DISCUSSION PROPOSAL, 1980

A JOINT STUDY MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY (UNU) AND THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE SCIENCE, HIROSHIMA UNIVERSITY (IPSHU) ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT—MODERNIZATION AND MILITARIZATION: A SUMMARY OF REPORTS AND DISCUSSION: AS STARTING MATERIALS FOR FUTURE PLANS.

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Foreword

From January 29 through 30 (Tuesday and Wednesday), 1980, a joint study meeting of the United Nations University and the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University (IPSHU) was held at the former's headquarters. Focusing its interest on the theme of "Peace and Development — Modernization and Militarization", the meeting was arranged in connection with the UNU's Human and Social Development (HSD) Programme. The IPSHU was the only Japanese research body which had participated in the Project on "Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development" (GPID)' constituting a part of the HSD Programme, and had held the position of responsible unit for its subproject on "Militarizarion". The paper reporting on this subtheme was Hiroharu Seki, "Global Militarization and Its Remedy" (HSDPGPID-11/UNUP-63). On its basis, at first a small workshop to discuss this topic was held in Tokyo on July 20, 1979, and then, from October 10 through 12, the first symposium on "Peace and Development" took place at the IPSHU under its joint auspices with the UNU. All of the papers presented at the meetings

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had their own positions in the GPID’s subproject on “Militarization”, though the October 10-13 symposium was integrated with the IPSHU’s work on another project of the HSD, “Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World” (SCA), in which the institute had also taken part. The recent joint study meeting was further expanded in scope in an attempt to answer the question of how to incorporate peace study into the overall framework of the HSD Programme. At least, firstly, it was intended as a step in the process to put together preliminary information. Secondly, it provided the first opportunity to expand and deepen channels of intercourse between the UNU’s and related Japanese projects through debating with leading peace researchers in Japan. It is therefore considered to have made important contributions to the future development of the relationship between the UNU and the academic community of Japan.

To make supplementary comments of the programme of this study meeting (see Reference 1), Mr. Rajni Kothari originally listed for Session I was compelled by unavoidable circumstances to go back to his country earlier than scheduled and accordingly to be absent, and instead Mr. Kinhide Mushakohi, vicerector of the UNU, presented a report. Mr. Hideo Uchiyama listed for Session 2 was also unable to attend the meeting on account of his illness and Mr. Takeshi Ishida reported in his place. Mr. Shoichi Yamashita replaced Mr. Makoto Kitanishi as chairman of Session 3, and Mr. Ishida, who was to report in Session 2, was relieved of his responsibility as descussant in Session 4.

Opening Addresses

In his opening address as director of the IPSHU, Prof. Ohtori Kurino commented on the relationship between the research projects of his institute and those of the UNU since the establishment of the IPSHU, saying, the aim of last year’s symposium on “Peace and Development” consisted in the pursuit of development system in which peace and development could converge
together in a broader perspective. He added that the joint study meeting was positioned on the extension of the previous research projects of the institute. If the meeting was to inquire into the problem of "Modernization and Militarization" in this context, the interest of its participants should be focused on the aspect of how to overcome the past history of modernization in which militarization had advanced in spite of the progress of modernization, he concluded. The IPSHU director thus proposed that the syndrome of "militarization despite modernization", rather than "modernization and militarization", should be precisely diagnosed and remedied.

Then Mr. Mushakoji gave his opening address, in which he stated that the UNU had come to a turning point and explained that, while two philosophies were competing with each other in the university's projects, one focusing its interest on technology transfers and the other urging arrangement of opportunities for dialogues between different paradigms, the HSD Programme laid stress on the latter and had launched five projects in that connection. The UNU's vice-rector further pointed out that, to the future work of his university on the question of "Peace and Disarmament" as one of its major research themes, dialogues at the joint study meeting, in which mainly Japanese researchers were scheduled to participate, might contribute useful views to refer to.

Session 1: Policy Science and Peace Study

Moderator – Hiroharu Seki

The first report was presented by Mr. Akira Tezuka of Saitama University. In his report entitled "Premises of Policy Science concerning Peace Study", Mr. Tezuka pointed out that, to promote peace study projects, it would be necessary; first, to make peace study a practically useful science instead of an art of manipulating empty theories; second, as a matter of cultural tradition, to keep it independent from politics and, in its relationship
to state power, to have it assume limited responsibilities on give-and-take basis, and third, to objectively observe military situations so that civilian control over armed forces, as groups competing in scientific and technological potentials, could be considered in more specific terms. For peace study to be pursued as a branch of policy science, the policies of the Japanese Government have to be cleared of their ambiguity and instead to be spelled out in precise concepts, Mr. Tezuka said. According to the first reporter, clarification of contradictions and conflicts between different policy alternatives should start from recognizing the presence of three different prototypes of peace policies, i.e. those of the world government pattern, Leviathan pattern and balance-of-power pattern. However, he said, the pacifism of the UNESCO pattern did not permit any medium or short term approach in an actual peace-seeking policy, which should stem from accurate understanding of policies currently taken. Hence inevitably comes the need for civilian control as instrument of peace policy as a medium or short term requirement from the standpoint of policy science. The most important aspects, Mr. Tezuka emphasized, were that civilian control should be a policy making capability involving a moment which was in conflict with armed forces and could even deny their existence and that the control capability of a civilian government should apply not only to the armed forces of its own country but also to those of its allies. In other words, as a matter of medium or short term policy, civilian control is meaningless unless it can compromise the external strategy of one nation and those of its allies where they come into contact with each other. It is for this reason that qualitative improvement in informational setups is called for, the reporter concluded.

The second reporter was Mr. Kinhide Mushakoji, speaking on “the Long Term Perspective of Policy Science”. As already stated, Mr. Rajni Kothari of India was supposed to report on this topic according to the initial programme, but Mr. Mushakoji took his place on account of his return to India.
ahead of the schedule. Referring to the propositions by Leontief and The Club of Rome on forecasting, planning and assessment as examples, the UNU vice-rector pointed out that policy science at the international level had emerged from criticisms of realities taken up in policy science at the national level. Recalling that forecasting in policy science at the local level led to proposing the concept of “civil minimum”, he urged the need for a meta-policy science which would elucidate the basic structure of policy science. He classified the ideal types of policy science which would emerge therefrom into the $\alpha$ type, which is traditional, bureaucratic, concentrative, vertically oriented and large in scale, and the $\beta$ type, which identifying itself with the people, attaches greater importance to horizontal relations and is small in scale. The $\alpha$-type policy science, characterized by its technocratic orientation, stands on the height of industrial development and subscribes to transcendentalism, means-to-end rationalism and operationalism. It tries to define everything in terms of planning subject, target and model, but it has its own limits which its very principles impose. Then, firstly, there arises the need to feed back the target by introducing a cybernetic way of thinking; secondly, the introduction of linguistics results in the transfer of interest to structuralism and generative grammar, and thirdly, it becomes inevitable to accept propositions of discontinuous changes based on the catastrophe theory in mathematics or the concept of fuzzy set. If it comes as far as to this point, there will be no wonder that the $\beta$ type emerge as another ideal pattern of policy science. The $\beta$ type from the outset subscribes to the existential view of man as a new norm of behavior, stands on ecology as a new view of nature and develops dialectic logic in a new view of society. Therefore, based on a pluralistic view of paradigms, it attaches importance to learning from one another and tries to overcome the tense relationship between the subject and object through dialogues. It is for this reason that positivism and criticism are combined to develop a critical
policy science, which then approaches political science which thinks about power and institutions, learns lessons from historical science which helps explicit recognition of periods of change and, based on a new view of technology, cooperates with natural science. After successively elucidating these aspects, the Mushakoji report emphasized the need for international collaboration for restructuring of policy science. The reporter concluded that this international collaboration would lead to restructuring of policy science for peace. He added that the right to live peacefully and peaceful coexistence constituted the basis for this restructuring.

The third report, entitled “Peace Study and Policies”, was delivered by Mr. Tadasu Kawata. Referring to the past controversy over whether peace study was a policy science or a critical science and to the demand, made in that connection, that it should be a positive empirical science, the Kawata report then stated that a consensus had been formed by now as to the character of peace study as an area of practical study for problem solution. An analogy was made to the circumstance that sciences on regional affairs and pollution needed practical experts. Further citing the suspicion raised by men of religion that, precisely because peace study should approach the problems of a huge international system which traditional sciences found too enormous to tackle, the vast dimensions and complexity of its objects might prevent peace from being scientifically studied, the report emphasized the need to explicitly define its teleological character manifested by its use of value-oriented approaches. However, the development of academic study on peace has given rise to the necessity for policy proposals and for a channel connecting it to the policy making process. But it is exactly at this point that the degeneration of peace study can begin. Peace study, which can not serve the military interest of a specific nation, inevitably has to set its focus on world interest and consequently requires contact with the United Nations. Eventually peace study should be a critical policy science to correct
conventional images, and accordingly there arises the need for peace educa-
tion to influence future policy makers. It deserves particular mention that
peace study has recently come to be recognized in the framework of a peace
study campaign. Nevertheless peace study remains a positive empirical
science as well, and as such it differs from both peace movements and peace
education, Mr. Kawata concluded.

During the debate, Mr. Naoya Nakagawa at first spoke up, saying, both
peace study and policy science should respond to the call for firstly independ-
ence, secondly plurality and thirdly expansion in living space. At the oppo-
site pole to the concept of plurality, cited secondly, is the priority principle.
However, basic research, in which no one can predict what will emerge where,
indispensably requires pluralistic orientation. As regards the third aspect,
living space can be expanded in many different ways, and this will be taken
as a problem of social entropy, Mr. Nakagawa predicted. Then Mr. Mineo
Nakajima questioned the unintelligibility of the UNU which he attributed
to its anti-Western, anti-modern character, and suspected that peace study
had avoided intellectual controversies. Asking why wars would readily break
out in Asia unlike in Europe where negotiations were still practicable even
when international tension was mounting, he pointed out the need for combi-
nation of policy science and peace studies with area study in considering a
system of peace. For these reasons, Mr. Nakajima urged that peace study
should not escape into the coziness of the inner group, but should seek free
exchanges of views through scholarly discussions. In the context of the
stresses placed on the pluralistic orientation of peace study by Mr. Nakagawa
with respect to its meaning and by Mr. Nakazima with regard to its contents,
a third discussant, Mr. Yasuhiro Maeda, emphasized that peace policy and
peace study should also have a pluralistic level because neither positive
peace nor negative peace could be singularly defined. He further argued:
The objectives of peace policy should therefore be clearly defined, but this
task was complicated by the need for distinction between superior and inferior objectives, between popular and controlling levels, between states of affairs and institutions; while he would prefer the term pluralistic policy science to the B type policy science, inquiries into peace inevitably called for intellectual integration of natural science, social science and humanities.

Responding to these propositions by the discussants, Mr. Tezuka added a comment that clarification of contradictions in, the means rather than the objectives, of peace policy had been demanded. Then Mr. Mushakoji pointed out that advocates of pluralism should be prepared to meet a criticism that pluralism was tantamount to intellectual equi-distance diplomacy, that the inner-circle fellow feeling should be overcome at the international level, too, that peace policy should also be considered outside the framework of the traditional Western set of rules and that, as long as distinction was made between popular and controlling levels, dialogues would also be required between researchers and the general public. Mr. Kawata said peace study, as far as the Peace Studies Association of Japan was concerned, had maintained and developed its character as strict science, and stressed that the Association had achieved a greater than expected development unlike the Japan Society of Futurology. A general impression of this debate was that the limitation of time prevented statements by different participants from coming into phase with one another. In this context, the discussion over the meeting points between policy science and peace study, including that over the contacts with them and area study, will have to be continued. Inquiries should desirably be made into the possibility for the Ministry of Education to sponsor a specific research project in this direction, which could cover a general theory on intellectual sociology relating these three disciplines with each other, together with pertinent case studies. The UNU, too, should promote research projects through international collaboration, covering specific individual cases of study on disarmament, science and technology policy, solution of disputes
and combinations of these areas as well as more general transdisciplinary methodology and epistemology. Every one of these disciplines, area study, policy science and peace study, having an interdisciplinary character, has from the outset endeavored to transcend the established fields of specialized study and expand its own realm of inquiry. It should not be denied, however, that every one of them had reached a stage, with the founding of the UNU, where it should form a new perspective of research. Thus area study had taken on a new meaning as a constituent element of intellectual information transfers in the world, centering around the UNU; policy science has acquire a possibility of developing from the national to the global level, and peace study, too, has opened a new perspective of coming closer to policy science through institutionalization at the international level though it may retain its traditional character of a critical science.

Session 2: Modernization and Militarization

Moderator: Sakio Takayanagi

The first report was presented by Mr. Takeshi Ishida in place of Mr. Hideo Uchiyama. Mr. Ishida changed his theme from “Comparative Political Science of Modernization and Militarization”, which Mr. Uchiyama had planned to report on, to “Symbols and Organizations of Modernization and Militarization”, and elucidated from the viewpoint of “symbols and organizations of presentday politics” how the symbol with which militarization is organized differed from one culture to another. In this elucidation, Mr. Ishida presented as his main proposition the comparison of symbols and organizations of militarization in the modernization process between cultures based on the universal ideas of absolute monotheisms and those of a pattern in which values are immanent in the groups constituting the cultures. First it was pointed out that in an absolutely monotheic culture (the traditional Jewish-Christian or Islamic world), because values are accept-
ed in a form transcending the secular order, there arose a demand to promote militarization for holy, and consequently righteous, wars, but there also was a need for the position to control wars, based on universal values. For a culture of the value immanent pattern, there can be no holy war and militarization tends to proceed without conscious intention for a holy war. This culture rarely fights for justice and is conservative and realistic, but once militarization begins therein, there is nothing to hold it in check, Mr. Ishida said. However, formal model building in peace study, if it is allowed to develop by its own force too far, will turn into universalism without different cultures. In this sense, it is necessary to attempt multiple approaches in culture comparison, which is made in relative terms, and thereby discover common elements to different cultures. Thus formal model building should be regarded as nothing more than a provisional means of acquiring knowledge. Any attempt, to overcome cultural relativism too hastily by formal model building the provisional nature of formal model building would ignore problematic aspects of culture and therefore undeniably involve the danger of relating one society to another merely by external common features. On the other hand attempts to absolutize culture comparison by cosmology include one to position human rights in the context of religious and cultural traditions, but this makes the assertion of human rights totally meaningless. The same applies to the concept of peace. Thus content analysis would be required to compare the actual functions of culture as a means to facilitate dialogues between different cultures. Then quoting a treatise by Mr. Michitoshi Takabatake on “Movements and Resistance” (Part 1) in State and Society in the Age of Fascism, 6, the Ishida report introduced a view that the Japanese version of fascism was better comparable to the authoritarian regimes of some developing nations than the German or Italian model. As aspects to endorse this comparison, first the strong nationalism of late developing countries and second their extreme forms of anti-communist posi-
tion and consciousness of external threats were referred to. In Japan, integration from above by the military and bureaucracy, incorporating renovative features of national socialism, took the form of organizing primary groups all-inclusively, and succeeded in putting together mass movements under their control. There was formed a carte blanche type of leadership, granting privileges to traditional leaders. Although the same process generally took place in the developing countries of postwar Asia, integration met obstacles where it involved ethnic minorities (e.g. Marcos versus Islam), or transcendental religions, staging supranational resistances (e.g. Christianity in South Korea and Islam versus Pahlevi), tried to frustrate authoritarian integrations. However, once a new force comes to power, there is again no guarantee that it will not militarize itself. Mr. Ishida further reported that in postwar Japan, in spite of the development of the check-and-balance function under pluralistic democracy, all-inclusive integration of primary groups still remained and overlapped and strengthened the oligopoly which constitutes the core around which pressure groups are formed. Ezra Vogel's admiration of this setup in his Japan as No. 1 involves a serious problem. In Japan, if the aforementioned mixed characteristics establish themselves in a vicious direction, they may lead to gradual formation of a military-industrial complex. If this trend intensifies, they may be kept unbroken and all-inclusively placed under the traditional leadership, resulting in the formation of a military-dominated system. To sum up in a few words, the Ishida report attempted a penetrating analysis in which propositions based on cultural characteristics were linked with characteristics of power structure.

The second reporter was Mr. Samon Kimbara, speaking on "Critical Review of the Modernization Theory". The Kimbara report first pointed out the paradigms of the modernization theory applicable to the 1930–1960 decades differed from those to the 1960s and subsequent years. However, as the theory focused on continuous changes stemming from a scientific re-
volution, the problem of militarization as a general facet of the modernization process was hidden behind. In Black’s Dynamics of Modernization (1966) as well, there was raised the problem of how to suppress violence out of control when it became impossible to control violence as an inhibitory factor to modernization. Thus the modernization became unpopular on the one hand, and on the other it came to require restructuring. In 1969, as the Japan—U.S. Security Treaty reemerged as a controversial topic, economic cooperation became a subject of discussion in the context of security in Asia. While modifying itself in this process, the modernization theory underwent an attempt to adapt it to the 1970s. the Kimbara report pointed out. For instance, while the Shimoda conference of 1969 prepared a statement advocating automatic extension of the Security Treaty or elimination of the danger involved in it, a scenario was written for militarization of a new modernized pattern, and there emerged a generation having no concern for the Security Treaty. Meanwhile in the consciousness pattern of the average Japanese, coexistence was observed between antagonisms to industrialization, development projects and long monopoly of administrative power by the conservative party on the one hand and, on the other, tacit acceptance of the Security Treaty setup and wishes for retention of a high standard of living (middle-class consciousness) and vested economic interests. However, at the prefectural and municipal levels, the awareness of constitutional rights has taken root in people’s minds with increasing expectation of and interest in local autonomoy and participation in public affairs, suggesting a growing possibility of a switch to a new set of values attaching central importance to human development. It has also come to be considered necessary to write a scenario for present-day Japan with primary emphasis on environment, human rights and peace through reconfirmation of the functions of the Peace Constitution.

The third report, entitled “Validity of the Japanese Model”, by Mr.
Ryuhei Hatsuse grasps the Japanese model as the modernization model of Japan, sees modernization in three aspects—technological innovation and industrialization, organization of human relations and social generalization of values—and further understand modernization in its entirety. However, Mr. Hatsuse questioned, when one spoke of the Japanese model, in what aspect, to what nation and in what sense Japan, again of what age, could provide a model. Presupposing this question, the Hatsuse report is accompanied by a list of past works on pertinent subjects. To take postwar Japan as example, it is generally pointed out that the smaller the military expenditure (non-military value), the greater the extent of popular participation and the greater the value attached to equality (egalitarian value), the more effective will be the model. While the synergetic effects of the $\alpha$ and $\beta$ patterns of modernization would be sought in a model, for future Japan, such specific guidelines for actions were proposed as ability to cooperate in the modernization of other nations, abstention from bringing military tension into international relations, and refraining from extending economic aid to undemocratic governments of other countries and from assisting societies where modernization could penetrate only limited parts of them.

During the discussion, first Mr. Keiichi Matsushita said, while he had spoken from the viewpoint of coupling of policy science and military sociology at the Hiroshima University symposium in October, this time he would turn his attention to the relationship between modernization and militarization, and emphasized the need to historically look at modernization as a metahistorical concept. Broadly dividing the history of modernization into three phases—the first phase mainly covering Western Europe, the second taking place from the latter half of the 19th century to the 20th (Germany, Japan and Russia), and the third coming after World War II—Mr. Matsushita said, as industrialization and democratization had brought about massive maturing of people as citizens, controversies over the conflict between
capitalist and socialist regimes since the organization of Comintern had also assumed relative viewpoints, as endorsed by Stalin's references to communism plus electrification or communism plus American efficiency. On the other hand, however, uneven development on a global basis, relativity of culture and different ways in which industrialization and democratization are linked give rise to major differences in pattern and dimensions of modernization from nation to nation and from region to region. There further arises, from the double-structure facet of modernization, the problem that government tends to become authoritarian, and in the third phase of modernization emerges the important role of bureaucracy in place of the military. Then, the reverse functions of modernization, including those providing an industrial basis for militarization, polluting environment and manipulating the masses, together with the reverse functions of democratization working through those of desires, invite globalization of local disputes along with the acceleration of interdependence between nations. Thus how to solve these problems has become a major point of controversy. It is for this reason that, when applying the metahistorical concept of modernization to Japan, reorganization of the idea of state inevitably has to be considered. In this age when the conservatives and progressives have completely exchanged their positions in the measure of closed character, Japan is strongly urged to internationalize and decentralize itself in terms of politics, economy and way of life. Mr. Matsushita emphasized the oil problem should be considered as a matter of choosing a way of life, instead of in a military context.

Citing an Indian example, Mr. Toshikazu Mori took up the problem of way of life pre-industrialization India had been faced with. Further discussing the roles of bureaucracy and nationalism in the modernization process, he also touched on the emerging possibility of considering national integration not just as a problem of nation states but in the framework of global politics.
Then Mr. John Welfield presented a criticism that it was a narrow way of thinking to view the modernization of South Korea and Taiwan separately from the problems of Japan as something unrelated to the modernization of Japan.

He was followed by Mr. Mushakoji, who made a supplementary remark that the authoritarian integration of Japan was a policy of the α type as in the case of the present—day Third World. Even in Japan’s historical experience, there also was β type policy science at work from below, which sometimes took the form of physiocratic movement. The UNU, advocating modernization based on pluralistic principles, should have much to learn from a system which would break up double structure from underneath.

Mr. Tezuka said that, because of the absence of an intellectual tradition to separate religion from politics unlike in the Christian world, the separation of religion, learning and politics was metaphistorically unstable in Japan. Mr. Ishida said he would not like to use the modernization model where the international environment and domestic conditions were different and it would be sufficient only to clarify both positive and negative aspects of lessons from the Japanese experience. It would further be desirable to make clear what welcome and unwelcome results emerged from modernization, he added. Mr. Ishida explained the reason for his argument in this way: Like conditions would certainly give like results, but Japan was never transformed by its own force; while Japan’s authoritarian integration was torn apart by the Allied Occupation Forces, history of Japan has never seen any authoritarian integration broken up by an inherent force. Mr. Kimbara said that the objective to be sought from now on was to achieve self—sustained growth, which would require firstly fostering of indigenous local industries even under the pressures of multinational corporations, secondly strengthening of self—governing capabilities through prescription of civil minimum, and thirdly increasing the influence of education for horizontal cooperation, instead
of vertical domination, along with the disintegration of primary groups.

In reply to the criticism by Mr. Welfield that international links seemed to be belittled, Mr. Hatsuse said militarization of nations around Japan was less unwelcome than militarization involving Japan as well.

Mr. Kawata pointed out that the present-day world had not yet been cleared of double structure, as questioned on the occasion of the Special General Assembly of the UN on Resources, and that a problem lay in the structure in which industrialization rather intensified, instead of reducing, subordination.

Mr. Matsushita maintained that ours was an age in which the ways of industrialization and democratization should be recomposed, and this recomposition required reorganization of democracy at the community level by means of appropriate technology, not by means of big technology. As there has emerged a possibility for nations involved in the third phase of modernization to achieve industrialization and democratization through mutual intercourse, attainment of peace on a global basis no longer needs the stale concept of modernization, he said.

Then Mr. Masayoshi Kakitsubo of the Disarmament Center informed the other participants of a three-part disarmament research project financed with a fund of $6,000,000 donated by Scandinavian nations. The first part is an analysis of the resources and technology currently put into armament, the second estimates the likely cost of disarmament to economy, and the third figures out how much of the money saved by disarmament could be diverted to economic development, he said. Mr. Kakitsubo deplored that no Japanese scholar took part in the research project.

The discussion summarized above failed to fully clarify the various aspects of interrelationship between the problems of modernization and militarization. A reporter warned against easy linking of modernization and militarization, but he did not explicitly state what kind of linking was easy
or what kind of linking was non–easy; Mr. Kurino spoke on “militarization in spite of modernization”, Mr. Hatsuse on “non military development of the central part accompanied by militarization of peripheral areas”, Mr. Matsushita on the “reverse functions of modernization” and Mr. Tezuka on “separation of modernization and militarization”, but none of them attempted systems analysis of mutual relationship between modernization and militarization. At any rate, military dictatorships in today’s developing countries are increasingly oriented toward linking of industrialization and militarization in its undesirable form, and it is inconceivable that this trend is unrelated to the militarization of international systems. How can they be separated from each other, theoretically and as a matter of policy? It seems that the Japanese model should have been evaluated from this point of view. Perhaps here lies a limit to the approaches by method of comparative politics. Anyhow, the discussion appears to have implicitly revealed that, unless the problems of the relationship between nation states building and international structures are brought in, no satisfactory answer can be obtained on the links between the two.

Session 3: Thought and Realities of Militarization

Moderator: Shoichi Yamashita

The first report was given by Mr. Yuji Mori on the “Structure of a Militarized Society—National Mobilization Setup”. Focusing on Showa Kenkyukai, the brain trust of prewar Prime Minister Konoe, the Mori report analyzed the relationship between rationality and irrationality in the thought which constituted the basis of policy making under the national mobilization setup. Within that group, attempts were made to assess and forecast military potentials, and proposals were made on how to resolve the blocked–up state of the Japanese society. However, rational and irrational ways of thinking coexisted completely independent of each other in the process of
policy making. Thus in the analysis of the wartime ideological and cultural situation by Kiyoshi Miki, who was one of the key personalities of the group, published in his "Ideological Principles of New Japan", the inseparability between the solution of the "Sino-Japanese Incident" and the domestic reforms of Japan was well recognized. He was in favor of totalitarianism, nationalism, Japanism, cooperativism and familism, but was antagonistic to communism and San-min Chu-i (the Three Principles of the People). He nevertheless pointed out the importance of the ideologies to which he expressed antagonism. Here is found Miki's implied resistance. Although he deliberately talked about cooperativism, magnanimity and down-to-earth practicality or subjectivity as characteristics of the Japanese culture, but these are almost meaningless references, suggesting his submission to the aforementioned irrational logic. His writing are characterized by the coexistence of these irrational expressions with more rational analyses. To make an analogy to an atomic model having one orbit of rationality and the other of irrationality, at a point he suddenly transfers from one orbit to the other.

![Diagram: Rationality and Irrationality]

Miki speaks in different expressions to intellectuals and to the general public, though. For example in his lecture in 1941 at School of Science, the Osaka University, one of the foremost scientific research centers in those days, he strongly urged thorough adherence to the positivist spirit of modern science.

The second reporter was Mr. Makoto Iokibe speaking on the "Political Consciousness of the Japanese regarding Military Affairs". Putting together in a time series the findings of various public opinion polls in the past, the Iokibe report stated that the negative attitude of the Japanese toward war was clearly demonstrated by the overall results of these surveys in three aspect: disarmed neutrality, opposition to rearmament through amendment
of the Constitution, and economism.

The third report was presented by Mr. Shingo Fukushima on "Militarization and Civilian Control". First pointing out that present-day militarization was essentially different to the Prussian militarism in 1890-1895, and then statistically tracing the historical changes in military expenditure and strength of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Mr. Fukushima stated that the U.S. in 1970 had been overloaded with its overseas stationing of 1.2 million troops at 227 military bases in 119 countries. Next looking back on the history of civilian control over the military in the U.A. since its founding, the reporter said that actually the President had had merely the supreme command over the armed forces but there had been neither effort to exercise nor argument over civilian control. During the Vietnam War, the congress was misled by deceptive information from the military, and it was only after public opinion changed and was aroused that the U.S. was able to withdraw troops from Vietnam. Thus civilian control cannot be dispensed with but it alone is no guarantee, Mr. Fukushima maintained. Postwar Japan remained unarmed for five years, and even now it is not yet militaristic. The problem is that militarization is nevertheless proceeding in Japan, the reporter said. Referring to the Nazis' Reichwehr, he pointed out that at first there had been a political intrigue to conceal secret rearmament from the public eye and, once they succeeded, the military was no longer controllable by the government. Japan's civilian control, too, is doomed to failure if it is used to conceal the violation of Article 9 of the Constitution, Mr Fukushima concluded.

During the discussion, first Mr. Masahide Ohta from Okinawa said that it was meaningless to talk about the militarization of Japan without taking into account the question of Okinawa and that what really mattered with the structure of a militarized society was not armament itself but the social change resulting from armament. To speak specifically about Okinawa,
uneared incomes from military bases changed the mentalities of people. U.S. military bases anywhere in the world constitute separate communities from the local indigenous ones, but the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have deliberately changed this situation. In thinking about the problems of peace and development, Japanese scholars should try not only the $\alpha$ type but also the $\beta$ type approach, Mr. Ohta emphasized. Then Mr. Michitoshi Takabatake said one of the weak points of public opinion polls was that they arrange various responses merely as so many phenomena. However, as the political party a voter supports and his consciousness are usually in agreement, what medium or media he comes into contact with in a group is an important point, Mr. Takabatake pointed out. Changes in political consciousness cannot be adequately understood without taking into consideration both the movement itself and the subject who executes the movement. The recent swing of public opinion toward the conservatives is closely related to the decline in the subjective capabilities of progressive parties, whose withdrawals from mass movements have affected the consciousness of the public. After referring to these points, Mr. Takabatake proposed that, in considering the problem of militarization or militarism, distinction should be made between three patterns: the first where, as in 19th century Germany, military values dominate; the second where armament is strengthened although military values do not dominate, and the third where, as in some present-day developing countries and prewar Japan, the military holds the political leadership. Pointing out that prewar Japan fell under the third pattern which applies to developing nations, Mr. Takabatake said it could as well be regarded as a case in which a rational productive force pattern eventually proved unsuccessful. Then to use an oval model, instead of the atomic one, in which one of the two cardinal points represents introduction of traditional values and the other, modernization, no thorough insistence would be possible either on rationality or irrationality. Thus Mr. Yuji Mori's onion-like
atomic model better applies to nations of the European pattern, Mr. Takabatake said. He added that Kiyoshi Miki as a member of Konoe’s brain trust, tried to develop a theory on how to fill the gaps in the community theory, and that the renovationism of the military would be clearly positioned if the relationship of populism versus the military and bureaucracy was taken on the axis of ordinate and that between status quo and reformation or renovation, on the axis of abscissa. Here lies the reason why there was formed the military—directed renovation pattern in antagonism to Anglo—American imperialism. Thus Mr. Takabatake argued that the Japanese model, which was not a simple model of militarism, had set a precedent to postwar developing nations. This argument is in agreement with the idea of Tetsuo Nazita expressed in his recent writings, Mr. Takabatake added.

The Takabatake model:

To supplement the views so far expressed, Mr. Fukushima said, although McNamara had been eventually unable to control the military, his experience posed the problem of whether or not the McNamara formula could prove relatively effective in Japan. Mr. Fukushima further said that McNamara had tried to cope with the old—fashioned ideas of the Defense Department with military rationalism, instead of political rationalism, and that in the Soviet Union, too, political leaders were unable to control this military rationalism because of the advanced differentiation of technical functions in the country. Thus present—day arguments on militarization cannot help demanding more extensive and comprehensive dialogues, but, because the difficulty of civilian control consists in the very size of the military budget, any success in civilian control is conceivable by no other way than reducing troops and the
military budget, he concluded. Mr. Iokibe, referring to Okinawa, said that the U.S. military insisted on maintaining its bases on the islands out of security considerations although the State Department was against keeping them, and that the Emperor’s message was merely used as an excuse. In other words, even without the Emperor’s message, the military’s will alone could decide non-militarization of mainland Japan at the sacrifice of Okinawa, Mr. Iokibe thinks.

Based on his practical experience as diplomat, Mr. Kurino said the prewar combination of rationality and irrationality had not changed after the war.

Although all pointing out important problems, the views expressed in this session were still inadequate to give a broad outlook of the present-day question of militarization. Thus from now on, it will become particularly important to assess how international environment has changed for the militarization of the Third World, or to single out the structural aspect in the international context. This point cannot help leaving the same dissatisfaction, as a problem left untouched on in the discussion of “Comparative Politics on Modernization and Militarization”.

Session 4: Global Militarization and Its Process
— Toward Demilitarized World —

Moderator: Ohtori Kurino

The first report was presented by Mr. Tsubin Takahashi on “Militarization as Viewed in the Light of East-West Relations”. Well coordinating his viewpoints partly based on his own experience in foreign service, Mr. Takahashi gave an interesting report on and inside history of the armament race. He first pointed out that what takes place in the Foreign Ministry was “decision emerging”, instead of “decision making”. Then he referred to the irony that the relative superiority or inferiority in nuclear potentials as a
result of SALT could not be truly determined without actually fighting a war and, in discussion whether disarmament was realistically possible, he introduced an episode that the Soviet Union initially had asked what arms control was all about. Mr. Takahashi said that the argument of whether armament or peace should come first was like asking whether the egg or the hen came first and that, although one might feel hopeless because of the difficulty of disarmament, it was possible that one day the way was suddenly opened to disarmament; therefore efforts should be patiently continued.

The second report, made by Mr. Jun Nishikawa, concerned "Militarization as Viewed in the Light of North–South Relations". The Nishikawa report successively touched on, firstly, the current situation of militarization in the Third World; secondly, its consequences, and thirdly, the way to demilitarization in the Third World. Succinctly analyzing the expansions of armament in numerical terms, the report pointed out that, as the growths of military expenditure by developing nations had reached an alarming level, such expenditures were greater in areas of violent international disputes and in larger nations of the Third World, which had turned subimperialistic. Nevertheless, only a few of them are militarily independent, and the increases in their military expenditures have rather invited their greater subordination to superpowers. The progress of militarization is attributed to the North–South gap and to the belief that militarization contributes to economic development. The report revealed, from the viewpoints of doubts about security, economic effect, productive effect and militarization of politics, that these factors could not justify expansions of armament. After analyzing nuclear development endeavors in the Third World, Mr. Nishikawa stated that militarization had resulted in expanded armament in the Third World, retarded economic development in these nations and changes in power structure within the Third World. He also referred to resistance to militarization, exemplified by the holding of the U.N. Special General Assembly on Disarma-
ment. Finally touching on prospects of disarmament, the reporter attached importance to cooperation among advanced nations for a new international economic order to narrow the North-South gap, solution of South-South problems through the relief of the poor in the South, restrictions on arms exports and decentralization of military-industrial complexes in individual countries. In Japan, specifically, high priorities should be given, in the list of strategies for peace, legislation of the three-point non-nuclear principle and establishment, followed by observance, of another three-point principle to prohibit arms exports. The Nishikawa report further emphasized the need for the U.N. Disarmament Center to establish its monitoring center in Asia and for the UNESCO to set up a peace information center in a place like Hiroshima, both to facilitate communication among peace researchers.

The third reporter was Mr. yoshikazu Sakamoto, speaking on "the Perspective of Disarmament". In his report, Mr. Sakamoto said that the crisis which he had anticipated in the mid-1980s because of a strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the aggravation of the resources problem had come earlier than expected and that, for this reason, he would look back on the historical perspective of militarization instead of talking about the future. First, to match the process of militarization since the beginning of the modern era with that of the formation of indigenous capitals in each society, the reporter divided each of the two basic categories, capitalist and socialist nations, into four chronological phases—the first half of the 1800s, from 1860 on, from 1945 on and from 1975 on—and put together these divisions into a 2x4 matrix as shown in the following table.
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Based on this table, the Sakamoto report explained by the theory of uneven development depending on the take-off lead time (TOLT) why typical examples of classical militarization in the 20th century had manifested themselves in Germany, Japan, and Italy. The expansion and proliferation of armament in modern times has been related to the historical dynamics of politico-economical development, but can never be an isolated, automatic process by itself. As a result of their defeat in the war, Japan, Germany and Italy were incorporated into Category I. Nations of Category I have inherent potentials to become big military powers without classical militarization. These nations have capabilities to build up empires by economic means, and their military force is used far more often than not for external
purposes, in contrast to the nations of Category II, which build up empires in the "enrich and strengthen the nation" fashion and whose military force is intended for not only external but also, though on a secondary basis, internal use. Those of Category III tend to militarize themselves without becoming big military powers. The militarization of their political systems precede the build-up of their military strength, and they are inclined toward sub-imperialism. Their military force is internally oriented, and used externally only on a secondary basis. Category V is blank, to which no nations belong, because in no nation the development of socialist economy followed the development pattern of early capitalism, according to the Sakamoto report. In a global perspective, this resulted in the most serious manifestation of the serious trend of uneven development. Categories I, II and VI include nations which achieved their take-offs through empire building. This version of imperialism is a modern form of imperialism, and differs from the early pattern of imperialism in structural dynamics. Categories III, IV, VII and VIII include nations which were subjected to extensive colonial rule by modern imperialist powers. It has to be noted here that Category II, which represents classical militarism, includes all the Axis countries in World War II. These countries took off for industrialization later than early capitalist countries. This is a very interesting phenomenon in studying classical militarization, attributable to the endeavors of classically militaristic nations to catch up with early capitalist powers in a hurry in the growing process of the capitalist system. Consequently the former ran into armed collisions with the latter, as typically exemplified by the Second World War. It is for this reason that this armed collision, as viewed from the classical militarist side, was firstly against democracy, secondly against the Soviet Union and communism, and thirdly against the peoples of underdeveloped colonies. This means that, as explicitly stated in the Sakamoto report, the nations of Category II fought against both those of Categories I and VI and those of Categories III, IV,
VII and VIII. The Sakamoto report further points out that the nations of Category III, as they seek rapid economic growth, tend to maintain repressive domestic orders and to subordinate smaller, backward nations. However, it is more difficult for the nations of Category III than for those of Category II to build up empires. There moreover is a wide gap between Categories III and IV. Socialistic militarism, too, more readily develops under a system seeking rapid economic growth and imposing stringent domestic control. The tendency to employ troops and arms more for internal control than in external disputes grows from Category VI to VII and further to VIII. While nations which achieved capitalistic development of the Category II pattern experienced ersatz revolutions as a result of their defeat in World War II, and a question now is whether the same is thinkable about those of Categories III and IV. At any rate, how to achieve demilitarization should be considered from a normative point of view as a matter of reciprocal stimulation. Now turning the table by 90 degrees would give a vertical chart of what roughly corresponds to the international military order of today, in which the order of relative strategic strength is also represented. This vertical chart illustrates the asymmetrical relationship between the socialist bloc consisting of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the capitalist bloc with the NATO members as its core, according to the Sakamoto report. Whereas the catching-up process can take place from any level to another

in this chart, a crisis occurs not when a nation fails to catch up but when
one does catch up with another. However, unless catching-up takes place, there are established structural gaps and subordinations. Now, what constitute the core of this global military order are military—industrial—bureaucratic—academic complexes, and the processes of armament build-up at different levels can be summarized as follows: (1) At the military—industrial—bureaucratic—academic complex level, there proceeds militarization of research and development (R & D) activities, (2) at the level of U.S.—U.S. S.R. relations, horizontal expansion of nuclear armament, (3) in vertical relations below the U.S.—U.S.S.R. level, expansion of armament through arms exports, (4) in horizontal relations below that level, expansion of conventional armament, and (5) at the bottom level, there is imposed an authoritarian order. In loose correlations, militarization efforts at these five levels reinforce one another. To break up military—industrial—bureaucratic—academic complexes at Level 1 is very difficult unless there is some favorable change at Level 2. Changing the situation at Level 2 is impossible without U.S.—U.S.S.R. agreement on arms control, which, however, would be prevented by the factor of Level 1. Suppressing armament build-up at Level 3 would be difficult because, unless it is accompanied by curtailments at Levels 1 and 2, it would solidify structural gaps. Control on Level 4 alone without any change at Level 3 would again be impossible. Changes at Level 5 would be meaningful, but they, too, would be difficult because of what happens at Levels 3 and 4. Demilitarization will become increasingly difficult with the lapse of time because the links between different levels are strengthened. Demilitarization should be planned in a manner integrating all the five levels, the Sakamoto report concluded.

During the discussion, first Mr. Shuzo Kimura said study on military—industrial—bureaucratic—academic complexes should constitute the core of academic inquiries into militarization. According to Mr. Kimura, it has to be questioned whether the military—industrial—bureaucratic—academic
complexes are an inevitable consequence of capitalism, or a matter of bureaucratic organization, or a combination of both, or a matter of the structural strength of public opinion surrounding them. Whatever the answer is, any control on the self-multiplying mechanisms of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. armament expansions is made difficult by the unbelievably fast progress of technological breakthroughs. Techniques developed for non-military purposes often contribute to further militarization by, for instance, improving the aiming accuracy of MIRVs. Thus, as Herbert York pointed out, the problem of technology critique cannot help rising to the surface, Mr. Kimura concluded.

Then referring to the Takahashi report which revealed on the basis of the reporter's own experience, the difficulty of East-West disarmament, the Nishikawa report which summarized the multiple facets of the armament race in the Third World, and the Sakamoto report which developed a historical time lag theory on the arms race and, turning it 90 degrees, a vertical structure theory, Hiroharu Seki said all these reports seemed to stand on more or less pessimistic outlooks that demilitarization was virtually impossible. In this context, he wondered if the so-called balance-of-power theory, based on illusions, did not expect automatic attainment of peace on the extension of the present state of things. Investments in research on militarization are significantly smaller than those in study on cancer. Since the standards of positivist empirical study have considerably risen, as indicated by the presentations made during this joint study meeting, a substantial increase in research investments at the UNU level would give significant implications. Now is an age in which new critiques are needed on the current state of things including the recent reopening of the cold war, and in this sense peace study will not be successful unless its two aspects, that of critical science and that of policy science, are advanced in parallel, Seki maintained. He further argued that the causes of ongoing militarization at different levels
should be individually defined and coped with and multiple interlocking of these individual steps would be indispensable for successful demilitarization. He also said that, because the sovereignty of existing sovereign states seriously impeded interlocking of these individual remedies, ways to overcome this obstacle should be searched for. Firstly, the functional expansion of international exchanges has now made it an important task to develop these exchanges with peace study as their core. The UNU and peace research centers can play major roles in this task, and also peace science schools should be established in universities. Secondly, on the logical extension of the increasing importance now attached to local autonomy, foreign relations of local governments should be developed eventually to such an extent that the 47 prefectures or equivalents of Japan should all become members of the UN. Reforming the concept of sovereignty in this way, and establishing an order of peace in Japan, which would then be even more integrated than the European Community, and thereby setting a model to the rest of the world should be considered as a future possibility. Seki's conclusion can be summarized in these two points.

In response to these propositions, Mr. Nishikawa said that a structurally important aspect of demilitarization was now conceivable and that, because the Third World was increasingly self-reliant, controls on arms exports and greater efforts to establish a new international economic order would constitute the central tasks. The first thing Japan can do in this direction will be to confirm, and proliferate to surrounding nations, its three-point non-nuclear principle. As a supplementary comment, Mr. Sakamoto criticized Mr. Michitoshi Takabatake's "comparative politics of militarization", and said comparison of Japan before and during the war with developing nations like Mexico was to think about the matter only as a question of thoughts and ideologies but lacked a structural point of view. He further said whether or not to view the current situation in a pessimistic way was of secondary
importance, and firstly it would suffice to know specifically what difficulties there were in the execution of control. Secondly, Mr. Sakamoto did not mean that phenomena at different levels were so intricately interlocked as to forbid any effective action on them, but meant that it was necessary, after finding the limitation to thinking about demilitarization as a matter of grand strategy, to combine individual remedies in a structural context. Thirdly, to look at present-day currents, the problem of inflation is linked to the rise in price of oil supplied from the Middle East. Thus is demanded a solution in a way transcending the question of resources distributions in the 1950s and 1960s. In other words, after identifying the creators of resistive factors and locating the origins of forces to change the present state of things, and after confirming that current trends will not lead to solution of the problem, the network of interdependence can be strengthened at a different level from what has prevailed. For instance, although demands for equalization are endlessly emerging, militarization suppresses the demands, and militarization is promoted to defend vested interests. It would be useful to make clear these points, Mr. Sakamoto said.

While the discussion expanded involving the problems of the current situation among others, the central themes of this study meeting certainly were the question of militarization viewed from the standpoint of science of comparative politics and analysis of the same question in the context of the global dimensions structure of militarization has taken on. In this sense, to make an analogy to the comparison of clinical medicine and basic medicine, the discussion was closer in its orientation to basic medicine. Therefore it can be reasonably expected that the two day meeting would prove substantially the first step of intellectual collaboration in establishing a closer and more profound partnership between the UNU and Japanese universities. It may also have thereby prepared preliminary conditions for organizing such study projects in the world with the Japanese academic body playing a coordinating role.
PROGRAM
UNU-IPSHU STUDY MEETING ON HSD PROJECT
CONFERENCE HALL, UNU HEADQUARTERS
Jan. 29-30, 1980

THEME
PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT—MODERNIZATION AND MILITARIZATION

SCHEDULE
Morning, Jan. 29 (Tue) 10:00-12:00
Opening Address Ohtori KURINO (IPSHU)
Address by Kinhide MUSHAKOJI (vice rector, UNU)
SESSION I: Policy Science and Peace Research
speakers; Akira TEZUKA (Saitama Univ.) "Premises of Policy Science"
Kinhide MUSHAKOJI (UNU) "Long Term Perspective of Policy Science"
Tadashi KAWATA (Sophia Univ.) "Peace Research and Policies"
discussants; Naoya NAKAGAWA (Univ. of Electoro—Communication)
Yasuhiro MAEDA (Chiba Univ.)

Afternoon, Jan. 29 14:00-17:30
SESSION II: Modernization and Militarization
speakers; Takeshi ISHIDA (Tokyo Univ.) "Comparative Politics of Modernization
and Militarization"
Samon KIMBARA (Chuo Univ.) "Critical Reexamination of Modernization Theories"
Ryuhei HATSUSE (Kita-Kyushu Univ. and IPSHU)
"Validity of 'Japan Model'"
discussants; Keiichi MATSUSHITA (Hosei Univ.), Toshikazu MORI (IPSHU),
John WELFIELD (Griffith Univ., Australia, now staying at IPSHU)

Morning Jan. 30 (Wed) 10:00-12:30
SESSION III: Realities and Psychology of Militarization
(Actual Situation and Consciousness)
speakers; Yuji MORI (IPSHU) "Structure of Militaristic Society; National
Mobilization System"
Makoto IOKIBE (IPSHU) "Political Attitudes concerning Military Affairs in Post-war Japan"
Shingo FUKUSHIMA (Senshu Univ.) "Militarization and Civilian Control"
discussants; Masahide OHTA (Ryukyu Univ.), Michitoshi TAKABATAKE* (Riykkyo Univ.)

Afternoon, Jan. 30 14:00–17:30
SESSION IV: Discussion
speakers; Michitoshi TAKAHASHI (Kashima Peace Research Inst.)
“Militarization Seen from East-West Relations”
Jun NISHIKAWA (Waseda Univ.)
“Militarization Seen from North-South Relations”
Yoshikazu SAKAMOTO (Tokyo Univ.)
“Perspective for Demilitarization”
discussants; Shuzo KIMURA (Research Division, Committee for Foreign Affairs, House of Councilors)
Hiroharu SEKI (Tokyo Univ. and IPSHU)

Other Participants
Toru Yoshimura (Saitama Univ.), Yoshinobu YAMAMOTO (Saitama Univ.), Shoichi AMAMIYA (Ibaragi Univ.), Eiichi SATO (Japan Institute of Int’l Affairs), Masuo TOMIOKA (Kanagawa Univ.), Yuji MASUDA (Japan Society for the Promotion of Machine Industry), Junpei Kato (Japan International Cooperation Agency), Chihiro HOSOYA (Hitotsubashi Univ.),
researchers, research associates, guest researchers of IPSHU