

Pāṇiniyas on *Yogyatā* and *Śakti*

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0. In *VP* 3.3.29 Bhartṛhari presents the view that the relation (*sambandha*) between word (*śabda*) and meaning (*artha*) is *yogyatā*, which he illustrates with the model of the sense-organ (*indriya*). The latest result of the study on Bhartṛhari's notion of *yogyatā* as one of the relations holding between word and meaning is found in Houben [*The saṃbandha-samuddeśa*, 1995]. No doubt his attempt to elucidate the notion of *yogyatā* is conscientious one, but he fails to show what underlies such a notion, as do other Bhartṛhari scholars. What he lacks in dealing with the *yogyatā* as the word-meaning relation is the broader perspective on Bhartṛhari's grammatical theory. Regrettably, Houben does not properly appreciate the significance of the fact that Bhartṛhari there draws a parallel not simply between sense-organs and words but between the act of perceiving some object and that of uttering some word. Having in view the participation of the word in the act of uttering leads to evaluating the word in relation to the *kāraka* theory, in consequence of which a new light will be thrown upon the conception of *yogyatā*. In this paper, in order to get rid of the preconceived notion of the *yogyatā* in question, I should like to propose a new angle: The *yogyatā* is that the notion of which is originally formed in the framework of the *kāraka* theory and Bhartṛhari applies it to the case in which the specific act of uttering words occurs.

1. **Act of uttering words** Now let us consider *VP* 2.405: "The relation between instrument (*karaṇa*) and object (*karman*) is observed to obtain through action. Therefore [the relation between] *abhidhāna* (i.e., *śabda*) and *abhidheya* (i.e., *artha*) is restricted through [the action of] *abhidhā* (*kriyāvuyavetaḥ saṃbandho dṛṣṭaḥ karaṇakarmaṇoḥ/abhidhāniyams tasmād abhidhānābh-*

idheyayoh)). The word and its meaning are related to each other through the action of *abhidhā*, respectively, as *abhidhāna* (lit. the instrument relative to the action of *abhidhā*) and as *abhidheya* (lit. the object relative to the action of *abhidhā*). For the present discussion it is important only to note that taking a word and its meaning respectively as an instrument and an object presupposes the participation of an agent (i.e., *abhidhātṛ*, a speaker) in the action of *abhidhā*. Accordingly, considering that a verb denotes an activity of a *kāraka* which in turn is treated as an agent (*kartṛ*), one may assume the following sentence that expresses the situation in which the accomplishment of the action of uttering a word is taking place: *devadattaḥ artham śabdena abhidadhāti* ('D. speaks of the object *x* with the word *y*'), in addition to *śabdaḥ artham abhidadhāti* ('the word *y* denotes the object *x*'). What then is the action of *abhidhā* that Devadatta performs? In *MBhD* 1:24-25, Bhartṛhari states that the word is the instrument in that its meaning is conveyed by it; the meaning is the object in that it is what is conveyed; the understanding of the meaning is the fruit of the action involved. From this it follows that the sentence in question is taken to mean that D. is performing the activity of causing the word to convey its meaning. Then what activity does D. perform so that a meaning may be conveyed by the word? It is said to be *praṇidhi* ('directing a word towards a particular meaning' in the present *MBhD*), *vinīyoga* ('application' in *VP* 2.403ab, which the *Vṛtti* thereupon explains as *pravaṇīkaraṇa* ('orienting a word toward a particular meaning')), *ukti* ('turning the speech organ towards the activity of producing sounds' in *VP* 2.403cd) or *abhisandhāna* ('aiming a word at a particular meaning' in *VP* 2.404cd). The activities called *praṇidhi*, *ukti* and *abhisandhāna* here are the specific kinds of *vinīyoga*-s to be found in the speech behavior, all of which are considered to be denoted by the verb *abhi √dhā* and hence to be synonymous with the term *abhidhā*. This is why Bhartṛhari makes a general statement that without being employed or applied by an agent the word cannot reveal its own meaning (*VP* 2.403 ab: *vinīyogād rte śabdo na svārthasya prakāśakah*).

Therefore, when he says that the word-meaning relation, which is nothing but the *yogyatā*, is restricted through *abhidhā*, he intends to imply that the relation is actualized as a concrete one through concrete activities of causing the word to convey its meaning, such as *praṇidhi*.

2. *Kartṛviniyoga* and *karāṇa* Generally speaking, *viniyoga* is an agent's function to appoint something to such a *kāraka* as an instrument, to set it in use and to activate it (*vyāpāraṇa*, *pravartaka*, *preṣaṇa*; Helārāja on *VP* 3.7.18: *sādhanaṅtaraviniyogavyāpārah kartā*). All *kāraka*-s other than an agent contribute to the accomplishment of the action through performing their own activities and expect to be activated by the agent. It is commonly accepted and repeatedly emphasized by Pāṇinīyas that a candidate for the *kāraka* is unlikely to conduce to the accomplishment of an action without the *viniyoga* performed by an agent. Now let us take into account *VP* 3.7.92 in which Bhartṛhari states that in order to bring the action to accomplishment agents repeatedly improve its instrument and apply it in various ways (*karāṇeṣu tu saṃskāram ārabhante punaḥ punaḥ/viniyogaviśeṣāṃś ca pradhānasya prasiddhaye//*). According to Helārāja [on *VP* 3.7.92], in the case of the firewood used for cooking, the *viniyoga* is the act of repeatedly laying it on the fire (*punaḥ punaḥ upasthāpanam*); in the case of the sword used for cutting, the act of wielding it (*udyamananīpatane*); in the case of the sense-organ used for the act of perceiving, the act of directing it to a particular object (*praṇidhi*). As, in *asinā chinatti devadattaḥ* ('D. cuts with a sword'), the sword cuts when wielded by D. and the *viniyoga* is considered to be the act of wielding; similarly, the word conveys its own meaning when directed towards the latter and the *viniyoga* is regarded as *praṇidhi* or *abhisandhāna*.

3. State of *karāṇa* before receiving *kartṛviniyoga* Now let us consider the following sentences: (A) *dātṛeṇa lunāti* ('He cuts with a scythe') and (B) *dātraṃ lavane karaṇam* ('The instrument of cutting is the scythe'). The fact that the *dātra* is the instrument of cutting can result in these two sentences. That is, they are used, as Patañjali [in *MBh* ad *P2.3.50*] explains, when a specific feature relative to the action of

cutting (*kriyākṛta-viśeṣa*), which Kaiyaṭa says is nothing but the capacity of functioning as *kāraka*, is recognized in the *dātra*. According to Kaiyaṭa, the sentence (A) expresses the active state of the scynthe (*vyāpārāveśa*) and the sentence (B) its mere potentiality for functioning as instrument (*yogyatāmātra*). It seems to suggest that in the stage where the *vinīyoga* by an agent is yet to be received, a candidate for such a *kāraka* as an instrument is in the state of being potential (*yogyatā*) for functioning as such in actuality. Only that which has the capability can be set in use (*Vṛtti* on *VP* 1.13: *yogyam śabdam pratyartham upādatte; yogyam indriyam praṇidhatte*).

Furthermore, it is interesting, in this connection, to take into consideration the rule *P* 2.3.23 *hetau*. Concerning this rule, Bhartṛhari states that what is regarded as a cause (*nimitta*) without reference to the activity is defined as *hetu* (*VP* 3.7.24ab: *anāśrite vyāpāre nimittam hetur iṣyate*) and Helārāja explains that what is regarded as a cause in terms of its mere potentiality (*yogyatāmātra*) is called *hetu*. Consider the example *agninā pākḥ* ('the cooking with the fire') which Helārāja gives. The given sentence conveys that potential participants in the act of cooking, like the fire, are inactive since they are not yet set into play by an agent. To borrow the phrase of *Nyāsa*: *aniṣpādayann api phalam tatsādhanayogyah*, in the situation where this sentence is used, the fire may be said to have the potential of being conducive to the accomplishment of the action of cooking, though at the moment not bringing it to accomplishment in actuality. The point is: As is indicated by the contrast of *yogyatāmātra* ('the mere state of being potential') with *vyāpārāveśa* ('taking on the activity'), once it is set into play, that is, it receives the *vinīyoga* by an agent, a candidate for the instrument becomes active and serves the accomplishment of an action; before being set into play, on the contrary, it remains simply in the state of having the potential of contributing to the accomplishment of the action.

4. *Yogyatā* and *śakti* Now let there be a scynthe here. With this scynthe, one could cut anything susceptible of cutting, rice plant or weed.

In this sense one may say that the scynthe has the ability to cut. Now if one sets it in use with the aim of cutting weeds, it is proper to say, its potential capacity of cutting will be manifested in them.

As is well known, Bhartṛhari has declared that a *kāra*ka is a capacity on the basis of the view set forth in *MBh* that a *kāra*ka is a property of things (*guṇa*). He states that all things are considered to be conglomerates of *śakti*-s [VP 3.7.2], defining the *śakti* as *nimittabhāva* ('the property of being a cause') [VP 3.7.14]. According to Helārāja [on VP 3.7.24], the *nimitta* is of three kinds: *kāra*ka as one that brings the action to accomplishment (*kriyānirvartaka*), *hetu* as one that is universally applied to something to bring about an effect (*janaka*), and *lakṣaṇa* as one that indicates something (*jñāpaka*). Whatever the *nimitta* may be, therefore, the *śakti* is considered to be that which is conducive to the production of the result (*Vṛtti* on VP 2.441: *śaktirūpa evāsau kāryaprasavasūcitah*).

The *Vṛtti* on VP 2.404 says that a word is capable of conveying many meanings (*ankeārthapratyāyanayogyā*) and Helārāja on VP 3.3.29 that its capability is regulated by convention (*samaya*, *saṅketa*), in other words, it is manifested by the convention (*saṅketās tu tām [yogyatām] dyotayati*). The *Vṛtti* on VP 2.366, on the other hand, remarks that any name-word (*saṃjñā*) has the capacity of conveying (*pratyāyanaśakti*) anything to named (*saṃjñin*); anything has the capacity of being conveyed by any name-word (*pratyāyyaśakti*); hence, for the sake of communication, the restriction (*niyama*) is made such that this is the name only for that; this is named only by that. Noteworthy is that the manifestation (*dyotana*; *āvīrbhāvayati* in *Vṛtti* on VP 2.403) and restriction, whose notions are introduced here with reference to *yogyatā* and *śakti*, are two sides of the same coin, according to *Vṛtti* on VP 2.297 which says that manifestation (*dyotana*) has a twofold function: actualization (*āvīrbhāvana*) and limitation (*avadhāraṇa*).

In addition, the *Vṛtti* on VP 2.432 states that a speaker's intention depends upon a word capable of conveying a particular meaning (*yogyāśabdanibandhanā vivakṣā*) and that following the capacity of the word to

convey the meaning (*śabdaśakti*), he conceives of a particular thing as meant. Moreover, the above-mentioned *MBhD* says that when uttering a word, a speaker has the *praṇidhi*: This word is capable of conveying this meaning (*ayaṃ yogyam etam artham pratyāyayitum*) and that without the *praṇidhāna* no word is capable of conveying its own meaning (*śabdo vya-vasthito 'rthe 'pi prayoktuḥ praṇidhānam antareṇa pratyāyane asamarthah*), in which is reflected the idea that candidates for *kāraka*-s other than an agent cannot serve for the action to produce its result without the activation by the agent, even if they are capable of doing so (Helārāja on *VP* 3.8.1: *śaktatve 'pi vyāpārābhāve phalādarśanāt*).

Reflection on these passages will make clear that *yogyatā* and *śakti* are not distinguished from each other in that they both stand for the ability to produce an effect. In fact, Helārāja in his commentary on *VP* 3.3.29 treats them as synonymous with each other. However, the term *yogyatā* has its own peculiar aspect. That is, it signifies the potential state of the ability exhibited by the thing which is supposed to play a role in a given activity.

5. **Summary** 1) The notion of *yogyatā* is not limited to the context in which the relation between word and meaning is argued; it is universally accepted in the framework of the *kāraka* theory. The *yogyatā* as one of the wordmeaning relations is merely an instance of the one which is fundamentally incorporated in that theory. That the word is treated as the instrument in the act of conveying the meaning admits of this interpretation. The underlying idea according to which the notion of *yogyatā* is introduced is that a *kāraka* functioning as agent sets into play other *kāraka*-s that are capable of bringing to accomplishment of an action, whereby the action is brought to accomplishment (*yogyāsādhnaviniyoga*).

2) '*Yogyatā*' and '*śakti*' are synonymous with each other in that both of them denote the same concept of ability to produce the fruit. The *kārtviniyoga* being introduced, however, '*yogyatā*' gains its aspect of potentiality.

⟨Key Words⟩ *yogyatā*, *viniyoga*, *śakti*, *kāraka*

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