arms control premises the maintenance of armaments at a certain level. Some authors define "arms control" or "arms limitation" as involving limitations on the number or types of armaments or armed forces; on their deployment or disposition, or on the use of particular types of armaments, thereby encompassing measures designed to reduce the danger of accidental war or to reduce concern about surprise attack. Arms control as such is said to be aimed at making war less probable, less destructive even if it does occur, and at reducing the economic cost of armaments.\(^{(12)}\)

It is doubtful that existing arms control measures contribute to these limited aims, let alone clearing the way to nuclear disarmament, for there is a wide discrepancy between the state of nuclear armaments today and the agreed measures on control of these armaments.

In the disarmament negotiations from the immediate postwar period through the 1950s, the position of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. remained far apart. It was aptly observed that the latter argued for disarmament with strict international control, while the former stood for the control of existing armaments prior to any disarmament.\(^{(13)}\)

The Soviet successes in the first test firing of an ICBM forerunner in August 1957 and in the launching of Sputnik in October that year seem to have been a major factor in arousing among leading circles of the U.S. an argument in favor of an early initiation of arms control talks with the Soviet Union. Of the various recommendations for overcoming the crises, which these events caused the American leaders, the Gaither Report, among others,
suggested to the National Security Council that comprehensive programs
to improve American security be integrated with foreign policy, and that
efforts be exerted toward securing Soviet agreement to “safe arms control
and regulation” while the U.S. still had the capability of making “a decisive
air nuclear attack on the USSR.” Such a “negotiate from strength” posture
has been maintained ever since. (14)

The U.S. nuclear strategy supporting this strength is often said to be
based on two elements of nuclear deterrence: survivability and vulnerability.
Both sides must have a survivable second-strike capability in case of a first-
strike, and at the same time must be vulnerable to a second-strike attack.
This is the so-called state of mutual assured destruction, or MAD. In reality,
however, the maintenance of a first-strike capability, the pivot of the “con-
tainment” strategy in the days of American monopoly in nuclear weapons
and of the “massive retaliation” strategy in the days of its relative nuclear
superiority, has remained a consistent aim, in one form or another, in U.S.
efforts to ensure counterforce capability even in strategy of “flexible re-
response,” with all its varieties today.

By 1960 there had evolved within the Pentagon three forms of deter-
rence strategy: (1) the counterforce; (2) the balanced deterrent; and (3)
the “mixed” strategy. The parallel existence of counterforce and balanced
deterrence strategies tended to negate the benefits each claimed against the
other, and the two continued to struggle with each other in the “mix,” which
in the Kennedy administration was not an alternative to the two predecessors
but only another means of escalating destructive capacity. This escalation
was stimulated by repeated technological breakthroughs on both sides, that
made the existing weapons systems vulnerable, and by military theories
and hypothetical scenarios serving to justify weapons development and arms
buildup (modelling, simulation, gaming, and other mathematical and statis-
tical techniques). Political decisions reflected changing alignments of, and
struggles between, different interest groups in Congress, corporations, the armed services, and the universities.\(^{(15)}\) A typical example of public opinion manipulation in these processes was the "missile gap" devised by the Kennedy administration. The deterrence strategy includes incompatible assumptions made by the military officers, who raised strategic questions, and by the scholars and scientists, who attempted to answer them, while the final course of any strategy resides with the political decision.

A striking trend in this evolution is that the arms buildup which is part of deterrence becomes the basis of a quest for nuclear superiority. It was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara who first admitted publicly that the U.S. nuclear strategy was not based on MAD but was headed for counterforce strategy. In 1962 McNamara stated that a "flexible" strategic force possessed by the U.S. could be used not only to attack Soviet ICBMs and long-range bombers to limit damage to the U.S., but also to attack the "entire Soviet target system simultaneously."\(^{(16)}\) This damage limitation theory was shelved for several years due to the technological limits of the projected ABM system, the difficulty of destroying the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and the complex and costly problems facing civil defense mobilization.

In the days of James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense under the Nixon and Ford administrations, MAD was still an aim but no longer the primary one. It would be "the height of folly," Schlesinger stated bluntly, to treat a reserve force or a highly survivable second-strike capability as an all-purpose deterrent. Henry Kissinger had earlier criticized the simplistic view of the early 1960s that deterrence could be measured by the amount of civilian carnage that could be inflicted by one side on the other. To consider the massive use of nuclear arms for the destruction of civilian populations, the Secretary of State said more diplomatically, would be both political and moral "impossibility."\(^{(17)}\)
When Schlesinger acknowledged that along with retaliatory targeting against urban and industrial centers, U.S. war plans had always included "military targets," he expressed the desire to provide the President with "a wider set of much more selective targeting options." (18) Schlesinger perhaps intended to get the already operating yet unpublicized policy officially authorized at the presidential level.

Instructive in this connection is a suggestion that there would probably be much less confusion if there were less talk about doctrines and more about the SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan) and GSP (General Strike Plan), the U.S. nuclear weapons targeting programs. (19)

In the development and deployment of U.S. nuclear strategic weaponry, one of the point-blank of the ascendancy of counterforce strategy is the history of the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle, or MIRV. According to 1968 testimony by Dr. John Foster, the Pentagon's Director of Defense, Research and Engineering, it was found during 1961-62 planning for targeting the Minuteman that the total number of aim points in the Soviet Union outnumbered the Minuteman missiles available. The solution found was to split up the payload of individual missiles so that all the targets could be covered. The MIRV concept originally generated was to increase U.S. "targeting capability rather than to penetrate ABM defenses" which was considered an ancillary merit. (20)

The advent of MIRVs marked a logical step forward in the evolution of weapons technology and were economical in cost/effect terms. Greater still are the political and military-strategic implications of their increased targeting capability. In this respect, technological development of weapons should strictly be distinguished from political decisions on the development and deployment of specific weapons. Minimum deterrence, defined as a second-strike capability aimed at assured destruction of urban and industrial centers, does not need MIRVs, which were introduced precisely to secure
the capability of destroying the enemy’s strategic forces.

The deployment of MIRVs, and the development of maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) and advanced maneuvering re-entry vehicles (AMaRVs) are aimed at improving accuracy to destroy enemy missiles in hardened silos and at breaking through defense networks. Such weapons, therefore, should be regarded as one of the chief means of “war fighting,” that would limit damage to the U.S. so that it may survive the fighting of a nuclear war. Damage limitation with a more flexible system of command, control and communication provides the President with wider options in targeting decision-making. Flexible targeting differs from the generally held rationalization for the use of massive and large-scale employment of so-called deterrence.

While deliberation of SALT II ratification were proceeding in the Senate, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) carried out one of its largest simulated nuclear war exercises, obviously directed against the Soviet Union. On July 10, 1979, two unarmed Minuteman III ICBMs, the most sophisticated in America’s nuclear arsenal, were fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base and flew 4,800 miles to strike targets at the Kwajalein missile range in the Pacific. In an exercise, which lasted one week, SAC’s full forces were mobilized: about 650 bomber, tanker, reconnaissance and command planes, and Minuteman and Titan missiles, based at 31 bomber bases and missile stations, including Anderson Air Force Base on Guam. SAC’s commander in chief, Gen. Richard H. Ellis, was quoted as saying that tested in a realistic environment were “readiness and capability” to support the war plans to be put into operation by national leaders in response to an attack on the U.S. In the exercise, B-52s and FB-111s flew on two low-level training orbits to test the simulated attack capability of bombers at altitude of 400 to 2,000 feet, low enough to evade enemy radar. The results achieved by the bombing of simulated targets were registered by radar. The bombers also conducted a simulated “positive control launch,” requiring them to return well short
of the enemy’s territory. This report was compiled by a highly competent writer,\(^{(21)}\) and it can be inferred that one of the major aims of the exercise was to test the flexible “war fighting” capability of a “damage limitation” type under the strictest systems of command, control and communication.

It is reasonable to conclude that the policy of nuclear superiority and first-strike capability promotes a qualitative nuclear arms buildup, even under SALT agreements. SALT can at best guarantee a temporary diplomatic stability of the strategy, but continued qualitative nuclear arms buildup will inevitably create new instability.

3. **Meaning of Arms Control Measures**

Relevant to the study of the meaning of SALT are the comments made in 1975 by the Technology Assessment Panel of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the technological perspectives of the competition in strategic weaponry for the decade ahead. The panel says that emphasis on increasing the numbers of delivery vehicles is likely to be replaced by emphasis on improving “the qualitative characteristics of strategic weaponry,” also on the part of the Soviet Union during the decade ahead. As an upper limit is placed by the SALT agreement on the number of launchers, qualitative improvements will be carried out. Secondly, the panel predicts that prospective areas for future competition will be “improved accuracy,” including the use of terminal guidance and other techniques, and “cruise missiles, and mobile ICBMs.” Thirdly, it warns that the prohibition of a new technology will be much more difficult after flight testing of that technology has been completed. Limits are “more difficult to verify” once system testing has been completed, and it often happens that tested systems attain “a degree of institutional commitment.” Fourthly, the panel says that after one side has deployed “innovations in strategic weaponry,” it will be difficult to prevent the other side, which is technologically behind, to try to catch
In a more political context, the reasons why SALT has helped stimulate a qualitative nuclear arms buildup seem to include: firstly, SALT agreements as arms control measures are not part and parcel of agreed comprehensive programs leading to disarmament, but are aimed at maintaining and controlling armaments at such a level as to satisfy the political and strategic aims of the parties to the agreements; secondly, the arms control measures have always been advocated on the assumptions and thrusts inherent in the U.S. nuclear strategy, which has also defined a general framework for such measures; and thirdly, whenever it had anticipated progress in the development and deployment of Soviet nuclear forces, and while it was still superior to the Soviet Union, the U.S. always tried to invite that partner into arms control negotiations aimed at curbing Soviet arms drives and working out a temporary stability by means of specific arms control measures, in order that the U.S. itself might be in a position to achieve new qualitative advances.

The positive Soviet response to U.S. initiatives for arms control negotiations and agreements, irrespective of the U.S.S.R.'s subjective intentions, objectively turned out to be a shift from its earlier policy line for general and complete disarmament. Those who had read the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament tabled at the United Nations in 1959, as well as Premier Khrushchev's enthusiastic speech at the 1962 World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace in Moscow, might have witnessed a conspicuous change in the position of the Soviet Government, which jointly with the U.S. Government sponsored the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty (PTBT) as well as the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). But they would find it difficult to read in Soviet Government statements a convincing justification for this strategic change.

Implications of this change seem to be of significance in the light of the following facts: the PTBT was concluded in the wake of the settlement of the
Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of 1962 and under the condition of increasing Sino-Soviet conflict; the NPT was agreed to while the U.S. was escalating its war of aggression in Vietnam and Sino-Soviet antagonism was becoming even sharper, and in defiance of the dissatisfactions felt by the non-nuclear weapons states; in June 1968 the Soviet Government gave its formal approval to the U.S. offer to initiate SALT I negotiations as if this might help alleviate such dissatisfaction; and finally, SALT I was concluded against the background of President Nixon's visit to Peking.

In the context of these political developments in the world, a series of arms control measures leading up to SALT II seem to correspond to the political detente, on the one hand between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and, on the other between the U.S. and China. These measures seem to constitute an arms control system or a discretionary international institution established at this historical stage by the two nuclear super-powers.

The establishment of this institution was made possible only as the result of the Soviet acceptance of the U.S. initiative, which was designed to diplomatically guarantee the framework of its nuclear strategy. Nevertheless, this institution appears to be extremely fragile, unstable and dangerous for the following reasons: the parties to the agreed arms control measure are limited only to the U.S. and the Soviet Union; both the items and areas of agreements and their duration are extremely limited; even within the purview of these limitations, there is no assurance of agreed regulations being continued beyond the date of expiration; and a qualitative nuclear arms buildup is legitimized, along with nuclear and conventional armaments uncontrolled by the agreements. The agreed arms control measures have come no closer to nuclear disarmament and the creation of a new international order, as strongly urged by most of the non-nuclear weapons states.

Despite "the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament," which the two parties to the arms control measures never fail to declare
having in mind, no program has ever been presented in which such arms
control measures can lead, even gradually, to a more stable interantional
institution in the form of disarmament.

Under these circumstances, the peace forces demanding disarmament
are being pressed to carry out the complicated and difficult task of formulat-
ing a new strategy for peace that would enable them to work more success-
fully for disarmament, in closer unity with those who support arms control
measures as a step toward the final goal of disarmament.

Notes

(1) For SALT II Agreement, Vienna, June 18, 1979, see U.S. Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs, Selected Documents No. 12, Washington, D.C. President
Carter’s address before the American Newspaper Publishers Association in New
York City on April 25, 1979, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, The Depart-

(2) Leslie H. Gelb, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of
State, address before the San Diego World Affairs Council on January 30, 1979,
excerpted in ibid., 24–27.

(3) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook of World
Arms and Disarmament, 1968/69 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1969),
243–244.

(4) Ibid., 255.

(5) Testimonies of John Foster and Melvin Laird, quoted in Milton Leitenberg, “The
Race to Oblivion,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1974, 9–10
[hereafter Leitenberg, I].

(6) G. B. Kistiakowsky, “The good and the bad of nuclear arms control negotiations,”

(7) Milton Leitenberg, “U.S. Counterforce Targeting and SALT,” February 20, 1974
[hereafter Leitenberg, II], Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm,
mimeograph, 10.

(8) Richard Burt, “Some Senators Say an Arms Pact Loophole Aids Soviet,” The

(9) See, for instance, Charles Mohr, “Ex-Top Officers Split on Arms Pact; Some Call it

(10) Garry D. Brewer and Bruce G. Blair, “War games and national security with a grain


(19) Leitenberg, II, 6.

(20) Testimony of John Foster, quoted in Leitenberg, I, 13–14, and II, 9.


(22) OTA Report, III, G. (Pranger and Labrie, 167.)

More on Human Survival*

—Soviet Nuclear Policy Reconsidered and Possibility of Human Survival—

Shingo SHIBATA

In my earlier paper, “For Human Survival,” I pointed out that Marxism (and Marxists) as well as other schools of contemporary thought (and theorists) are faced with unprecedentedly important and serious problems re-

lating to nuclear weapons, and that all human beings, both Marxists and non-
Marxists, and even civilization itself, could become extinct unless these prob-
lems are solved. Using my former essay as the basis, I here set out some
reflections on the perspective as I see it, of how the task of the elimination of
nuclear weapons may be carried to success.

In the first part of my earlier paper, I summarized what I consider to be
some of the most significant points in the final document adopted by the
1978 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to
Disarmament. It is extremely important that the governments of all states,
including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., adopted the final document by consen-
sus. Any discussion on how to eliminate nuclear weapons should therefore
derive from the confirmation of the agreed principles laid down in that final
document, and I referred in my earlier paper to those principles I consider to
be of positive significance.

1. The History and Present Status of Soviet Nuclear Policy

1. As in the previous paper, I plan to deal with the tasks of Marxists
for prevention of nuclear extinction. It therefore seems appropriate to refer
mainly to the nuclear policy followed by the Soviet Union which claims to
take the Marxist stand, from which viewpoint the following propositions
seem to be axiomatic.

First, the nuclear arms driving force behind the expansion race is U.S.
imperialism, a race which is yielding American monopoly capital enormous
profits. It follows therefore that the demand for the elimination of nuclear
weapons can never come from U.S. imperialism or the U.S. government.

Second, the movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons can
never win the sanction of the U.S. administration, because it is promoting
the nuclear arms buildup. The movement must be of the kind that takes issue
with that policy, such as will compel the U.S. administration to reverse its
policy and take a new direction. This movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons, in so far as it is a movement for human survival, takes on a character and form that transcends any class framework. At the same time the movement is bound to develop also into a class struggle involving the widest possible sections of people, in that it is forced into confrontation with the U.S. because of its opposition to the policy of expanding nuclear arms, which actually means toying with the threat of human extinction, and makes even that threat a source of profit by capitalist expansion.

Third, the aims of the movement can not be won by American-Soviet diplomatic negotiations, but must be achieved mainly by a mass movement that spreads world-wide on a scale unprecedented in history, with the participation of the overwhelming majority of the human family, including, of course, the American people. This kind of global mass movement can never reach maturation by supporting American-Soviet diplomatic negotiations, which, in as much as such negotiations are diplomatic, could well bring about merely a compromise achieved in closed sessions. No, this movement can reach maturity only when it operates as a mass movement carried on by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which wage the struggle in different countries against the nuclear policies of the U.S. government and its subordinate allies, and work for the establishment of a body of international laws under the authority of the United Nations, where the non-aligned states now command a majority.

Fourth, as we have said, neither U.S. imperialism nor any U.S. administration is in a position to advocate the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless they may proclaim a policy for nuclear arms control or nuclear arms coordination. The initiation of such a policy is possible because: (1) it would give the U.S. a monopoly (and in later years oligarchic control with the Soviet Union) in nuclear weapons; (2) it would enable the U.S. to “determine” and “coordinate” Soviet nuclear weapons development, and
to program its own development in such a way that the Soviet Union could not readily become superior to the U.S. in nuclear arms expansion; and (3) it would give the U.S. the leverage to subvert in its own country and elsewhere in the world the demand by mass movements for the \textit{prohibition} and \textit{elimination} of nuclear weapons, enabling it even to exercise control over the development of the mass movement. The historical evidence confirms that the U.S. government, representing the \textit{mainstream} of U.S. imperialism, has on the one hand consistently advocated "nuclear arms control," while at the same time accelerating nuclear arms expansion, a record that cannot be denied. The 1946 "Baruch proposals" formed a prototype of this posture, and it has to be born in mind that the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty, the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), on which the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to start immediately after the 1968 treaty, \textit{were all put up by the U.S. government}.

2. In the light of these propositions and historical facts, what has been the Soviet nuclear policy? Whereas U.S. imperialism proposed "nuclear arms control," the Soviet Union in 1946 resolutely opposed this and proposed the \textit{prohibition} and \textit{elimination} of nuclear weapons. As Professor Howard L. Parsons has reminded us in his contribution to this international discussion, the Soviet Union at the time proposed "the absolute prohibition of the use of the atomic bomb, destruction within three months of all atomic weapons, designation of the breach of the convention as a crime against humanity, severe penalties for any breach, application of the convention to all nations, and exchange of scientific information." These were just and principled proposals. From that time and \textit{up to June 1954}, the Soviet Union consistently demanded both in the United Nations and at the level of the mass movement that nuclear weapons be prohibited. This policy was in conformity with the demand made by the movement for the prohibition of
atomic and hydrogen bombs organized among the peoples of the world, in which the Soviet Union was able to claim a certain amount of legitimate prestige. In opposition to this policy of the Soviet Union and the worldwide movement demanding the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the governments of the U.S. and the NATO countries consistently opposed the prohibition of such weapons and put forward "arms control" plans and "progressive disarmament proposals."

But suddenly, in September 1954, the Soviet Union made a big retreat from its former position. It accepted as a basis of discussion the principle of "progressive disarmament proposals," which had been submitted in June that year by the United Kingdom and France, and declared at a session of the United Nations General Assembly that it was prepared to drop the demand for the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons. In May 1955, the Soviet Union tabled most comprehensive "disarmament proposals," which were closer to the Western proposals, and oriented to phased disarmament and arms control, but did not include as the immediate aim the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

At the level of the movement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons after 1954, only the prohibition of nuclear test explosions was made a major issue, not the prohibition of nuclear weapons themselves. This was partly because the consciousness of the peoples of the world was not mature enough, a condition for which the Soviet Union was not solely responsible. In November 1956, the Soviet Union justly denounced the United Kingdom and France in their aggression against Egypt, and even implied the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the aggressors. As a result, the Anglo-French partners ceased their aggression against Egypt, but the fact remains that the Soviet Union used the threat of nuclear weapons as an instrument of pressure. Since 1957, the Soviet Union has tabled one proposal after another for partial arms control and for the cessation of nuclear tests, and in
September 1959 presented proposals for “general and complete disarmament,” tabled by Premier Khrushchev at the United Nations. The urgent demand for the prohibition of nuclear weapons was carefully dropped, with sharper attention paid to problems of partial arms control and the ending of nuclear tests, which would not necessarily lead to the prohibition of nuclear weapons. At the same time an allout effort was made to create the rosy illusion about “general and complete disarmament,” which would surely be not feasible for a long time.

Thus, Soviet nuclear policy after September 1954 marked a retreat from the demand for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons to the position of nuclear arms control, moving actually closer to the Baruch plan. This retreat was combined with a big-power-centered policy of removing “disarmament” problems from the purview of the United Nations, so as to deal with them by way of diplomatic negotiations between the two major powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The tendency was thus strengthened, not for the United Nations to regulate the nuclear arms expansion race under the influence of the U.S. and the Soviet Union but for these two major nuclear powers to regulate the United Nations by presenting as faits accomplis the results of their own diplomatic negotiations. From this came the policy of big power intervention, which attempted to impose these same faits accomplis on the world movement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and on Japan in particular, where the Soviet Union tried to transform the movement into one of support for its own nuclear policy. This was one factor among others that in 1964 caused the split in the Japanese movement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. In this way the policy line came into being, oriented to the partial and phased “arms coordination” measures of big power centralism. This policy revealed itself as incapable of regulating the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear arms expansion, and contributed to the establishment of a series of arms control treaties sanctioned by U.S. imperialism,
beginning with the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty.\(^\text{(1)}\)

3. What is present Soviet nuclear policy? What steps has the Soviet leadership proposed for the elimination of nuclear weapons? Such steps can be summed up, as I have already indicated elsewhere, from the speech by L.I. Brezhnev on November 2, 1977. He proposed:

\(\text{(1)}\) that the approximate equilibrium of military power existing between the Soviet Union and the U.S. be maintained; \(\text{(2)}\) that a downward turn in the curve of the arms race be started (which allows that the curve could also go up -- Shibata); \(\text{(3)}\) that the level of military confrontation be gradually scaled down; \(\text{(4)}\) that as "a radical step," an agreement on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons be reached by all states; \(\text{(5)}\) that the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons be gradually reduced, to be followed by their complete and total destruction; and \(\text{(6)}\) that an agreement on a moratorium covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes be concluded, along with a ban on all nuclear weapons tests for a definite period.

In the light of the emphasis placed on the proposed steps \(\text{(4)}\) and \(\text{(6)}\), it is clear that the Soviet leadership for the present time at least is not making the total prohibition of nuclear weapons the aim of struggle. It is also clear that these form part of the policy of nuclear arms control, premised on a nuclear deterrent strategy, and not a policy for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. *Perspectives of the Movement for Human Survival*

1. So far we have reviewed briefly the retreat and present status of Soviet nuclear policy. Then, what is the policy of the NGO movement in Japan and elsewhere on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons? As I understand it, the principles and steps commonly confirmed in the NGO movement in Japan against nuclear weapons may be summed up as:
1) To provide relief and assistance to hibakusha, the surviving witnesses of the first nuclear war, and to have the Japanese government enact a genuine "hibakusha relief law." In doing this, the Japanese and U.S. governments will be charged with having committed the war crime of causing the first nuclear war, with atomic bombs on Japan, and that they must acknowledge that they were so responsible. To disseminate authentic information on the damage and sufferings caused by the atomic bombing, or should we not say, "the frist nuclear war", or even more correctly, the first act of nuclear extinction, and to warn the world against the danger of human annihilation, and do our utmost to prevent nuclear war.

2) To work for conclusion of a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons, mainly through the medium of the United Nations, with all states parties to it. To have the Japanese government enact and implement a law embodying the three non-nuclear principles (not to produce, not to possess, and not to bring in nuclear weapons). To internationalize these three non-nuclear principles, and specifically to expand nuclear-free zones.

3) To have all nuclear weapons scrapped, under a plan in which all states cooperate, and with United Nations control. The steps leading to the general and complete elimination of nuclear weapons should include specifically: (a) the prohibition of tests, the manufacture, stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear weapons; (b) reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons; and (c) control by the United Nations of all fissionable source materials.

4) Such steps should be followed by disarmament of conventional arms, i.e. general and complete disarmament.

To realize these steps it is necessary to have a non-sectarian, united mass movement developed on the widest possible scale. Such a mass movement
should unite precisely for the attainment of these objectives; and the question of whether or not support should be given to a certain diplomatic policy, or a certain nuclear policy or "partial measures" relating to nuclear weapons adopted by any government or governments, can never be made a required tenet of belief for such a movement, or even be brought into it. Independent and self-determined unity of the movement based on agreed aims for relief of hibakusha and for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons should be the organizational principle of NGO movements for the prohibition of nuclear weapons both in Japan and elsewhere.

2. In the light of such a policy line of the Japanese and world NGO movements for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the leadership of the Soviet Union and East European countries, and the World Peace Council-oriented peace movement, should be asked cordially: (1) to refrain from attempting to impose their own policy lines on the NGO movements of Japan and the West for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and refrain from obstructing other movements following their own programs of action in line with the organizational principles of a mass movement; (2) that they carry on united action with such movements; (3) that they re-examine their line of nuclear arms control which has been sanctioned by the main current of U.S. imperialism, and return to the policy line they had advocated up till June 1954; and (4) that they strengthen cooperation with the NGO movements and the non-alignment movement within the framework of the United Nations, and not within the American-Soviet bilateral framework, but consistent with what is set out and confirmed in the final document of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, to which they all subscribed.

3. In this international discussion, Professor Parsons criticizes the au-
thor’s view, and a reply from me should be in order here. Professor Parsons is invited to re-examine his views on the following points:

First, by highly evaluating SALT, is he not paying tribute to the policies of the successive U.S. administrations of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter, each of which follows the main current of U.S. imperialism? His line of argument appears to suggest that the peoples of the world can be saved from increased burdens of military spending and inflation only by reason of SALT, which would mean they should be grateful for the main current of U.S. imperialism.

Second, Professor Parsons claims that the fate of the human family rests on the “responsibility” of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But is it not rather that this responsibility of the two major nuclear powers should be made the first issue, for is it not they who have placed the fate of humanity in such a parlous position as we find it today? Why does not Professor Parsons mention the right and responsibility of the peoples other than those of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to speak out, for these comprise the overwhelming majority of the human family; nor does he speak about the roles of the United Nations, the non-aligned states, and the NGO mass movements? If we were to follow his line of argument, it would seem that the overwhelming majority of the world’s people must give unconditional credit to the U.S. and the Soviet Union for having arrived at “a careful, responsible agreement.” Has not this way of thinking which is a product of big power centralism or big power hegemonism been already refuted by the achievements of the Vietnam revolution, and by all independent-minded Communist movements, and by the final document of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament?

Third, what guarantee is there that Soviet nuclear policy is correct, which it is assumed to be, merely because the Soviet Union is the most powerful “socialist state”? As is well known, the Soviet leadership is
responsible for many errors committed on many problems, about which self-criticism was necessary. By the same process of reasoning may it not be argued that the Soviet leadership has committed errors in relation to nuclear weapons policy too, and thereby has caused no little damage to the Japanese and world movements for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and has itself lowered its own prestige? (3)

Fourth, Professor Parsons asks, “Have they (the “partial measures” — Shibata) served as a substitute, an inferior option for some more effective alternative?” But I only say that it is true that such major “partial measures” as the partial nuclear test ban treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, and SALT were first proposed by the U.S. administration, representing the main current of U.S. imperialism, and were then accepted by the Soviet Union; nevertheless this fact has neither been admitted candidly and calmly nor made public among the people. It has, in fact, been portrayed to the contrary, and this false, reversed picture has been made to appear good and virtuous by the Soviet leadership, spreading the illusion that the “partial measures” represented essential steps toward “overall measures,” a “first step” toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; the world movement against nuclear weapons has been asked to believe in such an illusion. If these “partial measures” had been frankly shown to be no “first step” toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, but only measures for arms control, the difficulties encountered by the mass movement might not have been caused.

Fifth, Professor Parsons has entitled his contribution, “Opposition to SALT II: A Dangerous Illusion,” perhaps as an antithesis to Barton J. Bernstein’s “SALT: the Dangerous Illusion” (The Enquiry, July 24, 1978) which I cited in a footnote of my earlier essay. My own position, a position which I think the NGO movement against nuclear weapons should take, is that we are not in favor of SALT II. After all, (1) the NGO movement for
the prohibition of nuclear weapons has had no share in the preparation of SALT II; it is a treaty concluded bilaterally between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and quite outside of the framework of the United Nations; the peoples of other countries cannot be held responsible for the preliminary negotiations nor for the implementation of the treaty. (2) If we favored SALT II, we would be agreeing that under the treaty (a) the U.S. is allowed to increase the number of its missiles and nuclear warheads and (b) both the U.S. and the Soviet Union may be permitted to flight-test and deploy a new type of ICBM (such as the American MX missile), which means agreeing with the promotion of nuclear arms expansion.

It goes without saying that such an attitude would be suicidal for the movement against nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we should oppose SALT II, nor should we organize a campaign against the ratification of the treaty by the U.S. Senate. Because: (1) to support or to oppose SALT II and its ratification is a problem for the American people, not for us; (2) the movement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons should not be dwarfed into a campaign of support or opposition to SALT II; and (3) we think it is important and even necessary to unite with Professor Parsons and other people and their movements, including, of course, the peace movements led by the World Peace Council, who think that SALT II should be ratified. Our position therefore is that, irrespective of whether one supports or opposes SALT II or the “partial measures” referred to by Professor Parsons, we should impose neither ayes nor nyets on each other as a precondition for united action, but we should work for the unity of the broadest masses to undertake tasks on which we agree possibly with the one immediate aim, viz., the conclusion of an international agreement, banning the use of nuclear weapons.

Sixth, in my earlier paper, “For Human Survival,” I pointed out that there are a great number of difficult tasks ahead for the prohibition and
elimination of nuclear weapons. But Professor Parsons has not addressed himself to this issue, on how these tasks can be undertaken. The author would like Professor Parsons to tackle these questions, and make suggestions from his standpoint.

4. Lastly, bearing in mind recent achievements of the NGO movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons, I want to put forward one suggestion on the direction which should be taken to advance the movement.

One major characteristic of the 1979 World Conference against A and H Bombs, held in August in Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was that it provided a venue for the maximum unity achieved in 16 years. Another characteristic was that the movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons has been confirmed as a movement for “human survival,” as the very title of the conference indicated: “The 1979 World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs – For Relief of Hibakusha, For Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, and For Human Survival.” This gives the most appropriate and accurate expression to the meaning of the movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Indeed, should the human family fail to eliminate nuclear weapons, it will be doomed to extinction. This must be made the common recognition of the whole human race, for only in this way can the road to the elimination of nuclear weapons be cleared of all blockages.

In this same context, it should be pointed out that the movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons does not belong to a particular party or faction, or only to those organizations at present represented in the movement, or of a particular state or people; it is a movement of the whole human family, and must always be open to all. It can safely be said that never in history has there been such a movement, non-sectarian in character, enjoying as it does the participation of people of all walks of life; nor has there been one of such historic significance.
Let us now consider how this movement for "human survival" can be understood, and actually gain the participation of the whole human race. In Cambodia, for instance, many people are suffering from starvation, and their very survival is being threatened. In the northern part of Vietnam, which shares a border with China, the "survival" of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese people is being threatened by the Chinese, who even now talk about "repunishment of the Vietnamese."(4) The people of Palestine, who were forced by Israel to become refugees, live under the constant threat to their "survival." In developing countries, hundreds of millions of people are on the border-line of starvation, their very "survival" being at stake. Are these people able to listen to the appeal of other peoples for the prohibition of nuclear weapons? If people in industrially advanced countries, where there is an abundance of food, remain indifferent about sharing some of their abundance with starving people, how would the appeal of the movement for "human survival" sound in the ears of those hundreds of millions who have never known what it is to have enough food? Since the movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons is dedicated to "human survival," can it remain indifferent to the fate of any of those of the developing countries, who belong equally to the human family – whose very survival is at stake? If we are indifferent to the threat to survival of these people, they will also be indifferent to the kind of danger that we say actually exists in nuclear weapons. The movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons could not become a movement of the whole human race if this were to be our attitude.

Hiroshima is the "point of origin" of the historic global movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons. But this does not mean that the Japanese movement can remain idle, merely warning humanity of the threat of nuclear weapons; this would be far from making the earnest desire of Hiroshima into the earnest desire of the whole world. True, the nuclear threat
to survival is different in both qualitative and quantitative ways from the survival threat from starvation, poverty, environmental hazards, nuclear power plant accidents, or conventional warfare. But the threat to survival from whatever source, is real. Life is indivisible and supremely valuable to every human being, and we should never claim that death by starvation is less serious than death by nuclear war.

To have the Japanese movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons heard sympathetically and affirmatively by all people of the world, taking in the meaning of Hiroshima, the people of Japan must themselves first listen to the voice of all those others whose survival is actually in peril throughout the world. In this sense; just as Hiroshima is the "point of origin" of the world movement against A and H bombs, so there are other "points of origin," as for example, Cambodia, Vietnam, South Korea, Palestine, South Africa, Harrisburg of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident, and in the North American continent where the survival of the native Americans is endangered. These "points of origin" of the world danger must be heard and linked with the "point of origin" in Hiroshima. When the whole earth is covered with a network of innumerable "points of origin," then and only then will the various movements for "human survival" be linked and mutually strengthened; then the movement that originates from Hiroshima will literally become a movement of the whole human family. On one hand, the movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons should pursue the course of its own specific and independent character, but, in terms of being a "human survival" movement it must be joined with all those other movements for "survival" all over the world; the logic of universality will enable it to expand and achieve its objectives.
Notes

(1) A preliminary draft of the partial nuclear test ban treaty was submitted first by the U.S. and the U.K. on August 27, 1962 at a meeting of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. The U.S. had consistently proposed a partial nuclear test ban. The Soviet Union, until June 15, 1963, had regarded such proposals as a fraudulent means of legalizing underground nuclear tests to promote the nuclear arms race, and had therefore opposed these proposals. Then, on July 15, 1963, the Soviet Union suddenly withdrew its earlier objections, and began diplomatic negotiations with the others in favor of a partial nuclear test ban treaty, and initialed the treaty on July 25. The clear fact that this history shows is that the position of the Soviet Union came closer to that of the U.S., and not vice versa. But this history is falsified in the reports published by the leadership of the Soviet Union and East European countries and the World Peace Council; they contend that the treaty was accomplished on the initiative of the Soviet Union, and that this was a victory for the peace-loving forces. This is the case set out, for instance, in P. Stulz, Schlaglicht Atom – Aus der Geschichte der Kernforschung (Berlin, 1973), S.333 and P. Klein and K. Engelhardt, Weltproblem Abrüstung (Berlin, 1979), S.34.

(2) Even though the Soviet Union is a “Socialist state,” the question to be posed now is, how “socialist” is it. The Communist Party of Japan has defined existing Socialist countries as “socialism in the nascent, formative period,” and many Japanese Marxists have defined them as “developing socialism” or “socialism in backward countries.” In a paper by the writer, “Re-examination of Theories of Contemporary Socialism,” Gendai to Shiso [Contemporary Times and Thought], No. 36 (in Japanese, Tokyo: June 1979), a careful examination is made of this issue.

(3) In an attempt to impose on the Japanese movement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons its own policy line, the Soviet Peace Committee was responsible in part for the movement’s division, giving support to one of the two groups thus formed. It was not until June 1979 that relations were normalized between the Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Gensuitkyo) and the Soviet Peace Committee. In a joint communiqué issued, the two organizations confirmed a position of mutual independence, equality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of each. This amounts to tacit admission by the Soviet Peace Committee of its wrong attitude of attempting to infringe on the independence of the Japan Council and to interfere in its internal affairs.

(4) In his contribution to this international discussion, Dr. A. Abdel-Malek criticizes the author for having made an appraisal of the Chinese nuclear policy based on misunderstanding. The important point, however, is not what written proposals were submitted by the Chinese government to the 1978 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, but what that government has been doing. In and after 1966, the Chinese leadership also attempted to force its own policy line on the Japanese movement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and when it failed, tried to destroy the Japanese movement. Then, from 1972 on, the Chinese leadership has
openly supported the presence in Japan of the U.S. armed forces and nuclear weapons, and has gone so far as to speak in support of the Japan-U.S. military treaty, and to encourage the revival of Japanese militarism. From 1975, the Chinese leadership sent a military advisory group to the Pol Pot faction in Cambodia, and directed them in their aggression against Vietnam. In February 1979, the Chinese leadership was guilty of aggression against Vietnam, invading that country with forces numbering some six hundred thousand, with a record of brutal war crimes. In October 1979 I visited the northern part of Vietnam and saw for myself the irrefutable evidence of the atrocities perpetrated by the Chinese forces. In November 1979, the Chinese leadership was still crying out for what they call the “repunishment” of Vietnam, with repeated acts of provocation being committed against Vietnam. In an article published in the October 1979 issue of the monthly *Hongqi*, the Chinese Defense Minister, Xu Xianquian, apparently with Vietnam in mind, said, “We have to prepare ourselves for a sudden, and large-scale outbreak of war, and further for an outbreak of nuclear war” (emphasis added). For the first time in the history of Chinese nuclear policy, no mention is made of the hitherto declared Chinese principle of non-first-nuclear-strike. Such a policy of the Chinese leadership is obviously hostile to the movement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. For a detailed analysis of the social basis of China’s big power hegemonism and of Pol Pot’s genocidal policy, and presenting the case for Vietnam’s just assistance to the Cambodian people, see the article referred to in note (2), and a sequel in No. 37 (September 1979).