

# **Nation-States, Peacebuilding and Global Society: Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism in the Contemporary Theory of State Sovereignty with Special Reference to the Discourse on the Responsibility to Protect<sup>i</sup>**

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## **1. Introduction**

This paper is intended to focus upon interactions among nationalism, regionalism and globalism from the perspective of “peacebuilding” especially for so-called “failed states.” In so doing, the paper aims to examine how the issue of peacebuilding illustrates the characteristic nature of the contemporary theory of state sovereignty. By examining some official documents with special reference to the idea of the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” the paper argues that the sovereign state from the perspective of peacebuilding for failed states is now largely based on a liberal theory of state sovereignty, which contains complex combinations of elements of nationalism, regionalism and globalism.

Sovereign states are not simply supported by nationalism in opposition to regionalism and globalism. They could be hampered or reinforced by all of them. The concept of “failed states” shows the critical moments of state sovereignty, since it suggests that a sovereign state is not a stable existence, but that it could be disrupted and also reshaped. Nationalism, regionalism and globalism are all active factors in peacebuilding for failed states, which quite often contains activities to re-establish dysfunctional state mechanisms. The elements of nationalism, regionalism and

globalism may contribute to advancing peacebuilding processes in some cases; they may hamper efforts for peacebuilding in other cases. These three elements are among the factors that make complex peacebuilding processes even more complex.

This paper argues that such a complex process of peacebuilding leads us to reconsider the characteristic of the contemporary theory of state sovereignty.<sup>ii</sup> It is wrong to presuppose that peacebuilding is just an attempt of nation-building. It is also wrong to assume that peacebuilding activities are in the end interventions by the powerful forces against weaker ones. Peacebuilding does not simply challenge or defend state sovereignty; it does not simply challenge or defend nationalism, regionalism and globalism. The three elements constitute the current complex configurations of peacebuilding activities. The discourse on the “Responsibility to Protect” as a theoretical backbone of peacebuilding for failed states characterizes how international society tends to understand state sovereignty in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The next section provides a basic perspective of this paper by explaining the complex relationship between peacebuilding and sovereignty in relation to nationalism, regionalism and globalism.<sup>iii</sup> The third section looks at the contemporary discourses on peacebuilding with special reference to the “Responsibility to Protect” in order to identify the characteristic nature of the contemporary theory of state sovereignty.<sup>iv</sup> Finally, the paper concludes by suggesting the implications of its findings for further studies on peacebuilding and international society.

## **2. Nationalism, Regionalism and Globalism in Peacebuilding for Failed States**

### **2-1 The Problem of Geographically Defined Concepts**

When we theoretically examine “globalism, regionalism and nationalism,” we tend to regard them as opposing views or movements. While analyzing interactions between them, we might end up asking which of these is the most dominant force now or will be so in the future.

This paper does not necessarily challenge such an analytical perspective, which is, of course, very useful and important in many cases. However, this paper also draws attention to the fact that all these three paradigms are defined in geographical scopes. If we analyze our contemporary world only by referring to geographically defined concepts, we might fall into temptation of arguing about which geographical unit is the

most fundamental in international relations. But the debate on units is not always productive. Even if the forces of globalism, regionalism and nationalism compete with each other, they could do so under the guise of the same banner. While some types of them form a certain set of movements, other types of them could constitute another set to challenge the other.

Geographically defined concepts tend to give the impression that the movement at one level does not contain the character of another movement at a different level. When we see a rise of nationalism at the nation-state level, we tend to suppose that the movement is not a regional or global movement. But that is not always the case. Nationalism could arise as a result of a certain regional movement. A typical historical example is the rise of nationalism in the age of decolonization in Asia and Africa. The eruption of nationalistic sentiments led to the independence of numerous states in the regions. But the process of decolonization was advanced as regional movements. Asia and Africa experienced regional movements to challenge the colonial legacy of European powers. Regionalism facilitated or even produced nationalism in the newly independent states. Even now, it is quite often the case that European countries keep nationalism with a strong sense of regional identity or pride. It is not contradictory at all to have a strong national identity of his or her country as a pro-EU state. Globalism can also be a source of nationalism. The global movement for human rights, for instance, could give its campaigners nationalistic affection for his or her country that endorses it.

Geographically defined concepts could overlap with certain cross-cutting political values. For instance, liberalism as one of the most prominent political ideologies in the contemporary world is not constrained by geographically defined boundaries. It is the source of nationalism in countries like the United States. There is a type of nationalism based on liberalism as its inalienable historical source. Some regional organizations including NATO, OSCE, EU and OSA that identify liberalism as their indispensable value indicate possible forms of regionalism based on liberalism. It goes without saying that liberalism is nowadays a globally valid value system, although this does not mean that the “End of History” has actually arrived or that no citizen in the world contests interventions in the name of liberalism.

While we highlight the peculiar function of a certain geographically defined movement, we can identify interactions between differently categorized movements. We

could also insert a certain cross-cutting perspective derived from a differently conceptualized framework. We can enrich our discussions on any issues in international society by referring to their relevance to nationalism, regionalism and globalism.

## **2-2 Peacebuilding in the Three Dimensions**

“Peacebuilding” is also a good example of observing such complex interactions of ideological movements. It is often asserted that peacebuilding activities are tantamount to “nation-building.” It is true that peacebuilding activities are often aimed to establish a solid mechanism of nation-state by stimulating national sentiments to mobilize national elites and national solidarity. Yet, it is also true that nationalism could disrupt efforts for rebuilding stable societies. Nationalistic emotions could easily lead people in local society to lose patience with long-term and quite often slow developments of international peacebuilding activities. Regionalism is a key factor in many cases of peacebuilding, since regional organizations play significant roles in implementing peacebuilding activities. Yet, it is also true that regionalism could disrupt sensitive handling of reconstructing a nation-state. Globalism is many a time a critical dimension of peacebuilding, because the international community needs the logic of globalism in order to justify interventions. Yet, it is also true that globalism could disrupt peacebuilding efforts to establish and solidify frameworks of political communities.

It is often said that failed states symbolize the need for peacebuilding. While failed states are not the only item of peacebuilding, it would be useful to focus upon the problem in order to identify how nationalism, regionalism and globalism relate to peacebuilding. Nationalism could foster disruption of a state, not only when nationalism leads a nation to a suicidal military exercise against another state. Nationalism may not always coincide with state boundaries. Nationalism for a certain group of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), for instance, could be emotional allegiance toward Serbs or the Republica Srpska (an internal entity of BiH), but others could have a strong nationalistic sentiment toward BiH itself. It is not sure whether nationalistic Afghans tend to defend the national government of President Karzai or to criticize the presence of international forces backing the government. We are not really surprised, if not persuaded, to see Iraqis who attack the US forces for the sake of nationalistic sentiments only to contribute to further disruption of Iraq.

Regionalism could also destabilize a state. It goes without saying that regionalism is one of the traditionally recognized causes of war because of the history of the Second World War. It is relevant to some contemporary conflicts. The conflict in the Middle East has been evolving around the emotional bondage shared by the people in the region. Palestine is not just somebody else's problem for most citizens in the region, but the problem of their entire region. The regional identity tends to be a hotbed of conflict in areas like the Caucasus where European and Russian influences have to be balanced. In Timor-Leste, the region-oriented influence of Australia is annoyance for those who cherish historical traditions derived from the colonial days.

Globalism is a major factor of armed conflicts in the world. Global capitalism never ignores conflict-areas where rich natural resources are buried. Global capitalism prolonged the war in Sierra Leone by profiting rebel forces, which exploited diamond with easy access to the global market. This applies to the conflicts in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as in Sudan where the factors of natural resources have even worsened the world's worst war cases. Global market economy never fails to absorb illegal narcotics in Afghanistan, even though it would substantially weaken the central government. Global flows of weapons, humans, fundamentalist ideas, etc. can all benefit those who want to continue war.

The three movements are not irrelevant to most cases of failed states. Rather, the elements of nationalism, regionalism and globalism are usually existent when a state fails to function properly. They do not compete with each other in such cases. Instead, they could jointly exert negative impacts upon the development of the process of disruption of state mechanisms.

However, the three movements could also contribute to the development of the process of peacebuilding to re-establish state mechanisms of failed states. Nationalism is almost an indispensable element of rebuilding a unified state in a disrupted state. Without the sentiment of nationalism and the sense of national identity, it would be very difficult to establish a stable political community in the framework of a nation state. Theoretically speaking, a peaceful society could be constructed without appealing to the element of nationalism. However, it is practically very difficult to create such a society without resorting to the internationally recognized framework of a nation-state. That is why peacebuilding is sometimes regarded as tantamount to nation-building.

Nationalism is an emotional engine for constructing a peaceful society in accordance with the widely shared framework of a political community, a nation-state.

Regionalism is one of the most useful tools of peacebuilding. When a nation does not have sufficient capacity to sustain peace by itself, it is quite natural that neighboring countries in the same region are asked to mobilize resources. Regionalism has changed the areas of activities of regional organizations like OSCE and NATO, which no longer hesitate to conduct peacebuilding activities. OSCE has many country offices in Europe as well as its surrounding areas in order to facilitate peacebuilding processes in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Africa the roles of the African Union (AU) as well as ECOWAS have recently been expanded to the area of peace operations. The deployment of its peacekeepers by the AU to Darfur, Sudan, was one of the outstanding initiatives by a regional organization. Regionalism is an indispensable perspective, especially when an armed conflict arises with a certain regional political background. For instance, it is not productive to consider separately the cases of Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, which constitute the so-called Great Lakes Region. In such a case, each conflict in each country ought to be analyzed from the perspective of the entire region.

Globalism is certainly an indispensable element for successful peacebuilding. Global solidarity is required to eradicate causes of armed conflicts, when peacebuilding needs to be reinforced by global control of weapons, materials, products, natural resources, etc. The rules of peace operations ought to be universally acknowledged. In the process of peacebuilding, for instance, the treatment of war criminals is one of the most common and serious issues. Even though each case of peacebuilding has its own distinct way of implementing policies, there must be common sets of rules to deal with the issue, like international humanitarian law and international human rights law, at the global level. Furthermore, in the first place, in order to sustain the political will of the international community for peacebuilding, there must be some kind of global interest in resolution of armed conflicts in the first place.

The elements of nationalism, regionalism and globalism exist behind the scenes of failed states. They also exist in the process of peacebuilding as well. None of them can be counted as the single most dominant reason of creating failed states or facilitating peacebuilding. The three elements provide us with multiple perspectives

upon the issue of peacebuilding for failed states. That is the very analytical importance of introducing the three elements.

### **2-3 Peacebuilding and State Sovereignty**

Peacebuilding has its particular orientation toward state sovereignty. When dealing with failed states, the international community implements peacebuilding activities in the direction of (re)establishing a sovereign state. The creation of a stable sovereign state is a presupposed goal of peacebuilding. This is not a theoretically inevitable conclusion. Nevertheless, it is practically always a common understanding that the (re)establishment of state sovereignty is the goal of peacebuilding.

This goal-setting tends to be conducted regardless of the relationship of peacebuilding with nationalism, regionalism and globalism. The three elements are in any case existent in the emergence of failed states as well as the development of peacebuilding. State sovereignty is not a product of nationalism, nor is it created only by regionalism or globalism. It is fostered and hampered by all the three elements jointly or separately in complex manners.

Thus, it is wrong to presuppose that peacebuilding is a matter of nationalism. The fact that peacebuilding aims to establish a sovereign state does not mean that those who are engaged in peacebuilding activities automatically become agents of nationalism. It is also wrong to assume that peacebuilding is an external force against actors in local society. No peacebuilding activity can succeed without active involvements of local actors. In the end, peacebuilding always ends up with attempts of capacity building of local society for durable peace.

It would not be appropriate, therefore, to ask which element of the three will become more dominant when peacebuilding is completed successfully. There is no answer to this question, since peacebuilding for (re)establishing state sovereignty in a failed state takes place without prejudice to the three elements.

But is it really true that globalism is reconciling itself with state sovereignty? Is it really possible to advance peacebuilding by (re)establishing state sovereignty without privileging any of the three elements of nationalism, regionalism and globalism? The affirmative answer, at least to some extent, will be provided after we carefully examine the contemporary theory of state sovereignty being applied in the field of peacebuilding.

### **3. Peacebuilding as the Critical Moment of State Sovereignty**

#### **3-1 Political Theory of Peacebuilding**

In order to examine the relationship between peacebuilding and state sovereignty, it is beneficial to reflect upon the point of view of political theory. This would give us the theoretical foundation of peacebuilding and enable us to explain how peacebuilding relates to state sovereignty in theoretical terms.

There are multiple ways of theorizing state sovereignty.<sup>v</sup> It is no exaggeration to say that the number of possible theories of sovereignty is almost limitless. But at the same time it is important to identify what kind of political inclinations dominate theories of sovereignty in a particular age. There are always dominating modes of political thoughts in each age in accordance with political environments of the times, even if it is still true that one single tendency does not exclude all the other forms in any event. It is apparent that in the post-Cold War era the theory of sovereignty based on communist ideas is outmoded. It is thus also safe to say that the theory of sovereignty based on the political theory of liberal democracy is predominantly influential throughout the contemporary world. While liberal democracy never abolishes other modes of political thoughts in the world, it is fair to say that liberal democracy is a dominant mode of political thought in our contemporary world due to the fact that most industrialized states have adopted liberal democracy as the constitutional foundation of their political systems and have formed political, economic and military alliances with like-minded states.

One may wonder if we can find one single explanation of liberal democracy, as it contains such a rich and diverse history. This paper argues that, taking into consideration the level of influence at the international level, it is crucial to analyze the Anglo-American tradition of liberal democracy, which could be regarded as the most influential political theory in the contemporary world.

The Anglo-American theory of liberal democracy has its theoretical origins in the social contract theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The revolutions in the period in Great Britain and the United States established the political systems which remain the oldest in our contemporary world. Thomas Hobbes in his *Leviathan* published in 1651 argued that in order to establish a common power to end the “state of nature,” the necessity of a covenant of every man with every man is required



in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, *I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing myself, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.* This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in Latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of the *Mortall God*, to which wee owe under the *Immortall God*, our peace and defence.<sup>vi</sup>

Hobbes started his theory with the natural rights of individuals, which symbolized the liberal nature of his theory. He argued that in order to keep individual rights well in reality, a political community needs sovereign power.

The word “authorise” is important here, because autonomous authorisation is a condition of self-sufficient commonwealth and signifies the autonomous status of liberal theory. What is symbolic is that the “Mortall God” is at the same time “an Artificiall Man,” “in which, the *Soveraignty* is an Artificiall *Soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body.”<sup>vii</sup> Hobbes’ theory of authorisation makes possible the emergence of an autonomous state.

There appeared shortly after Hobbes in the age of the Glorious Revolution the champion of the Anglo-American tradition of the liberal theory, John Lockes.<sup>viii</sup> He did not fully elaborate upon the theory of sovereignty, but his standpoint on sovereignty is evident in his *Two Treatises of Government*.<sup>ix</sup> It was his criticism of the absolute notion of sovereignty that led to his creation of two supreme powers.

Locke developed a theory of an autonomous political society by establishing two “supreme powers.” On the one hand, Locke asserted that even after consenting to make one community, “there remains still *in the people a Supreme Power*.” According to Locke, “the *Community* perpetually retains *a Supreme Power*.” Individuals never give up their right to property, which all political powers are set up to secure. Furthermore, they have the right to the appeal to “Heaven,” namely, the right to resistance and revolution, in case of abuse of governmental power.<sup>x</sup> On the other hand, Locke noted that although the community is “always the Supreme Power, but not as considered under any Form of Government, because this Power of the People can never take place till the Government be dissolved.”<sup>xi</sup>

By avoiding the word, sovereignty, Locke asserted *two supreme powers*. The theory of two supreme powers is possible, because he distinguished between “the

*Dissolution of the Society, and the Dissolution of the Government.*”<sup>xii</sup> One supreme power reigns in society, while the other represents the supreme power of government. This “distinction between constituent and ordinary power” was the foundation of civil revolutions, since abuse of governmental power would now result in invoking the other supreme power of the people.<sup>xiii</sup> This distinction leads to the most important premises of modern constitutionalism: the distinction between constitutive authority and ordinary power, i.e. between constitutional rules and ordinary laws. This was the logic of legitimizing the Glorious Revolution, to which revolutionaries in the thirteen colonial States in North America later resorted.

If we introduce Locke’s theory of the state in contemporary terms, we will find the two supreme powers in the liberal theory of sovereignty. The exerciser of governmental supreme power must protect the fundamental rights of individuals, since the people as a whole keeps the supreme power of authorization. Both of the supreme powers are part of the integrative theory of sovereignty in the political theory of liberal democracy. This is a conception of sovereignty in contemporary constitutional states.

This liberal conception of sovereignty cultivates a foundation of the political theory of peacebuilding too.<sup>xiv</sup> Governmental power may sometimes be unwilling or unable to protect citizens, or it may not be willing and capable enough to protect citizens properly. That is the case of a failed state. Under such a circumstance, some kind of peacebuilding activities, or even humanitarian intervention, could be justified. The international community may encourage and help the government protect citizens. This is a theoretical logic of justifying international peacebuilding activities.

The rationale for peacebuilding is theoretically founded upon the liberal concept of sovereignty. This explains why peacebuilding does not contradict state sovereignty; Rather, whether paradoxical or not, the theory of sovereignty is the very foundation of peacebuilding. Sovereignty understood in a constitutional framework justifies and even demands peacebuilding for the sake of rights of citizens and the welfare of the people. If the exerciser of supreme power will not or cannot exercise its power properly for the constitutive supreme power of the people, the liberal theory of sovereignty requires and legitimizes external help in the name of peacebuilding.

### **3-2 The Responsibility to Protect**

The implication of the liberal theory of sovereignty is enormous to the discussions ranging from humanitarian intervention to peacebuilding. The liberal theory implies that not all interventions in sovereign states violate sovereignty. Even when an intervention repudiates a certain governmental power, it might not be a violation of sovereignty. If governmental power was abused, the constitutional order of the state would be destroyed. Then a revolutionary action would be required and justified to replace the governmental power holder in the name of the supreme power of the people. This is a typical logic of justification for contemporary humanitarian intervention. Also, we need to realize that this is a logic to justify peacebuilding activities as well.

It is highly important in this context to see the argument of the Report of the “International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)” organized by the Canadian government, which was published in December 2001 under the title of “The Responsibility to Protect.”<sup>xv</sup> Its publication was a major event among academics and practitioners, although the shock of the terrorist attack on September 11 and the following “War on Terror” shadowed it immediately after its publication. Still, we should not underestimate its significance considering the gradual increase of its impact in international society.

The ICISS was co-chaired by Gareth Evanth, former Foreign Minister of Australia and incumbent President of the International Crisis Group, and Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General. One of the two Canadians among 12 members was Michael Ignatieff, outspoken writer on humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding related issues.<sup>xvi</sup>

The basic argument for the “Responsibility to Protect” is, surprisingly or not, in line with the very traditional liberal theory of sovereignty. The two “Basic Principles” of their argument is these;

- A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.
- B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

These simple two sentences represent the core value of liberalism from the time of John Locke. Sovereignty is an inalienable principle of domestic legal/political/social order as well as international legal/political/social order. But this notion of sovereignty contains the principle of responsibility between the two supreme powers; the exerciser of sovereignty is responsible for protecting the fundamental rights of individuals. Once it is proved that the power holder/government is unwilling or unable to take responsibility, the ultimate supreme power holder resumes sovereignty. The sovereign people are then allowed to “appeal to the Heaven” or even resort to a revolution. This is the theory of sovereignty in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal democracy. We can just add that in the context of contemporary international society this act of “appeal to the Heaven” could justify humanitarian intervention to help people protect themselves in case of serious abuse or negligence of governmental power. This is the theory of sovereignty in the school of the “Responsibility to Protect.”<sup>xvii</sup>

The ICISS continues that “The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states, lie in (1) obligation inherent in the concept of sovereignty; (2) the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; (3) specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; and (4) the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself.”

Then, interestingly, the ICISS proclaims that “The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities.” Namely,

- A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting population at risk.
- B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.
- C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

In short, the ICISS insists that conflict prevention, humanitarian intervention and

peacebuilding are the matters of “responsibility” on the side of the international community, while the initial primary responsibility is “inherent in the concept of sovereignty.”

### **3-3 Peacebuilding and Sovereignty as Responsibility**

The argument for the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” was endorsed by Canada, sponsor of the ICISS and the other members of the so-called Human Security Network led by Canada, which can be regarded as a coalition of states which recognize the importance of the argument for R2P. But at first its influence seemed limited, since there appeared to be a gap between the ICISS and the mainstream international community. This has changed since the publication of the report of the “Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” commissioned by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” in 2004.<sup>xviii</sup>

While the “Responsibility to Protect” was a response to international debates on humanitarian intervention after the Kosovo crisis, “Our Shared Responsibility” is a response to international debates on new security threats after the Iraq War. What is interesting is that the “High-Level Panel” included Gareth Evans, co-chair of the ICISS, among 16 members. It is thus not insensible at all to suppose that the title “Our Shared Responsibility” appears to have relevance to the R2P.

“Our Shared Responsibility” actually mentions the R2P. It is a key concept when the High-Level Panel discusses the issue of collective security. The Panel observes that;

The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign Governments but their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to protect” of *every* State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe - mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community - with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies. The primary focus should be on

assisting the cessation of violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of people through such measures as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and police missions. Force, if it needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort....We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.<sup>xix</sup>

This is the moment for the R2P to be included in an official UN document, while “Our Shared Responsibility” is merely a report of the independent commission organized by the Secretary-General. This clear affirmation of the logic of the R2P records a new stage of the theory of sovereignty in international society. Peacebuilding is recognized as a matter of R2P in the Panel’s report, which stipulates that “there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community - with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies.”

In this regard, the fact that the new organ of the United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), was recommended by this Panel is of crucial importance. The idea of the PBC as well as the accompanying Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) was endorsed by Kofi Annan in his “In Larger Freedom” of 2005 with some modifications in the PBC’s scope of activities and organizational structure.<sup>xx</sup> It was decided by the 2005 World Summit Outcome that the PBC was to be established.<sup>xxi</sup> The Resolutions simultaneously adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on December 20, 2005 actually decided on the establishment of the PBC as well as PBSO.<sup>xxii</sup>

The Resolutions recognize “the primary responsibility of national and transitional Governments and authorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict, where they are established, in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national ownership.” They also underline “the primary responsibility of the (Security) Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter.” These two responsibilities are not contradictory to each other and to the responsibility of the

PBC, since a system of responsibility is supposed to be coexistent with state sovereignty. The PBC will help governments of post-conflict states, as long as they are not sufficiently willing or capable enough to exert their sovereign powers properly. This help is theoretically understood to be in line with sovereignty, as the PBC simply helps the exercises of sovereignty. But when the government of a post-conflict state is apparently unwilling or unable to meet its responsibility, the Security Council will be asked to take its international responsibility to deal with such states.

There have been many confrontations and frictions among member states until they finally reached the contents of the resolutions to establish the PBC. It goes beyond the purpose of this paper to look at details of their debates. Suffice it to say that while the group led by the United States wanted the PBC to be as effective as possible under the command of the Security Council, a majority of developing countries were cautious about such an approach and made some significant changes including the major roles of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. Apart from details of respective issues, this confrontation evolved around a very large political map of divided international society. There is a group of states which wanted to see an active peacebuilding organ to respond to such crises as failed states. The opposing group found the character of intervention in the PBC and wanted to set up barriers to constrain its activities.

Theoretically speaking, this confrontation can be explained by the standpoint of the R2P. Those who support the R2P would like to see a strong, proactive and efficient PBC. Those who worry about the R2P would like to see a constrained PBC. The result was a compromise between the two groups. This tells the status of the liberal theory of sovereignty. It is a widely shared conception of sovereignty. We cannot ignore its impact upon the way of thinking in international society. Nevertheless, it is also true that a considerable number of states are not fully content with such a theory of sovereignty. The current understanding of peacebuilding should be well explained by this status of the R2P and the liberal theory of sovereignty.

Peacebuilding or peace operations in general by international society will probably continue to evolve around this confrontation between two groups with different views on sovereignty. There will be more debates and compromises in many instances as regards peacebuilding and sovereignty. We should keep attention to the

confrontation between pros and cons of the R2P. Nevertheless, it is not deniable that the liberal theory of sovereignty has begun to define the foundation and the future of peacebuilding to a greater extent, if not perfectly.

#### **4. Conclusions: Nationalism, Regionalism and Globalism Revisited**

This paper has argued that nationalism, regionalism and globalism are cross-cutting issues and may not always be contradictory to each other. Then the paper discussed that the liberal conception of sovereignty defined as responsibility constitutes the very theoretical foundation of peacebuilding in the contemporary world. That is an interventionary act without violating the principle of sovereignty thus defined. In so doing, the paper has suggested that the cross-cutting moment of the three elements of nationalism, regionalism and globalism can be identified in international peacebuilding activities characterized by the liberal conception of sovereignty defined as responsibility.

Peacebuilding is concerned with nationalism, since the former aims to establish a stable nation-state with a responsible national government. A healthy understanding of nationalism constitutes a foundation of peacebuilding in this sense. Peacebuilding is concerned with regionalism, since the former aims to establish a regional framework for peace into which a conflict-torn society can be absorbed. A responsible national government is expected to construct stable relations with neighboring countries, which are also expected to look after neighboring post-conflict countries in turn. Peacebuilding is concerned with globalism, since the former need to deal with multiple global issues in order to solidify peace in a post-conflict society. In the first place, the logic of peacebuilding is founded upon global values including the Responsibility to Protect. The liberal conception of sovereignty signifies a cross-cutting character of peacebuilding in relation to nationalism, regionalism and globalism.

ICISS argued that:

Sovereignty does still matter. It is strongly arguable that effective and legitimate states remain the best way to ensure that the benefits of the internationalization of trade, investment, technology and communication will be equitably shared. Those states which can call upon strong regional alliances, internal peace, and a strong and independent civil society, seem clearly best placed to benefit from globalization. They will also be likely to be those most respectful of human rights. And in security terms, a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of effective states, confident of their place in the world,



than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities.<sup>xxiii</sup>

For students of peacebuilding, it is crucial to bear in mind the fact that peacebuilding is a complex issue that relates to nationalism, regionalism and globalism in various forms at various places and times. But, of course, peacebuilding is not the only exception. The three elements of nationalism, regionalism and globalism make many intersections not only between peacebuilding and sovereignty, but also in other various political values and movements.

What we should obtain from this observation is the fact that nationalism, regionalism and globalism are no longer repellent to each other in our contemporary complex world. It is not productive to overemphasize advantages of one of these in order to eradicate disadvantages of another. Possibilities of multiple sets of their combinations indicate unfruitfulness of simplistic attempts. We could still refer to the three elements as analytical tools in order to better comprehend complex reality. What we ought to do then is to identify the configurations of the three elements interacting with some other political values and movements in our contemporary complex world.

## Notes

<sup>i</sup> This paper was originally presented at the Panel “ ‘Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism’ Revisited” at the 2006 Annual Convention of the Japan Association of International Relations, Kisarazu, Chiba, Japan, October 14, 2006.

<sup>ii</sup> This paper is based upon the author’s previous study of sovereignty, Hideaki Shinoda, *Re-examining State Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the Global Age* (London: Macmillan, 2000), which critically questioned and historically examined narrow understandings of sovereignty including very artificial distinctions like internal and external sovereignty, etc.

<sup>iii</sup> See Hideaki Shinoda, *Kokusai Shakai no Chitsujō (Order in International Society)* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2007).

<sup>iv</sup> See the author’s previous studies including Hideaki Shinoda, “Kokurenheiwakouchikuiinkai no setsuritsu: Atarashii Kokusaishakaizō wo meguru kattō (The Establishment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: The Conflicting Visions of New International Order),” *Kokusaihou Gaikou Zasshi (Journal of International Law and Diplomacy)*, vol. 105, no. 4, January 2007, pp. 68-93.

<sup>v</sup> See Shinoda, *Re-examining Sovereignty*.

<sup>vi</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin Books, 1985), originally published in 1651, p.227.

<sup>vii</sup> *Ibid.*, p.81.

<sup>viii</sup> The contrast between “sovereignty in the Lockean tradition” which includes George Lawson and the American federalists, and “sovereignty in Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau” is discussed, for instance, in Julie Mostov, *Power, Process, and Popular Sovereignty* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), pp.52-72.

<sup>ix</sup> See John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1690), pp.326-7.

<sup>x</sup> *Ibid.*, p.445.

<sup>xi</sup> *Ibid.*, p.385.

<sup>xii</sup> *Ibid.*, p.424.

<sup>xiii</sup> Julian H. Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).p.124.

<sup>xiv</sup> As regards the operational issues caused by the influence of liberal democracy upon peacebuilding, see Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>xv</sup> Report on the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

<sup>xvi</sup> See Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (Chatto and Windus, 1998); Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (Chatto and Windus, 2000); Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan* (Vintage, 2003).

<sup>xvii</sup> “Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse of the concept of human security. “The Responsibility to Protect,” p. 13.

<sup>xviii</sup> Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (New York: United Nations, 2004).

<sup>xix</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

<sup>xx</sup> “Integrated and Coordinated Implementation of and Follow-up to the Outcomes of the Major United Nations Conferences and Summits in the Economic, Social and Related Fields: Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” Report of the Secretary-General, UN Document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.

<sup>xxi</sup> Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Document A/60/1, 24 October 2005.

<sup>xxii</sup> Security Council Resolution 1645(2005), UN Document S/RES/1645(2005), 20 December 2005 and General Assembly Resolution 60/180 The Peacebuilding Commission, UN Document A/RES/60/180, 30 December 2005.

<sup>xxiii</sup> The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 7-8.