

Forward

This is the final research report of the joint research project on “Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of Peace-building” organized by the Institute for Peace Science of Hiroshima University and the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution of George Mason University. This is also a product of a generous research grant by the Center for Global Cooperation, Japan Foundation, between 2002 and 2004. All the contributors in this volume sincerely express the greatest gratitude for the financial support.

During the course of our two-year research, we held four panels on the occasions of the 2003 and 2004 annual conventions of the International Studies Association in order to exchange as many opinions as possible with those who are interested in this topic. Although we cannot list anonymous commentators at the conventions, we thank them all for their invaluable contributions.

We organized our own workshops to develop our arguments in New York, May 2003, and in Hiroshima, May 2004. We also thank those who supported us in many ways at the time of the two workshops.

Since we first proposed this research project in 2001, the world has changed rather drastically. “The war on terror” seems to have changed the course of international society as well as academic debates about “security.” We are confident that the issue of “human security” in the context of armed conflict became more critical than ever. This research report does not provide an ultimate solution to the problems of “human security” in and after armed conflict. However, we present this report as an honest exploration of some of the most critical issues in our contemporary world that could be illustrated by the perspective of “human security.”

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Abstracts

Introduction

Hideaki Shinoda and Ho-Won Jeong

The purpose of discussing human security is to introduce a comprehensive perspective in a strategic way. Human security is expected to coordinate various activities of various organizations in a coherent way. By focusing on the implications of human security in the context of armed conflict, the authors of this volume show how human security will help us identify new issues and clues to tackle them in our contemporary world.

1. The Concept of Human Security: Historical and Theoretical Implications

Hideaki Shinoda

While there are skeptics about the significance of the concept of human security, we need to recognize the historical and theoretical need for such a comprehensive concept. This chapter argues that not only human security does not contradict the “traditional” national security, but also they are both the products of the same political phenomena in the modern era: democratization, socialization and internationalization. The idea of public authorities responsible for political, economic and social security of people at the national as well as international level is the historical usher of the concept of human security. By examining UNDP’s *1994 Human Development Report*, this chapter demonstrates that human security was not presented as a concept against national security. The chapter also examines human security discourses by the government of Japan by pointing out the reason why Japan shows interest in the concept of human security.

2. Operational Phases of Human Security Measures in and after Armed Conflict: How Can We Link Humanitarian Aid to Peace-building?

Hideaki Shinoda

This chapter explores how human security measures are implemented in operational terms. In doing so, the chapter illuminates the links between humanitarian aid and

peace-building as core elements of human security in the context of armed conflict. As both humanitarian aid and peace-building are required in and after armed conflict, their roles are distinct but affect each other. The relationship between them may be conciliatory on some occasions, but contradictory on other occasions. Human security as a comprehensive perspective is expected to provide constructive understanding about how we should link humanitarian aid with peace-building. After explaining the purpose and perspective of the argument, this chapter identifies how humanitarian aid and peace-building are implemented during armed conflict and then discusses dilemmas concerning the linkages between the two activities in the mid-conflict phase. Accordingly, the chapter focuses on the transitional phase and the stabilization phase after armed conflict, while looking at the operational issues. The chapter shows how such a broad concept as human security can be used strategically in analyses of practical issues in the field.

3. Human Security and the UN Security Council

Juergen Dedring

In the UN Security Council, an organ mandated to maintain international peace and security, it does not come easily that the basic perspective of that institution is radically redirected to the most intimate dimension of human security. The UN Security Council turned in the mid-1990s its attention to a growing list of matters that related to the use of humanitarian instruments and their impact on war-torn countries. The deliberate change of direction in the UNSC's focus entails the recent attention to human security and its embattled condition in an increasingly turbulent and militarized world.

This chapter links the adoption of the new paradigmatic cluster of issues revolving around the notion of "human security" to its first beginnings in the UN Human Development report 1994 and briefly describes and evaluates the components of the new policy norm. Touching briefly on theoretical and conceptual aspects of the new term, this chapter emphasizes the route of policy deliberations within the parameters of the UNSC and its formalization as an agenda item entitled 'Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict' from about early 1999 through 2004 and seeks to depict the increased acceptance by all UNSC members of the new norm and terminology whereby the UNSC as a body made the concern for human security its own. This detailed narrative

also touches upon the vanguard role played by the Canadian delegation during their two-year term as nonpermanent member of the UNSC in 1999 and 2000 and makes reference to the informal alignment of sympathetic Member States in the so-called “Human Security Network.” A significant part of the chapter is devoted to the analytical review of the political process of the UNSC, in close cooperation with the UN Secretary-General and UN programs and offices serving humanitarian and human rights causes as well as with a number of international non-governmental organizations sharing concern about human security issues.

The chapter concludes with a brief evaluation of the treatment of the human security agenda by the UNSC and the evidence of the capability for learning demonstrated by the organ collectively and by its constituent members. The chapter also points to encouraging evidence that new forms of collaboration between different constituencies have loomed large in the trajectory of the UNSC handling of the specific issue of the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The author concludes by expressing his preference of a comprehensive definition of “human security” that would entail the freedom from want.

4. The Nexus between UN Peacekeeping and Human Security: Reviewing the Functions of UN Peacekeeping from a Perspective of Human Security

Yuji Uesugi

Since 1948, the United Nations has established fifty-six peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeeping was originally invented as a tool for international security, to deal with conflicts between states, but today more and more missions are being deployed to conflicts within a state or conflicts in a collapsed state. This chapter argues that the strategies of interstate peacekeeping may not provide an adequate response to the security needs of people caught up in intrastate conflicts when the objective of peace-building is the reintegration of separated entities. An alternative approach that can fill the gaps between today’s reality and the existing strategies of UN peacekeeping is called for. Using the concept of human security as a guideline to reveal the gaps that exist between current approaches and the needs on the ground, this chapter reviews the performance of UN peacekeeping and explores a new peacekeeping strategy that could help protect the security of people in areas of violent conflict.

The chapter first descriptively defines the concept of UN peacekeeping and systematically identifies a wide range of functions fulfilled by UN peacekeepers in a peace-building process. The chapter then groups the functions of UN peacekeeping into three categories - *interposition*, *transition assistance*, and *humanitarian intervention* - and argues that new peacekeeping strategies for intrastate conflicts should aim at fulfilling *transition assistance* functions in order to provide needed links between emergency humanitarian assistance and long-term development aid. The chapter also emphasises that upon undertaking such *transition assistance* functions, UN peacekeepers must seek to *assist*, not dictate, the peace-building process by respecting local initiatives, utilizing local resources, and nurturing local capacity in order to develop a sense of ownership among local participants. In short, the chapter seeks to contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive view of post-conflict strategies by reviewing the functions of UN peacekeeping from the perspective of human security. .

5. The OSCE Model and the PSCBM for Human Dimension

Noboru Miyawaki

From the vantage point of national security, the OSCE model has successfully combined national security and human security. Promoting military CBM through the OSCE process is a notable achievement for the OSCE in the realm of national security. On the other hand, human security issues also occupy an important part of the OSCE's operations, which range from land-mine issues to human trafficking. The OSCE can afford to address both military security and human security at the same time and at the same level. Meanwhile, the OSCE itself has rarely used the term "human security," despite the United Nations' high priority on the issue. In reality, however, the OSCE has conducted some concrete works of "human dimension," such as promoting democracy and human rights. As a result, human dimension covers most aspects of human security. Eight countries of the 12 Human Security Network (HSN) members are members of the OSCE, and many of the problems both organizations are attempting to address overlap. Canada has shown its commitment to the promotion of human security issues within the OSCE, by affirming its commitment to the human dimension of security.

This type of measure is necessary, especially with regard to establishing political stability in the democratic institution-building process, to ensure greater security for

human beings. Concretely speaking, the OSCE has developed the PSCBM, such as human rights education for police forces, empowerment of human rights NGOs and training of political parties. The OSCE has assumed an active role in promoting democracy and human rights with the PSCBM. There is a significant gap between the OSCE's ideal goal and the actual reality. The OSCE had great difficulty trying to promote the PSCBM in Belarus because the Belarusian Government sometimes refused to cooperate with the OSCE's mission. After all, the OSCE model is "an inadequate community of values." The PSCBM is necessary to ensure tighter human security, but it needs a political framework and the willingness of the relevant authority, albeit a negative one, to cooperate in promoting the PSCBM.

6. Human Rights in Armed Conflict

Reuben E. Brigety II

The nature of warfare has changed dramatically in the last century. Developments in technology ranging from modern combat aircraft to advances in infantry weapons have altered how war is conducted, increasing both its reach and its lethality. Global political developments have changed both where war is waged and who its most active participants are. Growth in urbanization makes it increasingly likely that belligerents will engage each other inside populated areas rather than on remote fields of battle, while the rise of armed non-state actors multiplies the number of potential sources of violence.

One of the most disturbing side effects of these changes in warfare is the deleterious effect that war has had on non-combatants. Harm to civilians in warfare and its aftermath takes largely two forms. The first, and most obvious, are civilians who suffer death or serious injury as a direct result of combat, either accidentally or deliberately. The second are those who suffer other assaults on their dignity (such as sexual assault, ethnic violence, etc.) as a result of the breakdown of law and order, resulting in a security vacuum in which such violations run rife. Such assaults often violate the letter, if not the spirit, of human rights norms designed to protect civilians.

Given both the normative and strategic value of protecting civilians during conflict and preserving their human rights afterward, it is important to understand why this problem persists and how it might be alleviated. This chapter will address this question

by examining three issues: (1) the ethical and legal framework of civilian human rights protections, (2) current issues of civilian protection, and (3) the way forward in seeking solutions. It argues that amongst the most important initiatives for addressing this issue are the acceptance and reaffirmation of the standards of conduct in warfare stated in international treaties by both state and non-state actors; the development by states of the tactical capacity to wage war in a manner that protects civilians as they engage the enemy; and the taking of steps by the international community to ensure ambient security in conflict and post-conflict areas for the prevention of human rights abuses that can run rife in such situations.

7. Women, Human Security, and Peace-building: A Feminist Analysis

Susan McKay

Because girls and women experience gender-specific forms of human security, feminist analyses seek to reveal how gender hierarchies and power inequities exacerbate insecurity. A central concern of these analyses is reducing violence against women that occurs at macro, meso-, and micro-levels. In conflict and post-conflict societies, special attention must be given to protecting and promoting girls' and women's human security by working to reduce gender discrimination, such as occurs in demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. Policy initiatives should be directed towards reducing the incidence of direct or physical violence and of indirect or structural violence. Because women's peace-building is key to the empowerment of girls and women in post-conflict societies, their initiatives should be encouraged, promoted, and supported through governmental policies and programs.

8. Health, Human Security, and the Peace-building Process

Larisa Mori, David R. Meddings and Douglas W. Bettcher

This chapter focuses on the links between health and human security, particularly with respect to the effects of collective violence on the health of individuals and the capacity to deal with health needs at the level of society. Collective violence typically undermines the health care system and has both direct and indirect effects on health and human security. Public health approaches and initiatives provide a potential peace-building effect by creating a bridge of peace between belligerents in the promise

of, and presumably shared interest in, health within societies as a common goal. Human security is presented as comprising three fundamental challenges in which health and the human security are linked: violence and conflict, global infectious disease, and poverty and inequity. Beyond the link between securing health in order to protect human security is the way health security promotes concepts essential to human security. Protecting the health of the public - locally, nationally, globally - is a core public good and a critical social arrangement for producing health and human security. The authors underline that public health is a global public good. Furthermore health interventions that integrate peace-building objectives into their health goals by using health-related actions to promote community reconciliation can increase human security. Health care providers can contribute to human security by creating superordinate goals, diplomacy and by redefining the situation. But their involvement in a conflict for the purpose of gaining ground in human security beyond the scope of health could also jeopardize the traditional legitimacy and neutrality of health sector actors. The authors underline that a human security paradigm for the 21st century must include space for public health, and the role of many global public health interventions in both peacemaking and peace-building.

9. Education as an Approach to Human Security: A Case of Afghanistan

Yasushi Katsuma

According to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, children are the rights-holders whose right to education should be realized by the duty-bearers, particularly the State. In unstable situations where the duty-bearers have difficulties in fulfilling their obligations to respect and realize the child's rights, the international humanitarian community often finds education an excellent delivery point for human security measures to promote empowerment and protection of children. However, in practice, it is not always easy to reach the most vulnerable groups of children with humanitarian assistance; that is the issue of coverage. The issue of coverage is important in our efforts to reduce disparities between different social groups, establishing the basis for peace-building. In order to address the issue of coverage, situation assessment needs to be carried out, collecting data disaggregated by gender and ethnicity. In this context, in 2000, a Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) was conducted in Afghanistan to

improve data availability. According to the MICS data collected in the eastern part of Afghanistan, girls had been deprived of their access to education. It was clear that the Taliban government enforced a discriminatory policy effectively to prohibit girls from receiving education, even though Afghanistan had ratified the Convention in 1994. Therefore, the international humanitarian community decided not to support the Taliban formal schools that were exclusively for boys, in accordance with the principle of “non-discrimination” established by Article 2 of the Convention. Alternatively, the capacities of the community were strengthened to run informal home-based schools for girls. By strengthening the home-based schools, the process of women’s empowerment was promoted. The home-based schools not only served as learning space but also provided girls in unstable situations with protection against various forms of threat. In order to translate the concept of human security into peace-building practice, it is necessary for us to enhance human rights-based programming and expand the range of actors beyond the State.

10. Conflict and Peoples’ Insecurity: An Insight from Experiences of Nigeria

Katsuya Mochizuki

This chapter tries to examine the conflict-tone situation and human insecurity of African society, as well as the resultant popular movements. The youth and women’s movements in Nigeria’s oil producing area are detailed with their historical backgrounds.

Youth-driven ethnic minority movements are described within the context of socio-political dynamics in the Niger Delta. Historical review reveals similarities and differences between movements in the independence era and those in the 1990s. The current youth movements have a strong inclination to control resources on the community level. They tend to skip political benefits on the national level, moving directly to secure international supports for their movements.

Women’s movements are described from an organizational point of view. They develop outside the community, supported by nationwide women’s organizations. Such movements are characterized by formal protests and peaceful actions, even in the Niger Delta. Through the political transition to civil rule, new movements emerge on the community level and demonstrate their opposition in the form of direct action. Currently,

the women's movement has become one of main actors in the oil politics of the Niger Delta.

There are some implications from these case studies. First, the youth and women have been challenging a traditional system of their community, especially its resource allocation mechanism. They oppose the system and require an alternative social mechanism for mitigating their insecurities. Second, the traditional methods of conflict resolution have been challenged by popular movements. The customary conflict resolution mechanism is often neglected by the youth and women, who doubt the authority of elders and traditional rulers. Rather, they welcome intervention from third parties and the international community because those outsiders are expected both to be intermediate stakeholders and to fill in the resource gap in the post-conflict phase.

11. Peace-building and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective

Earl Conteh-Morgan

In order to enhance human security this chapter argues that peace-building (reconstruction efforts after war) should evaluate power relations and relations of power at the personal, institutional, and socio-cultural levels. Accordingly, the analysis is based on, among others, the following questions: What effect do the construction and reproduction of exploitative class/power elite identities have on the theory and practice of peace-building and human security in war-torn societies?; and What is the underlying structure of privilege to the formation and conduct of domestic politics? Culture and identity and an interpretive bottom-up approach to peace-building are crucial to peace-building and for understanding human security of marginalized individuals, groups, and communities. It involves an attempt to understand human security/insecurity in terms of those who experience them. Peace-building with a view to alleviating human insecurity involves transforming the social and political environment that fosters intolerable inequality, engenders historical grievances, and nurtures adversarial interactions. Utilizing examples of peace-building from the borderlands of Eastern Africa, Mozambique, and Rwanda, the chapter underscores the utility of indigenous methods of ensuring peace and human security through: (1) popular communal participation whose objective is to eradicate the root causes of conflict; (2) the utilization of rituals that foster collective "healing" rather than

retributive zero-sum approaches; and (3) localizing of justice and healing that lend more legitimacy to peace-building and thereby ensures security for all groups. For peace-building efforts to be durable, countries need to tap into their cultural indigenous resources for peacemaking and conflict resolution, while at the same time complementing them with external modern methods.

12. Human Security at the Crossroad: Human Security in the Japanese Foreign Policy Context

Nobumasa Akiyama

The Japanese government positioned the concept of human security as one key perspective of its foreign policy. Japan's approach toward human security stems from three major motives. First, it emerged from the need for Japan to cope with and take advantage of changing international environment for promoting its international aspirations in the post Cold War period. The Japanese commitment to human security emerged in the course of responding to Asian economic crises in the late 1990s. As a concrete measure, Japan led the establishment of the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security. In this sense, Japan took the approach to human security based on "freedom from want," rather "than freedom from fear."

Second, Japan has sought to establish a more responsible, aspired position in the international community, such as a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council. Promoting human security is considered useful way for this purpose. With constraints in the use of force, promoting human security may be able to supplement the lack of contribution by Japan to international peace and security.

Third, ODA and peace keeping/building activities have become the most important policy areas in Japan's foreign policy. In ODA policy, the concept is incorporated or reflected in various aspects. Peace keeping/building also contains a large portion of human security elements in its activities. Even if there is no statement explicitly linking peace keeping/building with human security in the Japanese policy papers, as seen in Canada, they are obviously closely linked to each other. Hence, Japan's increasing commitment to international peace activities raises the level of Japan's commitment to human security as well.

The 9.11 incident and following wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have reduced

the public and political attention to the concept of human security *per se*. However, the ‘elements’ of human security have become important in formulation of Japan’s foreign policy and contribution to the international community.

13. An Ethical Basis for Human Security and its Implications for Peace-building

Laurie Calhoun

This chapter examines features of “the moral perspective” and applies them to the issues of human security and peace-building in the contemporary world, drawing upon recent examples of the use of military approaches to conflict resolution.

While all leaders wield moral rhetoric, only some policies promote the well-being of the persons whom leaders have been charged to protect, and governmental policies do not reflect a moral perspective when they draw *moral* distinctions between the persons of different lands, for one’s place of residence is manifestly irrelevant to one’s moral personhood. While war is often justified by leaders on grounds of “self-defense,” the practices of modern military institutions are often difficult to reconcile with the ethical requirements widely accepted to constrain legitimate self-defense. If the sanctity of conscious human life is an essential element of the moral perspective, then policies leading to the slaughter of innocent people and their perfunctory characterization as “collateral damage” are morally dubious. The aspersion of enemy leaders as “evil” is furthermore counterproductive to the aims of human security and peace-building, precluding, as it does, the possibility of dialogue, and especially in view of the nuclear arms capacity shared by many nations today.

While nuclear disarmament is an admirable goal, the principle of simple consistency implies that nations must allow that their own policies and practices are equally valid for other nations. In other words, the abolition of nuclear weapons should apply not only to some but to all nations. In the light of cases such as Saddam Hussein and Osama bin-Laden, nations should also reconsider their policies regarding weapons exports and the training of the people of other lands to kill. In the end, it would appear that applying the moral perspective to questions of human security and peace-building may be the best practical approach to avoiding war and diminishing the incidence of factional terrorism in the future.

14. Implementing Human Security: Possibilities and Limits

Jim Whitman

The reality of state interests conditions states to act cautiously in respect of commitments – and this includes commitments to adhere to guiding principles or norms. In a rapidly changing international and global environment, it is to be expected that states will want to maintain their flexibility and at the same time, maximize their standing in the international community. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that by adopting and furthering human security as an international norm, states can open up maneuvering room for themselves between pragmatism and idealism; that the gap opening up between emergency and post-conflict humanitarianism on the one hand and the more preventive and developmental aspects of human security on the other can be narrowed; and that there are opportunities here for international leadership and enhanced international standing.

Chapter 1

The Concept of Human Security: Historical and Theoretical Implications

Hideaki Shinoda

1. Introduction

The concept of human security has drawn great attention among scholars as well as practitioners since the publication of *Human Development Report 1994* by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). While it is regarded as a reflection of the new security environment of the post-Cold War world, a large number of scholars are skeptical of the validity of the concept. They argue that it is too vague to be examined academically or it should not blur the importance of traditional security agendas.¹ What is characteristic is that while major military powers like the United States pay little attention to discussions on human security, middle rank powers like Canada take advantage of linking their foreign policies with the concept of human security. The latter includes the government of Japan, which has made efforts to set up a fund for human security. Some commentators find paradoxical human security being advocated by governments, as the concept is intended to go beyond national boundaries; others simply point out that the concept is used for the purpose of national interests.

This chapter does not simply present the measures that governments and international organizations have been conducting under the heading of human security, as if there is a sufficiently coherent and substantial “human security” policy. Instead, the chapter examines historical and theoretical implications of the concept of human security. By locating the concept in historical and theoretical contexts, it seeks to identify the merits and demerits of the use of the concept.

The first section looks at the historical background of the concept of security in

order to examine the reason why the post-Cold War world needs a concept like human security. The second section more specifically analyzes the concept of human security by focusing on UNDP's *Human Development Report 1994*. The next demonstrates the way the government of Japan makes use of the concept as a case study of the use of human security by a government. By so doing, the chapter identifies the purpose and the possibility of the concept of human security beyond superficial debates about whether human security renovates the traditional security paradigm or whether it is too idealistic to discuss human security.

2. Historical Background of the “Traditional” Concept of Security

“Security” in the political sense is not an old term. In the discipline of international relations the term means “national security” or the protection of the state from external threats. This particular meaning emerged from practices of international politics after the First World War.² The term itself may convey more general meanings including safety of individuals from violence or crimes, religious peace of mind, and financial measures to sustain a certain standard of living. Therefore, speaking of security in its political sense, we may add the adjective, national, to clarify the context. Literally, “national security” points to the security of the state at least to the extent we identify the state as “national.” This is what is referred to as the “traditional” concept of security in the discipline of international relations.

However, even the political connotation of the term is not purely confined to the “national” level, as shown by the use of the term at such regional levels as “Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe” or “Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.” As the “traditional” concept of security is not the only or original meaning of the term “security,” national security is not the only political meaning of the term. Military measures and foreign policies to secure the independence of a state are not exclusive components of the term “security.” The dominance of national security discourses in the discipline of international relations is a result of the very modern recognition that the safety of a nation is the supreme mission for policy makers.

“National security” is a metaphorical expression. The object of security in other

meanings is each individual, as individuals may be content with being secure. A nation cannot “feel” secure, because it is not a tangible entity. The idea of security of a nation is based on an analogy between a human being and a nation, which is a result of the “anthropomorphism of nations.”³ It is nationalism in the modern era that made it possible to conceive of a nation as a living entity, thereby making it an object of protection. For instance, security of a state mechanism possessed by a king before the modern era was not perceived as “national” security. The concept of “national” or “traditional” security was derived from the progress of national identity in modernization.

Given the historically contingent character of the “traditional” concept of security, it is necessary to examine it in a historical context. This chapter attempts to do so by highlighting three aspects of modern politics, democratization, internationalization and socialization, which enabled national security to be perceived as “traditional.”

First, democratization and constitutionalism in the modern era gave governments a new role of maintaining domestic order and security, which prepared for the modern political notion of security. For instance, in Britain after the Glorious Revolution, the protection of the fundamental rights of nationals through the restriction of the king’s power constituted a pillar of constitutionalism. Social contract theory dictated that government should be responsible for protecting individual rights, because that is the very reason why it was established. The basic premise developed in the modern era, as laissez faire political economy and utilitarianism led to minimization of the role of government or the political thought of the “night watch state.” What is important is that the minimized state was not a weak state. The state responsible for domestic order and security must have sufficiently coercive power to discharge the mission. The state’s governmental power must be strong enough to overwhelm any other domestic groups to protect the rights of nationals. The essential state mechanisms include well functioning police and military powers. The idea of the state responsible for security of nationals corresponds to its modern role in a system of constitutional government and in the eruption of democratic and nationalistic movements after the French Revolution.

Second, in the course of democratization the role of the state was extended to what I characterize as socialization of security of nationals. The minimized state based upon laissez faire economy advanced capitalism, but also nurtured mass anti-capitalistic

movements. The influence of liberal democracies was seriously cut due to the rise of communist powers after the Depression. As a result, the welfare state doctrine to take care of social and economic lives of nationals was introduced. In the post-1945 world, even in Britain and the United States, let alone other industrial countries, it was widely held that governmental cares must cover social security of nationals.

This process of socialization of security of nationals shows a certain important change. To maintain economic goods like oil and food became an indispensable policy of the state in the twentieth century. Such a policy might be interpreted as a measure to reinforce state power, but it was also pursued for social security of nationals. It is noticeable that in the process of democratization and constitutionalism, economic and social security came to be recognized as an inalienable right of nationals. This applies to the next point on internationalization as well.

Third, what we understand as the “traditional” concept of security was a result of internationalization of politics in the modern era. The balance of power was the dominant theory of foreign policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was believed to be most effective to stabilize international society where states pursue national interests without super-state authority. Under such a circumstance, war was an inevitable institution to adjust the balance of power.⁴ Under the premises of the balance of power, the concept of security was contingent. Major Powers bargained for territorial gains; small states were simply objects to be bargained for in the overall framework of the balance of power. In other words, national security of each state was not an absolute goal in international society.

The idea of collective security in the twentieth century demonstrated a change in the normative structure of international society. National security of each state was now the common goal that the entire international society ought to maintain. The idea was founded upon the premise that every state was responsible for every state’s security. Although the idea collapsed at the time of the Second World War and the United Nations remained virtually ineffective since its establishment, during the Cold War the two superpowers were expected to be responsible for security of other states in their own camps. The so-called bipolar system showed the two facts in the twentieth century. On one hand, the principle of national self-determination and sovereign equality established the premise that national security of each state should be respected. On the

other, no state other than the superpowers can maintain national security independently and therefore national security of each state is maintained in international systems of alliances. This is what I call internationalization of national security.

The process took place in the economic and social fields. The establishment of various international agencies like WHO (World Health Organization), UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), WFP (World Food Programme), UNDP (UN Development Programme), UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) indicate that the post-1945 world extended the concern for economic and social lives of people internationally. Bilateral or multilateral aids between states expanded and created the notion that international agencies and industrial states are somehow responsible for economic and social security of developing states. Now social security is not an exclusively national term; it has international dimensions.

I argue that these three aspects surrounding the modern concept of security more or less prepared for the emergence of human security discourses. In other words, the idea of public authorities responsible for political, economic and social security of people at the national as well as international level is the historical usher of the concept of human security. I shall next look at this point by focusing on the discourse on human security in the post-Cold War world.

3. The Appearance of the Concept of Human Security

It is pointed out that the concept of human security was often mentioned before 1994,⁵ as the end of the Cold War ushered in the moment for re-examining the "traditional" concept of security. However, it was UNDP's *Human Development Report 1994* that really made human security a common currency among scholars and practitioners of international affairs. Advancing the discussion on "capability" introduced by Amartya Sen and *Human Development Report 1993* which first mentioned the concept of human security, the 1994 version provided a systematic explanation of it. It should be noted that the concept is therefore foremost understood as a tool for discussing a particular type of development. The reason why this chapter looks at the *Report* from a political perspective is its influence upon discussions in the discipline of international relations and its use by policy makers.

According to the *Report*, human development is defined as “a process of widening the range of people’s choices.” And human security means “that people can exercise these choices safely and freely - and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow.”⁶ The latter is “a critical ingredient of participatory development.” If given the opportunities to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living, people will set themselves free and ensure that they can make a full contribution to developments of themselves, their local communities, their countries and the world.⁷ In this way, the *Report* explains that the concept of human security advanced from the perspective of development with special reference to its four characteristics: Universal concern, interdependent, ensured by early prevention and people-centered.⁸

A “more explicit definition” of human security is provided by two main aspects: “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression,” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life.” Quoting the US Secretary of State reporting to his government on the results of conference in San Francisco in 1945 that set up the United Nations, the *Report* emphasized that the two freedoms, “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want,” were recognized at the founding of the UN. The *Report* deplores, however, that the concept of security has been linked only to “freedom from fear.”⁹

The *Report* then insists on making “a transition from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of human security.” It is a change from “an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security” and “from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.” More specifically, human security is considered in seven main categories: Economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Economic security requires jobs to secure an assured basic income. Food security means that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic foods. Health security is to provide healthy environment and health services to meet the challenges of poor nutrition, infectious diseases, and so on. Environmental security is concerned with lack of access to clean water, deforestation, salinization, air pollution, natural disasters, and so on. Personal security is to protect human lives from threats of various kinds of violence by states and other groups. This includes categories

like crimes, industrial and traffic accidents, threats to women, abuse of children. Community security is about threats like oppressive practices and ethnic clashes in traditional communities. Political security means the protection of human rights and democratization. Furthermore, as “global human security,” the *Report* refers to unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and international terrorism.¹⁰

The concept of human security supplies “early warning indicators” to signal “the risk of national breakdown.” Such indicators consist of deteriorating food consumption, high unemployment and declining wages, human rights violations, incidents of ethnic violence, widening regional disparities and an overemphasis on military spending. The *Report* exemplifies Afghanistan, Angola, Haiti, Iraq, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sudan and Zaire (currently Democratic Republic of Congo) as countries in various stages of crises. It calls for determined national and international actions including preventive and curative development to support processes of social integration. The standpoint of the *Report* to emphasize preventive actions is derived from the recognition that long-term developmental aid is more crucial than short-term humanitarian assistance. As a result, human security is considered to demand “policies for social integration.”¹¹

Now we may observe that this comprehensive concept of human security discussed by UNDP is so broad that it lacks conceptual clarity and covers too diverse topics. On the other hand, it has the advantage of systematically understanding various international assistances in order to provide an overall conceptual map for coordination. This gives rise to the view commonly shared by both supporters and critics that human security is opposed to state-centric “realism” and challenges the “traditional” concept of security. It is true that characteristics of human security mentioned in the *Report* are intended to be distinct from state-centric views. However, they do not necessarily challenge the state. The examination of the concept of human security in historical and theoretical contexts would prove it.

First, it should be pointed out that the concept of human security has the historical and theoretical tradition, which was one of the pillars of international norms after the Second World War. The *Report* explains that “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” are the two ingredients of human security, and both were among four freedoms that US President Franklin Roosevelt addressed in 1941 as the objectives of the Second

World War. In the same year Roosevelt made public the Atlantic Charter together with British Prime Minister Churchill by highlighting only “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” out of the four freedoms. The *Report* was correct to say that the two freedoms were fully recognized at the establishment of the United Nations. The two were the justifications for the Second World War on the side of the united nations allies, which is the reason why the UN set up the Economic and Social Council, departing from the precedent of the League of Nations. While it would be also correct to say that the “traditional” notion of security is mainly concerned with territorial and military affairs, we can find a gradual expansion of economic and social security needs at the international level as a result of democratization, socialization and internationalization in the twentieth century.

Second, the *Report* corresponds to previous theoretical frameworks in various academic discussions. For instance, the perspective of the *Report* is well understood as the advocacy for economic and social human rights in contrast to civil and political human rights. In the field of Peace Studies, Johann Galtung introduced the concept of positive peace as the absence of structural violence in opposition to the concept of negative peace as the absence of war. In fact, the *Report* emphasized that positive peace in addition to negative peace is a matter of security. In other words, the aim of human security advanced by UNDP is to shift more focus from political concerns to the importance of economic and social issues. As the first point suggests, this perspective was persistent throughout the period of the Cold War.

Third, the contrast between “traditional” security and human security is described as the contrast between “defensive” and “integrative” concepts;¹² they are not necessarily contradictory. For instance, the *Report* warned against the high ratio of military spending to education and health spending in Iraq and Somalia. This showed that human security demands a well-proportioned and integrated pursuit of various security measures, and “traditional” territorial and military concerns are simply located in a broad context of human security. It would be fair to say that the *Report* did not sufficiently make an effort to show it, which is understandable because the *Report* was prepared by a UN agency for development. Still, given that the *Report* identifies “threats from other states” as threats against human security in the category of “personal security,” the elements of “traditional” security are incorporated within the context of

human security.

Fourth, while human security is not a state-centric idea, the subjects of security measures are governments and intergovernmental agencies. The *Report* seems to be addressed to officials in governments and intergovernmental agencies. The conclusion drawn from the perspective of human security is that the state should decide on policies not for the state, but for people, and not only for people in a state but for people in the world. This does not mean that the *Report* ignores private organizations and individuals. Nevertheless, human security is not advocated somewhere outside the sphere of states; it is addressed to the states that adjust their policies to new needs.

Fifth, the concept of human security understood in the historical context does not appear to revolutionize the established order and values, but rather strengthen them systematically. That is why the *Report* characterized human security as the “integrative” concept that demands “policies for social integration.” Such policies do not deny the sovereign states system upon which the UN relies; they seek to reinforce it. While pluralistic values to respect diversity of states and other actors in international society would be the foundation of such policies, strengthening the function of states is the major course of human security. It is this “integrative” perspective of human security that aims to provide a systematic and comprehensive view for coordinating various international activities.

In spite of this relation of human security with the “traditional” international system of sovereign states, this chapter does not intend to underestimate the contribution of the *Report*. Instead, it insists that the concept of human security should not simply be understood as a radical and revolutionary idea against state-centrism or as a catchy word in tandem with discussions on the “decline of sovereign states.” Its importance resides in its integrative and comprehensive perspective to revitalize the values of post-1945 international society and reconstruct a strategy to coordinate various international aid activities of governments and intergovernmental agencies corresponding to contemporary needs.

4. The Concepts of Human Security and Peace-building

UNDP’s concept still constitutes the core of our understanding of human security.

However, its tone was not shared perfectly by all who discuss human security. For instance, among the governments that like to refer to human security, the government of Canada under the leadership of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy emphasized the military aspect of human security, so that it could defend “humanitarian intervention” like the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999.¹³ The governments of the United States and Great Britain that led the 2003 Iraq war do not speak of human security, but it would not be absurd to speculate that their logic of justifying Saddam Hussein’s inhumane regime by war is an unexpected extension of Axworthy’s position on human security.

Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen’s Commission on Human Security defined that human security is “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.” By intentionally using these broad and ambiguous words, the Commission states that “Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”¹⁴ In short, human security includes what we have understood as humanitarian aid, peace operations and sustainable development. It does not introduce something new. It reiterates the importance of what we understood as important under the heading of human security.

We are then told that human security does not oppose national security. It does not exclude any method to protect people including use of force. So what is the point of referring to human security instead of other concepts, if it includes almost everything? The answer lies with the concept’s broadness and ambiguity.

It was symbolic that UNDP’s *Report* emphasized the importance of early prevention as the essence of human security, then UNDP was able to present development as a topic of security. It actually advocated shifting international resources in the post-Cold War era from defense to developmental aid. Human security as a broad concept reiterates the importance of development while downgrading the need for traditional national security spending under the heading of security. Human security was used to discuss better allocations of limited resources of international society. It was

intended to introduce a perspective to coordinate various international activities in a certain manner. It had to be broad so that it could cover divergent issues. Its ambiguity never promised a final answer to practical problems, but that is not the point. What human security shows is that we need a broad concept in order to discuss how to coordinate various competing activities of international society.

When Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced “peace-building” in the paradigm of UN peace operations, his intention was almost the same as UNDP’s intention to introduce human security.¹⁵ Boutros-Ghali included social and economic development as a topic of peace-building in addition to demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights and electoral reform.¹⁶

This illustrates the importance of discussing human security in the context of peace-building and vice versa. Whether the US government likes human security or whether the government of Japan does not clearly distinguish between human security and peace-building, it is crucial to admit that we live in a world where we have so many divergent complex problems and where we need to think and act according to such broad concepts as human security and peace-building.

In the next section, I will use Japan to illustrate how the concept of human security was introduced in the language of national policy makers and will identify its actual uses in the contemporary world.

5. The Japanese Government’s Interest in Human Security

What this chapter calls democratization, socialization and internationalization of security in the twentieth century have been conspicuous among industrial countries. This applies to Japan among others. As its military power is constitutionally constrained, Japan naturally constructs security policies to cover not only military affairs but also economic and social affairs. The oil crisis in the 1970s accelerated the moment for Japan to develop a broad security perspective. The concept of “sogo-anzenhoshou” or “comprehensive security” emerged.¹⁷ The scope of “comprehensive security” corresponded with that of human security in the sense that both are intended to cover economic and social security concerns in addition to military ones,¹⁸ although the

concept of comprehensive security does not address “human-centered” perspectives.

Considering such an experience, it is not surprising that the government of Japan takes notice of the appearance of the concept of human security and introduced it favorably as a guiding principle of its foreign policies. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), “Japan emphasizes ‘Human Security’ from the perspective of strengthening efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel land mines, and has taken various initiatives in this context. To ensure ‘Human freedom and potential,’ a range of issues needs to be addressed from the perspective of ‘Human Security’ focused on the individual, requiring cooperation among the various actors in the international community, including governments, international organizations and civil society.”¹⁹

The reference to human security by Japan did not appear until after the Asian financial crisis. At an international conference held in December 1998, Prime Minister Keizo Ouchi remarked:

The current economic crisis has aggravated those strains, threatening the daily lives of many people. Taking this fact fully into consideration, I believe that we must deal with these difficulties with due consideration for the socially vulnerable segments of population, in the light of “Human Security,” and that we must seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development of our region....While the phrase “human security” is a relatively new one, I understand that it is the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats....To support Asian countries in this economic crisis, we have pledged and steadily implemented contributions on the largest scale in the world. With Human Security in mind, we have given, as one of the most important pillars of our support, assistance to the poor, the aged, the disabled, women and children, and other socially vulnerable segments of

population on whom economic difficulties have the heaviest impacts.²⁰

Obuchi mentioned human security on his visit to Vietnam in the same month, and pledged to contribute 500 million yen (US\$ 4.2 million) to the establishment of the “Human Security Fund” under the United Nations.²¹ Obuchi and his Foreign Minister continued to mention human security in the Japan’s national Diet and the UN General Assembly.²² The topic of human security was discussed at several international conferences hosted by the government of Japan and raised by Japan at summit meetings.²³

Yukio Takasu, Director-General of Multilateral Cooperation Department of the MOFA, explains the Japanese interest in human security by stating that:

The Japanese understanding of human security is very similar to the comprehensive and inclusive concept advocated by UNDP. I believe that Japan’s experience since the end of the Second World War in promoting prosperity and the well-being of its people through economic and social development makes it particularly well-prepared to advocate such a broad concept of human security. We are confident, moreover, that this is the direction in which the world will be heading in the 21st century.²⁴

Takasu continues to link human security to Japanese foreign policy by emphasizing that “Human security is not a brand-new concept. While the ultimate responsibility of a state is to protect its territory and safeguard the survival and well-being of its people, sound governments have long pursued human security as part of their national policy.” While admitting that “the level of attention and high priority accorded to human security internationally these days are a reflection of several developments,” he adds that:

I must hasten to add that the role of government will not diminish in a human-centered century. Human security efforts will not replace national security arrangements - the protection of territory and the life and property of the people remain the responsibility of government. While national

security is prerequisite for ensuing security - that is, the survival and dignity of the individual - it is not the only requirement. Even if a state becomes rich and strong, there is no guarantee that the individuals who live in that state will be safe and rich. The role of government is to provide a foundation or environment that will enable individuals to take care of themselves and to develop their capabilities without undue restrictions.²⁵

It is evident that the Japanese government took advantage of the possibilities of human security by linking it to the international position of Japan. The central role of governments for human security provides Japan with a new mission. MOFA's *Diplomatic Blue Book 2000* referred to the concept of human security as an overall principle for Japan to tackle such broad international problems as global environmental issues, terrorism, transnational organized crime and drugs, protection of human rights and promotion of democratization, healthcare, international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear power and science and technology and international emergency assistance for natural disasters. The Human Security Fund established by the Japanese contribution to the UN has initiated projects ranging from the Human Dignity Initiative Project carried out by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Medical Training Project in Tajikistan, designed by UNDP, the Tokyo International Conference on Semipalatinsk, to the Emergency School Rehabilitation in Decane, Kosovo, carried out by UNICEF with a Japanese NGO. Japan also earmarked 6.6 billion yen for the Fund from the Fiscal Year 1999 supplementary budget to assist the rehabilitation of Kosovo and the return of refugees, as well as the rehabilitation of East Timor.²⁶ The Japanese government sponsored "the Commission on Human Security."²⁷

Considering its political aspects, some characteristics of Japanese interest in human security follows.

First, the Japanese use of human security was derived from practical considerations. To rescue Asian countries from the financial crisis was not only "human-centered," but also in accordance with national interests of Japan. It is crucial for Japan's economic recovery to keep strong markets in Asia. It is also important for Japan's political leadership that it shows concerns over the plight of Asian countries.

Second, it goes without saying that the government of Japan has no intention to imply a decline of nation states by referring to human security. What is crucial is to create effective governmental systems. The government of Japan expressed its willingness to conduct human security measures, but demanded due respect for such efforts. Human security in this sense is not an idea of universal cosmopolitanism: it is simply international at best.

Third, it seems that the Japanese interest in human security was developed from its previous Official Developmental Aid (ODA). While Japan does not violate the principle of non-interference, ODA would not simply be beneficial to host-governments or power holders and Japanese firms. Human security accords perfectly with the orientation that the government of Japan insists it keeps in ODA projects.

Fourth, the soft image of human security creates no obstacle for Japan. Due to the constitutional constraints and historical disadvantages, Japan has difficulty in earning a good reputation in international cooperation concerning “traditional” security issues such as participation in peacekeeping operations. Human security is apparently expected to enable Japan to compensate for weakness in the “traditional” security field. The “incumbent” permanent members of the Security Council established their status in the “traditional” security field, and Japan might be a leading force in a newly recognized field called human security.

Fifth, as human security needs the subject of providing security and the object to be secured, the government of Japan seems to presuppose an uneven relationship between Japan and people in other (developing) countries. Of course, the government of Japan is not ready to commit itself to really comprehensive security measures for people throughout the world. Still, Japan does not only assist international agencies working for human security, but also wants to implement human security measures by itself, recognizing that it is on the side of providers of security.

Sixth, despite the above points, the Japanese government has yet demonstrated any strategy of human security. “Traditional” security measures have usually been conducted according to certain “strategies,” however, the Japanese advocacy of human security still lacks a coherent strategic vision to coordinate various policies.

By pointing out these aspects, this chapter does not intend to criticize the Japanese use of the concept of human security. It should rather be taken for granted that

the Japanese policy does not harm national interests of Japan. By saying that the concept of human security does not bring in anything substantially new in Japanese foreign policies, however, this chapter argues that human security provided Japan with a useful phrase to pursue its own means of international cooperation.

6. Concluding Remarks

Human security has not gained ground in countries like the United States. This especially applies to the post-9-11 social environment in the US. With the expanded interest in military affairs, human security tended to be understood as an even more unclear notion, if not irrelevant. This has affected the government of Japan, too. Since September 2001, the Japanese government has not simply emphasized its commitments to human security. Japanese foreign policy makers seem to be preoccupied with how to keep up with the military actions of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq as the US's major ally. They also seem to be mostly worried about the security threat from North Korea.

However, it is a matter of course that the change of focus in the diplomatic discourses does not mean that human security has become less important. As this chapter has suggested, human security has been introduced because our contemporary world needs comprehensive approaches to security. This need remains unchanged. The concept of human security as well as that of peace-building should not be praised or devalued as a result of short-sighted preoccupation with changing international events. The contents of human security may not be exciting enough, but it should not be a victim of those who only look for fashionable phrases to advance their narrow interests.

Notes

¹ Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2001, pp. 87-102.

² Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "Jyoshou: Anzenhoshou no shuen?: fuan to anzen no seijigaku (Introduction: The end of security?: Politics of fear and safety)," *Kokusaiseiji (International Relations)*, vol. 117, 1998, p. 2; and Hiroshi Nakanishi, "Anzenhoshou gainen no rekishiteki saikentou (A historical re-examination of the concept of security)"

in Akaneya Tatsuo and Ochiai Kotaro (eds.), *Atarashii Anzenhoshou no Shiza (A New Perspective of New Security)* (Tokyo: Aki Shobou, 2001), pp. 33-36.

³ Hideaki Shinoda, *Re-examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the Global Age* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 53.

⁴ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), Chapter 8.

⁵ Kaoruko Kurusu, "Ningen no anzenhoshou (Human security)," *Kokusaiseiji (International Relations)*, vol. 117, 1998, pp. 86-89.

⁶ UNDP, *Human Development Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-37.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹³ Rob McRae and Don Hubert (eds.), *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), pp. 111-133.

¹⁴ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003), p. 4.

¹⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, Second Edition (New York: United Nations, 1995), pp. 19-22.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁷ Hiroshi Nakanishi, "Nihon no anzenhoshou keiken: kokukmin seizonken ron kara sogo-anzenhoshou ron e (Japanese security experience: From the notion of the "right of national survival to the 'comprehensive security strategy'"), *Kokusaiseiji (International Relations)*, vol. 117, 1998, pp. 150-154.

¹⁸ Noboru Miyawaki, "Reisen go no anzenhoshou gainen no tayouka: nigen no anzenhoshou ron wo chushini (Multiplication of concepts of security in the post-Cold War era: Focusing on human security)," *Zaidanhoujin nihon gakujuutsu kyoryoku zaidan* (ed.), *Reisen go no ajia no anzenhoshou (Asian Security after the Cold War)* (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, 1997), p. 54.

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000: Toward the 21st Century: Foreign Policy for a Better Future*, 2000 <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/index.html>>

²⁰ Keizo Obuchi, "Opening remarks by Prime Minister Obuchi at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998 <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html>>

²¹ Keizo Obuchi, "Policy speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi at the Lecture Program hosted by the Institute for International Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam, 'Toward the Creation of A Bright Future of Asia,'" <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html>>

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²³ Keizo Takemi, “Keynote Address by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Keizo Takemi: ‘New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century which focus on the Dignity of the Individual’ at the International Symposium on Development, 24 June 1999, The United Nations University, Tokyo <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html>; Keizo Takemi, “Address by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Keizo Takemi at a Lecture Meeting hosted by the Asia Society ‘Capacity Building for Human Dignity: the Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,’” September 1, 1999, Asia Society, New York <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html>; Yukio Takasu, “Statement by Director-General Yukio Takasu at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan-Bator, 8 May 2000” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0005.html>; Yukio Takasu, “Statement by Mr. Yukio Takasu, Director-General of Multilateral Cooperation Department, at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World, June 19, 2000 Bangkok <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html>; Yukio Takasu, “Statement by Mr. Yukio Takasu, Director-General, Multilateral Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the Symposium on the International Movement of People and Immigration Policy toward the 21st century, 29 November, 2000, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0011.html>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “G8 Gaishou sokatsu (G8 Foreign Ministers Summary)” in Gaimushou (ed.), *op. cit.*; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Summary of International Symposium on Human Security, August 2000” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “International Symposium on Human Security from the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit to UN Millennium Summit, Tokyo, 28 July, 2000 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0007.html>.

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²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *op. cit.*, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*.

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Chapter 2

Operational Phases of Human Security Measures in and after Armed Conflict: How Can We Link Humanitarian Aid to Peace-building?

Hideaki Shinoda

1. Introduction

Human security provides a strategic perspective of a link between humanitarian aid and peace-building.¹ This chapter argues that human security in the context of armed conflict has multiple faces. During conflict, human security is pursued through humanitarian emergency aid for refugees and internally displaced people, medical care for war victims, and so on. This is a kind of symptomatic treatment. A deteriorating situation may critically require surgical operations to protect civilians physically and terminate armed conflict itself in the form of humanitarian intervention. These measures during conflict will lose importance, however, unless efforts for durable peace are also implemented. Establishing reliable governance and social stability must also be understood as a pillar of human security.

The link between humanitarian aid and peace-building indicates a fundamental question about different goals of the two needs. Protection of individuals might not necessarily create a peaceful society; Creating, keeping and building peace may not pay enough attention to humanitarian causes. Human security is a perspective that gives us a clue as to how to understand the link between the two needs.

This chapter identifies the roles of different components of international society

in various stages of human security measures. The military has to be recognized as a necessary component of human security, although the necessity should not be overstated. The police have relevant but distinct roles to play. The international aid community composed of international organizations and NGOs plays key roles in humanitarian emergencies as well as long-term developmental aid. More technical areas including judiciary and administrative bureaus demand significant contributions from international experts. These components are mobilized for the distinct goals of humanitarian aid and peace-building. Thus, they should have such a common guiding principle as human security in order to organize their activities strategically.

2. Human Security as a Perspective for International Aid and Peace-building

Human security is of great value in its comprehensive perspective. It reminds us of interrelatedness of multiple human needs, which we tend to overlook due to the division of organizational lines. What international society is expected to do for people in conflict-ridden society is, most fundamentally, two-fold: meeting humanitarian needs and helping build peaceful society.² Serious armed conflicts or “complex humanitarian emergencies” cause crises in a great number of people’s physical security, food and water security, health security and environmental security. Alternatively, it could be fair to say that the lack of human security is a hotbed of armed conflict.³ In order to meet this category of needs, humanitarian aid organizations cut into conflict-ridden society and surrounding areas. But armed conflict not only creates miseries among individuals, it destroys ordinary people’s social lives requiring international peace operations in addition to many other international organizations, governmental agencies and NGOs to intervene to reconstruct peaceful society.

The two activities, humanitarian aid and peace-building, are highly related to each other in the field of armed conflict. However, since there is a clear division of labor on the side of international actors, the link between the two is sometimes neglected. Various divergent actors like the International Committee of Red Cross and UN Peacekeeping Missions engage in humanitarian aid and peace operations separately.⁴ It is true that humanitarian workers consciously make efforts not to politicize their activities. They are afraid that cooperation with peace operations may politicize and

sacrifice their humanitarianism, as conflict parties may look at them in political contexts and refuse to recognize the neutrality of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, how humanitarian organizations construct a balanced relationship with peace operations is itself a matter of consideration here.

When armed conflict begins, we try to provide vital needs of human lives like water, food, medicine, sanitation, shelter, clothes and fuel. There must be efforts made to protect people's lives or liberty from physical threats. The provider of humanitarian services must also be protected physically. However, humanitarian aid does not guarantee durable human security. It may make people vulnerable and dependent upon foreign aid. It may not be able to distinguish between victims and wrongdoers, and as a result, prolong conflict. Long-term human security will be achieved only when peace-building succeeds in establishing local good governance and stable society. Therefore, the perspective of human security demands that humanitarian aid and peace-building be well coordinated for the sake of the integrated objective of human security.

So, we need to ask ourselves how we can link humanitarian aid to peace-building from the perspective of human security? Humanitarian aid and peace-building are two dimensions of multiple human security measures; the former points to short-term and individual-based demands of human security and the latter deals with long-term and group-oriented goals of human security. It is, thus, necessary for aid workers to recognize how the requirement of peace affects the orientation of humanitarian aid. It is also important for those engaged in peace-building to incorporate humanitarian needs into the framework of their missions.

This point does not indicate that professionals in each field have to compromise their specialties. The primary responsibility of each agency is to exert all their professional powers according to their aims. Still, it also holds true that international actors working to help people in conflict-ridden society can achieve the maximum possible degree of human security when they understand concerns in other fields. When activities of international actors are well coordinated regardless of the boundary between humanitarian and peace-building needs, local people's own efforts can also be well incorporated into the overall objective of human security.

3. Coincidence and Contradiction of Humanitarian Aid and Peace-building

The ultimate goals of humanitarian aid and peace-building overlap. The establishment of durable peace certainly leads to improvement of humanitarian needs. It can be said that the former is in a way a prerequisite for the latter's sustainable realization. It is also true that the elimination of humanitarian disasters will be a foundation for peaceful society. A society where people struggle with extreme poverty cannot be called peaceful. Human security aims to improve conditions for humanitarian aid and peace-building. Both are committed to enhancing human security.

The key to satisfying humanitarian needs and maintaining peace is establishing reliable and effective indigenous public authorities. Sustainable indigenous systems provide human security permanently and international society can only help local people achieve such a goal. With such an authority, improvement of economic and social conditions will contribute to meeting humanitarian needs and peace. Both humanitarian aid and peace-building strive to cultivate such a route.

Nevertheless, the two activities are not always beneficial to each other. Advancement of humanitarian aid sometimes hinders peace process. On some occasions, the logic of peace tends to ignore humanitarian demands. Humanitarian aid workers do not or cannot distinguish those who support peace and those who do not. The guiding principle of humanitarian aid is to meet humanitarian needs. As a result, aid workers might find themselves in a position to give militias a safe haven, for instance, in the form of a refugee camp. They could become a financial source of criminal armed groups. Notorious examples are the camps for Rwandan refugees in Zaire and Tanzania between 1994 and 1996. Among the refugees whom international aid organizations protected were former soldiers and paramilitaries who committed the genocide. Humanitarian organizations were powerless against the militias who controlled the camps. Humanitarian organizations demanded international forces deploy to provide order in the refugee camps, but no government responded effectively.⁵ Kofi Annan, then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, later recalled that he "even considered the possibility of engaging a private firm," although international society was apparently not ready to "privatize peace."⁶ The inability of international society to change the situation prepared the attack upon the camps by the rebel group in Zaire and the

Rwandan national army. This tragic end of the controversial humanitarian aid operation resulted in the disappearance of about 350,000 refugees in the border area due to fighting, hunger, infectious diseases, and so on. Under such circumstances the Rwandan president claimed that humanitarian aid had been the major destabilizing factor in the region.⁷

It is commonly seen that concerns about peace lead people to downgrade humanitarian needs. No international organization or governmental agency intervened in Russia and China to suspend humanitarian crises in Chechen and Tibet, since such interventions would have seriously disrupted stability of international society. The United States dispelled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 with the help of the Northern Alliance. Thus the US keeps silent on the Northern Alliance's atrocities. The central government in Kabul closes its eyes to human rights violations in the areas controlled by warlords in fear of political confrontations.

Humanitarian aid is powerless in face of politically motivated armed groups. Fragile peace does not afford to allow for unconditional humanitarian aid. Pursuit of humanitarian aid could endanger peace. Concerns about peace could sacrifice humanitarianism. To meet the two different needs is a difficult task, although the demand for human security aims for the two. It is probably fair to say that perfect human security is too difficult to achieve, as there are various competing demands.

The value of human security is not to hide contradictions like the tension between humanitarian aid and peace-building. Such a comprehensive perspective as human security is intended to function as a tool for well-balanced coordination of various divergent activities. In practice, while we have to understand fundamental incompatibility between various competing demands, we should also make efforts to find the best way to implement human security measures. The importance of such a comprehensive concept as human security lies in its possibility to provide a coordinating perspective.

In the next section, this chapter seeks to identify how the tension between humanitarian aid and peace-building can be well coordinated in the context of armed conflict. It argues that human security is a perspective to provide balanced views in and after armed conflict. In accordance with the stages of armed conflict, the chapter examines the roles of various international humanitarian aid and peace-building

organizations.

4. Mid-Conflict Phase

Humanitarian and Peace-building Activities during Conflict

In the mid-conflict phase unarmed humanitarian organizations would have difficulty discharging their mission, but given that ordinary civilians constitute a majority of victims in contemporary armed conflict, there is a strong need for humanitarian organizations to work. Thus emergency aid organizations including UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF as well as prominent NGOs like *Médecine sans frontières*, OXFAM, and CARE work hard to provide suffering people with vital services. Their activities are critical and indispensable for the ordinary people under conflict. Especially when a great number of refugees and/or internally displaced persons are moved out of conflict areas, international aid could be the only channel to sustain their lives.

Usually developmental organizations do not start working until armed conflict ends. Nevertheless, it is said that this attitude leaves a gap between emergency aid and developmental aid making local people vulnerable in the transitional period.⁸ Therefore, it is desirable for developmental organizations to be engaged before the end of conflict. In the first place, the presence of staff itself prepares swift needs assessment in liaison with emergency aid organizations. If international organizations cannot function without a legitimate government to be established after conflict, NGOs are able to act more flexibly. They would help local populations maintain a certain level of economy. NGOs are also able to provide refugees or displaced people with job training for smooth future returns. NGOs are expected to be more flexible about job creation in refugee camps. They may find ways to maintain local economy so that people will not lose all the economic and social means to live thereby making them very dependent upon emergency aid. In addition, the means to block exploitation of economic and social resources by conflict parties including economic sanctions should ideally be implemented.

The involvement of the military in humanitarian aid is a source of controversies, but military components widely believed as neutral, like UN peacekeeping forces, could be authorized to help humanitarian aid. UN humanitarian agencies as well as NGOs find

it easier to cooperate with UN forces. Sometimes more robust measures to protect local populations could be required. Balanced-involvements of military components contribute to humanitarian as well peace-building needs.⁹ When the military is inappropriate or even impotent, military police or civilian police may play crucial roles. Innovative uses of policemen in both humanitarian aid and peace-building could be important to assure a smooth link between them.

More aggressive use of force to attack recalcitrant forces on the ground tend to be conducted by regional actors like NATO, since the UN's wish to be neutral does not fit into such a mission.¹⁰ When enforcement measures are taken, political and legal discussions about legitimacy inevitably arise, as in the case of NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999. Lighter uses of force by "multinational forces" in the cases of Haiti in 1994 and 2004 and East Timor in 1999 is a realistic option, since the deployment of UN forces takes a considerable length of time.¹¹ Yet, ideally, multinational forces should be legitimized by the UN Security Council before or after deployment. This chapter only notes that the needs of peace-building could not afford to exclude necessity of taking enforcement measures in ultimate situations. Namely, enforcement options should not be excluded categorically, although serious considerations must always be taken.

When military contingents are deployed during conflict, they may be given a mandate to create "safe havens" or "humanitarian corridors." The idea of safe havens became popular after the successful creation of such a zone for Kurdish people in Northern Iraq in 1991, but became notorious after the political controversy concerning the French made safe haven in southern Rwanda in 1994 and the tragedy of Srebrenica in 1995. Whether the military should physically create such zones is a matter of policy consideration to be determined in accordance with specific circumstances in the field, but it should be noted that in some situations military measures are the only ultimate option to make humanitarian aid possible.

This chapter also identifies the role of legal personnel during conflict. Legal services may count as humanitarian work in refugee camps or detention centers, since they help refugees obtain legal status. It may be desirable for legal personnel to begin collecting evidence for future war crimes tribunals as well as reconciliation commissions, or at least for a case against serious human rights abuses. When investigative NGOs find room for activities during conflict, efforts to protect them must

be taken. It is also possible to say that political leaders as negotiators/brokers should function as coordinators of human security related activities.

Table 1: Mid-conflict phase

	Humanitarian needs	Peace-building needs
Emergency aid	- Providing vital services for survival	- Suspending operations which are beneficial to conflict parties
Developmental aid	- Keeping (assessing) local economy - Developmental aids like job training in circumscribed areas like refugees camps	- Blocking economic gains of conflict parties
Military force	- Protection of aid workers - Protection of civilians - Creation of humanitarian corridors or safe zones	- Military action to prevent conflict from spreading - Military action to enforce a ceasefire - Creation of buffer zones
Civilian police/ Police force	- Keeping order at sites of humanitarian aid	- Maintenance of order in circumscribed areas like refugees camps - Preparing to investigate war crimes - Fencing off sensitive sites
Legal personnel	- Dissemination of humanitarian law information - Monitoring human rights abuses	- Preparing to investigate war crimes
Negotiators	- Securing humanitarian access	- Broker a peace agreement

The Gap between Humanitarian Aid and Peace-building during Conflict

In the mid-conflict phase the gap between the needs of humanitarian aid and peace-building often becomes evident. Humanitarian organizations usually do not afford to distinguish between purely civilian victims and disguised or potential soldiers. They do not have the means to counter harassment or exploitation of warlords. Well-balanced decision-making after exhausting possible help from other agencies is required.

Since humanitarian organizations are not necessarily expected to work for peace, their contribution to peace-building would be summarized in the negative. Namely, they should be cautious not to empower violent forces. If humanitarian aid unintentionally solidifies disrupting groups, its impact upon peace-building becomes counterproductive.

Conversely, military actions to enforce peace are sometimes harmful to

humanitarian operations, since they heighten hostilities to international aid workers on the ground. Keeping and appealing neutrality is crucial for aid workers. Otherwise, they would be regarded as part of conflict, rather than humanitarian third parties. When Western nations are conducting military actions in non-Western countries, this especially applies to Western aid workers. The logic of humanitarianism strictly distinguishes between humanitarian organizations and the military. However, the logic of conflict may not accept it.

The most controversial issue is the direct involvement of the military in humanitarian aid. During the Balkan conflicts in which NATO forces deployed under the UN authority as a third party, humanitarian organizations received *de facto* protection from them. Joint air control was introduced after the Sarajevo airlift. In 1994, shortly after the genocide in Rwanda and a massive refugee flow into the neighboring countries, the military air control contributed to the logistical dimension of humanitarian aid. After the emergency operation was over and the military withdrew, humanitarian organizations began to agonize over the refugee camps controlled by militias. So they asked for more involvement of the military to impose order in the camps. The relationship became more controversial in the 1999 Kosovo crisis. NATO conducted an air campaign against Serbia without UN authorization. NATO member countries themselves engaged in providing basic materials for refugees. UNHCR cemented a close tie with NATO, which was an apparent departure from its traditional principle of neutrality. UNHCR decided to cooperate with NATO in face of the emergency on the ground and as a result sacrificed its relationship with the Serbian authorities. The decision has been critically described.¹²

5. Transitional Phase

Humanitarian and Peace-building Activities in the Transitional Phase

In the transitional phase after brokered peace agreements or termination of armed conflict, society is often fragile and susceptible to criminal activities including riots, looting, terror and physical violence in the forms of vandalism, factional disputes, revenge, rape, and so on. While emergency aid should continue during conflict, appropriate measures must be taken to meet new security needs. Military and, if

possible, police personnel must act swiftly and rigorously in this phase. This is the phase where humanitarian and peace-building needs are most blurred.

The important point in this phase is that aid workers and peace-builders share and respect the direction of peace-building set by a peace agreement or a UN Security Council resolution. Unless practitioners on the ground implement it, the framework of peace-building remains fiction. It is through various humanitarian/developmental aid and peace-building activities on the ground that the framework of peace gains real momentum. The principal goal in this phase is institution building. While new institutions would not fully function immediately after conflict, the foundation of political, social and economic institutions must be cultivated in order to create stable peace.

Humanitarian organizations make more use of local resources. Recruitments of local personnel are expected to reinforce resettlements of residents. Cooperation with local authorities in providing basic services should be facilitated for the sake of empowering the local population. Developmental organizations should help rebuild infrastructures that are recognized as essential in light of human security including hospitals, police facilities, fire stations, main roads, and so on. The programs for facilitating Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) could be prepared in the form of aid-in-kind, submission of small arms and light weapons in exchange for job trainings and community based infrastructures, and so on.

One of the transitional period's political targets is holding an election to set up a legitimate indigenous government that will take over governing authority. Civilian staff must work to make it happen by rebuilding administrative structures necessary for elections. The first critical stages of DDR ought to be finished before the first election, although its full completion would be difficult to achieve in most post-conflict societies. Armed groups never easily implement disarmament programs, which are often specified in a peace agreement or other documents. However, as the repeatedly referred to case of the 1992 Angolan election showed, holding an election without real disarmament puts the peace process at risk. If swift and complete DDR is not a condition to phase out the transitional stage, a significant level of disarmament as well as demobilization is an indispensable condition to transform "the transitional" phase to "the stabilization" phase.

Of course, the question about the acceptable level of disarmament remains valid. While complete disarmament in the transitional phase is unrealistic, the acceptable level of disarmament is difficult to determine. A significant number of heavy weapons and soldiers must be handed over or demobilized from all armed groups. But complete eradication of small arms and light weapons always requires patient effort. In the transitional phase in which confidence in peace among hostile parties is still weak, complete disarmament is an unrealistic expectation. The assessment of the level of disarmament and demobilization by civilian staff, military personnel or both should weigh heavy on the peace process. Humanitarian and developmental organizations in the field should help the DDR process by offering their information to the monitors. The principle of neutrality should not block such cooperation, at least when DDR is specified in a peace agreement or an equivalent document.

In the transitional phase, the political need to keep the peace process on track grows. All humanitarian and developmental actions need to be conducted according to the agreed framework of peace-building. For instance, the way to select a local agency as a counterpart for development programs inevitably counts as a political act, since it may facilitate or hamper peace processes. The value of humanitarian aid in this phase would be identified not only from the point of view of efficiency, but also from that of peace-building. Solidifying the agreed framework of peace-building is a major factor to identifying how to reconstruct devastated or poor infrastructures in post-conflict society.

Quick result programs are expected to give people confidence in peace processes. Politically prioritized programs like those in association with DDR should not be delayed or blocked for the sake of developmental feasibility alone. For instance, vocational training of ex-soldiers is not purely developmental because giving them jobs to keep their social lives is essential part of peace-building. Clearing landmines is a humanitarian act as well as a peace-building activity, as it facilitates restoration of ordinary people's daily lives.

Peacekeeping forces may deploy to solidify a ceasefire in this phase. They intervene between hostile armed groups and observe their behavior. They may then intentionally function to protect aid workers. The military also takes responsibility in maintaining social order. Rapid deployment of sufficient numbers of contingents in urban areas to protect citizens is crucial for both humanitarian aid and peace-building to

operate. Many cases of the transitional phase after conflict include rampant lawlessness and armed groups committing criminal acts. The military is expected to contain the armed men who disrupt social order and jeopardize humanitarian aid and peace-building. This applies to cases like Iraq in 2003 and Haiti in 2004, in which voluntary forces deployed to restore a minimum level of security in key areas in the environment without a ceasefire.

It is usually unlikely for the international police to deploy rapidly, but specialized police forces like the French *gendarmarie* and the Italian *carabinieri* could arrive quickly, as they work in contingents. Such specialized police forces have important roles to play in the transitional phase in which the critical task is to establish social order. There are crucial areas where both the military and the normal police are unsuitable; for instance, riot control, counterterrorist measures and arresting heavily armed individuals. The importance of specialized units was fully recognized after their systematic introduction into peace operations in Kosovo and East Timor.¹³

The basic nature of both the military and the police in this phase is law enforcement. How to decide on what aspects of the law to be implemented in post-conflict society is a complex topic. The question ought to be answered in accordance with specific circumstances in each case, although the core provisions of international humanitarian law and international human rights law should always be applied. It is recommended to send in civilian legal experts who can act as temporary investigators, prosecutors and even judges with the military and the police. Such instant “rule of law” teams may not be desirable from the perspective of strict legalism, but critically important in the transitional phase.¹⁴ They would add law enforcement characters to the international presence in post-conflict society. The effect of their actions ought to be framed by appropriate authorities like the UN Security Council.

Table 2: Transitional phase

	Humanitarian needs	Peace-building
Emergency aid	- Providing vital services - Assistance in repatriation	- Suspending operations which are beneficial to warlords/ human rights abusers
Developmental aid	- Reconstruction of a social system to provide basic public services	- Assistance in establishing public institutions including administrative bodies

	- Creation of jobs (cf. DDR)	- Reconstruction of infrastructures - Facilitation of grass roots peace-builders' activities
Military force	- Guarding aid workers - Assistance in delivering humanitarian aid	- Monitoring disarmament - Deployment of peacekeeping forces - Restoration of social order - Protection of politically sensitive personnel/sites
Civilian police/ Police force	- Guarding aid workers	- Riot control - Patrolling to deter human rights violations - law enforcement activities - Protecting politically sensitive personnel/sites
Legal personnel	- Providing legal services	- Organizing war crimes tribunals - Assistance in truth commissions
Negotiators	- Preparation for repatriation	- Building a durable constitutional framework

The Gap between Humanitarian Aid and Peace-building in the Transitional Phase

Each conflict has its own way of termination, but many, if not all, conflicts in the post-cold war era ended with some kind of mutual agreements or interventions to impose agreements. The third party countries that are supposed to represent “the international community” may broker such agreements. On some extreme occasions like the conflict over Kosovo in 1999, the states claiming to be “the international community” were directly involved in conflict. This became common in the last decade, since “the international community” with or without the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter often takes upon themselves enforcement measures in handling regional conflict. In such cases, “the international community” may become more willing to engage in armed conflict and “the international community” that can broker ceasefires as a neutral third party disappears.

This affects the character of the transitional phase. If international actors intervene as third parties, they continue to behave as an honest broker of a peace agreement. Humanitarian organizations would have little difficulty in cooperating with other international actors, as long as they keep rigid neutrality, but humanitarian organizations' close cooperation with those international actors who are manifestly involved in conflict might be problematic. The obvious example is Iraq after the war in

2003. The United States and Great Britain defeated Saddam Hussein's regime by claiming that they did so on behalf of the entire international community in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. Whether or not such a claim is valid, the important fact is that they directly waged war over Iraq and stayed as occupying powers. This kind of situation creates a dilemma for humanitarian organizations. It is realistic for them to cooperate with the occupying powers, but to do so seriously harm the principle of neutrality. As the terrorist attack upon the UN facilities in Baghdad in August 2003 showed, cooperation could be politically interpreted as a sign of support for occupation. This dilemma stems from the predicament of political circumstances, and cannot be solved easily.

Of course, this dilemma does not occur only between international actors. When one side of conflicting parties wins war, humanitarian organizations must seek protection and cooperation from the *de facto* authority regardless of its legitimacy. When power holders are unreliable or reaching a peace agreement seems inappropriate, humanitarian organizations face a hard question; whether it is right to cooperate with the *de facto* authority in order to conduct humanitarian and developmental aid efficiently. The ultimate answer could not be found, but a decision must be made at a certain point by those who can or must take responsibility.

6. Stabilization Phase

Humanitarian and Peace-building Activities after Conflict

This is the phase in which international actors' efforts shift from direct human security measures to cultivation of local capacity to sustain human security. Given that institution building was successful in the transitional phase, capacity building must follow in the stabilization phase. Humanitarian aid will dissolve into peace-building activities to create durable social stability. As human security is pursued in long-term programs, developmental organizations increase in importance. Security sectors change their roles according to daily needs and may be taken care of under developmental programs. This does not mean that the overall goals change in this phase. The needs of humanitarian aid and peace-building remain unchanged: the same human security goals are pursued by different methods in a different phase.

Programs for capacity building of local residents and transfer of authority accelerate in this phase, while basic infrastructures would have to continue to be built up. Internationals are encouraged to retreat and act as trainers or consultants for local workers. If a sustainable social system was introduced in the transitional phase in some way, the people who run the system should be the focus of the stabilization phase. The primary responsibility of humanitarian and developmental aid and peace-building should be transferred to local personnel in principle. The process takes considerable time and effort, however, unless this happens, social stability never comes into play.

One of the issues that often remain to stagnate in the stabilization phase is repatriation of refugees. In many post-conflict areas such as former Yugoslavia and East Timor, considerable numbers of refugees remain outside the territory of their origins. Absence of war for a few years without political settlements does not dramatically facilitate repatriation of refugees, if they have political reasons not to return. The problem cannot be solved by humanitarian organizations like UNHCR alone. The well coordinated policies of local governments and international agencies in various fields together with political mechanisms for human security are needed. While those who do not wish to return, have the right to settle down in a new country, this should not be an excuse to ignore the problem of further repatriation. The issue of repatriation is not only about humanitarianism and human rights. It is crucial for long-term stability of post-conflict society. Without a solution to refugees, political settlements continue to be fragile. Since the issue of refugees often makes peace negotiations delayed, the refugee issue and the political dialogue must be dealt with together. The issue may also technically hinder the registration process for holding elections.

While emergency aid scales down, developmental aid increases in importance. Tackling widespread social problems including poverty, joblessness, scarce resources and disrupted infrastructures appears as a pillar of peace-building in this phase.¹⁵ Since developmental aid could not be fully implemented during and shortly after conflict, it is this stabilization phase where social and economic development becomes the key to peace-building. It is also important to locate developmental agencies as well as the Bretton Woods institutions in the context of peace-building. UNDP, UNICEF and other social development agencies in addition to developmental NGOs greatly contribute to peace-building, especially, smaller NGOs that now have room to be active. Furthermore,

until economic agencies are actively involved, economic and social development, the foundation of peace, is difficult to achieve. A strategy to reconcile the desperate conditions of post-conflict society with requests of the Bretton Woods institutions is critically needed.

NGOs working in the field of human rights play further important roles in the stabilization phase. Unless social systems are well organized in the normative framework of internationally recognized human rights principles, and run by those who respect them, social stability remains fragile. Hostilities would result from human rights violations. It is impossible to obtain international and domestic legitimacy for the public authority that do not observe human rights norms. It is fair to say that respect for human rights is an indispensable condition for durable peace.

Setting up a system of punishing war criminals is now an ordinary part of post-conflict peace-building. It is important to put into post-conflict society a sense of justice and the rule of law, so that solid peace takes root. Unjust behaviors must be proclaimed unjust; criminals must be brought to justice. Two ad hoc international criminal tribunals were created in the early 1990s for peace-building: the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In the 21st century, East Timor and Sierra Leone introduced new ways of creating international tribunals. The International Criminal Court is also becoming operational to deal with serious war crimes based on a multilateral treaty.¹⁶

Various forms of so-called “truth and reconciliation commissions” may be also pursued as compensation for limits of the judiciary or the best possible way to avoid a cycle of revenge at the grass roots level. In East Timor, hundreds of suspects of war crimes indicted by the Prosecutor of the Serious Crimes Unit are in Indonesia where the government is not willing to detain them. In addition, a number of those who committed less serious crimes or just obeyed the order of superiors during the 1999 massacre are beyond the capacity of the government of East Timor and the Serious Crimes Unit. The Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission was thus created as an independent body and have the power to grant “immunity” through the process of popular consultation at the community level. Numerous other “truth and reconciliation commissions” were established in South Africa and many Latin American countries. In Rwanda, “gacaca,” a community-based court system, was introduced to deal with more

than 115,000 detained suspects of the 1994 genocide.

All these efforts are a result of pursuit for inserting a sense of justice in post-conflict society as part of peace-building. UN peace missions, developmental agencies, bilateral donors, international and local NGOs on human rights, and local governments are helping these mechanisms to work in the direction of long-term peace.

Since post-conflict peace-building is the phase of conflict prevention, early warning and other measures to avoid (re)occurrence of conflict are pursued in the stabilization phase. All agencies including smaller NGOs are expected to keep this point in mind and cooperate with each other by offering relevant useful information. The SRSG, when there is a peacekeeping mission, or the Residential Coordinator, when there is not, would be the best candidates to work as a focal point. Sometimes diplomatic channels receive sensitive information. Although complete sharing of information would be impossible, some kind of coordination should be pursued.

Measures to crack down on organized crimes constitute an important element of this phase. Once organized crimes are rampant, social stability cannot be established in the legitimate normative framework. Trafficking in women, abduction of children, illegal trade of narcotics and weapons are among common phenomena in conflict-ridden society. In order to secure border controls, internal policing and regional cooperation are essential. Conflict ridden society easily becomes a hotbed of illegal trade with outside communities. Seemingly, successful disarmament might be compensated by illegal transfers of weapons across borders.

In addition to the tasks required for directly tackling crimes, the international military and the international police personnel have other distinct roles to play in this phase. Peace-builders must establish a new army in post-conflict society by unifying various armed groups. The new army wants training by military professionals as well as appropriate equipment. The same is true for the police section. A new police force takes over responsibility to maintain law and order. Creating a disciplined military and a democratic police are crucial for peace-building to be successful. The military and the police operating within the normative framework of human rights contribute to improving humanitarian needs of citizen's daily lives. Sometimes, creating a new army and a new police needs a certain level of reform of the old army and the police. On many other occasions, it needs changes that are more drastic. The old ones may have to

be abolished, where the level of corruption and the record of human rights violations were serious, but the decision on the way to reform them is difficult and highly political, as the 2003 Iraq case suggests. Even when a new military and a new police are created, whether former army officers and police officers should be allowed to be recruited remains a matter of serious consideration. There must be a fine line to distinguish criminal officers and others, but the distinction is usually not easy to make, as such a move necessarily involves sensitive political, social and economic implications.

The same pattern applies to the judiciary. Legal professionals must be advised by fellow legal professionals. The judicial system in which judges, prosecutors and other lawyers attract public confidence is a foundation for durable peace, since it is the channel for ordinary people to protect their rights. The rule of law is a key to peace-building. Many peace-builders believe that the rule of law leads to durable social stability and long-term peace. The rule of law is the source of strategic thinking of peace-building and therefore human security.¹⁷

Table 3: Stabilization phase

	Humanitarian needs	Peace-building
Humanitarian aid	- Providing vital services still lacking	- Suspension of aid to human rights abusers
Developmental aid	- Creation of essential infrastructures	- Assistance in local governance - Facilitation of local peace-building activities - Introducing the Bretton Woods institutions - Promoting human rights
Military force		- Training the local military - Protection of citizens from outside threats
Civilian police/ Police force		- Training the local police - Maintaining law and order
Legal personnel		- Training/advising judges, prosecutors, lawyers - Help develop legal systems - Assistance in war crimes tribunals/truth commissions
Negotiators		- Help stabilize relations among local parties - Help stabilize relations with foreign governments

The Gap between Humanitarian Aid and Peace-building after Conflict

The gap between humanitarian aid and peace-building appears in this phase, when smooth transition did not take place in the transitional phase. Key political, social and economic institutions fail to take root in post-conflict society and the stabilization phase does not actually start. The institutional framework is a precondition of meaningful capacity building, which becomes meaningless when there's nothing to be stabilized.

Ideally, humanitarian aid will give way to developmental aid in the stabilization phase. It is because emergency phases are over and local institutions are expected to provide basic human security, but peace operations do not always succeed in establishing such institutions. If local institutions are too weak, no stabilization effort will be fruitful. If local institutions do not comply with normative standards, every stabilization effort will have counter-effects.

For instance, we all know that the stabilization phase cannot start in Somalia, since there is no reliable institutional foundation. This may apply to Afghanistan where warlords keep power to the detriment of the peace process. Developmental aid under these conditions may endanger peace-building by benefiting disturbing actors. We should say that developmental aid for human security is almost impossible in the long run, if the public authority does not comply with the principles of peace-building based on human rights law and humanitarian law. Under such circumstances, more developmental aid may increase contradictions. The contradiction between individual and collective human security should not be hidden when overall reassessment or reorientation of activities for human security is necessary.

7. Final Remarks

This chapter has examined human security measures in the forms of humanitarian aid and peace-building in and after armed conflict. It has specified a range of activities in three various phases that international actors are required to fulfill. In so doing, the chapter has argued that while humanitarian aid and peace-building have distinct mission logics, they may influence each other. If human security is to be accepted as a comprehensive strategic concept, it should contribute to sharpening the perspective on

the link between humanitarian aid and peace-building, both different but essential components of human security.

Human security is a concept that does not solve critical problems in reality. It does not provide a final solution to the problems we face in the fields of humanitarian aid and peace-building, but we still need concepts like human security in order to enrich our perspectives of reality. With such a conceptual tool, we are able to develop our understanding of this complex world. Its value should not be determined by how innovative it is, but by how useful it is in order to tackle critical problems in our world.

Notes

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¹ Here I use the term “peace-building” in a broad sense. The best account of such a use of the term is found, for instance, in The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade/ The Canadian International Development Agency, “Strategic Framework for the Canadian Peacebuilding Activities.” According to the definition, “Peacebuilding is the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence. The definition covers peacebuilding in pre, mid, and postconflict situations.” Michael Small, “Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies” in Rob McRae and Don Hubert (eds.), *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), p. 78. This paper uses the term to mean any kind of activities to support peace in conflict-ridden areas. Here it includes not only formal peace missions organized by the United Nations and other international organizations and inter-governmental activities, but also initiatives by private organizations.

² This corresponds to UNDP’s original proposition of human security as freedom from want and freedom from fear. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). About more specific discussions on peace-building in the context of human security, see Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: United Nations, 2003), chapter 4. See also UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 4.

³ See, for instance, Jeremy Shoham, Fiona O’Neilly and Jane Wallace, “Humanitarian Crisis and Conflict: Food Assistance and Nutritional Security Issues” in Edward Clay and Olav Stokke (eds.), *Food Aid and Human Security* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

⁴ Peace Operations is a generic term to include “peace making,” “peacekeeping” and “peace-building.” The term gained currency especially after the “Brahimi Report” was published in 2000. See “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

⁵ Canada urged the members of the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution for the crisis of Rwandan refugees in Zaire and prepared to deploy its force to Zaire in 1996. However, when the Security Council actually passed Resolution 1080 on November 15, 1996, the refugee camps had been almost dissolved. See Mike Elliot, “The Rwanda Crisis and its Consequences” in McRae and Hubert (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

⁶ See, Michèle Griffin, “Blue Helmet Blues: Assessing the Trend Towards ‘Subcontracting’ UN Peace Operations,” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 1, March 1999, p. 48.

⁷ See Fional Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), chapter 5; and Tony Waters, *Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan: The Limitations to Humanitarian Relief Operations* (Boulder: Westview, 2001), Part I.

⁸ See, for instance, Sadako Ogata, “My Ten Years as UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Lesson for the Future,” addressed at Woodrow Wilson International Center April 8, 2002, available at <<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/woodrow.html>>.

⁹ NGOs may hire private companies, and some have actually done so on various occasions, but inviting strong private companies could jeopardize local capacity for long-term peace-building. See Christopher Spearin, “Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Securing Humanitarian Spaces?” *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2001.

¹⁰ See, for instance, Michele Griffin, “Blue Helmet Blues: Assessing the Trend towards ‘Subcontracting UN Peace Operations,’” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 1, March 1999.

¹¹ Michael G. Smith with Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 123.

¹² See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR’s Emergency Preparedness and Response” (EPAU/2000/001), February 2000, pp. 109-121.

¹³ Hideaki Shinoda, *Heiwakochiku to Hounoshihai (Peace-building and the Rule of law)* (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 2003), chapter 5.

¹⁴ See “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 104; and Ray Salvatore Jennings, “The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq,” *Peaceworks* no. 49, United States Institute of Peace, April 2003.

¹⁵ See J. David Whaley, “Improving UN Developmental Coordination within Peace Missions,” Jeremy Ginifer, *Beyond the Emergency: Development within UN Peace Missions* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 107.

¹⁶ See Hideaki Shinoda, “Peace-building by the Rule of Law: An Examination of Intervention in the Form of International Tribunals,” *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2002.

¹⁷ See Commission on Human Security, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

Chapter 3

Human Security and the UN Security Council

Juergen Dedring

1. Introduction

The UN Security Council is the principal organ established under the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. The decades of UNSC practice ever since the founding of the world organization in 1945 reveal a nearly unbroken pattern of deliberations and decisions relating to a diverse collection of interstate items taken up by the members of the UNSC in fulfillment of their Charter-given task. Only rarely did the SC in the decades of Cold War diplomacy turn to matters that focused on the wellbeing of individuals rather than political communities.

The SC practice in the first half-century of the life of the UN was fully in line with the dominant orientation of international politics as handled by the two Cold War foes and their respective allies and supporters. Sea change only came to the institutions and procedures of multilateralism with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bilateral global order. The often-mentioned trend in international relations toward internal conflicts, frequently with ethnic or communal overtones, has initiated a slow but persistent shift in the agendas of global as well as regional intergovernmental organs, primarily the agenda of the UNSC and to a lesser degree the General Assembly agenda.

In an increasingly interdependent world, where the global forces of the market economy, of modern technological progress, of information and media developments, and of mass migration flows have changed the face of the contemporary world, the irreversible rise of individual concerns has taken place. Part of this imperceptible but effective change has been the dramatic redirection of the UNSC focus towards aspects of individual human security. The substantial turn to issues of human rights and

humanitarian concerns in the deliberations of the UNSC has been of such magnitude that it deserves special attention. What has been witnessed is the attention to human security and its embattled condition in a turbulent militarized world as an integral part of the UNSC's contemporary agenda.

While acknowledging that this historic change arrived in the late 90's, it should be pointed out that the term and conception of "human security" was proposed several years earlier in connection with the preparation of the seminal Human Development reports issued by UNDP since the early 90's. The quick acceptance of the notion and its invocation especially by numerous policymakers in many parts of the Western world has helped to cover up the unresolved quality of its terminological and conceptual validity. This discrepancy between analytical flaws and policy relevance has so far not been resolved. But the lingering scholarly debate on the merits and faults of the "human security" concept should not be misunderstood as a reason to abandon a meaningful policy norm. This tension will be briefly addressed in a review of some of the prevailing terminological and theoretical positions taken by several authors in recent years, as academic attention to the "human security" standard has risen.

The gist of the paper is, however, devoted to the treatment of an important aspect of the "human security" conception in the deliberations and policymaking of the UNSC. Special attention will be paid to the Canadian initiative and its reception among the open-minded and willing members of the UNSC and the wider UN membership. A close narrative will be provided to track the moves regarding "human security" concerns and to enable the observer and reader to judge the salience of the UNSC's involvement in these debates. The transformation of a lofty idea into a practical policy guideline is at the center of the following chapters and will terminate in a review of the initial assumptions and the outcomes of the new agenda items and their impact on the international practice of UN operations in field situations.

The chapter is structured in the following fashion: Following a brief review of the origins of the Human Security concept, dealing especially with the impact of the UNDP Human Development reports, a detailed account is provided about the Canadian initiative in the UNSC during its two-year term of 1999 and 2000 and the fall-out within the SC and on the outside, centered on the formation of the intergovernmental Human Security Network. The description and assessment will emphasize the UNSC treatment

of the vital agenda item entitled “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” and related humanitarian concerns. After the close analysis of the widening segment devoted to individual and societal concerns and needs, the whole process is reconsidered in order to measure the relevance of the “human security” norm for major arenas of global governance. While the situation may not amount to a complete paradigm shift, there is no denying the fact that the UNSC in the most recent years has changed direction in crucial ways. The viability of this new thrust cannot be fully measured until years from now.

2. Origins of the Human Security Concept

As scholarly attention has grown in intensity, the concept of “human security” has lost clarity, and its soundness and applicability has been argued about in recent academic analyses and polemics.¹ Specific definitions of the elusive concept abound and diverge, and the doubts expressed by sincere students about the salience of the contested notion must be taken seriously. Despite the arguments about the idea of “human security,” there is little disagreement about the genesis of this new norm. A number of descriptive accounts² have brought out the beginnings of the novel approach to security within the preparation and publication of the UNDP Human Development Reports. The explicit invocation and presentation of “human security” as the new referent for contemporary international relations took place in the 1994 Human Development report. The intellectual father of that new viewpoint was Mahbub ul Haq, first team leader for the UNDP reports and principal author of the seminal 1994 report conceived around the term “human security.” The new emphasis helped shape the direction of the subsequent reports filling in the missing elements in a complete overview. The startling success of the UNDP Human Development reports as alternative to the traditional national security focus allows the observer to take the cue from the intellectual treasure emanating from the UNDP efforts since the early 1990’s. Although ul Haq’s definition was not the definitive standard, it is most suitable to establish the general boundaries of this new idea. In the new understanding of security, ul Haq equated security with the security of individuals; he further suggested that a new concept of security needed to be fashioned that was grounded in the lives of the people, not in the weapons of the country. He

believed that human security would be achieved through development, not through arms. This multilateral credo firmly based in modern social science thinking demands serious attention and offers a first insight into the sea changes affecting the instruments of global governance in recent years. A new thinking has taken hold of the policy makers in the key areas of multilateral decision making.

Prior to the detailed look at the understanding of “human security” within UNDP, a further review should encompass some recent argument about the merits of the concept. First of all, one can identify two main interpretations of “human security” proposed by two Governments which have taken the lead in the propagation of this new value. With the former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy at the helm of the Canadian policy initiative, the argument was put forward that in the aftermath of the cold war, a new foreign policy paradigm was needed. It was postulated as obvious that protection of individuals should be a major focus of foreign policy. In the words of the Canadian Foreign ministry, “human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives.” Canada shaped five foreign policy priorities for advancing human security: 1. The protection of civilians, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of armed conflict. 2. Peace support operations, concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for deployment of skilled personnel to these missions. 3. Conflict prevention, with strengthening the capacity of the international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence. 4. Governance and accountability, concerned with fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of established norms of democracy and human rights. 5. Public safety, concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the rise of transnational organized crime.³

Diverging from the Canadian conceptualization, the Government of Japan has also directed its attention on these new aspects of contemporary international relations and proposed the following broader concept: “1. Human security may be defined as the preservation and protection of the life and dignity of individual human beings. Japan holds the view, as do many other countries, that human security can be ensured only when the individual is confident of a life free of fear and free of want.”⁴ 2. Japan

emphasizes “Human Security” from the perspective of strengthening efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel land mines, and has taken various initiatives in this context. To ensure “Human freedom and potential,” a range of issues needs to be addressed from the perspective of “Human Security” focused on the individual, requiring cooperation among the various actors in the international community, including governments, international organizations and civil society.⁵

In between these two governmental positions, the basic definition adopted by the Human Security Network formed by a group of States deserves considerable attention as its emphasis foreshadows the intense concern with human security matters in the UNSC. It reads as follows: “A humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from poverty and despair, is still a dream for many and should be enjoyed by all. In such a world, every individual would be guaranteed freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to fully develop their human potential. Building human security is essential to achieving this goal. In essence, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives.”⁶

What emerges rather clearly is a minor divergence between the Canadian focus on freedom from fear, whereas the Japanese and Network norms include both freedom from fear as well as freedom from want. This powerful tension cuts across the whole human security movement and has added to some of the terminological confusion prevalent in the governmental and non-governmental circles of the promoters of that new paradigm. It goes without saying that these first definitions are policy-oriented and do not claim theoretical or terminological purity. As the focus of the present review is the UNSC, it would appear meaningful to give the policy debate priority in the survey of the genesis of the concept.

In widening the foundation of the human security concept, a quick look at recent academic papers appears to be a helpful next step. The divergence in the above definitions amounts to rather little, compared to the range of views and definitions found in mainly academic writings. Thus, Kanti Bajpai, professor in New Delhi and, at the time of writing, visiting fellow at the Kroc Institute in spring 2000, suggested:

“Human security relates to the protection of the individual’s personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence. The promotion of human development and good governance, and when necessary, the collective use of sanctions and force are central to managing human security...”⁷ Lincoln Chen, in an essay entitled “Human Security: Concepts and Approaches,” circumscribed the concept as follows: “The term human security focuses the concept of security on human survival, wellbeing and freedom...human security (is conceptualized) as the objective - the ultimate end - of all security concerns.”⁸ In *Migration, Globalization and Human Security*, Graham and Poku argued: “Rather than viewing security as being concerned with “individuals qua citizens” (that is, toward their states), our approach views security as being concerned with “individuals qua persons.”...Human security is concerned with transcending the dominant paradigmatic orthodoxy that views critical concerns of migration - recognitions (i.e. citizenship), basic needs (i.e. sustenance), protection (i.e. refugee status), or human rights (legal standing) - as problems of interstate politics and consequently beyond the realm of the ethical and moral.”⁹ In a recent paper entitled “Rethinking Human Security,” Gary King and Christopher Murray introduced a simple, rigorous and measurable definition of human security: namely the number of years of future life spent outside a state of “generalized poverty.”¹⁰ Their suggestion for a parsimonious set of domains for measuring human security would be income, health, education, political freedom, and democracy.¹¹ Without going further into their finely detailed argument relating to the measurement of human security, it is noteworthy that their list of subjects embraces much of the basic needs catalogue.¹²

Taking their cue from a more medical background, Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie, in a background document for USAID, stipulated the following points: “Human security is an underlying condition for sustainable development. It results from the social, psychological, economic, and political aspects of human life that in times of acute crisis or chronic deprivation protect the survival of individuals, support individual and group capacities to attain minimally adequate standards of living, and promote constructive group attachment and continuity through time. Its key measurable components can be summarized as: a sustainable sense of home; constructive social and family networks; and an acceptance of the past and a positive grasp of the future....”¹³

Adding more voices to the rising dialogue, George MacLean opined: Human

security recognizes that an individual's personal protection and preservation comes not just from the safeguarding of the state as a political unit, but also from access to individual welfare and quality of life. Human security, in short, involves the security of the individual in their personal surroundings, their community, and in their environment."¹⁴ Astri Suhrke, in an article from 1999, argued as follows: "Whether the threat is economic or physical violence, immediate protective measures are necessary if longer-term investments to improve conditions can be relevant at all. It follows that the core of human insecurity can be seen as extreme vulnerability. The central task of a policy inspired by human security concerns would therefore be to protect those who are most vulnerable. ... it is self-evident that those exposed to immediate physical threats to life or deprivation of life-sustaining resources are extremely vulnerable. ... Other persons can be placed in equally life-threatening positions for reasons of deep poverty or natural disasters..."¹⁵

An important author, who has made human security central in her work, is Caroline Thomas who has sought to narrow down the key components of the elusive notion and at the same time set forth her scholarly and philosophical convictions in regard of the meaning and content of human security. In this endeavor, she stated the following points: 1. "Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realized. Such human security is indivisible; it cannot be pursued by one group at the expense of another." 2. While material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole. ...The quantitative aspect refers to material sufficiency...The pursuit of human security must have at its core the satisfaction of basic material needs of all mankind. At the most basic level, food, shelter, education and health care are essential for the survival of human beings. ... The qualitative aspect of human security is about the achievement of human dignity which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one's life and unhindered participation in the life of the community. Emancipation from oppressive power structures, be they global, national or local in origin and scope, is necessary for human security. Human security is oriented towards an active and substantive notion of democracy, one that ensures the opportunity of all for participation in the decisions that affect their lives.

Therefore it is engaged directly with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global.”¹⁶

These noteworthy efforts by a number of academic authors reflect the wide range and lack of clarity of the words, notions and terms employed in different combinations by the writers. Any attempt to decipher a common meaning of the new norm is at present futile. Although commissions, institutes and congresses have dealt with aspects of the problematique, it remains unsatisfactory to find crucial commonalities in the work. Nevertheless, it would be condescending to doubt the merit of these contributions. It might be more appropriate to acknowledge the valiant endeavors and to encourage a further round of questioning and testing of what constitutes human security. In passing, reference should be made to several new writings dealing with human security in a wider context of new dimensions of security and with the difficult task of auditing and measuring the state of human security.¹⁷ Each of these pieces helps open the hidden corners of the evolving human security conception.

An important feature of Astri Suhrke’s essay is that she turned her and our attention on the opposite of “security,” namely insecurity, and then traced the sense of what should be on the active agenda of everybody from local to global levels in fighting the conditions of inequality and insecurity in human communities. Her list of extremely vulnerable persons, victims of war and internal conflict; those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socioeconomic disaster; and victims of natural disasters, assists in establishing priorities for international assistance on many fronts of human strife. Such translation into policy-relevant criteria is eminently useful for the members of international organizations, intergovernmental as well as non-governmental, who have been searching for guidelines and models of effective multilateral assistance.

Having surveyed some of the recent work in academic reflection and having found considerable pluralism, if not anarchy in the many-voiced chorus of scholars and policy advisers, it moves us closer to the key issue of this paper, the engagement of the UNSC, to take a closer look at the specific propositions emanating from the Human Development team over the recent years. Emphasis is first placed on the 1994 Human Development report in which the new dimensions of human security were systematically set out starting from the premise that the end of the Cold War helped

break the hold of the traditional national security thinking and ease the path for a new human-centered emphasis on individual security concerns. “In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons - it is a concern with human life and dignity.”¹⁸

Having circumscribed the realm within which human security comes to figure as a significant antidote to the decades of stagnant Cold War military security thinking, the intellectual avant-garde of the new paradigm offered certain insights into the characteristics of human security and into the so-called components of the new key norm.

Starting with the characteristics, the UNDP team described human security as a universal concern, saw its components as interdependent, suggested that it could be more easily ensured through early prevention than later intervention, and emphasized its people-centered quality. Proposing a division between the two main aspects of human security, the authors of the Human Development report 1004 defined them as first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and second, protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. This distinction reminds the astute observer of the above-mentioned divide between freedom from want and freedom from fear. Such a dichotomy enjoys wide acceptance in the academic and policy communities.

Without entering into a detailed discussion of the intrinsic merits of the basic UNDP position, it is desirable to review the threats to human security as conceived by the authors of that seminal 1994 report.¹⁹ Here, the proposition suggests seven main categories, comprised of economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; and political security. It is always possible to quibble about aspects of some general conception, but in this case it makes sense to accept the list of components for argument's sake, and postpone a general critique to the concluding chapter. With UNDP as the originating office, it should not come as a surprise that the component of economic security gets the largest amount of attention from the authors. The explanation covers the full gamut of contemporary worries from the long-term structural unemployment problem to youth

unemployment, to the insecure and poorly paid work in the informal sector and the difficulties entailed in self-employment situations. Changes in the world of labor away from secure life-long employment to temporary jobs paying low wages and lacking any stability or permanence have exacerbated the condition of economic insecurity and resulted in prolonged painful crises affecting the lives of millions, in developing countries as well as in developed countries. The effect on large segments of the working population is increasing poverty pushing the victims of these economic transformations below the poverty line in their respective communities. The ramifications of the enduring economic crises are much more traumatic than a brief commentary can convey. The data-rich account offered by UNDP in 1994 remains as timely in our time as if it had been written just weeks ago.

Food security, reflecting a universally recognized basic need, is the second component of human security in the UNDP conception. Emphasis is placed on the distribution problem, which frequently creates gaps in the provision of food, still worsened by the frequent lack of purchasing power in many parts of the modern world. Again statistical information is offered to illustrate the claimed emergency situation. The numbers of affected populations are much too high translating into many millions of people around the world going hungry. UNDP points out what tools are required to overcome the food crisis and underlines that access to food comes from access to assets, work and an assured income. These linkages show, on the one hand, that solutions are feasible, but that in reality the end of the food shortages cannot be predicted due to inadequate conditions in economic and governance terms.

Health security is the third component of the UNDP conception. Overshadowed by the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, the inclusion of health in the UNDP approach requires no further explanation. The key points in the description of major health problems around the globe make clear that the health condition of many people in all parts of the modern world leaves much to be desired. Tropical diseases kill many people annually. Small children oftentimes endure shortages in essential vitamins and minerals and suffer life-long impairments in body and mind. Civilizational diseases strike rich and poor alike in highly developed industrial societies as well as in the poorest developing countries. The incidence of cancer is a major scourge of today's humanity, and even obesity is among new health threats competing with the effects of famine and starvation.

The common denominator in all these phenomena is the high level of insecurity and worry prevalent among people in all walks of life. Access to health services constitutes a significant divider between the rich and the poor as well as between men and women. Global statistics tell a powerful language in regard of major deprivations among the slum settlers in the Third World and among many rural residents especially in the developing world. Thus, the whole canvas of the modern health crisis including mental health binds all humans in the painful awareness that they might fall ill from one day to the next and suffer pain and death because of the severity of the illness and the lack of effective medicines to slow down or put a stop to the illness. The recent SARS crisis frightfully revealed the precarious nature of human health.

Another key component of human security deals with human beings in the environment. The emphasis, which UNDP has placed in its 1994 outlook on environmental security, should find ready consent in most parts of the contemporary world. The process of industrialization and the concomitant rapid population growth have placed severe strains on the planet. The familiar division of the ecological crisis addresses the global water shortage, which has steadily expanded in recent decades, and threatens to reach disastrous dimensions very soon. Moreover, the concern about the soiling of drinking water supplies has further cast a shadow over the future availability of a key ingredient of human existence. Air and soil pollution are other elements of the ecological agenda, and the unwillingness of major industrial societies to contribute fully to the limited but persistent campaign to reverse the recent damages and to restore a more balanced environment for mankind's survival in these critical areas of human existence has put a severe damper on an earlier global movement to approach the environment proactively. There is little new that can be added to the accumulated wisdom in the study of ecology, but it is decisive that all governments join hands to advance the environmental agenda in the common interest.

The fourth component of human security in the UNDP tabulation is what is called "personal security" and embraces the security of humans from physical violence. Again choosing a systematic approach, the argument is made that these threats include: i) threats from the state (physical torture); ii) threats from other states (war); iii) threats from other groups of people (ethnic or communal tension); iv) threats from individuals or gangs against other individuals or gangs (crime, street violence); v) threats directed

against women (rape, domestic violence); vi) threats directed at children based on their vulnerability and dependence (child abuse); and vii) threats to self (suicide, drug use). The breakdown of the general component of “personal security” provides compelling evidence that this particular feature may be most significant for individuals and their immediate families, friends and neighbors. The poignant relevance of any and all of these dimensions of individual security renders the concern about human security ever more pertinent. The UNDP narrative on this component, while brief and limited, offers statistical data to validate the assertions in the text. It emerges that “personal security” may be at the heart of what is conceptualized as “human security.”

The next category of “human security” has been designated “community security” by UNDP suggesting to cover under this rubric the protection of human beings by family, organizations, and racial or ethnic groups. The support provided in this sense ranges from cultural and ideational norms all the way to practical measures. Without dwelling on this theme at any length, it can be conceded that the community does indeed constitute the key setting within which humans live and interact, and thus equips the members of these groups with a sense of identity, with fundamental norms and mores and with the necessary shelter for safety and comfort. It is fitting that UNDP addresses under this category the pressing matter of interethnic strife, which has engendered massive situations of total insecurity and helplessness for large population groups, and the related concern with indigenous people and groups where the incidence of violence and severe psychological instability has been uncommonly high.

To complete the UNDP survey, the last component of “human security” is designated “political security” here understood as living in a society that honors the basic human rights of its citizens. While the world has recently seen some progress on that front, there is much at fault in global terms. Political repression, systematic torture, ill treatment or disappearances are still occurring in many countries. Important international human rights monitors, e.g. Amnesty International, have provided substantial information on this most critical frontier of human development. References to these concerns will be found in a range of UNSC debates touching upon the elements of the “human security” agenda that have been selected for consideration by that central UN organ.

In order to round out the somewhat extended look at the philosophy of human

security as developed by UNDP, it seems helpful to render the abstract terminology of the conception more concrete by touching upon the passage on “Global human security” incorporated in the principal essay of 1994.²⁰ Here, directing the focus into the future, the authors of the 1994 report summarized the real threats to human security in the following manner: It would take many forms: a) unchecked population growth; b) disparities in economic opportunities; c) excessive international migration; d) environmental degradation; e) drug production and trafficking; and f) international terrorism. The brief list strikes the observer as realistic, clear and action-oriented. The meaning of “human security” as propagated by UNDP turns out to be comprehensive, salient, and urgent. It embraces both, the freedom from want and the freedom from fear, and conveys to the political elite and to the general public in all contemporary societies the multiple threats to human security and the still available opportunities to repair the damages and to create a base for a more sustainable life of a growing mankind on this globe. What further emerges from this brief survey is the realization that the conception and terminology of “human security” as publicized by UNDP does not claim special philosophical or theoretical status but has sought to address the policy implications of serving the purposes of “human security” in the practical world of global and regional governance.

3. Canada in the UN Security Council

The protagonist role of Canada in the promotion of “human security” became evident in the years 1999 and 2000 when it served as a nonpermanent member in the UNSC. A very informative volume entitled *Human Security and the New Diplomacy. Protecting People, Promoting Peace* edited by Rob McRae and Don Hubert and published by McGill-Queen’s University Press in 2001, offers detailed testimony about the Canadian initiative in the UNSC and the wider context within which this new policy was actively pursued. As pointed out in more general terms, the task which Canada took upon itself when entering the UNSC in January 1999, was to demonstrate the relevance of human security for practical international politics. The notion of human security was alien to the basically traditional practices of the UNSC where the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity were paramount and overshadowed the impact of human rights.

Looking at the paradigm of “human security” as a whole, the Canadian policymakers came to the conclusion that the most effective lever for catching the attention of the other members of the UNSC was the issue of the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict. This initiative could clearly be tied to the Charter-defined responsibilities of the Council and to the more inclusive definitions of “threats to international peace and security” guiding and shaping the Council’s work since the early 1990’s.²¹

It is generally agreed that the UNSC became much more active in the 90’s as it involved itself increasingly in humanitarian crises. The effect of nonmilitary sources of instability had been acknowledged by the UNSC in its fundamental declaration of January 31 1992 and the link to the Council’s principal mandate had thereby been established. Most of the operations ensuing in the subsequent years had prominent humanitarian ramifications: Northern Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, or Haiti are referred to simply as examples in that connection. The failures in Rwanda, in Bosnia, in eastern Zaire, and the paralysis over the Kosovo crisis document the UNSC’s uneven response and its inadequacy in seeking to deliver humanitarian assistance while refraining from providing the physical safety of the affected people.

In taking up its two-year mandate, Canada chose a strategy combining a case-by-case approach with a thematic one. This was enacted by seeking “operational entry points” for advancing human security in the Council’s numerous decisions on key security issues, peacekeeping mandates, and sanctions regimes. Moreover, Canada also promoted a comprehensive approach to human security through the thematic initiative regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The latter proposal was presented to the other Council members and to important humanitarian agencies in preparation for the first Canadian UNSC Presidency in February 1999, the second month of its term of office. The item “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” offered an umbrella for a number of concerns to Canada, including the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions, children and armed conflict, strengthening peacekeeping mandates, and peace building and conflict prevention, while building on existing UNSC activity. Canada’s aim was to consolidate previous UNSC work and suggest a well-rounded framework for protection-related efforts. The Canadian purpose was also to shift the Council’s focus from satisfying material needs of the victims of armed conflict to the angle of safety for

civilians in war zones. In familiar policy terms, it meant to switch the Council's attention away from humanitarian assistance to the legal and physical protection of innocent civilians in the middle of violent conflict.

In pursuit of this overarching purpose, the Canadian delegation supported by its Mission to the UN established the timetable for the UNSC deliberations during the Canadian Presidency. The opportunity in February 1999 was to be used to schedule a public principal debate about the new agenda item entitled the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. At the conclusion of that first debate, the UNSC would request the Secretary-General to prepare a report with concrete proposals for UNSC action. The matter would again be taken up later in the same year once the report by the Secretary-General had been received with the purpose of shaping possible follow-up action addressing the concerns inherent in the new agenda item. To implement such a game plan requires careful preparation. The Canadian diplomats carried out the necessary conversations, approaches and consultations to gain the agreement and active participation of fellow diplomats, senior Secretariat and agency officials, in particular also the Secretary-General and his immediate aides. The success of the preparations was demonstrated in the flawless course of the public meeting on 12 February 1999 chaired by the then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy as UNSC President.²²

The theme of that session, protection of civilians in armed conflict, which had been already alluded to by the Canadian representative at the 3968th meeting of the UNSC held on 21 January 1999²³ on the agenda item "Promoting peace and security: Humanitarian activities relevant to the Security Council," presided over by the Brazilian Representative, was taken up in the opening remarks of Minister Axworthy and then further elaborated in briefings by Mr. Sommaruga, the then President of the ICRC, Ms. Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF, and Mr. Olara Otunnu, the SG's Representative on Children and Armed Conflict.²⁴ The three humanitarian officials fully shared with the Canadian delegation the view that it was long overdue for the UNSC to take up this urgent matter of humanitarian protection for the main victims of the many armed conflicts around the world. They laid out in varying ways detailed proposals for the implementation of this protection function and what the UNSC could do to advance this urgent relief agenda.

The direct link between the protection item and the norm of human security was

spelled out at the 3977th meeting by the Representative of Slovenia who pointed to human security understood not in legal but physical terms as the basic aim of UN humanitarian action, and referred to the initiative of like-minded States, under leadership of Canada and Norway, which was determined to give full meaning and specific practical expression to the concept of “human security”.²⁵ Minister Axworthy spoke at the end of the open debate in his capacity as representative of Canada and laid out in full his Government’s conception of this turn to effective physical protection by the UNSC of the weakest and most endangered victims in conflict zones. He appealed to the other UNSC members to join the Canadian Government in the endeavor to safeguard the security of the world’s people, not just the States in which they lived and underlined that the protection of individuals should be a primary consideration in the UNSC activities. He elaborated his philosophy and reminded the Council that the protection of all citizens was the fundamental public good that the State ought to provide. It followed that the responsibility of the Council to protect civilians was therefore compelling from a human security perspective, in terms of fulfilling the Council’s own mandate and in the interest of enhancing state sovereignty.²⁶

In the afternoon of the same day, 12 February 1999, the UNSC briefly convened in order to allow the President to make a statement on behalf of the Council. This Presidential statement²⁷ offered a summary of the Council’s agreed views and, in pursuit of this new debate, requested the Secretary-General, in accordance with the initial scenario, to submit a detailed report with concrete recommendations to the Council by September 1999 on ways the Council could improve the physical and legal protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict. In strong and clear language reflecting the consensus of all Council members, the statement deplored in particular the growing civilian toll of armed conflict, the large-scale human suffering inflicted upon the innocent people, mentioned specifically children, the most endangered group among the civilian victims, condemned in no uncertain terms the deliberate targeting by combatants of civilians in zones of conflict and appealed to all States and political forces to fulfill their obligations at the national level and to ensure full compliance with the relevant legal norms inscribed in the Geneva Conventions and other covenants and statutes of humanitarian law.

The strong positive reaction by the wider UN membership became evident in the

subsequent public meeting of the UNSC held on 22 February 1999²⁸ and devoted to the continuation of the opening debate allowing non-Council members to state their views about the new agenda item clustering several so far unconnected issues dealing with field conditions in complex operations and with salient provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights law. The immense interest was illustrated in the full-day duration of the 3980th meeting started in the morning and carried over into an equally lengthy afternoon session. Altogether, twenty-three delegations took the floor during the 3980th meeting revealing strong acclaim for the Canadian initiative.

While the whole debate cannot be summarized here, it is worth noting that several delegations took up explicitly the terminology of human security and its role in the recent endeavor to maximize the UNSC's effectiveness in its crucial peace and security function applied to the prevalent internal conflicts and civil wars. The number of delegates addressing the human security theme was still quite small, but the echo of their voices was strong enough to feed into the following period of preparing the Secretary-General's report in response to the UNSC request. The remarks by Norway, Japan, South Korea, the Dominican Republic and Azerbaijan²⁹ revealed a worldwide spread of the utilization of the new paradigm and, not surprisingly, related mostly to the sense and application of the norm proposed by the Canadian Foreign Minister. The main exception, strictly in emphasis, was the statement by the representative of Japan who put forth a broader understanding of human security. He emphasized Japan's view of the crucial importance of human security concerns and elaborated that human security should be ensured against menaces that threatened the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings. In view of that conception, Japan joined the other representatives in underwriting the significance of measures to protect civilians in conflict situations as integral elements of the basic human security concerns. As to other delegates touching upon the human security conception, they all viewed its application as including the physical dimensions of protection and not merely a legal or political connotation.

Although the overwhelming near-unanimous view of the prolonged public debate was strongly sympathetic to the Canadian demarche and blueprint for UNSC active involvement in this new area of international work, the lone dissenting voice of the Indian delegation should be referred to. Accurately, the Indian delegate remarked that civilians had always been targets and victims of armed conflict even before the era of

colonialism and that the pattern was never interrupted or broken up. He recalled the cataclysmic horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and urged the international community to address the burning question of outlawing the use of nuclear weapons. In view of the close link between international events and media attention, the protection of civilians had become an excuse for asserting political will and waging war. He appealed to the members of the UNSC to approach these situations in a highly restrained fashion and avoid exacerbating the conflicts through inappropriate international measures. Legitimate concern for the wellbeing of civilian populations should not be used as a cover for intervention by powerful states and alignments.³⁰

In fulfillment of the Canadian expectations, the opening debate offered an abundance of useful ideas and suggestions for consideration by the UN Secretary-General and the relevant personnel units in the Secretariat entrusted with the task of preparing a draft. The Canadian delegation and some partner delegations interacted with the Secretariat side during the months leading to the formal issuance of the report. Although innumerable reports are issued in the name of the Secretary-General every year, it can be said that the report on the protection of civilians was one of the most carefully prepared products and also constituted a rather courageous move on the part of the Office of the Secretary-General. The report issued on 8 September 1999³¹(S/1999/957) submitted forty recommendations ranging from traditional diplomatic and political initiatives to more innovative peacekeeping and enforcement operations.

The central theme of the report was the urgency to create a “climate of compliance” with the existing legal norms and standards, which were found to be already in place but still lacking adherence. These principles in international human rights, humanitarian law, and refugee law required only few additions relating to the specific needs of the internally displaced persons, war-affected children, and humanitarian personnel.

The first series of recommendations focused on improving UN conflict prevention mechanisms as the Secretary-General considered conflict prevention the most effective form of protection. The report placed emphasis on the use of preventive peacekeeping deployments, urged that sanctions should be carefully applied to minimize humanitarian impact, and underlined the need to put a stop to illegal trafficking in small arms.

A second batch of proposals dealt with measures to improve the ability of UN peacekeepers to protect affected civilian populations including strengthening the UN's capability to plan and deploy rapidly. Other proposals dealt with curbing the use of hate media and with giving adequate training to the troops in humanitarian law and human rights; specific measures ensuring the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and employing safe corridors and humanitarian zones were mentioned as underutilized and potentially helpful in the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

The last batch of the recommendations was the most provocative and controversial part of the report. Criteria were introduced for when and how to intervene militarily in promoting humanitarian objectives. The Secretary-General suggested five such criteria: the scope of the breaches; the inability of local authorities to protect affected populations; the exhaustion of alternative mechanisms; the ability of the UNSC to monitor the actions undertaken; and the need to guarantee proportionality in the use of force. The important debates in the last ten to fifteen years illustrate why these proposals were bound to disturb a good number of developing States and small States as they look with great misgivings at the juggernaut of military force ready to be deployed at will by the main military Powers of the contemporary international system. Much of what the Indian delegate had invoked already at the 3980th meeting mirrored perfectly the deep mistrust in the developing world. For these and related reasons, it was immediately clear that regarding acceptance and implementation of the report's farsighted ideas and moves, there would arise substantial opposition in the subsequent months.

The UNSC convened its 4046th meeting on 16 and 17 September 1999 to deliberate about the SG report and what to do with it. Using the form of the public meeting, the Council members maintained the posture from the February meetings. An open debate was seen as the appropriate response to a comprehensive and action-oriented SG report. The special nature of the occasion was demonstrated by the presence and statement of the Secretary-General at the outset of the debate and in the declaration by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs. Mary Robinson.³² In opening the deliberations, the Secretary-General summarized the report with special emphasis on the forty recommendations contained therein and in conclusion stated that the essence of the UN work was "to establish human security where it is no longer

present, where it is under threat or where it never existed” and called this task the UN’s humanitarian imperative. He further proposed an UNSC mechanism to seek advice on specific issues dealing with legal protection, prevention of conflicts, and physical protection.

In her intervention, Mrs. Robinson echoed the sentiments of the SG about the importance of this complex of issues. She highlighted the massive violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and underlined the UNSC obligation to act by pointing to the process leading to the independence of East Timor. Sharing the SG’s viewpoint, she pointed out that human security had become synonymous with international security and that it could be guaranteed through the full respect for all fundamental rights. It was up to the UNSC to enforce accountability for war crimes and put an end to impunity. She urged the Council to develop an enforceable mechanism for the protection of civilians in armed conflict ensuring for them respect, dignity and human rights.

Opening the round of statements by Member States, the representative of Canada reviewed the origins of this new issue and recalled his Government’s role in raising the protection of civilians in armed conflict as a subject for discussion in the Council because of its clear salience for the UNSC. The concerns spelled out by the SG in the report on that whole issue were shared by his Government, which was trying to enhance human security and looked at the Council as paramount in this critical area. His delegation wished to emphasize that the protection of civilians had to be a primary imperative for collective international action. Canada favored the depth and thrust of the SG’s report and wished to help in any way possible to realize many of the specific suggestions. Such concerted action could help bring an end to cultures of impunity employing legal and political means to advance this critical aim.³³

While the next speaker, the representative of Slovenia, echoed the Canadian emphasis on the core norm of human security, the remainder of the first day of the debate dwelt mostly with the normative and operational aspects of a new forceful promotion of civilian protection in violent conflict situations. Together with the formal discourse at the public meetings of the UNSC, a stream of consultations went on, largely informal and not in the form of consultations of the whole, sorting out which of the Secretary-General’s proposals to accept and which to postpone or possibly turn

down completely. The end result of this multi-track dialogue was the final draft resolution that addressed the agenda item, the SG report and the follow-up to be decided upon and to be undertaken. In all this, one must again note how many non-Council Member States felt called upon to return to the second great debate and make their views known regarding the normative importance of the agenda item and the potential implementation by the UNSC itself and by the Secretary-General. It should be reaffirmed that the conduct of these general public debates has gained in frequency in the late 90s and has restored the Council's standing of a central forum at which to entertain ways and means to exercise the tools of the Charter in the maintenance of international peace.

At the end of the 4046th meeting on 17 September 1999, the UNSC unanimously adopted the Canadian draft resolution as amended as SC resolution 1265 (1999). This text responded to the SG report's recommendation, in particular those, which focused on legal protection, but without prejudicing further consideration by the Council of the content of the report. Although traditional concerns about inviolability of state sovereignty had been raised, they were mitigated by the converging acknowledgement of atrocious events in Sierra Leone and Kosovo, the ongoing crisis in East Timor, and the impending issuance of reports about the UN's failure in Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica in 1995. The resolution still put the UNSC on record regarding its commitment to respond where "civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed."³⁴

Assessing this first push to put a core aspect of human security on the UNSC agenda and to obtain an accord on pursuing the matter actively in the future, one must rate it as a moderate, but impressive victory for the Canadian initiators. By the time the Canadian tenure on the UNSC ended in December 2000, the agenda item "Protection of civilians in armed conflict" had gained a firm place on the Council's active agenda and was assured of continuing UNSC attention in years to come. If the question is narrowed down and one asks whether the concept of human security had been embraced and accepted by the UNSC and the wider UN membership, one must postpone final judgment. The norm of human security has found much acclaim among UN members, but there is clearly quite a bit of traditional resistance against seeing this norm raised to the rank of fundamental Charter values. This somewhat mixed record is traceable in

carefully reviewing series of UNSC debates touching upon humanitarian and human rights matters. Nevertheless, without overstating the case, the UNSC has been very open in listening to the new arguments and in translating acceptable parts of those initiatives into actionable features in the UNSC's peace and security armor.

The Canadian protagonists have provided the public with an excellent account and analysis of this 1999 operation "human security"³⁵ They show in carefully balanced words the manifold endeavors to maintain the focus on the civilian protection item and ensure tracking UN actions in this respect through formal and informal mechanisms including an informal working group set up in December 1999 tasked with reviewing the SG report's recommendations and reporting to the Council on proposals for further action during Canada's next presidency in April 2000. In order to close the circle and express the undiminished commitment of the Canadian Government, Foreign Minister Axworthy once again presided over the UNSC at the 4130th meeting on 19 April 2000 and used the opportunity to review the whole process started in early 1999 and carried through to the concluding moment resulting in the adoption of the Canadian draft resolution. The authors of the Canadian account inform their readers that the follow-up in 2000 was extremely contentious, although the verbatim record of the 4130th meeting does not reflect that element of irritation. The issue of legal protection was eventually taken up by the General Assembly, whereas the theme of physical protection was developed in the UNSC draft resolution sponsored by the Canadian delegation. Due to bitter arguments over the issue of sovereignty in relation to human rights and humanitarian access in an earlier UNSC discussion on humanitarian action, the Canadian submission threatened to fail. In the end, the Canadian draft was adopted unanimously as resolution 1296 (2000) restating and reaffirming the declarations and commitments of resolution 1265 (1999) thus assuring continuity and the chance for deepening the understanding and strengthening tools and procedures for effective civilian protection by the UNSC.³⁶

4. The Security Council's focus on Human Security Concerns

In order to place the civilian protection campaign into the wider context of global political and social changes, notice should be taken of the establishment of the so-called

“Human Security Network” involving Canada and Norway as the principal partners. It is significant to realize that the creation of this intergovernmental network predated the UN campaign by several months. The network grew out of the close partnership that had developed between Canada and Norway during the negotiation of the Antipersonnel Landmines Convention, which was signed in a formal meeting in Ottawa in December 1997. The two key figures, Axworthy and his Norwegian counterpart, Knut Vollebaek, shared the belief and ambition to apply the winning formula bringing about the Landmines Treaty to other urgent international issues. The first step taken was the Norwegian invitation to Minister Axworthy to join in a bilateral retreat in Bergen, Norway, in May 1998. The gathering in the remote location was a great success bonding the two men together and resulted in a joint announcement, the so-called Lysoen Declaration: Canada-Norway Partnership for Action. The opening section spelled out the basic purpose of this new partnership: “Norway and Canada share common values and approaches to foreign policy. With the evolution of international affairs, particularly with regard to emerging *human security* issues, we have agreed to establish a framework for consultation and concerted action.” (italics mine) Shared objectives listed inter alia to coordinate and concert actions with a view to: a) enhancing human security; b) promoting human rights; c) strengthening humanitarian law; d) preventing conflict; and e) fostering democracy and good governance. To achieve the stated foreign policy objectives, the two partners agreed to establish a flexible framework for consultation and cooperation, to include: 1) ministerial meetings at least once a year to review progress, set priorities and impart direction; 2) bilateral teams to develop and implement joint ministerial initiatives; 3) meetings to be held alternately in Norway and Canada or, where convenient, on the margins of relevant international bodies. The declaration ended with a “partnership agenda” containing the following issues: Landmines, International Criminal Court, Human Rights, International humanitarian law, Gender dimensions in peace-building, Small arms proliferation, Children in armed conflict, including child soldiers, Child labor, and Arctic and northern cooperation.

The somewhat detailed summary of the Lysoen Declaration reveals what certain Canadian officials afterwards remarked about the occasion: “For the first time, you could see an entire agenda emerging around the idea of human security, rather than a disparate set of issues.” This perception was shared by other officials elsewhere seeing

here the harbinger of a new international agenda. While officials handled assignments for action plans and joint initiatives, Minister Axworthy himself launched an open-ended diplomatic process in order to draw other countries into the new engagement. He labeled his idea “the Humanitarian Eight or H-8” and juxtaposed it with the G-8 of which Canada is a member itself and compared the very different agendas for the two groups. The intensive efforts to attract other State members was crowned with success and brought about in the end a geographically balanced group comprising next to Canada and Norway Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, Thailand, Netherlands, Slovenia, Jordan, Chile, South Africa. The enlargement of that initial partnership was formalized at another Bergen, Norway, meeting held in May 1999 and chaired by the Foreign Minister resulting inter alia in the official adoption of the name “Human Security Network” The skill and persistence of the two main sponsors shows in the fact that the network established viable relations with many international Non-governmental Organizations and started to collaborate on occasion and when desirable in global and regional intergovernmental meetings including, of course, the UN system. The story of the Human Security Network offers useful background in following the developments in the UNSC on the “human security” and civilian protection fronts.³⁷

In the time since the end of the year 2000, the UNSC has taken up the agenda item “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” on numerous occasions, and in consequence of the Council’s deliberations, several new reports have been issued by the Secretary-General dealing with aspects of that issue. The topic of this chapter and the scope of the present investigation forbid a detailed accounting for the continued deliberation in the UNSC context of the core issue as introduced by Canada. But instead, the effort will be undertaken to provide a general summary emphasizing elements that constitute progress in the treatment of the subject matter, and points of agreement and enactment that result in changed procedures of UN agencies serving in the field in relevant missions. In this fashion, the chapter will round out the impressions garnered in the first phase and help to figure out whether the so-called paradigm change as postulated by the Canadian and other State parties really exists and affects policies at least in the multilateral arena, in and around the UN system.

The next important point in the human security trajectory came with the SG’s

response in his detailed report of 30 March 2001 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.³⁸(S/2001/331) In the opening paragraphs he recalled the stark picture he had painted in the report of 8 September 1999, his first one on the issue, and mentioned again the distressing figure of civilians around the world who are caught in the midst of armed conflict and in dire need of protection and assistance. The recommendations, which he had presented to the UNSC in this initial report, had not yet been put into practice. He felt especially the breach of human rights of various kinds and widespread impunity for cruelty and brutality had not in any way been reduced, and he also mentioned the growing threats to the lives of local and international staff members in international organizations and other humanitarian groups. He reminded the UNSC members once again of the enormous percentage of civilians among war victims and stressed in that connection that the civilians tended to be the basic object of the new irregular forces fighting in intrastate wars. In view also of the discrepancy between commitments made in the UN Millennium Declaration (GA res. 55/2) and the lack of forceful implementation by the States individually and in the UN context, the SG suggested that the Member States should work towards creating a culture of protection in which the State parties would comply with their responsibilities under international law and armed groups and other actors would all strive to fulfill their commitments under the international provisions.

Since many States were caught in a gray zone between war and peace, it was evident that protection questions constituted a major task for Governments although they would have to rely on the engagement of non-governmental groups and civil society to share the burden of assistance in these crises. In the midst of this dense action pattern it was clear that the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians rested with Governments in line with the principles of GA resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991, whereas the armed groups were directly obligated, according to Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to common international humanitarian law, to protect civilians populations in armed conflict. Here, the SG stressed that such protection efforts must be targeted on the individual rather than the security interests of the State, whose principal task was ensuring the security of its civilian population.

In the main body of the report, the SG offered explanatory text on fundamental measures to enhance protection and ended each subsection with highlighted

recommendations for action. These subsections dealt with a) prosecutions of violations of international criminal law; b) access to vulnerable populations; c) separation of civilians and armed elements; and d) media and information in conflict situations. In a further section of that report, the SG took up the issue of entities providing protection, with subsections on a) entities bearing primary responsibility; and b) complementarity of other entities. As in the first segment, this part of the report also offered a most detailed description of a range of political and social entities and presented once again concrete recommendations for action. The main report concluded with final observations summarizing and restating the key arguments put forward by the SG and his aides. He underlined once more the pressing need for effective action by the Member States and referred in this connection to the numerous recommendations from the first report left unimplemented so far. He appealed to the UNSC to help with implementation by installing review processes regarding the recommendations offered in the first and second report. To offer more help, the report contained furthermore two annexes, the first presenting recommendations and general policy directions, and the second offering an accounting of the implementation of the recommendations contained in the SG's report of 8 September 1999, evidently to emphasize the critical remarks made in the main body of the report. It showed a willingness on the part of the SG to collaborate closely with the members of the UNSC in advancing substantially the critical agenda of the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

At the 4312th meeting on 23 April 2001,³⁹ the UNSC took up the SG report and dealt with the content of the report and the underlying recommendations to the Council contained therein. A rather typical pattern can be observed in this as in many other similar settings combining an SG report and the concomitant UNSC debate and decision, namely that the Council members tend to echo important points from the report without, however, moving much beyond it. Considering that the Canadian initiative emphasized the core norm of "human security" and an important aspect of it, namely the protection of civilians, it is quite striking that after the initial opening phase the language of the diplomatic representatives hews very closely to the script of the SG report and refrains from exploring the wider topical arena as it matches numerous other UNSC sessions. Such narrow focus on the message and suggestions from the SG reduces the policymaking role of the UNSC that is independent from, and politically superior to, the

reflections and reporting of the SG.

The 4312th meeting is set apart from many other UNSC meetings in that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs. Mary Anderson, had been invited to this session in order to address the UNSC on a set of issues that fell directly within the mandate of the Commissioner's office. This presence had the effect that an even stronger emphasis was placed on the many human rights and humanitarian law provisions that were largely unknown to armed factions and too often not familiar to Governments and their representatives. The legal dimension of the whole cluster of issues was of course of crucial importance as the violation of the fundamental duty to protect civilians in armed conflicts occurred quite regularly in zones of violent conflict around the world. Moreover, the interventions by the Human Rights Commissioner helped fill the gaps in the more general reporting style coming from the SG's office. She could furthermore help to clarify questions about specific situations or about suitable tools to deal with the impunity problem as posed by Government representatives in the public meeting of the UNSC. Her presence in the public meeting further enabled her to press both the collective body of the UNSC and individual Ambassadors to act swiftly to close gaps in the scheme of protection for civilians in the respective forms found in the many field situations under UNSC authority.⁴⁰

The earlier general remark about the nature of the UNSC deliberations at this meeting covers also the Norwegian statement. Although Norway was a leading member of the Human Security Network (see above, p.17), not a word was uttered about the connection with the overarching human security theme. Instead, one notices the most appropriate suggestion by Norway that the international fight against impunity would have to try to establish contact also with armed groups since they were a major factor in the violation of fundamental international legal norms. In that sense, it comes as no surprise that the closing remarks of the British Representative in the capacity of UNSC President are focused on procedural and operational details following basically the line of reasoning introduced by the SG and underlining the frequently invoked need for coordination and the regional context.⁴¹

While the first session of the 4312th meeting gave opportunity to UNSC members to state their views, the resumed session on the same day in the afternoon opened the debate up to non-Council representatives. Furthermore, the meeting was enriched by the

statements of Mr. Oshima, current USG for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) who was invited to open the series of statements. He used the occasion to fully endorse the SG report and its presentation to the Council, stressed duly the fundamental humanitarian principles that were affected negatively in many contemporary emergency situations and needed to be repaired and improved in order to help somewhat the suffering civilians in these conflict spots. He amplified his remarks by sharing certain organizational measures instructing OCHA and the humanitarian field operations to improve their own past efforts in dealing with the affected civilian victims. Acting in the capacity of resource person, he was able to clarify questions and criticisms from other speakers later in the course of the discussion.⁴²

Since the 4312th meeting was the first public session since the end of 2000, the Canadian representative took the floor in the resumed portion and set out once more the initial history of the human security initiative as undertaken by his Government renewing for the Council the linkage between human security and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Conceding errors and omissions in the brief preparation period for the Canadian initiative, he surmised that much progress had been made in the UNSC since that time including here naturally the enormous achievements as constituted in the contribution from the office of the SG, and emphasized the point that the safety of people had moved from the periphery of the Council's preoccupations to the center. He also took note of the inclusion of specific civilian protection provisions in the mandates authorizing three recent peacekeeping operations and welcomed the appointment of advisers on child protection and on gender as well as human rights officers. He criticized, on the other hand, the exclusion of the protection of the civilian population from the revised concept for the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) based on putative "gaps" between ambition and capability as was argued by some and admonished the Council members to use a more general formulation allowing some shortcomings and gaps instead of dropping the provision altogether. Such caveats were much more acceptable than the decision to drop it. The Canadian speaker also emphasized that the protection of civilians was everyone's responsibility and should be addressed in upcoming consultations between the UN and regional organizations. He mentioned the Canadian sponsorship of an international independent commission to examine the issue of humanitarian intervention and State sovereignty and, in recalling

the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development, hoped that the new body would be able to synthesize the irreconcilable principles mentioned in its name. Last not least, the representative of Canada stipulated that existing resolutions and recommendations on the protection of civilians had to be implemented and pointed to relevant provisions in resolution 1296 (2000) asking the SG to include observations related to the protection of civilians in armed conflict in his regular reports to the Council; the Canadian government insisted that the practice should be systematic and, going further, should also identify cases where particular recommendations for the protection civilians should be acted on especially promptly. Another SG report on this whole issue should be requested in the resolution, and the annual audit idea put forward by the representative of Singapore could also be implemented in this respect.⁴³

Showing Canada here in the role of monitor regarding the agenda item reaffirms the previous assessment that the role of one State actor, Canada, and its diplomatic staff must be judged decisive for the promotion of the cause in the UNSC. It should be mentioned that the forceful contribution by Canada apparently effected two briefer and gentler responses during the proceedings at the resumed session. Keeping the focus of this review on the central notion of human security, one should take note of the subsequent intervention by Japan and the Republic of Korea. While fully endorsing the SG report and its recommendations, the Japanese representative reminded the UNSC that Japan had consistently favored a wider concept of human security entailing the protection of the life and dignity of peoples and considered poverty and environmental degradation, terrorism and infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, as falling within the meaning of the term. This expanded scope of human security did not omit or diminish the well-known fact that civilians in armed conflict were the most vulnerable by that standard.⁴⁴ At the same meeting, the representative of Korea suggested that the UNSC activities in previous years had addressed the issue of the protection of humanitarian assistance to refugees and others and that the trend since that time had clearly been to recognize that widespread human rights violations warranted the Council's attention and that human security was intricately linked to international peace and security. He further commented that the concern for human security involved not only the UNSC but also other UN organs, i.e. the GA and ECOSOC and subsidiary bodies, and pointed out that some ECOSOC entities had taken up root causes of conflict which often were related to

poverty, through the promotion of economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, good governance and democracy. In light of these promising crosscutting deliberations, he hoped that the UN system would be better able to respond to the multi-faceted challenges of civilian protection in armed conflict.⁴⁵ In a subsequent contribution at the same session, the representative of Malaysia felt the need to emphasize that the protection of civilians in armed conflict should encompass both physical security as well as legal protection under international law, thus endorsing the double-sided notion of civilian protection.⁴⁶ One can subsume that this perception would also relate to the understanding of human security. At the end of a lengthy statement lamenting the Iraqi situation under UN sanctions, the representative of Iraq concluded by saying that dealing seriously with the issue of the protection of civilians in armed conflict should entail going to the very heart of the matter, namely the causes of conflict which he listed as poverty, underdevelopment, disease, uneven distribution of wealth, hunger, the exploitation and looting of resources, the instigation of ethnic and religious conflicts, the imposition of others' values and interests, aggression and embargoes.⁴⁷ The polemical nature of this remark is well understood, but in fairness it must be conceded that the wide net used by the Iraqi spokesman did cover a comprehensive range of factors affecting the condition of human beings. It would not be farfetched to place the Iraqi understanding of human security in close proximity to the more comprehensive Japanese concept. Still, it is fair to sum up the resumed session of the 4312th meeting as providing only few morsels relating to the human security norm compared to many more comments about the concrete current operational and policy issues.

What is worthy of attention and explanation is a non-event. Despite Canada's admonishment shared by various other delegations that the UNSC should show its commitment by another formal resolution responding to the elaborate SG report, the long meeting ended merely with the bland statement by the UNSC President, the representative of the United Kingdom, that the Council would decide subsequently in informal consultations the follow-up to this full discussion. This reticence with regard to an intensive dialogue between UNSC and the Secretariat was definitely not welcome to the non-Council delegations attending the resumed session and to other outside interested actors, but the authority to take action lies, of course, in the hands of its

members. However, one thing that can be stated most affirmatively is the conclusion that the introduction of the new agenda item regarding civilian protection had been fully accepted and integrated into the demanding and very time-consuming political agenda of the UNSC. The speed and intensity of this process of adoption must be registered and taken as a sign for the UNSC's ability to become aware of changing political circumstances and to redirect and widen its own de facto list of priorities flowing into the handling of the Council's agenda both in the consultations as well as in its public meetings. This interim assessment can be registered as the survey over the Council's treatment of a key human security component is carried a little more forward on the timeline.

The next step in the UNSC's treatment of the civilian protection item was quite out of the ordinary and exceptional in that the Council, through its President, the representative of Bangladesh, contacted the SG by letter dated 21 June 2001⁴⁸ and indicated that further advice of the SG would be useful in the Council's consideration of the SG report of 30 March 2001. The Council further suggested that the report should be distributed more widely within the UN system, and therefore recommended that it be transmitted as an official document to the GA. Then the Council issued specific proposals: 1) The recommendations on the protection of civilians contained in the first SG report (S/1999/957) should be reorganized by the Secretariat into different groups to clarify responsibilities, enhance cooperation and facilitate their implementation by the Council. The recommendations in the second report (S/2001/331) should be reorganized based on SC resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), taking into account the different responsibilities and mandates of UN organs and the need to further strengthen coordination among UN system organizations in order to facilitate further deliberation by the UNSC. 2) The UNSC encouraged the SG to ensure closer cooperation between OCHA and DPKO, including by establishing a cross-cutting team of the Office and the Department, to facilitate consideration of civilian protection needs in the design, planning and implementation of peacekeeping operations. 3) In order to facilitate UNSC consideration, whenever appropriate, of issues relating to protection of civilians in its deliberations on the establishment, change or closing of peacekeeping mandates, an aide-memoire listing the relevant issues should be prepared in cooperation with the UNSC. 4) The Council members would welcome a briefing by the Secretariat on the

status of these initiatives by November 2001 with a view to finalizing them as soon as possible thereafter. Half-day expert-level seminars also were suggested on specific issues to further ensure the necessary interaction between Council and Secretariat. Against this background and invoking the UNSC decisions in this respect, the Council members requested the SG to present a report no later than November 2002 on the status of implementation of the relevant recommendations regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and any other matter he wished to bring to the Council's attention on this subject matter.

Several things are noteworthy about this most unusual letter from the UNSC to the SG. The communication came nearly two months after the April 2001 debate. The UNSC gave very precise and detailed instructions on what it wanted from the SG and the relevant units of the Secretariat. It demanded two major submissions, an aide-memoire in November 2001 and a full report in November 2002, thus establishing a long-term schedule for its own consideration of the agenda item. It was furthermore notable that in the UNSC letter an unmistakable desire for close Council-Secretariat collaboration was expressed and instructions were directly issued to two Secretariat units, OCHA and DPKO, for improvements in their collaboration. Such intrusive directions are quite unusual in that the UNSC has always respected the official rank and status of the SG as Head of the UN Secretariat. The language of the UNSC letter left little room for negotiation or reshuffling by those receiving the instruction. Still, it needs to be reiterated that the UNSC committed itself here in public form to a prolonged consideration of the civilian protection question aware of the pressure from Member States and NGOs for more active engagement on that critical dimension of the wellbeing of individuals worldwide.

The following months brought the fulfillment of the UNSC timetable and work schedule. As intimated in the UNSC letter, the Council convened its 4424th meeting on 21 November 2001 to receive the briefing by the Secretariat on the status of the initiatives outlined in the letter. Mr. Oshima, the USG for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, was invited to address the Council and present the briefing. He opened the briefing by highlighting the issues and challenges addressed in the SG report including the issue of humanitarian access to vulnerable populations; the special protection needs of women and children; safety, protection and security in

camps for internally displaced persons; engagement with armed groups for access negotiations; civil and military relations in the delivery of humanitarian aid; separation of civilians and combatants in camps for internally displaced persons and refugees; and the security and safety of humanitarian personnel. He added that the daily conditions in the field fully reflected what had been communicated in the SG report. In the following segment of his briefing he shared with the Council specific information about the steps taken to carry out what the Council had asked for. In the reorganization of the 54 recommendations of the SG reports, labeled “roadmap,” the Secretariat had set up a matrix for sorting out all the proposals and had consulted with other offices and with the UNSC in designing this new format. As to the aide-memoire, a checklist to ensure that the civilian protection concerns were systematically taken into consideration in establishing, changing or closing peacekeeping mandates, OCHA working closely with DPKO and humanitarian and human rights agencies, had prepared a list of issues for the Council’s consideration and had sent the draft informally to interested Member States for comment. It was suggested that a half-day expert-level discussion with SC members could be organized to review the aide-memoire the following year, in January or February. Concerning the third initiative ensuring closer coordination between OCHA and DPKO, the SG welcomed the idea of a cross-cutting team composed of members of the two units to facilitate due consideration of issues related to the protection of civilians in the design, planning implementation of peacekeeping operations. To that end, OCHA was developing a strategic paper, which would be brought to the attention of the members of the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for further development and action. In conclusion, Mr. Oshima committed his office to providing within a few months additional information on the status of these initiatives.⁴⁹

In the following question-and-answer period, most delegations asked a variety of questions dealing with the status of work and the effects in specific field situations. In a more critical vein, the representative of Singapore asked whether the thousands of words on the protection of civilians, the protection of children and the protection of women had actually made a difference in terms of deeds on the ground and requested at the next meeting on the subject concrete information, what he called “trend lines”: Could one indicate a change for better or worse: are more civilians really being harmed,

injured or killed? He also submitted that it might be useful to cluster the recommendations so that they could be applied in four related agenda items before the Council. This might save meeting time and costs and help ease the burden especially on the small missions with very limited staff. As a third point, he raised the issue of non-State actors and asked how the norms created by the Council could be applied to those parties without coercion. He felt that the Council really had to commit to this difficult aspect of the problem, which led him to raise the whole problem of the humanitarian intervention.⁵⁰

The UNSC President in closing this special meeting reaffirmed the direct link between the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the Council mandate to maintain international peace and security and, with thanks to Mr. Oshima, mentioned the continued follow-up on this question and another round of meetings in later months.⁵¹

The dialogue was resumed in March 2002, at the Council's 4492nd meeting on 15 March. Again, Mr. Oshima appeared before the Council to update the members on the work done in the past few months on the UNSC initiatives from June 2001. Reviewing several current field situations, such as Palestine, the Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he stressed how seriously endangered civilians were in those places. He listed important initiatives, which were being developed and were to be completed at the earliest opportunity. In this review, he pointed to the completion of the aide-memoire, serving as a toolkit for relevant situations and provided details regarding close inter-departmental and inter-agency collaboration on those issues, which were shared in terms of mandates and ongoing activities. This full expose of significant efforts and operations to advance the work on behalf of the protection of civilians was indicative of the seriousness, with which the UN entities had pursued the instructions by the Council.⁵² After a very constructive exchange of views and responding to numerous questions from Council members, the UNSC President, the representative of Norway, brought the meeting to a close, emphasizing the focus on the protection of civilians as part of the Council's peace work and noted the more than 40 references in previous SC resolutions and Presidential Statements addressing relevant concerns. This body of official declarations of the Council reflected the enormous progress made in the issue of civilian protection and the

tremendous work still to be done to further improve the record.⁵³

Following directly after the closure of the 4492nd meeting at 12:20 p.m., the UNSC held another official meeting, the 4493rd meeting, at which the President read the Presidential Statement⁵⁴, which had been agreed upon in consultations among the members. Herein, the UNSC reaffirmed its concern at the hardships borne by civilians during armed conflict and recognized the consequent impact this had on durable peace, reconciliation and development, and underlining the importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution. The UNSC decided to adopt the aide-memoire contained in the annex to the presidential statement as a means to facilitate its consideration of issues pertaining to protection of civilians. Having read the presidential statement, the UNSC President, in brief concluding remarks, remarked that the innovative manner in which the aide-memoire was developed, through close cooperation between OCHA and Council members, could be usefully applied when the aid-memoire needed updating.⁵⁵ The aide-memoire, in the fourth draft revealing the long drafting process, was attached to the Presidential Statement showing the well-structured presentation of the numerous previous references falling into thirteen separate objectives. These were: Access to vulnerable populations; separation of civilians and armed elements; justice and reconciliation; security, law and order; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and rehabilitation; small arms and mine action; training of security and peacekeeping forces; effects on women; effects on children; safety and security of humanitarian and associated personnel; media and information; natural resources and armed conflict; and humanitarian impact of sanctions.⁵⁶

This construct offers the full assortment of critical issues surrounding the matter of human security in the midst of danger and violent conflict. It justifies the conclusion that in this agenda item the special efforts to clarify the terminology and apply the scheme to the complex tasks to be carried out in the field had borne rich fruit and lent itself to the challenging work of the individual members of the UNSC and of the UNSC as a collective policy- and decision-maker. In this instance, the road taken by the UNSC and its partners had moved them deep into the field of specific actions in various conflict zones. Moreover, it put the attention for the civilian protection matter into the center of the UNSC's Charter-based work for peace and security.

The climax of the period in which the UNSC made the protection of civilians its

own theme was reached at the end of 2002 when on 26 November 2002 the SG submitted, in accordance with the UNSC's request, the third report on the agenda item.⁵⁷ Any more careful reading of the sequence of reports, deliberations and decisions during the three-year period since the inception of the consideration at Canada's initiative reveals a thorough and deepening search for the proper placement of this burning new concern on the UN agenda, in particular the crucial political agenda of the UNSC itself. The SG's report to the Council went back to the beginning and demonstrated to the Council the enormous distance it had traveled from those pristine moments in 1999. The emphasis, which the SG placed on the procedural angle of this immersion, was fully justified as all parties to the new cluster of human security concerns took full part in the endeavor to assimilate the new thinking about human security into the vocabulary of the UNSC and its partners in most of the ongoing field operations under UN auspices. While restating some of the earlier findings, the report was mostly targeted to equip the Council and its members with the tools necessary to carry the process further. Putting this special track of deliberation and policymaking into the wider context of the ever changing UN agenda, the SG rendered thereby critical assistance to the purposeful engagement of the UNSC. Placing the escalating human casualties due to armed conflict and many other known ills as background to his arguments, the SG presented a detailed and highly structured account of the state of affairs confronting the UNSC and its partners in action, and removed any and all excuses for the Council collectively or for individual members to shirk their responsibility towards human survival and wellbeing.

In concluding this seminal report, the SG stressed the changing environment for the protection of civilians. At present, he argued, the durability of peace was dependent on a commitment to the protection of civilians from its very inception. The report outlined practical measures in three key areas relating to transitional peace processes. First, Member States must understand and accept their obligations as well as responsibilities for the protection of civilians in conflict situations. Secondly, a commitment was required to structured and inclusive negotiations on issues of humanitarian access, to the separation of armed elements from civilians, and there was need for a determination to ensure the physical safety of humanitarian personnel and the civilians whom they were assisting. Thirdly, there was the need to appreciate better the

interdependence between humanitarian assistance, peace and development. Finally, the SG called for collective will to address new threats to civilian protection, which were posed by commercial exploitation of conflicts, the sexual exploitation of civilians in conflict and the global threat of terrorism.

Wrapping up this basic review, the SG warmly recommended several practical initiatives that should guide the UN in its daily work on civilian protection. Regional workshops could help in identifying threats to regional peace and security. The Council should consider adopting and using the aide-memoire to develop frameworks and more structured approaches to the protection of civilians by UN country teams in conflict areas. Here, he recalled favorably the review of these new tools in a UNSC workshop on 18 July 2002 on the Mano River region in the DRC. This kind of review should be undertaken periodically to improve key mandates and resolutions where the protection of civilians remained an important challenge. All this would benefit from a continuing and intensifying process of closely aligning the activities of all the UN offices and other relevant UN entities relating to the integration of the protection of civilians into planning frameworks for peace missions and peace processes.

In the Annex to the SG report, the draft “roadmap” was set out in response to UNSC requests in its resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000). The version contained a reorganized tabulation of the recommendations along action-oriented themes identified in the round tables and also found in the aide-memoire. Further work on this new format was scheduled in the early months of 2003 to refine the instrument and to make it more useful for the work of the UNSC itself as well as numerous partners in and outside the UN system. This involved also concrete steps taken by ECOSOC suggesting to Member States participation in workshops on the protection of civilians with a view to sharing knowledge and experience and improving practice. These workshops introduced fundamental concepts concerning civilian protection, provided participants with experience in using diagnostic tools and brought a regional perspective to the security threats and the protection of civilians.

A few weeks later, on 10 December 2002, the UNSC held its 4660th meeting⁵⁸ to take up the important report by the SG on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The importance of this particular session was indicated by its being held on Human Rights Day and by the presence of the Secretary-General who offered a general

introduction of his new report. He offered his compliments for the Council's impressive record of formulating within a period of less than three years a conceptual framework for tackling the issue at hand. He added that it was most significant to translate the knowledge gained in conceptualization into practical action and a clear path from policy to implementation. In view of the huge number of people falling within the category of civilians in conflict situations, he underlined that the protection needs did not end with a cease-fire, but must extend into the post-conflict period without which peace-building would not become effective. He related this substantial work on protecting victimized civilians to the fundamental aim of the UN, namely to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.⁵⁹ Following the practice of a few earlier meetings, the USG for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Oshima, speaking after the SG, shared with the Council members a very detailed and action-oriented overview of the recent activities within the Secretariat and with associated outside partners bringing about a growing tool box available to political organs and international personnel. He held the recent progress in conceptual and programming work against the unacceptably high toll in human life and livelihood and spelled out the dire need for protection and assistance in crisis situations around the world. He mentioned furthermore that the Government of Norway had taken the lead in establishing a support group of Member States to create a broader support base for the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and praised this exceptional step in burden-sharing between the membership and the Secretariat. Summing up, he submitted the three core tasks of the agenda of protection of civilians, namely to advocate, to educate and to implement, and promised that his Office would report on further progress in six months, thus maintaining the forward momentum.⁶⁰

Reflecting the openness of recent UNSC meetings, the current Head of the ICRC then took the floor and enlarged some of the field reports as put forward by the SG and his aide. Using the term "alarming," Mr. Gnaediger expressed his agreement with the tone of the SG's three reports on the issue and pointed out that the global network of the ICRC enabled it to attest to the unspeakable suffering of civilian populations who were frequently the prime targets of these violent conflicts. This suffering included acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate attacks by regular armies or other armed elements, terrorist acts, starving populations, women having fallen victim to sexual violence, child soldiers, families separated without any news of their loved ones and

forced disappearances. He added that such situations were exactly the subject of international humanitarian law, one of whose pillars was the protection of civilian populations. The absolute prohibition of any violence directed against any and all civilians was firmly inscribed in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols; therefore the main task was not the formulation of new legal principles but instead a concerted international effort to reach full compliance with the existing conventions and statutes.⁶¹

In the subsequent debate extending into a resumed session in the afternoon of 10 December 2002, a large number of non-Council Members addressed the UNSC on the question of civilian protection. Considering the principal quality of this particular meeting, it should not come as too much of a surprise that the core link between the protection of civilians and human security would be brought back into the public dialogue. Several members of the Human Security Network were among the speakers at the session, among them in particular Norway, which had been instrumental together with Canada to launch the movement for human security, and Austria, not a Council member during that year. As the representative of Norway spoke with great intensity about the urgent issue of improving the protection of civilians, he remarked that his delegation aligned itself fully with the statement to be made by Austria on behalf of the Human Security Network later in the debate. Similarly, the delegates of Canada, Chile, Ireland, and Switzerland associated themselves with the Austrian statement.⁶²

The profound importance of the occasion is fully reflected in the emphatic statement by the Austrian representative on behalf of the Human Security Network. The Austrian delegate opened his statement by stating that he spoke in Austria's capacity as current Chair of the Human Security Network, an interregional group of countries also comprising by then Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (as observer), Switzerland, and Thailand. For this group of States the protection of civilians was at the core of the Network's endeavors to ensure the security and the rights of the individual. The group aimed to take concrete actions to make the world a place where everybody could live in security and dignity, free from fear and want, with equal opportunities to develop their human potential. These efforts were directly related to what the SG had termed the humanitarian imperative: the very essence of UN work to establish human security where it was under threat, where it was

no longer present or where it never existed. The reality diverged dramatically from this powerful vision. But the Network joined the SG in embracing the goal to develop a culture of protection within and beyond the UN. The members of the group urged the Council to sustain the momentum generated behind the agenda item, and called upon the SG to update the Council regularly on new developments in that field. Specifically, the representative endorsed the proposal to develop measures to raise the awareness of all parties in conflict, including non-State actors, of their responsibilities and of the relevant provisions under international humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law. Regarding displacement of populations, oftentimes result or even aim of current conflicts, the Austrian delegate drew the Council's attention to the ongoing work of the GA and the Commission of Human Rights to formulate legal norms in support of protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, building upon the crucial efforts of the SG's Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. The members of the Network shared the view that sustainable peace could only be achieved on the foundation of an effective and fair administration of justice ensuring accountability for past grave human rights violations, and welcomed the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which marked an important contribution to ending impunity. They further agreed with the SG that reconciliation efforts needed to be carried out in a culturally sensitive way and that relevant education should build tolerance and social justice in communities during and after conflict, with human rights education being especially pertinent. The Network was currently engaged in drafting a declaration on human rights education principles and in producing a manual on that subject. On yet another aspect of the problem, the members of the Human Security Network viewed the widespread use of small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel landmines and their impact on the scope and level of violence as affecting civilian populations during and after armed conflict. In this connection, the representative remarked that a week ago, the fifth anniversary of the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and Their Destruction had been commemorated, an initiative that originally had led to the establishment of the Human Security Network. At the end of the forceful declaration, the Austrian representative pledged full dedication of the members of the Network to supporting and promoting the protection of civilians in armed conflict as an

indispensable foundation for peace, security and stability.⁶³

Ten days later, on 20 December 2002, the UNSC held a brief evening meeting to allow the President to read out the consensus statement on behalf of the Council.⁶⁴ This extensive declaration summarized the main points of the 10 December debate and put the Council and its members on record as to what they acknowledged as fundamental norms and values in the matter of civilian protection and as to what they committed themselves, individually and as a collective, to do in situations constituting a massive and immediate threat to civilian populations. Thus, the UNSC went on record again condemning all attacks and acts of violence directed against civilians and other protected persons. Furthermore, the Council called upon all parties to armed conflict to comply fully with the UN Charter, the four Geneva Conventions and other rules and principles of relevant international law. The UNSC also took note of the aide-memoire adopted in March 2002 and underscored its importance as a basis for improved analysis and diagnosis of key protection issues and committed itself to updating it annually to include emerging trends in the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Acknowledging the severe problems in securing access from non-State actors to civilian populations under their de-facto rule, the Council stressed the importance of the comprehensive framework agreements relating to improved access and encouraged the ongoing work by UN agencies for a manual of field practices of negotiations with armed groups to strengthen the UN capabilities in this respect. In addition, the UNSC issued a strong endorsement regarding the urgency to improve the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, and in particular to maintain the security and civilian character of camps for these groups in flight. The Council paid attention to the emerging conditions affecting the capacity of Member States to protect civilians, and expressed great dismay about gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation, abuse and trafficking of women and girls, new scourges exacerbating the situation of the unprotected victims; here, the Council advised States to apply the six core principles developed by the UN and other humanitarian partners to prevent or at least remedy situations of sexual cruelty. The concluding paragraph of the Presidential Statement offered the Council's recognition of the importance of a comprehensive, coherent and action-oriented approach to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Council encouraged all other partners, Member States and relevant UN offices and agencies, to cooperate on

this critical front of international engagement and drew attention to related recent Council resolutions on women, peace, and security, and on children in armed conflict. In order to stay fully informed and prepared, the Council requested another SG report by June 2004 and invited the Secretariat to continue its oral briefings every six months to report on progress in the roadmap concept as set out in the SG report (S/2002/1300).

If one sees this high point on the three-year time line as the climax and end point in the evolution from an idea to a central norm in the Council's work, the next occasion where the protection of civilians in armed conflict was placed on the UNSC agenda could be described as a postlude. This is not to argue that the story that has been told in a rather simplified way, ended at the December 2002 date. Nevertheless, there is the clear impression that with the deliberations of the 4660th meeting and thereafter a process has come to an important fulfillment. What occurs after this point in time is a new phase, in which the Council is handling the agenda item as a regular feature on its long list of issues to be considered. The feeling is generated that nobody questions any more the salience of the concept although differences continue about the description of "human security" as a new paradigm and the civilian protection item as the core of that basic norm.

It appears that the 4777th meeting on 20 June 2003 was convened in order to give the USG for Humanitarian Affairs an opportunity to update the Council members as agreed after six months about new activities and achievements, but possibly more important, to allow Mr. Oshima to bid goodbye to the UNSC as his tenure as USG was about to end. It is most probable that this coincidence facilitated the decision to take up the issue of civilian protection again. The opening statement by the Russian Ambassador serving in the capacity of UNSC President made mention of the impending departure of Mr. Oshima from his senior post in the Secretariat. The evidence of the course of the meeting further strengthens the speculation that the intention was to honor the USG in this formal and visible fashion. The statement of assessment and evaluation by Mr. Oshima took a major part of the Council meeting. He offered an overview over main strands of conceptualization and follow-up work carried out in his Office and reflected systematically on the remaining tasks and challenges for the Secretariat after his stepping down from his assignment. In offering his thoughts on the central purpose of the UN Charter and its practice, namely the safety and wellbeing of the human

individual, he warmly endorsed the movement towards the culture of protection, the goal coined by the SG and his principal aides.⁶⁵

The new phase of the Council's involvement with the issue was reflected in the strong recommendation by the UK representative who spoke in favor of "mainstreaming" these issues into the focus of the UNSC.⁶⁶ The near-unanimous appreciation of the steady efforts and results of Mr. Oshima's Office by the Council Members shaped the flow and atmosphere of this official farewell. Following in the footsteps of Austria at the earlier occasion, the representative of Chile speaking on behalf of the Human Security Network, affirmed the notion that protecting civilians was at the heart of UN credibility. He gave for the colleagues in the Council a brief recounting of what the purpose of this Network was. Its aim was to change the focus of security, which had traditionally been state-centered, to emphasize the human dimension of security. The concern of his Government and other Member States was directed towards the impact of conflict on real flesh-and- blood human beings. It appeared to his delegation that the concept of human security was directly related to the humanitarian efforts outlined by Mr. Oshima.⁶⁷

The meeting which had been convened due to the President's initiative, was concluded without any formal UNSC action further providing evidence that the basic reason for the gathering was the formal farewell for the USG for Humanitarian Affairs. It should be mentioned in this connection that compared to other UN officials and outside speakers and experts, Mr. Oshima had been much more frequently engaged with the Council, first in several public meetings over the years, and in addition in many informal consultations and working sessions. It also becomes clear that the Council members owed quite a bit of gratitude to Mr. Oshima and his colleagues as they had been in the forefront of filling in the blanks in the introduction and pursuit of the key item of the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

5. Human Security and Peace-Building

It has become clear from the previous argument that human security also falls within the parameters of peace-building. The logic of the relationship emerges from the simple question whether a stable peace can be gained without ensuring human security for the

members of the community in which such a process has been initiated. One can go even further and propose that it is absolutely indispensable to place the assurance of effective human security into the center of the achievement of enduring and stable peace. If we recall the genesis of the term “peace-building” coined and introduced prominently in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, the comprehensive quality of this integral part of the overall peace process strikes us as essential as well as pertinent. The referent for most of the components of what is understood as peace-building has been the individual in his/her community. Whatever needs doing is performed in order to provide to everybody the “freedom from fear” and the “freedom from want.” Much has been written in academic works about peace-building, and therefore there is no compelling necessity to go over those definitional and terminal endeavors again. From the perspective of the main UN organs, especially the UNSC as well as the GA, it is part and parcel of their respective mandates and agendas to establish a record of successful measures bringing the blessings of peace to conflicted communities around the world. One can hear a steady multilateral dialogue that attempts to advance the goal of peace and stability in failed states and civil war situations. The general insight between practitioners and scholars is the requirement of time and of commitment to keep a process of peace-building going. Examples in recent years abound where the elusive goal of durable peace has been delayed if not lost because of impatience on the part of the donor community and due to inadequate material and moral support for the difficult and challenging enterprise; one should name Afghanistan and Liberia as major examples of what is at stake in peace-building operations in major crisis spots. The financial shortfall in most emergencies is so notorious that one must question the underlying commitment to repair and restore those troubled sites.

The brief remarks so far need some expanding as one remembers the basic conceptual gap in the understanding of human security. The contrast is between protection of individuals on the one hand and poverty eradication on the other. The basic question here is whether an individual living in poverty and misery can be seen as “secure” if this miserable condition is not disturbed by violent conflict. One could draw the tentative conclusion that human security is a comprehensive formula and that the eradication of poverty is an integral part of its content. This debate was also briefly touched upon above when the definition of human security was the topic. Putting

human security into the wider context of universal principles as proclaimed by major UN bodies and conferences, there is no denying the fact that protection alone, while worthy and desirable for its own sake, is not sufficient to circumscribe the meaning of human security. Objectively speaking, the goal of human security is valid only in that it addresses all aspects of human depravity and insecurity as conditions to be overcome. Such absolutist premise can be maintained in order to keep alive the flame of vision for a better future for all mankind and not just the privileged few. If nothing else, one can venture the assumption that those who for pragmatic reasons restrict their program of action are still fully aware that the larger agenda of poverty eradication has not been abandoned, but that a start on this long journey had to be made.

That proposition helps to see the major efforts of the UNSC as motivated by Canada and Norway and others in the following light: those limited goals have been set and pursued in pragmatic restraint and have focussed on a few concrete objectives. Ideal notions of the authority of the UNSC must be adjusted downward in view of the political realities surrounding the functioning of this central Charter-body. The collective will of the Council members can affect many things, but it is beyond the capacity of the UNSC as currently constituted to revise the mechanisms of an interdependent world. The Canadian Government and its dynamic Foreign Minister saw the opportunity to launch a major campaign at a rather inactive time of the Council's evolution. Choosing a target that was basically beyond controversy and garnered at least lukewarm support from the most reticent among the Council members ensured that the breach in the wall of past practice created an innovative opportunity. The Canadian initiative gained in a limited period of less than three years a full success ending in the unrestricted acceptance of a new cluster of humanitarian and human rights concerns oriented toward the individual level by a unanimous Council. The victory of pragmatism did not amount to a defeat of principle, but to an implicit phasing-in of that new initiative over a longer period of time. As the Canadian speaker pointed out in 2002, long after its membership in the Council had come to an end,⁶⁸ the spectacle of extensive deliberations and a growing set of resolutions and statements on the civilian protection issue by the 15-member body offered the Governments of Canada and of other middle powers and smaller states in and around the Human Security Network tremendous gratification.

As was mentioned in passing above, the sequence on the protection of civilians in armed conflict has resulted in major gains in the Council's policymaking and decision-making posture. Opening the Council regularly to the presence and voices of important humanitarian organizations and UN offices and agencies constitutes a tremendous step forward into the world arena. Getting involved in informal sessions with Secretariat staff and joining those in deliberation and drafting strengthens the bonds between the different elements on the multilateral stage and improves the outcomes. Drafting help becomes more focused and sensitive to the political needs of the Council members and presents a golden opportunity to open up to more substantive help from UN officials and staff, thus lowering the barriers between senior diplomats and international staff. Altogether, the Council has become a more efficient decision-maker while improving transparency and thereby remaining well connected with all the Member States and numerous regional groupings whose interest in UN policymaking continues to be quite intense. The outcome of the last phase in the promotion of the civilian protection agenda item was remarkable as all participants praised the close collaboration and its effects on the matter at hand and on the Council's standing and acting altogether.

6. Conclusion

The review of the UNSC treatment of the innovative agenda item of the protection of civilians in armed conflict has brought a certain amount of clarity as to what can be seen in the policy notion of human security as promoted by Canada, Japan and other States and intergovernmental organizations as compared with a carefully defined theoretical term meeting the refined standards of scholarly examination. The prevailing mix of different understandings is at this point not ready to be settled by some definitive analysis of a philosopher or social scientist. To reject the notion is, however, neither desirable nor necessary. The earlier review of current uses of the term "human security" has exposed a major dichotomy of perception between the group which focuses on the narrow meaning of personal and group "security," whereas the other faction thinks of human security in much wider connotations resulting in the idea that all threats to human well-being should be included in the definition. As pointed out in a reference

above, the tension between “freedom of fear” and “freedom of want” should be amicably resolved. The current Canadian undertaking to collect and publish all data annually relating to threats to human security,⁶⁹ while excluding massive data about the huge gap of inequality in the global system and the immense poverty afflicting the majority of the world population, is in and of itself an arguable restriction. For a global perspective of the contemporary world, it is absolutely essential to depict the human community in its painful division between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” The scope of human misery is oftentimes reproduced in annual reports streaming out of the UN system and from many non-governmental organizations. Only a global view will be sufficient to expose the level of inequality and injustice and recommend measures to remedy this scandalous situation. As far as the circulating conceptions of “human security” are concerned, the UNDP terminology, the vocabulary of Caroline Thomas, and the articulations issued by the Japanese Government in recent years include the human misery component in their definition and description. There should be no way around the concession that human survival is the prime factor in what can be called “human security”. If critics claim that the concept is not viable because there are no clear empirical measures for that state of affairs, it must be argued that such stringent criteria need not be met in a policy norm.

Ultimately, and as spelled out a few times above, the focus of this paper is really on a policy standard that will allow operational decisions to be taken and to be carried out as instructed. Looking here once more at the Canadian step of reducing the paradigm debate to a practical guide for relevant political action in crisis-ridden sites all over the world, it is unavoidable to concede that the Canadian plan succeeded beyond expectations. Had the sponsor insisted on an absolute standard, the pragmatic actors in the UNSC forum would have refused joining such futile engagement. Since the shift to human security is presented as a paradigm shift, it creates some confusion to observe that the shift to pragmatic goals emerges from the absolute departure point. Glancing over the developments during the three year period from 1999 through 2002 in the UNSC, one is left with a positive sense of progress in that one could be sure that further difficulties on the protection front would be taken up much more quickly and quite forcefully.

With all the reservations about the current role of the UN and the UNSC, this story

of how the Council was challenged to take up a new and difficult task going far beyond the range of the Cold War period and how it managed to rise to the level of practical policies and effective decisions in many emergencies while establishing a new dimension in its widening agenda for a world in turmoil, is convincing evidence of the impressive vitality and dynamic of the Council. The UNSC underwent this transformation of its mandate and agenda and demonstrated in its tracking record its aptitude in learning. These specific examples of the Council's flexibility and openness have been touched upon earlier. The contributions by numerous Member States, many of them serving only on a nonpermanent basis, deserve to be heralded. This shows in the fact that among members of the informal Human Security Network quite a few have been involved in the UNSC business during these three years. The new evidence furthermore strengthens the viewpoint that initiative and guidance in the UNSC oftentimes come from smaller temporary members. This condition in the working of the Council serves as reaffirmation of the continuing viability and utility of the instrument of the UNSC for purposes relating to peace and security including the central obligation, to ensure the security of the individual in the changing world of today and tomorrow.

Notes

¹ For a fine example of such an article, see Roland Paris, "Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2001, pp. 87-102.

² Such descriptive account is e.g. found in the very comprehensive paper by Kanti Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," Occasional Paper #19, Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, 2000; esp. pp. 9-17.

³ See here Foreign ministry website <<http://www.dfait.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/menu-e>>. Further, highly pertinent is the volume issued under the auspices of the Canadian Foreign Ministry, Rob McRae & Don Hubert (eds.) *Human Security and the New Diplomacy. Promoting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

⁴ Yukio Takasu, "Toward Effective Cross-Sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World." <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html>

⁵ Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999*, Chapter 2, Section 3, from website <www.mofa.go.jp>.

⁶ Human Security Network homepage. <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.asp>>

⁷ See Kanti Bajpai, *op.cit.*, pp1-4.

⁸ Lincoln Chen, "Human Security: Concepts and Approaches" in Tatsuro Matsumae and Lincoln C. Chen (eds.), *Common Security in Asia; New Concepts of Human Security* (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1995), p. 139.

⁹ David T. Graham and Nana K. Poku, *Migration, Globalisation and Human Security* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 17.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 585.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 598.

¹² Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116, no. 4, Winter 2002, pp. 585-610. This article also provides an overview of the whole issue including the Canadian initiative.

¹³ Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie, "Human Security in Crisis and Transition: A Background Document of Definition and Application," Working Draft, prepared for USAID/Tulane CERTI. September 2000, p. 37.

¹⁴ George McLean, The Changing Concept of Human Security: Coordinating National and Multilateral Responses. <<http://www.anac.org/canada/security/maclean.html>>

¹⁵ Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests of States," *Security Dialogue*, vol. 303, 1999, pp. 265-276.

¹⁶ Caroline Thomas, *Global Governance, Development and Human Security* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 6-7; Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.) *Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 3; further, Caroline Thomas, "New Directions in Thinking about Security in the Third World," in Ken Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), pp. 267-289. Also Caroline Thomas, "Global governance and human security" in Rorden Wilkinson and Steve Hughes (eds.), *Global Governance. Critical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 113-131.

¹⁷ See here inter alia the essays by Roland Paris (endnote 1); Pinar Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security," *International Studies Review*, vol. 5, no. 2, June 2003, pp. 203-222; Jyothi M. Pathania, "Bangladesh: Non-traditional Security," paper no. 751, South Asia Analysis Group, 30.07., 2003; and Barnett Rubin, "Afghanistan and Threats to Human Security," *Social Science Research Council: After Sept.11, 2001*. (6 pages).

¹⁸ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 22.

¹⁹ For the description of the UNDP position, chapter 2: New dimensions of human security, *ibid.*, pp. 22-46, has been the essential source.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-37.

²¹ For fuller accounts regarding the Canadian diplomatic initiative, see Rob McRae and Don Hubert (eds.) *Human Security and the New Diplomacy. Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); esp. the Introduction by former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, and the case study entitled "The Security Council and the Protection of Civilians" by Elissa Goldberg and Don Hubert in chapter 9 (The New Multilateralism).

²² See her in particular the case study cited above by Goldberg and Hubert. See the 3977th meeting of the UNSC on 12 February 1999, especially the opening words by Axworthy as UNSC President and his lengthy statement in his capacity as

Representative of Canada, S/PV.3977, pp. 30-33.

²³ UN S/PV.3968, pp. 13-14.

²⁴ UN S/PV.3977, pp. 2-5 (Mr. Sommaruga); pp. 5-8 (Ms. Bellamy); pp. 9-11 (Mr. Otunnu).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

²⁷ UN S/PV. 3978. The Presidential Statement was issued as UNSC document S/PRST/1999/6.

²⁸ It was the 3980th meeting recorded in S/PV. 3980 and S/PV.3980/Resumption 1.

²⁹ UN S/PV. 3980, Norway, pp. 7-8; Japan, pp. 10-11; Republic of Korea, pp. 20-22; Dominican Republic, pp. 24-26; S/PV. 3980/Resumption 1, Azerbaijan, pp. 2-3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, S/PV/3980, India, pp. 16-19.

³¹ The report was issued as UNSC document S/1999/957.

³² UN S/PV.4046, Secretary-General, pp. 3-4; Mrs. Robinson, pp. 4-6.

³³ *Ibid.*, Canada, pp. 6-9.

³⁴ For the full text, see UNSC document S/RES/1265 (1999).

³⁵ See endnote xix above.

³⁶ For the full text of resolution 1296, see UNSC document S/RES/1296 (2000).

³⁷ This account is based on the first-hand case study on “The Human Security Network” by Michael Small, in: McRae and Hubert (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 231-235.

³⁸ The report by the SG was issued as UNSC document S/2001/331.

³⁹ For the complete verbatim record of the meeting, see UN S/PV.4312 and S/PV. 4312/Resumption 1.

⁴⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 4-7 for Mrs. Robinson’s statement.

⁴¹ For the concluding remarks of the UNSC President, see *ibid.*, Resumption 1, pp. 39-40.

⁴² For Mr. Oshima’s remarks, see S/PV.4312/Resumption 1, pp. 2-3.

⁴³ See *ibid.*, pp. 4-5 for the statement by the representative of Canada.

⁴⁴ For the statement by Japan, see *ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁵ For the statement by the Republic of Korea, see *ibid.*, 9-10.

⁴⁶ For the Malaysian statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 19-21.

⁴⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 30-32, for the Iraqi statement.

⁴⁸ The letter was issued as UNSC document S/2001/614.

⁴⁹ See UN document S/PV. 4424, pp. 2-4 for Mr. Oshima’s statement.

⁵⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 4-5 for Singapore’s pertinent intervention.

⁵¹ See *ibid.*, p. 13 for the President’s closing remarks.

⁵² See UNSC document S/PV. 4492, pp. 2-5 for Mr. Oshima’s account to the Council members.

⁵³ See *ibid.*, pp. 19-20 for the President’s remarks.

⁵⁴ The Presidential Statement read on the UNSC’s 4493rd meeting was issued as UNSC document S/PRST/2002/6.

⁵⁵ See the verbatim record of the 4493rd meeting (S/PV.4493) for the brief remarks by the President.

⁵⁶ See UNSC document S/PRST/2002/6/Annex for the full text of the aide-memoire.

⁵⁷ The third and so far last SG report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict was issued on 26 November as UNSC document S/2002/1300.

⁵⁸ The verbatim record of this extended public deliberation was issued as UNSC documents S/PV. 4660 and S/PV. 4660/Resumption 1.

⁵⁹ For the SG's introductory remarks, see S/PV. 4660, p. 1.

⁶⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 1-6 for Mr. Oshima's detailed presentation.

⁶¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 6-8 for Mr. Gnaedinger's intervention.

⁶² See *ibid.*, pp. 8-10 (Norway), 13-15 (Ireland), S/PV. 4660/Resumption 1, pp. 7-9 (Switzerland), 9-11 (Canada), and 11-13 (Chile).

⁶³ See S/PV. 4660/Resumption 1, pp. 16-18 for Austria's important statement on behalf of the Human Security Network.

⁶⁴ The Presidential Statement, which was read out at the 4679th meeting on 20 December 2002, was issued as UNSC document S/PRST/2002/41.

⁶⁵ See the verbatim record of the 4777th meeting of the UNSC on 20 June 2003, S/PV. 4777, pp. 3-8 for Mr. Oshima's presentation.

⁶⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 9-10 for the United Kingdom statement.

⁶⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 14-15 for the strong statement by Chile.

⁶⁸ See here for the Canadian statement at the 4660th meeting on 10 December 2002 UNSC document S/PV. 4660/Resumption 1, pp. 9-11.

⁶⁹ Reference here is to the new initiative to issue annually a "Human Security Report" produced by the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. The underlying definition of "human security" comprises the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence, as well as the defense of borders against external threats. Thus, this amounts to a conception of 'freedom from fear.

Chapter 4

The Nexus between UN Peacekeeping and Human Security: Reviewing the Functions of UN Peacekeeping from a Perspective of Human Security

Yuji Uesugi

1. Introduction

“History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work.”¹ This statement was made in the so-called Brahimi Report, which was submitted in 2000 to the United Nations secretary-general by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations as a comprehensive review of the whole concept of peacekeeping operations.

This emphasis on the interface between peacekeeping and peace-building may reflect the trend that fewer and fewer UN peacekeeping operations are being deployed to interstate conflicts, although the peacekeeping concept was originally invented as a tool for international security, to deal with conflicts between states. Since 1948, the United Nations has established a total of fifty-six peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War (1948–1988), the United Nations created fifteen operations, of which eight were deployed to interstate conflicts. In contrast, since 1989 the United Nations has created forty-one new operations, but only three were sent to conflicts fought between states. In other words, thirty-eight missions (93 percent of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the post–Cold War era) were, in fact, deployed either in

intrastate conflicts or conflicts in a collapsed state (often referred to as a “failed state”).

Furthermore, recent instances of humanitarian intervention and peace operations in Africa and the Balkans indicate that non-UN peacekeeping operations have been established by other international and regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In addition to these regional initiatives, UN-authorized multinational forces have played an important role in complex emergencies in East Timor, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.² These non-UN peacekeeping operations will not be examined separately in this paper, based on the understanding that the fundamental activities of non-UN operations are quite similar to those of UN operations, and that the operational difficulties that the peacekeepers face in the field are roughly equivalent regardless of the sponsor of the operation. Hence, the following analysis will focus on the performance of UN peacekeeping operations, but its implications should not be limited to UN peacekeeping.

Is UN peacekeeping able to provide an adequate response to the security needs of people caught up in intrastate conflicts? Can the strategies that have been employed by UN peacekeepers address the problems of intrastate conflicts? Even in intrastate conflicts, UN peacekeeping strategies that have been employed in various interstate conflicts are still quite appropriate when the objective of peace-building is the separate development of two newly established entities. For example, the installation of a buffer zone between the combatants helps to demarcate the “international” border between the contested parties. In this sense, the introduction of a UN peacekeeping operation can accelerate the peace process and thus contribute to the resolution of a conflict.

Such a peacekeeping strategy poses a serious problem, however, when the objective of peace-building is the reintegration of separated entities. This is because the logic of peacekeeping stresses the need to create a wall between the two contestants in the interest of forestalling violence between them. As a result of such a physical separation, positive interactions between the parties - necessary to address the fundamental causes of the conflict - are also unwittingly precluded. In short, the logic of peacekeeping may reduce the success of peace-building in divided communities.

This problem is particularly acute when peacekeepers are sent into a conflict in a failed state in which a number of illegitimate warlords and militias hold pieces of the

land, and they are unable to find a mutually satisfactory arrangement to share power in the reintegrated “state.” Under such circumstances, no one is willing or able to ensure the security of the people in that failed state. In fact, it is due to such a vacuum of public security apparatus that the most serious human security concerns develop in a failed state. UN peacekeepers tried to fill such gaps in Somalia, Rwanda, and elsewhere. But recent UN peacekeeping experience in intrastate conflicts shows that strategies of interstate peacekeeping may not be applicable to many of the security issues and challenges presented by intrastate conflicts. The Brahimi Report identified this shortcoming of existing UN peacekeeping strategies and recommended many reforms of UN peacekeeping approaches. A corollary of such an argument is that the strategies of peacekeeping that can facilitate the reintegration of separated entities need to be identified. In other words, an alternative approach that can fill the gaps between today’s reality and the existing strategies of UN peacekeeping must be rigorously explored.

An effective analytical tool that can stimulate creative thinking in this direction is the concept of “human security”, which was first introduced in the *Human Development Report 1994* by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Later, in 2003, the Commission on Human Security, cochaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, published a report called *Human Security Now*, which advocated a new security paradigm. In clarifying this new concept of human security, the report argued that attention must shift from the security of states to the security of people. The report also pointed out that the existing mechanisms responsible for protecting the security of people in areas of violent conflict were inadequate, as they drew heavily from state security assumptions.³

Using the concept of human security as a guideline to reveal the gaps that exist between current approaches and the needs on the ground, this paper will review the performance of UN peacekeeping and explore a new peacekeeping strategy that could help to protect the security of people in areas of violent conflict. In particular, the UN peacekeeping experience in Cyprus and Cambodia, where the United Nations was asked to help reintegrate the divided communities, will be referred to in order to draw some lessons for the development of peacekeeping strategies that can contribute to the reintegration of separated entities.

2. Definition of UN Peacekeeping

Before the role of human security in peacekeeping operations can be addressed, the notion of UN peacekeeping must be defined. Over the years, as mentioned above, the United Nations has undertaken fifty-six peacekeeping operations of varying scope, duration, and degree of success. The term “UN peacekeeping” means different things to different people. In fact, many scholars and practitioners have groped for definitions. The United Nations provides us with one of the most comprehensive and authoritative definitions: peacekeeping is

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an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the “enforcement action” of the United Nations under Article 42.⁴

However, even such a broad definition no longer reflects the reality of UN peacekeeping operations. The most remarkable defect of this definition concerns the phrase “without enforcement powers.” The Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) is a notable example refuting the claim that peacekeeping operations lack enforcement powers. The Security Council authorised UNOSOM II by its Resolution 837 (1993) to take “all necessary measures” against those responsible for the attack on UNOSOM II personnel on 5 June 1993. Theoretically, it can be argued that if the United Nations uses enforcement action to settle a conflict, then such an action is not a peacekeeping operation. This line of argument would exclude UNOSOM II from the list of UN peacekeeping operations, categorising it instead as a peace-enforcement operation. However, in addition to UNOSOM II, the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) also clearly failed to meet this definition of non-enforcement. Thus, the emphasis on the non-enforcement aspect of UN peacekeeping is at least debatable.

Some operations, such as the United Nations Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), do not involve any military personnel.⁵ This is because these missions are accompanied by non-UN “peacekeepers” who are responsible for overseeing the security of the unarmed UN personnel. Another reason is that these missions are aimed at providing technical assistance to a post-conflict society, which requires exclusively non-military expertise in areas such as electoral supervision, human rights verification, and supervision of public administration, including law enforcement. Despite the fact that people usually associate the term “peacekeeping” with the military, many activities carried out by multifunctional UN peacekeeping operations are, in fact, characterised as a concerted effort between military, police, and other civilian actors. Furthermore, as indicated above, some UN peacekeeping operations do not involve any military personnel.

The difficulty of finding an adequate definition of UN peacekeeping is largely due to the nature and historical roots of peacekeeping. First, because each UN peacekeeping operation is responsive to each particular conflict situation, and every conflict has its own unique character and dynamics, no two operations share identical traits. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that the strength of UN peacekeeping operations lies in their creative and spontaneous adaptation of general principles to a specific situation.⁶ Hence, UN peacekeeping has avoided institutionalisation.⁷ Second, since UN peacekeeping operations were not originally envisaged in the UN Charter as among the measures designed to preserve international peace and security, they are a purely empirical creation born of necessity.⁸ UN peacekeeping emerged during the Cold War as an ad hoc improvisation. As a result, its practice preceded the conceptualisation. The concept of UN peacekeeping has been empirically developed and a general theoretical framework of UN peacekeeping has emerged after repeated trial and error in the field. In short, it is “an evolving concept”.⁹

Because it is still evolving, the practice of UN peacekeeping operations is difficult to conceptualise. One useful way to recognise distinguishing features of UN peacekeeping operations is to define related concepts and identify the clear thresholds that lie between them and peacekeeping. Hence, the characteristics of UN peacekeeping will be compared with other related UN endeavours.

The United Nations has undertaken various efforts to maintain international peace

and security. These UN efforts are usually classified as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building. They can be categorised according to their objectives, the means used to achieve these objectives, the players who carry out the efforts, and the sequence of their implementation. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN secretary-general, presented the official definitions of these concepts:

- *Preventive diplomacy* is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
- *Peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
- *Peacekeeping* is a UN presence in the field (normally including military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements), and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief.
- *Peace-enforcement* may be needed when peaceful means fail. It consists of action under Chapter VII of the Charter, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
- *Peace-building* is critical in the aftermath of conflict. It means identifying and supporting measures and structures that will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.¹⁰

The above taxonomy of UN endeavours can provide clear theoretical thresholds between peacekeeping and other UN activities, and thus help us imagine distinct conceptual features of UN peacekeeping operations. For instance, what makes peacekeeping fundamentally different from other approaches is its overriding responsibility for controlling physical violence among the combatants. Activities that come under the rubric of peace-enforcement, in contrast, include sanctions and other

punitive actions against the offender of the international peace and security; therefore, they are different from peacekeeping, which maintains the principles of consent, impartiality, and self-defence. Nonetheless, recent examples of UN peacekeeping indicate that it has begun to assume much wider responsibility and undertake more multifaceted and complex tasks, so that its activity overlaps with that of other UN endeavours. For instance, some UN peacekeeping operations have been granted a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter and have involved a quasi-enforcement action, although their major objectives were still maintaining security arrangements and overseeing public security in the area of deployment.

Furthermore, UN peacekeepers have begun to intervene in intrastate conflicts and now assume a wide range of unprecedented activities.¹¹ Because some UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to oversee the implementation of a peace accord, they take on civilian tasks that require electoral, judicial, and administrative expertise. State institutions often collapse in intrastate conflicts, and irregular armies play a major role in such a chaotic situation. Due to the lack of sufficient measures and structures to provide humanitarian relief efficiently and safely in collapsed states, some UN peacekeepers are given a mandate to protect humanitarian operations. Under such circumstances, UN peacekeeping has adopted more coercive tactics and strategies, making it increasingly less distinct from peace-enforcement.¹²

In other words, the theoretical boundary between peacekeeping and other UN activities has become blurred as the functions of UN peacekeeping operations have expanded in three directions: peacemaking, peace-building, and peace-enforcement. The overlap between peacemaking and peacekeeping became enormous and institutionalised when UN peacekeeping operations took on new tasks such as supervising the implementation of peace accords and election processes. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) are clear examples of the combination of peacekeeping and peacemaking.

Similarly, some of the tasks often labelled as peace-building are now carried out under the framework of UN peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and UNOSOM II, for instance, sought to facilitate a reconciliation process, although their attempts failed. In addition to promoting political

reconciliation among former enemies, UNTAC oversaw economic reconstruction, social rehabilitation, and the repatriation of refugees - activities that used to be conducted outside the framework of UN peacekeeping through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNDP, and other organisations.

Furthermore, the grey area between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping seems to have widened. Several recent UN peacekeeping operations shifted temporarily or partly to enforcement. UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR, for example, involved a much larger number of more powerfully armed personnel than typical peacekeeping missions. These operations were authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all necessary measures to accomplish their mission objectives.

UN peacekeeping is essentially a holding action, but its functions have expanded well beyond its fundamental role. The wider the role that UN peacekeeping seeks to play beyond its original mandate, the more ambiguous the theoretical boundaries between peacekeeping and other UN endeavours become. Because UN peacekeeping is an evolving concept that emerged in the field, finding an all-encompassing definition of UN peacekeeping is almost impossible, and any attempt to treat all operations as the same under the general rubric of peacekeeping seems misguided.¹³

One way to avoid this pitfall while at the same time addressing a wide range of UN peacekeeping practices is to systematically identify the various functions that UN peacekeeping operations have fulfilled. Therefore, the following section will be devoted to the development of a typology of UN peacekeeping characteristics. In order to categorise the differing characteristics and practices of UN peacekeeping missions, the core spectrum of UN peacekeeping operations are outlined by their functions.

3. Taxonomy of UN Peacekeeping

There are as many types of UN peacekeeping operations as there are types of conflict. This is because, as mentioned above, the conceptualisation of UN peacekeeping operations has followed their practice, which features ad hoc adjustments to changing circumstances. UN peacekeeping is proving to be very flexible, in that sometimes it is given the task of simply supervising a cease-fire, and on other occasions it performs complex and delicate functions such as nation building and maintenance of law and

order in a failed state. Hence, UN peacekeeping operations must be defined descriptively in order to capture the diversity of their practice. A good description of complex activities must be guided by a clear and viable theoretical framework; therefore, the functions of UN peacekeeping operations will be used as a guiding framework in the effort to develop a sound taxonomy.

Classifying the activities of UN peacekeeping based on the functions that each operation fulfils on the ground not only helps us distinguish peacekeeping from other UN operations such as peacemaking, peace-building, and peace-enforcement, but is also useful in identifying the differences and similarities among UN peacekeeping operations. Through a focus on these categories, the concept of UN peacekeeping will be defined descriptively.

Various Typologies of UN Peacekeeping Functions

In order to appreciate the actual effects of each operation on the peace process, a specific set of functions that a UN peacekeeping operation seeks to fulfil in the overall process will be used as basic criteria for examining the nature of each operation. Scholars and practitioners have made several interesting attempts to classify the various tasks of UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, the next step is to briefly examine these typologies.

First, Mats Berdal provides an excellent typology in which he identifies eight categories of UN peacekeeping tasks. These categories are (1) electoral support, (2) humanitarian assistance, (3) mine clearance and training and awareness programmes, (4) observation and verification of cease-fire agreements, buffer zones, and foreign troop withdrawal, (5) preventive deployments, (6) separation of forces, their demobilisation, and the collection, custody, and/or destruction of weapons, (7) establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies, and (8) disarming paramilitary forces and private and irregular units.¹⁴ Although Berdal places the disarming of regular forces and irregular forces in two separate categories, in the following analysis these two tasks will be incorporated into a single heading: *demobilisation and regrouping*.

Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White examine the various functions performed by UN peacekeeping operations and develop another good typology: (1) observation, (2)

fact-finding, (3) supervision, (4) disarmament/demobilisation, (5) human rights monitoring, (6) election/referendum monitoring, and (7) humanitarian assistance.¹⁵

Likewise, Paul Diehl and colleagues classify peacekeeping operations into twelve categories: (1) traditional peacekeeping, (2) observation, (3) collective enforcement, (4) election supervision, (5) humanitarian assistance during conflict, (6) state/nation building, (7) pacification, (8) preventive deployment, (9) arms control verification, (10) protective services, (11) intervention in support of democracy, and (12) sanctions enforcement.¹⁶

John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra list nine distinct categories of UN-authorized military activity, which can be summarised as follows: (1) conventional observer mission, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) preventive peacekeeping, (4) supervising a cease-fire between irregular forces, (5) assisting in the maintenance of law and order, (6) protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, (7) guaranteeing rights of passage, (8) sanctions, and (9) enforcement.¹⁷

“Supervision” (McCoubrey and White) and “traditional peacekeeping” (Diehl et al., Mackinlay and Chopra) involve securing a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and disengagement of forces, whereas “observation” (McCoubrey and White, Diehl et al.), “fact-finding” (McCoubrey and White), and “conventional observer mission” (Mackinlay and Chopra) merely involve monitoring and reporting on these actions.¹⁸ When Mackinlay and Chopra address cease-fire supervision, they create a separate category for irregular forces; however, supervision of a cease-fire between irregular forces will not be considered as an independent category, based on the understanding that the fundamental activities of peacekeepers in cease-fire supervision are comparable regardless of the nature of the parties concerned.¹⁹ No UN peacekeeping operations seem to have assumed the functions of “collective enforcement” and “sanctions enforcement” (Diehl et al.) or “sanctions” and “enforcement” (Mackinlay and Chopra) that should clearly fall into the peace-enforcement category. Of course, it can be argued that some UN peacekeeping operations such as ONUC, UNOSOM II, and UNPROFOR have carried out quasi-enforcement tasks, but these missions undertook such tasks as a result of “mission creep” rather than a premeditated course of action clearly defined as sanctions and enforcement. For that reason, sanctions and enforcement will be excluded from the following analysis. “Intervention in support of democracy” (McCoubrey and

White) is interpreted to include *human rights verification* and *institutional reinforcement*.

Finally, Boutros-Ghali identifies eleven new tasks that the United Nations is now asked to undertake. These include: (1) supervision of cease-fire, (2) regrouping and demobilisation of forces (including their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons), (3) design and implementation of de-mining programmes, (4) return of refugees and displaced persons, (5) provision of humanitarian assistance, (6) supervision of existing administrative structures, (7) establishment of new police forces, (8) verification of respect for human rights, (9) design and supervision of constitutional, judicial, and electoral reforms, (10) observation, supervision, organisation, and conduct of elections, and (11) co-ordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.²⁰ In the following analysis, the terms *institutional reinforcement* or *nation building* will be used to encompass tasks identified in Boutros-Ghali's typology as the supervision of existing administrative structures, the establishment of new police forces, and the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial, and electoral reforms.

While the above lists are not exhaustive typologies of UN peacekeeping functions, they do capture the essence of different tasks performed by various UN peacekeeping operations and could be developed into a comprehensive set of categories. Since similar functions and related tasks are listed as distinct categories in some typologies, these will be summarised and merged into fewer subcategories in the following analysis. Table 1 summarises the features of the five typologies presented above.

Table 1: Summaries of the Five Typologies of UN Peacekeeping Functions

Tasks	Berdal	McCoubrey	Diehl	Mackinlay	Boutros-Ghali
Cease-fire Supervision	O	O	O	O	O
Disengagement of Forces	O	O	O	O	
Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops	O	O	O		
Arms Transfer Control		O	O		
Maintenance of Law and Order				O	
Preventive Deployment	O		O	O	
Institutional			O		

Reinforcement					
Nation Building			O		
Election Assistance	O	O	O		O
Demobilisation and Regrouping	O	O			O
De-mining	O				O
Refugee Assistance					O
Human Rights Verification		O	O		O
Socioeconomic Rehabilitation					O
Securing Humanitarian Assistance	O	O	O	O	O
Protective Services			O	O	

Categories of UN Peacekeeping Functions

Using these typologies as references, the functions of UN peacekeeping operations have been carefully reviewed and specific tasks that have been assigned to UN peacekeeping operations have been identified. These tasks fall broadly into three main clusters: (1) *interposition*, (2) *transition assistance*, and (3) *humanitarian intervention*. This is not an exhaustive list, although efforts have been made to make the list as comprehensive as possible. Furthermore, the categories are not intended to be mutually exclusive. Single-task UN peacekeeping operations are rare. Most operations are assigned several different tasks, either simultaneously or sequentially.

Several fundamental features are shared by the tasks that fall under the heading of *interposition*. First, these tasks are conducted primarily by military personnel and are considered to require military expertise to be fulfilled effectively. A common objective of UN peacekeeping operations involved in such tasks is to restrict overt violence by maintaining the status quo and to buy time for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. In these operations, UN peacekeepers seek to defuse and then stabilise the conflict situation.²¹ They provide physical, political, and moral barriers to the escalation of the conflict by interposing themselves between the adversaries.²² The presence of these barriers helps to prevent a tense situation from deteriorating into direct armed confrontation. At the same time, UN peacekeepers seek to help adversaries overcome co-ordination difficulties created by the hostility and the restriction of interaction between them.²³ The *interposition* functions can be classified into the following six categories:

(1) *Cease-fire supervision* means verifying compliance with the agreement by monitoring the parties' activities, investigating and reporting violations, and patrolling along a cease-fire line or established areas of separation (buffer zone).

(2) *Disengagement of forces* involves the stationing of impartial lightly armed troops as a buffer between opposing forces to prevent the recurrence of cross fire and to prevent minor incidents from escalating into a full-fledged war. In order to create a buffer, the UN operation oversees mutual or unilateral withdrawal of belligerents at the beginning of its emplacement.

(3) *Verification of withdrawal of foreign troops* involves the verification or supervision of the withdrawal of foreign troops (both regular and irregular forces) that intervened in a conflict.

(4) *Arms transfer control* includes regulation of the disposition and movement of military forces, verification of arms flows into the area of deployment, management of cross-border military assistance, prevention of infiltration, and inspection of military facilities.

(5) *Maintenance of law and order* may be pursued by assisting local authorities or by verifying the neutrality of their police force, but in the absence of local authorities, peacekeepers may assume the primary role in managing local disputes; quelling civil disturbances, riots, human rights abuses, and destruction of property; and prosecuting those members of the local population responsible for illegal actions. When peacekeepers are deployed to failed states, they might have to take responsibility for the security of innocent civilians, including minority groups, refugees, and displaced persons. This task is usually assigned to peacekeepers deployed to an intrastate conflict when there is no effective government capable of assuming such a task by itself, or while a referendum or election is held to determine the legitimate government.

(6) *Preventive deployment* is the stationing of buffer forces between two (actual or potential) combatants to deter the outbreak of direct armed confrontation or to prevent the spread of war.

The *transition assistance* functions seek to change the status quo by assisting a state or group of states in executing an agreed political solution to a conflict. Some of these functions require UN peacekeepers to act as an interface between peacemaking

and peace-building efforts, including both third-party consultancy and socioeconomic processes.²⁴ While acting as an interposition force between adversaries, many recent UN peacekeeping operations have also been assigned to supervise national elections as a step towards independence or as a reconciliation process. In order to perform these “non-military” functions, the mission must have a substantial or predominantly civilian composition and expertise. The *transition assistance* functions involve the following eight categories:

(1) *Institutional reinforcement* includes a variety of tasks that are intended to restore or repair state functions in the absence of an effective governmental authority but when a viable government does exist in the area of deployment. UN peacekeepers’ responsibility is to assist the existing or newly established government in the formation, reconstruction, or strengthening of its civil institutions, including local administration. This role also includes assistance with constitutional, judicial, and electoral reforms.

(2) *Nation building* is needed when no viable government exists. In the complete absence of a civil framework, UN peacekeeping operations take on the lead role in the restoration of statehood. In such circumstances, UN peacekeepers rebuild basic infrastructure, assume temporary governmental authority and administration, and establish a new law enforcement mechanism.

(3) *Election assistance* includes a variety of activities relating to post-conflict elections, such as technical assistance; support for national election observers; co-ordination and support for international observers; and verification, supervision, and organisation and conduct of elections or referenda.

(4) *Demobilisation and regrouping* involves the disarming of warring factions, supervision of cantonment and repatriation of combatants, and verification of the regrouping of warring forces. It also includes the collection, storage, and destruction of abandoned weapons.

(5) *De-mining* is a narrowly defined task that involves mine clearance and training for mine clearance.

(6) *Refugee assistance* includes monitoring and regulating the flow of refugees, assisting in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and other related efforts.

(7) *Human rights verification* consists of investigating alleged human rights

violations against the civilian population in the area of deployment and verifying the compliance of the parties with agreements relating to human rights abuses.

(8) *Socioeconomic rehabilitation* includes reconstruction of the war-torn economy, reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, and provision of security for the reestablishment of the economic life of local populations affected by the conflict.

The primary concern of the *humanitarian intervention* functions is to ease human suffering. These functions relate to the immediate needs of victims of natural or political disasters.²⁵ To achieve the goal of easing human suffering, the use of force has been authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter for some UN peacekeeping operations. Unlike peace-enforcement forces, however, UN peacekeepers seek to remain impartial toward the warring parties and they do not aim to challenge the overall political situation that might have caused the human suffering they are attempting to alleviate. Instead, they seek to defend victims of the conflict—such as innocent civilians, refugees, and displaced persons—from devastation by protecting humanitarian relief operations or creating UN-protected areas. The *humanitarian intervention* functions are grouped into the following two categories:

(1) *Securing humanitarian assistance* involves protection of the delivery of humanitarian aid carried out by unarmed civilian organisations and the provision of humanitarian aid to a threatened population in co-ordination with them. These tasks require armed troops to establish a protected area or corridors for the passage of aid, and to escort convoys of humanitarian aid.

(2) *Protective services* include the establishment and protection of “security zones” or “safe-areas,” enforcing “no-fly zones,” guaranteeing rights of passage for the purpose of protecting or denying hostile access to threatened civilian populations or areas of a state. UN peacekeepers are also assigned to protect UN and NGO personnel and equipment.

The concept of UN peacekeeping has been defined descriptively, and a wide range of functions fulfilled by UN peacekeeping operations has been systematically identified. In order to critically review the performance of UN peacekeeping and to evaluate its

potential as a catalyst for reintegrating divided communities, the concept of human security will be addressed in the next section.

Table 2: Key Clusters of UN Peacekeeping Functions

Interposition	Transition Assistance	Humanitarian Intervention
Cease-fire Supervision	Institutional Reinforcement	Securing Humanitarian Assistance
Disengagement of Forces	Nation Building	Protective Services
Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops	Election Assistance	
Arms Transfer Control	Demobilisation and Regrouping	
Maintenance of Law and Order	De-mining	
Preventive Deployment	Refugee Assistance	
	Human Rights Verification	
	Socioeconomic Rehabilitation	

4. Reviewing UN Peacekeeping from a Human Security Perspective Gaps in Today's Post-conflict Strategies

The *Human Security Now* report has identified a number of gaps in today's post-conflict strategies. These gaps can be categorised into four groups: (1) security gaps, (2) governance gaps, (3) gaps in international response, and (4) resource gaps.²⁶ While it is impossible to fill all the gaps identified in the report by improving the practice of UN peacekeeping, it seems reasonable to review the performance of current peacekeeping strategies in intrastate conflicts by examining the security gaps. This is because one of the most fundamental functions of UN peacekeeping operations is to provide and/or maintain security in the target area. Hence, the functions of UN peacekeeping are reviewed below, using a set of security gaps as an analytical framework.

Security Gap 1: Military troops deployed to separate combatants are frequently ill equipped to deal with public security issues such as civil unrest, crime, and trafficking in human beings.

This gap implies that the institutional capacity for maintaining not only military security arrangements (such as cease-fires) but also public security must be developed among UN peacekeepers who are deployed in an intrastate conflict area. A human security perspective suggests that the set of peacekeeping strategies that is required to maintain public security in a divided community should be quite different from the strategies that are useful for carrying out tasks such as cease-fire supervision, disengagement of forces, verification of withdrawal of foreign troops, arms transfer control, and preventive deployment in interstate conflicts. In fact, in maintaining military security arrangements UN peacekeepers usually deal with combatants, but when they are asked to tackle public security issues they need to interact with non-combatants, including ordinary people and criminal elements; these interactions require different skills and strategies.

Indeed, in intrastate peacekeeping operations, *maintenance of law and order* will play a significant role in the protection of people in a divided community or a failed state. Maintaining law and order in a community at risk is not an entirely new task for UN peacekeepers. For example, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) assumed such a task. Michael Harbottle cites an example of a local effort addressing public security needs that was undertaken by UNFICYP peacekeepers in the Paphos district in 1967 when a series of intercommunal murders and abductions halted economic life and free movement for the people in the region. According to Harbottle, as a result of a number of bicomunal meetings, each chaired by a UN officer, UNFICYP was able to broker a local deal between the *mukhtars* (mayors) of the two communities in the Paphos district, which helped a new sense of security to emerge in the region.²⁷ This function of UNFICYP became known as “reconciliation through communication.”²⁸ UNFICYP’s effort provided immediate and practical solutions to limited but urgent problems. Indeed, some peacekeepers are required to master not only combat skills but also what David Last calls contact skills.²⁹

Partly because contact skills are required for fulfilling the task of *maintenance of law and order*, and partly because military troops are not skilled at providing public security in communities, the civilian police (CIVPOL) have assumed the primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in UN peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, it has historically been very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of

competent police officers for UN peacekeeping operations. For example, in Cambodia it was argued that a total of 3,600 UNTAC civilian police officers would be required to carry out the tasks assigned to UNTAC. Nevertheless, only 200 police officers were deployed to Cambodia in April 1992, and they were still not fully in the field by December 1992.³⁰ Due to slow deployment and other deficiencies, CIVPOL was not capable of undertaking its mandate successfully.³¹ It soon became apparent that it was impossible for the unarmed and understaffed CIVPOL to maintain law and order in an environment where disarmament of the factions had been halted and their co-operation was not forthcoming.

In other words, although UN peacekeeping has dealt with public security issues in intrastate conflicts through the task of *maintaining law and order*, its performance must be improved. A new set of peacekeeping strategies for fulfilling the *interposition* function must be developed by placing more emphasis than ever on the task of *maintaining law and order*. The United Nations has not been able to recruit from its member states sufficient numbers of competent police officers who can perform effective public security duty in conflict-affected communities. The international community must train more public security specialists and establish more effective ways to recruit them.

Security Gap 2: From the outset, emphasis in peacekeeping operations is on pursuing an exit strategy that is not directly related to the security needs of the people.

This second gap is inevitable, as the United Nations' efforts are often directed at reaching agreements on a cease-fire or truce in order to prevent the conflict from spreading outside and to reduce the number of people suffering from the fighting. In interstate conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations are expected to physically separate the warring parties and remain between them until both parties no longer feel the necessity of a buffer force in order to prevent a recurrence of the fighting. Issues such as public security, reconstruction, and the governance of each state are considered to be the responsibility of the states involved, and these issues are not taken into consideration when the United Nations designs the exit strategies for its peacekeeping operations. Thus, in formulating exit strategies, the central security needs of the people within the states are frequently pushed aside, and the post-conflict relationship inevitably remains

a fragile one. While this may not be a serious problem in interstate conflicts, such an issue can cause a critical failure in the reintegration of a divided community. In Cyprus, for example, the strategy of UNFICYP failed to generate the necessary dynamic for the reintegration of the two separated communities that had been divided physically by the UN Buffer Zone since 1974. In fact, it was the very method of UNFICYP that unwittingly prevented the sense of security from growing across the buffer.

Nevertheless, if UN peacekeeping operations are designed to provide a link between emergency humanitarian assistance and long-term development, then peacekeeping missions can deal directly with the security needs of the people within the community. The human security framework indicates that the focus of post-conflict strategies should not be limited only to effective peacekeeping but should include peace-building and sustainable development as well. In this sense, the second security gap is linked closely with the challenges that are apparent in post-conflict peace-building, in particular the issues of promoting reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among people affected by conflict.

In the typology of UN peacekeeping functions, such issues are dealt with in the analysis of the *transition assistance* function. Thus, the *transition assistance* function will play a pivotal role in a new peacekeeping strategy that can help to protect the security of people in violent conflict. For example, although UNTAC pursued an exit strategy that was not directly related to the security needs of the Cambodian people, the *transition assistance* functions of UNTAC were systematically incorporated into the Cambodian peace process, and UNTAC helped to create a foundation for its long-term peace-building.

Security Gap 3: Security strategies do not take into account the needs of humanitarian and development actors.

As the third security gap indicates, UN peacekeepers do not always pay enough attention to the needs of humanitarian and development actors when they carry out the tasks that can be categorised as *humanitarian intervention* functions. The logic of the military component often dominates both planning and implementation of humanitarian operations when peacekeepers are asked to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, aid workers, and their equipment. Due to the nature of the tasks, the *humanitarian*

intervention functions of UN peacekeeping are conducted primarily by the military component, whereas some humanitarian and development activities that fall into the *transition assistance* functions require predominantly civilian expertise. As the military component seeks a temporary solution to a humanitarian crisis, it must be accompanied by a civilian component that aims at addressing the basic human needs of the people and creating an alternative socio-political structure.

One attempt to improve the effectiveness of intervention through co-ordinating the multiple UN agencies at the strategic level can be seen in the establishment of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in April 1992, which was later replaced by the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in January 1998. Thomas Weiss argues that the creation of the DHA was an explicit recognition of the critical need to co-ordinate various aspects of humanitarian diplomacy in New York.³² Furthermore, UNHCR set up the Partnership in Action (PARinAC) with an aim to improve co-ordination with NGOs working in refugee assistance and protection.³³

Some UN peacekeeping operations have had a good record of co-ordination with humanitarian agencies, not only at the policy level but also at the implementation level. During the 1974 crisis in Cyprus, for example, UNFICYP, especially through its Operation Economics section and CIVPOL, co-operated closely with humanitarian actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR, and UNDP. UNFICYP (particularly its CIVPOL staff) provided escorts and visited prisons and refugee camps. As a result of the active co-operation between UNFICYP and humanitarian agencies, a large number of humanitarian operations were carried out smoothly and were able to alleviate the suffering of many innocent individuals at the time of the crisis. This example shows the potential of good co-ordination between a UN peacekeeping operation and humanitarian agencies.

Another example can be found in Cambodia. Among the various peace-building tasks that UNTAC carried out during its tenure, the first step was to repatriate the 36,000 refugees from the Thai-Cambodian border.³⁴ One of the major goals of the UNTAC operation was to complete the repatriation process before the electoral process began so that the returnees could register to vote and participate fully in the electoral campaign.³⁵ In addition to their participation in the “democratic” elections, their

participation in the subsequent reconstruction was desperately needed for the future of Cambodia; therefore, the repatriation of these refugees was given top priority over the other tasks of UNTAC. Although the repatriation component of UNTAC was given a mandate to work with UNHCR in the repatriation of the refugees and their resettlement, it was UNHCR that took the lead in the repatriation process under the auspices of UNTAC.

While waiting for a peace settlement, UNHCR began training technical and administrative cadres in the camps and inside the country. UNHCR also provided workshops offering training in car repair, electrical services, and welding so that the people completing these programmes could in turn train others when they returned home.³⁶ To further facilitate the resettlement process, UNHCR, together with UNDP and several NGOs, initiated more than sixty quick-impact projects to help communities absorb the returning refugees. The quick-impact projects included road and bridge repairs, mine clearance, agricultural development, the digging of wells and water ponds, and the improvement and construction of sanitation, health, and education facilities.³⁷ Project funds were also allocated for the provision of vegetable seeds, fishing equipment, mosquito nets, and water jars as start-up loans.³⁸ Through these projects, support for UNTAC was consolidated among the Cambodian people and information about its mission was transferred to them, particularly those who lived in remote areas. Quick-impact projects also served to fill the gap between humanitarian relief aid and long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.³⁹

The third security gap also underlines the importance of the evolution of multifunctional UN peacekeeping as well as the formation of the Civilian-Military Liaison Centre (or Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre, Civil-Military Operations Centre) within a UN peacekeeping operation. The improvement of civilian-military co-ordination within a UN peacekeeping operation facilitates positive interaction among the various components of the operation and is an important step towards forming peacekeeping strategies that take into account the needs of humanitarian and development actors working in the field. By integrating the tasks and playing several different roles in a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations has improved its ability to co-ordinate effective interaction among various third parties. In fact, a civilian-military co-ordination centre presents a concrete way to reduce the

inconsistency and contradiction between the two major actors in post-conflict peace-building: peacekeepers on the one hand, and humanitarian and development actors on the other.

In *Human Security Now*, it is also argued that “to the extent possible, all relevant tools and instruments - political, military, humanitarian and developmental - should come under unified leadership, with integration close to the delivery points of assistance.”⁴⁰

A good example of such an approach can be found in the UN effort in the Cambodian conflict. The Paris Peace Accords stipulate that UNTAC’s civilian and military components will be put “under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General”, who will designate a special representative to act on his behalf. Yasushi Akashi was appointed as the special representative of the secretary-general, that is, the head of UNTAC, and he reported directly to the secretary-general and to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. The special representative of the secretary-general had authority over both civilian and military components and was authorised to act as the overall co-ordinator of the peace process in Cambodia.⁴¹ Thus, the military component and the civilian component fell under a single command structure. In addition, the executive staff from each component met three times a week (five times a week just before the election) during its operation to co-ordinate their activities on the ground.⁴²

In addition, UNTAC set up an Electoral Co-ordination Centre at its headquarters in Phnom Penh and joint co-ordination centres in each province to provide twenty-four-hour combined military and civilian command posts during registration and the elections.⁴³ While these measures to achieve greater co-ordination between the military and electoral components of UNTAC were not envisaged in the initial implementation plan, such positive developments were necessary for the military component to successfully undertake the newly assigned task of generating confidence in the electoral process and providing security for UNTAC’s electoral units and political party offices and candidates. If the military components had not responded to the necessity of the local situation through the redeployment of forces and the creation of civil-military co-ordination bodies, the elections would have faced enormous challenges.

Nevertheless, according to Janet Heining, the military's work was not co-ordinated fully with that of other civilian components despite these efforts. She points out that there was no joint civilian-military officer available to help co-ordinate the activities of the two components, and the co-ordination meetings were at the policy level and did not include working staff.⁴⁴ In other words, UNTAC still lacked an important branch that focused on maintaining good relationships and co-ordination among the seven components of UNTAC; therefore, although the various components of UNTAC might have been co-ordinated at the strategic level, such efforts did not affect the management of their day-to-day activities.

Furthermore, serious problems in civilian-military co-ordination emerged as a result of the different deployment patterns of the two sides. The original deployment pattern of the military component of UNTAC was based on the requirements of regrouping and cantonment, whereas that of the civilian components was designed to correspond with the borders of the Cambodian provinces. Therefore, no one was assigned in each province as the top provincial director who would be in charge of overseeing all the civilian and military activities of UNTAC within the province. The efficiency of the UNTAC operation would have been enhanced if liaison offices responsible for civilian-military co-ordination had been established within the UNTAC structure and if each province had had a single head of operations in the chain of command.

In short, it can be said that while the need for top-level strategic co-ordination between peacekeeping and humanitarian activities was recognised and reflected in the planning and implementation of UNTAC, the grassroots operational co-ordination among the various components, particularly between the civilian components and the military component of UNTAC, did not receive sufficient attention when the secretary-general developed his implementation plan for UNTAC.

5. Concluding Remarks

Traditionally, UN peacekeeping has focused largely on fulfilling the *interposition* tasks of supervising cease-fires in interstate conflicts. However, when UN peacekeeping operations have been sent to oversee the settlement of intrastate conflicts, they have

been asked to fulfil some of the *transition assistance* functions that would require peacekeepers (including both military and civilian personnel) to engage in peace-building methodologies. In fact, these *transition assistance* functions are the key elements of the peacekeeping strategies that can promote the reintegration of divided communities and meet the security needs of people in violent conflicts.

This chapter reviews the performance of UN peacekeeping from a human security perspective, which argues that post-conflict strategies must include a way to protect the people involved by guaranteeing public security, providing humanitarian relief, building social capital, nurturing the reconciliation and coexistence of divided communities, and restoring governance.⁴⁵ When UN peacekeeping functions are reviewed from this perspective, both positive developments and shortcomings of past and current UN peacekeeping strategies are revealed. For example, the human security perspective reveals the fact that the needs of the most vulnerable group of people involved in conflicts have not necessarily been taken into consideration adequately in the design of UN peacekeeping operations that assume *humanitarian intervention* functions. Indeed, the human security perspective can serve as an excellent checklist for the design of a comprehensive post-conflict strategy. The human security perspective places great significance on the tasks that can be categorised as *transition assistance* functions and emphasises the necessity of taking into consideration the people who were overlooked in the state security assumptions.

A good example of a positive development in this direction is the evolution of multifunction UN peacekeeping operations through which a more comprehensive and co-ordinated approach towards peace-building can be envisaged. It is true that the more tasks a UN peacekeeping mission assumes, the longer it may need to stay on the ground, which may not only make each operation more costly but may also delay the development of a sense of local ownership in the peace-building process. Moreover, it must be remembered that the involvement of military units in humanitarian assistance can easily undermine the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of such activities, although in some cases it is inevitable that assistance will be sought from the military side if humanitarian assistance is to be delivered to the people in need. While these side effects and setbacks should not be overlooked, multifunction UN peacekeeping operations that are fulfilling *transition assistance* functions successfully can provide an

official link between the achievements of the short-term peacekeeping operation and the goals of the long-term peace-building efforts. Indeed, such a transition period is the most critical phase for post-conflict strategies, and if *transition assistance* functions are completed effectively, the gap that exists between conflict settlement and subsequent reconstruction will be narrowed. A successful transition can pave the way for further peace-building and thus accelerate the conflict resolution process.

One of the primary goals of peace-building is to consolidate the foundations for a peaceful society, and, in fact, the concept of peace-building will play a central role in any reconsideration of the function of peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts. Although the number of organisations that carry out a broad range of peace-building tasks often surpasses the number of organisations that undertake peacekeeping tasks, an organisation that is established specifically to manage the interactive effects of various peace-building endeavours as well as their relationships with other intermediary efforts has rarely been included within the structure of UN peacekeeping. The lack of carefully harmonised peace-building tasks (that is, the lack of effective measures to assist in the transition from peacemaking to peace-building) in the functions of UN peacekeeping may be one of the major factors that has impeded conflict resolution in many areas around the world.

Another positive development identified in this paper is the creation of a civilian-military co-ordination centre within the structure of UN peacekeeping. Better co-ordination between the military units and civilian components of a mission does not necessarily enhance the capacity of UN peacekeeping as a co-ordinating body for peace-building activities, nor does it automatically enable UN peacekeepers to provide security for the people in a divided community; nevertheless, the civilian-military co-ordination centre has the potential to become a forum in which various functions fulfilled by the different components of a multifunction peacekeeping operation can be co-ordinated for conflict resolution.

In sum, the human security perspective suggests that a new set of peacekeeping strategies for intrastate conflicts should aim at fulfilling *transition assistance* functions, thus allowing the operation to provide a link between emergency humanitarian assistance and long-term development aid. The human security perspective also reminds us that upon undertaking such *transition assistance* functions, UN peacekeepers must

seek to *assist*, not dictate, the transition process by respecting local initiatives, utilizing local resources, and nurturing local capacity in order to develop a sense of ownership among local participants in the peace-building process. At the same time, the concept of peace-building can serve as a helpful analytical tool to envisage a linkage among the many tasks (such as nation building, reconstruction, rehabilitation, governance, and empowerment) required in the transition process and establish a comprehensive view of the post-conflict strategies.

Notes

¹ UN Document (A/55/305-S/2000/809), *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, 21 August 2000, p. 5 (para. 28).

² For instance, Australian-led multinational forces - the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) - were despatched to East Timor, and multinational forces - the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - are now assuming the responsibility for maintaining security in Kabul, Afghanistan.

³ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003), p. 26.

⁴ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 2nd edition (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1991), p. 4.

⁵ In addition, the United Nations Observer Group for Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), and the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the 1993 Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER) also consisted entirely of civilian observers, although the United Nations does not consider these “official” UN peacekeeping operations.

⁶ Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas G. Weiss, “Rethinking Peacekeeping” in Indarjit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsbaek (eds.), *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. and International Peace Association, 1990), p. 25.

⁷ A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994), p. 124.

⁸ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1985), p. 3.

⁹ UN Document (A/46/48), operative para. 28.

¹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General (A/48/403, S/26450)” in Paul Taylor, Sam Daws, and Ute Adamczick-Gerteis (eds.), *Documents on Reform of the United Nations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), p. 68. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (A/47/277, S/24111) (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 11 (para. 20-21), and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Building Peace and Development 1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994), pp. 147-278 (para. 397-787).

¹¹ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, para. 8-22.

¹² Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, "International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implication," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 42, no. 1, 1998, p. 34.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁴ Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping? An Analysis of the Changing Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping with Proposal for its Enhancement*, Adelphi Paper 281 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 12-23.

¹⁵ Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, *The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 91-118.

¹⁶ Diehl et al., "International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution," pp. 39-40.

¹⁷ John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 3, 1992, p. 117.

¹⁸ McCoubrey and White, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-99.

¹⁹ It may be true that the tasks of peacekeepers become more dangerous and complicated when not all parties are legitimate governments. Nonetheless, the nature of the job remains unchanged whether the peacekeepers work with legitimate governments or irregular forces; therefore, separate categories are not required in this study.

²⁰ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, para 21.

²¹ Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1990), pp. 4-5.

²² Yasushi Akashi points out this political effect (political barrier) of UN peacekeeping operations by illustrating them as "show windows" (*Perseverance and Hope: 560 Days in Cambodia* [in Japanese: Nintai to Kibou: Kanbojia no 560 Nichi] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1995), p. 41.

²³ Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3, 1993, p. 452.

²⁴ A. B. Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice," *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, 1994, p. 13.

²⁵ Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 12.

²⁶ Commission on Human Security, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁷ Michael Harbottle, "The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution," *International Journal*, vol. 35, no. 1, Winter 1979-80, pp. 118-119.

²⁸ Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjørn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and Its Future* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 112.

²⁹ David M. Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Clemensport: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), pp. 55-62.

³⁰ Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 79. As of 25 January 1993, 3,550 UNTAC police monitors (representing 98.6 percent of the planned force of 3,600) had been deployed to Cambodia (*UN Document (S/25154)*, 25 January 1993).

³¹ CIVPOL was criticised for insufficient staff, the uneven calibre of its personnel,

questions about the extent of their authority, the lack of a common frame of reference to guide investigation of human rights abuses, and deficiencies in equipment.

³² Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), p. 23.

³³ The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), "About PARinAC," *NGO-UNHCR Partnership in Action* (<http://www.icva.ch/parinac/>:ICVA and UNHCR cooperation, 2001).

³⁴ Heininger, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

³⁵ United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume II (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995), p. 19.

³⁶ Nayan Chanda, "Indochina" in Valeriana Kallab and Richard E. Feinberg (eds.), *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, South Africa, and Horn of Africa* (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 92.

³⁷ *UN Document (S/25719), Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC*, 3 May 1993.

³⁸ Heininger, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁴⁰ Commission on Human Security, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁴¹ Michael C. Williams, *Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 321 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 42.

⁴² Yasushi Akashi's comment; quoted in Keiko Chino, *Yasushi Akashi Lives in the UN* [in Japanese: Akashi Yasushi Kokuren ni Ikiru] (Tokyo: Shincho Sha, 1994), p. 98.

⁴³ Heininger, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁴⁵ Thus, the human security framework includes five clusters, which incorporate the human security issues and needs: ensuring public security, meeting immediate humanitarian needs, launching rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, emphasising reconciliation and coexistence, and promoting governance and empowerment (Commission on Human Security, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-61).

Chapter 5

The OSCE Model and the PSCBM for Human Dimension

Noboru Miyawaki

1. What is the “OSCE Model”?

Formerly known as the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) was originally set in motion by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Signed by 35 member states, including most of the eastern and western European states, Canada, and the United States, the Act served to regulate the process of détente between East and West. Following the Cold War, the OSCE has been expected to function as a security organization to prevent conflict, and to promote democracy in the former Eastern Bloc.

The OSCE has been involved in 18 field missions and field activities in 2004, ranging from Bosnia to Central Asia, and has assigned specific functional bodies or representatives with the aim of preventing conflict and promoting democratic values. These include the Chairman-in-Office (CiO), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the OSCE Representative for Freedom for the Media.

From its inception, the CSCE served as an international body whose sphere covered military, economic and human dimensions. From the national security perspective, the OSCE model has successfully combined national security and human security. It has a history of providing opportunities for its participants to discuss security issues of “national” and “international” importance, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Promoting military CBM through the OSCE process is a notable achievement of the OSCE in the realm of national security. On the other hand,

human security issues also occupy an important part of the OSCE's operations, and range from land-mine issues to human trafficking. The OSCE was originally formed as a kind of forum for discussing issues of military and human dimensions, and was a political result of East-West power politics.

The OSCE mechanism serves both military security and human security, which emphasizes the importance of the role this international security organization plays. The OSCE can afford to address both military security and human security simultaneously and at the same level. Some international organizations *are* often overtly treated as comprehensive types of organization, but even in these cases, the organizations define their main task in a dimension of either military security or human security. For example, NATO is usually regarded as a military security organization, and the Council of Europe is usually regarded more as a human security organization.

2. Human Security and the PSCBM

Human Security and Human Dimension in the OSCE

Meanwhile, the OSCE itself has rarely used the term "human security," despite the United Nations' high priority on the issue. In reality, however, the OSCE has conducted some concrete works of "human dimension," such as promoting democracy and human rights. The words "human dimension" in the OSCE context have been used since the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting, adopted in January 1989. They are used in combination to include fundamental human rights clauses, referred to as "Principle ,," and humanitarian issues, named as "Basket "(Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields)" in the Helsinki Final Act, and cover such areas as human contacts, promoting international information flow, and cultural, sport- or educational cooperation. Human dimension, therefore, covers most aspects of human security.

The Human Security Network (HSN), is an intergovernmental organization consisting of "like-minded countries from all regions of the world that, at the level of Foreign Ministers,"¹ maintains dialogue on questions pertaining to human security. The network includes Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and South Africa as an observer. Eight of

these 12 members are OSCE member states. As pointed out by the US mission to the OSCE, there is:

“[M]uch overlap between the problems that the Human Security Network and the OSCE are attempting to address. These include such issues as small arms and light weapons, the exploitation of children, transnational organized crime, conflict prevention, human rights education, and the development of civil society. More could be done as well on other issues in which your organization is involved, including the improvement of public awareness about HIV/AIDs.”²

Canada, the country which stressed the importance of human security, shows its “commitment to the promotion of human security issues within the OSCE” by the following points³:

- ◆ Affirming a commitment to the human dimension of security
- ◆ Encouraging the organization to become equipped to assist with the post-conflict rehabilitation of civilians
- ◆ Advocating addressing the root causes of terrorism
- ◆ Promoting arms control issues
- ◆ Sponsoring a regional anti-terrorism meeting in Bishkek (2001)”

In addition, Canada provides funding for a large number of human security-related projects in the OSCE region – including police training in Kosovo.⁴

“PSCBM” to promote the OSCE model

In order to implement human security effectively in the area of the post-conflict zone and to establish preventive diplomacy, we need to build “Political and Social Confidence-Building Measures” (PSCBM). I believe these types of measures are necessary in implementing human security, especially from the perspective of political stability in the democratic, institution-building process.

The concept of PSCBM is sometimes used by the OSCE, but the definition is still vague.

I define this term as, “measures to build political and social confidence among related parties who are directly or indirectly related to the conflict, including state authorities, political parties, NGOs, ethnic groups, and mass-media.”

Often, the notion of “CBM” is used in military situations, such as in the prior notification of major military maneuvers and major military movements. In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE clearly declaimed - as declaimed means to speak loudly or pompously) the importance of CBM to prevent the war between East and West. Later this notion was “upgraded” to CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measures) with agreements that became more concrete after the mid-1980s.

Based on the idea of military CBM, we find some attempts in the international arena to apply this notion to the civil and human dimension in order to prevent the recurrence of conflict. For example, the Council of Europe has investigated ways to build confidence among civic leaders. The OSCE has held the “Implementation Meeting of Human Dimension” annually and examined the effectiveness of human rights regimes in order to enhance civil society under post-communist regimes.

As in the case of Europe, we find the same pattern of confidence-building among hostile groups in, for instance, the Middle East Peace Process. In general, the PSCBM accord with the “comprehensive approach” to prevent conflicts. Simply speaking, ethnic conflicts are accelerated by such causes as political instability or economic disparities. From this perspective, to prevent conflict, we first need to build political and social dialogue to solve it. Secondly, we need to establish a permanent or ad hoc system that covers comprehensive dimensions of both hostile groups to get rid of needless distrust and misunderstanding. Thirdly, we have to focus on structural causes of conflict, such as economic divide. PSCBM is concerned with the first and second conflict-prevention strategies.

The PSCBM shall include the following tools:

- 1) Police training
- 2) Human rights education for police forces
- 3) The establishment of multilingual broadcasting (for ethnic minorities)

- 4) Guiding the rule of law
- 5) Drafting election laws and penal laws, in accordance with international democratic standards
- 6) Empowering human rights NGOs
- 7) Enabling the free movement of people, including family reunifications and marriage between citizens of different states
- 8) Establishing contact points or a permanent round table for political parties
- 9) Training of political parties

Please see Table 1. for examples of applying the above tools to certain types of conflict.

The effectiveness of this toolbox depends on the condition that all state actors must be pro-democracy at least in formal attitude. This condition is absolutely necessary for the promotion of the “PSCBM.” If we find some players in post- or pre-conflict areas who do not assent to basic democratic values in their formal statements, as well as in their informal attitudes, it will be difficult to adopt PSCBM conflict resolution.

In dealing with the Baltic States, some countries of former Yugoslavia in the post-Dayton period, and other Central European countries, the OSCE has successfully used this kind of PSCBM to consolidate democracy and political stability in post-conflict or transitional periods. Along with this success story, I have studied other scenarios in which attempts were made to simply empower civil society and democracy in the former Soviet-states without the host governments’ cooperation, which made the process difficult (for example, Belarus).

3. When Does the PSCBM Work Well?

Co-operation of Related State Actors

It is well known that the former Soviet states still suffer from a violation of human rights or difficulties with democratization. Such problems have been on the increase in some areas, indicating a contradiction between reality and common values. The OSCE has assumed an active role in promoting democracy and human rights with the PSCBM. Putting the PSCBM into practice requires political will on the part of each state player

to co-operate with the OSCE mission in the field or the ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights).

In the case of Belarus, the OSCE mission, named as the AMG (Advisory and Monitoring Group) in Belarus, and the Belarusian Government confronted each other. According to a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Belarus and the OSCE, the AMG had two important roles: To “assist the Belarusian authorities in promoting democratic institutions and in complying with other OSCE commitments,” and to “monitor and report on this process.” The memorandum further stated that “the OSCE and its personnel had the right to seek and maintain unimpeded contact with all national and local authorities, as well as with every person, individually or in association with others, including NGOs, and with the media.”⁵ These phrases indisputably meant that the OSCE could help Belarus’ domestic political opposition toward the goal of democratization, and at the same time, take actions that in a sense legitimized the Lukashenko regime for the sake of stability.

Despite the AMG’s singular purpose of promoting a democratic society in Belarus, there is clearly a contradiction between its two mandates – on the one hand, to assist the Lukashenko regime, and on the other, to promote democratic institutions through which the anti-Lukashenko movement can act. This fundamental contradiction reveals the nature and limits of the OSCE.⁶ As a result, the Belarusian Government requested the OSCE to terminate the AMG mission. Established in its place was the “OSCE Office in Minsk” (OOM), which started its work in February 2003, but which has less power and authority than the AMG (See Table 2).

The OOM has also faced a difficult political situation in this country, but has done its work on the PSCBM. In 2003, the Belarusian Government applied pressure on 11 NGOs in Belarus, and made them close down for largely technical violations of the law, “although the sheer number and timing of these closures leads one to suspect a political motivation behind the actions of the authorities.”⁷

In May 2004, the Head of the OOM, Ambassador Eberhard Heyken, criticized a TV documentary shown on Belarusian state television as an “open slander of key opposition politicians.” This documentary linked prominent opposition figures to images of civil unrest and fascism during World War II. Ambassador Heyken criticized this program as “inappropriate political programming, which clearly falls below the

standards of free and unbiased representation of political pluralism.” He added that, “the OSCE Office interprets the content of this programme as a clear attempt to undermine the political opposition in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections.”⁸

Apart from the screening of this inappropriate program on state-run TV, a journalist was also deported from Belarus. In June 2004, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Miklos Haraszti, expressed grave concern about the Belarusian KGB’s decision to deport a Ukrainian journalist from the independent newspaper *Vremya anda*.⁹

Restrictions on the dissemination of information within other former Soviet states, especially in Central Asia, are common. In Kazakhstan, for instance, there was a disturbing case of intervention in the independent media when an independent journalist was arrested before attending the Implementation Meeting of Human Dimension in 2002.¹⁰ Similar incidents occurred in the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War period, and by and large, the situation as it pertains to the independent flow of information has not changed drastically since 1975.

Dilemma of the OSCE

The OSCE faces a serious dilemma in the difficult application of its universal values and high standards in the ex-Soviet states. Universal values, or European values that the OSCE have agreed to, have a threshold that is too high for some of the transitional, or non-democratic, states such as Belarus. Nevertheless, the OSCE cannot help continuing to promote these values, because it is not a community of interests, but a “community of values,” as the OSCE itself described in the concluding document of the OSCE ministerial council in Stockholm in 1992, as follows:

“The CSCE as a Community of Values

The CSCE’s comprehensive concept of security relates peace, security and prosperity directly to the observance of human rights and democratic freedoms. Many of the present problems are linked to the failure to observe CSCE commitments and principles. The human dimension mechanisms of the CSCE are being used increasingly as a major foundation for the CSCE’s efforts at early warning and conflict prevention. Their further elaboration

and utilization will strengthen considerably the CSCE's ability to pursue the root causes of tensions and to refine its mechanisms for early warning on potentially dangerous situations.”

In reality, this community of values is challenged by some participating states, such as Belarus, or Central Asian states that have not committed themselves wholeheartedly to the OSCE standards.¹¹ The community of values must be based on a political framework, which means political cooperation with authoritarian rule. The OSCE, trying to promote the PSCBM in Belarus, had many difficulties in accomplishing its task because the Belarusian Government sometimes refused to cooperate with its mission.

After all, the OSCE model is “an inadequate community of values.”¹² However, the OSCE model has been, at least formally, supported by all participating states. This gap between reality and ideal still has room to discuss how to make the PSCBM more assured and implemented.

4. Adopting the Model for Conflict Zones in Other Areas

In discussing the effectiveness of the OSCE model, we need to test it in other areas, such as in Asian or African countries that are sometimes in more acute need of human security than the OSCE area. These areas have some political frameworks to discuss conflicts, such as the African Union or the ASEAN. However, these existing regional organizations do not have a concrete framework consisting of rules and procedures, as well as norms and principles to solve human security issues.

The possibility of realizing the OSCE model, the involvement of related institutions, and the application of the PSCBM in Asia or Africa is low, because of a lack of political will on the part of the relevant states, especially major regional powers such as India or Egypt. However, in recent years China has shown some willingness to establish multilateral talks on security issues in East Asia. Of course, this change in Chinese diplomatic policy does not address the area of human security or human dimension. However, once China agrees to establish such a regional security framework, the United States will try to include human rights issues in the framework. This will be

the starting point for normalizing human security or human dimension through regional dialogue, and to establish an OSCE-type regime in the region.

Another obstacle to adopting this PSCBM model in other regions is that the model is essentially “top-down.” In cooperating with some transnational players, an international organization is likely to ask related parties (who are most often state representatives) to implement norms and principles or initiate dialogue. However, it is fully expected of International Organizations or NGOs to let related parties in the midst of armed conflict talk or negotiate at a single table. The OSCE model (including the idea of PSCBM) is premised on an established political community or the presence of a powerful state player that is capable of pressuring related parties to assume peace talks. If a region lacks the political will to establish a political community of its own, implementing the PSCBM will be difficult.

The PSCBM is necessary to ensure a tightening of human security. However, to accomplish this measure, to set it up and to run it successfully or not depends on the political cooperation of all related players, especially the relevant state representatives. In conclusion, to get state players – even if their stance is negative – to devote their willingness to cooperate with the other players in order to run the PSCBM in practice, is a key element to discussing institutionalization with a view to ensuring human security.

Table 1. PSCBM and type of conflict

	Potential Ethnic Conflict	Implicit Ethnic Conflict	State-to-State Conflict/Confrontation
Law	Human rights ombudsperson		
Information and media	Broadcasting in languages of ethnic minorities	Sharing of articles and editing of state-run newspapers	Free circulation of foreign newspapers, improvement of working conditions of foreign journalists
Movement of persons		Family reunification	Family reunification, Marriage between citizens of different states
Political party	Training	Round-table Contact point Training	
Other dimensions	Police training Establishment of school system for ethnic minorities	Police training Establishment of school system for ethnic minorities	

Table 2. OSCE AMG and OOM¹³

	AMG (OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus)	OOM (OSCE Office in Minsk)
Based agreement of the OSCE Permanent Council	September 18, 1997	December 30, 2002
Head	Hans-Georg Wieck	Eberhard Heyken
Staff	Nine (incl. five foreigners)	Thirteen (incl. five foreigners)
Main mandates	Assisting in promoting democratic institutions and in complying with other OSCE commitments; Monitoring this process	Assisting in promoting institution building, consolidating the Rule of Law and in developing relations with civil society, in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments; Assisting in Belarusian efforts in developing economic and environmental activities; Monitoring this process
Termination	Indefinitely	Renewal every year

Notes

¹ See <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php>>.

² United States Mission to the OSCE (USOSCE), “Statement on the Human Security Network, prepared delivery by Ambassador Stephen M. Minikes to the Permanent Council,” Vienna, January 16. <<http://www.usosce.rpo.at/archive/2003/01/16hsn.htm>>

³ See <http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/hsi_osce-en.asp>.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ OSCE, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Belarus and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus,” Copenhagen, 18 December, 1997.

⁶ Noboru Miyawaki, Noboru, “Human Rights, Democratization, and Preventive Diplomacy: The OSCE in Belarus” in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.), *Containing Conflict, Cases in Preventive Diplomacy*, Japan Center for International

Exchange, 2003, pp. 97-132.

⁷ OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc Working Group on Belarus Ms.Uta Zapf (Germany), Chair Visit to Minsk, 30 October – 1 November 2003

⁸ See <http://www.osce.org/news/show_news. Minsk, 13 May 2004>.

⁹ See <http://www.osce.org/news/sho_news, Vienna, 23 June 2004>.

¹⁰ See <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/15261.htm>>.

¹¹ Noboru Miyawaki, “Democratization Issues and the OSCE (Belarusi no Minsyuka Mondai to OSCE),” *Russian and East European Studies*, 2003, pp. 199-217.

¹² Eimert Von Middelkoop, “The OSCE: An Inadequate Community of Values,” *Helsinki Monitor*, vol. 4, 1995, pp. 30-34.

¹³ Miyawaki, *op. cit.*, “Democratization Issues.”

Chapter 6

Human Rights in Armed Conflict

Reuben E. Brigety II

The first bomb missed its target and slammed into the road a few hundred meters away, while the second hit the targeted home, also reducing it to rubble. Hamudi was able to save three people, his daughter and her two sons, a five-year-old, and six-year-old, all of whom were injured in the blast. The other ten people in his house perished. “Why did this happen?” Hamudi asked a reporter. “Ten lives are gone. The house was completely destroyed... Innocent people are killed.”¹

1. Introduction

The nature of warfare has changed dramatically in the last century. Developments in technology ranging from modern combat aircraft to advances in infantry weapons have altered how war is conducted, increasing both its reach and its lethality. Global political developments have changed both where war is waged and who its most active participants are. Growth in urbanization makes it increasingly likely that belligerents will engage each other inside populated areas rather than on remote fields of battle, while the rise of armed non-state actors multiplies the number of potential sources violence.

One of the most disturbing side effects of these changes in warfare is the deleterious effect that war has had on non-combatants. For certain, innocents have always suffered since the dawn of war. Yet the extent of civilian harm arguably reached unprecedented proportions in the twentieth century. Harm to civilians in warfare and its aftermath takes largely two forms. The first, and most obvious, are civilians who suffer death or serious injury as a direct result of combat, either accidentally or deliberately.

The second are those who suffer other assaults on their dignity (such as sexual assault, ethnic violence, etc.) as a result of the breakdown of law and order, resulting in a security vacuum in which such violations run rife. Such assaults often violate the letter, if not the spirit, of human rights norms designed to protect civilians.

This disturbing trend demands attention for at least two reasons. First, the international community has demonstrated the normative importance of protecting civilians and other non-combatants in time of war and in its aftermath. It has done so through the ratification of legal treaties that delineate the rights of civilians, through speeches and other statements by governmental officials condemning the suffering of non-combatants, and through the provision of material support to the victims of conflict. Second, states have increasingly come to recognize the strategic value of minimizing harm to civilians in war. In an age of instantaneous global media, the inadvertent death of civilians during warfare can undermine domestic and international support for the responsible party. This is even truer if such deaths are deliberate. Furthermore, human rights abuses that occur during or after conflict can both indicate and foment political instability that is generally counter to the interests of sovereign states.

Given both the normative and strategic value of protecting civilians during conflict and preserving their human rights afterward, it is important to understand why this problem persists and how it might be alleviated. This chapter will address this question by examining three issues: (1) the ethical and legal framework of civilian human rights protections, (2) current issues of civilian protection, and (3) the way forward in seeking solutions.

2. Ethical and Legal Foundations

“In time of war, the law is silent,” Cicero famously declared. Yet soldiers, statesmen, scholars and theologians have struggled for centuries to establish boundaries that would mitigate the horrors of warfare. Two of the most important intellectual bases for civilian protections in time of war are just war theory and international humanitarian law.

Just War Theory

Developed by Christian theologians such as St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas,

Francisco Vittoria and others between the fifth and sixteen centuries, just war theory (JWT) provides a moral framework for analyzing the proper resort to war (*jus ad bellum*) and proper conduct during war (*jus in bello*). Though *jus ad bellum* precepts serve as useful guideposts regarding the morality of a war's purpose, it is the tenets of *jus in bello* which offer the more important guidelines for how civilians should be treated during warfare. There are essentially two fundamental concepts in *jus in bello*: discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination notes that there are essentially two classes of people in the realm of warfare, combatants and non-combatants. As such, combatants have a moral obligation not to attack non-combatants or otherwise make them objects of violence. Proportionality suggests that only such force should be used as is absolutely necessary to accomplish a valid military objective.

Seventeenth-century European jurists such as Hugo Grotius used the theological precepts of Christian JWT, as well as concepts of natural law, to derive secular legal codes of behavior for sovereign states engaged in warfare. In writings such as Grotius' *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, these jurists began to lay the groundwork for modern international law, to include the Laws of War. This trend continued with nineteenth century *jus in bello* treaties such as the 1899 Hague Regulations that developed restrictions on certain weapons considered inhumane and the 1864 Geneva Convention that prescribed basic treatment for prisoners of war.

International Humanitarian Law

The most comprehensive legal framework for the protection of civilians during armed conflict to that point in history was contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Following a series of abuses in World War II such as the Allied firebombings of Tokyo and Dresden and the brutal Axis occupations of Poland and Manchuria, members of the international community decided that international norms regarding conduct in warfare needed to be strengthened and enhanced. The Fourth Geneva Convention lays out obligations of combatants vis-à-vis noncombatants in wartime, such as the prohibition of “(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; and c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”²

The brutality of wars of colonial liberation in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that

the protections delineated in the Fourth Geneva Convention were not strong enough. As a result, some members of the international community negotiated and ratified the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Focusing on international and non-international armed conflict respectively, the Additional Protocols delineated further protections for noncombatants in conflict. Among the most significant protections were the admonition that:

*neither the civilian population as such, nor individual civilians may be the object of attacks; moreover, acts of terrorism against them are prohibited. Civilians benefit from this protection as long as they do not take a direct part in hostilities. Starvation of civilians is a prohibited method of combat. The displacement of the civilian population may only be ordered if its safety or imperative military reasons require it, and only after all possible measures have been taken to ensure it will be received under satisfactory conditions.*³

The 1949 Geneva Conventions are considered universally binding by nature of the number of states that have acceded to them and the amount of time that they have been in force. Yet the Additional Protocols do not enjoy the same level of universality as such, despite the fact that many of their provisions are considered by most states to be binding under customary international law.

In the 1990s, other *jus in bello* international treaties were negotiated and ratified principally on the basis of the humanitarian impact on the civilian population. Chief among them are the 1997 Ottawa Convention (Mine Ban Treaty), which bans the use, production and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines, and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that creates a permanent tribunal to try war crimes and describes actions for which individuals can be held accountable. This general body of law has come to be known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Human Rights Law

Enlightenment philosophers like John Locke developed political notions of natural rights emphasizing the inherent dignity and worth of every individual. Concepts of

natural rights led to the idea that restraints must be placed on the powers of government in order to protect individuals from abuse of these fundamental rights by the state. These ideas served as the basis for groundbreaking political documents such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.⁴ Furthermore, it was these Enlightenment ideas, among others, that served as the basis for the most path-breaking international human rights instrument: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.

The Universal Declaration, “proclaimed that all people everywhere possessed certain basic and identifiable rights, that universal standards existed for the world as a whole, and that human rights were matters of legitimate international concern and no longer within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of nation-states as in the past.”⁵ By advancing a vision of human rights that has been widely ratified by national governments, its provisions have largely become binding under customary international law⁶ and have served as the basis for a number of other international and regional human rights instruments, the full corpus of which comprises international human rights law.

IHL and Human Rights Law

Both IHL and international human rights law are designed to protect the dignity and security of individuals by “guaranteeing and safeguarding human rights generally and in situations which require specific treatment.”⁷ Nevertheless, there are some critical differences between the two that merit consideration.

The first, and perhaps most significant, is the focus of these bodies of law. IHL is principally concerned with obligations of the state. Until the ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions in 1977, law of war treaties addressed responsibilities of contracting parties (i.e., sovereign governments) toward the combatants and protected persons of other states and limitations on the methods of warfare.⁸ In this sense, IHL is not different from other parts of international law in that the rights and responsibilities it delineates lie principally with sovereign states. In human rights law, however, the rights principally belong not to sovereign states, but to individuals. For the first time, people became not simply objects of international law through state obligations, but subjects of the law empowered to demand affirmative

expectations of governments with regard to their own treatment.

Second, IHL is only applicable during periods of armed conflict and belligerent occupation. Human rights law, however, is applicable at least in all other circumstances besides armed conflict and, for certain actions (such as slavery and torture), during armed conflict as well.⁹ This expansive scope of human rights law has arguably affected the development of IHL, advancing the notion that all people are “entitled to the enjoyment of human rights, whether in time of peace or war.”¹⁰

Related to this is the third principal difference. Whereas IHL permits and even presumes harm done to individuals under certain circumstances, human rights law prohibits assaults on the dignity and security of individuals under virtually all circumstances. Theodor Meron notes:

Unlike human rights law, the law of war [or IHL,] allows, or at least tolerates, the killing and wounding of innocent human beings not directly participating in an armed conflict, such as civilian victims of lawful collateral damage. It also permits certain deprivations of personal freedom without convictions in a court of law.... The law of armed conflict [IHL] regulates aspects of a struggle for life and death between contestants who operate on the basis of formal equality.... Human rights laws protect physical integrity and human dignity in all circumstances. They apply to relationships between unequal parties, protecting the governed from their governments. Under human rights law, no one may be deprived of life except in pursuance of a judgment by a competent court. The two systems, human rights and humanitarian norms, are thus distinct and, in many respects, different.¹¹

This distinction is of crucial significance. While all civilian deaths and injuries in warfare are tragic, they are not all violations of international law. The concept of proportionality in IHL permits attacks that will cause foreseeable harm to noncombatants so long as that harm is not out of proportion to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated by the attack. While such judgments are clearly subjective, they are permitted under IHL because of the inherently chaotic nature of

warfare and the assumption that innocents will inevitably be touched by it. Human rights law, however, makes virtually no exceptions because it presumes that, short of the exigencies of warfare, there is no rationale to justify derogation of fundamental rights; and even in war, there are still prohibitions which cannot be violated under any circumstances.

3. Current Issues

Civilian Harm in Conventional War

One of the most important, and indeed most visible, problems in this arena is the killing or injury of civilians during armed conflict. As noted above, in a strict legal sense this problem is governed by humanitarian law rather than human rights law. Nevertheless, it goes to the very heart of both of these legal regimes, which is protection of the dignity and security of the individual, in both peace and war.

The baseline for understanding the problem of civilian protections in warfare is arguably World War II. Some estimates suggest that at least 27 million civilians died during that war,¹² not only from disease and hunger but also as a direct result of hostilities. While no conflict since that war has claimed as many civilian lives, the trend of civilian protections since then have been decidedly mixed.

From the early 1990s to the present, three independent forces have come together to significantly improve civilian protections during armed conflict in certain circumstances. The first is the development and strengthening of international norms designed to shield noncombatants from unnecessary combat violence. The second is the rise in global, instantaneous news media which can transmit images of civilian casualties throughout the world and across national boundaries in real-time. The third is the development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) that allow an attacker to pinpoint destructive force against a particular target while largely limiting damage to unintended objects. These three forces have simultaneously increased the ability of technologically advanced militaries to minimize civilian casualties, especially in aerial warfare, at the same time as they have raised the international expectations of such militaries to protect civilians and increased the strategic costs for failing to do so.

This pattern is most readily observed by examining major U.S. combat actions

between 1991 and 2003, specifically Operation Desert Storm (1991), Operation Allied Force (1999), Operation Enduring Freedom (2001) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).

Operation Desert Storm was the first time since the age of instantaneous global media that PGMs were extensively employed in combat, as part of an extended forty-day aerial bombardment campaign. Though only nine per cent of the weapons employed were PGMs,¹³ news briefings by coalition officials during the war showing video images of pinpoint strikes through windows and ventilation shafts of buildings gave the impression U.S. air forces could be very precise if they so chose. This impression, combined with the video broadcast of some spectacular bombing errors (such as the attack on the Al Firdos bunker in February 2001 that killed over 200 civilians)¹⁴ and second order effects (such as the civilian harm caused by the destruction of Iraq's electrical grid) fostered condemnation of U.S. military forces and raised expectations for civilian protections in future conflicts.

As a result, during Operation Allied Force in 1999, U.S. air forces were careful both to increase the percentage of PGMs they employed and to avoid previously questionable targeting practices, such as the destruction of electrical generation capacity, which had disastrous consequences for the civilian population.¹⁵ Despite the fact that only about five hundred civilians were killed in seventy-eight days of bombing and general agreement that IHL was largely respected by allied forces there were still recriminations.¹⁶ The employment of laser-guided PGMs by coalition pilots from very high altitudes in order to avoid enemy ground fire caused some of these weapons to miss their target and harm civilians. It can be argued that such tactics inappropriately transferred risk from combat pilots to defenseless civilians.

In both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, American officials claimed that these campaigns were the most humanely planned and executed in military history.¹⁷ They did so because they clearly understood that in a war such as the Global War on Terror in which it is critical to maintain domestic and international support for the cause, it is essential to protect the human rights of civilians and to uphold the humanitarian obligations of combatants. Precision technology had improved to allow the use of satellite-guided bombs that could be dropped accurately from high altitudes, thus protecting both pilots and noncombatants on the ground. Furthermore, the vast

majority of aerial weapons employed in both of those conflicts were PGMs as opposed to unguided bombs that pose a greater threat to civilians.

By almost any objective standard, both the ability and the willingness of advanced military forces such as those of the United States to improve civilian protections in warfare have increased dramatically since World War II. Nevertheless, substantial problems remain for at least three reasons.

First, most militaries in the world are not advanced post-industrial militaries and most conflicts do not have a substantial aerial component. The precision capability of U.S. military forces, particularly air forces, is almost *sui generis*. Even its closest NATO allies do not have the same sophistication in their weaponry, ability to plan “humane” bombing campaigns, or inventory of weapons. Thus, it cannot reasonably be expected that other armed forces will be able to display the same level of precision vis-à-vis civilians in their military campaigns for the foreseeable future.

Second, and related to the previous point, it must be noted that the vast majority of conflicts in the world today and since the end of the cold war have largely been between ground forces. This is significant because, contrary to some conventional wisdom, ground combat can be much more harmful to noncombatants than conventional aerial bombardment, especially when it takes place in populated areas.

Finally recognizing that they do not have the technological capability to match advanced militaries successfully, many states and armed groups have adopted tactics to mitigate this advantage that also endanger civilians. Serb military forces in Kosovo, for example, used Kosovar Albanians as human shields during Operation Allied Force.¹⁸ Iraqi forces hid themselves and their military equipment amongst hospitals, schools and mosques to protect themselves from coalition attack during Operation Iraqi Freedom.¹⁹ In both cases the defending forces did not have the technological capability to confront their adversaries directly, but they understood that coalition forces were constrained by the strategic imperative to adhere to humanitarian norms and took steps to take advantage of it, resulting in increased harm for civilians.

Ethnic Cleansing and Terrorism

The Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols were written under the assumption that warfare would take certain broad parameters. The drafters of the

conventions assumed that warfare would be conducted largely by uniformed personnel accountable to sovereign states and that they would perpetrate acts of violence against each other in support of the political objectives of their governments.²⁰ Yet in the last fifteen years two forms of warfare have re-emerged with disastrous consequences for civilian protections: ethnic cleansing and terrorism.

One of the most important provisions of international humanitarian law is the strict prohibition on attacking civilians as a method of warfare. Yet precisely this strategy has been used to devastating effect. Saddam Hussein's assault on the Kurds of northern Iraq during the Anfal campaign of 1987-1989 deliberately killed tens of thousands of men, women and children.²¹ Between 1992 and 1995 Bosnian Serb forces systematically attacked Bosnian Muslim and Croat civilians to create an ethnically pure Republica Srbska, committing many other human rights abuses (such as systematic rape) as well.

There is vigorous debate about why such deliberate targeting of civilians continues over fifty years since the discovery Nazi concentration camps in Eastern Europe and the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Samantha Power has argued that such killings occur during armed conflict, and in other circumstances, at least in part because states have an immediate political interest in ignoring the true magnitude and significance of massive human rights abuses to civilians. Recognizing such actions for what they are would require states to commit the necessary political, financial and military resources necessary to stop them. Despite their solemn pledges in a variety of international instruments to do so, Power argues that most states are strongly disinclined to make such commitments in support of anything other than their vital national interests. Hence, the international system works to protect the prerogatives of nation states at the same time as it fails to provide for the physical security of individuals threatened by ethnic cleansing and genocide.²² Others suggest that the rise of ethnic cleansing is a result of the demise of the Cold War. In the absence of a strong hegemonic power to ensure that competing ethno-political groups suppress their differences in support of loyalty to a higher political authority, such groups may seek dominance against each other through forceful means. This is the dynamic which arguably led to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and which many fear could lead to ethnic violence against civilians in Iraq after it achieves full independence. Regardless of the reasons underling systematic attacks against civilians

by military forces or organized armed groups, they remain a serious human rights problem for the international community to confront.

Whereas ethnic cleansing and genocide were the most pressing security issues for the 1990s, terrorism is arguably the most significant security issue today. It is also considerably more vexing. The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that terrorist groups could inflict damage on a civilian populace on the same scale as attacks launched by organized militaries or militias. Furthermore, they re-emphasized the notion that non-state actors, unaccountable under international law, could use force with near impunity in support of their particular political objectives. They do so by inflicting terror in civilian populations through random acts of violence, hoping to force sovereign governments to respond to their demands in exchange for an end to bloodshed. This strategy has been pursued by groups as disparate as the Irish Republican Army against the British government, by HAMAS and the Palestinian Liberation Organization against the Israeli Government, by the “Tamil Tigers” against the Sri Lankan government, and by Al-Qaeda against the United States and its allies. What each of these groups has in common is that their strategy depends on the deliberate violation of the human rights of innocent civilians as a means of achieving their ends.

As with ethnic cleansing, the international community is divided on how to respond to this threat. One example of this division is the failure of the United Nations to develop a commonly acceptable definition of terrorism, let alone an international treaty banning it. Countries such as the United States would prefer a definition that focuses on the illegitimacy of the perpetrator and of the means of attack in addition to the victims. Others, such as Syria, focus on the civilians who are the subject of violence in order to demonstrate that sovereign states in addition to non-state actors can be culpable of acts of terrorism. Furthermore, there is profound disagreement on proper responses to terrorism. In the aftermath of September 11, the government of the United States decided that terrorism could only be stopped through offensive action against terrorist groups, and the states that support them, regardless of where they were. This aggressive approach mirrors and amplifies the strategy employed by other states, such as the Egyptian government against the Muslim Brotherhood. While such measures are enacted to stop terrorist groups from randomly killing and injuring civilians, it has been argued that such aggressive responses can lead to other human rights violations such as

arbitrary detention, suppression of freedom of speech, and extrajudicial killing.

Human Rights and Insecurity

One of the most important problems for civilian protections in armed conflict is ambient insecurity. In addition to the organized violence perpetrated by armed groups against each other and against civilians (either purposefully or inadvertently), warfare also brings with it a general breakdown in the norms that ordinarily govern society. This occurs either because strong governments curtail personal freedoms for purposes of national security, or because governments lose some portion of their ability to monopolize violence and enforce the rule of law. As a result, civilians in conflict zones around the world find their human rights violated, often without meaningful recourse either to their national governments or to the international community. This is especially the case regarding the protection of refugees, sexual violence against women, and trafficking of persons.

Refugees are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations both in their countries of origin and in their countries of refuge. By definition, they are people who have left their homes and crossed international borders because of a well-founded fear of persecution. By early 2003, the total number of refugees in the world exceeded 20 million people.²³ Many of these people fled their countries to escape the violence of warfare. Yet when civilians flee war, armed groups who are party to the conflict are often intermixed in the exodus. As Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan has noted:

...[T]he presence of armed elements in refugee camps and internally displaced person settlements has very specific and serious humanitarian consequences. Women and children are particularly vulnerable to serious human rights violations, such as trafficking, forced recruitment, rape and other forms of physical and sexual abuse.... When combatants are intermingled with civilians, Governments sometimes resort to extraordinary measures to address the problem.... Examples of such responses, which have themselves resulted in further threats to civilian security and rights to protection, include regroupement [sic] camps, forced relocation, protected

villages and, in the Middle East, punitive measures directed at civilians. Such actions violate international humanitarian law and human rights law and should be condemned.²⁴

Such abuses occur not only to refugees but also to civilians still living within the borders of their home countries. In northern Uganda, for example, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which is fighting an insurgency against the central government, have abducted children for use as armed fighters and as sex slaves.²⁵ Similarly, in the Darfur region of western Sudan, government-backed militias have been implicated in the systematic rape, torture, forced migration and killing of civilians. Over 10,000 people have been killed in this region since February 2003 and over one million people internally displaced.²⁶ Finally, in Afghanistan, women have been harassed, forced to wear the *burqa* and prevented from seeking education and healthcare. This is particularly true in the south and southeast of the country where the authority of the central government is weak and hostilities continue between resurgent Taliban forces and coalition/Afghan National Army troops.²⁷

Human rights abuses such as these abound in virtually every armed conflict around the world. The international community increasingly recognizes the scope and complexity of such problems as fundamental threats to human security. Yet in the absence of credible government or international authority acting in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights standards, such abuses will inevitably continue.

4. Way Forward

The problem of human rights protection in armed conflict is both complex and urgent. Millions of people suffer abuses in the context of warfare every year. Just as the problem is complex, so is the solution. There are at least three major elements to improving the protection of human rights in armed conflict.

First, it is vital that all actors in the international community accept and reaffirm the standards of conduct in warfare stated in IHL treaties in order to make such norms universal. While the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been widely ratified and their

provisions have achieved the force of customary international law, the same cannot be said for the provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocols, which contain even stricter standards for the protection of civilians. This need for universality of norms in the conduct of warfare is made all the more urgent by two trends: the entrance of non-state actors on the battlefield and the transformation of modern warfare. The international community must find ways to hold non-state actors like the LRA in Uganda or the RUF in Sierra Leone accountable for their actions on the battlefield so that they have an incentive to refrain from deliberate attacks or careless violence directed at civilians. In addition, the resurgence of attacks on civilians as a method of warfare and the use of civilian populations as shields against advanced military forces requires not only renewed commitment to existing norms, but perhaps even new international norms to cope with these emerging trends.

Second, states must develop the tactical capacity to wage war in a manner that protects civilians as they engage the enemy. The United States has achieved great success in this area regarding air warfare. Yet it, and most other countries, have substantial room for improvement in land warfare. The development of non-lethal and less-than-lethal weaponry may hold great potential in this area, as does the development of infantry tactics for more humane fighting in urban areas. States may prove more willing to invest in such weapons and tactics as they come to recognize the strategic value of protecting civilians in armed conflict above and beyond the inherent humanitarian value.

Finally, the international community must take more active steps to ensure ambient security in conflict and post-conflict areas in order to prevent human rights abuses that can run rife in such situations. This can happen largely in two ways. First, the UN Security Council, recognizing threats to the human rights of civilians as a threat to international peace and security, can authorize additional peacekeeping missions to protect civilians as necessary. Second, national governments can expend additional resources to ensure a secure environment in areas of conflict and thus protect civilians from abuses associated with lawlessness.

All of these solutions will require additional political commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights on behalf of states, both individually and collectively. Yet it is essential that such steps be taken if the promises of human rights

are to have any true meaning in both peace and war.

Notes

¹ “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq,” A Human Rights Watch Report, December 2003, p.31.

² “Chapter V: Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts: Extract from Basic Rules of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols,” International Committee of the Red Cross, December 13, 1998. <<http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList104/6D73335C674B821DC1256B66005951D1>>, accessed May 17, 2004.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Jerome J. Shestack, “The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights” in Januz Symonides (ed.), *Human Rights: Concept and Standards* (Burlington, VA: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2000), pp. 37-38.

⁵ Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen - Second Edition*. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), p. 232.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Hector Gros Espiell, “Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law” Januz Symonides (ed.) *Human Rights: Concept and Standards*, (Burlington, VA: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2000), p. 356.

⁸ APII is applicable to movements of national liberation that are not yet recognized as sovereign governments but are nonetheless presumed to be the functional equivalent as they organize themselves to conduct warfare against the forces of an existing sovereign state.

⁹ Espiell, p. 353.

¹⁰ “Fact Sheet No. 13, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs13.htm>>, accessed May 6, 2004.

¹¹ Theodor Meron, “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law,” *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 94, no. 2, April 2000, p. 240.

¹² <http://www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/world_war_ii_casualties#Civilians%20killed>, accessed 13 May 2004.

¹³ John A. Tirpak, “The State of Precision Engagement,” *Airpower Magazine*, vol. 83, no. 3, March 2000, <<http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2000/0300precision.asp>>, accessed May 17, 2004.

¹⁴ John Mintz, “Air war on Iraq would be similar to Desert Storm.” *Washington Post*, February 15, 1998, p. A1, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/stories/iraq021598.htm>>, accessed May 17, 2004.

¹⁵ In Kosovo, allied forces attacked electrical distribution facilities in such a way that temporarily disrupted the electrical supply for a matter of hours but allowed it to be restored in relatively short order, thus avoiding substantial civilian harm.

¹⁶ “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign.” *A Human Rights Watch Report*. February 2000.

<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm#P164_36978>, accessed May 17, 2004.

¹⁷ For example, upon declaring an end to major combat operations in Iraq, U.S. President George W. Bush stated, “Operation Iraqi Freedom was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen before.... Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent.” “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.” Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California, May 1, 2003. <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html>>, accessed May 17, 2004.

¹⁸ “NATO says ‘Human Shields’ account for Bombing Deaths,” CNN, May 18, 1999. <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/17/kosovo.03/>>, accessed May 17, 2004.

¹⁹ “Off Target,” A Human Rights Watch Report, December 2003.

²⁰ Though APII recognizes that guerilla forces supporting a liberation movement (i.e., *not* a sovereign government) can be legitimate combatants, it nonetheless assumes that it will conduct violence against the armed forces of sovereign states and imposes certain obligations on them for protecting noncombatants.

²¹ “Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds.” A Human Rights Watch Report, July 1993. <<http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/index.htm#TopOfPage>>, accessed May 17, 2004.

²² Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

²³ “Basic Facts,” UNHCR website, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics>>, accessed May 16, 2004.

²⁴ “Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,” S/2002/1300, November 26, 2002.

²⁵ “Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict,” International Crisis Group, April 14, 2004. <<http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2588&l=1>>, accessed May 16, 2004.

²⁶ “Sudan: Human Rights Concerns,” Amnesty International USA, May 13, 2004. <<http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/sudan/summary.do>>, accessed May 16, 2004.

²⁷ “Human Rights Overview: Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, January 2004. <<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/afghan6991.htm>>, accessed May 16, 2004.

Chapter 7

Women, Human Security, and Peace-building: A Feminist Analysis

Susan McKay

1. Introduction

“To build peace requires visioning what constitutes peace and security across cultures, nationalities, ethnicities, and between genders.”¹

Two key dimensions of women’s security that, more often than not, are omitted from discussions of human security are (1) feminist critiques of the concept of human security and (2) the ways girls and women experience insecurity and the conditions that must be met for them to be secure.

I begin this chapter by explicating why gender should be incorporated as a key dimension of human security discourses. Using several post-conflict countries as examples, I provide an overview of feminist critiques of security and draw attention to how women’s experiences and gender discrimination exacerbate their insecurity. I then present a feminist framework of human security that explicates threats of violence that are both direct and structural and argue that reducing direct and structural violence must be an international priority if girls and women are to experience improved human security. I next compare two key security documents - *Human Security Now*² and *Women, Peace and Security*³ according to their feminist emphases and discuss how women’s peace-building initiatives focus upon improving girls’ and women’s human security by seeking to prevent and reduce direct and structural violence. Finally, I emphasize that women’s peace-building is crucial in drawing attention to and enhancing girls’ and women’s security - for example, in advocating women’s increased involvement in developing peace accords and establishing constitutions that incorporate

gender equality and women's human rights as key components.

My expertise in women's health, women's studies, and feminist peace psychology shapes my analysis. Therefore, I include discussion of women's and girls' experiences of psycho-social and physical insecurity, as well as more established parameters associated with human security.

2. Gender and Human Security

Gender analyses take into account perspectives and behaviors of women and men, boys and girls, and are a corrective to gender-bias in either direction. These may or may not draw upon feminist analyses. In relation to human security, Simone Wisotzki stressed that “underlying gender hierarchies and their relevance for shaping societal practice must be made visible, and alternatives to overcoming insecurities have to be developed.”⁴ For example, in developing programs and policies, analyzing potential effects upon both genders is crucial because men and women experience the erosion of security differently.⁵

Effects of Women's Inequality

Girls and women experience human insecurity differently from men and are subject to gender hierarchies and power inequities that exacerbate their insecurity. Because of their lower status, girls and women are less able to articulate and act upon their security needs, as compared with boys and men. A 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report noted: “In no society are women secure or treated equally to men. Personal insecurity shadows them from cradle to grave...And from childhood through adulthood they are abused because of their gender.”⁶

Holzner and Truong argued that “all forms of human (in)security are gendered, even though their manifestations, patterns and degree of intensity may be specific and context dependent,”⁷ because social structures, practices and symbols in societies are gendered. As noted by Ulf Kristofferson, Humanitarian Coordinator of the Joint United Nations (UN) Program on HIV/AIDS, “Whether it is economic security, food security, health security, personal or political security, women and young girls are affected in a very specific way due to their physical, emotional and material differences and due to

the important social, economic, and political inequalities existing between women and men.”⁸ For example, in many parts of the world, women and girls are fed less than men and boys, have fewer opportunities to secure an economic livelihood, and receive less education than boys.⁹ Inequalities also threaten girls’ and women’s health, an essential component of their security, and increase their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS.

Beth Woroniuk drew attention to key gendered dimensions that have been missing within human security discussions, notably (1) violence against women, (2) gender inequality in control over resources, (3) gender inequality in power and decision making, (4) women’s human rights, and (5) women (and men) as actors, not victims.¹⁰ Erin Baines questioned how central an agenda gender-related violence should be within human security discourses and pointed to the potential danger of privileging women over men, given the persistent lack of masculinist analyses.¹¹ Baines’ point that masculinist analyses of human security deserve far greater attention is an important one. However, given women’s low status worldwide, the inequality of and the profound influences of patriarchy on women’s ability to attain equality, the risk of privileging girls’ and women’s human security over boys’ and men’s seems remote and, even, implausible. Further, scant evidence exists that feminist analyses have been mainstreamed into international debates about human security. Instead, sophisticated and insightful feminist analyses are usually ghettoized within feminist international studies and the academic literature of sister disciplines.

Post-conflict societies merit special attention in terms of how well they meet girls’ and women’s human security needs since they are not very peaceful and are subject to pervasive lawlessness, social dislocation and, often, intense violence.¹² Within the context of contemporary armed conflicts and during post-conflict, women and girls suffer disproportionately due to the gender-specific effects of contemporary conflicts.¹³ Also, they are neglected within disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes because they are not recognized as combatants or are viewed simplistically as camp followers or “wives” of rebel commanders.¹⁴

Burundi, in Africa, provides an example of discrimination against girls and women and of indifference to gender-based violence. As is true in many countries throughout the world, Burundi’s patriarchal and patrilineal culture supports gender discrimination. As such, through customary practices, it creates, reinforces, and maintains girls’ and

women's human insecurity. Girls and women have little influence in decision making about their own lives. They cannot own property or the land they work, nor can they inherit their husbands' property. Their educational levels are lower than men's, and they have limited ability to make decisions about their sexual health, family planning, and access to health care; abortion is illegal. Abortion is illegal despite an increase of sexual violence and accompanying threats of contracting sexually-transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Police and magistrates have humiliated women when they reported rape, and women have seldom been successful in bringing perpetrators to justice.¹⁵

3. Feminist Critiques of Human Security

Whereas gender disparities in human security provides an important level of analysis, the primary interest of feminist analyses is to make women's perspectives visible - to gather and interpret information from the standpoints of girls' and women's diverse experiences in order to affect policy making in regard to women's rights. Feminist analysts' larger referents are human security discourses and androcentric biases. They bring to the forefront girls' and women's experiences to emphasize that removing gender-linked insecurities, such as unequal social relationships, are critical to women's security.¹⁶

Feminist analysts accept as true that patriarchal assumptions and actions privilege men and are globally endemic - although these vary by race, class, culture, and Euro-American, non-Western, and other perspectives. Reiterating this perspective, Gunhild Hoogensen emphasized that security should be defined by those who are least secure: "Feminisms, including western, non-western, and indigenous feminisms, offer powerful arguments articulating voices of the insecure, and deserve to be heard and responded to by mainstream sources."¹⁷

A key feminist question about human security is "whose security is emphasized and how?" The feminist answer is that boys' and men's security is prioritized over that of girls and women because of sexism whereby women and girls are discriminated against because of their gender. Yet, even when acknowledged, this question must continually be reintroduced because it is easily forgotten within typically

masculinist-dominant human security discourses. Other feminist questions are, “how do ordinary women define human security as compared with prevailing meanings?” and “what forces in a nation or community create, reinforce, and maintain gendered conditions of human insecurity, and what are these?” In their critiques, feminist scholars assert that human security must privilege issues of physical, structural, and ecological violence rather than military security. Also, their critiques underscore interrelationships between military, economic, and sexual violence.¹⁸

Envisioning a global security that takes into account both state security *and* the security of individuals and their natural environment, J. Ann Tickner encapsulated the ways in which feminist critiques diverge from traditional masculinist notions of human security:

Feminist perspectives on security start with the individual or community, rather than the state or the international system. Rejecting universal explanations that, they believe, contain hidden gender biases, since they are so often based on the experiences of men, feminists frequently draw on local interpretation to explain women’s relatively deprived position and their insecurity...feminists seek to uncover how gender hierarchies and their intersection with race and class exacerbate women’s insecurities.¹⁹

Similarly, Erin Baines observed that, “Feminists offer not only important data on the security of the individual but also fresh new perspectives into the nexus of the individual and structures of violence at the local, national and global level.”²⁰ Feminist critiques of threats to women and girls’ human security consequently raise awareness about missing pieces within the prevailing human security discourse. They eschew reductionism or piecemeal approaches by considering *all* constraints that prevent girls and women from attaining human security. Baines identified three central themes emerging from feminist scholarship on human security: 1) impacts of armed conflict on women, gender relations, and gender roles; 2) ways international humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations widen or diminish unequal gender relations; and 3) women’s absence from decision making positions that are central to peace-building.

Peace educator Betty Reardon, a pioneer feminist critic of the concept of security and peace, asserted that feminists view of human security stresses human relationships and meeting human needs, whereas a masculine view tends to emphasize institutions and organizations.²¹ According to Reardon, two key overall factors feminists identified as critical in improving human security are protection from attack and fulfillment of fundamental needs; however, security agendas typically favor the former. Reardon visualized a feminist global agenda for human security as follows:

A feminist world security system would attempt to include all peoples and all nations based on a notion of extended kinship including the entire human family...[that] any system to be effective must be fully global, that no nation can fully assure its own security, as the security of each is best assured by the security of all.²²

Reardon further argued that security should be redefined to emphasize a life-affirming stance and to incorporate social justice, economic equity, and ecological balance such as the agenda developed by the Women's International Network for Gender and Security (WINGHS) with its four critical feminist dimensions of human security: a healthy planet, meeting basic human needs, respecting and fulfilling human rights, and renunciation of violence and armed conflict in preference for nonviolent change and conflict resolution.²³

Inger Skjelsbaek, although supportive of the importance of feminist security analyses, questioned whether feminist concepts of human security are viable. She observed that women's experiences and identifications contain considerable diversity and noted that not all women are subordinate to men.²⁴ Contemporary feminist analyses and critiques, however, are cognizant that experiences and perspectives vary according to ethnicities, race, class, sexualities, geographies, and culture.

Gender justice is another key aspect of improving women's human security that is only occasionally discussed within feminist human security discourses. Gender justice refers to legal processes that are equitable, not privileged by and for men, and which distinguish gender-specific injustices that women experience.²⁵ Girls and women are usually rendered invisible or are marginalized within judicial processes, including war

tribunals, when they seek justice in response to gender-specific violence. Within the context of armed conflicts and their aftermath, “gender injustice perpetuates inequality, violates fundamental human rights, hinders healing and psychological restoration, and prevents societies from developing their full potential.”²⁶

4. How Girls and Women Experience Human Insecurity

Kristen Timothy emphasized that the most pervasive threat to women’s security is violence in its various forms.²⁷ The United Nations Fund for Women [UNIFEM] stressed that gender inequality is key to the continuing scale of violence against women, is critical to their (in)security, and is tied to global security. Women are keenly aware that these threats affect their security and want changes that prevent and decrease violence in their lives.²⁸ They must be safe from direct physical and psychological violence such as that which occurs from acts such as rape, battering, and gender-specific torture.

Using examples from Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other post-conflict countries, I provide context for these assertions. In Sierra Leone, following the ending of an 11-year old civil war, presidential and parliamentary elections were held on May 14, 2002. According to a Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children report, sixty-two internally-displaced women were interviewed when they voted: “53 rated peace and security as one of their top priorities and expectations from the newly elected (or re-elected) officials.”²⁹ In Afghanistan, women identified security as the primary barrier to their full participation in Afghan society; they view security as the foundation for rebuilding the country.³⁰ About Afghan women, Antje Bauer observed that “being safe from violence is the precondition for women to reclaim public space. Security is the basic condition for the future.”³¹ Further, post-conflict discriminatory criminal laws, lack of gender justice, and family members who restrict and violate them, severely compromise women and girls’ security and prevent their equal participation with men in family and community life.³²

Direct (physical) Violence

Charlotte Bunch and Roxanna Carillo asserted that gender-based violence is the primary

human security concern for women:

Women in both the [global] North and South live with the constant risk of physical harm. The experience and fear of violence is an underlying threat in women's lives that intertwines with their most basic security needs at all levels -- personal, community, economic, and political. In virtually every nation, violence (or the threat of it) shrinks the range of choices open to women and girls, limiting their mobility and even their ability to imagine having control over their lives.³³

The World Health Organization identified violence against women as epidemic throughout the world and a key public health concern. Interpersonal violence is the tenth leading cause of death for women between 15 and 44 years of age. In countries where population-based studies have been conducted, between 12 and 25 percent of women have experienced attempted or forced sex by an intimate or ex-partner. Forced prostitution, sex trafficking, and sex tourism are on the rise.³⁴

Structural (indirect) Violence

In addition to the importance of preventing and reducing direct violence, women point to the insecurity of structural (indirect) violence. Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana Leighton define structural violence as follows:

[structural violence is] embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable institutions and regular experiences. Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic, or cultural traditions. Because they are longstanding, structural inequities usually seem ordinary -- the way things are and always have been. But structural violence produces suffering and death as often as direct violence does, though the damage is slower, more subtle, more common, and more difficult to repair.³⁵

Within non-feminist human security discourses, structural violence is usually given limited attention despite its major effects on women's lives.³⁶ In part, this occurs

because structural violence is so insidious and consequently less visible and so is the discrimination that exacerbates it.

5. Post-Conflict, Girls and Women: A Feminist Human Security Framework

The four-cell framework in Table I details threats to women’s human insecurity from direct and structural violence during conflict and after conflicts. Feminist scholar Birgit Brock-Utne originally developed a six-cell model to analyze the presence (or absence) of negative and positive peace at organized (macro or institutional/ societal) and unorganized (micro) levels.³⁷ This adaptation of her model provides a feminist human security framework that can be used within any context to analyze existing threats to girls’ and women’s human insecurity.

In general, feminists take a bottom-up approach when analyzing impacts of armed conflict whereas conventional security studies tend to use a top-down approach.³⁸ A bottom-up approach starts with the conditions of women’s lives; in this discussion, a bottom-up approach starts by looking at the presence of direct and indirect violence at unorganized and organized levels. As such, analysis at this level can help determine what elements are missing from conventional and critical security perspectives which come from top down.

Table 1: Women’s and Girls’ Human Security During and After Armed Conflicts: Indirect and Direct Violence/ Unorganized and Organized Threats

	Direct Violence	Structural Violence (indirect)
Unorganized: violence occurs from individual acts at the micro-level	Cell 1 Violence from rape, partner battering, verbal/emotional abuse by partner and family members, “honor” killings. Exposure to sexually-transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, during and after armed conflicts from partners or individual acts of rape. Harassment, injury, and murder of women and girls in post-war	Cell 2 Fewer household resources compared with boys and men, compromised health because of poor-quality water, food, and housing. Environmental damage that affects quality of life and life span. Lack of personal and political freedom of choice. Forced marriage. Difficulty marrying post-war due to stigma,

	societies.	shame, and psychological trauma resulting from forced maternity. Lack of economic opportunities. Prostitution for economic survival and to feed children. Pressure to wear garments to cover the head and body despite personal choices.
Organized: at institutional/ societal (macro) levels	Cell 3 Violence from military or other organized groups including murder, beatings, abductions, systematic rape with high risk for sexually-transmitted diseases, forced abortions, gender-specific torture, abductions into a fighting force, sex slavery, physical and psychological assaults. Gendered effects of land mines planted as a military maneuver. Sex trafficking. Female genital excision.	Cell 4 Neglect during formal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes. Exclusion or marginalization within peace negotiations and post-conflict peace accords. Lack of decision-making authority within political and economic systems. Inability to participate in elections and public life. Lack of gender justice. Religious-based oppression. Lack of access to skills training, schooling, primary health care, and reproductive health services.

This human security framework contains threats of direct and structural violence at unorganized and organized levels, emphasizing girls' and women's human security in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sierra Leone.

Cell 1 contains examples of threats of direct violence towards girls and women that are unorganized by a political, economic, military, or other institution. Peacekeepers, at times, perpetrate acts of violence against girls and women in the countries where they serve;³⁹ yet, such acts are typically unorganized and individual, not formally organized by leaders of peacekeeping forces. In one example, in post-war Iraq, women and girls are harassed on the streets, and many cover their heads and bodies because they fear violence. If they choose not to wear a *hijab* (Muslim garment covering the head and body), they potentially subject themselves to verbal harassment.⁴⁰ A second example comes from post-war Afghanistan where women fear for their physical safety because the country lacks well-trained police and security forces.⁴¹ Also, honor killings are a form of direct and unorganized violence in which girls and women are murdered by family members for purportedly besmirching family honor, for

example, they are blamed and killed because they, themselves, were raped.

Cell 2 contains examples of human security threats that occur because of unorganized structural violence. Fueled by lack of opportunities for securing an income, the inability to secure a livelihood is a key form of structural violence. In post-war Afghanistan, women's ability to generate incomes is problematic, and widows and female heads of households suffer disproportionately. The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children's reported the situation as follows, "The deputy minister for Women's Affairs, Tajjwar Kakar, noted that hundreds of widows come to the ministry offices every week, desperate to find jobs or financial assistance in order to survive."⁴² The employment situation for Afghan women with professions is worsened because many have been forced to abandon their professions.⁴³ Also, because of tribal customs and fundamentalist Islam, girls have often been forced into marriages that are arranged by their families. These marriages perpetuate their low status and may lead to their injury by family members.⁴⁴ In post-war Sierra Leone, girl mothers (under 18 years of age when pregnant) who were abducted into the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) report that since they have returned to their communities, they must beg for food to feed themselves and their children. They barely survive because they earn money only through low-paying work such as hair plaiting. Others must turn to prostitution.⁴⁵

Cell 3 contains threats to human security that are organized at societal (macro) levels. In Afghanistan, women in the city of Herat were subjected, by the order of the governor, to abusive gynecological examinations to prove their virginity. Many girls and women have been afraid to leave their homes for work or school because they fear rape or abduction by armed groups.⁴⁶ In early March 2004, more than 30 girls' schools had been burned since the Taliban fell.⁴⁷ On May 2, 2004, three young girls in eastern Afghanistan, were poisoned, apparently by militants, as punishment for attending school. In the south of the country, girls' schools had been attacked in the months prior to the poisoning, and a school was burnt to the ground in Kandahar.⁴⁸ Women activists have been threatened with death, and sex trafficking of women through and from Afghanistan has been reported.⁴⁹ Also, the country of Afghanistan has one of the highest rates of mines and unexploded ordnance which have posed particular threats to young children, including girls who farm, tend animals, and collect water in areas where these munitions are often found.⁵⁰ In Sierra Leone, girls and women suffered direct threats of violence

from the various military forces, both pro-government and rebel, during the war. Large numbers of girls were abducted into the RUF to serve as porters, cooks, spies, “wives,” and fighters.⁵¹ They were raped, tortured, and otherwise injured, and forced to work. Large numbers of women and girls in the civilian sector also were raped, tortured, killed, and otherwise brutalized, predominately by the RUF, but also by other forces.⁵²

Cell 4 contains threats that occur from organized (macro level) structural violence. For example, inadequate reproductive health services, including lack of prenatal and postnatal care, jeopardize the health of girls and women and result in high death rates in their infants. In Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world.⁵³ In Afghanistan, only 15 percent of births are presently attended by trained birth attendants.⁵⁴ Another form of macro-level structural violence stems from the laws of a country, for example, laws prohibiting women from the right to vote or to own or inherit land. In parts of Afghanistan, women have been denied the right to participate in political processes.⁵⁵ In Iraq, when Ibtisam Ali led a petition drive in Hilla demanding a percentage of seats for Iraqi women in the new national assembly and thus challenged the organized structural violence in her country, she was told by a man that “women did not deserve equal representation because they were not equal to men.”⁵⁶

Organized structural violence was also evident in Sierra Leone when girls and women were significantly under-represented in UN DDR processes. Some girls and women reported that poor physical and safety conditions existed at demobilization sites so they avoided demobilization. More often, the opportunity to participate in demobilization was not given to them, largely because they were not seen to be fighters or did not have a gun to present.⁵⁷ Consequently, they lost benefits that could provide them with opportunities to enroll in school and/or learn marketable skills, thus contributing to their difficult economic circumstances and their insecurity.

6. Comparative Gender/Feminist Emphases: Two Human Security Reports

Despite more than a decade of important scholarship, gender theorizing and feminist perspectives have remained on the margins of human security discourses.⁵⁸ To provide comparative examples of gendered and feminist emphases within human security documents, I will analyze two recent reports to analyze in the extent to which gender

and/or feminist perspectives are represented: *Human Security Now*⁵⁹ and *Women, Peace, and Security*.⁶⁰

Human Security Now is a comprehensive agenda developed by the Commission on Human Security. *Women, Peace and Security* is a study commissioned by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that was prepared in response to the October 31, 2002 adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN, 2000). Resolution 1325's discussion of women's peace and security was a historic first for the Security Council because, for the first time, it endorsed civil groups, especially women, in peace processes.⁶¹

Human Security Now focuses upon key interrelated areas that produce insecurity, such as conflict and poverty, armed conflict and post-conflict situations, forced migration, and economic insecurity. The Commission views human security as dynamic, comprehensive, protective of "the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment"⁶² and complementary to state security. Its policy recommendations include protection and empowerment strategies to decrease human insecurity around the world.

Throughout, the report emphasizes the importance of individuals and their empowerment and the inter-linkages between planet, nation, community, and individuals. Gender discrimination as it relates to women is occasionally identified, for example, in discussing how gender-related domestic violence reflects girls' and women's lesser status. In discussing criminal tribunals held in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, *Human Security Now* implicitly targets issues of gender injustice and impunity by making the extremely-important point that future peace agreements should not grant amnesties for gender-based crimes. Also, disproportionate effects of global financial crises upon women are noted. In a section about forced migration, sex trafficking involving women is briefly covered. The importance of girls' schooling in eliminating gender disparity is emphasized as is the key issue of school security, an especially critical concern in countries with ongoing civil wars. A feminist analysis is apparent in the report's discussion of specific effects of environmental degradation and its related impacts upon women's economic livelihood; this latter section provides an important example of what could have been accomplished in the rest of the report.

Human Security Now underscores Hoogensen and Rottem's argument that, within

human security discourses, opportunities are however repeatedly lost to explicate gendered and feminist dimensions.⁶³ In her discussion of this same report, Bunch noted that by failing to take up women as subject, “something is missing in the report.”⁶⁴

Although not intended as a comprehensive analysis, the report contains important gaps in *Human Security Now* that have significant implications for girls’ and women’s human security. The report’s almost ubiquitous use of the term “people” masks real differences in security threats experienced by males and females and fails to explain how inequalities and power relations fuel these. In *Human Security Now*, boys and men are presumed to be combatants in fighting forces, which ignores the widespread presence of girls and women in these forces and their disproportionate neglect during DDR processes.⁶⁵ Furthermore, one section that identifies gaps in post-conflict strategies fails to explicate that women are under-represented in peace processes and peace-building schemes.⁶⁶ In the same section the importance of peace-building initiatives within local civil society and communities is discussed.⁶⁷ Women are often key actors at these levels, but their participation is not highlighted though this omission is remedied, in part, within a brief discussion about the important role of women’s groups in strengthening civil society and capacity building.⁶⁸

Reproductive health issues are accorded minimal attention in *Human Security Now* and, in the main, are “boxed” on one page that cites an excerpt from a 1992 UN Population Fund fact sheet. The report fails to point out how security threats, such as HIV/AIDS in the family, markedly impact girls’ ability to attain an education because they are prematurely cast into roles of responsibility at home and/or the family has no resources to support their schooling. Bunch observed this same omission, saying that:

What it [the report] fails to explore fully as core matters of human security are those complex issues of bodily integrity that women have identified as critical to their intimate security: reproductive rights and violence against women in the family in particular...Bodily/integrity/reproductive rights/violence against women in the family are the missing chapters from this report, and all too often from much of the human security literature and discussion.⁶⁹

The report notes that the UN Security Council recognized links between security and women, children, refugees, and HIV/AIDS, that women and girls were especially vulnerable during conflict, and that they experience gender-based violence such as rape, enforced prostitution and trafficking. The report, however, could have improved its analysis by highlighting differential impacts of sexually-transmitted diseases upon girls and women and the relationship between their unequal status and the personal and political violence that they experience. Finally, the report could emphasize how women's reproductive security affects other kinds of security, such as food security. In discussing hunger, water, and control of natural resources, a feminist analysis would point to the relationship between gender discrimination, power inequities, and girls' and women's human insecurities.

Women, Peace, and Security focuses on girls' and women's human security. The study identifies impacts of armed conflict upon girls and women, the special needs of girls and women during post-conflict including in DDR, women's agency and importance in the promotion and maintenance of peace and human security, and the importance of incorporating a gender perspective into peacekeeping. Its feminist agenda and policy recommendations stress distinct experiences of girls and women during armed conflicts and gendered aspects of women's and girls' human security needs, such as for food and health security and protection. *Women, Peace and Security* fully recognizes how girls and women participate in fighting forces and are subsequently left out of DDR programs. After conflicts end, the difficulties girls and women experience in reintegrating back into their communities are detailed. The reproductive health needs of women and girls are stressed as is the importance of girls' and women's involvement in informal and formal peace processes. The marginalization of women during peace and security negotiations and within post-conflict agreements, disarmament, and reconstruction processes and the importance of increasing their levels of participation are accorded key emphases. Peace-building is viewed as an important role of women during post-conflict reconstruction and an opportunity to improve girls' and women's human security.

7. Linking Women's Peace-building to Human Security

A major goal of women's peace-building is to call attention to women's and girls' oppression, marginalization, and threatened security, and to establish a peace-building agenda that involves women as key actors. However, instead of being "at the table" where they belong, women are typically not involved as participants within formal peace-building initiatives. As noted by Isha Dyfan, Katherine Haver, and Kara Piccirilli,⁷⁰ "Despite the work women do at the grassroots level to organize for peace, the majority of their voices go unheard during formal processes including peace negotiations, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, constitution-creation, elections, reconstruction, rehabilitation, truth and reconciliation, and establishing a judicial system."

Despite their being left out of the public arena, women's peace-building has had significant impacts in restoring normalcy within post-war countries.⁷¹ Women peacebuilders typically work at community and regional levels where they emphasize processes, such as reconciliation, that build peace and human security.⁷² Consequently, their peace-building can take unconventional forms such as demonstrations and other forms of grassroots activism.⁷³

Women's peace-building emphasizes psychosocial, relational, and spiritual processes.⁷⁴ McKay and de la Rey's feminist analysis of South African women's meanings of peace-building revealed that, for women in their study, peace-building is a process, and relationship building is crucial to peace-building's effectiveness. Meeting basic human needs underlies their peace-building initiatives.⁷⁵

Mazurana and McKay's feminist definition of peace-building was shaped by women's explanations of, and actions for, peace-building:

Peace-building includes gender-aware and women-empowering political, social, economic and human rights. It involves personal and group accountability and reconciliation processes which contribute to the reduction or prevention of violence. It fosters the ability of women, men, girls and boys in their own cultures to promote conditions of nonviolence, equality, justice, and human rights of all people, to build democratic institutions, and to sustain the environment.⁷⁶

Women's peace-building, therefore, is centrally concerned with the presence and prevention of direct and indirect violence in girls' and women's lives which, as outlined in Table 1, are key aspects of girls and women's human security.

Peace-building for Human Security

In the countries from which I have drawn examples of direct and structural violence, women's groups are working under extremely difficult circumstances to build peace. Their activism creates dangers for both individual and collective security, as indicated in the following assessment of the situation in Afghanistan:

The barring of women by the Taliban from most employment and secondary education paradoxically galvanized Afghan women activists. The underground schools and literacy programs they established have given rise to many of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now active in Kabul... [they] operate in a difficult environment. A renewed and expanded international commitment to security is urgently needed if the limited gains women have made in Kabul are to be institutionalized and emulated in other Afghan cities.⁷⁷

In Iraq, likewise, women fear violence if they are activist during post-war peace-building. The Women's Network reports that "According to reports, women have been apprehensive to emerge in public because of the violence and looting, and support seems to be growing for Islamic fundamentalism in the South...the US and British occupation forces appear to have made little effort to appoint specialists in women's affairs or make women's rights a priority in the reconstruction effort."⁷⁸ As in Afghanistan, post-war insecurity has posed a special threat to these women. In their efforts to prevent and reduce direct and indirect violence, they themselves face violence.

Priorities and initiatives for peace-building and human security. Consistent with Security Council Resolution 1325,⁷⁹ Afghan women have advocated for their equal participation and full involvement in maintaining and promoting peace and security in Afghanistan. These women peacebuilders have sought ways to build women's leadership in Afghanistan so as to take advantage of women's talents, skills and

contributions and improve their security.⁸⁰ They identified key areas for improving their human security: supporting women's health, food security, and education; strengthening women's community-based organizations; and establishing an independent media. In West Africa, although excluded from peace processes and negotiations in the region, West African women members of the Mano River Women's Peace Network (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) joined together to build peace, reconciliation, and confidence in their countries⁸¹ They organized themselves regionally, built networks, and identified measures to help stop the recurrence of civil wars that have imperiled the region.

Such initiatives illustrate how women peacebuilders are working to improve peace and human security in post-war countries. Their activities are widespread although usually unrecognized, offer one-to-one and community help, and are often not well organized. These peace-building initiatives act to reduce direct and structural violence, empower girls and women, and increase their security. They embody the fundamental goal of human security, which has as its focus individual security. Yet, in addition to these bottom up activities, to significantly improve girls' and women's human security and reduce the effects of power and gender inequities, women must be also included at the top -- within governmental, intergovernmental, and UN policies and programming, a goal that remains elusive.⁸²

8. Conclusion

In recognizing the current militarized climate surrounding national and human security, Rosalind Petchesky questioned whether feminist human security discourse "is a good enough answer to the militarization of people's minds that's rapidly becoming 'normal' thought."⁸³ Her words frame a key challenge for gender and feminist analysts to find ways to incorporate their critiques into mainstream security discourses, particularly in highlighting the key importance of reducing direct and structural violence in girls' and women's lives and conveying the necessity of working towards its prevention and eradication using both "bottom up" and "top down" approaches.

As I have argued in relation to the countries of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sierra Leone, gender-based direct and structural violence is a critical issue for women's human security. Also, girls' and women's empowerment through the promotion of gender

equality and reduction of gender discrimination is crucial to their security and the protection of their political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights. Because women's peace-building initiatives are key in addressing and reducing gender inequities and discrimination and related direct and structural violence, their peace-building work must be encouraged and supported by policies and programs that underscore its importance in improving human security.

Policy Recommendations

- Analyze human security by using both feminist and gender perspectives. Incorporate these perspectives in developing and implementing programs and policies about human security.
- In tandem with grassroots, NGOs, governmental, and intergovernmental groups, work collaboratively to improve girls' and women's status as an integral aspect of human security, particularly in conflict and post-conflict societies.
- Recognize that both direct and structural (indirect) violence against girls and women is key to girls' and women's insecurity in all societies. Therefore, programs and policies that promote human security must address this central feminist concern at micro, meso-, and meta-levels.
- Promote and fund women's peace-building at top-down and bottom-up levels to improve girls' and women's human security.

Notes

¹ Dyan Mazurana and Susan McKay, *Women and Peace-building* (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1999).

² Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003).

³ United Nations, *Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)* (New York: United Nations, 2002).

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Chapter 8

Health, Human Security and the Peace-building Process

Larisa Mori, David R. Meddings and Douglas W. Bettcher

1. Introduction

Humanitarian assistance, health leaders, and health personnel are in the unique position to be able to leverage something universally important, irrespective of the details of any given conflict: The promise of good health. This makes the international health community a potentially powerful force in peace efforts throughout the world.¹

Human security and health are linked. One link is the effects of violence and conflict on both an individual's health and the overall health care system. Violence and conflict often leads to a collapse in the health care system, furthering jeopardizing the health security of those people caught in the middle of the conflict. Appropriate health interventions can increase the level of human security in a conflict situation and provide a vital link to the beginning of the large societal peace-building process.

Human Security

There are two predominant concepts underlying human security. They include the sustainable access to basic human needs and the guarantee of freedom or human rights. The Independent Commission on Human Security defines human security as the protections of "the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment."² More broadly, human security is based on protection and empowerment.

Human security involves protecting human freedoms such as freedom from want, freedom from harm, freedom from fear, and the freedom to take action on one's own behalf; freedoms without which empowerment would not be possible.³ Empowerment means ensuring the continued existence or creation of systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Challenges to human security arise from threats to freedom and empowerment such as poverty robbing people of choices and mobility, violence endangering bodily safety, and disease creating fear and disability or even death.

Often, these challenges are ensured through the strengthening of civilian police and demobilizing combatants; meeting immediate needs of displaced people; launching reconstruction and development; promoting reconciliation and coexistence; advancing effective governance; and providing health intervention. In most cases, human security complements national security by focusing on internal threats that may weaken the nation as a whole whether economic, violent, or epidemic; threats that are often overlooked in national security but are at the core of human security.

Health

The World Health Organization's constitution defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." Using this definition, the notions embedded within human security - sustainable access to essential needs and respect for certain rights - are necessary but not sufficient conditions for health.⁴

Peace-building

Peace-building is a broadly used term that is often ill-defined. It gained widespread use after 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then United Nations Secretary-General, announced his *Agenda for Peace*.⁵

In reality, the term peace-building is often lost in similar but better-established terms whose juxtaposed meanings may help explain peace-building. Peacemaking, for example, is the mid-conflict process of bringing hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, involves post-conflict interventions by the UN or other legitimate third party that are aimed at bringing stability to areas of

tension. Both peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. Preventative diplomacy is the attempt at diffusing or resolving a dispute before it turns into violence. While maintaining temporal distinctions between the terms, peace-building may be seen as the final post-conflict step in attaining peace. Peace-building efforts are aimed at avoiding a relapse into conflict by identifying and encouraging institutions that strengthen and solidify the peace. In other words, peace-building is not possible without first observing successful peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts.⁶

Peace-building efforts may take the form of cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace.⁷ These projects would normally focus on three main components of peace-building: the strengthening of political institutions, the reformation of internal and external security arrangements, and revitalizing the economy. However, strong pressure on fixing inequalities through programs and policy in a conflict zone should be included as group inequalities are strong root causes of conflict.

A common approach to the peace-building process in a post-conflict society is the use of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. These programs are normally a combination of efforts by national governments, international organizations (usually the United Nations), local NGOs and donors to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life and reunite communities. DDR programs seek to create safe environments, enable people to earn an adequate living through constructive means, and assist in the community reconciliation process.⁸

Disarmament, as defined by the United Nations, is “the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone.” Disarmament usually entails the use of incentives, often monetary, to encourage the giving up of weapons. At this stage in the program, ex-combatants are typically given food aid, clothing shelter, medical attention, and are taught basic skills.⁹

Demobilization is the formal disbanding of military formations. It involves grouping ex-combatants in a neutral area and putting them through orientation programs that offer skills training as a means of obtaining income as opposed to fighting.¹⁰

The goal of reintegration is to assist ex-combatants transition into civilian life.

Cash allowances, household goods, land, farm equipment, and housing materials are provided in order to address the most immediate needs of ex-combatants.¹¹

While DDR is a necessary component of peace-building, it alone is not sufficient to ensure a stable post-conflict society and to prevent failed states from relapsing into violence.¹² To be sustainable, DDR efforts need to go beyond free hand-outs and short-term job training. Ex-combatants need a channel through which they can feel solidarity with their fellow community members.¹³ The community needs a goal towards which all individuals are interested in obtaining.¹⁴ Public health can meet that need. Health is important to all members of a community. By working together towards good health, community members can learn the long-term skills necessary for successful community reconciliation.

2. Health and human security are linked

Human security is obviously linked to protection from violence and the guarantee of basic freedoms. Consequently, it is tempting to believe that protecting human security is best left to police or military forces, even though substantial evidence indicates that public health approaches are also vitally important in preventing violence.¹⁵ Moreover, evidence is showing that nurturing good health is also inextricably tied to the pursuit of human security,¹⁶ proving the necessity of a host of other factors and groups that can and do play a vital role in attaining human security.

Poor health can be as devastating within a society as war, taking away from people their ability to exercise choice, take advantage of social opportunities and plan for their future. In fact, the importance of maintaining the good health of population has at times taken priority over war as is evidenced by the fact that cease-fires have been called in order to allow for the immunization of children during times of conflict.

Human security is mainly comprised of three challenges in which health and the security of good health are intricately linked: violence and conflict, global infectious disease, and poverty and inequity.¹⁷ As this chapter focuses on the link between health and violence, it is helpful to note that more broadly, at the center of upholding human security is indeed the protection of human life. When the core of human life is weakened, whether by illness, disability, or avoidable death, poor health becomes a

critical threat to human security. Since human security is largely based on the welfare of human life, and the welfare of human life is dependant on maintaining good health, human security cannot be divorced from the crucial role that health plays in a society. And yet, settling on a standard for good health is difficult anytime we attempt to move beyond the mere absence of disease. Within the scope of good health as defined by the WHO is “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being,” all of which is harder to translate into concrete human health terms than the absolute positive or negative presence of disease.

A standard could be established at a point at which health no longer inhibits the ability of a society to function freely and allows it to advance in a manner of its choosing. More accurately, good health can be seen as a precondition for social stability. If a society's stability is jeopardised because of health conditions within it's population it is indicative of an absence of health among an important part of the population. This is both important and plausible when we consider that current health problems can have long-term and wide-spread effects on the stability of more than the immediately affected population. Sickness and health can expand beyond the time and zone of origin and the scale of death due to health can escalate dramatically through ripple effects, extended in time into neighbouring regions. For example, in some African nations, the population of teachers has been devastated by the outbreak of AIDS which has in turn eroded the ability of those nations to secure effective levels of education. In such situations, there are important long term impacts that arise through the indirect effects of disease. A similar logic holds for health outcomes such as HIV-related deaths or those from violent injury tending to be concentrated within the young adult population - a subset of the population which is vital to the economic security of their dependants and their own societies.

Beyond the obvious link between securing health in order to protect human security is the way health security promotes concepts essential to human security. Both health and human security depend on access to knowledge.¹⁸ Knowledge not only allows scientists and governments to detect arising problems, but it also serves as an intellectual resource and as the base necessary for the advancement of vaccines and drugs that promise to be the solution to those problems. Furthermore, such a knowledge base allows a society's public to be educated on sanitary health practices, the availability

of health services, and the means in which to participate in the decision-making behind the protection of their own health whether by democracy or by adopting certain behaviors at home. However, the entire process, while promoting social stability, needs a certain level of prior stability in order to be effective. A society may be driven to promote its own health, but will only go so far as the capacities afforded by knowledge that is readily available to that society. Health-based information, data and analyses of disease risks and spread not only need to be available, but should be promoted to achieve health and human security. This can only be possible in a society that places little or no barriers to the dissemination of information. In this sense, the role of the information media is growing in educating and engaging the public.

Health is also advanced by social arrangements such as health care systems, local health groups, and civic engagement, the most important of which is the state's assumption of responsibility and authority for the health of its citizens. Ensuring the health security of the public is, like police, fire protection and education, an indivisible good, with strong multiplier effects. Improvements in health anywhere benefit everyone everywhere. Protecting the health of the public - locally, nationally, globally - is thus a core public good and a critical social arrangement for producing health and human security.

Reducing health threats to human security, however, will require unprecedented cooperation among diverse actors and nation states. Good health and human security for all depend on the productive stability provided through peace and development - to ensure universal access to the basic requirements of food, nutrition, clean drinking water, hygiene and sanitation, and housing. Peace reduces the threat of violent conflict, and conversely, experience of violent conflict, even in a neighbouring country predicts more violent conflict.¹⁹ When basic conditions of peace and development are achieved, good health can be attained as part of human security.

Health as a Global Public Good

More often than not, health is seen as a public good, whose attainment depends not just on domestic policies, but on international cooperation. Even those who do not see good health as a global public good, will concede that public health is.²⁰ To understand how public health is a public good requires breaking the concept into pieces. A 'good' can

broadly be seen as a product, program, activity, or service. To be a public good, the good must be non-rivalrous and non-exclusive.²¹ A non-rivalrous good does not cost more to give it to additional people and the use of it by additional people does not diminish the use of it by others. Non-exclusive goods are goods that people cannot be prevented from using.

An illustrative example of a non-rivalrous and non-exclusive good is a lighthouse.²² Once a lighthouse is built, it does not cost more to allow additional people to use it, and use of it by one person does not diminish the usefulness of it by others. It is also impossible to prevent one person from using a lighthouse while it is on for others to use. To be a global public good, the good must exhibit significant cross-border externalities. Externalities occur when one nation takes an action but does not bear the full cost or benefits of that action.²³ Therefore, Global Public Goods are considered to be goods characterised by a significant degree of publicness (non-excludability and non-rivalry) that crosses national boundaries.²⁴

Health in itself does not qualify as a public good, either individually or nationally. A person's or a country's particularly health status is a private good in that he/she (or it) benefits primarily from it.²⁵ For public health activities to be considered as global public goods they must involve cross-country externalities and publicness. Take for example a global infectious disease eradication campaign. If the goal of the campaign is to completely eradicate a disease, it does not cost more for additional people to benefit from it, and all benefit from it once eradication is achieved. And it is impossible to exclude any individual from the benefits of not being at risk of becoming infected. A broad range of potential global public goods for health exist. These can be classified as follows:

- Knowledge and technologies, which can be defined, for example, as an understanding of health risks; preventive, diagnostic, curative and palliative interventions, and delivery systems;
- Policy and regulatory regimes, for example, international norms and standards, and treaties;
- Support for the health system in countries where it is currently ineffective or inaccessible.²⁶

Along those lines, control of violence and war is also a global public good since everyone benefits once peace is achieved and you cannot exclude someone from reaping the benefits associated with the end of a violent situation. It is easy to see how the effects of violence are global and do not stop at the borders of a conflict. The effects can be felt in a far away country that agrees to resettle displaced families, not knowing, for example, that some have acquired TB in a hastily set up refugee camp and will now pass the disease on to others. Countries that border conflict zones may also feel the effects of violence if their economy suffers because it relied on the exportation of goods to a country that spends all of its money on weapons.

3. Effects of Globalization on Collective Violence

Globalization has been defined as a set of processes that intensify human interaction by eroding boundaries of time, space, and ideas that have historically separated people and nations in a number of spheres of action, including economic, health and environmental, social and cultural, knowledge and technology, and political and institutional.²⁷ The interaction of the processes of globalization and the international system is changing the face of the international security discourse.

Health development in the 21st century must take advantage of the opportunities afforded by global change and at the same time, minimize the risks and threats associated with globalization, such as the negative effects of violence. Negative changes are associated with both collective and interpersonal violence and exemplify a downside human security risk that may be substantially greater in population impact than would have been observed in a less globalized world.

At the end of the Cold War era brought relatively and far-reaching consequences to the political and social structures of the former Soviet bloc, as well as radical changes affecting livelihood strategies.²⁸ Comparison of regional trends in youth homicide between western Europe and the former Soviet Bloc from 1985 to 1995 illustrates some of the associated changes in interpersonal violence that were observed during this period. Homicide rates in the 10 to 24 age bracket increased by over 150% from 1985 to 1994 in the Russian Federation, and by 125% in the same period in Latvia.²⁹ Moreover financial factors related to globalization may also contribute to changes in levels of

violence. With respect to collective violence, there is little doubt that economic motivations have played a major role in initiating conflicts, and that access to global markets and trade in commodities from conflict areas has played a substantial role in maintaining the ability of parties to the conflict to continue their struggle. Another aspect of globalization that is associated with both collective and interpersonal violence is the issue of transnational flows, over increasingly porous borders, of weapons, particularly small arms.³⁰

The resulting disparities and the emergence of concomitant clusters of intense violence within nations enhances the probability of state collapse and disintegration, and the emergence failed states. Collapsed states often pose a direct threat to their citizens or fail to protect them. Failed states and the ensuing random violence, both local and transnational, that results from such collapse set off waves of domestic and transnational catastrophes such as migration, epidemics of communicable disease, undernutrition and malnutrition, and rape and unsafe sex.³¹

Therefore, in today's globalizing world, countries are increasingly interdependent and thus more vulnerable to health problems that originate outside of their borders.³² Yet it is also globalization that can help promote global health objectives. Building international research networks for health, supporting international public-private partnership to create new lines of drugs and vaccines, banning together to eradicate diseases, taking part in international treaties that govern the movement of people, animals, and foodstuff are all ways that countries can use globalization to promote public health.³³ In this respect, linking to the analysis in the previous section, global public goods are important because their adequate provision is crucial for the management of the process of globalization.³⁴ It is within this context that this chapter has stressed the important role of public health knowledge and prevention as an important tool to manage the collective violence threats of a more interdependent and globalized world.

4. Effects of Violence on Health

Violence and conflict can have both direct and indirect effects on health and human security. Violence has been defined by the WHO in the recent publication *World report*

*on violence and health.*³⁵ Collective violence is a form of violence often associated with situations in which human security is said to be threatened. The World Health Organization defines collective violence as “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group - whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity - against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives.”³⁶ Recognised forms of collective violence include wars, terrorism, violent political conflicts occurring within or between states, state-perpetuated violence (genocide, repression, disappearances, torture, human rights violations), and organized violent crimes (banditry and gang warfare).³⁷

It should be apparent that direct health effects related to collective violence take the form of weapon-related injury or death.³⁸ The World Health Report 2001 estimated that conflicts accounted for over 310,000 deaths during 2000.³⁹ On the other hand, the indirect effects of collective violence and conflict are felt on a more long-term⁴⁰ and far-reaching scale, and include health conditions arising from population displacement, and destruction of health facility infrastructure among other factors.⁴¹ As opposed to direct effects, which much more frequently involve combatants, indirect health effects of collective violence disproportionately affect non-combatant populations.

Population displacement as a factor in undermining a population's health and human security deserves further comment. Populations displaced from their homes due to conflict are subject to a variety of health risks they might not ordinarily face. Displaced populations fleeing collective violence have a crude mortality rate above baseline rates,⁴² with the primary causes of death being communicable diseases and malnutrition. In this respect, over the last 20 years crude mortality rates (CMRs) 30-fold higher than baseline rates have not been unusual. Furthermore, daily CMRs amongst Rwandan refugees have ranged between 25 and 50 per 10,000 per day.⁴³ An estimated 25 million people from 47 countries were internally displaced in 2002 due to armed conflict, generalised violence and human rights abuse. The fact that they are displaced brings with it the very real potential of lack of access to food, clean water, proper sanitation, and possibilities of providing economic security for themselves. Malnutrition, overcrowding, and lack of sanitation frequently combine to facilitate the emergence of epidemics of transmissible disease in such populations, and children and the elderly are the ones most susceptible to death from such causes. Diarrheal diseases, acute

respiratory infections, measles, and other infectious diseases are the most common causes of death among refugee and displaced populations.⁴⁴

Collective violence can also cause the existing health care system to deteriorate at a time when the medical needs of a population are increasing. Health care facilities are often destroyed, leaving no places for people to seek treatment. Governments spend more money on fighting and so less money is invested in health services and thus the infrastructure deteriorates.⁴⁵ Medical supplies and equipment become scarce and skilled doctors and nurses flee to more stable areas. Routine and rudimentary procedures, like immunizations are ignored so the spread of communicable disease such as measles becomes more widespread.

War and conflict can lead to reduced food production and limited or no access to food for many people, with the most serious impact on the poorest households. Food insecurity in situations of conflict can also be seen in the use of hunger as a weapon if food supplies are seized, cut-off, if food aid is diverted, or if crops, water supplies, livestock and land are intentionally destroyed.

A decline in agricultural output, due to a decrease in production or to the use as hunger as a weapon, can negatively impact the nutritional status of a population, thus affecting their health. Without access to a proper diet, people become more susceptible to disease and epidemics. Unreliability of transportation services can contribute to food insecurity as can a lack of commerce.⁴⁶ In periods of conflict, money is often scarce because the institutions that hold it - banks or post office for example, can close and people can not access money to buy necessary goods.⁴⁷ Without reliable transportation or road security, even goods and food supplies that are available tend to be extremely expensive and inconsistent.⁴⁸ Displaced populations lack even the ability to barter or trade household goods or cattle that they may have relied upon when faced with a food shortage.⁴⁹

5. Health Interventions Can Increase Human Security

Health interventions have the potential to play an integral role in the peace-building process⁵⁰ and can increase the level of human security in a conflict situation. The health sector can create a bridge of peace between the conflicting parties using the promise of

good health as a common goal. Working toward the goal of good health can also serve as the basis for continued cooperation from both sides. In addition, the involvement of health professionals from different sides of a conflict can be a model for other sectors affected by conflict and can create the long-term community involvement that is essential for sustainable peace.

In the fragile transitional phase from conflict to peace, the health sector can promote a concerted effort to help overcome the enduring physical and psychological trauma, encourage community reconciliation, and help prevent renewed outbreaks of violence. Once the fighting has ceased and the peace-building process has begun, the health sector has the chance to reform and/or change past systems and structures, which may have originally contributed to the economic and social inequities that caused the conflict.⁵¹

Health-Peace Initiatives

Health programs that integrate peace work into their health goals can be roughly grouped together as Health-Peace Initiatives (HPI). HPIs are any initiatives that intend to improve the health of people and that simultaneously heighten that group's level of peace, whether this peace is internal to the group or between the group and one of more other groups.⁵²

HPIs can be divided by mode of operation into nine main categories.

(1) *Communication of knowledge*: by using the health infrastructure and their specialized training and skills, health workers have the ability to discover and disseminate crucial facts about conflict that may be difficult for others to obtain.⁵³

(2) *Evocation and broadening of altruism*: In a conflict situation, it is easier to partake in the violence when the people you are fighting against have been depersonalized. By not seeing them as people, they are easier to kill. Health workers are in a position to counter this effect by personalizing both sides of the conflict. In addition to helping to prevent, restrict, and terminate wars, personalizing can make the task of reconstituting healthy communities easier after they end.⁵⁴

(3) *Construction of superordinate goals*: Health workers can help develop goals that transcend the immediate interest of warring parties. To bring both parties into a more peaceful relationship, these goals would have to be valued in the long term by both

sides.⁵⁵

(4) *Extension of solidarity*: Health workers can serve as a link outside of the immediate conflict situation for those who are struggling to prevent or curtail war, making it easier to survive it. Additionally, the vigilant presence and backing of an international community of health workers may help protect the existing medical infrastructure.⁵⁶

(5) *Strengthening of communities*: A health care system that is equally accessible to all members of society can foster a feeling of belonging to a broader, more inclusive group that makes hate-based mobilization of ethnic or other in-groups more difficult.⁵⁷

(6) *Psychological healing of individual society*: In a post-conflict society, the work of prejudice reduction, protection of human rights, building of knowledge and skills in nonviolent conflict resolution, and strengthening of diverse groups living together cooperatively must be carried out in many sectors of society, including health.⁵⁸

(7) *Non-cooperation and dissent*: health workers can choose not to cooperate with programs that are not in line with established medical goals. They can also speak out against programs, boycott companies, and testify as to the atrocities of war.⁵⁹

(8) *Diplomacy*: Health officials are often well placed to engage in diplomatic activities. They can have access to the officials in high political offices while also having high credibility with the general public.⁶⁰

(9) *Redefinition of the situation*: Health workers can redefine the situation as involving public health issues thus justifying, and even necessitating their individual and collective involvement in the issue.⁶¹

Health-Peace Initiatives in Action

“Health as a Bridge for Peace” was developed by the ministries of health of Central America during the 1980’s, with support from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). It noted that the Ministries of Health of Central America and Panama had met together for 30 consecutive years so health cooperation must be the most resilient form of exchange among governments of the region.⁶² Health as a Bridge for Peace was created with the intention of integrating conflict management and community reconciliation into a program of co-operative health care delivery.⁶³ It has succeeded in bridging some gaps between opposing parties that no other entity or group had been

able to achieve.⁶⁴

UNICEF used the delivery of health care as the basis for cooperation between conflicting parties in both their cease-fire for immunizations and “corridor of peace” campaigns. In 1985 UNICEF pioneered the use of humanitarian cease-fires for pediatric immunizations. The success of this program led to a repeat in Lebanon in 1987. In 1985, UNICEF again merged peace work with the delivery of health care in the negotiation of a “corridor of peace” between the government and the NRA in Uganda to safely transport medical supplies and vaccines. A similar agreement was reached and a “corridor of peace” arranged between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in 1989. This corridor allowed relief supplies to be delivered in southern Sudan.⁶⁵

The WHO, inspired by UNICEF’s success in cease-fire arrangements, arranged a similar program in Afghanistan in 1994. There, two weeks of peace turned into a two-month cease-fire during which a mass immunization campaign was carried out. In addition to immunizing children, this campaign got the Afghan people talking about co-operation rather than confrontation.⁶⁶

Also organized by the WHO, was a research and action program that sought to combine peace-building with health-related initiatives. This program, Health and Development for Displaced Populations (Hedip) conducted three programs in Croatia, Mozambique and Sri Lanka from 1991-1995. Hedip programs focused on health issues whose solutions relied on the integration of the health sector with other sectors, thus using health-related actions to promote community reconciliation.⁶⁷

The Hedip program in Mozambique brought conflicting parties together for dialogue using basic health issues. A committee to co-ordinate health outreach activities was formed that included representatives from the district government, religious organizations, local NGOs, and the traditional leadership system. By focusing this committee’s attention on a common interest in primary health care, the Hedip program was able to start the process of opposing parties working together for community reconciliation.

6. The Role of the Health Worker in the Peace-building Process

Another way that health can contribute to human security is through the unique position of health care providers. Health care professionals not only have a special role to play in healing violence-ravaged communities, but they are well educated, and have access to a wide range of community groups.⁶⁸ Although the role of not-for-profit health workers could be compromised through indiscriminate participation, they hold several characteristics and abilities that give them an opportunity to advance the goals of human security and engage in the peace process in ways that are closed off to other groups or individuals.

A core value for the majority of health care providers, particularly in humanitarian aid agencies, is an ideological sense of altruism that serves as the foundation of medicine, medical education, and health care policy.⁶⁹ This characteristic guides their goals and is easily acknowledged and even applauded in most societies, which puts health care workers in a unique position of trust amongst those societies. Moreover, the aim of their work is unbiased and usually in the interest of all groups. This gives health care providers a great deal of legitimacy in their endeavors especially because they are consistently considered members of a very ethical and honest profession.

Health care goals are usually beneficial to both sides of opposing forces as in the case of pediatric immunizations that were possible because of specially arranged cease-fires in El Salvador, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Again, this may grant health care workers rare access to both sides of opponents due to the unbiased nature of their work. In a more extreme case, an armed group will choose not to shoot at doctors healing their enemies because those doctors are equally obliged if not willing to treat them.

This neutrality exists in policy and politics as much as in warfare. Since medicine is rooted in scientific inquiry with a high regard for empirical reasoning⁷⁰ the objectivity of health care professionals prevents them from being seen as sources of propaganda or the agents of an opposing position.⁷¹ This merited reputation not only gives physicians and medical researchers power in public discourse and publications, but it also allows them to be acknowledged as credible sources of information from where ethnic prejudices may be debunked and human rights abuses may be challenged. In fact, health care providers and researchers hold more credibility than politicians amongst most societies.⁷²

Besides providing an unbiased opinion and neutral health care in areas of conflict,

health-based aid agents also provide a wide array of services that are beneficial to the procurement of human security. For example, health officials and health-based aid agencies can investigate the conditions of hospitals, medical clinics, sanitation facilities, and other health-related infrastructure in areas of conflict.

Additionally, health care providers are especially trained and able to gather information at the core of human security. Data on victims of alleged human rights abuse; epidemiological surveys on refugees, displaced persons, or forcibly deported people; and statistics on the effects and numbers of those denied access to medical care, food, or drinking water are all obtained through the expertise of medical researchers and physicians. Such information is also analyzed by them yielding both real and potential consequences on a society as a whole or its threat to human security.

What may be more interesting to modern-day governments in light of the war on terrorism is the documentation that is being provided by medical researchers of the health effects of indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction such as land mines, incendiary weapons, poison gas, and biological warfare, including their effects on noncombatant civilians. Not only does the documentation provide governments with credible information about its dangers and consequences, but it gives nations-states legitimate political ammunition or leverage in pressuring other nations to abandon its use.

Since health concerns can quickly become internationalized, governments and global agencies must also rely on medical researchers or health aid workers to provide information and other analysis that concerns human security from regions or areas that are normally politically “closed.” Such surveys and analysis may include the spread and effects of an epidemic, the civilian impact of infrastructure destruction, loss of medical care, and long-term health effects of conflict and economic sanctions.⁷³

Although health care providers definitely have an important role to play in peace-building by attaining useful knowledge and generally aiding in the pursuit of human security through their unique access to groups, their participation could also have negative consequences.⁷⁴ For example, a humanitarian cease-fire could be called to allow health workers to enter an area of conflict while the underlying benefit to one or more of the groups calling the cease-fire might be to re-arm, re-group, or reposition forces which would most likely postpone an outcome to the conflict or even intensify it.

Some groups might also use the cease-fire as a form of propaganda to gain moral superiority and support for their cause undermining the solidarity between the groups that would otherwise be observed. However, to avoid this, most cease-fires established for the benefit of public health are in tandem with the insertion of observers who monitor opposing groups for cease-fire violations.

The involvement of health care workers and health interventions in a conflict for the purpose of gaining ground in human security beyond the scope of health could also jeopardize the legitimacy and ethical grounds that give health workers their neutrality and impartiality.⁷⁵ Ultimately, this might have the undesired effect of restricting or prohibiting the presence of health-based aid agencies and workers in areas where they are most needed. More dangerously, participation in human security efforts may prove to be much more favorable to a certain group which would significantly erode the legitimacy of information and education provided by the health sector; being taken as partial, it would place the lives of health care providers at risk by being identified with an opposing force and making them legitimate targets for attack.

7. Conclusion

Human security is jeopardized not only by the direct effects that violence and conflict have on a society, but also by the indirect effects that are felt by people and communities far removed from the physical fighting.⁷⁶ As the affairs of countries become more intertwined and interdependent in the coming years, these effects will be even more widespread. Globalization means easier movement of people between countries and at the same time allows countries to take less individual responsibility for global health problems.

Health as a global public good is undersupplied because the market-based incentives are not adequate. Governments in developing countries think the responsibility should be placed on wealthier countries that are better prepared to bear the financial burdens associated with health. Yet developed countries feel that the responsibility needs to be placed on the countries most affected by health problems. In the end, it will take a concerted international effort to stymie the ill effects violence has on human security and to provide necessary and critical public health goods.⁷⁷

Public health interventions can help to contain the effects of violence on a population and preventing further conflicts from developing.⁷⁸ In giving communities a larger goal to attain, it serves as a unifying force and shows both sides of a conflict how to get along. Peace-building is a multi-factorial enterprise that requires the participation of many sectors. Integrating public health interventions and involving community health workers in both short-term and long-term peace goals can add to the sustainability and stability of a community. In doing so, higher levels of human security and health can also be achieved.⁷⁹ A human security paradigm for the 21st century must include space for public health, and the role of many global public health interventions in both peacemaking and peace-building.

Notes

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Chapter 9

Education as an Approach to Human Security: A Case of Afghanistan

Yasushi Katsuma

1. Child Rights, Education and Human Security

The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1989. To date, all but one of the world's eligible States Parties have already ratified the Convention: The U.S.A. has signed, but has not yet ratified it. Afghanistan signed the Convention in 1990 and ratified it in March 1994. That was before the Taliban movement took over control of Kabul. Nevertheless, the Convention obliges Afghanistan to undertake "all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation" in accordance with the international norms. The Convention also establishes ways in which its implementation will be monitored. For example, the Committee on the Rights of the Child examines reports from the States Parties, considers information submitted by United Nations agencies and NGOs, and makes recommendations.

Article 28 of the Convention establishes the child's right to education. Education empowers the child by developing his or her skills, learning, and other capacities, human dignity, self-esteem, and self-confidence. The 1990 World Summit for Children set a goal: "By the year 2000...universal access to basic education and achievement of primary education by at least 80% of primary school-age children." That goal has yet to be achieved in many countries, including Afghanistan. Also in 1990, a World Conference on Education for All was held in Jomtien, Thailand. The resulting World Declaration on Education for All asserts that basic education "is more than an end in itself. It is the foundation for lifelong learning and human development on which

countries may build, systematically, further levels and types of education and training (Article 1–4).” It also states that “every person...shall be able to benefit from educational opportunities designed to meet his basic learning needs. These needs comprise both essential learning tools and the basic learning content required by human beings to be able to survive, to develop their full capacities, to live and work in dignity, to improve the quality of their lives, to make informed decisions, and to continue learning (Article 1–1).” A decade later, in 2000, the World Education Forum, held in Dakar, set a Framework for Action, reconfirming international goals and identifying strategies for attaining them.

According to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, children are the rights-holders whose right to education should be realized by the duty-bearers at the national, sub-national, community and household levels. In unstable situations where the duty-bearers have difficulty fulfilling their obligations to respect and realize the child’s rights, the international humanitarian community often finds education as an excellent delivery point for human security measures to promote empowerment and protection of children living in especially difficult circumstances.¹ As the Committee on the Rights of the Child commented in 2001, the basic aims of learning are “to provide the child with life skills, to strengthen the child’s capacity to enjoy the full range of human rights and to promote a culture which is infused by appropriate human rights values.” At the same time, within the international humanitarian community, there are increasing calls for education to play a role in enhancing child protection in unstable situations.² In this context, the concept of human security helps us broaden our scope in advancing the security of children.

2. Coverage of Humanitarian Assistance

Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child stresses that the right to education must be achieved on the basis of equal opportunity, reflecting the fact that vast numbers of children suffer discrimination in access to education. However, in practice, it is not always easy to reach the most vulnerable groups of children with humanitarian assistance; that is the issue of coverage. The issue of coverage is important in our efforts to reduce disparities between different social groups, establishing the basis

for peace-building. This paper argues that we need to enhance human rights-based programming and expand the range of actors beyond the State in order to translate the concept of human security into peace-building practice. The shift from the traditional basic needs approach to the human rights-based approach in programming requires a change of language to reflect this paradigm shift. The following table exemplifies some differences between them.³

Table 1: Basic Needs Approach and the Human Rights-Based Approach

BASIC NEEDS APPROACH	HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH
Needs are met or satisfied.	Rights are realized (respected, protected, facilitated, and fulfilled).
Needs do not imply duties or obligations, although they may generate promises.	Rights always imply correlative duties or obligations.
Needs are not necessarily universal.	Human rights are always universal.
Basic needs can be met by goal or outcome strategies.	Human rights can be realized only by attention to both outcome and process.
Needs can be ranked in a hierarchy of priorities.	Human rights are indivisible because they are interdependent; there is no such thing as “basic rights.”
Needs can be met through charity and benevolence.	Charity and benevolence do not reflect duty or obligation.
It is gratifying to state that “80% of all children have had their needs met to be educated.”	In a human rights-based approach, this means that 20% of all children have not had their right to be educated realized.
The government does not yet have the political will to enforce legislation to achieve gender equality.	The government has chosen to ignore its duty by failing to enforce legislation to achieve gender equality.

Before September 11, 2001, the complex emergency in Afghanistan was almost forgotten by the international community, although the needs for humanitarian assistance were continuously generated by the armed conflict as well as by droughts. Given the limited resources available for Afghanistan, the challenge for the international humanitarian community was to reach the most vulnerable groups with relevant and appropriate humanitarian activities.⁴ However, the humanitarian actors, including United Nations agencies and NGOs, had to plan their interventions without access to basic statistical data of Afghanistan. More than twenty years of armed conflict made it practically impossible to conduct any national survey. The lack of reliable data often led

to non-optimal allocation of the limited resources available for Afghanistan. In addition to the lack of disaggregated national data, humanitarian actors suffered from the gender and ethnic biases created by the Taliban's discriminatory policy and practice against Afghan women in general and particularly non-Pashtun ethnic groups.

The coverage of certain vulnerable groups was inadequate in some cases. First, given that effective control was in the hands of the Taliban, it was necessary for humanitarian actors to work with the *de facto* government. Therefore it was difficult for humanitarian actors to reach Afghan women with appropriate assistance. As already documented well, the Taliban's edicts imposed numerous restrictions on Afghan women's mobility, discouraging women from directly participating in and benefiting from humanitarian assistance. In particular, girls were prevented from receiving formal education. Second, as the Taliban is a predominantly Pashtun ethnic group, it was not easy to reach non-Pashtun vulnerable groups, particularly Hazara in the central region. This tendency was further strengthened by the dense concentration of humanitarian actors in the geographical areas close to Pakistan. The majority of international NGOs preferred to work in the eastern region, as the access from Peshawar was relatively easy.

3. Situation Assessment in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, reliable national data disaggregated by geographical area, gender, and ethnic groups were not available for a long time. Without such disaggregated data, it is extremely difficult to identify which problems exist, where they are occurring, who are most affected by them, and how widespread the problems are. In order to identify vulnerabilities leading to new problems as the situation changes, it was imperative for the humanitarian actors to collect basic data in Afghanistan. In order to address the issue of coverage, situation assessment needs to be carried out, collecting data disaggregated by gender and ethnicity. In this context, in 2000, a Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) was conducted in Afghanistan to improve data availability.

To assess the current status of the rights of children and women and to develop common baseline data, facilitating monitoring and evaluation for future interventions, the UNICEF Afghanistan Country Office decided in 2000 to implement an MICS in Afghanistan. This household survey was meant to fill gaps in the data necessary for

reporting on the situation of children and women at the end of the millennium. This also was going to provide a baseline from which it would be possible to measure changes in the coming decade. The World Summit for Children, held in New York in September 1990, established the need for this assessment. In order to conduct this survey in Afghanistan, UNICEF invited experts from other United Nations agencies and NGOs working for Afghanistan to form a steering committee that would ensure consistency and avoid duplication with other surveys.

Technically, the process was smooth: the questionnaire was modified to suit the Afghan context, a stratified sampling strategy was adopted, and interviewers were trained. It soon became clear, however, that access to Afghan women in the survey, both as interviewers and interviewees, was a problem. Afghan women would not meet male strangers who knock on their door, so local female enumerators were needed. Yet, Taliban authorities did not allow Afghan women to be engaged in paid work, except in the health sector.⁵

In June 2000, the director of the Central Statistics Office (CSO) of the Taliban (the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) came to Islamabad to meet with UNICEF. In this meeting, the CSO director verbally approved the MICS. Therefore, UNICEF sent a survey team from Peshawar as enumerators. This included Afghan men and women working in the health sector. In spite of obstacles, data collection was completed in 22 of 97 districts selected by random sampling. For the most part, the districts where data collection was successful were in the eastern (Nangarhar, Konar, Laghman), southeastern (Ghazni, Paktika, Paktya), and partial Central (Logar and Wardak) regions of the country. However, another Taliban edict was issued in July 2000 that prohibited Afghan women from working with the United Nations or foreign NGOs. Since Afghan women were an integral part of the survey team as enumerators, data collection was suspended in the central region of the country. Meanwhile, UNICEF argued that the MICS was health-related and should be exempt from the edict. Though the CSO director agreed with UNICEF, and took the case to the Taliban Supreme Court, the court denied the request and expressed concern regarding the security of Afghan women.

The CSO director then asked the Taliban Council of Ministers to exempt the MICS from the edict. In response, the Council of Ministers appointed a subcommittee to review the request. After the review, the subcommittee recommended that the data

collection be allowed to continue. The Council of Ministers agreed with this recommendation and requested the Ministry of Justice to formally approve work on the survey. At the end of September 2000, however, the Minister of Justice rejected the request, saying the survey was neither urgent nor curative. He also accused the humanitarian agencies of continually trying to find alternative employment opportunities for Afghan women.

On the other hand, in August 2000, UNICEF received a letter approving the work on the survey from the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (the “Northern Alliance”). Because of the escalation of fighting among factions in Afghanistan, though, UNICEF was not able to send a survey team to the northeastern region.

In spring 2001, the author traveled to meet with the governor of Kandahar, the effective seat of the Taliban authorities. There was a breakthrough when the second-highest ranking member of the Taliban finally was convinced that the MICS was necessary. The author was referred to the Director of Public Health, who promised to allow his female health workers to become interviewers for the survey. These women were trained but, unfortunately, the events subsequent to the September terrorist attack on the World Trade Center led to withdrawal of the survey team. With the data that were collected in the east of Afghanistan, a report titled “2000 Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey: Volume 1” was produced, hoping that humanitarian and reconstruction assistance will have a better chance of success.

4. Ensuring Girls’ Right to Education: A Process of Empowerment and Protection

The World Summit for Children estimated that two-thirds of the world’s 100 million children without basic education were girls, and set goals for increasing the education of female children.⁶ These goals were endorsed by the 1995 World Conference on Women held in Beijing, which attributed the disproportionately low number of girls in education to “customary attitudes, child labour, early marriages, lack of funds and lack of adequate schooling facilities, teenage pregnancies and gender inequalities in society at large as well as in the family.” The Conference called for full implementation of Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.⁷ In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly held a special session as a follow-up to the Beijing Conference. It noted some

progress, but cited some remaining obstacles in improving the education of girls: lack of resources, insufficient political will, persisting gender discrimination and gender stereotyping, among others.

In 1998, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the right to education. Her mandate is to report on the status of the right to education throughout the world and the difficulties in implementing this right, with particular attention to gender inequality.⁸ In 2001, the Special Rapporteur reported on progress: “In the Arab States, gender disparity has actually increased in 1995-2000 with proportionately fewer girls having had access to schooling.”

It was clear that in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, girls lagged behind their male peers because of the discriminatory education policy. The MICS conducted in the east of Afghanistan also demonstrated that girls had been deprived of their access to formal education. The net attendance ratios at the primary education level were 47 percent for boys and 12 percent for girls.⁹ The girls who responded positively were educated at non-formal home-based schools.

Table 2: Children of Primary School Age Attending School (any type), East of Afghanistan, 2000

Characteristics	Sex						Total		
	Male			Female			Attending	Percent	Total
	Attending	Percent	Total	Attending	Percent	Total			
Region									
Central (partial)	95	49.7	191	4	2.2	181	99	26.6	372
South-Eastern	246	56.4	436	43	10.5	409	289	34.2	845
Eastern	169	36.1	468	75	16.9	443	244	26.8	911
Age (in years)									
5	23	15.4	149	7	4.5	156	30	9.8	305
6	44	24.2	182	14	10.2	137	58	18.2	319
7	60	45.5	132	26	15.9	164	86	29.1	296
8	98	57.0	172	20	12.7	158	118	35.8	330
9	74	66.1	112	12	14.5	83	86	44.1	195
10	88	59.5	148	18	13.7	131	106	38.0	279
11	40	58.8	68	8	11.4	70	48	34.8	138
12	83	62.9	132	17	12.7	134	100	37.6	266
Total East	510	46.6	1095	122	11.8	1033	632	29.7	2128

The international humanitarian community found the home-based school an excellent delivery point for human security measures to promote empowerment and protection of children.¹⁰ The support to non-formal education at the community level promoted the process of women’s empowerment. First, the female teachers who were prohibited from

working and excluded from the formal education sector started teaching children in their neighborhood. The international assistance community supported the female teachers' initiative to start up their own home-based schools, building networks of female teachers. In 1999, there were at least 532 home-based schools supported by the international assistance community.¹¹ Second, Afghan girls who were not allowed to study at formal schools administered by the Taliban government were able to find alternative learning space at the home-based schools, developing their skills, learning, and other capacities, human dignity, self-esteem, and self-confidence.¹²

The home-based schools not only served as learning space but also provided children in unstable situations with protection against various forms of threats. First, the home-based schools brought some elements of physical protection to girls, providing a safe place to play, offering an alternative to destructive behavior and providing regular adult supervision. Second, the home-based schools offered opportunities for self-expression and the chance to engage with peers, promoting psychosocial health. Gathering children together supported socialization and established peer networks. Being students also encouraged girls to regain some sense of identity and hope. Third, the instruction at the home-based schools transmitted vital basic skills to girls, including literacy, numeracy, and life skills. Acquiring basic skills is not a luxury but essential for children in unstable situations to make decisions about what is in their best interests..

5. Building Capacities at the Community Level to Address the Issue of Insecurities of Girls

As discussed earlier, Afghanistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994; therefore the State is the ultimate duty-bearer to realize girls' right to education. In spite of that, the Taliban government continued to enforce the discriminatory policy that prohibited girls from receiving education. The international humanitarian community made numerous advocacy efforts to change the discriminatory education policy. However, the Taliban government kept disrespecting girls' right to education; therefore, the international assistance community shifted its focus from the formal schools to the non-formal home-based schools. There was a conscious decision not to support the Taliban Ministry of Education, due to the discriminatory education policy

and practice against girls. Instead, the international assistance community decided to build capacities at the community level to run the home-based schools. The intervention at the community level was in accordance with the general principle of “non-discrimination” established by Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. By addressing the issue of coverage, the gender disparity was reduced to some extent, establishing the basis for peace-building. When the “Back-to-School” campaign was launched after the fall of the Taliban regime, the international humanitarian community was able to significantly expand girls’ access to formal schools, based on the existing network of home-based schools for girls.

In the case of Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, the State failed to fulfill its obligations to respect and realize girls’ right to education. In response, the international assistance community tried to promote empowerment and protection of girls by supporting home-based schools at the community level. In order to translate the concept of human security into peace-building practice, the case of Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of enhancing human rights-based programming and expanding the range of actors beyond the State. First, promoting protection at the home-based schools allows us to address the issue of insecurity of girls in unstable situations, enhancing human rights-based programming. Second, the process of empowering female teachers and girls at the community level encourages us to expand the range of actors beyond the State, strengthening the practice of human development.

Notes

¹ See Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003).

² See S. Nicolai, and C. Triplehorn, “The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict,” *HPN Paper*, No.42, 2003.

³ See U. Jonsson, *Human Rights Approach to Development Programming* (UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office, 2003).

⁴ See Global Movement for Children, Afghanistan Working Group, *Lost Chances: The Changing Situation of Children in Afghanistan, 1990–2000* (UNICEF Afghanistan Country Office, 2001).

⁵ See Yasushi Katsuma, “Looking for Women in Afghanistan,” *Land Tenure Center Newsletter* (University of Wisconsin at Madison), No.82, 2001.

⁶ See UNICEF, *The State of the World’s Children 1999: Education*, 1998.

⁷ See United Nations, “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,” Fourth World Conference on Women, 4–15 September 1995, Beijing (A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1).

⁸ See K. Tomasevski, *Education Denied: Costs and Remedies* (Zed Books, 2003)

⁹ See UNICEF, Afghanistan, “2000 Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS2): Vol.1,” 2001.

¹⁰ See A. B. Rugh, *Education for Afghans: A Strategy Paper* (Save the Children & UNICEF Afghanistan, 1998).

¹¹ See UNESCO, *EFA 2000: Afghanistan (Draft final report)* (UNESCO Pakistan, 2001).

¹² See A. B. Rugh, and E. Kalmthout, *Strategy for Afghan Primary Education: Progress from 1998 to 2000* (UNICEF Afghanistan & Save the Children, 2000).

Chapter 10

Conflict and Peoples' Insecurity: An Insight from the Experiences of Nigeria

Katsuya Mochizuki

1. Introduction

Sequential deterioration of the macro economy has seriously affected human security in African society since the 1980s. Multilateral financial institutions advocated structural economic adjustment as a panacea for stagnant economies. In Nigeria, the economic growth of the early 1990s showed comparatively better performance than the previous decade. However, economic gain had not trickled down to the life of ordinary people. Their substantial income further declined as devaluation of national currency and inflation followed in this period. A common phrase among people to describe their situation was “SAP (Structural Adjustment Program) saps us.” The adjustment effort resulted in wider income gaps and social insecurity.

A sense of insecurity often leads people to struggle for resources. Faced with structural changes, people have been driven to secure their own share in the economy. Most African governments, however, failed to provide proper roadmaps to economic recovery. They failed to securing employment and earnings for their people, while immediate dismissal and delayed payment became commonplace, even in the public sector. The shrinking private sector had no capacity to absorb unemployed workers. Ordinary people tried to find alternative sources of income and economic space. Their survival strategies ranged from begging to self-help style petit trades. Strong desires for resources led people to try all kinds of ventures, including criminal ones. These adventures sometimes resulted in violent disputes, community clashes, and so on. As the most populous country in the African continent, Nigeria has experienced harsh

domestic confrontations, including the civil war (Biafran War). Conflicts in the oil-producing area of the country (the so-called Niger Delta) have also started to show their violent aspects since the early 1990s. One of the epoch-making incidents was the opposition movement of the Ogoni people (the Movement of the Survival of the Ogoni People: MOSOP) which, in spite of its peaceful character, had a great impact on other popular movements in the country. The leadership of the MOSOP behaved tactically, and their bargaining method showed itself to be an effective strategy for securing resources. Following the MOSOP, many groups and movements emerged in the Niger Delta. They became more radical in their demands and actions, given their youth elements. Even women became involved and began to take an active part in these oppositions.

The objective of this chapter is to amplify an understanding of human (in-) security by examining the popular movements and the conflict-tone situation of African society. The behavior of such groups as the youth and women's movements are detailed with their historical backgrounds. Various social struggles and conflicts in the Niger Delta have thus far been assumed to be inter- or intra-ethnic in character. Even recent research portrays communities and ethnic groups as a single and monolithic entity. They tend to over-simplify the structures of struggle and conflict, and often neglect the human dimensions of movements. Reflecting on this point, the present inquiry starts from empirical observation of the realities of popular movements. The youth and women become the focuses of description in following sections. In each case, the emphasis will lie on historical inquiry for the purposes of addressing the source of these groups' insecurities.

The first question to be answered in this inquiry concerns methods of attaining human security in such a society. What kind of social system do ordinary people utilize to mitigate their insecurities under such conditions? On a community level, the youth and the women challenge the elders for the sheer reason that resource distribution is unfair. On the national level, however, people - including the younger generation - expect some political benefits from the existing system controlled by elder politicians, even though the interests of these distinct groups do not always coincide. This contradiction needs to be analyzed within the African context.

The second question concerns the rules and order of conflict management. How

and with what mechanisms can ordinary people resolve their disputes and conflicts? Declining social institutions and changing social relations used to place major constraints on the process of conflict resolution. The search for an alternative mechanism presents an urgent matter for both people and the government. The method of outsider intervention is also examined in this analysis.

2. Theoretical and Historical Backgrounds

The Concept of Security in the African Context

The advocacy of the concept of human security has afforded chances to reconsider traditional security agendas. Historical examinations of the concept of security in the former chapters made it clear that the traditional concept is contingent in character, and that the national security is a metaphorical expression. Democratization, internationalization and socialization are addressed as the key aspects that gave birth to the concept of human security.¹

The above arguments imply that the state's governmental power must be strong enough to overwhelm any other domestic groups to protect the rights of people. It is assumed that the modern notion of security requires a role committed to maintaining domestic rule and order. Accordingly, the government of a nation-state shall fulfill this requirement. In addition to this minimized role, the state must have enough coercive power to meet its physical challenges. Here appeared the idea that the state responsible for security of its people corresponds to its modern role in a system of constitutional government.

Very few African countries, however, could meet this requirement as nation-states. Unlike Western countries, the fundamental rights of people have not been protected, even under their modern constitutions. In addition to the shortcomings of those independent governments, de-centralized power structures in the society prevented them from meeting security requirements. As African governments couldn't manage parochial power relations at its independence, they failed to maintain domestic rule and order. National integration took priority over national security agendas.

As a matter of course, the welfare and security of the people were left behind. Financial and human resources were concentrated on national development, and their

residual drops trickled down to communities that were managed by elders under patriarchal rule and order. Just as the security of a state mechanism possessed by a king in the pre-modern era was not perceived as national security, the security of a community controlled by traditional chiefs is not defined as people's security. The concept of human security shall be derived from the progress of identities among members of a group, association, and community.

The promotion of identities in African society had been a double-edged sword that can split a society into fragments during the process of national integration and development. Nationalism in African countries diminished in the domestic sphere after independence, though it survived and developed internationally in the form of Pan-Africanism. The absence of a common ideological base and political consciousness led people back to intolerant ethnicity. It caused the transformation of identities among people, and let them fall into identity politics under socio-economic changes.²

3. Historical Settings of the Niger Delta

The integration of people with diverse cultures under the common umbrella of new statehood made up the political scene for ethnicity and ethnic identity in Nigeria. Ethnic minority issues in the country were the outcome of a political process that provided political maneuvers and leverage to ethnic groups on the basis of the size of their populations. As a result, ethnic minorities were at a disadvantageous position in the distribution of spoils under the colonial rule. Major ethnic groups like the Hausa-the Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo were dominant in Nigerian politics even after the independence.

Among all ethnic minorities around the country, those in the Niger Delta were of special note, their situations reflecting keen linkages between the polity, the economy, and the natural environment. Since the 17th century, the Niger Delta had been a trading outpost connected to European and American markets, first for forest products and then for slaves. After the abolition of slave trade in the early 19th century, the palm oil trade became dominant in the area. The so-called village states and kingdoms of the Niger Delta were prosperous in trans-Atlantic trade. People there acted as middlemen, while providing labor and other services to foreign traders. Europeans had extended their

control over the sources of palm products in the hinterland. Through this process, the Niger Delta and its people were included in British colonial rule and were formally incorporated into the protectorate.

The end of colonial rule and formal creation of Nigerian federation caused ethnic groups to compete for autonomous status and political leadership. The ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta suffered marginalization by the dominant ethnic groups which strongly agitated for their own administrative units. In 1963, a new state (a sub-unit of the federation) was created by the central (federal) government with the intention to split the votes in the opposition party's stronghold in the western part of the country, while appeasing the minorities in the same area. However, the creation of a new state did not contribute the welfare of the people in the Niger Delta.

This picture changed in the mid-1960s as international cash crop prices declined. On the contrary, interests in oil reserves in the Niger Delta had grown and continued to do so when oil revenues began to rise in the 1970s after quadrupling of the crude price. In the midst of the growing importance of oil production, there appeared an activist group which attempted to secede from the Nigerian federation on the eve of Nigerian civil war. The group named itself the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), and their armed members seized some governmental premises until they were arrested. This occurrence might have marked the first case of ethnic minorities' protesting violently against marginalization within the federation. After this incident, in 1967, two new states were additionally created in the area.

By the end of the Biafran war in the early 1970s, the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta had emerged as host communities for the oil which became the major source of national wealth. However, it also became obvious that their expectations of using total control over oil wealth as leverage for accessing power at the federal level were not realized. The central government progressively vested control over oil in itself, resulting in the persistent exclusion of ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta. The fiscal centralization of oil revenues was largely effected through eliminating the allocation principle of derivation, in favor of equality among the country's whole population. The relationship between ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta and the government backed by dominant ethnic groups further deteriorated. These tensions were exacerbated by shrinking oil revenues, worsening economic conditions, and the collapse of civilian rule

in the 1980s.

Concurrently, old disputes and antagonism among communities were revived, leading to brutality all around Nigeria. The basic nature of those conflicts has posed a challenge for the status quo. Under distressing economic conditions in the post-adjustment era, ordinary people wished to bypass the mechanism of resource distribution sustained by governments and those in power. People, especially youths, attempted direct access to the source of wealth.

The local power structure also changed in its mechanisms of patronage. With economic liberalization and so-called democratization, there appeared a steep decline in the capacity of traditional rulers to cope with the demands of local populations. Elders of the community could not provide enough financial resources to meet community development needs because governmental grants diminished substantially following fiscal reforms under the structural adjustment. Traditional titles also fell short of the increased number of candidates in communities where the population growth remained at a high rate. As a result, untitled and financially dissatisfied youths became a majority among their generation. They were eager to extend political space, and were thus mobilized by politicians who could control scarce resources. The youth were easily involved and manipulated by politicians in the election and other political rallies.

In the Niger Delta, the youth did challenge both the governments and the elders of their own communities to re-distribute oil wealth produced in their living space. Their main target of their direct actions was the oil company. Activists were reported to be occupying production facilities and taking personnel as hostages. The present rule and order of the society could not assure rights of those young residents. It is also worthy of special mention that they sometimes leveled their opposition against each other. Even the MOSOP experienced internal disputes after the decease of its prominent leader, Kenule (Ken) Saro-Wiwa.³

3. The Youth Element

Historical Role of the Youth

In African modern history, youths and their movements have been deemed important leverage for directing a society toward political independence. African youth have been

strongly instrumental in mobilizing opposition for political change, and many young candidates participate actively in electoral campaign.⁴ Many post-independence African leaders had their political backgrounds in student protest, the youth league and so on.

The youth had been one of the most active agents in the African colonial politics. In British West Africa the youth movements led political independence from the colonial rule. They account for the student body and the intellectuals, who advocated social change and development. For example, the Sierra Leonian journalist and trade-unionist I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson played a key role in establishing the West African Youth League (WAYL) which dwelt upon the many travails of the less affluent members of the society like teachers, clerks, artisans, the self-employed, the unemployed, and unskilled workers.⁵ Accordingly, the youth became an important element of the opposition movement in the post-independence era.

In the 1940's and 1950's Nigerian youths had formed the vanguard of the anti-colonial movement, as they were the rising generation both for the polity and the economy. They joined forces with the nationalist movement that led struggles for independence. At the end of World War II, the youth groups were re-organized by the nationalistic political parties that succeeded those struggles. The youths became mobilizing forces and catalysts for the political movement for Nigeria's independence. While Nigerian youths played a critical role in advancing the political wave for independence, they were gradually demobilized after attaining their political goal. Their morale also diminished as the government settled down fully to exercise its political power. Under such conditions, the multi-party democracy had brought ethnic division and disunity among people. In case of Nigeria, the military has been acting as a powerful social force committed to the preservation of status quo. The youths in the society could not be free from their socio-economic context and the balance of power among forces in the society.

The Youth Movement in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta has substantial oil and natural gas reserves. Oil mined in the area accounts for 95% of the country's foreign exchange earnings and about a quarter of its GDP. Nigeria's current proven oil reserves, estimated at over 20 billion barrels, is located both onshore and offshore. In spite of these abundant resource endowments, the

Niger Delta is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped parts of the country. Majority of inhabitants there still live in rural, subsistence conditions characterized by a total lack of such basic infrastructures as roads, electricity, pipe-born water, and so on.

The Niger Delta maintains one of the highest population densities in the country. The population growth, almost equivalent to the country's 3% average, exerts accordingly strong pressure on arable land which is naturally scarce. Local populations have been pushed out from their own communities and have migrated to major towns and cities in the area. Such destinations like Warri and Port Harcourt were already too populous to absorb newly-arrived people into the work force. Since the country's oil boom in the 1970s, the populations of those "oil cities" have been exploding, but their urbanization process does not necessarily keep pace with their economic growth.

It was under these circumstances that youth movements reemerged in the Niger Delta, which also resulted in the dispossession of oil wealth produced in their living space. Furthermore, the military regime did not provide any political space for the popular forces of the Niger Delta to express their grievances, or to participate in the political process. Thus, the youth resorted to their ethnic identities to mobilize the people towards the struggle for rights to secure their minimum living standards. In this regard, they criticized the centralization of Nigerian fiscal system and demanded the control of resources by local population. These claims and demands received international support and were gradually recognized as part of the struggle for the protection of global human and minority rights. Since the 1990s these groups have been transforming themselves into global actors and linking themselves to international networks against the violation of human and environmental rights.

Various factors can explain the (re-)emergence of youth activism as a major element for change in the Niger Delta. The organizational structure, the leadership, and the internal politics of youth movements shall now be examined from different perspectives. This emergence cannot be separated from the convergence of other global and domestic factors. It has also become clear that these movements were reacting to worsening socio-economic environment in the Niger Delta.

It is nevertheless indispensable to understand implications of ascendancy of the youth as a radical social force in the Niger Delta. The role of the youth has been further reinforced by the rise of oil economy since the mid-1960s, and youth movements have

become more significant in the oil politics of the country. Thus, the youths found themselves representing popular interests in an ethnically minor, marginalized, but oil-rich area, in a context where the people in the area lack access to the oil wealth produced in their land. Politics in the Niger Delta became more radical as a result of repression by the military administration. The youths have themselves been transformed into a social force of local resistance and protests.

Another interesting dimension is the way the youth convulse local power structures constructed around the authority of elders and traditional rulers, which carries interesting implications for the volatility of local politics in the area. Youth movements overturned local politics hitherto exercised by the elders and other people in power who have close connections with oil companies and governments. This has resulted in a tug-of-war between generational social forces and in the escalation of tensions among communities. While the youths have ever recognized the leadership of elders as an established one, they now oppose, challenge, and sometime impose pressures in the form of criticism, disregard, or neglect.

Context of the Youth Movement

When the youth find that their presence in the community is marginalized, and their present status does not offer much in terms of access to resources, they are prone to organize protests and mobilize people for change. It is clear that when the youth fail to secure their position in the community as a result of economic and political transformation, they had no option but to start the struggle for survival. These struggles were supposed to be directed at the expansion of political space and the defense of previous gains that had been eroded by harsh policies adopted by governments.

The youths mobilized themselves in order to protest their marginalization, and resist the erosion of their rights. The structural adjustment program, for example, seriously affected people's daily lives. Not only youths but also their families and relations lost their jobs, while unemployment and social misery worsened. Such conditions provided a social basis for mobilization and organization within the community and for popular movements, by which the youths could struggle for political and economic reforms. At the heart of their struggles was the quest for an alternative hegemony based on peoples' power, in order to guarantee the people's standard of

living.

Not all youth movements favor social change. Indeed, some of them are organized by the government, and depend heavily on its patronage for their relevance. They exist either as youth wings of ruling political parties, or as pressure groups with keen connections to powerful politicians. For example, so-called Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) was established to campaign for the then military head of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha and his self-succession plan as the elected President. Such is an example of how easily the youth are manipulated in general.

In order to understand the roots and evolution of youth movements in the Niger Delta, it is important to analyze its connections to their ethnic identity. After all, it is through the medium of ethnic minority politics that youth movements in the Niger Delta constructed their struggles. With a view to connecting with local people, youth groups had to organize social struggles for changing political and economic relations in their communities.

What is more relevant in this context is the linkage between the youths and ethnic minority politics, which explains the immersion of Niger Delta youth movements into the competitive and conflictive relations between ethnic minorities and majorities over access to political space, power and resources. The youth can be directly connected to the construction of ethnic minority identity as a political instrument for solidarity, empowerment, and the staking of claims. They adopted ethnic identity as a tool for the mobilization of minority groups in the power struggle. They also used it as the basis of negotiation with other ethnic groups either for coalition building or for the formulation of agreements over power and resource sharing.

Strategies of the Youth Movement

The most important strategy of the youth movement has been the youth-driven transformation of such ethnic minority movements in the process of economic and political transitions. The youth faced grim prospects of continued unemployment and neglect from the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta. They insisted that they themselves were the main victims of environmental degradation, having bleak prospects in the region. As a result they confronted the government and oil companies for access to resources, social welfare services and infrastructure, and compensation. In many

instances, the youths either became victims or victimizers. However, within the context of popular movements in the Niger Delta, they sought to resist the further exploitation and pollution of their lands and waters. They also required compensation for the harm already done by oil companies.

In order to achieve their own agenda, youth movements mainstreamed themselves within umbrella organizations. One example is the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) that played a central role in the politics of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). Other examples operated as distinct entities such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) or as human rights organizations such as the Environmental Rights Action (ERA). These groups drew up their demands either in the form of bills of rights, charters, or declarations, which were endorsed on the occasions of mass rallies before being disseminated widely. The movements also operated through mass action, and international campaigns.

It is also important to point out that youth movements had a definite gender-bias, reflected in the violation of gender rights, various acts of violence against women, and the marginalization and suffering of women. Such female youth groups as the Egi Women's Movement, Niger Delta Women for Justice (NDWJ) and the Federation of Ogoni Women Associations (FOWA) have played prominent roles in the mobilization of people in the Niger Delta. They took the lead in providing care to displaced people, together with their local and international campaign against the violation of women's human rights.

The surge of youth activism was also related to the widespread perception that elders in the community have been responsible for the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta. Those elders were believed to collude with oil companies and the central government in depriving their people, which aroused the peoples' anger. Well-educated youth leaders had evolved a radical outlook. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the youths had become a most potent force in the popularization of opposition movements in the Niger Delta, and in raising the effectiveness of the protests and blocking power of minority groups. In pursuit of their political goals, some of them have sought to build popular alliances across ethnic and gender lines in the Niger delta. Indeed, they have transcended the locale of the area to connect global spaces and causes in empowering their claims and grievances.

4. Women's Movements

Historical Development of Women's Movements

It is important to draw attentions to the emergence of women's movements, not only because male power is still dominant in African society, but because these movements embody the female struggle against the exploitation and oppression of women there. In this regard, women come forth as key actors in the process of social struggle. They are not passive victims of a male-dominated society, but active agents of change that have started to confront the social force and structure that has marginalized them. It is therefore possible to locate women movements as often neglected but very important players in advancing social change.⁶

Women's organizations and protest movements can be traced through Nigerian history. They first appeared in the pre-colonial era and expanded during the colonial period, developing remarkably after independence, even under the military rule. A historical turning point in the colonial period was so-called Women's War (or Aba Women's riots) of 1929 in the southeastern part of modern Nigeria. Then, women protested taxation without representation, and the actions of male chiefs who collaborated with the colonial authority. The women attacked government premises and market places and protested against the colonial authority until their demands were met. It is worthy of special mention that Ogoni women also participated in this Women's War of 1929.

Thereafter, other women protests emerged from the 1930s to the 1940s. In the southwestern part of the country, a notable movement called the Egba Women's Protest of 1947 was led by a famous female educationist, Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti. Two female organizations bearing the name of their town, the Abeokuta Women's Union and the Abeokuta Ladies Club, protested against discriminatory colonial laws and policies that threatened women's socio-economic interests. They also forced the traditional ruler, a collaborator with the colonial government, to abdicate his throne in 1949. Women's protests continued even after then. In the post-colonial period, the women's movement expanded its terrain of struggles to include issues of women's emancipation and empowerment.⁷

In the 1980's through 1990's, a new phase of female protests was caused by the harsh socio-economic consequences of the structural adjustment program. At this stage, the women's movement was characterized by three distinct organizational stances. These were namely the conservative (pro-government), the development-oriented and the feminist. The conservative stance is represented by women's groups which sought to improve the position of women in the society without overturning the socio-economic and political status quo. Development-oriented groups such as grassroots development organizations focus on improving the standard of living for their members and communities. They have sharpened their organizational skills in the course of resource mobilization against the harsh consequences of the structural adjustment program. Groups with the feminist stance also seek to change the position of women drastically through a total transformation of basic social relations.⁸

Women's Movements in the Niger Delta

While a lot has been written on popular movements led by men in the Niger Delta, little attention has been paid to women's movements. There was an obvious gender-blindness in the analysis of those social struggles. There have also been very few discussions of the social context of emergent women's activism in such areas as rights, survival and networking. Given the volatility of interests in the Niger Delta, women's struggles can also be described in the context of local politics. Regardless of this fact, women's movements have provided reactions to deepening tensions and social crises, which were also the outcome of worsening exploitation, underdevelopment, and repression in the Niger Delta.

Women in the Niger Delta have organized themselves into a potent social force in seeking survival from the devastation of economic and ecological basis of their lives. Their movements are distinct not only because they laid down motherhood and gender to mobilize fellow women at the grassroots, but also because they have implied their own local cultures to demonstrate their demands, while sharing ideas with international rights groups and global civil society to empower their local claims and protests. It is this strategic way of thinking that has differentiated the post-adjustment women's movements from the earlier ones of the colonial period.

It is even possible to discern a certain level of cross-gender collaboration and mutual support. There has been evident support from and collaborations with the youth groups. Indeed, it seems that the combination of women's and youth power has been the most potent force behind opposition struggles in the Niger Delta. This combination proved most important for the youth group that insisted on compensations for the damages to their lives, given that women have been the greatest victims of the contradictions emanating from oil production.

Women's movements seem to have been less visible than the broad popular movements even in the 1990s. Indeed they were organized within the context of wider social struggles. Apart from providing a balanced gender basis for struggles and social movements in the Niger Delta, women's movements played their roles both in front of and behind the lines. Among all, women have played prominent roles as victims and resisters of victimization. Apart from being victims of violence, environmental degradation, poverty and oil politics, they have risen above victimization to mobilize local populations to struggle for their own rights.

Women in the Niger Delta have been confronted mainly by the power of government, acting through security forces that have routinely subjected female protesters to intimidation, harassment and brutal forms of physical abuse. They have also been excluded and discriminated from the oil companies that expropriated their lands and destroyed their environment as a result of their oil production. In resisting powers of the government and the oil companies, women's movements have successfully networked with other rights groups in the area and within Nigeria, as well as with donor organizations around the world. At the local level, women's protests have taken the form of songs, dance and the use of the threat of nakedness – believed to be a taboo or curse, to strengthen their cause and political agency.

A couple of major women's groups in the Niger Delta are worthy of introduction. They are the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA), an affiliate organization of MOSOP, and the Niger Delta Women for Justice (NDWJ). Both groups have always remained in the front of struggles for women's rights in the area by drawing on local and international support. It might be useful to understand the role of these groups in social struggles, the challenges they face, and their prospects in the Niger Delta.

Women and the Environment

In order to properly locate women in the Niger Delta, the social context is defined more by resource insecurity for the majority of population. It seems important to examine the linkage between women and the environment. A study of gender and the environment should examine gender relations as a set of power relations operating at the levels of household, economy/society, and its links with the outside world.

Even though local people, including women, are a part of the environment, they exploit the environment in the course of production, either as a source of raw materials or for the discharge of waste. In the same manner, the environment is a source for subsistence needs, livelihoods, habitats, and the daily reproduction of life. Thus, in the course of the daily renewal of their lives, people exercise power over their environment. Yet, there is another sense in which the social and the environmental contexts interact and sometimes merge, having to do with how issues of access, ownership and power over the environment are socially organized. It is in this way that gender as a social construction tends to marginalize women in terms of access to environmental resources even though they tend to carry a greater burden in terms of more difficult labor, household and reproductive roles for little or next to no reward.

The oil companies, their local partners and the government have damaged the environment, deepened resource scarcities, and denied basic rights to the local people. They have also deployed violence as a modality of defending their monopoly of resources, in their bid to crush women's protests and resistance, illustrating the mult-layered suffering of women, first in terms of resource insecurity and denial of subsistence rights, and then as victims of violence. This situation best captures the state of women in the Niger Delta, who for decades have been on the receiving end of exploitation, environmental insecurity, and violence from the oil companies-government alliance. This condition also explains the context of the emergence of women's movements in the Niger Delta as one framed by the logic of liberation and resistance.

Women and the Oil Economy

Since oil became a source of power in Nigeria, its social relations of production have tended to alienate local people in the Niger Delta. For example, Shell (Nigeria's largest on-shore oil producer which had operated in the region for over fifty years) required neither local labor nor local ecological propriety. In this context, it is the politics that define women as victims. The alienation of local people, the expropriation of their lands and the destruction of their environment by the oil industry have further fueled oil politics and local resistance. Change for the better requires a form of collective action against further alienation, expropriation and environmental degradation, and forcing through a mass action of restitution and self-determination. By its very nature the local protest is a social movement shaped and influenced by the host community.

The interaction between oil companies and the local oil-rich environment breeds a host of contradictions which reflect a geography of power that enriches the global and impoverishes the local, thus feeding into local resistance, through which the local blocks global extraction until it attends to demands for restitution, justice and equity. In the case of Nigeria, the politics of local resistance in the prolific oil region of the Niger Delta targeted Shell first of all, the oldest operator in the area. In its well-known campaign, MOSOP took on Shell and successfully brought global attention to focus on the Ogoni and the Niger Delta. In 1993 MOSOP was able to block Shell operations in Ogoniland, and the company has yet to return there. More recently, women's groups have targeted Chevron-Texaco as the politics of local resistance in the Niger Delta continues in its bid for restitution and respect for the rights of the people of the oil producing communities, who are ironically being impoverished as hosts of one of the world's most powerful and wealthiest industries.

The oil is so important to the Nigerian economy because the economy's oil exports account for over 90 % of the country's foreign exchange earnings and over 80% of all the revenue of the central government; the Nigerian economy is wholly dependent on oil, which is therefore inextricably bound to governmental power. In a context where oil production is dominated by foreign companies, the Nigerian government is hard pressed to promote oil production as a way of increasing its own power and the continued access of the politicians to providential oil wealth. In the power relations spawned by oil politics, women are subject to relations of exclusion and domination, which are also reflected in the environment of the Niger Delta.

At this point, it would be apposite to draw attention to the linkage of women to the oil economy. Women are alienated from the social relations of oil production. The acquisition (or expropriation) of land by oil companies and the attendant environmental degradation hits women the hardest. In the fields of farming, fishery and trading, the expansion of the oil industry with its monopolistic approach provides no economic space for women, who already suffer from oppression in male-dominated society. Moreover the politics of oil with its pervasive commoditization of the oil-rich ecology also excludes local women from its labor needs. Such marginalized women are forced into acts of desperation, either to fight back, or in varying degrees to insert themselves into the fringe economies around oil locations, petty trading, contract labor, and closeted or open prostitution with all its own attendant risks.

The politics of oil often implies the subordination of local people in the way it subordinates the so-called oil economy. Thus, when the people protest or seek to interrupt oil production in order to call attention to their demands, Nigeria as an oil economy reacts with a “carrot and stick” policy. While the “carrot” goes to local collaborators, politicians and authorities, in most cases, the “stick”, usually coercive power through the deployment of armed forces, is wielded against local people. In this case again women become the main victim of violence sponsored by the oil company and the government.

The bulk of pressure falls back on resident women. Women in the Niger Delta in particular have suffered with adverse effects of environmental degradation, and they have been forced to bear the burden much more than men. For instance, these women search for firewood in an ecologically degraded environment. They search for potable water in a situation where pollution has rendered communal ponds and stream water undrinkable. The risk of ill health is also borne disproportionately by women, especially when there is an outbreak of an epidemic due to environmental pollution.

There are other notable consequences of the oil industry, such as the expropriation of farmlands, which leaves women with less or no lands to farm. However, the forceful aspects of the nexus of women’s victimization and oil can be gleaned from the violence they have suffered in the Niger Delta. The international coordinator of the NDWJ casts in sharp relief the acts of violence committed against women by the security forces of Nigerian government, which consisted of sexual violence such as rape and prostitution,

physical violence such as beatings, maiming and murder, and violence against women's property.

What is important at this point is to locate violent actions against women within the infrastructure of force that backs the Nigerian oil economy. The government intends to maintain the oil industry by breaking the will of the people to organize protests or seek to block oil production. Violent actions, even in the case of violence sponsored by the oil companies and the government, often take the form of men in uniforms punishing women for engaging in the politics of local resistance. Clearly in such circumstances of gendered violence, women suffer the most.

From the foregoing, the relationship between women and the political economy of oil becomes one in which the power relations subordinate women and victimize them. However it must be noted that such "victimization" is not synonymous with surrender or defeat, as it is dialectically transformed into an agency by which women organize and protest the inequities of oil companies whose activities directly deepen resource scarcities and threaten the ecological basis of the survival of local women (and men).

5. Summary and Tentative Conclusions

The youth and women have been recognized as critical social forces in post-adjustment Nigeria. Democratization in the political arena of Nigerian society has accelerated their (re-)emergence as active stakeholders in the social struggle. As shown in the case of the Niger Delta, the youth and women appeared to initiate opposition against the government and oil companies. They demanded a fair share of resources and performed in their respective manners. Both the youth and women seemed to approach the issue from the same direction. Their common objective was to secure enough of the resources with which their living spaces were endowed.

Youth movements in the Niger Delta are described within the context of community dynamics. Historical review of Nigerian youth movements shows similarities and differences between movements in the independence era and those in the 1990s. Experiences in the Niger Delta suggest that present youth movements have a strong inclination to control resources on the community level. The youth can also expect benefits on national level through, for example, political representation, but such

a political maneuver is out of their scope. Rather it may increase the risk of manipulation by the politicians closely connected to the government. Out of strategic considerations, the youth tend to skip national benefits and to access international ones utilizing their organizational networks.

Women's movements are described differently from the conflict-tone movements of the youth in this paper. Both women and the youth have kept common goals in their movements, but women's movements were developed mainly outside the community, supported by nation-wide women's organizations. On the local level, most women's actions were limited to formal protests and symbolic performances. Women did take actions peacefully in the Niger Delta. As a result, women's movements were comparatively invisible to the eye of the outsider. Accordingly they have seldom attracted international attention as radical movements of the youth did in the 1990s. The scene changed after 1999, when the political transition to civil rule was completed. New organizations emerged on the community level and demonstrated their opposition and demands in the form of direct action. Now the women's movement has become one of main actors in the oil politics of the Niger Delta.

Finally two questions raised earlier in the paper shall tentatively be answered here. The resource allocation mechanisms on the community level were not functioning as well as possible so far, under the authority of elders and traditional rulers. The youth and women are openly challenging such a traditional system. Their movements require alternative social mechanisms for mitigating their insecurities. However, their approaches also contradict one another between community and national levels. Behaviors of the same people are often different on two different levels.

Methods of conflict resolution which are successful on the community level are not necessarily applicable to disputes and conflicts on the national level. It is expected that the application of customary settlement mechanisms to conflicts will result in more community involvement, and thereby contribute to eradicating root causes of dispute. This mechanism works on the assumption that traditional rulers and elders can sustain rule and order of the community.⁹ However, their authority has been challenged by the local population as the youth movement has shown itself more vividly. As the existing power structure's capacity for resource mobilization shrank, its role in conflict management also diminished.

On the other hand, expectations for intervention from a third party and the international community have been increasing. These actors are expected to build bridges between the people concerned and to fill up the resource gap, especially in the post-conflict phase. In Nigeria, for example, NGOs are making reconciliation efforts such as dialogues, mutual understandings, and the promotion of peace education among conflict-tone communities.¹⁰ Many of these groups are receiving financial supports from foreign donors and introducing know-how from foreign counterparts. Local stakeholders become fully understanding of the meaning and the merits of foreign interventions. Such a human-centric approach allows more room for development amidst and resolution of community conflicts.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The authority of elders and traditional rulers is challenged even in the community.

Resource allocation mechanisms on the community level had functioned under the authority of elders and traditional rulers. This mechanism is based on the assumption that the ruling people of the community could supply enough resources for the local population. However, the resource base has been shrinking since the introduction of the economic structural adjustment. Local populations, especially the youth and women, are not satisfied with such a traditional system and are openly challenging it. They require alternative socio-economic mechanisms for mitigating their insecurities.

An alternative mechanism for conflict resolution shall be sought out and recommended in multi-ethnic societies.

Conflict resolution methods successful on the community level have primarily depended on the authority and leadership of elders and traditional rulers. The application of customary settlement mechanisms to conflicts is still effective within a community, as far as those ruling people can sustain rule and order. In a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria, however, there are increased community clashes and ethnic conflicts for which effective resolution mechanism has never sought. Other than

conventional interventionist measures of state power, new ideas, such as a search for human security at the individual, group and community levels, shall be introduced in the context of peace-building.

Roles of the third party and the international community have been increasing in the peace-making and peace-building process.

With a top-down approach, if the ruling people are getting the absolute respect in conflicted communities, eminent personalities with public profiles could be invited to work effectively as peace-makers or peace-builders. On the other hand, there are alternate approaches for the local population, conceived to produce and sustain a cease-fire and peace agreements with follow-up mechanisms, such as a problem-solving workshop, conflict-management training and establishment of peace committees. In both approaches, individuals and agencies from the third party can play an effective role. The international community is the most suitable source for those human resources, since such people can secure neutrality and respect from the local population in the conflicted communities.

Notes

¹ See Chapter 1 of this Report.

² See Attahiru Jega (ed.), *Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria* (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2000).

³ See Ike Okonta, & Orono Douglas, *Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil* (London: Verso, 2003).

⁴ Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (The International Africa Institute, 1999), p. 33.

⁵ Conteh-Morgan 1999: 57

⁶ See Jane L. Parpart and Kathlee A. Standt (eds.), *Women and the State in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989).

⁷ See Nina E. Mba, *Nigerian Women Mobilized: Women's Political Activities in Southern Nigeria 1900-1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

⁸ Hussaina Abdullah, "Women as Emergent Actors in Nigeria's Political Economy: The Nigerian Women's Movement: Responses to Adjustment and Democratization" in Katsuya Mochizuki (ed.), *Emergent Actors in African Political Economy*, Africa Research Series No.9 (Institute of Developing Economies, 2003), p. 23.

⁹ See Olufemi Vaughan, *Nigerian Chiefs: Traditional Power in Modern Politics, 1890s-1990* (Rochester: The University of Rochester Press, 2000).

¹⁰ See Onigu Otite and Isaac Olawale Albert, *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1999).

Chapter 11

Peace-building and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective

Earl Conteh-Morgan

1. Introduction

This late-Westphalian/accelerated globalization era is characterized by two simultaneous trends: global political and economic integration processes and national/local disintegration with serious ontological and existential insecurity implications. Accordingly, the international relations of the new millennium is impelling many analysts to broaden their conception of security to include issues of human security broadly defined. Societal disruptions in the form of civil wars produce dissatisfaction and multilevel (individual, group, communal, and national) insecurity that have profound implications for conflict management/peace-building efforts in war-torn regions. The many conflict management/peace-building operation and democracy promotion efforts since the end of the Cold War have spawned many academic works on the subject.¹ While these studies have underscored the strengths and weaknesses of particular efforts, relatively little attention has been devoted to the implications of the interactive relationship between peace-building and human security. In other words, what are the prospects for effective peace-building in post-war societies beset by (in) security problems? What paradigmatic shifts in the theory and practice of international relations, for example, underlie the relationship between peace-building activities and human security? In what ways do these paradigm shifts/interactions shape the conduct of peace-building and affect dominant attitudes towards human security concerns?

Current peace-building efforts whether in Africa, Asia, or Europe are largely

characterized by a language of power, exclusion, or defense of an international order that does not adequately address issues of emancipation and inappropriate impositions. In most cases of peace-building (reconstruction efforts after conflict termination) it is the integrity of the state that is often given security.² Insecurity is, in other words, synonymous with an attack on the integrity of the state. As a result of this unidimensional, state-centric view of security, many states confronted with civil strife have been unable to resolve their difficulties. Besides, many peace-building efforts undermine the emphasis on human security because people are viewed as the “means” to political stability as opposed to being the “end” of all peace-building efforts. People are also viewed as the means to a stable state conducive to the infiltration of globalization trends. The objective of this chapter is to utilize a constructivist approach to human security and peace-building in order to better understand current peace-building efforts in war-torn countries. In other words, how relevant is a constructivist approach to a better understanding of human security concerns and peace-building efforts in post-war societies?

2. Human Security, Peace-building, and Constructivism: Conceptual, Relational, and Theoretical Clarification.

An analysis of the relationship between peace-building and human security should begin from a broad conceptualization of human security that takes into consideration the individual situated in broader social structures. Such a conceptualization should include:

(1) Individual sources of human insecurity - harmful actions directed against people or property with visible and immediate consequences. They include banditry, lootings, and intercommunal strife, among others. The worst affected are women, children, and the elderly.

(2) Institutional sources of human insecurity - harmful actions and neglect of institutions that undermine human rights and human security. These include, among others, the collapse of welfare systems, the politicization and neglect of the military, the unprofessionalism and paramilitary and police forces that were once an integral part of the neopatrimonial system. The specific examples are reduced wages, layoffs or a freeze on hiring, and workers (even soldiers) going for months without pay. Medical

institutions such as hospitals without drugs and facilities, dilapidated schools and teachers with low morale, and increasingly corrupt civil servants are some of the effects of the neglect of institutions.

(3) Structural and cultural sources of human insecurity harmful actions and results linked to the new modes of thinking and cognition in society at large, including international society. This results from the decline of the old social security/neopatrimonial systems and the ascendance of a neo-liberal morality that is more suitable to the societies of the advanced industrial states. The consequence is that tensions heighten between groups within a country, along with an increase in cross-border crimes and violence. Fresh outbreak of old diseases, lowering of life expectancy, and an increase in infant framework mortality, among others, also abound.

Sources of Human Insecurity: A Conceptual Model

<u>PERSONAL SOURCES</u> banditry, looting, rioting, hate crimes...
└
<u>INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES</u> Oppression, corruption, torture, paramilitary brutality, state repression...
└
<u>SOCIAL STRUCTURAL/CULTURAL SOURCES</u> poverty, hunger, avoidable inequalities, unemployment

In order to guarantee human security at the personal, institutional, and structural-cultural levels, power relations and relations of power should be underscored within a socio-cultural context. In other words, questions like the following, among many others, should be thoroughly analyzed:

- (1) What is the underlying structure of privilege to the formation and conduct of domestic politics?
- (2) How is daily life affected by the historical constructions of gender, class and culture, and their impact on individuals, institutions, and structures?
- (3) What effect do the construction and reproduction of exploitative class/power elite identities have on the theory and practice of peace-building and human security?

In other words, emancipation or sustainable peace-building occurs when one understands the true nature of things - class, gender, ethnic equality, etc. A great deal of

peace-building deals with issues of security within a positivist-rational epistemology.³ Cultural and identity, ideas, knowledge, and structures within an interpretive “bottom-up” approach to peace-building are crucial for understanding human security of marginalized individuals, groups, and communities. Human security is therefore a situation/condition free of injury/threats to an individual’s group’s, or community’s well-being, including freedom from threats and/or direct attacks on physical and psychological integrity. To ensure such security involves the understanding of, or elimination of human security located at the structural, institutional, and personal (individual) levels of society. It involves an attempt to understand human security/insecurity in terms of those who experience them. What motivates the dissatisfied to agitate and their beliefs as marginalized individuals should be seriously taken into account, instead of merely imposing on them.

Peace-building with a view to alleviating human insecurity involves transforming the social and political environment that fosters intolerable inequality, engenders historical grievances, and nurtures adversarial interactions. This may mean the development of social, political, and economic infrastructures that produce tolerable inequality and/or prevent future violence. The focus is on dismantling structures that contribute to conflict - in particular, moving beyond short-term functions of maintaining a ceasefire, demobilization and disarmament, and monitoring competitive elections among former adversaries.

While peacekeeping/peace-building efforts generally operate on the assumptions of neorealist or neoliberal approaches to world order that underscore material power as the principal source of authority, influence, and struggle for dominance, social constructivism would emphasize both material and discursive (communicative: ideas, norms, knowledge, or culture) power as avenues for a better understanding of wars and peace-building. In particular, constructivists would argue that violent political behavior and thereby its resolution and future prevention could be explained and even understood by focusing on the role of norms and ideas as determinants of such behavior. Constructivism focuses on what John Searle has called ‘social facts’ - things like sovereignty, rights, or money, which have no material reality, but are vested with importance and reality by people who act accordingly towards them.⁴ The intersubjective (collectively held) transmission of ideas and beliefs as opposed to

material factors is the primary source of interaction among humans. Collective intentionality can “will” the rules of behavior, interactions, or the game of change within and among nations.⁵ Examples would be the end of slavery or colonialism, or the ongoing changes in state sovereignty, humanitarian interventions, or the creation of global human rights through collective intentionality.

Many conflicts and disputes in the world, their intensity, and the level of participation in them by groups or states could be explained in terms of how the identities, ideas, and goals of the actors are affected. The socially constructed understanding and perceptions or interpretations of such actors shape the way in which conflict and/or cooperation unfold. For instance, it could be argued that rebels whether in Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, or Colombia, their understandings of who they are, as well as what they consider legitimate and want to achieve, had their origins in their social environment - an environment perhaps characterized by injustice, inequality, and oppression. In other words, the social relationships (exploitation, corruption, and the like) in which actors (states, groups, individuals) find themselves determine how they interpret events and others' actions, define interests, and how they pursue goals - whether peacefully or through the use of violence.

There is not doubt that changes in norms, values, and beliefs in the recent post-Cold War past have ended some violent systems in the world, such as apartheid in South Africa, oppressive communist control in Eastern and Central Europe, and the blatant dictatorial behavior of leaders in many developing states of the world. The positive outcome of all these normative developments is the spread of a more comprehensive peacekeeping and peace-building agenda, as well as the spread of a culture of human rights and democracy.⁶ The questions that social constructivists will continue to grapple with include: When do norms change? What causes them to change? Is it when they are too costly to sustain that they change? How do actors accept the new norms? Do actors persuade or coerce others to accept new norms?

Constructivism as an approach is a useful theoretical lens in understanding the true nature of things such as collective violence, class, gender, and racial issues, among others. Within these units emancipation (security) occurs when the accurate picture (view) of things is understood. When agents (individuals, groups, or nations) and events are contextualized in a normative and material structure it becomes easier to understand

and even evaluate the resulting political action (cooperation or conflict). For example, rebellious behavior may be better understood in the context of a corrupt, insensitive, oppressive, and patrimonial behavior of inept power elite in a situation of resource scarcity and economic deprivation. The goal is to examine human behavior (cooperative or conflictual) in an effort to understand it. A violent event can only take on meaning if it is considered in relation to other meaningful events. That meaning can be found in structures. In this sense constructivism emphasizes *understanding* and not necessarily *explanation*. Understanding implies a profound and complex appreciation of the phenomenon.⁷ For example, in order to understand group rebellion, one must get a sense of the rebels' worldview, their motivation within a normative-material social structure. Similarly, in order to achieve sustained peace and human security following a brutal civil war, peace-builders must delve into the normative, ideational, and intersubjective beliefs that constructed the interests and identities of key actors during the civil war.

Constructivists operate on the ontological assumption that actors are shaped by the socio-cultural milieu in which they live. Accordingly, an obvious research question is to determine how this shaping occurs and with what results. Whereas materialist theories such as realism, liberalism, or Marxism take interests and identities for granted, constructivists are preoccupied with their origin and change. Constructivists try to go beyond description to an understanding of constitution of things in order to explain how they behave and what causes political outcomes.⁸ For instance, an understanding of how issues such as sovereignty, human rights, laws of war, peacekeeping/peace-building, or bureaucracies are constituted socially allows for hypothesizing about their effects in both international relations and internal politics. An obvious task for constructivist empirical research related to peace-building is to establish that norms and the social structures are critical to the realization of human security. Various social structures could demonstrate how individual and group interests, self-understandings, and behavior relate to demobilization, identity politics, or post-war reconciliation activities. Constructivists have produced empirical studies showing how "global culture" shaped national policies, especially the policies of developing nations in many different policy arenas.

Constructivism is not only limited to the influence of norms and social

understandings on different actors (individuals, groups, and states), it also investigates why they (norms and intersubjective beliefs) often had different influences on different actors (agents).⁹ A crucial research task will be to try and understand the political effects of global social structures on domestic politics. For example, how do global norms related to peacekeeping/peace-building influence domestic politics? In human rights, studies have shown how regime type, civil war, and the presence of domestic human rights affect the degree to which states will comply with international human rights norms.

Many constructivist studies have emphasized the ways in which ideas and norms become more powerful in their effect than conventional conceptions of strong state interests. More powerful state and corporate business interests are often undermined by norms related to human rights, preferences of the weak and environmental norms, among others. However, critical constructivist scholarship by Giddens, Habermas, or Foucault is more skeptical about this autonomy of ideas from power.¹⁰ For them, constructions of reality reflect, enact, or reify power relations. It is certain powerful groups that play a primary role in the process of social construction. In other words, ideas play a weaker autonomous role because they are viewed as more directly linked to relations of material power. In the arena of peace-building, the role of analysis will be to determine whether efforts related to demobilization, reintegration, reconciliation, and overall post-war construction perpetuate these ideational structures of domination. Will the relations of material power change to the point of ensuring individual, group, and societal security?

The transmission of ideas/norms in this era of globalization is done through transnational civil society. A good example is in the areas of environmentalism, and human rights. An increasingly transnational civil society is also emerging in the areas of poverty, hunger, and disease.¹¹ All of these issues are tightly linked with human security broadly defined. The powerful pressure from both transnational and local NGOs has no doubt contributed to the changes in the areas of conflict mediation ranging now from preventive diplomacy/peacemaking to peace enforcement and peace-building.

While most of the above analysis underscores the actor/agent role in social construction, some constructivists explore the structural side of this process by examining in more detail the ways in which contradictions and complementarities in

social structure produce opportunities for actors. For example, Burkavansky's work shows how the European Enlightenment as an international political culture produced a pattern of contradictions and complementarities that led to the success of some kinds of political legitimacy claims and not others.¹² Similarly Reuss-Smit has explored the ways in which the structure of different "fundamental institutions" in international society shape the kinds of policies that are possible.¹³

In constructivism in general, ideas are tightly linked to political change. Instead of simply assuming that new ideas are imposed by those with political, economic, and military power, it is rather argued that a process of learning is involved, especially in situations characterized by complexity, failure, anomaly, and new information. The process revolves around three main questions: (a) how do new ideas emerge and rise to prominence?; (b) how do ideas become institutionalized and take on a life of their own?; (c) how, why, and when do ideas matter in any particular circumstance?¹⁴ The learning process in terms of peace-building assumes that individuals, groups, and society in general process new information in order to create a better environment for themselves. New ideas emerge and are embraced by an entire nation because the old order has experienced policy failures, shocks, or crises. Peace-building in this regard could be seen as the process of introducing new ideas as a search for security at the individual, group, community, and national levels following the traumatic effects of a civil war.

3. Peace-building as Society-Building

The recent (2001) end to Sierra Leone's civil conflict has been accompanied by an augmentation of peace-building efforts conducted by a variety of state and non-state actors. What happened in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Angola, among others, had a psychological element to it. The crisis or trauma associated with intense relative deprivation was tantamount to severe repression which escalated into rebellion against authority, age-old traditional attitudes, and professionalism. The consequence in Sierra Leone in particular was blatant disregard for communal values such that individuals and groups were forced to take violent action against people or organizations believed to be agents of insecurity.¹⁵ The task of peace-building should,

first and foremost, be to eliminate the mind set that compelled people to distrust and question their socio-political and psychological environment. The emphasis should be on combating the structural and cultural sources of insecurity - harmful actions and results linked to new modes of thinking and cognition on society at large. This means engaging in resocialization in order to strengthen commonly held traditional ideas and understanding of political and social life.

Both material and ideational (norms, values, mores, etc.) factors are deeply interconnected. However, where peace-building efforts overemphasize the political (with its power centered focus) at the expense of normative integrity of individuals, groups, and communities, they may not flourish in war-torn countries in need of holistic security. Since the widely shared intersubjective beliefs (especially deep-seated psychological/moral values) in a war-torn country are often destroyed by violence and intercommunal bloodletting, the purpose of reintegration and rehabilitation should be, for instance, to reemphasize collectively held ideas of mutual support and sharing, the centrality of the extended family, respect for elders, recognition of customs and taboos, among others, especially in developing societies with a large traditional/rural sector like Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Angola.¹⁶

Judging from the many challenges peace-building efforts face in post-conflict societies in the world, it can be said that traditional conceptions of peace-building have to be reconsidered/complemented if a self-sustaining peace is to become a reality in a country like Sierra Leone. There is, in other words, a need for new concepts and practices that can advance the ideals of a positive peace. For Sierra Leone, self-sustaining peace means not just the cessation of hostilities, which has already been achieved, but the strengthening and reassertion of normative structures that enable individuals in postwar settlement situations to share common identities, understandings, and expectations that enhance a social order that eliminates exploitation, corruption, and all forms of existential insecurity. Traditional conceptions of peace-building merely promote negative peace by emphasizing state security/state building mechanisms. Examples, however, show that this approach does not translate into a self-sustaining peace in places like Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Liberia.

A study by the World Bank concluded that the international system has consistently failed to reconstruct the “social fabric” of war-torn societies.¹⁷ The reason

behind this neglect is the assumption that politico-economic reconstruction defined as strengthening of the state and introduction of market economics can automatically foster sustainable peace that goes far beyond the end of hostilities. Issues of cultural integrity and identity, interethnic dialogue, social empowerment, and collective intentionality are all necessary conditions for the attainment of human security.

To a large extent reconciliatory mechanisms are the domain of ideas, norms, and identities. A substantial literature in social psychology has demonstrated that perceptions have a great deal of influence on human behavior.¹⁸ For instance in Sierra Leone and other post-conflict societies, the effort toward political reintegration and social rehabilitation could be hampered by strong feelings of hatred, mistrust and fear among groups in society. In discussions with ordinary Sierra Leoneans, for example, it is easy to see the high level of contempt for people in uniform, especially soldiers because of their connivance with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel group notorious for amputating the limbs of ordinary people during the civil war.¹⁹ There is still a high level of mistrust among ordinary people, police, soldiers, ex-civil defense force members, and government officials. Because of the prevailing high levels of social distance in many post-conflict societies, a key objective of peace-building is to foster a dimension of human security that nurtures a culture based on tolerance, cooperation, and empathy. It involves a deliberate effort to deconstruct the negative images of the “other” that prevailed during the years of conflict.

Often the pervasive violence of the civil war years does not totally destroy the discourses, ideas, and institutions communities shared and collectively upheld during the years of peace. These are usually “social facts” such as legitimacy, rights, fraternal relations, and others, which serve as the bedrock of national reconciliation. The problem with state-centered peace-building is that it is often characterized by internationally-backed mechanisms, structures, and ideas that lack indigenous legitimacy since they are not a product of internal intersubjective understandings and/or agreements. They do not encourage post-war communities to critically reflect on their own socio-political and economic condition, so they can determine what mechanisms of social change are best suited for their society.

In war-torn societies like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, and so on, the war years are synonymous to a violent imposition on society and culture. Such

imposition curtailed the power and opportunity of the weak (women to a large extent, the old, children, and non-combatants) to shape and control liberties and duties within society. Thus, whatever collectively held, norms, rights, or cultural that existed prior to the war were disrupted, undermined, outlawed, and/or marginalized by the coercive environment of the war. In largely traditional settings (e.g. village level) even the web of kinship that provided the frameworks within which individuals and groups exercised their economic, political and social liberties and duties were jolted, undermined, or stifled. An effective peace-building and human security agenda ought therefore to reactivate and reaffirm the right to life, education, freedom of movement, to receive justice, to work, and participate in the benefits and decision-making of the community.²⁰ These rights which were pervasive in pre-Westphalian traditional societies existed within collective contexts.

Often, for example, in the case of African states there is an inherent tension between external impositions (e.g., neoliberal internationalism) and communal African lifestyles. Thus an African model of human security, especially with regards to human rights broadly defined, may be more relevant for sustainable peace-building and human security. Josiah Cobbah in his critique of the Western rights tradition captures the relevance of the African model of human rights to peace, stability and security. He emphasizes communalism, duties, and hierarchy:

Within the organization of African social life one can discern various organizing principles. As a people, Africans emphasize groupings, sameness, and commonality. Rather than the survival of the fittest and control over nature, the African worldview is tempered with the general guiding principle of the survival of the entire community and a sense of cooperation, interdependence, and collective responsibility.... Although African society is communal, it is [also] hierarchical.²¹

Since universal human rights emphasize a Lockean abstraction of natural rights, certain groups (women, minorities in general) have not fared well because Western rights tradition assumes an abstract equality of all individuals and downplays the reality of discrimination based on group identity which undermines individual, group, and human

security in general. In especially a non-Western post-conflict society, the relevance of culture is significant for protecting the rights of the less powerful.

Where peace-building is based on external impositions aimed at merely securing the late Westphalian state and other elements of neoliberal internationalism, the moment the foreign actors (UN, external NGOs, etc.) withdraw, people who did not interact mutually with regards to political and economic reconstruction, or collectively define their postwar relationships will have to confront key issues. One issue might be what right did groups made dominant by external favor had to retain their position. An equally important issue might be what claim does the postwar state have to the obedience that had recently been demanded by the external peace-builders. The character and success of peace-building and human security will depend to a large extent on how effectively these major issues would be resolved. Some of the consequences have been or are seen, in recurrence of civil wars and other types of political violence: coups, riots, or even genocides.

4. The Constitutive Force of Traditional Culture in Peace-building

Traditional indigenous societies by their very nature tend to be communal, collective, and more prone to foster an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence. The application of traditional customs and values in reconciliation efforts may result in a more communal grassroots involvement and thereby contribute substantially to eradication of the root causes of the conflict and to holistic reconciliation. Within this context, culture is viewed as the primary explanation of change, it is by nature intersubjective, and has real constitutive force. For instance, Josiah Osamba in his analysis of violence, warfare, insecurity, and reconciliation among pastoral groups in Eastern Africa, underscored the effectiveness of indigenous communal methods of peace-building.²² He maintains that the use of security forces and other extra-judicial methods of maintaining peace have failed. What is more likely to be effective is the adoption of norms and values based on those indigenous cultures. According to Osamba, the current climate of repeated violence in the borderlands of Eastern Africa, among pastoralists, is due to “the marginalisation of the African indigenous practices of conflict principles and norms.”²³ Such communities include the Turkana, the Pokot, the Samburu, the Somali, and the

Boran of Kenya. The Topasa and the Merille of Ethiopia and Sudan, and the Karamojong of Uganda are the others.

Among these Eastern African groups in particular, culture is hegemonic and thereby constitute the foundation of reconciliation efforts following violence and warfare. In other words, in such societies, cultural values are of primary importance to most members of the community. According to Burton, indigenous societies are more inclined to utilize rituals that foster collective “healing” than methods that emphasized confrontation and zero-sum/power bargaining which have become common in many peace-building activities.²⁴ Traditional cultures are often characterized by methods embedded in ethnic wisdom for effectively resolving conflicts. However, the influence of westernization and external impositions may lead to their demise.

In indigenous cultures conflicts are viewed as a collective/communal concern/responsibility. Both the conflict and its context are viewed as a communal issue. In the Western approach more emphasis is placed on personal and individual levels of ownership. In most cases it becomes a zero-sum situation.

A community-based grassroots peace-building approach is based on the argument that since war involves most of the masses (grassroots people) or rank and file as either active participants or victims, it only makes sense to involve this large segment of the society in the process of peace-building and fostering human security. A communal approach to peace-building translates into building peace from below. Among many African societies, symbols and rituals are key to an effective and permanent peace-building/reconciliation process.

A traditional/communal approach to peace-building is based on the premise that sustained peace and order in society results from the moral authority exerted by the communal group over its members. In pastoral communities peace-building takes the form of elders from two neighboring clans playing an important part in defusing tensions and conflicts, which usually revolve around the control of grazing land or water.²⁵ The wisdom and experience of the elders is manifested in clear and well-articulated procedures for conflict resolution in which all the parties to the conflict are given the chance to express their views. On the other hand, the elders were vested with cultural authority to act as arbiters and even give judgment on the rights and wrongs of a dispute submitted to them for resolution and then suggest a settlement,

although they may have no power of physical coercion by which to enforce them. But often the pressures of culture guarantee obedience.

The peace-building/reconciliation process in a communal/traditional post-conflict setting is often viewed as an opportunity to re-affirm and re-establish relationships not just between former protagonists but between all the people as well as with their God and spirits. According to Kiplagat: “There is a holistic approach to the process, working with the community as a whole, invoking spiritual forces to be present and accompany the community towards peace.”²⁶ Consensus is a key objective in negotiations, and the responsibility of the elders is to steer the negotiations towards that end. Reconciliation becomes the major preoccupation. Treaties or agreements concluded during negotiations are considered binding and sacred and are therefore entered into with solemnity. Members of the community believed that any violation of the oaths would incur the wrath of the supernatural against the culprit.

The convening of a traditional peace conference is normal, for example, among the Turkana following any serious conflict. The main purpose of such a conference is to restore broken relationships and strengthen the process of social healing.²⁷ Such a meeting is meant to be therapeutic in the sense that all participants are given unlimited time to vent their feelings. The meeting is also punctuated by singing, story-telling, dancing, proverbs, and the like such that the atmosphere takes on a form of a “celebration.” God’s name and the spirits would be invoked, and animal sacrifice performed. The slaughter of an animal and the sprinkling of its blood into the air is a way of getting the community to ratify the peace covenant. The entire community would then feast on the meat, followed by singing and dancing. The celebration would continue for several days.

In peace-building/reconciliation processes between the Luo and Maasai, the elders play a key role as conveners of a peace conference with women, youth, and children playing an active role. The two groups would then strengthen their blood brotherhood by performing a number of rituals, such as: (1) getting mothers to exchange babies with the “enemy” group and suckle them; (2) warriors exchanging spears; (3) prayers offered by the elders; and (4) a profound curse being pronounced on anyone who attempted any further cross-border violence. These rituals among others would make it almost impossible for the two sides to fight again.²⁸ The presence of the entire community

meant that the process of reconciliation was one of total communal involvement. William Ury underscored this process when he wrote:

Emotional wounds and injured relationships are healed within the context of the emotional unity of the community. Opposed interests are resolved within the context of the community interest in peace. Quarrels over rights are sorted out within the context of overall community power.²⁹

On moral issues, the elders are viewed as embodying the norms and values of the society. Since they are preoccupied with societal stability and cordial relationships, elders make sure that any settlement is based on consensus underlined by commonly accepted principles of justice based on custom, virtue and fairness. The main objective is to go beyond the mere satisfaction of justice, but to ensure longterm sustainable peace.

The culturally-based process of conflict resolution and reconciliation in the borderlands of Eastern Africa bear a strong resemblance to peace-building efforts in Mozambique. In the latter case peace-building has often involved rights activists, men who had fought in the civil war, and a traditional healer. The objective was for communities to embark on reintegrating community members back into society after the traumas of violence. The transition from violence to reconciliation is underscored by traditional ceremonies, thanksgiving services of special mass. In one account by Helena Cobban she notes that:

Jorge Moine, the healer, explained that when a community member returns from war, his or her parents would traditionally sit by a holy tree, and ask the family's ancestors for guidance on reintegrating the returning one. Then there would be special ceremonies to "cleanse" the former fighter of the taint of war before he would be allowed into the home.³⁰

Cobban argues that Mozambique's peace-building efforts have been durable because the country tapped into its many strong cultural resources for peacemaking and conflict resolution.

Rwanda is a good example of the simultaneous use of modern and traditional methods of ensuring justice and reconciliation following gross human rights violations: conventional criminal courts and “gacaca” courts. In October 2001, approximately 255,000 people were elected to act as judges in the “gacaca” courts. The tribunals are derived from traditional Rwandan community courts in which elders would sit on the grass (gacaca is the Kinyarwandan word for grass) and try to resolve disputes. Gacaca tribunals have many advantages. First, they would help relieve the backlog of cases related to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Second, because of their inclusive and participatory nature the tribunals would help rebuild the communities through grass-roots efforts at reconciliation. Third, gacaca is an inexpensive way of dispensing justice and fostering reconciliation because it bypasses many of the time-consuming formalities of conventional trials, and does not require much expenditure of resources on training of court personnel. A fourth advantage of gacaca is that it is very democratic because it ensures popular participation of communities across Rwanda. Communal participation is supposed to foster a sense of solidarity or *esprit de corps*. Gacaca involves average Rwandans participating in the election of representatives, acting as judges, handling evidence, and shaping the direction and course of justice in their communities, rather than it being imposed from outside. Because gacaca involves localizing justice it ensures that the decisions are perceived as more legitimate by Rwandans.

However, gacaca is also characterized by some disadvantages. First, because of its power to convict and punish, it may result in some serious violations or deprivations of due process rights. In the end, instead of building peace, reconciling groups, and healing wounds, it may end up aggravating bitter memories. A second potential problem is that the courts could be used by individuals as an avenue for the manifestation of mob justice or blatant retribution. On the other hand, the judges could exhibit bias in favor of the accused thereby polarizing communities instead of bringing them together. These two disadvantages are directly related to the fact that gacaca judges are ill-trained, defendants are not represented by counsel, and there is no precedent to assure consistency of treatment of the accused. Nonetheless, the Rwandan peace-building efforts are unique because they emphasize the interdependence of retributive justice and community building.

5. Problems and Prospects of Indigenous Approaches to Peace-building

The rapid pace of globalization and/or westernization is seriously eroding the respect by the youth for the elders and traditional hierarchy of authority that are necessary for maintaining the hegemony of indigenous approaches to peace-building. Communalism, and the primacy of elders in maintaining, traditional ceremonies, are rapidly giving way to individualism and private accumulation. The pastoral communities and many traditional societies are in a state of transition, as a result of their incorporation into the market economy and commercialization. The consequences are that communal societies are experiencing a serious challenge to their societal structure, security, survival as well as traditional moral foundations. Because traditional moral foundations are disintegrating, warfare has become more vicious and waged with more sophisticated firearms, with little or no regard for women, children, or the elderly.

In indigenous approaches to peace-building there is an emphasis on both individuals and groups in the process of reconciliation. The elders defuse conflicts within and between societies. Conflict is viewed as a communal concern reconciliation is therefore embedded in the norms and customs of the community affected. The reconciliation process, in particular, emphasizes “healing of emotional wounds created by conflict and restoration of social relationships.”³¹ Public or open acts of reconciliation served to remind community members of their shared unity. The African philosopher, John Mbiti summarized the communal spirit when he stated that African philosophy is based on the “I am because we are ... because we are therefore I am” principle.³² Thus, much of peace-building could be enhanced, facilitated, and improved by the incorporation of indigenous approaches and cultural values in post-conflict societies.

In sum, a solution to the peace-building and human security activities regarding rehabilitation, reintegration/ethnic reconciliation, or democracy enhancement, is for peace-builders to turn to indigenous sources for sanctioning authority, power, and legitimacy. Another alternative could be for indigenous communities to attempt to find an appropriate and effective blend of traditional institutional norms and external-type institutions that would guarantee stable and effective leadership while at the same time

enhancing democratic norms within the context of the variable economy. Peace-builders could fail because of a discrepancy between the policies of the postwar incumbent regime and the values adhered to by the society at large. Threats or challenges against the political establishment have ranged from protests, demonstrations, riots and civil wars. Moreover, the diffusionist effects of external cultural and other influences tend to encourage the growth of formal practices and the gradual shift toward participatory democracy. The result is the exposure of the incumbent postwar regime to new forms of competition for which it is not prepared. Groups that are still at the political periphery begin clamoring for more prominence in the struggle for political control. The usual intransigence of the political establishment, coupled with the underdeveloped postwar political institutions could result in a political conflict.

6. A “Real People” Perspective on Peace-building and Human Security

Since human security is a tri-level (individual, institutional, and structural/cultural) phenomenon, what is needed is to base peace-building/human security efforts in the lives of “marginalized people,” often women, frustrated youth, or simply “common people.” These are the people from whom the state has been relatively removed because they are not empowered and therefore suffer the worst forms of human insecurity. Peace-building needs another discourse, other voices, in particular the voices of the non-state informal sectors of society. In order to arrive at a peace-building strategy that enhances human security, the following factors should form its basis: (a) integrate the views, activities and experiences of the marginalized/common folk in processes of reconciliation, political will-formation, and in the rebuilding of reflexive structures of governance; (b) along the lines of the first factor, for an effective peace-building/human security strategy, it is necessary to identify and underscore a set of psycho-social experiences, activities, modes of behavior and thinking which are characteristic of the “marginalized/common folk”: individuals, groups, and communities; and (c) the objective of peace-building for human security should be to bring to the level of national and sub-national consciousness the implicit, tacit, informal and unarticulated experiences, behaviors, and activities of common folk.

The focus on the articulation of ideational, cultural, and non-state factors in

peace-building is in itself a critique of the dominance of state-centric peace-building which contributes to the process of giving voice and legitimacy to the bedrock of sustainable peace and human security: ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, intersubjective ideas and understandings of social life, and non-state actors.

The task of a human security perspective in peace-building is to make the lived experiences, activities, and perspectives of specific groups (the marginalized, women, unemployed youth, or ordinary folk) the agenda of reintegration, rehabilitation, democracy-building, and inter-ethnic reconciliation. A post-war reconstruction effort that emphasizes security at the subnational level and deliberately cultivates/fosters mutuality, caring, empathy, and compassion among intersecting identity components of cultural, sexual, class, race, regional, gender and other identities is more desirable than the mere attainment of a “strong” national security state. In her critique of the role of women in conflict resolution, Louise Vincent articulates that:

So rather than the goal of a good politics being the creation of a neutral state which presides over perpetual conflict, the aim is unashamedly to give a particular content and meaning to the good life that is being proposed, unashamedly to avow a politics of mutual compassion rather than narrow self-interest. It is true that the virtues in question have at some points been associated with the “feminine,” while competition, aggression and violence have historically been associated with the “masculine,” but the idea here is to recognize that these are human virtues and human ills; they do not adhere timelessly, biologically or necessarily to any particular gender or to any particular type of man or woman. Rather, these are virtues which are always precarious, vulnerable to corruption and in need of our ongoing and dutiful attention so that they may be privileged in public life.³³

Similarly, in peace-building to enhance human security, what is even more important is the values that are affirmed and not necessarily a particular type of identity or person. Human security is only possible where all the different identities forge/foster a community of solidarity that sustains the individual identities through mutual support and recognition. This translates into what has been referred to as the creation of “an

enlarged mentality” as the primary voice in politics. In such a situation the nations of a common good, shared vision, and a we-feeling are reactivated.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, a constructivist focus on peace-building and human security is predicated on the argument that in order for peace-building to enhance human security it needs to make the views, activities and experiences of “real people”: average folk, “marginalized” ones, a bedrock of its deliberations and overall efforts. Along these lines, it could be argued that the dominant discourse of peace-building has consistently downplayed or totally failed to take into account the experiences of, say, women, the unemployed, the average, or marginalized youth. For example, when specifically applied to one group, women, their activities have often been relegated to the domestic/private or reproductive spheres. In peace they should also be an integral part of the public/political/production or war realms.

There is often a psychological and/or cultural dimension to the entire process of peace-building for human security oriented knowledge, ideas and norms should be the focus. The constant habitualization of positive intersubjective activities results in institutionalization of shared goals, understandings, and a common destiny. For instance, the promotion of reconciliation and accountability in Rwanda and Mozambique through “gacaca” and traditional healing rituals in Mozambique respectively are a small example of this process.

Peace-building is in other words, dependent on the prior conceptions “local people” as well as the powerful bring to the public experience. They must all together construct their collective meaning of peace-building which they are confident will enhance security at the personal, group, communal, or national levels. Effective international assistance either from the UN or other external actors involves understanding the cognitive structures of those who have experienced war-related violence/trauma and providing the appropriate peace-building activities to assist them. Members of the post-war society together invent the properties of the new society. Reality cannot be imposed from outside, or by the powerful, and it does not exist prior to its social (collective) invention. Moreover, the knowledge that is integral to the new

reality is socially and culturally constructed. The postwar individuals, groups, or communities whether in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia, or Rwanda, create meaning through their interactions with each other and with their common environment. Communications and interactions result in socially-agreed upon governance related to economic, political, cultural, educational, or military matters, among others. A blend of modern and traditional methods of peace-building are ongoing. In some countries the blend would be effective, in others not, depending on time and other factors. It would be worthwhile for local NGOs to encourage the process of blending the external and indigenous in order to ensure a more holistic approach to peace-building and human security.

Notes

¹ Among many other works on the subject see: Carlos L. Yourdin, "Society Building in Bosnia: A Critique of Post-Dayton Peace-building Efforts," *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer/Fall 2003, pp. 59-74; Kumar Rupesinghe, *Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution* (London: Pluto Press, 1998); Oliver P. Richmond, *Maintaining Order, Making Peace* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); and Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), *Approaches to Peace-building* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

² Peace-building or post-war reconstruction efforts entail several core activities such as: demobilization and reintegration of combatants; rehabilitation of child soldiers and other traumatized members of society; democracy building; economic reconstruction; and societal reconciliation, among others. See for example Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating, "Outside Agents and the Politics of Peace-building and Reconciliation," *International Journal*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1999-2000, pp. 80-106.

³ For details see J.T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Nationalist-Constructivist Divide," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 3, pp. 473-95, 1997.

⁴ John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

⁵ For further details see John Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

⁶ For further discussion of these activities, see: Earl Conteh-Morgan, *Collective Political Violence - An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

⁷ See for details, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, June 2001, vol. 4, pp. 391-416.

⁸ For details see Alexander Wendt, "Constitution and Causation in International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 24, pp. 101-17, 1998.

⁹ See for example J.T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics*, vol. 50, pp. 324-48, 1998.

¹⁰ See for example, R. Price, and C. Reuss-Smit, "Dangerous Liaison?" "Critical International Relations Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 4, pp. 259-941.

¹¹ See for example, Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991).

¹² M. Bukovansky, *Ideas and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹³ C. Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

¹⁴ See again, Finnemore and Sikkink, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ See, *Sierra Leone News Archives*, Jan. 1999 in <<http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews.html>>.

¹⁶ In many war-torn societies, child soldiers were drugged and coerced into disobeying and even killing their own parents and members of their community. The sacrosanct nature of the community and its norms need to be reactivated in the minds of all, including combatants and especially child soldiers. For details on the role of child soldiers in Sierra Leone's conflict see *Sierra Leone—Child Soldiers* in <<http://www.rnw.nl/humanrights/html/childsoldiers.html>>, pp. 1-3.

¹⁷ See Nat J. Colleta, Michelle Cullen, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, *Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects*, Workshop Report (Washington: World Bank Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit, 1998).

¹⁸ For details see William Eckhardt, "Making and Breaking Negative Images," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, no. 1, 1991, pp. 87-95.

¹⁹ See for example, Earl Conteh-Morgan and Mac Dixon-Fyle, *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century: History, Politics, and Society* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), chapters 6 and 7.

²⁰ This argument is based on Claude Welch's work on African cultures and human rights. For details see: Claude Welch, "Human Rights as a Problem in Contemporary Africa" in Claude Welch and Ronald Meltzer, *Human Rights and Development in Africa* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).

²¹ Josiah A.M. Cobbah, "African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective," *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 307-31, 320-21.

²² Josiah Osamba, "Peace-building and Transformation from below: Indigenous Approaches to Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation among the Pastoral Societies in the Borderlands of Eastern Africa," *Africa Journal in Conflict Resolution*, no. 1, 2001.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ John Burton, and Frank Dukes (eds.) *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

²⁵ See for example, M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems* (London: Oxford, 1940).

²⁶ B. Kiplagat, "Is Mediation Alien to Africa?" *Track Tow*, vol. 7, no. 1. (Cape Town: Centre for Conflict Resolution, 1998).

²⁷ Osamba, *op. cit.*

²⁸ D.W. Augsburger, *Conflict Mediation Across Cultures: Pathways and Patterns* (Westminster: John Knox Press, 1992).

²⁹ William Ury, "Wandering Out To The Gods," *Track Two*, vol 8, no. 1 (Cape Town: Center for Conflict Resolution 1999), p. 28.

³⁰ Helena Cobban, "Healing Lessons from Another War-torn Society - Mozambique," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 2003, p. 1.

³¹ Osamba, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

³² John Mbiti, *African Traditional Religion and Philosophy* (London: Longman, 1970).

³³ Louise Vincent, "Role of Women in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Transformation: A critique," *ACCORD*, 3/2003, pp. 5-10, p. 9.

Chapter 12

Human Security at the Crossroad: Human Security in the Japanese Foreign Policy Context

Nobumasa Akiyama

1. Introduction

Whether human security can be a new approach to security policy of a state has been one of the contentious themes in the discourse of how to perceive and cope with (new) diverse threats to the post Cold War international community. The emergence of human security caused academic and policy communities to re-think and re-interpret the concept of security, and brought about the confusion, to some extent, in how to incorporate this new concept into existing foreign policy framework. Some governments just ignored or criticized the concept as it was too broad and inclusive of any kind of problems in the world. But others such as governments of Canada and Japan proactively promoted the concept of human security as an important policy idea for the 21st century.

Obviously, “security” has not been a term only for discourse on national security in military defense policy. This term has been used when discussing welfare policy as well as “social security” in the context of domestic governance. However, when this term is used in the discourse of international politics or foreign policy, it has meant strictly “national security” concerning the defense of territory or nation-state. However, the emergence of human security in the mid 1990s symbolized the transformation of the conventional international system, which has been centered on inter-”national” relationships, into a globalized, people-centered international system. Accordingly, perceptions of both objects and subjects of threats have also changed. In the Westphalian (nation-state centered) international system, the subject of security was

mainly a nation-state. It was assumed that defending the integrity and interests of a nation-state could secure the security of people living there. In other words, under such a system, although the protection of people's lives and dignity was the ultimate goal of security, it was indirectly realized only through the national territorial security. But the introduction of the concept of human security made it clear that people were THE subject of security. Such a transformation of the logic of linking people and national interests posed states to re-think and re-organize their own "security" policy. Further, the emergence of the notion of "human security" affected the shaping of a new framework of foreign policy, with which conventional security policy and other policies such as economic aid and multilateral diplomacy have come to be closer or even overlap and converge.

As a country with limitations in use of force, Japan has expressed its value of human security. This paper analyzes how the Japanese government, as one of the most enthusiastic advocates of human security, coped with the rise of human security and tried to make best use of it to promote its own foreign policy agenda such as increase in contributions to international peace and security or promoting its international reputation.

2. Two Types of Freedoms, Two Ways of Approach to Human Security

Human security has two components: freedom from fear and freedom from want. These two freedoms were mentioned by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan in his book as important international norms.¹ The former pays attention to territorial or "national" security, weighing the military and defensive aspect of security. The latter, in the meantime, focuses on people's life, rights and integrity, embodying a goal for development. These two concepts of freedom appeared in a report of the U.S. Secretary of State on the results of San Francisco Peace Conference, which says that only "victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace..."² Both played an important role in defining essential missions for the establishment of the United Nations.³

When the concept of human security was presented, the United Nations Development Program's publication, *Human Development Report 1994*, explained that

these two freedoms were both the components of human security. The report said that “freedom from fear” had been prioritized over “freedom from want” in the past even if they were recognized since the beginning of the post war history. However, the report viewed the shift of major security concerns, or threat perceptions, with the end of the Cold War, indicating “a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event,” that is a nuclear holocaust, in the post Cold War world.⁴ The report proposes a change in the concept of security “from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security,” and “from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.”⁵

The two freedoms are not mutually exclusive. Rather, it is essential to achieve both components to realize human security. Nevertheless, which component is given more weight may vary in different agencies.⁶ This difference also affects where human security is placed within any government’s foreign policy framework. If a government or an agency concerned puts emphasis on “freedom from want,” human security should be interpreted as a strategic concept for promoting economic and social development and realized in developmental assistance policy. This approach can be found in the UNDP’s interpretation of human security.

Human Security as Logic of Promoting Social and Economic Development: The Case of UNDP

Human Development Report 1994 focuses its considerations on human security based on four essential characteristics:

1. Human security is a universal concern.
2. The components of human security are interdependent.
3. Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention.
4. Human security is people-centered.⁷

Then, it defines the concept of human security as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression,” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.”⁸

Apparently, such a definition was made with a linkage between human security

and human development in mind, a notion that UNDP advocates. Thus, the context in which the concept of human security was taken up in the report was rather of strengthening a strategy for developmental assistance. The report tried to send a message that a new development strategy in the new century would require putting emphasis on increasing people's capability and securing human dignity and rights.⁹ Human security in the UNDP Report could also be understood as the globalized application of a concept of "social security."

Human Security as an Expansion of "Conventional" Security Sphere: The Canadian Approach

The Canadian government has taken an approach to human security with an emphasis on "Freedom from Fear," which became the title of a policy paper that the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade issued. The Canadian government defines human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives." Its approach focuses on five policy issues - public safety with a stress on terrorism, conflict prevention by building local capacity and promoting small arms non-proliferation, protection of civilians to reduce human costs of armed conflict, peace support operations such as conventional peace keeping operations and issues related to women, and governance and accountability for the promotion of justice, security sector reform, and institutional building.¹⁰ This list shows that in the Canadian approach to human security, priorities are placed on how to resolve and prevent violent conflicts and to cope with the safety and security of people (including local residents and international humanitarian workers) under armed conflicts (mostly in civil war type conflicts). Therefore, the interest in realizing "freedom from fear" in the armed conflict situation is understood as an urgent task for human security before "freedom from want."

In the Canadian approach, the relationship of human security with national security is defined clearly, as it complements "existing efforts focused on ensuring national security."¹¹ Considering that the Canadian government has been taking an active role in advocating peace keeping operations in the post-Cold War era, its approach to human security places its emphasis on the aspect of "freedom from fear" between two freedoms. Actually, in order to realize human security for the people in the conflict situation, it is

necessary to deal with social and economic problems that might cause conflict, at both phases of emergent humanitarian crisis as well as middle-to-long-term development. It also says that “the genuine security can be found only by increasing respect of fundamental human rights.”¹² Nevertheless, the Canadian approach does not exclude a possibility of the use of military force in extreme cases of crisis such as the threat of genocide and mass ethnic cleansing.

As described above, realizing human security is to achieve two freedoms - freedom from fear and freedom from want. Although both must be achieved in order for human security to be prevailed; however, the point of emphasis varies. Such a difference in approach comes from priorities in policy. The UNDP approach puts emphasis on realizing freedom from want. UNDP as an organization to conduct development assistance is mandated to promote human development, and it tries to define the concept of human security to serve its mandate. Canada finds that freedom from fear is a key element in describing its policy toward human security as it seeks a new role in international peace and security, including more active utilization of peace keeping operations, in the post Cold War period.

3. Japan’s Approach to Human Security: Concept Building and Policy Implementations

A Framework for Understanding the Japanese Way of Human Security

In the previous section, I depicted two different approaches to human security. The task of this section is to analyze where the Japanese approach to human security falls in this spectrum. When we try to understand how human security fits within Japan’s foreign policy framework, it is necessary to analyze it by answering a fundamental question: How does the Japanese government define its foreign policy challenges in the post Cold War international environment? This question leads to another one: What kind of values does the Japanese government intend to realize through the concept of human security?

Goals of foreign policy are roughly divided into two different types. One is to realize rather direct national interests such as establishing good relationship with other countries or solving concrete issues or dispute. The other is to realize and maintain the order and norms of the international society to realize certain values that the country

believes.¹³ In other words, the former type of foreign policy directly aims at realizing national interests, which often tends to bear interests in materialistic, concrete benefits. In the meantime, foreign policy to pursue the latter goal would not pursue short-term, direct interests, but it requires “structural” power, either hard or soft, to lead international society in a certain direction.¹⁴

Japanese diplomacy in the post war period was labeled as “economistic” diplomacy, meaning Japan just pursued its own economic interests. If not totally motivated by self economic interests, it was true to some extent that Japan was minding its own national interests with rather passive and reactive attitudes in international politics by the 1980s.¹⁵ Three basic pillars of the Japanese diplomacy in the post war period: coordination with liberal countries, which mainly meant the stronghold of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, constructing better relationships with Asian neighbors as a member of Asia, and the U.N.-centered diplomacy.¹⁶ These pillars have been maintained throughout the post war Japanese diplomacy.

As the tide turned in international politics, Japan needed to adjust and renovate its foreign policy architecture to respond to and take even further advantage of coping with emerging issues and new threats in the post Cold War period. It was natural, in a sense, for the second largest economy, or the largest donor at that time (now the second), to seek a more responsible role for global welfare and security, on top of regional peace and prosperity in Asia. Since the early 1990s, we have seen tremendous efforts by the Japanese government along this line, such as the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, a quest for a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council, extensive discussions on a new ODA strategy and so on.

With the promotion of human security in its foreign policy, the Japanese government did not intend to realize any specific (or concrete) national interests in bilateral or multilateral diplomacy vis-à-vis other states. However, there must be rationale and logic for the government to promote the concept of human security within its foreign policy as well as in international arenas. In the following part of this paper, I explore the factors of the emergence of human security in Japanese foreign policy in the later 1990s by linking it to the changing environment of the international community in terms of these three aspects.

The Japanese government has “positioned the concept of human security as one of

key perspectives of its foreign policy” with a perspective on making the 21st Century a human-centered one.¹⁷ Its definition of human security is “a concept that focuses on the strengthening of human-centered efforts from the perspective of protecting the lives, livelihoods and dignity of individual human beings and realizing the abundant potential inherent in each individual.”¹⁸

The Emergence of Human Security Concept in Japan’s Foreign Policy

a) Turbulence and Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

As the Cold War ended, so did the threat of the Soviet Union or communism. It brought the necessity of re-definition and transitional instability in the U.S.-Japan alliance. The alliance had to seek new objectives or *raison d’etre*. Japan was required to increase its substantial role to strengthen the alliance while there was growing domestic pressure in Japan for relocation of U.S. troops stationed in various bases in Japan. The “redefinition” of the bilateral alliance was an urgent political task for both governments.¹⁹ The U.S. and Japanese government intended to strengthen the alliance both in deepening cooperation in defense of the countries and in stretching the sphere for alliance activities. The alliance, especially Japan, was expected to play an important role in maintaining the stability of the region, but a rape incident committed by an American soldier in Okinawa triggered Japanese public antipathy, and the task of re-definition and further strengthening of the alliance made more difficult. So the U.S.-Japan alliance was put under stress and somehow “drifted” in the mid-1990s.

b) Rise of Needs for Human Security from the Asian Economic Crisis

Hoshino points out that the embryo of Japan’s commitment to human security was seen as early as a speech by Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama, at the World Summit for Social Development in 1995, in which Murayama mentioned people-centered social development.²⁰ In June 1997, Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, stressed the importance of a perspective of “security of human beings” in his speech at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Environment and Development.²¹

Nevertheless, as Ueda mentions, it was Keizo Obuchi in 1998, which put a cornerstone of the commitment to human security in Japanese foreign policy.²² In his speech, Obuchi, as Foreign Minister of the Hashimoto Cabinet, described Japan’s intention to cooperate with its Asian neighbors who suffered from economic crises. He

pointed to the importance of considering “compassion” among “five C’s” as key elements to overcome economic difficulties. (Five C’s are compassion, courage, creativity, cooperation and confidence.) He identified the poor, the aged, the disabled, women and children, and other socially vulnerable segments of the population as most severely damaged by economic difficulties. He mentioned health and employment as “human security” concerns and showed an intention to enhance cooperation in this area further by putting priority on social development in Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy.²³

In July 1998, Obuchi assumed the premiership following Hashimoto’s resignation. As Prime Minister, he made two key speeches mentioning human security. On December 2, 1998, he delivered the opening remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow. In his remarks, he expressed the necessity to seek new strategies for economic development attaching importance to human security in the region while urging for cross national cooperation among governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).²⁴

Two weeks later in Vietnam, Obuchi made another speech, which proposed further steps for Japanese foreign policy to promote the concept of human security. He envisaged the 21st Century for Asia as “a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity,” and urged for efforts “to strive to revitalize Asia,” to place “emphasis on human security,” and to promote further “intellectual dialog.” Related to the promotion of human security in this speech, he announced that the Japanese government would contribute 500 million yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars) for the establishment of the “Human Security Fund” under the United Nations (the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security). According to this speech, the establishment of this fund was initially purported to provide flexible and timely financial support for international organizations eager to implement projects in Asia. The rest of the world was not included in the scope of the fund. (Of course, when the Human Security Fund was established, the fund became available to projects implemented in any part of the world.)

The Japanese government’s launch of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security suggests two characters of Japan’s human security diplomacy. First, the Japanese initiatives on human security initially emerged in the course of responding to economic crises hitting Asia in the late 1990s. In this respect, the Japanese approach to

human security has naturally focused on the aspect of “freedom from want.”

At the same time, it should be noted that “securitization” of concerns related to human security in the context of Japan’s foreign policy derived from both needs of supplementing the lack of international contributions in military security areas, and the importance of the issues *per se*.²⁵ In Obuchi’s speech in May 1998, in which human security first appeared in a policy paper, human security was translated into a Japanese term, *ningen no* (corresponding to “human”) *anzen* (corresponding to “security”). However, in his speeches in December 1998, the translation of “security” was modified to *anzen-hosho*. *Anzen* and *anzen-hosho* give different impressions to the public. *Anzen* in the Japanese sense sounds more like “safety” rather than “security,” and *anzen-hosho* literally means “to ensure the safety,” and is exclusively used in the discourse of defense and military security. By attaching *hosho* to *anzen*, it gives two connotations. The issue was perceived as a policy action, which is naturally assumed as a deed of government. Security indeed was recognized as a main responsibility that a state must fulfill since the emergence of the concept of security. In other words, *anzen-hosho* seemed to represent structural issues, something to provide safety in a systematic way by being dealt with by the society as a whole. *Anzen-hosho* also impressed upon the people the sense of more urgency and a larger scale than *anzen* when tackling issues.

Second, we should pay attention to the fact that it was Asia that was initially targeted by Japan’s human security diplomacy, which means that the Japanese government would strengthen the relationship with Asian countries further. Since the Fukuda Doctrine, launched by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1977 and the benchmark for Japan’s Asia diplomacy, Japan has emphasized two commitments: refraining from becoming a military power and promoting economic cooperation and exchange of people based upon equal partnership with regional countries. The end of the Cold War added new elements to Japan’s Asia diplomacy. They are cooperation in “global (or transnational) issues” such as drugs, illicit human trafficking, transnational crimes, environment, and terrorism, and enhancement of political dialogue for regional security.

By introducing the concept of human security, Japan tried to increase the political significance of its diplomacy in Asia while official development assistance (ODA) remained as a major policy tool. However, new definitions of above-mentioned issues

as threats to the stability and prosperity of the region increased political implication of cooperation toward Asia. In Asia, especially at arenas such as Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), there have been lively discussions on and some actions regarding these issues since they have come to be perceived as new threats to the region. For example, the 7th ministerial conference of ARF in July 2000 agreed to utilize the ARF framework to cope with the cross-border drug issue between Thailand and Myanmar. Obviously, these issues overlap with concerns to human security.

In addition, since the economic crisis in 1997, which taught ASEAN countries that threats to the stability and prosperity of the region were not necessarily military ones, the failure of social and economic management could cause social and political turmoil. Moreover, ASEAN started serious discussions on the economic and social structure of society, which would create economic inequality and poverty. It was natural for them to conclude that the construction of social safety net and human resource development would be important to contain potential destabilizing factors for regional security. The ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting in July 2000 launched the concept of human-centered “comprehensive development” to deal with such problems.

Such moves depicted the emergence of a new security approach to new security threats in Asia. The region would need to cope with new threats to human security and economic issues in order to enhance confidence building and conflict prevention in the region. It indicated the effectiveness of human security approach in Asia and Japan’s diplomacy with a focus on human security elements should be considered to possess a great potential for Japan’s interests in better international security and economic environment in the region.

Efforts to Consolidate Human Security in the Multilateral Arena

By endorsing human security as “the cornerstone of international cooperation in the 21st century,” Japan also moved toward strengthening the philosophical foundation as well as establishing an international policy institution through which human security related policies are implemented. When Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori addressed the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, a substantial portion of his speech was on human security issues and proposed to launch the Commission on Human Security.

In response to Mori's speech, the commission was established in January 2001 with the objective of developing the concept of human security and making recommendations that would serve as guidelines for concrete action to be taken by the international community.²⁶ It was co-chaired by former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and Professor Amartya Sen, of Trinity College, Cambridge. The commission consisted of 12 prominent figures on global issues, including Special Representative of UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, and the chair of the special panel on peace operations of the United Nations, Lakhdar Brahimi.

The report of this commission, agreed in February 2003, describes human security in the context of conflicts as well as development. It provides a strong indication that "empowerment" in addition to "protection" of people would be most important either in conflict and (post conflict) developmental situations. The report also says, "human security complements state security, furthers human development and enhances human rights. It complements state security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats."²⁷ The commission made the following policy recommendations:

1. Protect people in violent conflict.
2. Support the security of people on the move.
3. Establish human security transition funds for post-conflict situations.
4. Encourage markets and fair trade and secure minimum living standards.
5. Accord higher priority to ensure universal access to basic health care.
6. Develop an efficient and equitable system for patient rights.
7. Empower all people with universal basic education and strengthen international and domestic measures.
8. Introduce a method of education that respects the diversity of people.²⁸

MOFA states that "Japan intends to strengthen efforts with the aim of spreading the concept of human security throughout the world based on these recommendations."²⁹

On the policy implementation front, the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security is the materialization of Japan's initiative in promoting human security. The fund was established in March 1999 in response to Prime Minister Mori's statement at the U.N. Millennium Summit. Japan initially appropriated 500 million yen (or 4.2 million U.S. dollars) to the fund, and as of August 2003, total contribution amounted to some 22.9

billion yen (\$200 million U.S.), making the trust fund the largest of its kind established in the U.N. The fund aims at translating the concept of human security into concrete activities by supporting projects implemented by U.N. organizations that address threats to human security. Categories of the projects to be supported by the fund are poverty eradication projects such as community reconstruction, vocational training, food production and the protection of children, medical and health care such as reproduction health, control of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, refugee and internally displaced persons assistance and conflict-related areas such as social reintegration for ex-combatants through vocational training. By June 2003, approximately 100 million U.S. dollars were appropriated to 84 projects.³⁰

A unique character of the fund is its decision-making process. A project for the fund was planned by a U.N. agency and proposed to the Japanese government. When the Japanese government finds project proposals appropriate for the fund, it notifies the agency to request an approval by the U.N. headquarters whereupon the U.N. headquarters checks the procedural aptness of the project. When both the Japanese government and the U.N. headquarter give approval, the project is launched formally.

In such a way, the Japanese government is determined to commit itself to promoting the concept of human security as a framework for further international cooperation, not only among governments and international organizations, but also with other entities such as civil society actors (NGOs), local governments and communities, and it tries to put the concept into implementation with concrete projects. However, further efforts are necessary. First, the financial contribution was made only by the Japanese government. In order for this fund to have a truly global impact, it should invite financial contributors from other countries and the Japanese government should also be expected to encourage other governments in that direction. Second, since human security has cross-sector characteristics by nature, it would be important to increase coherence and coordination among different types of organizations with different mandates.

Changing the Agenda of the U.N. Activities: A Quest for Leadership

Japan's initiative to establish and promote the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security intends to strengthen the capacity of the U.N. system, as a policy implementation

mechanism, to advocate human security. When we see the United Nations as an arena for relations among nations (or even real politics), how has Japan placed human security in its U.N. diplomacy? Ishikawa, the Director of International Social Cooperation Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described the United Nations as an arena to set global rules to cope with the chaos brought about along with the end of the Cold War, and he further wrote that the concept of human security, which the Japanese government promoted, would provide a fundamental philosophy in rule-setting at the United Nations.³¹ Nakamura, Director of the United Nations Policy Division of MOFA, explained the post Cold War situation as an increasing necessity for the international community to work together to cope with various threats such as refugees, hunger, epidemic problems and cross border crimes all of which involve the “global rule making” process.³²

The introduction of the concept of human security along with “global rule making” are important functions that the United Nations should play in the post Cold War world, which also suggests Japan’s willingness to exercise active diplomacy in multilateral arenas such as the United Nations, by advocating the concept of human security. By doing so, the Japanese government seems to establish its leadership role in multilateral diplomacy especially in the areas of “global issues.” As the second largest economy in the world, Japan made huge financial contributions to international organizations, however, the Japanese government sought to play a more influential, leading role in multilateral arena in a political sense as well. Setting agendas and making rules, or contributing to the creation of an international order, may be quite symbolic for political leadership in international relations since they require political capacity to let others follow either by power or by skills.

In a sense, this desire is crystallized as Japan’s desperate yearning for a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations as one of the most important goals of Japan’s diplomacy in the post Cold War period. The presence of Japan at the United Nations grown since its accession in 1956, and it is now the second largest financial contributor to UN activities. Japan has been successful in being elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council at every alternate term. However, the constraint in the use of force posed by domestic politics over Constitution Article 9 and historical legacy restricted Japan’s participation in U.N. peace keeping operations. The

limited contribution in the security field could be perceived as an obstacle for Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council. If introduction of the concept of human security enlarges the scope of security-related activities into social and economic dimensions, or at least raises the significance of activities in the social and economic development up to the level of conventional security issues, it would cover up the shortfall of Japan's policy toward collective security and relatively increase the presence of Japan in the United Nations.

4. Relevance of Human Security to Japan's Peace -related Activities

Human Security as Underlying Theme of Peace Operations and ODA

So far, I have seen Japan's approach through its U.N. related diplomacy. This section reviews how the concept of human security related, or disengaged, to government's own foreign policies, especially in the areas of peace keeping/peace building and Official Development Assistance (ODA). As seen above, in contrast to the Canadian approach, Japanese activities related to human security have not put priorities in achieving "freedom from fear," but rather focused on realizing "freedom from want" through social and economic development and increasing the capability of people.

The experiences of the Gulf War affected Japanese foreign policy makers. Restricted in the dispatch of self defense forces as a way to contribute to the war, it instead made a huge financial contribution. However, \$13 billion U.S. in financial contributions to the war, procured even by raising taxes, was not credited to Japan as positive efforts toward the war; rather it was criticized as "too little, too late." It made it urgent for the Japanese government to enable itself to make an appropriate response to an international security crisis.

After a lengthy political discourse and struggle, the Japanese government finally introduced the Law on International Peace Cooperation, which enabled the Japanese government to participate in peacekeeping operations organized or endorsed by the United Nations. The Japanese government dispatched the Self Defense Forces (SDF) for the first time to a U.N. Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), then to the U.N. peace keeping operation in Cambodia under the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTACT) in September 1992. Restricted by the Five Principles, the use of

force included limitations on logistical support, civil engineering and military observers.³³ Since then, the Japanese government participated with the SDF in some peace operations. For example, in 1994, the Air SDF sent cargo planes to transport emergency assistance materials for Rwandan refugees in Zaire. Since 1996, the Ground SDF was sent to Golan Heights for transportation activities. In East Timor, the SDFs were engaged in various activities including airlift for rescue materials for East Timor refugees in West Timor, and as a part of the U.N. peacekeeping operation, the GSDF was engaged in rehabilitation of infrastructures such as roads and schools.³⁴ It is evident that there were human security elements contained in such activities, however, these activities are not explicitly defined in Japan's human security policy.

As the Brahimi Report suggests and actual operations show, recent PKOs are no longer used for maintenance of cease-fire situations.³⁵ They were requested to make wider and deeper contributions to building and consolidating peace in post conflict situations. Sustainable peace building necessitates caring human security so that social, economic and political structure and environment can be established, in which people's lives, livelihood and dignity are well protected and even promoted. Even though Japan's participation in U.N. peace keeping operations and other peace building operations could be interpreted as serving human security missions, there is no explicit linkage between human security and peace operations at the official policy document level.

In the area of ODA, the MOFA reformed a category of "grass-roots grants," which provides small grant aids to projects conducted by non-governmental organizations for community reconstruction or capacity building, health and so on into "grass-roots and human security grants," placing strong emphasis on human security. MOFA reviewed the 1992 ODA Charter and issued a new version in August 2003 reflecting rising importance on human security. Human security, along with other basic policies, was placed in an important position in ODA policy.³⁶ The Charter also identified priority issues - poverty reduction, sustainable growth, global issues and peace building.

9.11 as the Turning Point: Is Human Security Sidelined?

Indeed, fighting terrorism and eradicating its root causes such as poverty and the inequality and injustice of a society are on the human security agenda. Japanese government officials indicated initially that Japan perceived terrorist attacks in the

United States as a matter of human security. In the beginning, it seemed that Japan expected to play a supportive role fighting war on terrorism through economic and social development assistance to regions vulnerable to penetration of terrorist groups.

In view to U.S.-Japan relations, “War on Terrorism” resulted in strengthening this bilateral alliance. Japan enacted a special law making it possible to participate in the war on terrorism and dispatched an aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean for logistical support for the operation of international force in Afghanistan. The Japanese government also took counter-terrorism measures in coordination with the U.S. government. Furthermore, the dispatch of SDF units to Iraq for reconstruction of roads and water supply deepened Japan’s commitment to the alliance with the United States further. Although there was controversy in the endorsement by the United Nations for the international peace operations in Iraq, the Japanese government decided to send the SDF to Iraq. It does not seem that the operation had significant humanitarian impact on the local people’s life; rather, it had tremendous impact on strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Conceptual, rhetorical manipulation of “security” by utilizing human security became less popular among policymakers in Japan as a means to cover up the lack of military contributions to international peace and security since the Japanese contributions actually satisfy its allies to some degree.

In addition, Koizumi’s personal preferences regarding diplomacy may be reflected in the decreased presence on human security in Japanese diplomacy. Koizumi is well known for his negative attitude toward acquisition of a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council. Further, there were observations on his foreign policy stance by not placing high value on multilateral diplomacy, but rather valuing the bilateral relationships highly.

5. Conclusion

In the 2003 edition of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, the description of human security appeared as a sub-section of the section on Efforts in Global Issues although the concept of human security covers almost all issues taken up in the Section, among which are sustainable development, environment, transnational crimes, illicit drugs and piracy, human rights, and controlling infectious diseases. The sub-section covers only the

Commission on Human Security and the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security. This impresses that the concept of human security is not well treated within the overall framework of Japanese diplomacy. In other words, MOFA either cannot exploit fully the utility of the concept of human security or cannot find the concept useful.

Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that the Japanese government is not enthusiastic regarding issues defined as “threats to human security.” Probably, the reasons why the concept of human security *per se* have not been well received through policymaking in Japan is due to its ambiguity and broad definition as a concrete policy idea, and the compartmentalized policy structure in Japanese government. Conversely, sustainable development, global environment issues, drugs and post-conflict peace building are areas of policy where the Japanese government recently tried to take initiative in discussion and activities at various forums. As a single, independent concept, human security seems to become less significant, but as an underlying principle for formulating foreign policies, elements and substance of the “human security” concept have come to be more and more significant.

Throughout the post Cold War period, Japan sought to establish a new image as a responsible, (reasonably great) power with the leadership role in certain policy areas, especially in global issues. This involves an increasing political role and strong leadership both in concept building and in realization of concepts into policies and their implementation. In this respect, human security has great potential as it explains the new international environment for peace and prosperity of people.

The concept and its elements of human security would survive or become even more important for any policies related to peace building and betterment of people’s life and dignity. It is natural to assume that Japanese foreign policy would further incorporate these elements into it, even if the term “human security” becomes less popular.

Notes

¹ Recently, Annan carefully avoided the usage of “human security” as this term involves some political controversy. Instead, he used “people-centered” as an adjective.

² United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report* (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 24.

³ The inclusion of “freedom from want” in the reasons for beginning the UN resulted in the installment of the Economic and Social Council, in addition to the Security Council, which is a major distinction from its predecessor, the League of Nations. See Chapter 1 of this Report.

⁴ UNDP, *op. cit.*, p. 22

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24).

⁶ In the existing international system, nation states or international organizations established under the nation-state centered system remain major actors of international relations that can provide policy measures for human security although the role of civil society actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has increasingly become important. However, in this analysis, I narrowly focus on policies of governments and international agencies since the aim of this paper is to argue the appearance of human security in foreign policy of the Japanese government.

⁷ UNDP, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

¹⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security*, 2002, p. 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹³ See Watanabe Akio, “Gaiko-Seisaku kara Kokusai-Seisaku e (From Foreign Policy to International Policy)” in Watanabe Akio (ed.), *Gendai Nihon no Kokusai-Seisaku – Posuto Reisen no Kokusai Chitsujo wo Motomete* (International Policy of Contemporary Japan – A Quest for the Post Cold War International Order) (Tokyo: Yuuhi-kaku, 1997).

¹⁴ See Susan Strange, *States and Markets* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988); and Joseph Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (Basic Book, 1991).

¹⁵ K. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” *World Politics*, July 1988, vol. XL, no. 4, 1988, pp. 517-541.

¹⁶ See Gaimusho (MOFA), *Wagakuni no Gaiko no Kinkyō (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1957*.

¹⁷ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2003, p. 183.

¹⁸ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2002, p. 88.

¹⁹ Along this line, the Japanese government took actions such as issuing the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996, setting new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1997, and the establishment of the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.” See M. Akiyama, *Nichi-bei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta – anpo saiteigi no butaiura (U.S.-Japan Strategic Talks begun – Backstage of Redefinition of Security Alliance)* (Tokyo: Akishobo, 2002).

²⁰ Toshiya Hoshino, “Ningen no Anzen-hosho to Nihon no Kokusai Seisaku (Human Security and Japan’s International Policy),” *Kokusai Anzen-hosho (The Journal of International Security)*, vol. 30, no. 3, December 2001, pp. 9-25.

²¹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 12.

²² H. Ueda, “Ima naze ‘Ningen no Anzen-hosho’ nanoka (Why Human Security Now?),” *Gaiko Forum*, February 2000.

²³ Keizo Obuchi, “Statement by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi on Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium,” <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/980504.html>>, 1998.

²⁴ Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks by Prime Minister Obuchi at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html>>, 1998.

²⁵ For a theory of securitization, please see Weaver et al.

²⁶ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2002, p. 89.

²⁷ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003).

²⁸ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2003, p. 185.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

³⁰ R. Nakamura, “‘Ningen no Anzen-hosho’ to Atarashii Kokusai kyoryoku no Rinen (‘Human Security’ and New Ideas for International Cooperation),” *Jurisuto (Jurist)*, no. 1254, October 15, 2003, pp. 87-93.

³¹ Kaoru Ishikawa, “Global Rule o tsukuru kokuren (the United Nations sets the Global Rules),” *Gaiko Forum*, December 2003, pp. 32-38.

³² Nakamura, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 87.

³³ The five principles are as follows: 1) Agreement on a cease-fire shall be reached among the parties to armed conflicts. 2) Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations obtained from host countries as well as parties to armed conflict. 3) Operations shall strictly maintain impartiality not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts. 4) Should any of the requirements in the above mentioned guidelines cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw SDF Units. 5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life, etc. <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/pref_e.html#5rules>.

³⁴ As of April 2004, Japan dispatched personnel and SDF units to eight peace keeping operations and five humanitarian relief activities. For the record of dispatch of personnel and SDF units, please see <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/results_e.html>.

³⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations’ Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/909, 21 August 2000.

³⁶ Other elements of basic principles in the new ODA Charter are: Supporting self-help efforts of developing countries, assurance of fairness, utilization of Japan’s experience and expertise, partnership and collaboration with the international community.

Chapter 13

An Ethical Basis for Human Security and its Implications for Peace-building

Laurie Calhoun

1. The Perspective of Morality

There are many different ways of thinking about the world in which we live, each of which represents a perspective, a point of view commencing from a set of values and interests. Sometimes we adopt an aesthetic stance, evaluating things in terms of concepts such as beauty and symmetry. Sometimes we adopt an economic stance, assessing things in terms of monetary value and net efficiency. In our dealings with others, we often speak in terms of *morality* or *ethics*. The moral, in contrast to the aesthetic and the economic, perspective commences from the idea of moral worth and the entities that possess it. The fundamental premise of the moral perspective is that persons have a special sort of value or “dignity” that non-persons do not. To adopt a moral perspective toward other people requires that one regard them as having intrinsic value, a moral worth equivalent to one’s own.

Because the moral perspective, in contrast to scientific, economic and aesthetic perspectives, commences from the ascription of consciousness and sentience to other persons, policies that ignore this essential quality of moral persons cannot with linguistic propriety be described as genuinely *moral* policies. Such policies are often defended through the use of moral *rhetoric*. However, when the essential value of conscious and sentient personhood is flatly denied (or simply brushed aside as “irrelevant”), the policies in question have prioritized non-moral interests and values.

For to adopt a moral perspective is to accept what is sometimes referred to as the “overriding” nature of moral considerations. Convenience, prudence, economics,

aesthetics, and all other perspectives must be set to one side when morality is at stake. This idea forms the basis for the “last resort” requirement of just war theory, according to which nothing could justify war but the direst of circumstances. The idea of an “optional” war, one that does not need to be waged, could only be an immoral war, for if there is a pacific option, one that circumvents the needless slaughter of human beings, then it must, morally speaking, be pursued. Similarly, a war waged to protect economic interests could never be moral, because considerations of prudence and economics cannot compete with the moral perspective, which asserts the absolute value of conscious human life. Wars waged for oil, to acquire new territory, or to protect the economic interests of a country, do not reflect a moral perspective.

The tendency to substitute economic for moral considerations, as though the productivity of a nation directly reflected the well-being of its citizens, is symptomatic of a more general trend among intellectuals. Throughout the twentieth century, the ascendancy of science has had the consequence of directing thinkers involved in normative areas of human endeavor, those relating to values and prescriptions, toward the goal of a quasi-scientific paradigm. In science, the perspective of individual subjects is an irrelevant “hurdle” to be cleared, in order to arrive at objective knowledge about the state of the world. However, to disregard the subjective experience of individual centers of consciousness, assimilating them with insentient, non-moral things, is to invalidate the very basis for morality. For the peculiar interest of moral persons inheres precisely in their unique status as conscious agents, susceptible of pleasure and pain, and embodying a moral worth which transcends the purely physical sum of their parts.

Nonetheless, following the example set by the early twentieth century logical positivists, many professional philosophers have set out to “naturalize” moral theory, in the hopes that morality might become as “respectable” as science. Because the naturalization of ethics would seem to be impossible, given the “is-ought” problem diagnosed by philosophers throughout history (though most famously by David Hume), some conclude that morality is relative and that no act is wrong, *tout court*, but only *vis-à-vis* a particular set of circumstances and within a certain context. Indeed, even those who adopt an “objective” utilitarian approach thereby renounce any commitment to an absolute prohibition against the annihilation of innocent life.

The pervasive error of prioritizing the third-person perspective in theories of value

(the most obvious example of which is perhaps “utilitarianism”), while downplaying, if not entirely disregarding, the first-person perspective, leads directly to problems in distinguishing simple moral rhetoric, which every leader wields, from policies that genuinely support and promote morality.¹ Leaders and policy-makers often speak in terms of good and evil or right and wrong, as though everything came down to “objective” or scientific truth, as opposed to the intrinsic value of conscious life, which eludes characterization by language. But if the first person perspective is of paramount importance, morally speaking, then it is false and misleading to talk of so-called “collateral damage” as any less awful than intentional murder. For what matters above all, from a moral perspective, is not the *aggressor’s* but the *victim’s* perspective of what is being done to him or her. Why is it, then, that the populace tends readily to accept the military’s own characterization of its violent attacks as morally permissible even while they dismiss as “irrelevant” the perspectives of the victims? The consequences of the use of deadly force do not differ from an innocent victim’s perspective whether it be brandished by governments, individuals, or factions. Similarly, from the perspective of an innocent civilian victim, terrorism is terrorism, whether its vehicles wear uniforms or not.

Strikingly, the common failure to think about conflict from the enemy’s perspective, as though they were not human beings, centers of consciousness and loci of interpretation, often leads directly to the recourse to deadly force, when it might have been avoided. To take a recent example, in the build-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. administration repeatedly announced that war could be averted if Hussein (and his sons) relinquished their power through voluntary exile. Recall, however, that on December 14, 2002 the Bush administration had issued a “lethal force list” of suspected terrorists whom the CIA had been granted permission by the commander-in-chief to assassinate with impunity. It was indicated at the time that the list was not exhaustive, that other, unnamed, terrorist suspects would be subject to assassination as well. This proclamation came after the November 4, 2002 use by the CIA of an unmanned air vehicle (UAV), the RQ-1 “Predator Drone,” to assassinate six alleged terrorist suspects in Yemen.² Because those people were executed without trial, and in view of the vague terms of the U.S. administration’s “lethal force list,” Saddam Hussein (and his sons) had every reason in the world to avoid seeking refuge abroad. No one appears ever to have

doubted the practical rationality and the will to survive of Saddam Hussein. It therefore seemed quite clear at the time that the U.S. administration's "offer" to permit Saddam Hussein to seek asylum elsewhere was empty. By making this the single acceptable condition for the avoidance of war, the Bush administration effectively precluded the possibility of stopping the invasion, and then blamed it upon Hussein for refusing to do what would have been patently irrational for him to do.

A further problem arises during times of international conflict because, at the political level, discussions of war between diplomats often prioritize an economic perspective. The representatives of nations "bargain" with one another, compromising and making concessions in exchange for economic benefits. On the one hand, this is entirely understandable, for the people charged with protecting the interests of a nation are generally focusing upon quasi-prudential as opposed to moral matters. Often prudence and morality become conflated, when the economic interests of a nation are assumed to coincide with the interests of its inhabitants. But when governments are bribed or extorted to support a war that they would have rejected of their own accord, a war which leads to the annihilation of human beings (albeit the citizens of another nation), then there is a sense in which those governments have been corrupted, at least according to a moral assessment of what has transpired. In some cases, such as those of poor African nations faced with the specter of allowing even more of their own citizens to perish due to the withdrawal of aid from a wealthy nation courting their favor, morality may be sacrificed for prudence, though the leaders of nations who succumb to bribery and/or extortion undoubtedly reason along quasi-utilitarian lines and under the assumption that their first priority must be to the people of their own nation, as opposed to the prospective victims of a war waged abroad.

The general trend toward scientism has led to a situation in which defense and state security experts concern themselves primarily with how to develop swifter and more efficient means to destroy property and kill human beings. To confound matters, the military budget of the United States is enormous, and the heavy involvement of the military in the education of Americans has led some to speculate that military "means-end" type reasoning has overshadowed traditional issues regarding values and humanity, leading to the creation of a pervasively militarily-minded society. Thus Douglas Noble writes:

“The military and its researchers share an interest in improving the efficiency of learning, which is typically defined by them in terms of temporal efficiency.....just as educators are being told that their long-standing desire to teach students how to think now happily coincides with the new intellectual needs of corporate employers, the ongoing, militarized degradation of education and human intelligence is important to bear in mind...while we still have one.”³

The very idea of “military science” excludes the first-person perspective and thus promotes an amoral agenda through the misleading use of euphemism and moral rhetoric. Because “moral persons” are not features of a military paradigm, examples of the reification of the enemy are rife during wartime, when soldiers kill other soldiers not as fellow human beings, but as the weapons of their leaders. Because the third-person or quasi-scientific view of international commerce promulgated by “the experts” is uncritically accepted by the populace (since they naturally accept the testimony of “the experts” in other realms), rarely does anyone pause to ask profoundly important moral questions such as whether the slaughter of thousands of men in the prime of their life can be *morally* justified, if in fact those men were economically or physically coerced to act in their capacity as soldiers.

Enemy soldiers are certainly not the only persons reified during wartime. Innocent civilians, in no way responsible for the crimes of their leaders, are often slaughtered in war. Indeed, in modern warfare, the primary victims of decisions on the part of leaders to embroil their nations and groups in warfare have been not soldiers, but civilians.⁴ The concept of “collateral damage,” assumed by military spokesmen to be morally innocuous, presupposes that victims can be accounted for in “objective” terms, in numerical reports. By assuming that the plight of civilians can be summed up in “collateral damage” statistics alone, the reigning military paradigm disregards altogether the moral worth of those people. Moral persons have plans and projects, relationships and histories, all of which are erased from the face of the earth with the dropping of a bomb.

To regard war from a moral, as opposed to a political or an economic vista,

requires that we consider the perspectives of **all** individuals, for only individual centers of consciousness are subject to and presumably protected by morality, and the moral worth of persons is **not** a function of their place of birth. The moral perspective also carries with it practical implications for the conduct of nations and their associated institutions. For example, the policies adopted by a democratic nation are done so in the name of the people, who must, in consistency, own that the same policies are equally valid for the leaders of other nations acting in the name of their own people. Indeed, the most basic requirement of rationality, that of simple consistency, is expressed by the law of non-contradiction, and serves as the most fundamental constraint upon all theories, including moral theories. Consider, for example, the formal principle of justice “treat equals equally,” or “treat like cases alike.” This content-free principle does not imply that any particular mode of conduct is morally required, but only that, **whatever practices and policies are decided upon by the community, they must be applied to all similarly relevant cases.**

The requirement of simple consistency is characterized by moral philosophers as “universalizability”, and is arguably an indispensable part of any truly **moral** perspective. In the view of Immanuel Kant, the requirement of universalizability takes the explicit form of the test for the Categorical Imperative, that one act only upon those maxims which one can will all others to act upon as well. In the view of John Stuart Mill and other utilitarians, the requirement of universalizability is embedded directly in the principle of utility, that one ought always to act so as to maximize the happiness of the greatest number.

The perspective of human rights, according to which all human beings possess an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, also insists upon the equal worth of all people, whether they live within or outside one’s own country. The reigning military paradigm conflicts with the concern of human rights advocates to protect all people from aggression, for it assumes that some people (so-called “collateral damage” victims) can be stripped of their lives. For example, the U.S. Administration has long claimed that the people of Iraq would be better off after Saddam Hussein had been ousted from power. But, of course, thousands (more) of them are now dead. If human life is sacred, then from the victims’ perspective, their own demise, characterized by the military as “collateral damage,” is a crime no less than it would be to have been killed

by Saddam Hussein himself.

The Ethical Concept of Self-defense

War is nearly always justified on grounds of “self-defense”, and military institutions are charged with *defending* the nation. Indeed, the moral permissibility of war is often assumed to be obvious, for many people appear to believe that war is nothing more and nothing less than a form of community self-defense. In civil society it is illegal to harm other people, and the penalties for doing so are proportional to the degree of damage done. The worst crime that one can commit in civil society is intentionally to kill another human being, to strip someone of his or her own life. However, self-defense, the use of force to protect oneself from an aggressor, is considered an acceptable justification for harming another person, *if and only if* doing so is the only way to prevent harm to one’s self. The concept of self-defense seems straightforward and relatively uncontroversial: an innocent person directly threatened with harm may defend him- or herself from such unjust attack. But we need to examine the details of the self-defense paradigm which has been uncritically assumed to justify the activities of military institutions, rather than simply supposing that the moral permissibility of self-defense implies that of war.

Nothing could be more valuable to a person than his or her own life, the *sine qua non* of the possibility of valuing anything else. If there are any human rights whatsoever, then the most basic right must be the right to defend oneself from the possibility of annihilation. People often disagree about policies and plans, the best manners in which to organize institutions and, most fundamentally, the best sort of life to live. But in order to have these sorts of disagreements, we must first be alive. Given this basis for self-defense, it is impermissible to kill an aggressor when a lesser form of violence would achieve the same aim of defusing the danger at hand. This moral perspective regarding the sanctity of conscious human life is reflected in the laws of civil society, according to which criminal suspects are innocent until proven guilty, and vigilante killings of allegedly “just retribution” are prohibited. Nor is it considered morally permissible to kill other, non-threatening people in deflecting a threat to oneself.

Yet modern war invariably results in the deaths of people who pose no danger to others, but happen to be located in the vicinity of a perceived threat. The most obvious

problem with war, when compared with legitimate self-defense, would certainly seem to be that it involves an *excessive* use of force, the use of extraordinarily destructive weapons that invariably kill innocent people. In fact, upon closer examination, the actions of individuals defending themselves from harm by violent aggressors and the modern activities of military institutions prove to be wildly disparate. A typical case of self-defense involves an agent who perceives himself to be in grave danger and adopts violent means to protect him- or herself from an aggressor who is armed and dangerous and clearly intends to harm the person who wields force to deter the threat. The person defending himself is surprised by the perilous situation in which he finds himself and decides in the moment, as a direct result of his own perceptions, to take action against the aggressor so as to neutralize the threat with which he has been confronted through no fault of his own. *Bona fide* cases of self-defense highlight the intuitive appeal of the “proportionality” and “last resort” principles of just war theory, for while people are justified in defending themselves from attack, they may wield only so much force as is necessary to neutralize a clear and present deadly threat. Premeditated killings are not acts of self-defense, for when there is time to formulate a plot, there is also time to take cover or flee.

Many may assume that the military is analogous to the head of a parent-protector figure, who would naturally defend his children from attack in the very manner in which he would defend himself. Children are incapable of defending themselves from attack by adult aggressors, and so it is the responsibility of their parents to defend them. The parents in such cases act on behalf of their children, and the military analogy is supposed to be that the military similarly defends the civilian population from attack. Just as helpless children have the right to be protected by their parents, so, too, do helpless civilians have the right to be protected by the military, which has been charged with this responsibility and armed for this purpose. Rhetorical allusions to “self-defense” have proven most effective throughout history in rallying the populace and troops behind leaders’ causes, but the analogy between war and self-defense is extremely weak, even when war is compared to the defense of a family by a parent-protector figure.

Strikingly, *none* of the features of legitimate self-defense are present in wars fought abroad. First, while legitimate self-defense culminates only *sometimes* in death,

war *always* does. Second, the military is nothing like the head of a household, for military personnel fill their roles as a matter of profession: either they are *paid* to wield deadly weapons, or they are *conscripted* by law. Third, because in modern warfare the commander-in-chief does not participate in the wars of his own waging, he certainly is not related to the populace allegedly being defended as the father is related to the children whom he defends in his own home. But the comparison between the head of the household and the soldiers who do the actual fighting is faulty as well, for modern soldiers do not act upon their own perceptions and interpretations of the allegedly clear and present danger. Rather, soldiers act under order by their superior officers and the commander-in-chief, who provide their own interpretations of the danger against which soldiers have been charged to fight. The soldier's situation is morally perplexing, for while he may be convinced of the story being told to him by his own commander-in-chief, he also knows (on some level) that the enemy leader tells similar stories to his troops, which they also believe. The situation of the enemy soldier is in fact morally identical to that of the allied soldier: Each has been strenuously conditioned to believe that his leader's cause is just and the enemy evil.

But arguably the most striking difference between war and literal self-defense involves the means deemed acceptable for achieving the aim of "defense". The weapons developed by modern military institutions supposedly for the purpose of protecting the people of the nation differ significantly from those used in defending one's self and family from harm. While guns have "dual" usage for either offensive or defensive action, bombs are always and only used through *transporting them to other parts of the world and dropping them upon other people's property*. It is *a fortiori* difficult to see how weapons such as cluster bombs, land mines, napalm, depleted uranium missiles, etc., can be conceived of in terms of literal self-defense, which does not admit cases of wanton destruction. While guns are produced for a legitimate domestic purpose, viz., to arm law enforcement agents within civil society, bombs have no purpose independent from that of war, for which they have been expressly developed and *premeditatedly* produced. The gun wielded in self-defense by a person suddenly confronted by danger existed antecedently for a legal purpose. The premeditated development of massively destructive weapons designed *only* for deployment *away* from one's own homeland thus further impugns the alleged analogy between war and legitimate self-defense.

Military supporters will reply that the aggressor against which the military defends the populace is an army far more dangerous than any individual aggressor, and this is why formidable weapons are needed to protect the nation, weapons that can in fact destroy large numbers of people in a small amount of time. But weapons of mass destruction, for example, nuclear warheads and chemical and biological weapons of insidious infiltration, devastate entire populations (and the environments in which they and their descendants might live) without regard to the victims' roles in society. On the face of it, then, the use (or the threat of the use) of such weapons does not fit into the picture according to which war is a form of self-defense, for non-combatant civilians do not pose a clear and present threat to anyone, and legitimate cases of self-defense harm only violent aggressors.

A war takes place between groups of people, is waged by a leader and fought by soldiers, who sometimes act on behalf of nations, and sometimes represent subsets of nations. Factional groups within a single nation often vehemently disagree about certain moral issues and policies, and such disagreement is sometimes expressed through the use of deadly violence. While there can be little doubt that soldiers fighting a ground war on their own territory view themselves as engaged in self-defense when directly faced with attack by enemy soldiers, combat soldiers fighting abroad do not simply *find themselves* on the battlefield. Rather, they have been sent by the commander-in-chief to meet the enemy soldiers whom they fight. So another obvious distinction between wars fought abroad and legitimate self-defense is that the former involve an intention on the part of the commander-in-chief to engage his troops in battle, while legitimate self-defense always involves a person who finds him- or herself in a dangerous situation by chance and, in desperation, defends him- or herself from harm.

Now, when a country has been invaded by enemy soldiers, then the soldiers of the invaded land **do** find themselves in that situation by chance, and so their use of force to repel acts of aggression by the invaders is much easier to construe in terms of self-defense, for they may reasonably regard themselves along the lines of a person sleeping in his own home who is awakened by an armed trespasser.

The *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) draws a clear distinction between the defensive and the offensive use of force, asserting that acts of aggression by one nation against another are not to be tolerated. For example, Chapter 1, Article 2 states:

“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”⁵

And the first two stated purposes of the United Nations are:

“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind [the year of the Charter was 1945] and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small...”⁶

In 1991, military action was condoned by the United Nations on the grounds that Saddam Hussein had violated international law by invading and occupying Kuwait, thereby *initiating* a war to which the international community subsequently reacted *defensively*. Then President George H.W. Bush characterized the war in terms of self-defense: “The state of Kuwait must be restored, or no nation will be safe, and the promising future we anticipate will indeed be jeopardized.”⁷ The international community has also approved of military interventions by outside (foreign) troops, arguing that the people of those nations needed to be protected from the government in power. The NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999 (which was not, however, promoted by the United Nations) was defended by its supporters on the grounds that the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo needed to be defended from the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. When the United States undertook to wrest power from the Taliban in 2001, many war supporters claimed that the Afghani people, especially oppressed women, would benefit greatly. Again, among the many arguments offered for the 2003 invasion of Iraq was that the people of Iraq needed to be liberated from their dictator. Whether or not the justifications in these cases were sound continues to be a matter of debate. Because

resistance groups located within each of these nations opposed the bombing of their own lands, it is unclear how these military actions, imposed by outsiders and in some cases without so much as consulting the inhabitants of the countries in question, might be viewed along the lines of legitimate “self-defense.” No father would bomb the school in which his children were attending class in order to protect them from an aggressor on the premises.

Although most people appear to accept uncritically the identification of the activities of “Defense” institutions with morally permissible “self-defense,” in the light of the fact that millions of innocent people were killed during the wars of the past century, we need to ask which policies of our institutions of “Defense” promote the ethical goal of self-defense and which in fact undermine it.

2. Human Security Viewed through the Lens of Ethics

Given the intuitive distinction between the offensive and the defensive use of force (which is highlighted by cases of legitimate self-defense), many people and governments were alarmed by the following statement, issued by the U.S. Administration in September 2002:

“We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: ...defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country...**we recognize that our best defense is a good offense...**” [my emphasis]⁸

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002; hereafter, *NSSUSA*) asserts the right to a form of “self-defense” that is never accepted within civil society, where persons are always presumed innocent until proven guilty.

The idea of “offensive defense” also flies in the face of international law as articulated in the *Charter of the United Nations* and grounded in classical just war theory, for it is arguably impossible to interpret a *preventive* war as a *last resort*. Just as in the case of individual self-defense, when there is time to plan and execute a war, there is also time to take cover. If all nations were to embrace a reading of “defense” as permitting offensive military action, we would find ourselves in the proverbial Hobbesian state of nature. On the other hand, it is also true that of all nations in existence today, only the United States can violate international law with impunity, having withdrawn from the International Criminal Court (ICC), and possessing an army and arsenal orders of magnitude larger than those of any other nation (indeed, of the next fifteen nations combined).⁹

The U.S. policy of “preemptive” or offensive defense gained a fair amount of support among members of the security community in the aftermath of 9/11.¹⁰ The defensive use of containment, multilateral institution-building, and the rule of international law gave way during this period to what may be called a “rugged individualist,” or perhaps more aptly, a Western cowboy approach, summed up by George W. Bush in his 2004 State of the Union Address: “America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country.” In this view, when the United States decides to violate international law and flout the conventions governing even those multilateral institutions established by the United States itself, this is supposed to be regarded not as an affront to the rule of law, but a refusal to submit sheepishly to the will of other nations.

Critics of the United States’ offensive approach to defense equate the “strategy” with unprovoked military action or “naked aggression”, to use the term employed by then President George H. W. Bush in condemning the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq claimed to justify the 1991 Gulf War. But supporters of the United States’ proactive approach wish for potential threats be stopped before they reach the nation’s borders. In their view, the policy of “offensive defense” requires the United States to interpose itself in the affairs of other nations in order to confront evil enemies operating abroad, deploying the weapons of war before, not after, the enemy does the same.

Those who supported the Bush administration’s plan to invade Iraq did so despite warnings from experts around the world that, far from constituting a form of “defense,”

such a war would actually lead to an increase in terrorist activity, for the action would be widely *interpreted* as an unjust act of military aggression designed to extend the hegemonic power exerted by the United States both militarily and economically, and indeed symbolized by the very Pentagon and World Trade Center targeted on September 11, 2001. War critics warned that some of those who viewed the United States' military action as criminal would retaliate, taking the lives of even more innocent people.

Many also predicted that the impending war would lead to a humanitarian disaster, especially in view of the administration's publicly pronounced "shock and awe" plan to drop more bombs in the first 48 hours than were dropped during the entire 1991 Gulf War. A Pentagon official briefed CBS News on the plan:

"There will not be a safe place in Baghdad... The sheer size of this has never been seen before, never been contemplated before... We want them to quit, not to fight, so that you have this simultaneous effect - rather like the nuclear weapons at Hiroshima - not taking days or weeks but minutes."¹¹

Such reports on the part of U.S. Defense personnel did not mesh with claims by other administration spokesmen that "collateral damage" would be minimized, for most of the millions of people who live in Baghdad are civilians. During March and April of 2003, thousands, not millions, of innocent people were destroyed by U.S. military forces, but millions were in fact terrorized by the ominous threat of "shock and awe" put forth by the U.S. Administration. For what is terrorism, if not the threat of the use of deadly force against innocent people in arbitrary ways? And how else could a preemptive war against Iraq have been understood by the prospective victims themselves, given that the very existence of the alleged arsenals had not been established, much less their location?

I have suggested that the dominant military paradigm neglects the most important factor in morality, viz., the perspective of individual subjects victimized in war. Because most people simply assume that war is a form of legitimate self-defense, they very rarely think about the meaning of military proclamations, such as "There will not be a safe place in Baghdad," from the prospective victim's perspective. Were war supporters

to reflect upon the perspective of the human beings at the receiving ends of bombing campaigns, they might recognize that “collateral damage” reports leave out the very basis for morality and, there subsumed, self-defense.

Security from the First-person Perspective

One of the most telling distinctions between war opponents and those who advocate the use of deadly force in resolving disputes would seem indeed to be precisely the importance that they ascribe to a third-person or “objective” and a first-person or “subjective” evaluation of the effects of war. Thus one often hears military supporters praising a mission for its having limited “collateral damage” to 50, 100 or 1000 civilian deaths. These numbers may seem small when compared to the entire population potentially affected. However, viewed *from the perspective of the victims*, whose lives are terminated prematurely through the decision of a political leader to wield deadly force, the deaths can only be seen as grossly unjust. It is important to emphasize here that the phenomenological effect upon a human being’s psychological state of threatened bombing campaigns is indistinguishable from the threat of factional terrorist attack.

Fanatical terrorists assume, no less than those who initiate bombing campaigns under the auspices of formal military institutions, that they have privileged access to the “knowledge” upon which they base actions having serious consequences for innocent people, though the targets of terrorists’ criticism are typically the governments of the people whom they destroy. Incapable of converting others to their own views through the use of language, fanatics resort to deadly force, silencing irrevocably some of those who disagree while simultaneously threatening all survivors with death.¹² The aftereffects of terrorist acts ramify through space and time, traumatizing the survivors and hindering their ability to live in a world without fear. The trauma caused by terrorism is a persistent consequence of the isolated instance of violence, forcing people to confront the fragility of human existence and their own mortality. From the perspective of the locus of afflicted consciousness, this traumatic experience is not a function of the identity of the persons threatening the use of force in arbitrary ways against innocent people. The subjective experience of civilians trapped in lands undergoing bombing raids is phenomenologically indistinguishable from the threat of

terrorism with which citizens of the United States became familiar only on September 11, 2001. From the perspectives of those threatened with the use of deadly force in retaliation to *other people's* actions, they are being unjustly punished no less than were the victims of the September 11th attacks.

Wars waged abroad undermine the psychological security of the inhabitants of a nation being bombed no less than do random terrorist attacks, for the people who happen to be located, through no fault of their own, in countries run by criminal leaders, have no way of knowing whether they will survive. All they really know is that some, perhaps many, people are bound to die when the military of another nation begins to drop bombs from on high. The number of civilians killed in Iraq by the U.S. Military during 2003 has been estimated to be between 8-10,000. All of those people was terrorized before they died. Yet, because of the dominance of the military paradigm in contemporary society, people somehow find it easy to overlook such obvious facts.

When on March 11, 2004 the simultaneous explosions of several trains in Madrid killed some 200 people and injured many more, the horror of the act was patent to all. Images of bodies being carried out of the wrecked trains were transmitted by all major media outlets. In contrast, no major media outlet in United States transmitted any images of the thousands of dead civilians killed by U.S. bombs in 2003. In comparing these two cases, one must bear in mind that it would take dozens of the coordinated train attacks in Madrid to add up to the slaughter of Iraqis in March and April of 2003. In other words, even if one neglects the first-person perspective and does simple utilitarian math, there is a serious problem with the reigning paradigm.

From a moral perspective, the peculiarity of the reigning paradigm of military solutions to conflict inheres in the fact that it takes into consideration the subjective intention of the killers (so long as they are one's own allies), while dismissing the perspective of the victims as "irrelevant", and defining the intentions and perspectives of the enemy as "evil". As is well known and widely accepted, the distinction between political killing by factions and military killing by states (at least one's own state and allies) is made on the basis of a "legitimacy" said to be enjoyed by the latter but not by the former. However, from a moral perspective, it is unclear that this view can withstand scrutiny.

When civilians are erroneously targeted, as happened often in Vietnam, during the

1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo, in the campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, a thorough diffusion of responsibility ensues.¹³ The planners who mistakenly selected the targets can absolve themselves from wrongdoing by reasoning that they never physically caused the death of anyone. Soldiers, on the other hand, can absolve themselves from any moral responsibility for the innocent lives they destroy on the grounds that they merely did their soldierly duty. It is the role of a soldier to obey, not to call into question the orders that he receives from his commanders. Since soldiers most likely do not *intend* to harm innocent people, such mistakes are an unfortunate consequence of human fallibility as it manifests itself in warfare.

Note, however, that if once one admits the validity of this line of reasoning, then one must, in consistency, allow that it applies to **all** military strategists and soldiers, including those on the enemy side. Defenders of “just war theory” have often explained the distinction between accidental killings and war crimes by appeal to the Catholic “doctrine of double effect”. This doctrine allows one to evaluate the moral rightness or wrongness of an action by considering the actor’s intention. If a killer targets innocent life directly (either as an end in itself, or as a means to an end intentionally sought), then his act is murder. If, in contrast, a killer physically causes the deaths of innocent people as a side effect of a legitimate military action, then those killings are not murder.

The problem with this approach to distinguishing permissible from impermissible killings of innocent people is that it is quite unclear that any soldier, whether ally or enemy, ever kills people with the aim of destroying innocent life. Rather, soldiers typically do what they are told out of a sense of duty and in obedience to authority. As misguided as the soldiers on the enemy side may be, they probably do not have evil intentions and their actions are without any doubt informed by a story told to them by their leader. Even when factional groups wreak havoc upon civilians, they are in all likelihood interpreting their victims as complicitors in the crimes of the government, through their ongoing support of what the faction takes to be the evil regime in power.

The Dominance of the State Security Model and its Blindspots

The authority of a state is contingent upon its satisfaction of the needs of the people who alone can legitimate that authority. The details of those needs will differ slightly from community to community, due to geographic and other factors, but the most

fundamental purpose is generally assumed to be the protection of people from violence and the threat of violence. Because the state-centered paradigm of security that gained sway during the Cold War period continues to dominate discourse regarding national defense, seldom are non-military forms of security entertained by political leaders. Indeed, most writers in the mainstream security community simply assume that “security” is synonymous with “state security,” a tendency reflected in many passages of *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), which asserts the possibility of the deployment even of nuclear arms by the United States, should they deem the use of such weapons necessary in “self-defense”. One might have hoped that with the end of the Cold War nuclear arms would finally be abolished, but, due to the persistence of the state-centered paradigm, this is quite far from being the case, and the human insecurity engendered by the existence of such arms continues unabated.

During the Cold War the strategy of mutually assured destruction (“MAD”) was championed by military strategists in the United States and the Soviet Union, on the grounds that possessing weapons sufficient to destroy the entire population of the enemy would prevent a direct war from ever being waged between the two super-powers (though it should not be forgotten that many surrogate battles were fought in other areas of the world throughout this period). The fundamental idea behind mutually assured destruction was that the enemy comprised a group of rational agents who would act so as to ensure their own survival, even while disagreeing about any number of matters of value and ideology. Two films released in 1964, *Fail-Safe* (directed by Sidney Lumet) and *Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (directed by Stanley Kubrick) address the problem of human fallibility in the light of the nuclear capability now shared by many nations. Some military professionals would dismiss these critiques as alarmist, suggesting as they do that a single unbalanced person might “push the button” to end human civilization. In fact, the premises upon which the critiques made by these films rest are near platitudes.

First, some human beings are unbalanced. Second, soldiers and military officers are trained to carry out missions when told to do so by their superior officers, a chain of command that culminates with the commander-in-chief. Third, some people involved in the military may well believe that they and their fellow citizens would be “better dead than red (or X)”. And, finally, all human beings are fallible. It is altogether conceivable

that an unbalanced person might become the commander-in-chief of a nation with a nuclear arsenal, and that person may very well order soldiers who have been trained to obey unconditionally and without hesitation to carry out even unthinkable missions. Such a scenario is really not so far-fetched, as is arguably illustrated by the cases of U.S. President Harry S. Truman, who in 1945 deployed the atom bomb against both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and George W. Bush, who in 2003 waged war in violation of international law and in the face of widespread opposition by the world community.

While, in theory, among rational parties, possession of the means for mutual destruction of both sides to a conflict might minimize the likelihood that either side would ever deploy such weapons, in reality, military strategists are human beings whose judgment may be impaired by a variety of factors. We simply do not have grounds for believing that a commander-in-chief and his subordinate military officers will conduct themselves rationally under the stressful conditions of perceived threat. Furthermore, for all we know, in some countries the persons at the highest level of military command may well believe in a slogan such as “better dead than X,” preferring group suicide to capitulation. Suicide bombers have taken action against their enemies in countries all over the world (and their numbers appear to be on the rise). Nothing can guarantee that such people will never end up working in formal military institutions. (Consider the infiltration problem in post-Saddam Iraq.) The hijackers of September 11, 2001 certainly demonstrated for everyone to see that some people are quite ready and willing to kill themselves along with thousands of others for what they take to be a “just cause”.

Fail Safe and *Dr. Strangelove* underscore the fact that war differs significantly from individual self-defense in that it involves several levels of participation and involvement (chains of command) not reflected in the typical self-defense scenario of an individual defending him- or herself from harm. Nor can the modern weapons of war be accommodated by the schema of legitimate self-defense, which precludes the wanton destruction of human beings. Bear in mind that what justifies self-defense is the wrongness of harming (and *a fortiori* destroying) innocent people, who must have the right to defend themselves from their own annihilation, if there are any rights at all.

If war is simply an instance of self-defense, then one must explain how resisting violent aggression can involve the very same act of aggression against *other* innocent people. If it is wrong to destroy innocent people, then how can it be right to destroy

innocent people in the process of protecting innocent people?¹⁴ The most frequent response to this question appeals to quasi-utilitarian reasoning. In this view, it is sometimes necessary to kill *some* innocent people in order to save an even larger number. While such rationalizations are nearly always offered in times of war, the history of human society suggests that recourse to the institutionalized use of deadly force is counterproductive to the goal of community self-defense and in fact undermines human security. Indeed, when one considers the enormous number of people slaughtered during war throughout history, one is immediately struck by the fact that most of those people were civilian non-combatants, presumably the very people who were supposed to have been saved through resorting to war.

Strikingly, even if we simply assume its premises, the utilitarian argument for war fails, because military attacks affect not only the immediate victims, but the views of all survivors. An accurate utilitarian speculation regarding prospective actions must therefore take into account the long-range effects of destructive violence, which exceed the limited parameters of what may seem to be a short-term and local military campaign. It seems clear that the recourse to deadly force by nations serves as an example to subnational factions of how to resolve conflict. Furthermore, acts of military aggression, even on the part of coalitions with the best of intentions, may have the infelicitous effect of strengthening the popular support of a criminal leader, for in such a case the people themselves personally witness the destruction and death wrought by invading forces. Far from weakening a dictator's grip over his people, offensive military action may have precisely the opposite of the intended effect, causing even more of the people than ever before to believe the leader's characterization of invading forces as "evil."

This certainly appears to have been one effect of the 1999 bombing of Kosovo by NATO.¹⁵ That "violence breeds violence" was illustrated by the increase in murder of Serbs by ethnic Albanians, who seemed to have been galvanized by the example set by their NATO role models. But longer range consequences of the NATO bombing of Kosovo also suggest that people probably cannot be bombed into changing their views, as illustrated by the election to parliament in December 2003 of Slobodan Milosevic and his Serbian Radical Party ally, Vojislav Seselj, though both men were at the time standing trial at the Hague for war crimes. In fact, the Serbian Radical Party secured 81 of the 250 available parliament seats, faring better than the pro-Western groups

supported by the NATO bombing. Even more disturbingly, the new (anti-Milosevic) Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, was assassinated on March 12, 2003.

While the effects of the NATO bombing of Kosovo are telling, nowhere are the perilous blindspots of “military science” better illustrated than in the cases of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. By now people are generally aware of the role that the international community played in producing the tyrant that Saddam Hussein became. The picture of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld shaking hands with the former dictator in December 1983 tells a thousand words, but unfortunately U.S. administration officials have not read them. Today’s ally may become tomorrow’s enemy, and there is no way to retract the technology, weapons, and training already lavished upon what has transmogrified into a megalomaniacal dictator such as Saddam Hussein or an international terrorist such as Osama bin Laden, who was of course supported by the United States during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Until the implications of such cases are taken seriously by administration officials, such blunders are bound to be repeated.

Although the U.S. offered “international security” as one of its many rationalizations for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, in fact, violent attacks upon ordinary citizens increased not only within, but also outside of Iraq, for example, in Turkey and in Spain. Indeed, the very fact that the focus of the war on terrorism should have switched to Iraq *upon* the U.S. invasion and occupation, itself reveals that the actions of terrorists are reactive to perceived injustice. Note also that, several months following the invasion, when U.S. President George W. Bush visited the United Kingdom in late 2003, the British people were made to pay an astounding £4 million to ensure his safety. That such extreme measures were deemed necessary by the U.S. and British governments itself reveals their recognition of the potential for terrorist proliferation engendered by the offensive war waged by Bush and supported by British Premier Tony Blair and José María Aznar, the Prime Minister of Spain. In the aftermath of the invasion and during the ongoing occupation numerous intercontinental flights were cancelled due to heightened security concerns. In an insecure world, only elite persons such as heads of state are ensured of protection. George W. Bush does not have to worry about his flights being cancelled - he simply hops on Air Force One.

The Proliferation of Weapons and War Caused by Weapons and War

Although the United States had branded North Korea as a part of the “axis of evil” to which Iraq was said to belong, the U.S. attacked Iraq but not North Korea in 2003. One clear difference between the two cases is that North Korea *already* possessed nuclear arms which it was poised to use against its neighbors, while Iraq was said only to have a program for the *development* of nuclear weapons. This suggests that the United States’ offensive approach to defense will lead to global nuclear proliferation, as nations scurry about trying to protect themselves from unpredictable, offensive war waged by the U.S. administration, which has already displayed its insouciance toward world opinion and international law. Indeed, the unpredictable behavior of the United States will in all likelihood also galvanize terrorist factions to develop further innovative methods of destruction. The danger of nuclear recipes finding their way into the manuals of terrorist factions will naturally increase with the proliferation of those technologies among governments. Consider, for example, the case of the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who confessed in early 2004 to having sold nuclear secrets around the world. Even more astounding to those concerned with human security is the U.S. administration’s decision to develop so-called “suitcase nukes”, which can obviously be carried just as easily in the suitcases of terrorists as in those of U.S. Marines.

In galvanizing their troops to fight and their societies to fund war, leaders invariably claim that their military campaigns will lead to peace. However, that war will lead to a lasting peace would seem to be impugned by the simple fact that the history of human societies is a long series of war after war, slaughter after slaughter, atrocity after atrocity. The use of destructive military means has increased dramatically over time, and the military-industrial complex has in the process grown to be enormous and formidably powerful. If wars diminished the frequency of war on this planet, then one might have thought that by the twenty-first century the world would be a relatively pacific place. In fact, the accretion of weapons of mass destruction continues to cause some seriously to worry whether the last war will be the prelude to peace only through its culmination in total global destruction. Now that the Cold War has ended, its legacy of weapons and technology remains. Meanwhile, conventional weapons are deployed in conflicts all over the planet, and nothing precludes the possibility that a leader may decide to deploy the nuclear arms readily available for his use, as Truman did in 1945.

In the last four major conflicts involving the United States (Iraq 2003, Afghanistan 2001, Kosovo 1999, and Iraq 1991), thousands of innocent people were destroyed. While in the United States it is often lamented that in Vietnam more than fifty thousand American soldiers died, *millions* of civilian Vietnamese and Cambodians were killed as a direct result of the United States' involvement in the conflict between the North and the South Vietnamese. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians (including many children) died as a direct result of the obliteration by the United States of Iraq's water treatment facilities and the subsequent imposition of economic sanctions restricting the people's access to desperately needed medication. Tragically, more civilians were killed during the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan in 2001 than were killed by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. According to even the most conservative estimates, more than twice the number of civilians killed on 9/11 were killed by the U.S. Military in Iraq in 2003. Recourse to deadly force by nations leads to weapons proliferation and retaliatory action by angry factions, individuals, and even states. Indeed, the very fact that the U.S. Administration opted for military responses to the crimes of September 11, 2001, itself arguably illustrates that "violence breeds violence."

War supporters in the Western world often claim to be informed by the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, unfazed by the biblical commandment "Thou shalt not kill." The apparent conflict between the religious proscription against killing and the use of deadly force in times of strife is resolved by re-interpreting "Thou shalt not kill" to mean "Thou shalt not murder." War advocates then maintain that the acts of killing which they promote are not acts of murder. But the weakness of the analogy between war and self-defense implies that war must be justified in some other way, given the assumption that it is wrong to kill innocent people.

Because war nearly never harms the people whose actions have led to the retaliatory use of deadly force, the analogy between war and the punitive justice system within civil society fails as well. Most recently, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were waged ostensibly in response to the actions of Osama bin-Laden and Saddam Hussein, but thousands of innocent people bearing no responsibility for these men's crimes were killed in their stead. In considering the possibility of war as a form of retribution, the question thus arises: in circumstances of international strife, who ought really to be

punished? Civilians living under dictatorial rule? No, for they are in no way responsible for the crimes of their leaders. Conscripted soldiers? No, for they have been physically coerced to fight. Professional soldiers? No, for they have been (nearly always) economically coerced. By slaughtering innocent civilians for the crimes of their leaders, who themselves go effectively unpunished, war embodies the very antithesis of “just retribution”. But if our leaders will wage war in response to what they take to be the injustices of others, why should the leaders of other nations, groups, and factions not do the same? All human beings are trapped in and act upon their own subjective interpretations of the world in which they find themselves.

3. The Moral Perspective Applied to Peace-building

The reason for applying moral concepts to other nations is of course that nations comprise no more and no less than groups of people, no different in moral essence from the people of our own nation, the members of our own families and ourselves. Military and political leaders often assert their nation’s own rights to “self-defense” without taking any responsibility whatsoever for the devastation and death that their own policies wreak upon the people of other nations. Accordingly, standard “collateral damage” apologies, and what has become the wholesale diffusion of responsibility (to the point of denial) regarding the negative consequences of war, need to be criticized in the public realm in order to promote peace and security in the global community.

To look at war from a moral, as opposed to a political or an economic perspective, requires that we consider the perspectives of individuals, but it also requires that a person’s citizenship (or lack thereof) not be used as a basis for deciding whether or not that person has rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Given the longstanding traditions regarding patriotism in virtually every existent nation, few seem to have recognized that such chauvinism is morally equivalent to the very racism and sexism that have been roundly rejected in our modern democratic societies. This does not mean that people are, in principle, incapable of seeing the analogy of their own favoritism of their compatriots to racism and sexism. But it does mean that we have a long way to go before the paradigm of cosmopolitanism favored by Kofi Annan and many others concerned with the future of the world and the species will be accepted by

everyone (or, more realistically, most people) everywhere.

Moral concepts are often invoked by spokesmen for nations as though their policies were grounded in morality, but this is not always the case. For to take morality seriously is to accord all others equally situated the same rights (and responsibilities) that one accords to one's self. Extrapolating to the international case, then, a nation that wishes to conduct itself in conformity with the dictates of morality in its dealings with other nations must accord to all other nations the rights (and responsibilities) that it accords to itself. There is no room for "free-riders" in international affairs any more than there is room for "free-riders" at the level of interpersonal morality. The basis for a peaceful community of nations is the same as the basis for a peaceful community of persons: the members of the group in question must treat others with the same respect with which they expect others to treat them.

Now, how can adopting a moral, as opposed to a political or economic, perspective toward international affairs bring about a more peaceful world? What practical measures implied by the moral perspective might be implemented in order to foster the human security sought by all? In thinking about how to transform the world into a more pacific place, it is important to bear in mind how and why the "state security" model of national defense continues to prevail even in spite of its obvious limitations and deficiencies. First, and most obviously, human beings are creatures of habit, and it is extraordinarily difficult to chip away at ideas inculcated over millennia, especially given the essentially conservative nature of belief.¹⁶ The situation is exacerbated by the relatively recent capitalization of the weapons industry, an extremely powerful economic force that serves to perpetuate the reigning paradigm and in fact favors the incessant expansion of the military state. We need always to be aware of the existence of such forces, acting behind the scenes of what often appears to be a debate about justice and morality.¹⁷ In addition, given the manifestly insecure state of the contemporary world, we need to examine etiological factors surrounding factional violence that are generally ignored by national security strategists, whose policies tend to focus upon the current situation, not the history leading up to it, nor what may later ensue.

Although political realists appear to view moral theorists as living in fantasy worlds of childish concepts, in fact, the moral perspective carries with it many practical implications for the conduct of nations and their associated institutions. Can anyone

rationaly condone “preemptive war” or “offensive defense” as a heuristic principle for all nations to abide by? To take another example, if it is wrong for some countries to wield nuclear warheads, then it is wrong for any country to do so (or threaten to do so - in this connection see, again, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002). If it is wrong for some countries to develop biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, then it is wrong for any country to do so.

In a world in which one nation possesses and wields overwhelming military superiority, the prospects may seem dim for the role of morality at the international level. But the fact that leaders persistently offer *moral* interpretations of their actions (even while violating international law) itself illustrates that the populace is moved by moral considerations. The challenge becomes to make graphic the contradictions and inefficacies of an administration’s policies, so that the people themselves will choose to effect a change. Might makes “right,” in the sense that contemporaneously the will of the strong prevails, at least for a time, but history can be, is, and will be revised. When the citizens of a nation themselves express dissent from the policies and practices of their leaders, then the possibility exists to change the administration to one that recognizes the value of the moral perspective and so does not systematically apply two sets of standards, one to itself, and another to “outsiders.”

It is unfortunate that economic factors often persuade administrators to be more accommodating of unjust policies than they might otherwise be. But the same problem occurred in pre-Civil War America. Slave-owners were always wary of abolitionists, and they had every economic reason in the world to be so, but eventually an ethical perspective prevailed. If there is no manner in which to distinguish genuinely moral intentions from those of leaders who use moral rhetoric to achieve non-moral ends, it may nonetheless be possible to identify some cases in which morality is not really what is at issue, assuming the plausible requirements of universalizability and a non-arbitrary conception of moral personhood, arguably components of any genuinely moral view.

Viewing “The Enemy” as a Locus of Consciousness

I have suggested that the peculiarity of the reigning paradigm of military solutions to conflict inheres in the fact that it takes into consideration the subjective intention of the killers (so long as they are one’s own allies), while dismissing as “irrelevant,” the

perspective of the victims, and defining as “evil,” the intentions and perspectives of the enemy. In demonizing criminal leaders, the subjective perspective is not entirely ignored, for ascription of evil intentions is nearly always made. But this ascription seems counterproductive to the goals of peace and security, and in fact often seems to be ironically directed toward the ultimate reification of the enemy as absolutely evil in order to rationalize recourse to war. Who but “the evil enemy” should be eradicated from the face of the planet (or to use one of George W. Bush’s locutions, “hunted down”)?

Thinking about “the enemy” from a first-person perspective, as though they, too, had values, beliefs, plans and projects along the lines of our own, would make it much more difficult to indulge in what more often than not becomes a vicious cycle of violence, the most graphic recent example of which being the seemingly interminable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What, to take another example, should we expect the leaders of so-called “evil nations” to do, when faced with the direct threat of annihilation? Pushed up against a wall, a leader with nuclear arms may well decide to use them in the face of the manifest hostility evinced through the preposterous postulation of a so-called “axis of evil”. Bear in mind that people who have nothing to lose are the most dangerous people of all. When they are placed in desperate or impossible situations, we should expect them to react accordingly. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s troops set many oil wells on fire. This was a grotesque assault upon the environment and an obvious waste of the nation’s resources. But what behavior can we realistically expect of leaders who have been pushed up against a wall with neither the means for escape nor for saving face?

Consider the delicate situation in North Korea. North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, was branded as “evil” by U.S. President George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union Address. In 2003, Bush waged an offensive war, in violation of international law, against one of the members of this so-called “axis of evil.” Subsequent to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, other members of the “axis” can harbor no further doubts as to the willingness of the self-proclaimed “good” U.S. administration to deploy deadly force in unpredictable and offensive ways. Can anyone say that the psychological insecurity among denigrated leaders caused by such a situation has made the world a safer place?

When people offer arguments for going to war, they invariably begin with the

assumptions that the enemy is evil and that only through war can the enemy be prevented from destroying human lives. In cases such as that of Saddam Hussein, few would deny that the leader committed many serious crimes. But to summarily destroy human beings through so-called “collateral damage” in contending with a tyrannical regime is, from the perspective of those who disagree, to make the same mistake that the enemy has already made. Should not, then, the United States’ annihilation of innocent people lead others, who reject the U.S. administration’s interpretation of its own acts of killing as morally innocuous while nonetheless sharing their meta-view regarding the permissibility of “collateral damage,” to follow their example and attempt to **stop U.S. leaders**, whom **they** stigmatize as “the evil enemy”? Is that not precisely how people such as Osama Bin Laden persuade people to join their ranks? Note that, before and during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, millions of people in Muslim lands protested in the streets against the United States. Many of these people were carrying signs of support for Saddam Hussein and/or Osama bin-Laden. Other people were carrying signs (and this occurred all over Europe as well) of George W. Bush, who was being depicted as the new Adolf Hitler. Not only did millions of people participate in these demonstrations, but they were widely broadcast throughout the nations in which they took place, with one notable exception, viz., the United States.

The Bush administration obviously believes on some level that they are right. But practically speaking, national security strategists need to wake-up to the reality of how the United States is viewed abroad. We must, in self-defense, attend to the interpretations of other people, because **they** base plans, policies, and actions upon **their** interpretations, not upon ours. If we are disturbed by those interpretations, then we must endeavor to find ways to transform them. The U.S. administration cannot simply kill everyone on the planet who disagrees (though this would undoubtedly solve the problem of overpopulation). From the perspectives of the citizens of nations such as Korea, Iran, and Syria, the ongoing threat of preemptive attack upon their land by the United States is empirically indistinguishable from the threat of terrorist attack, thus confirming in their minds the “Bush = Hitler” hypothesis. Under this interpretation, civilians continually faced with the threat of the use of deadly force in retaliation to their government’s actions are being unjustly punished, while the leaders of those nations are simultaneously placed in the psychologically perilous situation of not

knowing whether they will be next in the line of fire. Because he has already flouted international law and dismissed the United Nations as “irrelevant,” at least when deciding when and where to deploy deadly force, George W. Bush has directly engendered global insecurity by his very unpredictability.

Now, there are many moral and intellectual problems with the comportment of the United States administration in their invasion and occupation of Iraq.¹⁸ Certainly the moral problem with the sort of chauvinism evinced by the U.S. approach is obvious, for one’s place of birth does not determine one’s moral worth any more than does one’s race, gender, sexual persuasion or economic status. From a moral perspective, if it is wrong to kill innocent Americans, then it is equally wrong to kill innocent non-Americans. Suffice it to say here that, from the moral perspective, mistakes have been made. But because in the high-tech world the people who hold in their hands the power to wage war, are the very same people who hold the key to peace, pointing out what we take to be their moral and intellectual failures and deficiencies, will not, in and of itself, change their views. Indeed, if we simply assume that the U.S. administration is incorrigibly corrupt and/or hopelessly incoherent, then we, following their own example, foreclose the possibility of dialogue, and with it, the possibility of transforming their policy in the future. Instead, we need to explain in the public domain how the strategy of national defense promulgated by this administration actually undermines the security of the people whom these leaders nominally represent.

Freedom of speech is fundamental to peaceful societies, both within a country and internationally, because members of any community must regard one another as interlocutors in a dialogue that is always advancing through stages of change. If, as I have suggested, individual centers of consciousness constitute the essence of moral value, a genuinely moral perspective will not simply issue edicts about objectively wrong actions and objectively bad states of affairs. For such accounts reduce morality to a type of scientific theory, which cannot even in principle capture the first-person perspective. Third-person theories commence from the conception of others as objects to be talked about, not as other persons to be talked to. The “conviction” model of morality conflicts with the basic recognition of one’s own fallibility, which rationally requires the acknowledgement that others, too, are moral persons acting according to their own beliefs, which they arrived at through historically unique pathways.

The Problem of Divergent Premises

The basic requirements upon any moral theory are at once the prerequisites to international communication needed in order to effect and maintain a peaceful and secure world. In circumstances of conflict, dialogue is essential to the moral perspective, which accords other persons the dignity of having their own opinions and beliefs. Far from being an impediment to national security, adopting a moral as opposed to a realist perspective in international affairs would in all likelihood make the world a safer place. While the sources of anger and hatred that in some cases lead to the slaughter of innocent people inhere in what are perceived to be the hypocrisy of governments that apply one standard to the “insiders”, and another to everyone else, we need to find common ground with the people with whom we vehemently disagree. War supporters and war opponents alike can agree that people such as Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden are threats to global security and peace. Having agreed on this point, we need to reflect seriously upon how to avoid repeating the mistakes of history while recognizing that we may be commencing our discussion from different sets of premises.

Let us consider some examples of the problem of divergent premises. Although the apparently inconsistent application of standards of conduct to other people and nations but not to one’s own, is viewed by many as flagrantly hypocritical, from the perspective of U.S. strategists, the use of double standards by the administration, one set for U.S. citizens, and another for outsiders, seems perfectly appropriate, given the uniqueness of the U.S. position in the world.¹⁹ In this view, there is no contradiction in what are perceived to be double standards, for while we must, in fairness, “treat like cases alike,” the U.S. is exceptional in such a way as to be exempted even from the rules which it applies to others. Now, many of us do not agree with this reading of U.S. “double standards,” but in order to engage in a dialogue with the people in power who hold this view, we must be ready and willing to think about the current situation from the perspective of someone who believes it to be true.

Again, while opponents to the 2003 invasion of Iraq were alarmed by the United States’ willingness to defy many of their longstanding U.N. allies, those who supported the war insisted that the mission was a part of the ongoing “war on terrorism”. Some supporters of the invasion maintained that a tyrant such as Saddam Hussein could easily

transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist factions to do with as they pleased. But people such as George W. Bush, who speak of a time when evil and darkness will be eradicated, leaving sweetness and light to reign supreme, hold a quite different view about the nature of the terrorist threat than do critics of preemptive military action. In what is apparently the view of Bush, et al., a finite number of terrorists exists, and we need only to root them out.

In contrast, those who warned about the proliferation of terrorism that would ensue from an unprovoked military attack upon a sovereign nation find it obvious that the set of “terrorists” is not a static entity but rather the function of a variety of factors which change over time. From this perspective, sending soldiers abroad to kill everyone who appears to the U.S. administration to be dangerous will actually *increase* the net number of terrorists in existence. Because people are *formed* into, not *born* as terrorists, a sound strategy for confronting the threat posed by terrorist groups must take into consideration etiological factors ignored by advocates of preemptive defense. In order to change the views of policy-makers, we must, as promoters of peace, take the time to display how the incidence of terrorism in the world is affected by the military behavior of states. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian, Russian-Chechen, and now the U.S.-Iraq situation (among others) all suggest that the last way to put an end to terrorist attack is by summarily executing terrorist suspects. When during their “wars against terrorism” such governments perfunctorily dismiss innocent victims as irrelevant “collateral damage,” they confirm the very theories promulgated by dissenting factional groups, some of whom decide to wield deadly force in response to what they view as war crimes.

Finally, although an international tribunal would seem to be the obvious alternative to the largely indiscriminate destruction caused during wars waged against criminal leaders, on May 6, 2002, the United States withdrew from the International Criminal Court, the explanation for which was published later that year in the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSSUSA)*:

“We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not

extend to Americans and which we do not accept. We will work together with other nations to avoid complications in our military operations and cooperation, through such mechanisms as multilateral and bilateral agreements that will protect U.S. nationals from the ICC. We will implement fully the American Service members Protection Act, whose provisions are intended to ensure and enhance the protection of U.S. personnel and officials.” [my emphasis]²⁰

This is a troubling statement, given that one of the primary purposes of the ICC would seem to be to circumvent the tragic killing of innocent people (through war) for the crimes of their leaders. However, rather than simply railing against the U.S. administration’s withdrawal from the ICC and its arrogant presumption of infallibility, we need to think strategically. We can point out to the administration that, in fact, the ICC offers more, not fewer options for dealing with criminal leaders. For example, in a case where a dictator’s control is strengthened by the dissemination of misinformation, an international criminal court could be used to make public the crimes of the leader, thus weakening the moral hold he has over his people.

We need, further, to remind those such as General Tommy Franks, who infamously asserted that “We don’t do body counts” when asked about the civilian casualty toll in Iraq, that nations are run by leaders but inhabited largely by ordinary people, most of whom have little or nothing to do with the crimes of their government. Military officers probably regard “the evil enemy” nation as an aggressor analogous to a person threatening deadly force against another person. However, this assumption commits both the fallacy of division and the fallacy of composition, for the moral properties of the parts of a nation (its citizens) are not reflected in the actions its government, nor *vice versa*. A nation comprises both more and less than the sum of its parts.

The Ultimate Importance of Interpretation

The self-undermining nature of preemptive military attack derives finally from the public nature of intentional acts of deadly violence. From the moral perspective, one must own that if one is justified in wielding deadly force whenever one *believes* this to be justified, then the same is true for other conscious agents. This suggests that sending

the military abroad to kill non-nationals on their own soil can only lead to more violence on the part of those who find themselves in social climates already conducive to the incubation of terrorists, who may well interpret their own actions as a form of legitimate self-defense. As has been amply illustrated in Iraq, some fraction of those enraged by what they take to be U.S. double standards and hegemony will decide to fight back, even sacrificing their own lives in the process.

When people assume that other people, leaders, and governments are evil, they adopt a perspective toward them that permits the rationalization of any number of acts of destruction in the name of “self-defense.” In fact, people, leaders, and governments are evolving entities whose attitudes and practices transform over time. Weapons are used by those who wield them for their own purposes, whatever they may be, and what could be more obvious than that through the course of their lives people change? We may believe a nation and its government to be our ally today, but in the future this may or may not be the case. The United States treated Saddam Hussein with the utmost respect, as an international interlocutor, during the Iran-Iraq conflict. Did Saddam Hussein really change so much between 1983, when the U.S. provided him with weapons and chemical technology, and 2003, when the U.S. effectively ordered his assassination? And, if so, was not this transformation in fact catalyzed by the military empowerment of this leader by the international community?

Cases such as that of Saddam Hussein strongly suggest that we need an entirely new way of approaching international affairs. It is time to abandon the prevailing paradigm of “Us vs. Them”. Suppose, instead, that we were to operate under the assumption that **we do not know** who our allies nor who our enemies in the future will be? What policy changes would such a stance imply? Most obviously, it would seem that we should refuse to export weapons to anyone. Period. Because we cannot control the ultimate ownership of any weapon once it leaves our borders, we should refuse to arm even our current allies. We should also refuse to train the people of any other land to kill.²¹

Adopting a more skeptical approach would have other implications for public policy as well. Among other things, it is simply self-defeating to foment anger and resentment through the overt expression of contempt for other members of the international community. And how else could the denunciation of a so-called “axis of

evil” comprising Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have been interpreted?²² Far from ensuring the safety of its citizenry, the conduct of the Bush administration appears to serve two primary functions: (1) the application of double standards, one set to itself and another to all outsiders, reaffirms in the minds of terrorists (both actual and potential), just how “evil” the U.S. empire truly is; and (2) the ongoing threat of the use of deadly force persistently drives home the idea that sometimes war (which, in the modern world, always involves the killing of innocent people) is needed in order to effect justice.

Imagine that instead of reinforcing the negative images of the United States embraced by potential terrorists all over the planet, the U.S. were to pour resources into rendering Russia’s vast nuclear arsenals secure. Or what if, rather than sending our troops across the world to instill fear in the people of the Middle East, the U.S. administration were to help them, by providing them with food, water, and access to medical care? There can be little doubt that such a change in approach would be strategic in the sense that it would make it more difficult for those of Bin Laden’s ilk to persuade others to join his ranks.

At the crossroads of political realism and pacifism is found an Aristotelian perspective that promotes both the democratic virtue of skepticism and the prudential desideratum of survival. Aristotle held that self-interest and community well-being did not conflict and, indeed, that the agent himself would benefit through acting virtuously. Aristotle’s mentor Plato pointed out in the *Republic* that the best way to gain the reputation of a good person is to act as a good person would. Both of these classical perspectives figure into what I take to be the most plausible approach to peace-building among diversely situated groups of self-interested people.

For it would seem that, at the end of the day, the best way to prevent the fanatical hatred and retaliation engendered by the interpretations of U.S. military action as criminal, is to avoid acting in any way that can be interpreted as criminal. Just as Plato observed in the *Republic*, the best way to secure the reputation of a moral person (read: “just government”) is in fact to act as a moral person (read: “just government”) would. If our policy-makers were to uphold even the most skeletal theory of morality, according to which it is absolutely wrong to destroy innocent life, and if they were to conduct themselves as though they actually believed the theory, in other words, mindful of the sanctity of conscious human existence, then other people would not be able to

interpret their actions as “immoral” or “evil.” In this way we would help ourselves while saving innocent lives and creating a climate infused not with hatred and resentment, but with mutual respect and fraternity.

In promoting the moral perspective, we can raise more practical and concrete concerns as well. For example, the fact that the information used by U.S. “intelligence” is often obtained through the arguably immoral use of economic coercion (bribery), raises serious questions about veridicality. For what sorts of people do we generally deem to be vulnerable to bribes? Those who are simply unscrupulous and will do anything, so long as “the price is right,” and those who are desperately poor, who justify to themselves the acceptance of a bribe in order to secure the means to survive (often not only for themselves, but for their families as well). It is the nature of top-secret information about groups such as Al-Qaeda to be shared by very few. This suggests that many of those approached with bribes in exchange for information are not themselves privy to that information, but they may nonetheless offer “tips” to agents who have promised to pay in return. A further disturbing possibility is that those who sympathize on some level with terrorist factions (against U.S. hegemony), may well provide ersatz information as a way of distracting U.S. intelligence from ascertaining what in fact is being planned. Because bribery is not a moral means of obtaining information, it would seem that those most likely to succumb to the lure of money are the least likely to tell the truth.

Above all, in the light of cases such as Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, we must confront our national security policymakers regarding the danger of weapons exports. So long as weapons exports reap hefty profits for the associated corporate interests, the economic perspective will be a powerful enemy to the adoption of truly moral policies at the international level. But skepticism among the populace with regard to their generous funding (*via* federal taxation) of weapons production, many of which end up in the hands of potential enemies (bear in mind that half of all weapons exported are made in the United States), will increase in direct proportion as ignorance diminishes.

Democracy is founded upon open dialogue and dissent. Ideas that survive in a democratic society do so because they make sense to the people. At any given point in time, some of the practices and policies of any government comprising fallible human

beings will be wrong. But it is one of the crowning virtues of democracy that no policy is etched in stone for eternity. The United States and many other nations used to condone racial and sexual discrimination, and even slavery. These practices contradict the basic principle “treat equals equally,” given that race and gender are not morally relevant properties, and after many, many years of dissent by those who recognized the injustice of racist and sexist practices, our laws have changed. This was not easy, and many lives were lost in the fight for civil rights, but in the end reason prevailed, and while racists and sexists persist, their views are no longer codified as law in modern democracies.

Built directly into democratic systems are mechanisms which conspire to perpetuate democracy, though a society may endure less democratic periods as a result of the actual values and practices of those elected (or appointed) solely upon the basis of the images that they have conveyed. The leaders of democratic societies are accountable to their constituents, for what power they have has been conferred upon them *by the people* to be used *in the people’s best interests*. If a government in power is unwilling to act as a member of the international community (treating the other members with the respect and consideration that it expects itself to be accorded by them), even after having been shown the tangible strategic benefits of doing so, then the citizens of that nation must strive to instate new leaders, whose use of the idiom of morality is not merely rhetorical.

Notes

¹ I discuss this problem in: “Regarding War Realism,” *International Journal on World Peace*, vol. XVIII, no. 4, 2001, pp. 37-61.

² I analyze this event in: “The Strange Case of Summary Execution by Predator Drone,” *Peace Review*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2003, 209-214.

³ Douglas Noble, “Mental Materiel: The Militarization of Learning and Intelligence in US Education” in Les Levidow Kevin Robins (eds.), *Cyborg Worlds: the Military Information Society* (London: Free Association Books, 1989), p. 35.

⁴ See Richard Shelly Hartigan, *The Forgotten Victim: A History of the Civilian*, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1982).

⁵ *Charter of the United Nations*. 1945. Available online at <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>>.

⁶ Preamble, *ibid*.

⁷ Micah L. Sifray and Christopher Cerf (eds.), *The Gulf War Reader*, (New York:

Random House, 1991), p. 229.

⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSSUSA)*, September 2002, p. 6. Available online at <<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat.htm>>.

⁹ Some would object here that Israel has violated international law “with impunity”, so perhaps it would be more accurate to say that a country may violate international law “with impunity,” only so long as it is supported by the United States. I thank Jim Whitman for asking me to refine this point.

¹⁰ See G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, no. 5, 2002, pp. 44-60.

¹¹ “800 missiles to hit Iraq in first 48 hours,” by Andrew West, January 26, 2003, *The Sun-Herald*. Available online at <<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/01/25/1042911596206.html>>.

¹² See my “An Anatomy of Fanaticism,” *Peace Review*, 2004, forthcoming.

¹³ For example, in February 1991, the U.S. Military bombed a large neighborhood shelter in Baghdad’s Amiriya district, which is said to have killed more than 400 people, mostly women and children. See <http://www.iraqfoundation.org/news/2003/cmar/5_baghdad.html>.

¹⁴ An analogous problem arises with regard to capital punishment, but the problem is far worse in war, for the people who die in wars are nearly never the leaders whose policies have generated the conflict. Soldiers obliged to fight and civilians bearing no responsibility for the crimes of their government are killed instead. In contrast, at least some convicted capital criminals have actually committed murders and so can be morally distinguished from the people whom they have killed. This distinction is effaced in war, where the people who die are innocent non-combatant civilians and conscripted or economically coerced soldiers, arguably equally innocent in virtue of the procedure through which they became soldiers.

¹⁵ See Stanko Cerovic, *Dans les griffes des humanistes*, trad. Mireille Robin (Paris: Éditions Climats, 2001).

¹⁶ See Gilbert Harman, *Change in View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).

¹⁷ See Robert Higgs (ed.) *Arms, Politics, and the Economy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990).

¹⁸ I discuss some of these in “Preemption and Paradox,” *Global Change, Peace & Security*, vol. 17, no. 3, 2004 (forthcoming).

¹⁹ The double standards applied to U.S. nationals and non-nationals are most obvious in cases such as the summary execution of terrorist suspects in Yemen on November 4, 2002, but also through the detainment of suspects without legal representation in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. This chauvinism is further illustrated by the U.S. Administration’s divergent responses to the cases of Timothy McVeigh and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. No one proposed that the proper response to McVeigh’s crime would be to bomb his hometown.

²⁰ *NSSUSA*, p. 31.

²¹ One might suggest here, for that matter, that we should also stop training our own people to kill, for they, too, may one day turn against us, as did Timothy McVeigh (a decorated veteran of the 1991 Gulf War), John Allen Muhammad (“the Washington sniper” and also a Gulf War veteran), and others. In the aftermath of September 11th, now more than ever, we have become acutely aware that individuals can wreak havoc

even through the creative use of non-weapons. How much easier is it for people trained to kill to wreak havoc by deploying deadly weapons designed expressly for the purpose of killing?

²² China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan issued the following response to Bush's delineation of an "axis of evil": "We always advocate the principle of equality of all countries when dealing with state-to-state relations, otherwise it can only undermine the atmosphere for seeking resolution and harm the maintenance of world peace and stability." (*China Daily*, February 1, 2002; online at <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Feb/26297.htm>>).

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Chapter 14

Implementing Human Security: Possibilities and Limits

Jim Whitman

1. Introduction: Contexts

What would count as policy for any government which believed - as many sensibly do - that they are likely to be confronted by situations of considerable and deeply impacted human insecurity in other states which oblige them to act? Conceiving policy for such contingencies is politically awkward because states are understandably reluctant to pre-commit themselves to action which can be - and often is - politically contentious, fraught with military and financial risk, and difficult to contain in terms of cost or duration, or both. That said, states have a variety of motives for participating in peace-building activities, ranging from a concern with regional security to adopting or maintaining their standing in international institutions, or the international system more generally.

It is important to bear in mind that when we discuss human security within a peace-building framework, we are already at one remove from the structures and mechanisms that shape the lot of the largest number of the world's poor - the millions of malnourished, sick and inadequately housed and clothed who are not caught up in violent conflict and its aftermath (at least of the sort or to the degree that is likely to capture international attention.) Peace-building initiatives are undertaken within a bounded territory in order to enhance the human security of its population - that is, to remove the sources of fear and gross deprivation and to ensure at least the conditions if not the means for the establishment and continuance of positive peace. This is laudable, but dwarfed by the larger sphere of human insecurity, so it is worth pondering how

much we can accomplish by means of peace-building: how much of the security of humanity we can achieve by attending to war-torn societies. This is important in a policy-making context, because it confronts the matter of scarce or at least limited resources with prioritising action between sites of human suffering that in *human* terms differ little one from another.

Consider this stark if unsurprising (and not unfeeling) characterisation by Umberto Eco:

In the era of globalisation, global peace becomes impossible. So there remains just one possibility for peace: working for peace on a case-by-case basis, creating each time a possible peaceful solution in the context of wars that follow one another. Peace on a local basis can be achieved if, when combatants are wearied, a negotiating agency puts itself forward as a mediator and produces a ceasefire. A continuous series of these 'small peaces' can, in the long term, act as a sort of drain washing away the tension produced by permanent war...a small peace is like the act of a doctor who cures a wound: not a promise of immortality, but at least a way to postpone death.

At first glance, this might seem like a sensible orientation of humane decency - the adoption of a realistic perspective and a steeling of nerve for the endless struggle of hope against hope. But are we to accept the assertion that in a globalised and globalising world, peace - and presumably, by extension, human security - is impossible? That we can alleviate suffering here and there, in certain places and in some sectors (such as food relief and emergency medicine) but that we are powerless to alter the conditions that create, shape and sustain human insecurity? That we are helpless before the sheer momentum of globalisation and must gird ourselves to pick up the pieces, as and when we, its beneficiaries, are able? Surely Umberto Eco does have a point when we consider the structural constraints on morally significant action even at the highest level.

The assertion of historical inevitability or of nascent world order as ineluctable fate can be darkly attractive - not least because our moral engagement with the world we have made for ourselves can be restricted to instrumental responses to human suffering.

So while the deep appeal of humanitarianism, especially in war-torn areas, is not difficult to appreciate, nor is the concomitant assertion that emergency humanitarianism has been used as a substitute for political engagement with the world's most beleaguered peoples. If we accept that the "context" for violent conflicts is "wars that follow one another" and not globalisation - or indeed, other socio-political, economic and environmental dynamics that both amplify and are in turn affected by globalisation - then the best we can accomplish in terms of human security is confined to emergency and remedial action. Seen in this way, Eco's wound-binding metaphor is quite apt; and so too is Sadako Ogata's observation that there are "no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems."

This is not to denigrate the alleviation of distress locally, or on a small scale; rather, it is to stress the importance of assessing the worth of our actions in context - and here, that means the sources of human insecurity in "peaceful" as well as post-conflict environments. Recall that in November 1974 at an emergency World Food Conference in Rome, then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger promised that "within a decade no child will go to bed hungry."¹ Twenty-two years later, the UN World Food Summit declared the aim of reducing the number of malnourished human beings from 800 million to 400 million by the year 2015. "This goal is, just for its modesty, a shame," Cuban President Fidel Castro told the Summit.² The shame applies not merely to the paucity of the vision, but also because of what our imaginative and practical capacities could accomplish were the end deemed to be sufficiently important. After all, even in the midst of the Cold War, the developed world conceived the project of eliminating smallpox, one of the great killer diseases of children. The necessary political courage, funding and logistical hurdles were formidable, but by 1979, the struggle was concluded successfully. Now, only a generation later, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, malaria and TB, established in 2001 with a target of raising US\$10 billion a year, has already run out of funds, having secured only a fraction of the sums required from wealthy donor countries.³ (Beside this, the cost of maintaining the US military alone is US\$ 1 billion per day.)

Returning to Umberto Eco, if the practical possibilities open to peace-building are "on a case-by-case" basis, they are dispiritingly small. The pity of this is not only because of the number and severity of unaddressed violent conflicts, but because

observable and preventable human insecurity, prior to and outside of war zones, is abundant. The point here is not only about double standards and hypocrisy, but about interests. Those states sufficiently wealthy and powerful to act in third party peace-building roles do so on the basis of their interests. This does not preclude genuine humanitarian concern in specific cases, but states are not altruistic; indeed, it takes a great deal of concerted political and economic activity to sustain a grossly inequitable world to the benefit of the wealthy minority.

And interests not only have negative expression - that is, states' refusal to engage in a current or post conflict situation because the costs and/or risks are perceived as being too high. Interests also shape bilateral aid - a fact which is unsurprising, but which nevertheless places national responses to human desperation within a nexus of other, often non-humanitarian concerns. Not all of these concerns are strictly self-interested, as is certainly the case of donors insisting that recipient states satisfy minimal criteria of good governance. However, the authors of a World Bank study found that national interests are still powerfully operative, even within these policy criteria:

...[P]olicy selectivity is a new phenomenon: in the 1984-89 period, aid overall was allocated indiscriminately without any consideration to the quality of governance, whereas 10 years later there was a clear relationship between aid disbursements and institutions. This increasing selectivity of aid is good news for aid effectiveness. The bad news is that...[s]ome donors that are largest in absolute size, such as France and the United States, are not particularly selective. Japan comes in high on the policy selectivity index but far down on the poverty selectivity index, reflecting its pattern of giving large amounts of aid in Asia to countries that are well governed but in many cases not poor.⁴

What these and similar examples exhibit is that policy has many levels; and that governmental humanitarianism extended to conflict-ridden countries and beyond is not free-standing from other national concerns which routinely have a much higher priority. Policy in this field will therefore be limited to general principles, subject to the larger, strategic concerns which comprise perceptions of the national interest. So it is that the

geography of human suffering, rather than its nature and extent, will be a more reliable determinant of states' willingness to initiate or participate in peace-building.

This is a sobering background against which to consider the worth of the "human security" concept, particularly from the perspective of government policy. Nevertheless, the following sections will argue that by adopting and furthering human security as an international norm, states can open up maneuvering room for themselves between pragmatism and idealism; that the gap opening up between emergency and post-conflict humanitarianism on the one hand and the more preventive and developmental aspects of human security on the other can be narrowed; and that there are opportunities here for international leadership and enhanced international standing.

2. The importance of norms

While it is not difficult to demonstrate that states are not structured or oriented to display altruism, those states with the capacity to alleviate human suffering and/or to assist development do so not merely on an *ad hoc* basis, but as part of their normal functioning. This is the meaning of overseas development budgets and emergency funds. It is well appreciated that a great deal of foreign aid is "tied"⁵ and recipient selection is not generally made solely on the basis of quantifiable need. Nevertheless, the establishment of foreign aid as a normal function of the governments of developed countries is a particularly striking example of the power of norms in the international system.⁶ That is, although national efforts to further human security abroad are very often self-interested to some degree, part of that self-interest entails meeting the expectation of other, similarly developed states. In turn, governments are also responsive to the expectations of their electorates – and human solidarity, although not limitless, is easily and routinely engaged by media-assisted awareness of suffering in other nations. As a result, at least occasionally, governments find themselves under normative pressure, arising both from within the state and between states.

One can see this clearly in the growth of human rights as a norm. From its declaratory beginnings in 1948, the idea and ideal of human rights has become rooted in the expectations of individuals - in respect of their governments; and in states themselves - in respect of the disposition and behaviour of other states. This is quite a

remarkable development to have taken place within the span of a single lifetime, all the more since few people (let alone states) could have anticipated its rapid growth as a norm and subsequent codification in law, both domestically and internationally. While it is true that human rights as a norm has not prevented instances of genocide, nor prevented some states from grossly abusing the human rights of their citizens, it would be all too easy to write off human rights as a fine ideal with little practical force. After all, in the year that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed, the UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium were still colonial powers. But colonialism and many of the worst elements of force-based power and oppression that have marked human history are now anathema. Such behaviours are not the prerogative of the powerful, but are deemed by peoples and states alike to be violations of a universally accepted norm. The ideal of human rights continues to animate struggles for political freedom, as does the strength of the norm, as codified in law and routinely upheld in other states.⁷ Apartheid in South Africa was not sustainable in such a world; and this is the hope for those struggling for human rights and representative democracy in present-day Myanmar.

Although the human rights norm is inconsistently and unevenly applied and lacks enforcement provisions, its power to shape or constrain state behaviours both within their borders and beyond them is considerable. Indeed, because human rights are a matter of lived expectation for free and unfree peoples alike, the idea of human rights can be seen as an implicit challenge to sovereignty, setting limits on the exercise of sovereign power.

What is easy to overlook in this is the extent to which the norm of human rights has extended beyond negative human rights (“freedom from”) to a more generalised recognition that poverty and other forms of precarious living conditions are not merely regrettable, but are a moral and practical challenge that prosperous states cannot shirk. Of course, for reasons outlined above, states are very reluctant to adopt “second generation” or “positive” human rights⁸ in a programmatic fashion, but that has not kept the impulse to humane decency and humanitarian impulse within already-established confines. This trend is greatly reinforced by the proliferation of active, well-informed and media-savvy NGOs, operating at both domestic and international levels. What results is not only that states sometimes find themselves on the defensive for their

actions and omissions where preventable human suffering is concerned. In addition, the normative climate opens up possibilities for creative leadership – with considerable credit accruing to those who do so.

Canada's leadership of the campaign to ban landmines is a case in point. Against the prevailing tide of reasonable expectation and at first only working with NGOs and other civil society groups, the Canadian government recognised not only the human worth of the goal, but also the opportunity this presented for positive leadership, rooted in but extending beyond human rights. Through diplomacy both unconventional and tough-minded (particularly with respect to US opposition to the proposed ban), Canada secured the signatures of 123 countries to the Ottawa Treaty in little more than a year.⁹ Further reinforced by its decades-long participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions, Canada continues to build on its internationalist reputation in ways which at times seem to blur the distinction between international service and self-interest. Most recently (as detailed in Juergen Dedring's chapter in this volume) Canada championed the human security concept – again, with a combination of idealism and pragmatism – and persistence.

These examples cannot be sidelined as merely demonstrating middle power internationalism at work. They are certainly that, but since multilateral organizations and other forums shape the contours of international agendas, all nations have much to gain in raising their profile by creating or supporting norms that capture the spirit of the time or by taking a lead in their implementation. This certainly applies to Japan, which has already given public, albeit tentative, support to the concept of human security. It is to that concept that we now turn.

3. The Commission on Human Security

Entrenched human suffering and quite visible structural inequalities are hardly a novel feature of our world: they are the background to and impetus behind the establishment of the Commission on Human Security. Yet its report, *Human Security Now*¹⁰ succinctly articulates and reinforces perspectives that have been extant for decades.¹¹ The perspectives and prescriptions contained in the Report are so morally compelling and so widely and routinely voiced that it becomes tempting to suppose that the wealthy and

secure have experienced the counterpart to “donor fatigue” in respect of awful and extensive human insecurity - a kind of moral habituation. Is this the discomfiting but inescapable meaning of the World Food Summit story (above) and others of its kind? What is one to make of the worthwhile but nevertheless generalised injunctions contained in the Report?

This is not to question the considerable merit in the stance adopted: “By placing people at the centre, the human security approach calls for enhancing and redirecting policies and institutions.” However, as with most such high-level reports, *Human Security Now* is quite ambivalent about the role of the state; unspecific about the deeply embedded sources of human insecurity and debilitating inequality; and - partly as a consequence of these two - largely admonitory in respect of the way forward. So although the aspirations are clearly set out, there remain the dishearteningly familiar injunctions that organizations of political community of every size and disposition “ought” “should” and “must” expand, empower, encourage and advance the various goals of human security.

To whom or to what are these laudable injunctions addressed? If what is at the heart of re-orienting the world’s priorities is “enhancing and redirecting policies and institutions,” can we then assume that the fault lies with what is generally characterised as ‘lack of political will’ - and specifically (though not entirely) with states? There appears to be a considerable gap between the admonitory aspects of the Report and the disposition of those agents most powerfully placed to undertake them - stable and prosperous states.

Where the state is either wholly corrupted or predatory, the *Report* is on firmer ground. At the outset, it notes that

The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security obligations - and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people - to human security.¹²

But in such a context, whose attention must now shift? We might well say that the passage above is an accurate description of present-day Zimbabwe, where the human

security responsibilities of the state have been subsumed to regime preservation. But does the World Food Programme's distribution of emergency food aid to some 45% of the country's population¹³ amount to a shift in international perception - or instead, a stop-gap response to a looming human catastrophe with grave regional implications? Since the likelihood is that emergency provision of this kind will remain a necessity for the time that the current regime continues, *can* donor states' attention - and their policy priorities in respect of human security - easily separate state viability and human security? The reluctance of the international community to engage Zimbabwe beyond large-scale humanitarian relief owes nothing to privileging the security of the state of Zimbabwe over the security of its peoples, but is because serious difficulties and dilemmas would have to be faced in order to act forcefully and to good effect. (The political failure and political costs of the 11-year sanctions regime against Iraq is instructive here.)

The Zimbabwe case exposes two difficulties for states as they confront the revitalisation of the idea of human security - and how much public emphasis they should give the concept in formulating policy orientation. Both run the risk of exposing governments to an expectation that they fulfil a general commitment in specific and sometimes, quite difficult or risky instances. The first is that some high-profile emergencies are well outside the national and regional interests of the state and if there is a high element of risk or cost, the likelihood of a direct, concerted response is unlikely. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is only the worst of a number of cases: the current emergency in Sudan appears to differ little from Rwanda in this respect. The second, partly an outcome of limited resources, is choosing between emergency humanitarianism and longer-term developmental and/or preventive initiatives to enhance human security, since the human security concept is inclusive to a degree that the development aid and emergency budgets of nations cannot accommodate.

In addition, an important aspect of the perspective adopted in *Human Security Now* is that not everything that nominally comes under the "peace-building" and "democratization" rubrics is motivated by humanitarian concerns - hence the invasion of Iraq (Coalition protestations about the desire to bring human rights and democracy to the Iraqi people notwithstanding); and US efforts to overthrow Cuba's Castro regime: USAID has a budget of "US\$7 million for Cuba, aimed at peaceful transition to

democracy characterised by open markets and strong support for human rights.”¹⁴ Perhaps in the same way that the idea and ideal of human rights is an implicit challenge to sovereignty, “human security” is an implicit challenge to exclusive conceptions of state interests.

Why then should any state champion the concept of human security? Governments might accept that there is much to be gained by assuming a leadership role in an area of activity which is both attractive in itself and enhances their international standing, but is a public commitment to human security a hostage to fortune? Would it not be less politically risky to adopt a more charitable and programmatic basis for foreign aid and emergency assistance?

The first response to these kinds of concerns is to note that in abstract terms, the dangers are easy to exaggerate. Consider that all developed states now espouse the fundamental importance of human rights, both in principle and in practical terms. The same is now true of democracy and democratization. Yet governments’ open, public support of both norms is well understood to entail a degree of self interest as well as genuine concern for the plight of others - and one can see this in the regional character of at least some of the aid devoted to these ends. But inconsistencies and omissions are also very much part of this history - some more contentious than others, of course, but there is not a sense in which either publics or other states expect their governments always to act in defence of the norms they espouse. And norms - at least of the sort as deep and far reaching as human rights and human security - are remarkably resilient in the face of recalcitrance, slow progress, omissions and practical failures. Even the recurrence of genocide has not diminished the norm of human rights - if anything, quite the opposite.

For the same reason, an avowed concern with human security will not pre-commit a government to action in specific cases: guiding principles and policy orientation is not the same as policy, which is always a matter of balancing a nation’s many contending needs and aspirations. The United States might feel free to castigate North Korea on any number of matters pertinent to human security; and although Japan is similarly disposed in normative terms, its circumstances and politico-diplomatic culture require it to develop its own, much less confrontational relations with that country - to the surprise of no one, nor to the detriment of the human security norm. Although states can be

strategic about how and when they espouse norms (in the same way that they act in other areas of foreign policy), that leaves open the question of whether a persistent failure to honour a norm that has been evinced will be worse than never having embraced it in the first place. This too seems exaggerated, since Japan's considerable overseas aid budget and substantial record of achievement cannot so easily be sidelined.

On a more practical note, it could be argued that the largest benefit that accrues to Japan from its work to improve human security is bilateral - opening up trade and diplomatic links with recipient states that will benefit the country's regional security or its economy. Could this not be conducted on a strictly programmatic basis, without the possibly risky and restrictive public avowal of human security as an important priority? I will argue below that to adopt such a position would be to overlook the opportunities that an explicit normative bearing have to offer. And since Japan actually funded the work of the Commission on Human Security - itself an act which profiles Japan and the way it is viewed in the world well beyond the boundaries of the work of the Commission - it is worth now examining the opportunities and limitations involved in maintaining and strengthening a more forthright commitment to the ideal of human security.

4. Limitations

If a certain wariness attends the assertion that finding appropriate and acceptable ways of furthering the human security norm could pay considerable dividends, it is because peace-building initiatives - essentially, addressing what are often the worst and most difficult forms of human insecurity - make the strongest claims on our willingness to help distant populations. The fear is that by raising the standing of human security at the level of government policy, commitments to quite deep and impacted human tragedies will become open-ended, either in terms of time or resources. Japan is no exception to the rule that states prefer to adopt pragmatic approaches to implementing human security in post-conflict situations. Whether these are situations that sometimes cannot be avoided because they have an effect on other aspects of the national interest, or are part of a more internationalised undertaking (Afghanistan; post-war Iraq), nations have good reason for wanting to adopt a very programmatic, targeted and delimited approach.

Conflicts and emergencies that galvanise the world's attention during their violent period are often of a much lower profile once peace-building activities begin - particularly if an important source of insecurity or instability is thereby "contained"; and the more mundane business of infrastructural repair, and social, legal and political rehabilitation differ little from one donor country to the next, especially where many states are involved. For a country of Japan's standing, the general norm of responsiveness to human insecurity is part of the background of OECD-level foreign policy disposition. This does not require a forthright renewal of the human security norm, however much programme directors and officers are aware that a strongly-voiced norm would give them some position in the inevitably tough battles for their share of national budget allocation.

Human Security Now is quite blunt about the peace-building prospect: the cessation of violent conflict carries with it a 50% chance that it will re-erupt - a chance that is even higher where the control of natural resources is at issue. And some 60 countries are currently engaged in or have only recently emerged from violent conflict, among them the poorest. (This is in addition to human insecurity of various kinds, unconnected to violent conflict.) At the state level, any serious commitment to human security in the broadest sense will entail a close consideration of how best to allocate resources dwarfed by dire human need. Re-investing in our established international organizations - and particularly the United Nations and its agencies, funds and programmes is perhaps the most obvious and efficacious way of doing so. To their long experience, disinterested standing and world-wide reach, one might also add that they are also able to deal with both the emergency and developmental aspects of human security. The UN funds and programmes rely on only ten countries for as much as 90 per cent of their funds; and UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR - in the front line of dealing with the world's worst human insecurity, both in emergency and non-emergency contexts - must rely for funding on voluntary contributions and not assessed contributions. Of course, voluntary funding confers on states a degree of political control for various purposes, but it also has the effect of exacerbating need to the point of emergency: in 1998 alone, emergency allocations absorbed 66 per cent of the World Food Programme's operating budget. WFP's current and projected shortfalls for 2004 make grim reading.¹⁵

In large-scale, life-and-death situations, remedial action by developed states, whether direct or indirect, is a crowded field and (rightly) regarded as evidence of humane decency; while on the ground, credit will accrue to the direct actors rather than the funders; and more routine peace-building rarely attracts the kind of recognition it deserves.

One of the difficulties that Japan faces in raising its profile and evincing leadership in multilateral efforts to end conflict and restore peace around the world is the sensitive matter of dispatching Japanese troops outside the country; and there is a greater sensitivity to civilian casualties arising from such commitments than in many other countries who routinely participate. And although financial support for various emergencies doubtless has some diplomatic advantages, there is little evidence to suggest that its benefit is other than short-lived. There is therefore a good case for regarding Japan's financial and material support for various peace-building efforts as necessary but partial, at least as far as the potential politico-diplomatic benefits are concerned.

Given that states will want to delimit their commitment to peace-building initiatives- at least as far as high-stakes political risk is concerned, particularly the lives of soldiers - one fruitful area for policy development is in restoring institutions devastated by violent conflict. Such work is less politically exposed and less costly and therefore open to longer-term commitments. We have come a long way since the once-radical proposals for "justice packages" to be part of peacekeeping initiatives to a more detailed concern with how to restore justice in post-conflict societies. This too is not without a multitude of conceptual and practical problems¹⁶ but with claims on justice commonly a crucial aspect of a fragile peace, states can devote finance and expertise to what might seem to be narrow or rather mundane matters - for example, restoring a prison system, training lawyers or refurbishing courts and the wider legal profession - but which matter a great deal on the ground. In the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, almost nothing remained of the legal system: trained personnel had been killed or fled; and the entire legal infrastructure had been looted or destroyed.

However, in this as in other sector-specific activities, the projects are unlikely to be open to the kind of inspired leadership under discussion here. Progress is often slow or halting; the conditions (and chances of even limited success) vary considerably from

one site to another; and positive advancements are all too easily subsumed under a larger mission or agency umbrella. So a larger, less tactical, more strategic endeavour suggests itself - the most obvious being democratization, which since the end of the Cold War is regarded by some as a normative expectation in its own right.

Whether and how to initiate democratization is perhaps the most difficult problem facing states engaged in peace-building. The record on democratization by force is mixed, at best¹⁷ - and Iraq in 2004, for all that it might be anomalous, is unlikely to encourage any uncertain parties. We need to think of democratization in less goal-oriented ways, because we cannot resolve a tensioned relationship between human security as a feature of material needs; and human security as a feature of mediated power relations in the abstract. There are and will be cases when the need to resolve violent conflict requires the re-consolidation of federal power (as when this is desired both by a rebel group and the government they have opposed), but there will be others that are less clear-cut - and indeed, where a first-past-the-post electoral race reignites the worst forms of mistrust and competition between antagonistic groups. (Jonas Savimbi's repudiation of the election in Angola and his return to war is a case in point.¹⁸) And it is by no means clear that the essentially clan-based population of Somalia is at all prepared or willing to accept a centralised government.

One of the difficulties that attend "free and fair elections" is that it signals an end to full-scale commitment: they are the exit point for peace-builders, at least in respect of high levels of risk and cost.¹⁹ But whatever the difficulties of organising an election in a post-conflict country - and they were very considerable leading up to Cambodia's first-ever democratic election in 1993 - a democratic culture cannot be conjured up in a matter of a few short years from the ashes of conflict, or from a culture alien to its principles. Less than five years after the highly successful elections in Cambodia, the country suffered a military coup.

Nurturing a post-conflict country back to democratic norms is likely to be a slow process, requiring a good deal of third party support and mediated negotiation.²⁰ It is a pity that the long and carefully-prepared transition process organised by the United Nations for Namibia has largely been overlooked.²¹ The rush to democracy - and to free elections in particular - should therefore be reconsidered, or at least, considered carefully in every case. The virtues of democracy are inclusiveness and the non-violent

resolution of disagreements, but these are the fruits of a stable political culture which the establishment of a formal democracy cannot establish on its own. There will be places where democracy will best be regarded by all concerned as the outcome or peace-building, rather than as one of its means.

So although a good many states - Japan included - support the democratizing norm both in principle and in practical terms, the practical difficulties, costs and timelines in individual cases mean that commitments in this field will be weighed no less carefully than in other areas of peace-building. This is visible in Japan's own Partnership for Democratic Development for FY 1998.²²

If states are appropriately cautious about foreign commitment, particularly in view of the increasing demands being made upon them; and if the programmes that are sanctioned and completed are more prudently undertaken on the basis of a traditional foreign policy interests calculus, what scope is there for enhanced international standing and active leadership with regard to the human security norm?

5. Possibilities

This brings us to a central problem that has beset development assistance since the surge in intra-state warfare in the 1990s - the difficulty of keeping development and emergency assistance budgets separate - and sufficient to cope. The term 'peace-building,' though it pertains to post-conflict activity, nevertheless frequently entails both - hence efforts both conceptual and practical to establish a 'relief to development' continuum.²³

The problem for all states committed to overseas development assistance and/or to emergency relief is how in the present circumstances to attend to the worst outcomes of politically-driven suffering without depleting the limited amounts of money, material, expertise and time from preventive and developmental work - in other words, promoting human security instead of addressing human insecurity; or to return to our earlier metaphor, promoting healthy living instead of binding wounds. This is morally challenging, and practically difficult; and within the context of human security, it seems especially vexed. If a state wants to champion human security it cannot eschew peace-building activities, yet it must limit these without undermining its proclaimed

normative stance. However, it must be borne in mind that the practical limits of engagement are visible for the entire international community; and though it takes a certain political courage, it is open to states to try to temper its commitment to fire-fighting by devoting some of its resources to fire-revention.

It is of particular note that although *Human Security Now* devotes an entire chapter to “recovering from violent conflict,” the largest part of the report is forward-looking: preventive and developmental. The most direct means of enhancing human security as a norm is to deal directly with human insecurity in non-emergency contexts as well as the peace-building initiatives that individual states regard as politically urgent. In an article written in 2003, it is noteworthy that one of the authors of *Human Security Now*, Sadako Ogata, places a great deal of emphasis on primary, poverty elimination goals, including basic literacy, health care and access to land and credit. In addition, she also notes matters of “high” politics including export barriers and the extent to which the current intellectual property rights regime poses a threat to the health security of millions.²⁴

There are many aspects of human insecurity that will only be undertaken as a result of inspired leadership. This was recognised at the outset of the campaign to eliminate smallpox. Although the work was driven by the Centres for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States, CDC wisely decided (not least given the Cold War context) to let the World Health Organization take the nominal lead - so that other states would find the campaign entirely unobjectionable.²⁵ Canada’s diplomacy around the human security theme is no less creative and hard-headed. In our own time, the provision of clean water and remarkably cheap medicines would be utterly transformative in some regions. These matters are not a matter of sophisticated technology or vast expense; nor are they controversial. A nation truly committed to addressing one of the more obvious and tractable sources of human suffering, garnering support under the human security concept, might prove difficult to resist. Compare this with a matter as politically charged and militarily sensitive as banning landmines and the possibilities seem obvious. A sector-specific initiative of this sort - one with obvious public appeal, without the risks entailed in some forms of peace-building and carefully chosen to deliver visibly improved conditions or prospects in an early phase would create a “virtuous circle”: humanitarian accomplishment; a further strengthening of the norm; and great credit accruing to the nation or group of nations with the courage and vision to set it in place.

It is puzzling that Japan is not a member of the Human Security Network,²⁶ which could provide a ready-made platform for such an initiative, facilitating the diplomatic and lobbying work and giving any activity weight and momentum from the outset.

Emergency humanitarianism and post-conflict peace-building is not trifling in any respect, but it scarcely evinces a genuine commitment to human security as outlined in *Human Security Now*, even though there is no shortage of important, if low-profile work to accomplish. But this work, important as it is, need not detract us from a proactive approach to human security; peace-building need not be curtailed in order to subsidise a positive initiative; and lastly, one or more states could galvanise support both high and low – accomplishing something for its own standing in the international community as well as for the many thousands who look to us for support.

6. Conclusion

Human security will always stand in a tensioned relationship with the national interest as it is conceived and enacted by governments and, in all probability, by citizens, too - at least in some respects and to some degree. It is also likely that globalizing forces will add further stress to international relationships, surely implicit in the political contention surrounding the idea of sustainable development. States can reasonably be expected to maintain their economic, cultural and regional interests - sometimes, as can be seen in the case of bilateral aid, against the pull of more compelling human need elsewhere. And as emphasised above, policy in relation to emergency or post-conflict peace-building - with its possible entanglements and open-ended commitments - will largely be confined to conditional willingness, or general principles.

The scope of likely political engagement in post-conflict peace-building is likely to remain limited in almost every important respect: the criteria employed; the resources available; and the willingness to commit over lengthy and /or unspecified periods of time, except where close interests are at hand (such as the stabilization of the former Yugoslavia.) Policy initiatives and reforms within state machinery are therefore going to be incremental, or at least delimited by these more important political considerations. On its own, therefore, the Report of the Commission on Human Security is not going to have a radical impact on peace-building. But the Report can be seen as an outgrowth

rather than the instigator of normative change throughout the developed world; and we might yet entertain the hope that human security will take its place beside human rights as lived expectation within states – and eventually, between them. The best way of ensuring this is to make improving human security the equal of addressing gross human insecurity. Japan has the resources, the international standing and the public policy machinery to take the lead in this – with minimal risk. A combination of humanitarian ideals and pragmatic self-interest awaits creative spark and energetic leadership.

Notes

¹ Bruce Stokes, “Here’s Food for Thought: Fears of Famine have faded, but we’re Never More Than One or Two Bad Harvests Away from Crisis,” *The National Journal* (Section: Economics), vol. 31, no. 37, p. 2570 (Saturday, September 11, 1999).

² “According to estimates by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the number of chronically hungry people increased by nearly 60 million in 26 countries in the last decade.” WFP Press release, “WFP Chief in Brazil for talks with President Lula on rising global hunger,” 20 May 2004.

³ Sarah Boseley, “UN AIDS fund runs out of money,” *The Guardian*, 1 February, 2003.

⁴ David Dollar and Victoria Levin, “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-2002,” World Bank Research Working Paper 3299, May, 2004, <http://econ.worldbank.org/files/35475_wps3299.pdf>. Note that according to the latest figures, Japan’s overseas aid budget for basic education, basic health *and* water and sanitation was less than 6 per cent of the total. See *The Reality of Aid 2004* (London: Earthscan, 2004), p.254.

⁵ “In the face of rising criticism of the commercial nature of its aid, the [Japanese] Government made major efforts and accomplished 100% untying of its loan aid in FY 1996. But erosion started the year after, as uncompetitive Japanese firms lost ground and started complaining vociferously. The decision was reversed and the untied portion of the loan aid kept slipping down – hitting the level of 60% in FY 2001.” *Ibid*, p. 255.

⁶ For a detailed consideration of this, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4, Autumn, 1998, pp. 887-917.

⁷ For an interesting study of how recalcitrant states are brought into the human rights regime by a combination of internal and external pressures (including normative pressure), see Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁸ See D. Beetham, “What Future for Economic and Social Rights?” *Political Studies*, Special Issue, 1995; Mario Gormez, “Social Economic Rights and Human Rights Commissions,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 17, 1995.

⁹ Julian Davis, “The Campaign to Ban Landmines: Public Diplomacy, Middle Power Leadership and an Unconventional Negotiating Process,” *Journal of Humanitarian*

Assistance, <<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a134.htm>>.

¹⁰ Report of the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York, 2003), available at <<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html>>.

¹¹ Notable works of this kind include: Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security, *Common Security: Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); The World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); *North-South: A Program for Survival* (The Brandt Report) (Boston: MIT Press, 1990); The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Report of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, *Winning the Human Race?* (London: Zed Books, 1998). See also the 1994 *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 1994).

¹² *Human Security Now*, p.2.

¹³ See <http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=716>.

¹⁴ <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/summary_of_budget_request.pdf>, p. 14.

¹⁵ See <<http://www.wfp.org/index.asp?section=3>>.

¹⁶ Detailed in Rama Mani, *Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).

¹⁷ A worthwhile study is Karin von Hippel, *Democratization by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹⁸ For an account of which, see Margaret Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).

¹⁹ See Simon Chesterman, *You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building* (Oxford University Press, 2004), Chapter 7.

²⁰ See Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace," *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 1, Summer, 1999, pp. 127-55.

²¹ On the other hand, the UNTAC mission in Cambodia has been well studied: see for example, Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (New York: International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, 1995).

²² <<http://www.montreal.ca.emb-japan.go.jp/english/speeches/download/chart12.htm>>

²³ A useful bibliography on the literatures is available at <<http://www.certi.org/publications/liblinkreldev.htm>>.

²⁴ Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels, "Human Security - Protecting and Empowering People," *Global Governance* vol. 9, 2003, pp. 273-82.

²⁵ William Foege, "Surveillance, Eradication and Control: Successes and Failures" in Jim Whitman (ed.), *The Politics of Emerging and Resurgent Infectious Diseases* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 213-19.

²⁶ See <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/members-e.php>>.